LESSON PLAN
Author: Corey LeCompte
UNIT HEADING: _______The United States and the Vietnam War________________________
Lesson Topic/Title: __ How committed was the Kennedy administration to the war in Vietnam?
Grade Level ____9-12________
Period: ____60-90 minutes_________
Objectives: By the conclusion of the lesson, students should be able to:
 Analyze a primary source for accuracy and bias and connect it to a time and place in United
States history.
 Articulate the context of a historical event or action.
 Evaluate cause-and-result relationships bearing in mind multiple causations.
 Interpret the interests and causes that led the United States’ government into the war in
Vietnam.
Standards:
CC.8.5.9-10.A: Cite specific textual evidence to support analysis of primary and secondary sources,
attending to such features as the date and origin of the information.
CC.8.5.9-10.B: Determine the central ideas or information of a primary or secondary source; provide
an accurate summary of how key events or ideas develop over the course of the text.
CC.8.5.9-10.C: Analyze in detail a series of events described in a text; determine whether earlier
events caused later ones or simply preceded them.
CC.8.5.9-10.I: Compare and contrast treatments of the same topic in several primary and secondary
sources.
CC.8.6.9-10.G: Gather relevant information from multiple authoritative print and digital sources, using
advanced searches effectively; assess the usefulness of each source in answering the research question;
integrate information into the text selectively to maintain the flow of ideas, avoiding plagiarism and
following a standard format for citation.
Content: Domino Theory, Robert McNamara, John F. Kennedy, South Vietnam, China
Materials:
• Copies of Guiding Questions worksheet
• Copies of Documents A-C
• Copies of the photograph of Kennedy and McNamara from October 2, 1963.
• Copies of President Kennedy and the Vietnam War political cartoon worksheets
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Parts of the Lesson:
Essential Question: How committed was the Kennedy administration to the conflict in Vietnam?
Introduction:
1. Do Now: Hand out one or both political cartoons related to the Vietnam War. Provide students
time to complete the accompanying worksheet individually or in pairs. Review responses as a
class. At the end of this activity and discussion, assess student understanding and review the
following concepts:
a. Chinese Communist Revolution of 1949
b. Domino Theory
c. Geographical position of China and Vietnam in Asia
2. Today, students will explore increasing U.S. involvement in Vietnam through an historical
investigation. Students will investigate the essential question: How committed was the
Kennedy administration to the conflict in Vietnam?
Body:
During Reading (Sourcing and Context)
3. Hand out the “Guiding Questions” worksheet and “Document A: Two Interviews with
President John F. Kennedy.”
a. Model and demonstrate a close reading of Document A and answer the appropriate
questions on the “Guiding Questions” worksheet as a class.
b. Review students’ responses to questions and assess understanding.
4. Hand out “Document B: Memorandum from President Kennedy to Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara.”
a. Demonstrate another close reading or have students independently read Document B
and answer the appropriate questions on the “Guiding Questions” worksheet.
b. Review students’ responses to questions and assess understanding.
5. Hand out “Document C: Memorandum for President John F. Kennedy.”
a. Have students closely read the document independently or in small groups. Then, have
students respond to the appropriate questions on the worksheet.
6. Students should recognize that, in accordance with the Domino Theory, the Kennedy
administration was committed to protecting American interests in South Vietnam, but wanted
to remove military forces and advisors as quickly as possible.
Conclusion:
After Reading (Corroboration)
7. Ask students to evaluate and synthesize the three documents to answer the essential question:
How committed was the Kennedy administration to the conflict in Vietnam?
a. Students should write a paragraph, citing evidence, based on the three documents.
Space is provided on the back of the “Guiding Questions” worksheet.
8. Foreshadowing
a. Direct students’ attention to McNamara’s final sentence in Document C: “These
estimates necessarily assume that the political situation does not significantly impede
the effort….” This may prepare students for a future lesson on the assassinations of
South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem on November 2, 1963 and President John
F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963.
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Assessment:
 Diagnostic: Review of political cartoons and question-and-answer on background information
will provide as assessment of students’ understanding of the content.
 Formative: Whole class review of questions relating to Documents A,B, and C will provide
feedback on students’ developing understandings of the material.
 Summative: The one-paragraph summary will illustrate whether students are able to synthesize
their analysis of the three primary source documents.
President Kennedy and the Vietnam War
Examine the cartoon below and respond to the following questions.
“Dominoes,” Herbert Block, 1964
1. What people and objects are shown? · What, if any, words do you see? What do you
see that might be a symbol?
2. What is the message of this cartoon? · What do you think the cartoonist's opinion on
this issue is? Provide evidence from the cartoon to support your assertion.
President Kennedy and the Vietnam War
Examine the cartoon below and respond to the following questions.
“Backbone,” Bill Mauldin, 1964
1. What people and objects are shown? · What, if any, words do you see? What do you
see that might be a symbol?
2. What is the message of this cartoon? · What do you think the cartoonist's opinion on
this issue is? Provide evidence from the cartoon to support your assertion.
Name:________________________________________ Date: ______________________Period: _____
GUIDING QUESTIONS
Essential Question: How committed was the Kennedy administration to the war in Vietnam?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Document A: Two Interviews with Kennedy
1. (Sourcing) When did President Kennedy make these comments? What was Kennedy’s purpose
in making these comments?
2. (Context) What point does Kennedy make about China? What is the “domino theory” and how
does it relate to the situation in Vietnam?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Document B: Memorandum from Kennedy to McNamara
1. (Sourcing) When was this document written? What was Kennedy’s purpose in writing it?
2. (Context) Why does Kennedy send McNamara to make an “on-the-spot” appraisal? Has the
situation in Vietnam changed recently? For better or worse?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Document C: Robert McNamara’s Memorandum
1. (Sourcing) When was this document written? What was Robert McNamara’s purpose in
writing it?
2. (Context) How does McNamara describe the military campaign in Vietnam? According to
McNamara, who must “run the war,” the Vietnamese or the American advisors?
3. (Context) According to McNamara, for how long are U.S. military personnel committed to
Vietnam? What assumption does McNamara of the military campaign and U.S. assistance to
Vietnam?
Assessment (Corroboration)
After reading Documents A, B, and C,
create a hypothesis regarding the question:
How committed was the Kennedy administration to the conflict in Vietnam?
Cite statements from the three documents to support your answer.
Document A: Two Interviews with President John F. Kennedy
President Kennedy's NBC Interview, September 9, 1963
Mr. Huntley: "Mr. President, in respect to our difficulties in South Viet-Nam, could it be that
our Government tends occasionally to get locked into a policy or an attitude and then finds it
difficult to alter or shift that policy?"
President Kennedy: “…We are faced with the problem of wanting to protect the area against
the Communists. On the other hand, we have to deal with the Government there. That
produces a kind of ambivalence in our efforts which exposes us to some criticism. We are
using our influence to persuade the Government o there to take those steps which will win
back support. That takes some time, and we must be patient, we must persist."
Mr. Huntley: "Are we likely to reduce our aid to South Viet-Nam now?"
President Kennedy: "I don't think we think that would be helpful at this time. If you reduce
your aid, it is possible you could have some effect upon the government structure there. On
the other hand, you might have a situation which could bring about a collapse. Strongly in our
mind is what happened in the case of China at the end of World War II, where China was
lost--a weak government became increasingly unable to control events. We don't want that."
Mr. Brinkley: "Mr. President, have you had any reason to doubt this so-called 'domino
theory,' that if South Viet-Nam falls, the rest of Southeast Asia will go behind it?"
President Kennedy: "No, I believe it. I believe it. I think that the struggle is close enough.
China is so large, looms so high just beyond the frontiers, that if South Viet-Nam went, it
would not only give them an improved geographic position for a guerrilla assault on Malaya
but would also give the impression that the wave of the future in Southeast Asia was China
and the Communists. So I believe it."
_________________________________________________________________________
President Kennedy's News Conference, September 12, 1963
President Kennedy: "…We have a very simple policy in that area, I think. In some ways I
think the Vietnamese people and ourselves agree; we want the war to be won, the
Communists to be contained, and the Americans to go home. That is our policy. I am sure it
is the policy of the people of Viet-Nam. But we are not there to see a war lost, and we will
follow the policy which I have indicated today of advancing those causes and issues which
help win the war."
Source: The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 2, pp. 827-828.
Document B: Memorandum from President Kennedy to Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara on the Purposes of McNamara's Visit to South Vietnam
September 21, 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
It may be useful to put on paper our understanding of the purpose of your visit to South
Vietnam. I am asking you to go because of my desire to have the best possible on-the-spot
appraisal of the military and paramilitary effort to defeat the Viet Cong. The program
developed after General Taylor's mission and carried forward under your close supervision
has brought heartening results, at least until recently. The events in South Vietnam since May
have now raised serious questions both about the present prospects for success against the
Viet Cong and still more about the future effectiveness of this effort unless there can be
important political improvement in the country. It is in this context that I now need your
appraisal of the situation. If the prognosis in your judgment is not hopeful, I would like your
views on what action must be taken by the South Vietnamese Government and what steps
our Government should take to lead the Vietnamese to that action.
In my judgment the question of the progress of the contest in South Vietnam is of the first
importance and in executing this mission you should take as much time as is necessary for a
thorough examination both in Saigon and in the field.
John F. Kennedy
Source: The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 2, pp. 748-749.
Document C: Memorandum for President John F. Kennedy, "Report of McNamaraTaylor Mission to South Vietnam," 2 October 1963
2 October 1963: Memorandum For the President
Your memorandum of 21 September 1963 directed that General Taylor and Secretary
McNamara proceed to South Vietnam to appraise the military and para-military effort to
defeat the Viet Cong…You further directed that, if the prognosis in our judgment was not
hopeful, we should present our views of what action must be taken by the South Vietnam
Government and what steps our Government should take to lead the Vietnamese to that
action….
CONCLUSIONS
The military campaign has made great progress and continues to progress….We recommend
that…A program be established to train Vietnamese so that essential functions now
performed by U.S. military personnel can be carried out by Vietnamese by the end of 1965. It
should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by that time.
In accordance with the program to train progressively Vietnamese to take over military
functions, the Defense Department should announce in the very near future presently
prepared plans to withdraw 1000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963. This action
should be explained in low key as an initial step in a long-term program to replace U.S.
personnel with trained Vietnamese without impairment of the war effort….
The security of South Vietnam remains vital to United States security. For this reason, we
adhere to the overriding objective of denying this country to Communism and of suppressing
the Viet Cong insurgency as promptly as possible….We believe the U.S. part of the task can
be completed by the end of 1965,…
The military program in Vietnam has made progress and is sound in principle….
…This is a Vietnamese war and the country and the war must, in the end, be run solely by
the Vietnamese. It will impair their independence and the development of their initiative if we
leave our advisors in place beyond the time they are really needed…
…Acknowledging the progress achieved to date, there still remains the question of when the
final military victory can be attained. If, by victory, we mean the reduction of the insurgency to
something little more than sporadic banditry in outlying districts, it is the view of the vast
majority of military commanders consulted that success may be achieved…by the end of CY
1964. These estimates necessarily assume that the political situation does not significantly
impede the effort….
General Maxwell Taylor, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense
Source: The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 2, pp. 751-766.
Document A: Two Interviews with President John F. Kennedy
Teacher emphasis
of phrases in
BOLD and
underlined.
President Kennedy's NBC Interview, September 9, 1963
Mr. Huntley: "Mr. President, in respect to our difficulties in South Viet-Nam, could it be that
our Government tends occasionally to get locked into a policy or an attitude and then finds it
difficult to alter or shift that policy?"
President Kennedy: “…We are faced with the problem of wanting to protect the area against
the Communists. On the other hand, we have to deal with the Government there. That
produces a kind of ambivalence in our efforts which exposes us to some criticism. We are
using our influence to persuade the Government over there to take those steps which will win
back support. That takes some time, and we must be patient, we must persist."
Mr. Huntley: "Are we likely to reduce our aid to South Viet-Nam now?"
President Kennedy: "I don't think we think that would be helpful at this time. If you reduce
your aid, it is possible you could have some effect upon the government structure there. On
the other hand, you might have a situation which could bring about a collapse. Strongly in
our mind is what happened in the case of China at the end of World War II, where China
was lost--a weak government became increasingly unable to control events. We don't want
that."
Mr. Brinkley: "Mr. President, have you had any reason to doubt this so-called 'domino
theory,' that if South Viet-Nam falls, the rest of Southeast Asia will go behind it?"
President Kennedy: "No, I believe it. I believe it. I think that the struggle is close enough.
China is so large, looms so high just beyond the frontiers, that if South Viet-Nam went, it
would not only give them an improved geographic position for a guerrilla assault on Malaya
but would also give the impression that the wave of the future in Southeast Asia was China
and the Communists. So I believe it."
______________________________________________________________________
President Kennedy's News Conference, September 12, 1963
President Kennedy: "…We have a very simple policy in that area, I think. In some ways I
think the Vietnamese people and ourselves agree; we want the war to be won, the
Communists to be contained, and the Americans to go home. That is our policy. I am
sure it is the policy of the people of Viet-Nam. But we are not there to see a war lost,
and we will follow the policy which I have indicated today of advancing those causes and
issues which help win the war."
Source: The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 2, pp. 827-828.
Document B: Memorandum from President Kennedy to Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara on the Purposes of McNamara's Visit to South Vietnam
September 21, 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
It may be useful to put on paper our understanding of the purpose of your visit to South
Vietnam. I am asking you to go because of my desire to have the best possible on-thespot appraisal of the military and paramilitary effort to defeat the Viet Cong. The program
developed after General Taylor's mission and carried forward under your close supervision
has brought heartening results, at least until recently. The events in South Vietnam
since May have now raised serious questions both about the present prospects for
success against the Viet Cong and still more about the future effectiveness of this effort
unless there can be important political improvement in the country. It is in this context that I
now need your appraisal of the situation. If the prognosis in your judgment is not hopeful, I
would like your views on what action must be taken by the South Vietnamese Government
and what steps our Government should take to lead the Vietnamese to that action….
In my judgment the question of the progress of the contest in South Vietnam is of the first
importance and in executing this mission you should take as much time as is necessary for a
thorough examination both in Saigon and in the field.
John F. Kennedy
Source: The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 2, pp. 748-749.
Document C: Memorandum for President John F. Kennedy, "Report of McNamaraTaylor Mission to South Vietnam," 2 October 1963
2 October 1963: Memorandum For the President
Your memorandum of 21 September 1963 directed that General Taylor and Secretary
McNamara proceed to South Vietnam to appraise the military and para-military effort to
defeat the Viet Cong…You further directed that, if the prognosis in our judgment was not
hopeful, we should present our views of what action must be taken by the South Vietnam
Government and what steps our Government should take to lead the Vietnamese to that
action….
CONCLUSIONS
The military campaign has made great progress and continues to progress….We
recommend that…A program be established to train Vietnamese so that essential functions
now performed by U.S. military personnel can be carried out by Vietnamese by the end of
1965. It should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by that time.
In accordance with the program to train progressively Vietnamese to take over military
functions, the Defense Department should announce in the very near future presently
prepared plans to withdraw 1000 U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963. This action
should be explained in low key as an initial step in a long-term program to replace U.S.
personnel with trained Vietnamese without impairment of the war effort….
The security of South Vietnam remains vital to United States security. For this reason, we
adhere to the overriding objective of denying this country to Communism and of suppressing
the Viet Cong insurgency as promptly as possible….We believe the U.S. part of the task
can be completed by the end of 1965,…
The military program in Vietnam has made progress and is sound in principle….
…This is a Vietnamese war and the country and the war must, in the end, be run solely by
the Vietnamese. It will impair their independence and the development of their initiative if we
leave our advisors in place beyond the time they are really needed…
…Acknowledging the progress achieved to date, there still remains the question of when
the final military victory can be attained. If, by victory, we mean the reduction of the
insurgency to something little more than sporadic banditry in outlying districts, it is the view of
the vast majority of military commanders consulted that success may be achieved…by the
end of 1964. These estimates necessarily assume that the political situation does not
significantly impede the effort….
General Maxwell Taylor, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense
Source: The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 2, pp. 751-766.