Spring 1999
254 Uris Hall
Tuesdays 2:30 – 5:30
GOVERNMENT 707:
INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENCE
Christopher Way
Office: McGraw Hall B42
Office Hours: Wednesday 1:30 – 3:30
Email: crw12@cornell.edu
Phone: 255-8920
Course Description: This seminar provides an introduction to game theory for political
scientists. Game theory is a way of studying strategic interaction – situations in which
individuals’ decisions are interrelated and those decisions jointly determine outcomes.
Game theory provides a deductive method for rigorously deriving conclusions from
clearly stated assumptions. In this class, basic concepts of game theory are explained and
applied to topics in comparative politics, international relations, and American politics.
Topics covered include: foundations of rational choice approaches, basic utility theory,
normal form games and Nash equilibria, extensive form games, backwards induction,
subgame perfection, beliefs and Bayesian updating, limited information games, repeated
games, and additional topics as time allows. The class requires no background in formal
theory and assumes a very low comfort level with mathematics. The target audience for
this class is the game theory neophyte; if you have taken previous classes on game theory
you will almost certainly find this class redundant and largely a waste of your time.
The course has three main goals. The first is to provide students with a basic
introduction to rational choice methods, and game theory in particular, and their
application in political science. Game theoretic models are increasingly common in all
areas of political science. Consequently all political scientists should be familiar with the
basic logic of game theoretic explanation. Students who see game theory as a
complement to their primary focus rather than a method they intend to pursue in their
future research will receive an appropriate survey in this seminar.
The second goal is to provide the necessary background for students who wish to
use rational choice methods in their own research. For this purpose, this course is a
preparation for taking classes such as Economics 751 and 760. In addition, this class
provides a useful start to using game theory as a tool in your own research. Students will
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learn not only about game theoretic concepts, but also how to solve and create simple
models. The paper projects, in particular, can potentially lay the ground-work either for
dissertation topics or publishable papers on topics unrelated to your dissertation.
Finally, the class provides students with an introduction to simple versions of the
types of models most commonly used in political science. It is important for students to
learn not only the core concepts of game theory itself, but to see how those concepts can
be used to model politics and to provide insights into important substantive problems.
Texts:
Two texts are required for this course: Game Theory for Political Scientists by James
Morrow and Game Theory and Economic Modelling by David M. Kreps are available
for purchase at the Cornell Campus Store. In addition, I have ordered copies of Game
Theory with Economic Applications by H. Scott Bierman and Luis Fernandez. This text
is recommended; it covers the same material as Morrow, but it is often helpful to see two
different presentations of the same concepts when learning game theory.
Papers will supplement the texts and provide examples of applications. These papers are
available for you to copy or read in Olin Library 405. The list given below is not
complete and is not final, especially for the later portions of the class; readings will be
added and deleted to reflect student interests and the pace of the class. Consequently, the
reading list given below is not complete and is subject to change as the course proceeds.
The reading load may appear light compared to the norm in Government Department
graduate classes. This appearance, however, is very misleading. Most of these papers are
very slow reading, and you will have to read some of them several times to understand
the arguments. In general, you are expected to “work through” the papers in a careful
fashion so that you understand not just the intuition of the argument, but the logic of
model and the modeling decisions as well.
Requirements:
Students will complete several problem sets (probably seven), write two short (7-8 page)
papers, and take an in-class final exam. In the papers, you will develop simple, original
models applying the tools learned in class to topics of your own choosing. The problem
sets will account for 20% of the course grade. The remaining 80% will be divvied up
equally between the two papers and final (for those who like precision, each of these
three assignments is worth 26.6 % of the grade).
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SEMESTER SCHEDULE
TOPIC 1: INTRODUCTION, WHY RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY,
THEORY?
AND WHY STUDY GAME
Texts: Morrow, chapter 1; Kreps, chapter 1.
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Book chapter: Jon Elster, “Introduction” to Rational Choice, 1986 (New York
University Press), pp. 1 – 33.
Paper: John Ferejohn and Debra Satz, "Rational Choice and Social Theory." The
Journal of Philosophy (1994), 71-87.
Book chapter: Duncan Snidal, “The Game Theory of International Politics.” In
Kenneth Oye (ed.), Cooperation under Anarchy.
Book chapter: William H. Riker. “Political Science and Rational Choice.” In James
Alt and Kenneth Shepsle (eds.), Perspectives on Positive Political Economy.
Paper: Milton Friedman, “The Methodology of Positive Economics,” in Essays in
Positive Economics.
Book chapter: Jeffrey Friedman, “Economic Approaches to Politics.” In Jeffrey
Friedman (ed.), The Rational Choice Controversy , 1996 (Yale University Press), pp.
1 – 24.
TOPIC 2: UTILITY THEORY AND DECISION THEORY
Text: Morrow, chapter 2.
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Paper: David W. Rohde, “Risk-Bearing and Progressive Ambition: The Case of
Members of the United States House of Representatives,” American Journal of
Political Science (1979), vol. 23, no.1.
Book chapter: Fritz W. Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered
Institutionalism in Policy Research (1997, Westview Press), Introduction (pages 1 –
19).
Book chapters: Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (1981, Yale University
Press), chapters 2-3 (pp. 19 – 92).
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TOPIC 3: SPECIFYING A NORMAL FORM GAME AND NASH EQUILIBRIA
Text: Morrow, chapters 3 and 4; Kreps, chapter 3.
Supplemental Text: Bierman and Fernandez, chapter 1. (If you are interested in seeing
more applications, skim chapters 2 and 3 on Oligopoly and Strategic Trade Policy).
 Paper: Barbara Geddes. “A Game Theoretic Model of Reform in Latin American
Democracies.” American Political Science Review (June 1991).
 Paper: Tanisha Fazal, “Rethinking the Japan-America Security Agreement: A
Strategic Model of Alliance Burden Distribution,” manuscript, Stanford University
(1998).
 Paper: Fritz W. Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism
in Policy Research (1997, Westview Press), Chapter 4: “Actor Constellations”
(pages 69-96).
 Paper: Joseph Grieco, “Realist Theory and the Problem of International
Cooperation: Analysis with an Amended Prisoner’s Dilemma,” Journal of Politics
(1988: 600-24).
 Paper: Duncan Snidal, “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International
Cooperation,” American Political Science Review (Sept 1991: 701-726).
TOPIC 4: SPECIFYING EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES, BACKWARDS INDUCTION, AND SUBGAME
PERFECTION
Text: Morrow, chapter 5, Kreps, chapter 4.
Supplemental Text: Bierman and Fernandez, chapter 6.
 Paper: John Ferejohn and Charles Shipan, “Congressional Influence on
Bureaucracy,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, (1990).
 Paper: John Ferejohn and Charles Shipan, “Congressional Influence on
Administrative Agencies: A Case Study of Telecommunications Policy,” in L. Dodd
and B. Oppenheimer, eds, Congress Reconsidered (1989).
 Book chapters: Keith Krehbiel, Pivotal Politics, (1998, University of Chicago
Press), Chapters 1 and 2 (pp. 3 – 50).
 Paper: Fritz W. Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism
in Policy Research (1997, Westview Press), Chapter 7: “Decisions by Majority Vote”
(pages 151-171).
 Paper. Kelly Chang. “The President Versus the Senate: Appointments in the
American System of Separated Powers and the Federal Reserve.” Manuscript,
University of Wisconsin-Madison (1998).
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 Paper: R. Michael Alvarez, Geoffrey Garrett, and Peter Lange. “Government
Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance,” American
Political Science Review (June 1991).
 Paper: William Roberts Clark and Mark Hallerberg. “Strategic Interaction Between
Monetary and Fiscal Actors Under Full Capital Mobility,” APSA paper (1997).
 Paper: Torben Iversen, “Wage Bargaining, Central Bank Independence, and the Real
Effects of Money,” International Organization (Summer 1998: 469-504).
 Paper: Susanne Lohmann, “Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy,” American
Economic Review (1992: 273-86).
TOPIC 5: BELIEFS, BAYES’ THEOREM, AND GAMES WITH UNCERTAINTY
Text: Morrow, chapter 6; Kreps chapter 5.
Supplemental Text: Bierman and Fernandez, chapter 10.
 Paper: Randall Calvert. “The Value of Biased Information.” Journal of Politics
(1985).
 Paper: Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, chapter on transitions.
TOPIC 6: GAMES OF LIMITED INFORMATION
Text: Morrow, chapters 7 and 8.
Supplemental Text: Bierman and Fernandez, chapters 15 and 16.
 Paper: James Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International
Organization (1995).
 Paper: Kenneth Schultz, “Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform?
Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War.” Manuscript,
Princeton University (1998).
 Book: Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization (1991, University
of Michigan Press).
 Paper: William Roberts Clark, “Agents and Structures: Two Views of Preferences,
Two Views of Institutions,” International Studies Quarterly (1998), 42:245-270.
 Excerpts: James Fearon, Threats to Use Force, (Dissertation, University of
California at Berkeley), selections.
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TOPIC 7: REPEATED GAMES
Text: Morrow, chapter 9.
Supplemental Text: Bierman and Fernandez, chapter 9.
 Paper: Andrew Rutten, “Anarchy, Order, and the Law: Notes on the Post-Hobbesian
View,” manuscript, Cornell University (1997).
 Paper: Barry Weingast, “The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of
Law,” American Political Science Review (1997).
 Paper: James Morrow, “The Laws of War as an Institution.” Manuscript, Stanford
University (1997).
 Paper: James Morrow, “The Institutional Features of the Prisoner of War Treaties.”
Manuscript, Stanford University (1998).
 Paper: Paul Milgrom, Douglass C. North, and Barry R. Weingast. "The Role of
Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the
Champagne Fairs." Economics and Politics (1990): 1-23.
TOPIC 8: CONCLUSION, WHY STUDY GAME THEORY? REVISITED
Text: Morrow, chapter 10; Kreps chapter 6.