INTRODUCTION
One of the more recently developed fields of political science is public administration. This
relatively late-developing, highly theoretical offshoot of political science was almost an
afterthought in the United States. Even though it developed in the 1880s with the work of
Woodrow Wilson, its relations to older parts of political science have been awkward and uneasy.
Strangely, public administration tends to develop in spurts, which allows for improvement, but
this improvement rarely incorporates older theory. The 1980s and 1990s were marked by
administrative reform in western industrial democracies.1 Some of this is attributable to the
nature of public administration development in the United States. Rather than adopting the rigid
European model of administration, Americans chose to “chink in” an administrative structure,
adding functions as merited by need.2 Even so, the development process often ran years behind
cited needs. In addition, it was often common to have two or more agencies performing
essentially the same task since new methods of administration often disregarded current
mechanisms in favor of obtaining independence for the newly-established agency. Of course, a
highly theoretical discipline like American public administration would be susceptible to such
disorder. The answer to such a quandary lies within developing a single coherent method that
describes how public administration really works. Once this framework is established, a single
frame of reference can link troublesome pieces in the public administration puzzle, and the level
of understanding will permit in-depth investigation of individual variables.
This paper will explain how the different theories of public administration can be used in
Patricia W. Ingraham, “Play it Again Sam; It’s Still Not Right: Searching for the Right Notes in Administrative
Reform.” Public Administration Review, Vol. 57 (July/Aug. 1997), 325-331. Accessed from http://firstsearch.org
19 February 2000.
1
2
Richard J. Stillman II, Preface to Public Administration: A Search for Themes and Direction (Burke, VA:
Chatelaine, 1999), 57.
2
tandem to develop a more effective and elusive “grand theory” of public administration. For this
purpose, this paper will use the writing of David Rosenbloom to explain how his theories can
serve as the backbone for a composite theory. This paper will take Rosenbloom’s predecessors
and critics one by one, and attempt to explain how Rosenbloom’s writing is strengthened by their
arguments and how Rosenbloom’s reasoning can serve as the framework for understanding other
theories of public administration. Indeed, Rosenbloom’s argument was groundbreaking; it
advanced a new theory of how the separation of powers interfered with effective bureaucracy.
BIOGRAPHY OF DAVID ROSENBLOOM
David H. Rosenbloom is a professor of Public Administration at American University in
Washington, DC. Dr. Rosenbloom received the 1992 Distinguished Research Award and the
1993 Charles Levine Award for Excellence in Public Administration from the American Society
for Public Administration and National Association of Schools of Public Policy and
Administration. He serves on the board of a dozen leading public administration journals and his
focus areas for research include constitutional and administrative law, administrative history, and
theory.
ROSENBLOOM’S ARGUMENT
Public Administration Theory and the Separation of Powers: A Simple Explanation
Rosenbloom’s best known and most cited theory was advanced in his 1983 article, “Public
Administration Theory and the Separation of Powers.”3 In this article, Rosenbloom argues that
three interrelated approaches to public administration make it difficult for government to perform
effectively. Specifically, he cites the legal approach, which relates to the judicial system; the
managerial approach, which relates to the executive branch; and the political approach, which
David H. Rosenbloom, “Public Administration Theory and the Separation of Powers.” In Jay M. Shafritz, Classics
of Public Administration (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1997).
3
3
relates to the legislative branch. Tendencies associated with these three approaches make it
extremely difficult for government to identify a problem, decide on a solution, and implement
that solution.
The legal approach is primarily concerned with defending basic constitutional rights of
individuals, safeguarding procedural due process, and its core values are equity and fairness.
The organizational structure involves using impartial examiners and the adversarial model,
where two sides attempt to fight and clarify their positions, under the basic assumption that the
truth is somewhere in the middle. The legal approach views individuals as unique people
operating under unique circumstances. Each case has its own particular merits. An example of
how Rosenbloom would argue that the legal approach limits the effectiveness of individuals
would be in fighting crime. Although crime could be nearly eliminated if police officers arrested
every single person walking after midnight, this runs contrary to the system of our system of
constitutionally guaranteed freedoms. In the United States, there is a consensus that agrees that
individual rights supersede society’s right to take such arbitrary action. Procedural due process,
in other words, prevents government from dealing with crime and other goals of administration
in the cheapest and easiest way.
The managerial approach preaches the values of efficiency, effectiveness, and economy.
Organizational structure is designed to emphasize specialization, with the upper echelon of
management working as coordinators and facilitators. Civil service jobs, according to this
model, should be divided up into the proper agencies; these agencies should then clarify these
jobs and classify them. Next, these jobs, the duties of which should be codified, are filled on a
merit basis by politically neutral, qualified applicants. This model takes the stance that the
individual is not distinct; only position in the hierarchy matters when determining net worth.
4
The classic example of this would be the role of public health epidemiologists during a disease
outbreak. Members of this group would plan their attack without input from elected officials or
the citizens, and the orders of the President would be obeyed without question. Most complex
agencies have a proficient and valuable command structure.
Rosenbloom’s third approach is the political approach. This view values representativeness,
responsiveness, and accountability. Examples of the trend toward accountability include the
proliferation of so-called “sunshine laws,” which require that government meetings be open to
the public; and “sunset laws,” which impose definite limits on the duration of programs. To
continue a program after the specified, predetermined length of time it is given in a law, the
legislature must reenact the program. Not surprisingly, the organizational structure under this
model is pluralistic and includes the rights of citizens to access public information. The Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) allows interested citizens to obtain copies of certain documents and
records of proceedings so they can conduct their own inquiries. The political approach embraces
the view of the employee or civil servant as the member of a group, and the public as a clientele
of that group. This approach is very consumer-friendly and responsive to citizens.
Rosenbloom’s triple approach can be extrapolated in various ways to relate to many other
works of public administration. No matter which aspect of public administration is being
studied, Rosenbloom’s approach can be used to analyze that procedure, giving researchers a
baseline for developing a comprehensive theory of public administration. In succeeding
sections, this paper will explain the implications of Rosenbloom’s argument on the main points
of contention within the discipline. It will first define “public administration,” explain the role of
the executive, and then discuss how resulting perspectives of public administration ultimately
revolve around at least one of Rosenbloom’s three approaches to public administration.
5
Rosenbloom’s approaches are amazingly helpful in reconciling administrative theories.
DEFINITION: “PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION”
It is proper to begin by defining exactly what constitutes “public administration.” James Skok
defines public administration as “the carrying out of policies established by the political (or
policy making) elements of the government.”4 For the purposes of this paper, this definition will
be used. The implications of using this definition include a sharpening of the politicsadministration dichotomy and accepting the assumption that public administration itself does not
influence the policy-making process, an issue this paper will deal with in detail later. The
politics-administration dichotomy represents the idea that politics and administration are two
separate entities that should be mixed as little as possible. The major benefit of using this
definition are its broad base and its emphasis on implementation as a key factor. The chief
criticism of this approach lies in the idea that it oversimplifies the dichotomy itself. The logical
place to begin the application of Rosenbloom is with the executive branch.
GULICK AND THE ROLE OF THE EXECUTIVE
One of the earliest to focus on the executive was Luther Gulick, in his 1937 work “Notes on
the Theory of Organization.”5 Gulick’s work contained several important connotations for
public administration. First, Gulick argues that men differ in nature, capacity, and skill, and
therefore a division of work is not only prudent, but mandatory.6 Coordination of work,
therefore, requires a capable executive with a written mandate. Gulick coined the word
James E. Skok, “Policy Issue Networks and the Public Policy Cycle: A Structural-Functional Framework for
Public Administration.” Public Administration Review, V. 55 (July/Aug. 1995), 325-332. Accessed form
http://firstsearch.oclc.org. Accessed 19 February 2000.
4
Luther Gulick, “Notes on the Theory of Organization.” In Luther Gulick and L. Urwick, Papers on the Science of
Administration (New York: Institute of Public Administration, 1937).
5
6
Gulick, 6.
6
“POSDCORB” to explain the functions of the executive, namely planning, organizing, staffing,
directing, coordinating, and budgeting.7 More importantly, Gulick maintained that “A man
cannot serve two masters.”8 This “unity of command” allows workers to be more methodical,
efficient, and responsible.9 This focus on upper-level management is useful for its structure.
Gulick avoided taking a stance on the question of “top-down” or “bottom-up” organization in
favor of promoting both. Gulick found that this approach was useful in reorganizing New York
City’s sixty departments. Because the number of city departments subject to mayoral oversight
could not be brought down to a manageable number without creating serious intra-departmental
conflicts and confusion, the City Charter Commission of 1934 recommended a smaller-scale
downsizing to twenty-five departments, along with the appointment of three or four assistant
mayors.10 This trend has continued into the present era, as “super agencies” have been crated at
all levels of government to streamline management control.11
Rosenbloom’s theory corresponds favorably with Gulick’s theory and model in New
York City. According to Rosenbloom, public administration’s managerial approach is dependent
on a structure arranged hierarchically. “Programs and functions are to be clearly assigned to
organizational units. Overlap is to be minimized.”12 Gulick had admitted that a major concern
of the New York City project had been the possibility that the new assistant mayors would usurp
powers instead of being the eyes and ears of the mayor, who would exercise broad administrative
7
Gulick, 13.
8
Gulick, 9.
9
Gulick, 9.
10
Gulick, 12.
11
Philip E. Present, People and Public Administration (Pacific Palisades, CA: Palisades, 1979), 99.
12
Rosenbloom in Shafritz, 433.
7
power and ultimate decision-making authority power.13 Rosenbloom’s theory argues that it is
precisely this view of the individual bureaucrat as a “‘cog’ in an organizational machine over
which he/she has virtually no control” that is characteristic of the managerial approach.14 The
values emphasized by such an approach become obvious. The organization reigns supreme over
the individual, and administration is to determine what government can do, and do achieve these
goals with the least possible expenditure of time, energy, or money. In New York City, this was
demonstrated by the stress placed on the need to preserve the principle of homogeneity, which
was solved by requiring the new assistant mayors to remove themselves from the “technology of
the services and devote themselves to the broad aspects of administration and co-ordination.”15
While what Gulick supported fit with Rosenbloom’s managerial approach, Gulick’s problem was
that he did not balance it out with a political and legal perspective.
IMPLEMENTATION
At its core, the study of public administration is a study of implementation; it is an evaluation
of whether policy can be put into practice. The chief architects of theories concerning
implementation of bureautically-derived policies are Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky.16
Wildavsky defines implementation by the dictionary definition, “to carry out, accomplish, fulfill,
produce, complete.”17 Writing in the 1970s, the two used the federal government intervention in
Oakland as a classic example of how policy enacted in Washington frequently fails to affect the
13
Gulick, 12.
14
Rosenbloom in Shafritz, 433.
15
Gulick, 12.
16
Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron B. Wildavsky, Implementation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,
1974).
17
Pressman and Wildavsky, xiii.
8
individual on the street. In 1966, the newly-created Economic Development Administration
(EDA) was seeking a target destination for its endowment of $23 million dollars. The EDA was
under the Department of Commerce, and until the mid 1960s, the agency had concentrated its aid
in rural areas, which was its jurisdiction.18 Its authorizing act was the Public Works and
Economic Development Act, passed into law on August 26, 1965. This legislation was created
to stimulate economic development and aid recovery in areas of the country which were
suffering through depletion of a natural resource, like gold or timber, or an area that was shifting
from reliance on one natural resource to another.19 Suddenly, the agency did an about-face and
selected Oakland, California as the first site where it would try to rebuild cities, eliminate
poverty, and quell racial tensions by redressing unemployment. The agency ignored its original
directive and chose to implement its own policy. Douglas Murray McGregor claims that
“noncompliance tends to appear in the presence of perceived threat.”20 Herbert Kaufman
concurs, and argues that “people who calculate that they will be worse off under the proposed
changes than they would be under the status quo often will not cooperate with them.”21 This
indeed seems to have been the case here.
The political process often results in a serious misallocation of resources. Logically, other
cities like Chicago, Los Angeles, or New York, which already had suffered riots, would be first
in line to receive funds. Still, Eugene Foley, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce and the head
of EDA, choose to spend the EDA’s funds in Oakland rather than another large city because it
18
Pressman and Wildavsky, 1.
19
Pressman and Wildavsky, 7.
20
Douglas Murray McGregor, The Professional Manager (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), 118.
21
Herbert Kaufman, Time, Change, and Organizations: Natural selection in a Perilous Environment (Chatham, NJ:
Chatham House, 1985), 53.
9
had a Republican administration, and if there had been quarrels with a mayor in the city chosen,
Foley “did not want some Democratic mayor—like Daley—to be able to pick up the phone and
call President Johnson.”22 Even more appalling, the agency had too much free rein in
determining which business enterprises were eligible for funds. Because of a tight time
schedule, and the pressure imposed by the Watts riot in Los Angeles, the EDA’s hands were tied.
Tension and foreboding were combined with stringent budgetary requirements. Funds were
available in the 1965 budget, but if they were not used within four months, the money would be
lost.23 The end result was that, three years later, only $3 million had been spent, and most of that
was spent on one highway overpass and architect’s fees.24 Jobs created were largely temporary,
and very small in number.
Rosenbloom’s discussion of implementation is found indirectly within his legal and political
approaches. The view of the individual emphasizes procedural and substantive due process,
placing the interests of the individual above society. Organizations under the legal approach
focus on individuals, who are guaranteed basic rights, which include certain rights of
obstruction. Public administration under the political approach values responsiveness,
representativeness, and accountability. Clearly, the political approach led to the selection of
Oakland as a beneficiary of EDA funds. EDA directors, alarmed by the riots that had been
taking place in the inner cities, thought they could make a contribution by diverting their funds to
a city with the right preconditions for a riot. Oakland was an obvious target. The fact that
Oakland city government was viewed as non-hostile led to the realization that a plan to hire
minorities would promote political pluralism, another key concept embedded in the political
22
Pressman and Wildavsky, 14-15.
23
Pressman and Wildavsky, 138.
24
Pressman and Wildavsky, xi.
10
approach of Rosenbloom. Not surprisingly, Rosenbloom claims that this approach has been
widely denounced as making government “unmanageable, costly, and inefficient.”25 Therefore,
McGregor’s idea that managerial strategies can induce commitment may actually be dangerous
in circumstances such as these.26 Instead, should one desire to change policy, it is wiser to
approach the problem by using no coercive techniques to push the bureaucrat down the desired
road. Leonard White lists several, including educational campaigns and compliance through
publicity.27
Kenneth Meier takes a more extreme view.28 He remarks that “zero-base budgeting,
management by objectives, reform in the civil service structure, reinventing government, and
planned programmed budgeting systems are “efforts to convince us that bureaucracy is the
problem with governance in the United States.”29 The real problem, according to Meier, is that
good policy can be political suicide in the short run. For example, because the government has a
limited supply of funds, Congress deals with the Social Security system by creating an
“intergenerational transfer of wealth,” which creates intergenerational conflict that Congress
failed to address.30 Congress, in essence, has failed as a deliberative body, and gridlock is the
major reason American public administration is worse off than its European counterpart.31 To
25
Rosenbloom in Shafritz, 435.
26
Douglas Murray McGregor, The Professional Manager, 129.
27
Leonard White, Introduction to the Study of Public Administration (New York: Macmillan, 1946), 469-477.
Kenneth J. Meier, “Bureaucracy and Democracy: The Case for More Bureaucracy and Less Democracy.” Public
Administration Review, V. 57 (May/June 1997), 193-199. Accessed from http://firstsearch.org 19 February 2000.
28
29
Quoted in Meier.
30
Meier.
31
Meier.
11
resolve this problem, which is the exact problem Rosenbloom cites as his “political approach,”
Meier advocates redesigning the political system to eliminate some checks and balances, making
United States government more like British or Canadian government.32 Tacitly, this admits that
the Rosenbloom approach is correct, based on Meier’s willingness to scrap the monkey wrenches
in the system cited by Rosenbloom. Next, Meier wants to lengthen the time frame for public
policy making and manipulate the system to favor a long-term, rather than a short-term policy
approach, through the use of longer terms for elected officials.33 Conceivably, this would allow
executives to be better managers, as they would not need to be quite as responsive to the whims
of a changeable electorate. In fact, Meier fails to recognize one other aspect of this point. The
European bureaucracies he champions all have elected executives with terms longer than that of
the United States President. In Great Britain, the Prime Minister serves a term up to five years,
and in France, the President serves a seven year term. Both are re-electable at least once, and in
Britain, the shorter term is compensated for by a greatly shortened election process compared to
the United States. Executives in these Western European democracies can concentrate on longterm contingency planning, without fear of upsetting the electorate or engaging in reelection
campaigns that in the United States seem to begin shortly after inauguration.
Since it is
unlikely that we will adopt the British model, Rosenbloom is helpful in clarifying how the
United States system combines political and legal insights in the pursuit of efficiency. So, we
see that Rosenbloom combines with other works to achieve innovative and pragmatic solutions.
BUDGETING
Meier hinted that intimately related to the troubles of implementation is the problem of
32
Meier.
33
Meier.
12
budgeting. A budget is “a document, containing words and figures, which proposes expenditures
for certain items and purposes.”34 At best, budgets can be a tool to help achieve the objectives of
an organization. At worst, budgets create unfair expectations, obstruct the process by dictating
how money will be spent, and create resentment that leads an agency to backlash and devote
itself to causes other than its original mission, as we have seen occurred in Oakland with EDA.
Budgets are measured both quantitatively and qualitatively.
James Q. Wilson points out, “bureaucracies are often prepared to accept less money with
greater control than more money with less control.”35 Wilson provides the example of Robert
McNamara, the Secretary of Defense under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, whose budget was
considerably higher than his predecessors and successors, including Melvin Laird, who despite
having a smaller budget, was a far more popular secretary of defense among the military
services.36 The reason for this discrepancy is that McNamara embraced a PPBS, or planned,
programmed budgeting system. McNamara saw the budget as a tool to achieve goals, whereas
Laird, when he took office, slashed the budget but allowed the individual services to determine
where the savings would come from. Laird cut the budget twenty-eight percent during his
tenure, resulting in the loss of army divisions, ships, and total personnel.37 Still, each service
continued its own pt projects; the Navy was free to continue developing its high-performance,
pricey F-14 fleet defense fighter, and the army was permitted to continue research into
technological communications breakthroughs.
34
Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), 1.
35
James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: Harper Collins,
1989), 179.
36
Wilson, 179.
37
Wilson, 179.
13
This is an example of the coordination of Rosenbloom’s managerial and political principals.
The amount of leverage given to individual agencies is a managerial question typical of what
Frederick Mosher labels the “political challenge.”38 The product of egalitarianism, knowledge
expansion, and management, the political challenge represents the fact that politics is the enemy
of career systems, and that many systems, including the military, actually grew up in opposition
to politics.39 Knowing that the military services function as one of these enemies eliminates the
ability to use the budget as a tool to achieve specific objectives. True, budgets can achieve
overall goals; but it must be accepted that when dealing with career systems agencies, it is best to
not force specific tactics. Hence, the politics of coercion and the price paid for enforcing that
coercion play a major role in the calculations of bureaucrats like Laird. McNamara, as a
Washington outsider, could not or would not recognize this fact.
THE EFFECT OF INTEREST-GROUP LIBERALISM
Like Rosenbloom, Theodore Lowi has noticed the problems resulting from the political
approach.40 Lowi argues that pluralism, which he terms “interest-group liberalism,” was an
effective tool in American government because it made the “state an acceptable source of power
in a capitalist society.”41 Unfortunately, according to Lowi, “The zeal of pluralism for the group
and its belief in natural harmony tended to break down the very ethic of government.”42 Interest
groups have gained such power that it is difficult to determine whether interest groups influence
38
Frederick C. Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 173.
39
Mosher, 172-173.
40
Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority (New York: W. W.
Norton, 1969).
41
Lowi, 48.
42
Lowi, 48.
14
policy or actually make it. Long-range contingency planning within government is now gone,
and the informal politicking of lobbyists threatens both government ethics and the rules structure,
which as a result cannot be codified.
Robert K. Merton agrees, and states that formality facilitates the interaction of the occupants
of government offices.43 According to Merton, “A formal, rationally organized social structure
involves clearly defined patterns of activity in which, ideally, every series of actions is
functionally related to the purposes of the organization.”44 If a bureaucracy is to function
effectively, it must exert constant pressure on officials to be “methodical, prudent, and
disciplined.”45 This view agrees with Charles E. Lindblom, who argues that government cannot
decide on a path of action and stay the course, and instead chooses to “muddle through.”46
Rosenbloom, of course, bases his political argument on the premise that the accountability of
elected officials and administrative appointees are “crucial to the maintenance of constitutional
democracy.”47 But to accept this, we must discount the idea that all bureaucrats behave in a
predictable, rational manner, or else Merton’s view will turn against Rosenbloom and imply that
politics, management, and the law are distinct from one another.
DISMANTLING “RATIONAL ACTOR”
Beyond the relatively simple question of “muddling through,” because of political discord,
government faces another quandary that often produces the same result. Often in political
Robert K. Merton, “Bureaucratic Structure and Personality.” In Robert K. Merton, et al., Reader in Bureaucracy
(Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1952).
43
44
Merton, 361.
45
Merton, 365.
46
Charles E. Lindblom and David K. Cohen, Usable Knowledge: Social Science and Social Problem Solving (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979).
47
Rosenbloom, “Public Administration Theory and the Separation of Powers,” 434.
15
science, there is a tendency to accept a “rational-actor” theory, which states that an actor will
attempt to maximize gains after performing a cost-benefit analysis of the available “facts.” The
operative term, of course, is “facts.” Rarely do government organizations know everything.
Combine this with the fact that organizations are run my people with material concerns. That is,
instead of running the organization benignly, policymakers are inclined to further there own
political agenda, which frequently is fueled by misperception in the first place.
It is this problem of misperception that Lindblom addresses. He identifies several occasions
in the policy process where misperception is free to enter. The first is the stage where analysis
meets interaction. Lindblom quotes Thomas Dye as stating, “The solution of societal problems
generally implies a rational model,” and that model “requires complete understanding.”48 Yet,
according to Lindblom, these models “seem to deny—sometimes flatly and with ambiguity—the
frequency with which interactions solve problems without anyone’s understanding or analysis.”49
So if one extreme is possible, it is also similarly possible that despite the “best” information
available, government organizations are still unlikely to overcome problems. Herbert Simon
generally agrees, but takes the idea a step forward.50 Simon argues that not only can government
agencies make incorrect decisions when confronted with information, but that it is impossible for
bureaucrats to have all the information required, or at least unlikely that a large quantity of
information can be accurately processed and analyzed. Simon writes, “Limits include (a) limits
on his ability to perform and (b) limits on his ability to make correct decisions.”51 But
48
Quoted in Lindblom, 30.
49
Quoted in Lindblom, 30.
50
Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative
Organizations, Third Edition (New York: Macmillan, 1976.
51
Simon, 39.
16
knowledge of consequences is difficult, and one error made about the future destroys the schema
of the decision maker, which forces yet another reevaluation of values.52
Herbert Kaufman concurred, and argued for a need to reshape government bureaucracy so it
was more representative, decentralized, and composed of neutral, competent bureaucrats.53 It
is precisely this representativeness that Paul Appleby cites when he explains what makes
government different from private enterprise. Can the same style of management and
supervision succeed equally in both realms? Appleby says that the politics-administration
dichotomy was a self-imposed restriction that held no consistency with real-world functioning of
bureaucracy. Politics, according to Appleby, was removable from public administration.
Appleby wrote, “This difference is a fact and I believe it to be so big that the dissimilarity
between government and all other forms of social action is greater than any dissimilarity among
those other from themselves.”54
Rosenbloom reconciles all of these contributing ideologies. Simon writes, “The principle of
efficiency should be considered as a definition rather than a principle: it is a definition of what is
meant by ‘good’ or ‘correct’ administrative behavior. It does not tell how accomplishments are
to be maximized, but merely states that this maximization is the aim of administrative activity.” 55
Simon gives lip service to the hope that managers strive for efficiency , but he is actually
promoting the idea that efficiency may not be the best way to get things done. It is merely a
goal, an objective, not mandatory. It may be even better achieved if vigorous public
participation guides management.
52
Simon, 80-81, 243.
53
Shafritz, 170.
54
Paul Appleby, Big Democracy (New York: Knopf, 1945).
55
Simon, 39.
17
The representation Kaufman would prefer to have conflicts with the ideas of Frank J.
Goodnow, the founder of the politics-administration dichotomy. Goodnow was a pioneer writer
in the field of public administration, and was the first to differentiate the ideas of “politics” and
“administration.”56 Goodnow wrote, “The principle of separation of powers in its extreme form
cannot. . . be made the basis of any concrete political organization. For this principle demands
that there shall be separate authorities of the government, each of which shall be confined to the
discharge of one of the functions of government.”57 This limitation then leads to a consideration
of where the demarcation between politics and administration lies. Goodnow answers, “practical
political necessity makes impossible the consideration of the function of politics apart from that
of administration. Politics must have a certain control over administration.”58 Because
Goodnow argues that “the function of politics. . . consists in the expression of the will of the
state,” “if no attempt is made in the governmental system to provide for the separation of politics
and administration. . . the control and superintendence of the function of administration tends to
be assumed by the governmental body which discharges the political function.”59 In other words,
Goodnow fears that any diminution of the politics-administration dichotomy will eliminate one
of the checks on power imposed by the Constitution’s separation of powers.
Appleby claimed that political involvement was a benefit, since “Government administration
differs from all other administrative work to a degree not even faintly realized outside, by virtue
of its public nature, the way in which it is subject to public scrutiny and public outcry.”60
Frank J. Goodnow, “Politics and Administration” in Jay M. Shaft Ritz, ed. Classics of Public Administration,
Fourth Edition (Fort Worth: Harcourt-Brace, 1997).
56
57
Goodnow in Shafritz, 28-29.
58
Goodnow in Shafritz, 29.
59
Goodnow in Shaft Ritz, 28-29.
18
So, representation by its very nature seems to be opposed to the politics-administration
dichotomy, which itself is opposed to efficiency because of the links it promotes in its change of
command and the fact that officials need to report to more than one leader. But if we look at the
process as essentially one which develops a general strategy, then strategy, and only then tactics,
then this approach is a wholly accurate description.
The key to bringing these interpretations together lies in recognizing the separation of powers;
as does Rosenbloom, Dwight Waldo remarked that the politics-administration dichotomy “tells
us nothing at all about the organs to which these functions should be assigned, or the desirable
relationships among these organs.”61 But since Waldo, those who dismiss the dichotomy, have
automatically assumed that since no clear cut definition exists, then the entire process is
unworkable. Rosenbloom’s theory legitimizes the dichotomy as a constricting device that limits
the ability of administrators to complete tasks with wild abandon. At the same time, though,
Rosenbloom is quick to point out that the inability of administrators to push programs through to
completion often contributes to better policy.
This raises the question: Does the public policy making process impact public administration,
or does public administration impact the public policy making process? With respect to core
functions, that is a difficult question to answer. Michael Lipsky points out a problem with
bureaucracy in his book Street Level Bureaucracy.62 Lipsky defines “street level bureaucrats” as
workers such as police officers, teachers, and others who receive considerable discretion while
60
Appleby, Big Democracy, 7.
61
Dwight Waldo, The Administrative State: A Study of the Political Theory of American Public Administration
(New York: Ronald Press, 1948), 115.
62
Michael Lipsky, Street Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services (New York: Russell
Sage Foundation, 1980).
19
completing tasks assigned to them. Lipsky claims that certain job circumstances, such as work
overloads or harsh working conditions, or personal needs for security or fulfillment can persuade
street-level bureaucrats to simplify their jobs, usually resulting in a shirking of responsibility.
Many of these street level bureaucrats have some sort of expertise gained either on the job or
through special training programs. It is disconcerting, therefore, that Warren Bennis points out
that “there is a positive correlation between [level of] education and need for autonomy.”63
Daniel Katz and Robert Kahn point out that personality factors can be the “determinants of role
expectations.”64 Street level bureaucrats have “great discretion in their interactions with clients,”
which equates “description with prescription.”65 Effectively, Rosenbloom’s theory could have a
corollary which would state that political ineffectiveness, specifically the inability for politicians
to specify managerial control of the functions of street-level bureaucrats, will lead to managerial
ineffectiveness because “it is unlikely that the. . .approaches can be synthesized without violating
values deeply ingrained in the United States political culture.66 Rosenbloom’s theory, however,
accommodates street-level discretion better than others.
But the people are ultimately supreme. Appleby concedes, “Because of these circumstances,
every governmental executive lives and moves and has his being in the presence of public
dynamite. Every action he may take is influenced by his condition—whether before or after an
explosion. . . .In a narrow sense, government is less efficient because of its public nature.”67
63
Warren G. Bennis, Changing Organizations: Essays on the Development and Evolution of Human Organization
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), 11.
64
Daniel Katz and Robert Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations (New York: Wiley, 1967), 193.
Richard E. Matland, “Synthesizing the Implementation Literature,” In Richard J. Stillman, Public Administration
Concepts and Cases, Seventh Edition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000), 410.
65
66
Rosenbloom in Shafritz, 432
67
Appleby, Big Democracy, 8.
20
Public input can occur either before or after the fact, and indeed Appleby is convinced that “The
part played by criticism after a decision has been reached , a program launched, is not
sufficiently understood or appreciated. . . . popular discussion and criticism after the fact has far
greater value than it has before the fact.”68 Appleby sees genuine value in debate before the
process, but once a decision has been made, it is only prudent that debate should be ended and
administrators given the green light to do their jobs. The only problem with that is that
administrators are rarely indifferent in their political views, and organizations promote these
increases in influence. So, the debate between representativeness and the value of the politicsadministration dichotomy hinges on the question of when each component, politics or
administration, is predominant at which times during the process. This of course, means that the
political approach begins the process, then surrenders its authority to the managerial process,
whose arbitrary actions can be checked by the legal process.
Anthony Downs discusses the organization structure of agencies with respect to their
individual components. According to Downs, bureaucratic study must include an examination of
the life cycles of bureaus, which are influenced greatly by the personalities of workers inside
those bureaus.69 Workers can be identified as climbers, conservers, zealots, advocates, or
statesmen.70 Climbers are the pertinent members in this discussion. Downs claims that climbers
are seeking to acquire specific functions not performed by anyone else in the bureau, and has
strong incentives not to economize.71 Politically, to achieve this agenda, a climber must be
aggressive, ignore official policy, and behave flamboyantly to become noticed, even if this
68
Appleby, Big Democracy, 83.
69
Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman, 1967).
70
Downs, 88.
71
Downs, 92, 94.
21
means shirking official policy. By doing this, administrators frequently fulfill the requirement of
being responsible to clientele groups.72 This is the primary reason for the blurring between when
the managerial, political, and legal processes are acting.
The second stage identified by Lindblom as an entry point for misperception is at the
individual decision-maker level. Even more important than the nature of the problem itself is
how the officer charged with eliminating it views the problem. If the problem is dismissed as
insignificant, remedies will be slow in coming. In addition, Lindblom correctly points out that
“an interactive process will eventuate in a decision that can be attributed to an official or
committee; but often not. Instead, the outcome will emerge from such interactions as, for
example, when a price is established in a competitive market without anyone playing the role of
price setter. The price is more a happening than any one person’s decision to establish it, even if
thousands of buying and selling decisions lead to the result.”73 This analogy directly relates to
Rosenbloom’s “political approach.” Policies are the result of a similar process. Constituents
often dictate policy concerns to their elected officials, who then attempt to formulate responses
in the form of legislation or administrative overhaul.
E. Pendleton Herring agrees with this assessment, and sees the accompanying dangers.74
Herring wrote that legislatures can pass laws that fall into disfavor through institutional
personification.75 Meanwhile, the obtrusive law may not garner enough dissent to be changed,
72
Herbert A. Simon, Donald W. Smithburg, and Victor A. Thompson, Public Administration (New York: Knopf,
1964), 413.
73
Lindblom, 33.
E. Pendleton Herring, “Public Administration and the Public Interest.” In Jay M. Shafritz, ed., Classics of public
Administration, Fourth Edition (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt-Brace, 1997),76-81.
74
75
Herring, “Public Administration,” in Shafritz, 77.
22
despite the fact that it does not promote its original interests. Legislative reform may not be
possible because of “a change of economic or political conditions” that “may alter the alignment
of social forces.”76 Herring states, “Upon the shoulders of the bureaucrat has been placed in
large part the burden of reconciling group differences and making effective and workable the
economic and social compromises arrived at through the legislative process.” In other words, the
bureaucrat, who is “in a better position than the legislators,” has the duty of fleshing out vague
laws.77 “The words of the statute limit his purpose, but within the margin of his discretion he
must write his interpretation of state purpose.”78 (emphasis mine). Rosenbloom argues that not
only is this possible, but it is preferable. Congress’s job is to provide a general policy program.
It is the bureaucrat’s job to provide a strategy for implementing that program, and job of “streetlevel” bureaucrats to develop tactics. Perhaps that is where the policy goes awry.
THE EFFECT OF STRUCTURE ON GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS
Not surprisingly, public administration is often under the knife, usually under the auspices of
“reinventing government.”79 Many have suggested reinventing the politics-administration
dichotomy, in an effort to recreate the balance between input and output. Yet, the very nature of
the American system of public administration precludes such sweeping change. Barbara Coe
argues that “The concept of structural conflict explains much of what occurs when organizations
move forward in a determined and vigorous matter, then move away from the target, oscillating
and often ultimately giving up on their (original) goal.”80 This prompts us to ask why
76
Herring, “Public Administration.” In Shafritz, 77-78.
77
Herring, “Public Administration,” in Shafritz, 76.
78
Herring, “Public Administration,” in Shafritz, 76.
H. George Frederickson, “Comparing the Reinventing Government Movement with Public Administration.”
Public Administration Review, Vol. 56 (May/June 1996). Accessed from http://firstsearch.org 19 February 2000.
79
Barbara A. Coe, “How Structural Conflicts Stymie Reinvention.” Public Administration Review, Vol. 57
(March/April 1997), 168-173. Accessed from http://firstsearch.org 19 February 2000.
80
23
government organizations that have outlived their usefulness persist, missionless, and why many
government organizations have concurrent powers that promulgate inefficiency
The classic work on this subject is Herbert Kaufman’s 1976 work “Are Government
Organizations Immortal?”81 Kaufman argues that government organizations are indeed
essentially immortal, and this is the result of an evolution between 1923 and 1973.82
Components favoring long agency life include difficulty in overturning legislation, the sheltering
of independent organizations like the Post Office, and the size of the federal budget.83
Kaufman argues that agencies develop their own clientele; this clientele routinely
incorporates many of the ideas advanced by Rosenbloom’s “political approach. According to
Kaufman, “whether an agency provides services for its clients or regulates them, its clientele can
frequently be counted on to come to its assistance when it is in trouble.”84 In addition, agencies
who compete frequently “divide the field” so their competition for resources in the form of tax
dollars does not drive either agency out of business.85 So we also see that the political approach
forces agencies to act in rational ways to preserve their power. Agencies frequently take on new,
additional missions as a by-product of the fight to remain alive when they are challenged by new
agencies that infringe on their territory. Kaufman points out several examples where politics has
forced agencies to modify their original mandate. There is considerable tension between the
Bureau of Customs and the Immigration and Naturalization Service with regard to smuggling on
81
Herbert Kaufman, Are Government Organizations Immortal? (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1976).
82
Kaufman, Are Government Organizations Immortal, 29.
83
Kaufman, Are Government Organizations Immortal, 3-7
84
Kaufman, Are Government Organizations Immortal, 11.
85
Kaufman, Are Government Organizations Immortal, 15.
24
the U.S.-Mexican border.86 It is quite possible that prosecution of smugglers could be conducted
purely through either agency, and funds diverted to the most capable agency. Instead, the two
organizations conduct their own operations almost independently, resulting a waste of time,
energy, and taxpayer dollars. Yet, Rosenbloom helps here as well, since simple efficiency is no
the primary goal. In fact, the redundancy imposed by such a system often leads to fewer
smugglers falling through the cracks.
Another example is the frustration experienced by various other agencies towards
representing the government in court. Currently, the Justice Department holds a monopoly on
this privilege.87 General counsel of various agencies are likely to be more cognizant of the
special circumstances concerning cases their agency brings, yet, bureaucratic structure and rules
prevent them from representing their agencies, which leads to uninformed Department of Justice
lawyers wasting more taxpayer dollars. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), for example,
shares power with the Justice Department to regulate business and prevent monopolies. Yet, the
FTC cannot bring a case to challenge the practices of a certain business; it can only request that
the department of Justice investigate the matter. This wastes time and money, and allows the
business extra time to cut a deal with the Justice Department, after already failing to do so with
the FTC. The FTC has been especially aware of threats to its longevity. When the Consumer
Product Safety Commission (CPSC) was created, the FTC rushed to begin prosecuting the “most
politically powerful industries in the nation—life insurance, the legal, medical, and other
professions, automobiles, and pharmaceuticals.”88 It pursued these industries for two reasons;
86
Kaufman, Are Government Organizations Immortal, 15.
87
Kaufman, Are Government Organizations Immortal, 15.
Mark V. Nadel, “Making Regulatory Policy.” In Allen Schick, ed. Making Economic Policy in Congress
(Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1983), 227.
88
25
first it tried to reassert its role in protecting consumers, and secondly, because that role had been
taken, the FTC was forced to justify it existence by pressing aggressively on another track. This
drastic change in policy was the result of the CSPC usurping the power of the FTC to regulate
industries for the benefit of consumers. As a result of the massive number of prosecutions,
Congress was inundated with requests from lobbyists to curtail the power of the FTC. This is an
indication of how politics drives the policy-making process. These two examples are typical of
the way that the political requirements of pubic administration impair the effectiveness and
efficiency of various organs in the system.
We would expect a backlash because of this intense level of control, but Rosenbloom’s theory
addresses drawbacks to such an approach. Rosenbloom reminds us, “public administration is an
intensely political process that should be responsive to interested publics and legislators.”89
Kaufman agrees, and states that reforms should incorporate central values, which include
administration through executive leadership, representativeness, and decentralization to promote
better oversight, even if such systems compromises national mandates for economic and social
equality.90 Although Rosenbloom and Kaufman differ on the merits of such a system, it can still
be concluded that Rosenbloom’s model is a true model of the American system of public
administration. The implications can seem bleak. The above cases suggest a runaway
bureaucracy, one that is self-sustaining and looks out for its own interests.
Yet, bureaucracy sometimes needs freer reins. Peter Grier points out some of the problems
that result from too much upper level management.91 NASA, in response to Congressional cost
89
Quoted in Barbara Coe.
Herbert Kaufman, “Administration, Decentralization, and Political Power.” In Jay M. Shafritz, ed., Classics of
Public Administration, Fourth Edition (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt-Brace, 1997), 289, 291, 296-297.
90
91
Grier, Peter. “At NASA, Signs of Too Much Scrimping.” Christian Science Monitor 29 March 2000.
26
cutting, has been forced to adopt a “faster, better, cheaper” philosophy of operations. 92 This has
led to a reduction in staffing, which eliminated many internal testing programs for components.
This policy has had drastic effects on NASA’s efficiency and success. The Mars Observer and
Mars Polar Lander both disappeared or quit responding, and engine seals for the new
International Space Station are reputed to be cheaply made, requiring astronauts to wear earplugs
while they are in use.93 Clearly, pushing too hard for government efficiency can result in
substandard products that actually waste more money than they save.
THE RESULTING QUESTIONS OF ETHICS
One of the ethical dilemmas of political science results from the “political power struggle
underlying the politics-administration dichotomy.”94
Herring addresses another ethical
dilemma, political neutrality. Herring defines political neutrality as “loyalty to the broad social
purpose to which the country seems to be committed.”95 In reexamining the relationship
between the role of the administrator to political parties, Herring was disturbed to find that the
requirement for administrators to follow the policies of the party in power were being shunned.
Many of the important regulatory functions have been given to “quasi-judicial tribunals,” which
have considerable autonomy from the political process.96 In addition, to Theodore Lowi’s
dismay, Paul Appleby points out that “Administrators in a modern liberal regime will be more
attentive to pressures from popular groups than they are in a conservative regime.”97 Patricia
92
Grier, Peter. “At NASA, Signs of Too Much Scrimping.” Christian Science Monitor 29 March 2000, 1
.
93
Grier, Peter. “At NASA, Signs of Too Much Scrimping.” Christian Science Monitor 29 March 2000, 1-2.
Eliza Wing-yee Lee, “Political Science, Public Administration, and the Rise of the American Administrative
State.” Public Administration Vol.55 (Nov./Dec. 1995), 538-546. Accessed from http://firstsearch.org 19 February
2000.
94
95
96
E. Pendleton Herring, The Politics of Democracy: American Parties in Action (New York: Rinehart, 1940), 379.
E. Pendleton Herring, The Politics of Democracy, 379.
27
Wallace Ingraham sees this question a little differently; she frames it as one of “Neutrality
versus Responsiveness.”98 She cites two major trends that undermine the ability of the civil
service to adjust when elections prompt changes in the ideology of the government. First,
Ingraham claims that the very structure of the civil service, which is designed to prevent
undue external political influence, combines with an ever-increasing bureaucracy and its
operating procedures to isolate civil servants from changes imposed by new administrations.99
Second, the esoteric and complex nature of new programs has forced bureaucrats to become
active in the actual decision-making process, in addition to their role of carrying out decisions.100
Rosenbloom’s methodology provides each of his approaches with ethical challenges.101 The
managerial model dictates that agency heads be singular rather than plural to emphasize
responsibility and accountability.102 Second, by definition, this system demands strict
subordination. Because of this intensive power concentrated in managers, a limited span of
control is essential. Rosenbloom argues, “just as plural leadership was considered inappropriate,
members are expected to be loyal to the organization and their managers.103 Disciplinary
measures enforce that provision. Finally, internal audits promote accountability. These form the
bases for ethics under the managerial approach. They serve as checks against Lowi’s concerns
97
Paul Appleby, Policy and Administration (Birmingham, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1949), 122.
98
Patricia Wallace Ingraham, The Foundation of Merit: Public Service in American Democracy (Baltimore, MD:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1995), xix.
99
Ingraham, xix.
100
Ingraham, xix-xx.
101
David Rosenbloom, Public Administration: Understanding Management, Politics, and Law in the Public Sector
(New York: Random House, 1989).
102
Rosenbloom, Public Administration, 475.
103
Rosenbloom, Public Administration, 475-476.
28
of runaway liberalism and strengthen Ingraham’s argument. Ingraham maintains that neutrality
is an important value in pubic administration. Rosenbloom takes that idea a little farther.
According to Rosenbloom, “a public administrator who is unwilling to follow orders is expected
to leave his or her post.”104 There is no room for squabbling or compromising; proficiency
compels any administrator to leave if they cannot carry out their objectives. This harsh reality is
balanced as technology and government growth allows lower-level administrators to take a more
active role in establishing policy, often times stretching laws as far as possible.
Unlike the managerial approach, the political approach to ethics involves significant external,
rather than internal, mechanisms. Legislative oversight, budgetary control, office rotation, and
public participation dampen the tendency of organizations to seize power.105 “Sunshine laws”
and the Freedom of Information act also allow citizens to monitor organizations.106 External
checks are particularly helpful in placating Lowi, but they also remedy Herring’s concerns.
Herring’s primary concern is that administrators will not be responsive to the party in power, and
will instead follow their own agenda or preserve the status quo initiated by the former party in
power. Rosenbloom’s theory, though, contains ethical safeguards that make such behavior
unlikely. The external nature of the controls and the incentives provided for “whistle blowers”
make it abundantly clear that anyone exposing their organization’s shortcoming will be
rewarded. In addition, because the party in power in the United States must win a majority of
votes, any willful disobedience of directives would be a disobedience of the public in general,
which would surely be noticed and condemned by the public. Therefore, it is unlikely that an
organization could pursue a policy contradictory to that of the government, and the fact that
104
Rosenbloom, Public Administration, 475.
105
Rosenbloom, Public Administration, 477-479.
106
Rosenbloom, Public Administration, 479-480.
29
directors are appointed by the President emphatically deny any organizations that try to push
their prerogatives.
The legal approach also has distinct ethical ramifications. Constitutional values and
requirements, although not as frequently used against the managerial and political approaches,
have far greater power when they are invoked. The judicial system is unique in that it provides
public administrators with powerful incentives to respect the constitutional rights of those they
encounter while performing their official duties.107 The primary enforcement tool here is the
power of those injured to seek redress in the civil courts. This is the key; by limiting the power
of administrators, the American political system closes the gap created by the growth of
government. Discretion in adopting policy is diluted, and administrators cannot completely
concentrate on adopting a managerial approach to achieve goals in an expeditious fashion, while
sacrificing whomever gets in the way. In this way, the legal system provides the most important
safeguard against especially egregious administrative behavior. To cope with this challenge,
Dwight Waldo lists a series of obligations civil servants have: to the Constitution, to law, to
nation, to democracy, to bureaucratic norms, to professionalism, to family, to friends, to the
public interest, to humanity, and to God.108 Perhaps the best part of Rosenbloom’s model is that
its three-pronged approach promotes these ethics on three semi-parallel fronts that allow the
defense and pursuit of ethics from more than one source.
THE FUTURE
With the rise of what Stillman terms a “global professional technocracy,” public
administration will be asked to contend with more dilemmas.109 According to Stillman, the
107
Rosenbloom, Public Administration, 451.
108
Dwight Waldo, The Enterprise of Public Administration (Novato, CA: Chandler and Sharp, 1980), 103-106.
109
Richard J. Stillman, Preface, 82.
30
characteristics of such a system are sheer size and technical complexity, transitory professionals
that move in and out of government agencies with ease, new technology and its global spread,
the meshing of powers, the invention of new human liberties, and the new “fifth estate” of
government.110 The most interesting of these developments is the “meshing of powers” concept.
According to Stillman, the Constitutional concept of the separation of powers had been eroded
into a system where “separated institutions sharing powers.”111 Stillman fails to cite any
concrete examples of this though, and perfunctorily states that “the executive branch is deeply
involved in the messy realities of legislative and judicial activities, as well as vice-versa, across a
wide spectrum of activities from nuclear disarmament to local welfare policies.”112 Rosenbloom,
on the other hand, argues that it is this separation of powers that causes problems in public
administration. So who is right? Stillman seems to confuse activities and realities. True, it is
common for executives and administrators in public agencies to cooperate, but usually this
cooperation takes the form of resource-sharing. It is possible for two completely different
federal agencies to have the same goal. For example, in cases of ecological or environmental
disaster clean up, the Environmental Protection Agency’s primary goals are to contain the
damage, treat the affected are in the most cost-effective manner, and to restore as much territory
as possible to normal status. The cabinet agency of Housing and Urban Development, on the
other hand, is solely interested in making sure that Americans have safe and adequate housing.
The mission of these two agencies is entirely different. But if we apply a specific case, like the
cleanup of the Love Canal site in Buffalo, New York, we see that both agencies had something
110
Richard J. Stillman, Preface, 82-87.
111
Richard J. Stillman, Preface, 84.
112
Richard J. Stillman, Preface, 84.
31
to gain by working together. In cases like these, both sides would be foolish to conduct their
own ecological and chemical damage studies, when a single study and a copy machine would
suffice. Cases like these of resource-pooling are common, and do not contradict Rosenbloom.
CONCLUSION
Clearly, there is no one “correct” theory of public administration. This paper merely attempts
to find a coherent method of organizing the available writings in the doctrine so that they can be
analyzed in a similar frame of reference. As it stands now, the closest attempt to create a broad
based, all-encompassing theory is that of David Rosenbloom. His three approaches, the
“managerial approach,” the “political approach,” and the “legal approach” best summarize the
barriers to effective public administration. The scope of the theories presented here in
comparison vary by discipline, time period, and motivation. Somehow, in each of these
competing theories, Rosenbloom is present. By adopting the Rosenbloom framework as a basis
for future study, these competing ideologies can be unified into a grand theory of public
administration. Whether we are examining the executive, implementation, methods of analyzing
bureaucratic output, or discrepancies between bureaucratic policy and tangible results, the
Rosenbloom benchmark can remind us that each independent theory has merit, based on its
application in the Rosenbloom model. Rather than attempting the impossible task of assimilating
all these theories, the first step is to determine where they differ, which has been completed, and
what they share in common. Only following this step, can we achieve a synthesis. Public
Administration is a composite of compromises, but rather than merely “muddling through,” we
should look to negotiate the managerial, legal, and political hurdles and accept the limitations in
our constitution that allow us to enjoy a wide degree of personal freedom and reasonably
effective public administration.
32
WORKS CITED
Appleby, Paul H. Policy and Administration. Birmingham, AL: University of Alabama Press,
1949. Investigates the checks on administrative power.
Appleby, Paul H. Big Democracy. New York: Knopf, 1945. Presents the case that government
is different from the private sector, and explains the limits and opportunities because of this
arrangement.
Bennis, Warren. Changing Organizations: Essays on the Development and Evolution of Human
Organization. New York: McGraw Hill, 1966. Bennis provides an important counterweight
to Kaufman’s model of the life cycles of government organizations.
Coe, Barbara A. “How Structural Conflicts Stymie Reinvention.” Public Administration
Review, V. 57 (Mar./Apr. 1997), 168-173. Accessed 19 February 2000 from
http://www.firstsearch.oclc.org Relates to Frederickson’s call for “new public
administration,” but has more of an emphasis on why the “old public administration” remains
alive and well.
Downs, Anthony. Inside Bureaucracy. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1967. Downs focuses
on goal setting and a model hierarchy, which are blueprints of Rosenbloom’s model.
Frederickson, H. George. New Public Administration. Birmingham, AL: University of Alabama
Press, 1980. Introduces the “five classic models” of administration and argues that
substructures and individuals link to the superstructure of organizations.
Frederickson, H. George. “Comparing the Reinventing Government Movement with the New
Public Administration.” Public Administration Review¸ V. 56 (May/June 1996), 263-70.
Accessed 19 February 2000 from http://firstsearch.oclc.org Expands on his earlier models of
“new public administration,” and challenges conventional rationale of public administration.
Grier, Peter. “At NASA, Signs of Too Much Scrimping.” Christian Science Monitor 29 March
2000. An article that explains why NASA’s budget cuts have been fundamentally destructive.
Gulick, Luther and Urwick, L., eds. Papers on the Science of Administration. New York:
Institute of Public Administration, 1937. Includes Gulick’s “Notes,” and several other articles
that advise on the proper role of administration.
Herring, E. Pendleton. The Politics of Democracy. New York: Rinehart, 1940. This source has
Herring’s spin on administrative ethics, which differs markedly from his stance on group
representation.
33
Ingraham, Patricia Wallace. The Foundation of Merit: Public Service in American Democracy.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1995. Wallace examines the civil service system and determines
if the best applicants are receiving the best jobs.
Ingraham, Patricia W. “Play it Again Sam; It’s Still Not Right: Searching for the Right Notes in
Administrative Reform. Public Administration Review, V. 57, (July/Aug. 1997), 325-31.
Accessed 19 February 2000 from http://firstsearch.oclc.org This source elucidates the options
available to would-be reformers of public administration.
Katz, Daniel and Kahn, Robert L. The Social Psychology of Organizations. New York: Wiley,
1966. These sociologists explain organizations on an individual level, using the idea that
certain factors, coupled with the “hierarchy of needs and wants,” causes organization
members to take certain actions.
Kaufman, Herbert. Are Government Organizations Immortal? Washington, DC: The Brookings
Institution, 1976. Kaufman provides a corollary to the Rosenbloom argument by basically
arguing that the legal, managerial, and political approaches have an effect on the life of
organizations.
Kaufman, Herbert. The Administrative Behavior of Federal Bureaucracies. Washington, DC:
The Brookings Institution, 1981. This source dedicates itself to the confines of bureaucratic
leadership and perspectives.
Krislov, Samuel and Rosenbloom, David H. Representative Bureaucracy and the American
Political System. New York: Praeger, 1981. Discusses the different methods that
bureaucracies use to implement policy.
Lee, Eliza Wing-yee. “Political Science, Public Administration, and the Rise of the American
Administrative State.” Public Administration Review, V. 55 (Dec./Jan. 1995), 538-546.
Accessed 19 February 2000 from http://www.firstsearch.oclc.org Addresses the politicsadministration dichotomy problem and contends that it is not in the best interest of public
administration to meddle with a naturally-produced system.
Lindblom, Charles E. and Cohen, David K. Usable Knowledge: Social science and Problem
Solving. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1979. Lindblom’s infamous work on
“muddling through” to solve public administration problems helps to explain why
Rosenbloom’s “managerial approach” is salient.
Lipsky, Michael. Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services.
York: Russell Sage, 1980. Offers an explanation of how problems faced by individual public
servants are almost always resolved in a negative manner.
Lowi, Theodore J. The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority.
New York: W.W. Norton, 1969. Lowi’s contention that liberalism must go is in complete
accordance with Rosenbloom’s arguments.
34
Maslow, Abraham. Maslow on Management: New York: Wiley, 1998. Maslow ‘s compilation
of writings over his forty year career.
McGregor, Douglas. The Professional Manager. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967. This book
discusses the intricacies of the managerial perception of reality.
McGregor, Douglas. The Human Side of Enterprise. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960.
Advances theories involving management, the development of managerial talent, and his
trademark “Theory X”/conventionalism debate versus “Theory Y”/Modernization.
Meier, Kenneth J. “Bureaucracy and Democracy: The Case for More Bureaucracy and Less
Democracy.” Public Administration Review, V. 57 (May/June 1997), 193-199. Meier’s
article enhances Rosenbloom’s argument; Meier feels that excessive intervention in
administration in the name of democracy is wrong.
Merton, Robert K., et al. Reader in Bureaucracy. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1952. Contains
many articles on administration by notable authors from other disciplines.
Moe, Ronald C. and Gilmour, Robert S. “Rediscovering Principles of Public Administration:
The Neglected Foundation of Public Law.” Public Administration Review, V. 55 (Mar./Apr.
1995), 135-146. An insightful article that demonstrates how the laws that form the backbone
of public administration have eroded substantially.
Mosher, Frederick C. Democracy and the Public Service: Second Edition. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1982. Mosher’s book concentrates on the system of due process within
organizations.
Present, Phillip E. People and Public Administration. Pacific Palisades, CA: Palisades, 1979.
Offers a perspective focusing on the consumers of the fruits of public administration.
Pressman, Jeffrey L. and Wildavsky, Aaron. Implementation. Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 1973. Accounts for the sometimes wide gap between official policy and
results on the street.
Rosenbloom, David. Public Administration: Understanding Management, Politics, and Law in
the Public Sector. New York: Random House, 1989. Includes an ethical discussion of the
legal, managerial, and political approaches.
Shafritz, Jay M. and Hyde, Albert C. Classics of Public Administration, Fourth Edition. Fort
Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace, 1997. An excellent overview of the history and evolution of
public administration, containing many important works by influential authors of public
administration doctrine. An extremely useful tool for dissecting public administration
thought.
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Schick, Allen, ed. Making Economic Policy in Congress. Washington, DC: American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1983. A contemporary look at how Congress
is influenced and constrained by political, managerial, and legal concerns.
Simon, Herbert A. Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in
Administrative Organization: Third Edition. New York: Macmillan, 1976. Decision making
is the heart of any organization, and this book seeks to prove that theory holds, even when
confronted by varying types of organizations. The book also presents a useful nomenclature
for defining organizations.
Simon, Herbert A., Smithburg, Donald W., and Thompson, Victor A. Public Administration.
New York: Knopf, 1964. Focuses on the distribution of work and its effect on administrative
efficiency.
Skok, James E. “Policy Issue Networks and the Public Policy Cycle: A Structural-Functional
Framework for Public Administration.” Public Administration Review, Vol. 55 (July/Aug.
1995), 325-332. Skok tackles the problem of whether policy issue networks drive the public
policy, or vice versa.
Stillman, Richard J. Preface to Public Administration: A Search for Themes and Direction,
Second Edition. Burke, VA: Chatelaine, 1999. Discusses the main themes prevalent in
public administration, and compares American public administration to European models.
Waldo, Dwight. The Administrative State: A Study of the Political Theory of American Public
Administration. New York: Ronald Press, 1948. Includes a section discussing the relevancy
of the concept of separation of powers.
White, Leonard D. Introduction to the Study of Public Administration, Revised Edition. New
York: Macmillan, 1942. The chapter in this book on the role of the executive is helpful, but
even more interesting, although only peripherally related to the topic of this paper, are tactics
to ensure compliance with regulations.
Wildavsky, Aaron. The Politics of the Budgetary Process: Second Edition. Boston: Little,
Brown, 1964. In typical Wildavsky fashion, this book dissects the proper way of using
budgets to obtain policy objectives, without PPBS.
Wilson, James Q. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. New
York: Basic Books, 1989. Discusses bureaucratic strategies, their implementation, and their
successfulness.