Nietzsche-Seminar
Reflective Report, 08.05.09
Florian Häubi 0844675
Article for the Nietzsche-Wörterbuch (NWB) on
“Gefahr”
Benedetta Giovanola
Introduction:
This report is structured into four main chapters. The first one is a summary consisting of four
sections. Each section deals with one category discussed during the Nietzsche-Seminar.
Furthermore, the summary of each category is divided in three sub-sections. First, I will
present the category in general in line with the “Darstellung und Begründung des Konzepts
des Nietzsche-Wörterbuchs”. The second sub-section summarizes Giovanola’s article on the
concept of “Gefahr”, focusing primarily on the different meanings of “Gefahr” (category 2;
3/4). In the third one, I give a summary of the discussion and the main critical points.
In the second chapter of this paper I will present my own critical remarks and work them out
in more detail. Finally, the third chapter will give a conclusion.
1. Summary
1.1. Category 1
NWB:
The aim of the first category is to give quantitative and factual information about the
concerning lemma, in particular the “Wortformen”, “Beleganzahlen” and “Belegzeiten”. The
category also gives a hint to the emphasis in Nietzsche’s texts. However, remarks about the
“Verwendungsschwerpunkt” of a concept in a certain period are not merely from a
quantitative point of view, but from a qualitative point of view as well. Furthermore, the first
category outlines the “Wortfeld” regarding the concerning concept by giving synonyms or
other related concepts (including opposed concepts) in German and foreign languages. The
text of reference for this overview is the Kritische Studienausgabe.
Article:
The concept of “Gefahr” appears 1380 times in Nietzsche’s texts (including the Nachlass) and
is often used in a combined word-form. However, the article does not consider the concept
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“Ohngefähr” (today “ungefähr”) – although it is etymologically linked to “Gefahr” - since its
meaning is no more linked to “Gefahr”. The concept of “Gefahr” and the related word-forms
have their emphasis in the works of MA I, MA II, M, FW and JGB, whereas the concept of
“Lebensgefahr” and its related word-forms can mainly be found in the later works of
Nietzsche, especially in AC, EH and in the Nachlass from 1888-89.
Discussion:
Regarding the first category, four main points were made during the discussion. First, the
third Untimely Mediation, Schopenhauer als Erzieher should be taken into account when
talking about the emphasis of “Gefahr” in Nietzsche’s texts, since “Gefahr” is a decisive
notion in the whole of the third Untimely Meditation. Furthermore, it was suggested to take up
this text in category 7, which is meant to deal with texts in which the concept is in need of a
separate and more detailed commentary.
Second, the passage about the concept of “Ohngefähr/ungefähr” should be reduced, since it is
discussed at length in category 5.1. Furthermore, its relevance for an understanding of
“Gefahr” in Nietzsche’s texts should be reconsidered. I will come back to this point in my
personal critical remarks (cf. 3.)
Third, it might be better not to include the concepts of “Angst”, “Furcht” or “Feind” within
the “Wortfeld”, since one would open up a whole new range of other possible related
concepts such as “Krieg”, “Kampf”, etc.
Fourth, the fixed expression “Gefahr der Gefahren” which is used repeatedly by Nietzsche
should be added. One could also add the fact that Nietzsche refers with the superlative
“Gefahr der Gefahren” to different concepts such as “Moral” or “Nihilismus” and uses it in
different contexts.
1.2. Categories 2 and 3/4:
NWB:
The second category gives a “zusammenfassende Übersicht über die Bedeutung” of the
concerning lemma. The focus of the structure is on the analyses of the different manners
Nietzsche uses the concept and on the different “Wortbedeutungen”.1 The aim is to present
During the discussion, van Tongeren answered the question of how we are to understand “meaning” in the
following, pragmatic way: the meaning of a word is understood as the most complete circumscription of that
word in a certain and specific context.
1
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the semantic spectrum that a word has in Nietzsche’s vocabulary. In other words, the author
of the article should refrain - as far as possible - from formulating or paraphrasing any theses
about Nietzsche’s thinking.
In the printed edition of the NWB category 3 and 4 are taken together. Category 3 is meant for
a later electronic version of the NWB and will present category 4 to the full extent.
The fourth category keeps the structure of the different “Bedeutungsvarianten” presented in
category 2, but adds relevant passages of Nietzsche’s texts. However, the passage given
within a specific “Bedeutungsvariante” must not be understood as excluding other meanings.
On the contrary, the NWB aims to show that, for Nietzsche, a concept can have a different
meaning in the very same passage.
Article:
In the category 3/4, which is meant to present a complete structure of the different meanings
of the concept by means of selected passages, Giovanola structures the concept of “Gefahr” in
Nietzsche’s texts according to the following three questions: “Was heisst Gefahr?”, “Was ist
in Gefahr? (Was wird bedroht?)”, “Was ist die Quelle der Gefahr?” Each of the three
questions is subdivided in further specifications and complemented by selected passages.
The first question is answered by a main distinction between negative/passive on the one
hand, and, positive/active on the other hand. In the first meaning of the concept, according to
Giovanola’s structure, “Gefahr” is connected to destruction and weakening. As such,
„Gefahr” is linked to notions like “Wille zum Untergang” or “Wille zur Verneinung des
Lebens”. That is, in many cases where Nietzsche refers to „Gefahr“ with its passive/negative
meaning, it is life itself that is weakened or threatened. In another, more particular way,
Nietzsche thinks of this passivity in terms of morality or a “übertriebene Verehrung des
Vergangenen”.
However, Nietzsche understands “Gefahr” also as something positive or active, which –
according to Giovanola – is “Nietzsche’s peculiar use of Gefahr”.2 “Gefahr” in its
active/positive meaning is related to a twofold activity. First, activity understood as the
capacity of the individual to take risks, be it regarding life as such or regarding “Wissenschaft
bzw. Erkenntnis”. This capacity of taking risk becomes – contrary to the “Heerden-Instinkt” –
an attribute of the “starke Mensch” and an indication of a “Steigerung des Lebens”. Second,
activity is understood as experimenting. “Gefahr” in its positive connotation is connected with
2
Giovanola, p. 12.
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the “Noch-Nicht-Festgestellt-Sein” as the human condition. Therefore, “Gefahr” not only asks
for taking risks, but also for getting active in terms of “Versuch”, “Experiment” and
“schöpferische Kraft”. In order to take risks as well as experimenting, the individual is forced
to express “Mut”. Therefore, “Gefahr” is “ein Stimulans des Muts als innerer Haltung des
Lebens”.3
Regarding the second question – i.e. „Was ist in Gefahr? (Was wird bedroht?)” - Giovanola
makes a main distinction between “das Leben” and “die Menschen”. However, each of these
two main divisions is subdivided differently. Whereas “das Leben” is subdivided by
indicating through what the life is in danger, namely, on the one hand “durch die Historie”
and on the other hand “durch die Moral u. das Sitten-Machen”, the second main division
follows another structure. “Die Menschen” are subdivided in six different domains, namely:
“Das Menschliche”, “Der Mensch”, “Das Individuum”, “Die starken Menschen”, “Der
ausgezeichnete Mensch” and “Der Übermensch”. Furthermore, „das Individuum“ is
structured according to three different references: “als Glied der Gesellschaft”; “als fähig, an
sich zu denken” and “als einzelne Person”.
In the third section “Was ist die Quelle der Gefahr?”, Giovanola lists eight sources of danger.
The first of these sources is morality. It is subdivided into morality in general and two specific
kinds of morality, namely: “Die Heerde-Moral” and “Die Mitleids-Moral”. For the sources
“die Religion” and “die Wissenschaft” a threefold specification is given: religion’s
specifications are “das Christentum”, “der Monotheismus” and “Gott” and science is
subdivided into “Die Verzweiflung an der Wahrheit”, “der Wille zur Wahrheit um jeden
Preis” and “die Überfüllung mit wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen”.
The remaining five sources of danger are “das Mitleid”, “das Bewusstsein”, “die Kunst”, “die
Metaphysik” and “die Historie”.
Discussion:
The main part of the discussion dealt with category 3/4. The most important points can be
summarized as follows:
1) How can we separate between the source of a danger and that which is in danger? Would it
be possible to work with cross-references in order to give a fuller picture of the related
dangers? The point is that the structure does not make clear which relevance certain kinds of
“Gefahr” – e.g. “Moral” – have for a certain object that is in danger – e.g. “Das Individuum
3
Giovanola, p. 6.
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als einzelne Person”. Certainly, not every form of “Gefahr” threatens the same object in the
same way. Therefore, it would be helpful, for a better understanding of the different meanings
of “Gefahr”, if the danger and that which is in danger were explicitly interconnected.
2) The first main section of the structure “Was heisst Gefahr?” is not answered by
subdivisions such as “ein Wille zum Untergang” or “die Fähigkeit zu riskieren”. The listed
elements of “Gefahr” refer rather to different ways of dealing with “Gefahr” than to the
question of “Was heist ‘Gefahr’?” It was suggested to keep in mind the following question, in
order find the different meanings of “Gefahr”: which other concept could replace the concept
of “Gefahr”?
3) Giovanola answers the question of “Was heist Gefahr?” by making a main division
between “Gefahr” as something negative/passive and something positive/active. However, it
seems that “Gefahr” is never in itself something positive or negative. Rather, it becomes
positive or negative by provoking or asking for a certain kind of behaviour from the object in
danger. Moreover, it was suggested that “etwas Passives” might not be the right description,
since “ein Wille zum Untergang” - which is listed as a subcategory of “Etwas Passives” – can
be expressed as a strong activity.
4) An alternative structure according to van Tongeren consists of 5 questions and looks as
follows:
1) What are the “Grundbedeutungen” of “Gefahr”? Here, one could think of threat, to
risk, to seek, to fear something that can happen or not.
2) What does “Gefahr” consist in?
3) What is danger doing? What are its effects? It is this question which seems to be
answered by most of the elements of “Gefahr” listed by Giovanola regarding the
question “Was heisst Gefahr?”
4) What is in danger?
5) What are the causes of danger?
Since Nietzsche does often use in his texts certain types, one could add to the list the
following question: Who is dangerous?
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1.3. Category 5
NWB:
This category gives a philological, etymological and - if possible - a philosophical „Wort- und
Begriffsgeschichte“. Futhermore, it shows if and how Nietzsche can be situated in this “Wortund Begriffsgeschichte”. It should become apparent how a concept has developed within the
history of the concept as well as in the history of philosophy. In order to do so, it might be
helpful to compare Nietzsche’s use of a concept to earlier or contemporary writers – e.g.
Luther, Goethe – or to biographical, cultural or political contexts.
Article:
In the fifth category, Giovanola first (5.1.) describes the “Wortgeschichte” of “Gefahr”,
“Gefährlich u. Gefährlichkeit”, “Gefährden u. Gefährdung“ and „Ohngefähr u. Ungefähr“.
Then (5.2) she summarizes the history of the concept „Gefahr“ in philosophy.
Regarding the “Wortgeschichte”, there seem to be two important aspects. First, the word
“Gefahr” was originally used in the form “Fahr”, which means “(feindliche) Nachstellung”.
The adjunct “ge-“ can be observed since the 14th/15th century. Whereas “Fahr” as “feindlich
Nachstellung”, “Betrug” or “böse Absicht” originally designates the activity of the one who is
dangerous, this meaning is lost in “Gefahr”, which expresses merely the situation of the one
who is in danger. In this sense, “Gefahr” can also be linked with the sensation of being in
danger, i.e. “Furcht”, “Angst” or “Schrecken”.
Second, the word “Gefahr” is etymologically connected to “Ohngefähr” and “Ungefähr”.
Originally, “Ohngefähr” meant “ohne böse Absicht”. Later, it was used in the meaning of
“nicht mit Absicht” or “zufällig”. However, the use and the meaning of the word “Ohngefähr”
got lost and was replaced by “ungefähr”, which means “mehr oder weniger”.
In the second part on the “Philosophische Begriffsgeschichte”, Giovanola focuses on the
connection between “Gefahr” and the notion of sublime as it is embedded in the 18 th century.
The reason for this connection is the general understanding of the sublime as an infinite object
which provokes sentiments of pride and majesty as well as feelings of terror, fear or pain. In
this respect, Giovanola works out how for Kant the ethical and aesthetical dimension of the
sublime are linked and how the sublime is taken up by Lyotard as something “that challenges
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human perceptual and conceptual reach, as a regular inducement to strive to extend that
reach.”4
However, this part is not fully worked out yet. Giovanola is planning to add the Latin epic
tradition as well as the tradition of Greek tragedy, especially regarding Eschylus, Sophocles
and Euripides. Furthermore, the notion of “Gefahr” plays an important role in the history of
political philosophy, particularly in the political theories of Machiavelli, Hobbes, and
Rousseau.
Discussion:
1) The connection between the sublime and “Gefahr” has to be linked to some passages in
Nietzsche’s texts in order to show its relevance for an understanding of “Gefahr” in
Nietzsche. It was suggested to consider Nietzsche’s notion of “Dionysos” which in some way
might be understood as “erhaben” and therefore as something that threatens.
In general, the philosophical “Begriffsgeschichte” should keep in mind the relevance for an
understanding of Nietzsche’s notion of “Gefahr” and should be provided with decisive
passages of Nietzsche’s texts.
2) One could also take into account Hegel’s conception of “Herr und Knecht” for which
“Gefahr” seems to be an important element and therefore might be considered as a
philosophical relevant concept.
However, since Hegel thinks of the dynamic between “Herr und Knecht” in terms of “Agon”,
one would have to show that Nietzsche links “Gefahr” with “Agon” as well. But although
Nietzsche does use “Gefahr” in some passages together with “Krieg”, these passages seem to
be rather an exception than the rule.
1.4. Category 6
NWB:
The sixth category aims at giving an interpretative framework for different meanings, contexts
and connotations as they have been worked out in the fourth category. Here, problems
regarding the different aspects of the “Wortbedeutung” or its application are discussed and - if
necessary - the relevant “Forschungsliteratur” is consulted. Furthermore, regarding concepts
4
Giovanola, p. 11.
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which have a particular meaning for Nietzsche, this category aims to locate and indicate the
function of this concept within Nietzsche’s thinking.
Since this category is strongly interpretative, it has to be mentioned that it is not the intention
of the NWB to propose or to impose a particular interpretation.
Article:
Giovanola divides the sixth category in three parts. In the first part she summarizes how the
“Nietzsche-Forschung” has taken into account the concept of “Gefahr”. Although “Gefahr”
has not been subject to a specific research so far, its importance within the “NietzscheForschung” arises indirectly, that is, in its connection with other subjects, such as: “Historie”
and “Bildung” (Geijsen, 1997), “Wahrheit” as “Gefahr” and linked to “Mut” (Jaspers, 1936;
also: Zibis, 2007) and finally “Gefahr” as an important notion for an interpretation of the
“Vorwort” in Also sprach Zarathustra (van Tongeren 2000). However, Giovanola mainly
focuses on Müller-Lauter (2000), which sees “Gefahr” as a key concept of Heidegger’s
reading of nihilism.
The second part presents the “Herkünftliche Bedeutung und Verwendung von Gefahr bei
Nietzsche”. Giovanola presents Nietzsche’s peculiar use of “Gefahr” as something active and
affirmative and, as such, connected with “riskieren” and “experimentieren”. Furthermore, in
this sense, “Gefahr” is strictly linked to the individual’s transformation understood as a neverending process of “Selbstüberwindung” and creation of the future. Therefore, Nietzsche
seems to use “Gefahr” in order to describe the human condition as such. Within this situation
of uncertainty, the individual is confronted with two different options. On the one hand, he
can react passively and look for security, which is equivalent of creating “Sitten” and
subsuming oneself to morality; on the other hand, the individual can become active by
experimenting and expressing his creative power. This activity is strictly linked with
“Bejahung” and can therefore be seen as a “Lebensideal”. “Gefahr” as “Lebensideal” is
described by Giovanola in the third part.
It is from Morgenröthe onwards and in the later writings that Nietzsche thinks of “Gefahr” as
Lebensideal” and as “Stimulans des Lebens”. It is especially in opposition to morality as
“Wille zur Verneinung des Lebens” and as the attempt to transform human beings in
something general and stable that “Gefahr” gains an existential connotation. It is due to the
“Gefahr” that human beings can become individual – as opposed to “allgemein” - and thus
overcome morality and affirm life. Giovanola summarizes Nietzsche’s ideal as follows:
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“’gefährlich leben’, not avoiding danger, but rather taking it as a kind of source of energy that
increases our creative capacity.”5 Giovanola concludes that “Leben” and “Selbstgestaltung”
are therefore the two most important fields where Nietzsche gives a philosophical account of
“Gefahr”.
Discussion:
1) The key question which should be answered in the sixth category is: Why does “Gefahr”
for the first time in the history of philosophy get a specific philosophical meaning and why
does it become a central philosophical category in Nietzsche?
This point could be worked out in more detail by making the link between nihilism and
“Gefahr”. Giovanola points to the passage of NL 2 [100] 12.109f where Nietzsche writes:
“die Gefahr der Gefahren (Darstellung des Nihilismus) (als der nothwendigen Consequenz der
bisherigen Werthschätzungen) [...] Die Gefahr der Gefahren: Alles hat keinen Sinn.)“
Furthermore, this issue could be linked to Giovanola’s remarks about Heidegger’s
interpretation of Nietzsche.
2) In the discussion it was mentioned that “Gefahr als Lebensideal” might not be an adequate
expression. It seems that especially in SE, “Gefahr” does not appear as “Lebensideal” as such,
but rather as that which can bring about - in line with the particular decisions one makes –
something like a “Lebensideal”. Indeed, in SE Nietzsche seems to think of “Gefahr” in terms
of a constitution. Therefore, it is in the very constitution of Schopenhauer where one can find
different forms of “Gefahr”. Since “Gefahr” is something that one finds oneself already
confronted with, it is only by dealing in an appropriate way with these “Gefahren” that an
ideal can come about. However, it was suggested that “Gefahr” is mainly a cognitive ideal.
“Gefahr als Lebensideal” can then be described as confronting oneself actively with “Gefahr”
and exposing oneself cognitively to “Gefahr”.
3) It was suggested that one could also add the discussion about Nietzsche’s philosophy as
being dangerous itself.
2. Critical remarks
In my personal critical remark I will deal with the category 5., or more precisely with the
“philosophische Begriffsgeschichte”. I will work out in more detail Machiavelli’s conception
5
Giovanola, p. 13.
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of fortuna as it is related to “Gefahr” and “Mut”. The aim is to show the relevance of
Machiavelli’s notion of fortuna for an understanding of “Gefahr” in Nietzsche.
In her article on “Gefahr”, Giovanola writes: “Die Wortform ‘Ohngefähr’ (8 Belege), die nach
dem 18. Jh. allmählich durch ‚ungefähr‘ verdrängt wird und deren Etymologie sich auf G.
bezieht, ist bei N. substantiviert verwendet und bedeutet ‚Zufall‘.“ 6 I would like to argue that
the connection between “Zufall” and “Gefahr” is not only etymological, but also
philosophical which can be traced back to Machiavelli.
In his Principe, Machiavelli makes clear that fortuna as a universal force is the ultimate
danger for a state and its ruler. In the following passage, Machiavelli gives a metaphor in
order to describe fortuna:
„Ich vergleiche sie [fortuna, F.H.] mit einem reissenden Strom, der bei Hochwasser das Land
überschwemmt, Bäume und Häuser niederreisst, hier Land fortträgt und dort anschwemmt;
alles ergreift vor ihm die Flucht, jeder weicht seinem Ungestüm aus, ohne nur den geringsten
Widerstand leisten zu können. Obwohl die Dinge so liegen, bleibt doch nichts anderes übrig,
als dass die Menschen in ruhigen Zeiten durch den Bau von Deichen und Dämmen
Vorkehrungen treffen, und zwar derart, dass die steigenden Fluten entweder durch einen
Kanal abgeleitet werden oder ihre Wucht gehemmt wird, damit sie nicht so rasend und
verheerend sind.“7
This passage shows three important elements of fortuna. First, the conditions of emergence of
fortuna, the goddess of “Zufall”, are completely unknown. Human beings and especially the
ruler of the state are confronted with an uncontrollable and not calculable force, here
compared to the destructive power of a “torrential river”. Second, fortuna is described in this
passage as a danger, which accompanies every human action and human life in general.8 Once
she gets active, the effects are destructive and tremendous.
However, thirdly, the ruler can guard himself and his state against the dangerous impact of
fortuna by taking adequate measures. Nonetheless, it is not only prudentia and rational action
which are necessary in order to control the destructive force of fortuna. Another important
element is described by Machiavelli in the following passage:
“Fortuna ist ein Weib; um es unterzukriegen, muss man es schlagen und stossen. Man sieht
auch, dass es sich leichter von Draufgängern bezwingen lässt als von denen, die kühl
6
Giovanola, p. 1.
Machiavelli, Niccolò: Der Fürst, übers. u. hrsg. von Rudolf Zorn, Stuttgart 61978, p. 103.
8
For Machiavelli, fortuna does not only have destructive effects, but can also be beneficial.
7
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abwägend vorgehen.“9 The last sentence seems to suggest that fortuna can be easier
encountered by a brave person than by somebody hesitating or
This relation between fortuna, “Zufall”, “Gefahr” and “Mut” needs more attention and has to
be worked out in more detail. However, I think it became clear why this topic is of relevance
for an understanding of Nietzsche’s notion of “Gefahr”. As Prof. van Tongeren mentioned in
the Nietzsche-Seminar, Nietzsche does think in his works of “Gefahr” in terms of something
that can happen or not. Here, I would see the link between “Gefahr” and “Zufall”.
Furthermore, Giovanola also points to the important connection between “Gefahr” and “Mut”
by taking up van Tongeren’s discussion of the Vorwort in Also sprach Zarathustra and quotes
the following passage from the Nachlass: “Gott ist todt, dies ist die Ursache der grössten
Gefahr: wie? Sie könnte auch die Ursache des grössten Muths sein!”10
That is, the three elements as I worked them out regarding Machiavelli’s conception of
fortuna, can be found in Nietzsche. Therefore, I consider this topic to be important for the
“Philosophische Begriffsgeschichte” in category 5.
3. Conclusions
By way of conclusion, I would like to give one main impression I got from our last meeting
about the article on “Gefahr” for the NWB.
I realized how much one is tempted to structure Nietzsche’s use of concepts, such as
“Gefahr”, according to the opposition “positive” or “negative”. However, I think that one
should use these notions carefully, since they seem to be rather a matter of interpretation or
the result of it than a way of giving a description or structure. To structure a certain concept
according to positive or negative, is to ask: How did Nietzsche evaluate this concept in this
specific context? But this is a different question than to ask: What are the different meanings a
certain concept gets within Nietzsche’s use of language? – which I consider to be basic
question for category 2 and 3/4. Of course, this does not mean that there aren’t any concepts
in Nietzsche’s vocabulary – e.g. “Bildung” - which can be structured according to the
distinction between positive and negative.11
9
Ibid. p. 106.
KSA 12, 128.
11
It seems reasonable to structure „Bildung“ according to the distinction between positive and negative, since
these concepts do not refer to “Bildung” or its effects, but to the way Nietzsche is mainly concerned with
“Bildung”. Nietzsche works out on the one hand a “Bildungskritik” and on the other hand, he gives a more
positive account of “Bildung” by giving some referential points. Thus, the concept of “negative” refers to
“Bildungskritik” and the concept “positive” refers to the referential points.
10
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I think this is true not only regarding an article for the NWB, but for an interpretation of
Nietzsche in general. It seems that by reading Nietzsche and asking: what did Nietzsche want
to say?, it is difficult not to ask: how did Nietzsche relate to it? To be sure, I think the latter
question matters as much as the former does. But I also think that it is necessary to hesitate in
using evaluative concepts such as positive or negative.
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