Specimen Questions and Answers: German Unification
1. Assess the importance of the Zollverein and the 1848 Revolutions in the history of the
German Unification.
The master piece of Bismarck the conquest of Germany of Prussia or some historian call it the 'unification of Germany' is
always regarded under the direct influence of the Zollverein and 1848 Revolution. However, this view is not so precise to the
fact. Zollverein actually obstructed the unifcation. The 1848 Revolutions, offereed more construction influence, but always
associated with Bismarck's brillant statemanship. The 1848 Revolution, including its results and consequence, were only raw
materials. For Bismarck's policy was inspired by the revolutions. On the other hand, some effects of the revolution contributed
for the foundation of German unification.
Zollverein was formed in 1834,it was a custom union between the German states. Prussia initiated such union, naturally, she
became the leader. Her rival, Austria was excluded, some smaller states, such as Hanover, Oldenburg, Mechlenburg and the
three Hansa towns remained outside after 10 years of its formation.
Many people suggested that the Zollverein promoted a sense of belonging within the member states. However, the facts
proved it reversely. It was a loose organization of states, the veot rights enjoyed by the members made the negotiation of
commerical of labourious undertaking, a programme of unification could hardly be a product of such an unrooted
organization.
The German sovereign states seemingly followed Prussian economically but this idea dose not imply that they followed
Prussia politically. In 1866, Austro-Prussian War, most of the Zollverein members fought against Prussia. They remained
loyeal to their traditional leader- Austria. The sovereign states of Germany joined the Zollverein only because they wanted to
pacify the radical programme of the middle-class who resented the internal tariff of Germany- which hurt their economic
privilege. The prince aimed at survival not unification. If Germany was unified, their political power would certainly be
minimized to an unacceptable extent. Again they joined the German Empire and North German Confederation for the sake of
survival in 1870 and 1867 respectively. Since they joined the Zollverein, they were suspicious to Prussia, who joined the most
benefits from the union. Once again, the suggestion that Prussia assumed leadership from the Zollverein was disproved.
The smallere German states were economically improved after joining the Zollverein. But a unified Germany was formed,
both their political power and economic benefit would be reduced. Their independent econoic affairs would hardly
established under a unified Germany. In other words, they were satisfied by the established conditions and would never think
of an adventurous plan of unification.
From the view of the point the post-1870 German statesmen, the unification of Germany actually gave no share to the
Zollverein. The Zollverein was actually irrelevant to the events between 1862 and 1870. Tariff was not used as weapons to
forces states to join Prussia's camp, Austria was not attacked economically, or even France, her commerce was not boycotted
by the members of the Zollverein. Pure military expedition paved the way for German's future, but never economic interengagement.
The preceding paragraphs have proved that Prussia was not assumed as leader in 1834. Moreover, she was not trained as
leader between 1834 and 1867, and was never the leader of Germany in any aspect till 1867, in Crimean War, she echoed
Austria, in the 1859 Italian War she could get ride of Austria, also mobilized to meet the demand of Austria. In the Danish
War, David Thomson says that Prussia inevitably associated with Austria, this showed that Prussia could not formally
exploited Austria's leadership even until 1863. Though in 1848 Austrian leadership was deteriorated, Prussia could not
immediately overwhelm her.
The only seemingly acceptable view that Zollverein contributed to the unification of Germany was that it strengthened Prussia
economically. thus its military strength was improved. However, A. J. P. Taylor disagrees with this view, he realised that coal
production did not climb up until 1870, before 1870 there was even no big iron and steel industry in Germany. Only railways
contributed a little, Professor Taylor's view is reasonable since 1870, Prussia sent army to fight against Napoleon III, she had
already a considerable military strength, not only the Zollverein could improve her.
Practically, the Zollverein had the least importance in the history of German unification, even if there was no Zollverein,
German would have been unified.
Historians blames that the 1848 revolutions had no resolute programme thus if failed, but Bismarck's 'revolution' had a prefect
programme though without details. After 1849, we can notice that several distinctive features appeared.
German nationalism grew in this period, precisely Prussian patriotism rose. The cause of the phenomenon was greatly due to
the 1848 Revolution.
After the 1848 Revolution, the monarchies were discredited, for the dishonesty in the Frankfurt Assembly and their
reactionary policy. Bismarck knew that to make the dynasty survive, national colouring was essential. Thus, such a kind of
dynasty nationalism grew. The Danish crisis was one of the stimulus for the national sentiment in Germany.
Liberalism and soverignty of people's were stressed in the 1848 Revolution. Liberalism was discredited due to the
uncompromising attitude of the liberals who caused the revolution to death. The liberals only concerned with owned
previleges in 1848 but ignored other demands. So many of them abandon, liberalism and turned to German patriotism,
sovereignty of people. Bismarck diversified the masses mind from people's sovereignty to patriotism. They were induced to
put the state at their first importance, and abandoned their demand for liberty. The glory of Danish War and Seven Weeks'
War once again made both the liberals and nationalists quiet.
Vienna Settlment and the old fashioned despotism were destroyed in the revolution Prussia against from the engagement of
Holly Alliance. Vienna Settlement opposed German Unification, despotism, retarded German liberal and national movement.
Once the settlement was destroyed, they turned to the new slogans of 'nationalism'.
German revolution was fatal mainly because its participants were diversified in socialist, radical or other ideas. Bismarck
realised that if Prussia was divided by ideological fragmentation, unification could hardly success. Then he simultaneously
created a feeling of nationalism by provoking foreign threat, in Danish War, Austro-Prussian War and the Franco-Prussian
War, his aim was achieved, a national sentiment grew between the people.
Precisely, German nationalism began in 1863, the 1848 nationalism was pseudo-nationalism since the liberals only liberty but
concerned little for national unity. Bismarck was the creater of German nationalism.
Another feature was the rise of nationalism and Realpolitik which led to the belief of force and war. Nationalism was caused
by the failure of Romanticism in 1848 Sir Dewis Namica realised that the 1848 revolution were dreamers, their romantic ideas
contributed nothing to the revolution. Moreover, the revolutions were crushed the ties of people, then realised that forces
could determine anything. Practically, they believed forces more than theories after the revolution. They all discovered the
aims of 1848 could not achieve by manifests and barricades but by blood and iron. Even the most anti-invasion liberals also
supported Bismarck after 1866, Bismarck had the same opinion. Even he realised that the political was upheavaled.
Politicians like Castlereagh, Talleyrand could never found, they patronized peace, mutual help balance of power and moral,
however, the atmosphere of 1848 gave the politicians an idea that military strength could achieve what they desired.
Conspiracy, threat could also be used. Thus "Realpolitik" such as Bismarck and Cavour appeared.
Prussian leadership began to be transformed from 1848 and completed in 1867. The downfall of Metternich, caused a
political vacuum, the strongest Prussia became the first choice though no one thought Prussia would be the leader before 1848.
However, Prussia could not succeed Metternich immediately. Until 1867, Austrian influence in Germany was almost expelled.
The Prussian army acted as a protector in the 1848 Revolution, gave confidence to the princes, since they crushed the
revolution when they had recovered. So, in 1870 the princes went to Prussia for protection when a crisis came.
Austria was seriously weakened since she had received great disturbances in Hungary and Italy. These two revolutions helped
Prussia to assume leadership to a great extent. Moreover, in the Frankfurt Assembly, the Archduke John was a poor leader,
since the princes had tasted the situation of leaderless, they were eager to seek one to replace the deteriorating old man.
Prussia then, largely due to the revolution of 1848, built up the foundation of her leadership.
In the nineteenth century, no country could achieve her independence or unification without foreign assistance. For instance,
Greece, Belgium and Italy also got foreign help. Germany was not the exception. In the 1848 revolution, the revolutionaries
failed partly be cause they had no foreign help Bismarck knew the importance of foreign help especially when he wanted to
expel some powerful element from the country. At least, the foreign powers neutrality must be secured. In the Danish War,
Bismarck had Russian neutrality, in the Seven Weeks' War he had French neutrality. Moreover, he made use of the
foreigner's national pride to fulfill his destiny. He defeated Denmark in 1863, Austria in 1866 and France in 1870. These three
wars contributed a lot to the unification of Germany, but the idea was originated from the revolution of 1848.
Dictatorship was practised in Germany after 1862, when Bismarck came to office, he ignored the paramount and increased the
tax for army expenditure. This was also caused by the 1848 Revolution. In 1848, the parliamentary system was discredited by
the inefficient Frankfurt Assembly. So the people tolerated the dictatorship of Bismarck. However, Bismarck thought
reversely that the Frankfurt Assembly gave a chance for the Germans to voice their opinion, he was afraid that democracy
would grow, so he strictly controlled the parliament.
The 1848 Revolution failed, one of the reason was that the governments in Berlin and Vienna were healthy. They had cash in
hand, loyal army and the well administered public affairs. There had no disease to be cured. So, Bismarck changed a form of
revolution that was, he conquested the German States from above, not revolt from below. Due to the strong army of Prussia he
succeed. But he was inspired by the 1848 Revolution failure.
German nationalism paved the way for the ultimate nation forming army strength. Realpolitik were definite process to achieve
unification at that time, Prussian leadership, if not assumed, the whole story of German unification would have been rewritten,
foreign assistance, dictatorship and conquest programme were less important, but they also contributed to the unification to a
certain extent. But we must remember, these significant factors in the German unification was mainly inspired or influence by
the 1848 Revolution, this the Revolution in fact contributed a lot to the unification, the consequence of the Revolution were
raw materials, Bismarck was the manufacturer, both have the same important role.
2. How did the 1848 Revolution in Germany affect the unification movement?
The 1848 Revolution demonstrated certain positive effects on the German unification such as giving more weight on
diplomacy, by public, weakening of liberalism, rising power of conservatives, including Junkers. There was also the rising
power of Prussia as a potential leader in unification Germany, weakening the power of Austria and stabilizing economic
condition in Prussia. All these factors paved the way for the unification movement of Germany.
Firstly, public opinion was given more weight in diplomacy.
Socialism began to take its importance in Germany. At the least various important socialist traditions were born or furthered
in the revolution, leaders produced and a nucleus of support formed. However, the revolutions by increasing middle class fear
of social unrest, enhanced the general class consciousness of European society. This at least, in the long run assured the
development of new combat organisation on the part of the working class.
The rise of the middle class was also reflected. The middle class in Prussia gained more substantially. The Prussian
government now began to support industrialization. Bismarck also found it necessary to fulfill the demands of these people.
He also sought to manipulate sentiment of these people to his own ends. A means of Bismarck to unify Germany was to create
public opinion in favour of German unity.
Secondly, the failure of the 1848 Revolution demonstrated the weakening of Liberalism. Liberals, though they might
challenge existing government, held back from a full confrontation. The hopes of a united Germany under liberal aspires had
failed and the way was paved. In the pacification of Germany under Bismarck's policy of 'blood and Iron' during the 1860s, it
was mainly because Bismarck had learnt from the failure of the 1848 Revolutions that 'it was necessary that Germany should
look not to Liberalism but to her own power.' In 1853, that real politic was used for the first time, that is, Bismarck was able
to bring the whole of non-Austrian Germany into the Zollverein. It could be seen though the joining of Brunswish, Hanover,
and Oldenburg into the Zollverein.
Bismarck had no liking for Liberalism and Nationalism. He never relied on the strength of the parliament, but only on the
efficient bureaucracy and a strength army in governing Prussia. But he realised the tremendous influence of both forces. He
understood that liberal demand had to be satisfied to certain extent because Liberalism and Nationalism had one supported
among the people. Therefore, the parliament was kept and nationalism was used for the conquest of Germany by Prussia.
Thirdly, in the 1848 Revolution conservative had emerged as political force included Junkers. They responded police, though
not judicial rights over their estates. There was little resistance to the reactionary regimes had this cannot be resistance to the
reactionary regimes and this cannot be explained entirely by the activities of political policy.
The conservatives also understood signs of universal suffrage and showed interest in social problems. They learned that some
concessions to the demands for changes were necessary and reasonably painless. Therefore, during the revolutions themselves,
to conciliate groups such as peasantry. Other concessions followed, particularly towards liberals and nationalists. The old
style conservatism of the Metternichian variety pretty well disappeared. All the same time, conservatives tightened their
defences. Police force were greatly expanded and were given better training in not control. This plus improvements in
weaponry made barricade fighting an increasingly risky venture. So the conservatives in Prussia adopted social policy in order
to gain support of people. It was the conservatives under Bismarck that was to lead Germany under unification but not
liberalism. People were quite willing to accept their leadership.
Fourthly, the shift in the balance of power was evident in 1848. Prussia emerged as the potential leader in unifying Germany,
Frederick William IV suggested a new and closer union under the Prussian presidency.
With the creation of Zollverein Prussia became economically supreme in Germany. Moreover, economic unity formed the
basis for later political unity. Prussian economic power was a contributing cause of her later military and political supremacy
in Germany. Furthermore, Austria began to lose influence in German affairs. As Austria did not become a member, this
accustomed people to think of a unified Germany which excluded her.
At that time, there were three possible solutions to German Unification. The first one was to admit all Austrian Empire into
the new Germany. The second one was to admit only the German part of Austria and the last one was to admit none of Austria.
Finally, the delegates in assembly agreed to include only the German part of Austria. When Austria rejected the proposal. The
delegates looked to Prussia for leadership. The potential leadership of Prussia had been shown.
At the same time, the 1848 Revolution marked the rise of Louis Napoleon of France who wanted to extend her frontier
including the Rhineland. Therefore, the German states after 1848 looked for Prussia for protection.
Fifthly, Austria was weakened by the revolutionary outbreak. Austria was still ruled under autocratic rule but Prussia was
more willing to reform. Although Prussian series of reforms was taken in a small degree with little significance, she was able
to create an effective and powerful bureaucracy.
Conversely, Austria suffered from poor diplomacy especially after the sudden death of Schwarzenberg in 1852. There was a
lack of potential leader in Austria and the affairs floundered under the personal direction of the Emperor. Austria had
considerable problems both at home and abroad. Her failure to restore her problems as a result of inflexible diplomacy
contributed to her decline.
Lastly, Prussia became more powerful than Austria through the economic means. The Zollverein represented a serious means.
The Zollverein represented a serious threat to the hegemony of Austria in Germany. Economic unity formed the basis for later
political unity. As the Zollverein never included Austria as a member. Prussia would have become richer and stronger
together with the economic power and strength to oppose Austria.
Austro-Prussian war was inevitable after 1848. Austria wanted to preserve her supremacy but this depended to a large extent
on her position in Germany. Therefore, she was unwilling to give up her power in Germany to Prussia. At that time, Prussia's
power was increasing. Therefore, war was unavoidable.
Consequently, the positive changes in the 1848 Revolution were able to pave a way for the German unification.
3. In what ways did the formation of Zollverein a landmark of German Unification?
In 1818 Prussia abolished the internal tariff of the provinces and set up a standard tariff. The German states complained of the
high transit due of Prussia. By negotiation, the German states engulfed Prussia agreed to adopt the Prussian tariff. Hence,
adopted the Prussian tariff and drew it share of customs revenue calculated on population proportion. This was the foundation
of the Zollverein.
The south German states began to feel the economic pressure of the Zollverein. Bavaria and Wuttemburg formed the South
German customs union, however, by a series of negotiation, the South German customs union merged into the Zollverein. The
affairs of Zollverein was regulated by a conference in which disputes were sent from member states. Prussia represented the
Zollverein in negotiation with foreign powers. Zollverein enabled Prussia as to assume economic leadership in Germans long
before its political unification.
In 1834, Prussia was commanding a population of 23.5 million in economic affairs.
Austria was suspicious of Prussia and hated Prussia's challenged for the leadership of Germany, therefore, she opposed to the
Zollverein, Austria helped the setting up of the Middle Germans Commerical Union as a counter-balance to the Zollverein,
however, Prussia was able to break up the Union by a series of treaties. Austria then forced Prussia to enter a treaty abolishing
the prohibitive duties between Zollverein and Austria and proposing the establishment of z Zollverein-Austria Customs Union
in the future. This never came into existence, therefore, Austria failed to break up the Zollverein or alternatively, dominated it,
later joined the Zollverein by them, Prussia was in a leading position of a population of 36 million.
After 1848, industrial production of the Zollverein doubled. iron and coal production tripled. By 1870 the Zollverein enabled
coal production passed the French marked. The great prosperity and wealth created by the Zollverein enabled Prussia to build
up her armament and finance wars. This contributed to the success of Prussia in the Austro-Prussian War and the FrancoPrussian War. Economic prosperity led to military success and paved the way to the creation of the North German
Confederation in 1869 and the German Empire in 1870.
"As far as economic life was concerned, Germany was practically united before Bismarck began work at all." wrote W. O.
Henderson. The German States were forced to join the Zollverein because of its economic pressure. The economic exclusion
of Austria participated the political exclusion. Although the Zollverein had failed to prevent the South German states and
Hanover to join the war in 1867 on the side of Austria, the former members of the Zollverein continued to levy customs and
sold them to Berlin and received the normal share. This indicated how important economic impact was on the German states.
After the setting up of the Confederation of North German States, the Zollverein was an important link between the
Confederation and the South German states, as W. O. Henderson observed, "it was a commerical, political and legal bond
between the North and South Germany.
Moreover, the Zollverein was significant in the promotion of national consciousness of the German people. The improvement
of communication by the setting up of an uniform postal and telegraph services, enhance the nationalism of the Germans.
Moreover, "the consciousness of mutual dependence... lies the historical significance of the customs union" wrote W. O.
Henderson. Therefore, the Zollverein contributed to the psychological preparation of German Confederation among the
Germans, as Bewring said, "by a community of interest an commerical and broading questions, it has prepared the way for a
political nationality."
The Conference of the Zollverein provided a place for the Prussian diplomats to learn their skill by manoevouring small states
without irritating them or display of force. This experience was valued. Since it had so Prussia's diplomatic success in 1867 in
securing French and Russian neutrality and in 1870 Austria and Russian neutrality, also the diplomatic success after the
creation.
Consequently, the states most their respective deputies to the conference and discussed problems. This was the forerunner of
the Riechstag of the German Empire. The Zollverein also was attributed to German's rise in economic predominance in the
continent after 1870 as it had laid down the foundation of the modern German economic. Therefore, the formation of the
Zollverein was a landmark in the history of German unification economically, politically, militarily and psychologically.
4. What part did the diplomacy play in the process of German Unification?
Diplomacy is the relation between states. In the process of German Unification, Prussia used diplomacy as a measure to
achieve the Unification of Germany under Prussian leadership. In my opinion, diplomacy played an important part in the
process of German Unification. If there had no such diplomacy, Germany might not have been united.
The first diplomacy played in the process of German Unification was the Vienna Settlement of 1815. The Vienna Congress
established the German Confederation. The Vienna peace makers attempted to simplify the structure of Germany to form
effective checks on France. As a result, the number of German states was reduced to 39. They had never thought of it being
the first step towards unification.
The Vienna Settlement though despaired Prussia of some Polish provinces, Prussia's position in 1815 was strengthened with
gaining of Rhineland. It consented to Austria dominance in Germany for the time being. But as its strength continued to grow,
discord between Prussia and Austria was unavoidable. So while maintaining a balance between Austria and Prussia in Central
Europe, the 1815 settlement prepared Prussia in the long run for leadership in the movement towards German unity.
Furthermore, by the settlement of 1815, Prussia exchanged a large share of her holding in Poland. For held of Saxony did for
the Rhineland province and Westphalia. This tended to transform Prussia from as thoroughly agricultural state into the leading
industrial state of Germany. By the Vienna Settlement, Prussia was meant to be a bulwark against France, this made her
ultimately the national champion of Germany.
On the whole, the German Unification in 1871 meant a partial breach of settlement of 1815, but ironically the very seeds for
the making of Germany were sown at first by the 1815 settlement.
Then came the formation of the Zollverein. Since it was through the relation between Prussia and other German States that the
Zollverein was established, it was also regarded as a part of diplomacy. The formation of the Zollverein under Prussia
fostered leadership. It first made Prussia essential to Germany.
The Zollverein was in large part, the result of Prussian determination. Its aim was to prevent economic union through the
German Confederation, a protectionist union which would have been dominated by Austria and would have found its centre of
gravity in the Danube Valley to the political and economic ruin of Prussia. So the Zollverein became a powerful instrument in
Prussia's control of Germany. Thus the formation of the Zollverein facilitated Prussian leadership in German unification.
It was Bismarck who made use of diplomacy to bring about the unification. Bismarck tried to unite Germany by waging war
on Austria, and then consolidate Prussian superiority in Germany by waging war on France. His use of force in each case went
hand in hand with his brilliant diplomacy.
Firstly, at a meeting at Frankfurt in 1863, Austria proposed an reorganization of the Confederation, Prussia refused to enter
the scheme. Other states realised that their survival depended upon the balance between Prussia and Austria; and therefore,
refused to support the scheme. It was through diplomacy that Austria failed to restore influence in German Confederation.
Secondly, in the Polish Revolt of 1863, Bismarck made clear that he had little sympathy with the Polish rebels. A convention
now signed with the Tsar by which the military forces of both states would co-operate within their own territories in putting
down the Polish rebels. By doing so, Bismarck gained his first and most important ally.
Moreover, in the Schleswig-Holstein question, German nationalists championed the resistance of the two duchies against
Denmark. They turned to Prussia for leadership in this affair. Bismarck saw this as an opportunity to annex both duchies
which were of strategic value. Besides, he found lots to gain Prussia's prestige could be raised, the might of the reorganised
army could be tested. Moreover, he might find a pretext for war against Austria over such thorny questions and he could also
win the support of German nationalists.
In January, 1864 an Austro-Prussian alliance was formed. Denmark was finally defeated. By the Treaty of Vienna in October
1864, the king of Denmark renounced all rights over the two duchies. A year later, Prussia and Austria signed the Convention
of Gastein, by which Prussia would administer Schleswig and Austria administer Holstein.
Bismarck later manipulated the term of the Convention to pick up quarrel with Austria. Some historians argued that his real
intention of fighting the war was to start a quarrel with Austria later.
Lastly came the Austro-Prussia War in 1866. Preparation was complete after two years of rest. Diplomatically, Austria was
isolated. Bismarck had a meeting with Napoleon at which he extracted a promise of French neutrality in case of war between
Prussia and Austria. Agreement with Italy now also made by Bismarck who promised Italy would get back Venetia if it joined
Prussia against Austria, if war took place. Russia was on good terms with Prussia since 1863. What was needed was a pretext
for war. The issue of control over the two duchies gave Bismarck the chance. Bismarck made Austria declared war first and it
seemed that Austria was an aggressor. Thus, Austria had been played into the hands of Bismarck. Bismarck also realised
Austria would not accept mediation, so he allowed th mission of Arton Von Gablenz to seek peace between the two states.
Due to such diplomatic skill of Bismarck, Austria seemed to be an aggressor which was unwilling to preserve peace.
The war ended quickly with the defeat of Austria. The Treaty of Prague was lenient to Austria. Austria agreed to have the
German Confederation dissolved nd the North German Confederation was created under Prussian presidency.
South German states then inclined closer to Prussia. They signed treaties of defensive alliance with the North German
Confederation after joining the Zollverein to form a customs parliament called Zollparliament. Eventually, the German
unification was achieved.
In conclusion, diplomacy played the most important part in the process of German Unification. Though internal army reform
was also one of the factors, diplomacy was the major factor that led to success. The Vienna Settlement first paved the way for
Prussian leadership. Then the formation of Zollverein further strengthened Prussia's position. It was the diplomacy of
Bismarck that achieved the aim. Thus, diplomacy played a dominant role ion the process of German Unification.
5. "Germany was not united, but conquered." Discuss.
The nature of the unification of Germany was complex just as the personality of its architect--- Count Otto Von Bismarck,
was. It is because the united Germany which came into existence in 1870 was actually constructed at various stages and by
numerous people. Each had its own characteristics and to sum up the unification went back as early as 1815, when Bismarck
was still a long way from the European political scene. In the following, each of the "stages" would be examined
chronologically to see how there is A. J. P. Taylor's comment was in each case.
After the Congress of Vienna, in 1815, the thirty-nine German states grouped loosely together, willingly, to form a Germanic
Confederation. This provided the earliest instruction of unification, though insignificant, should not be ignored. This league
was reinforced when in 1818, Prussia proposed the an economic union of the states in the abolition of the numerous internal
customs barrier to promote trade. A custom union or the Zollverein was formed in 1819, later attracting the other states to join
in. A South German custom union and a Middle German Custom Union appeared, following. This provided a groundwork for
further union with three cohesive economic groups rather than some thirty individual states. Gradually, the Zollverein
prospered. It became undoubtedly, 'an economic weapon' that can 'achieve political ends." But, in reality, so far no arms had
been used in uniting Germany. Without 'conquering', the foundation of a united Germany was laid, rather by the common
economic interests of the states. The Zollverein was strengthened later in 1854 when Hanover joined and in 1854 when the
states signed to agree on the continuance on the economic unity.
With the rise of Bismarck, the unification started to have a military small. In 1864, Denmark was defeated in the DanishPrussian War. Prussia, of course, played "the role of the injured". It was Denmark who tried to annex Holstein-Schleswig
violating the terms in the Treaty of London. As a result of this, Treaty of Gastein signed, in which Austria was to administer
Holstein, and Prussia got Schleswig. This was, in effect, one step nearer to annexation. Thus, in this case, Prussia brought
forth a step to a united Germany by conquest but it was conquering of a third part, and not the immediate state there was
annexed. In June 1866, Prussia in another attempt to provoke Austria, occupied Holstein. This incident justified what A. J. P.
Taylor commented.
The cause of the unification leaped forward drastically with the outbreak of the Austro-Prussian War in 1866, namely due to
the conflicts over the duchies and the setting up of the German constitution. Austria was defeated, and so naturally, were her
supporting states, among them Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover and Baden. The Treaty of Prague was signed and a North German
Confederation including all states north of the River Main was recognised. This was a very important stage towards complete
German unification. However, again, the annexed or united states, except for some like Hanover and Saxony, were not
conquered by Prussia. The union was dependent upon, rather, a defeat of third party --- Austria. Taylor's account was
therefore true only to a certain extent.
The final phase of German unification came with the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War during which the states of the
South German Confederation joined the North German Confederation into a united military war. After the defeat of France,
the treaty of Frankfurt was signed and a united German Confederation declared. The southern states helped the North German
Confederation because they shared a common German nationality and an association in the past Zollverein. The military glory
Prussia had gained and Bismarck's championship of their integrity against France by turning down her proposal to annex
parts of southern Germany just before the war pleased the states. Therefore, this unification was totally voluntary and the
conquering was again on a third party --- France.
From the above, we can see that the statement was valid in only some cases, Bismarck's tactic, however skillful, and Prussia's
military strength, however, threatening were insufficient to create the German Empire in 1871. Other factors, like the
appearance of a foreign threat and the link up of the states by railways and communication, constituted a lot to unite the
German states. The different German prince had always looked to Vienna, instead of Berlin, for leadership. It seems unlikely
that they would change their attitudes willingly. Moreover, the Bismarckian Reich imposed in the German states after the
Treaty of Frankfurt was one of dictatorship under the Prussian king who held the presidency hereditarily. There was unequal
representation in the State Council with Prussia getting 17 out of 58 votes, while no other states had more than 4. The Empire
was therefore nothing but an expanded Prussia. Surely, the states would never have agreed to such terms of it had not been for
fear of Prussia's military power. But as history has shown that no military manoeuver took place, thus, the German unification
could not be considered as totally a military conquer, but rather if possible, a psychological conquer over the states.
The statement of 'Germany was not united but conquered" applied in the case of Holstein, and some states that joined the
Confederation after the Austro-Prussian War. However, in most cases, like many of the northern and all of the southern states
joined willingly thus, invalidating the statement. However, it seemed very likely that Bismarck would use the Prussia arms to
conquer the states to ensure a Prussian dominance over the German states if things had not happened so smoothly. But this is
no more than conjecture. The various German states were united, very often, with the defeat or 'conquer' of a third country --Denmark, Austria and France. However, this does not seem to be the case suggested by the statement, which implied more
likely to the conquering of the states and so does not support it. With a 'blood and iron' policy, with war being 'the national
industry of Prussia'. Prussia were able to unite Germany, but without extensive use of her policy and industry on the states
united. Thus, the statement given is true only to a united extent the 'conquer' seldom appeared more than a psychological
threat which was adequate in itself.
6. Was the unification of Germany a by-product of Bismarck's pursuit of Prussian interest?
There is no denying the unification of Germany was by-product of Bismarck's pursuit of Prussian interest, Bismarck was born
in the year of Waterloo and belonged to the class of large Prussian landowners of Junkers. By the tradition of his family and
class, as well as by personal temperament, Bismarck was intensely conservative in outlook and had a strong patriotism for
Prussia. Prussia interest was always dear to heart.
Bismarck's patriotism for Prussia showed itself early in his careers. Then he became Prussia representative to the restored Diet
at Frankfurt, he realised that Prussia had no future so long as she was tied to the Austrian-dominated Bund, Austria was the
enemy, not only of German unity, but --- most ranked even higher in Bismarck's rank least equal with Austria in the conduct
of German affairs. In 1859, when he was sent to St. Petersburg as Prussian ambassador to Russia his leading ideas had taken
definite shape: devotion to Prussia, contempt for liberalism and its methods, belief in force as the arbitrator of destiny and a
determination to end the hampering effect of Austrian dominance over German affairs.
Bismarck was first and always a Prussian nationalist who believed that Prussian interests demanded that she should dominate
the whole of northern Germany and exclude Austria for German affairs. His policy towards Denmark, Austria and even
France was guided therefore, only by the one ultimate task of the interests of the Prussia state. All else was a matter of detail
and method, determined by circumstances of the polities understood them. The unification of Germany was incidental, a byproduct of his never-ending pursuit of Prussian interests.
One aim Bismarck never pursued: that of uniting all Germans in a single national state. Greater Germany would mean the end
of Junker Prussia. The Junkers had another the number of the capacity of run all central Europe, instead, German radicialism
would run Prussia. Greater Germany would be predominantly Rome Catholics if the Austrian lands were excluded. Greater
Germany mean a greater German foreign policy, protection, that is, of the German communities in eastern and South Eastern
Europe, conflict therefore with Russia to the rui of Junkers, for co-operation between Russia and Prussia was vital for the
subjugation of Poland and so for the security of the Junker estates. Ultimately Greater Germany, with its programme of
central Europe united German authority, implied a conflict not only with Russia, but with all the world, a conflict which
Bismarck knew the Junkers were not powerful enough to sustain. Bismarck was ceaselessly active and his mind endlessly
fertile in expedients, but in the last resort his policy was, like Metternich's negative; to bar the way to Greater Germany.
Metternich and Bismarck both despaired of the old order for which alone they cared. Metternich defended the old order
without hoping for success. Bismarck went far with the new forces in order to draw their sting. He conjured up the phantom of
unification in order to avoid the reality.
The independent action of Prussia and the lack of co-operation between Prussia and the German states in the War against
Denmark and Austria was another factor to illustrate that Bismarck fought the wars primarily for the purpose of satisfying
Prussian interests. In the case of Schleswig and Holstein, the German Diet declared in favour of the Duke of Augustenburg,
and forces of some smaller states marched into Holstein. Bismarck wanted the Duchies for Prussia, and not for a petty duke
backed by the German Confederation. So he invited Austria to enter into war against Denmark. In this way it would indicate
future leadership, and would raise Prussia's prestige. In the Austro-Prussian War, Bismarck again took no notice of the desire
of the German states. The majority of the other German states supported Austria while Prussia acted independently.
The Treaty of Prague which terminated the war made Bismarck's dream of a united Germany under Prussian domination a
reality. Austria was henceforth excluded from German. A North German Confederation was created. It was composed of the
states north of the River Main. Schleswig-Holstein. However, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau and Frankfurt were annexed by Prussia.
A constitution was drawn up by Bismarck and accept by or forced upon government of the states; for in this year 1866
German opinion as a whole was still on the side of Austria and even in Prussia, especially in the Rhinelands, there was a
resistance to the war against Austria. They opposed to Prussian predominance in the Federal Council. The liberal class was
alienated by Bismarck's unconstitutional government. It is true to say that north Germany was conquered, not united, because
Bismarck's outlook on European politics was always Prussian rather than German. "Prussia we are and Prussians we will
remain" he said. German unity was for him an extension of Prussian power.
The Seven Weeks' War was milestone on the road of German unification, by it Prussia hegemony in Germany was established,
but German unity was still in complete. The South German states still remained out of the Prussian fold. The way Bismarck
prepared for the absorption of the south states was a war with France aiming arousing the spirit of nationalism among them
causes for a Franco-Prussian war were not lacking. Napoleon III's irritation and alarm at the growth of Prussian power across
the Rhine and his failure to obtain territorial compensation as vaguely promised by Bismarck at Biarrity gave ground for
conflict. Finally the problem about the purchase of Luxembourg and the Spanish candidacy lighted the power barrel of the
Franco-Prussian War of 1870. Exactly to the wish of Bismarck, the South German states placed their arms at the disposal of
the North German Confederation, so that when the Franco-Prussian War ended with the Treaty of Frankfurt 1871, the South
German states were swept into the embrace of Prussia and a German Empire was declared at the coronation of the Prussian
king in the Hall of Mirrors in Versailles.
The imperial constitution was simply a revised edition of the North German Confederation 1867. In the new empire, equality
of the federated state was formal not material when the Emperor Frederick William I said "The empire is nothing but an
expended Prussia" he told the truth. In short Prussia was predominant in the Federal Council, her king was emperor, sole ruler
who was to exercise executive power to control foreign affairs. The German unity of 1871 was not a unity expressed in selfgovernment by the German people. The new state was designed not to represent the will of the German people but to maintain
as in the general past the subjection of the people to the will of a privileged minority.
This was simply the result of the Bismarckian policy. He purposely created a "Prussian Germany" instead of a "Greater
Germany" which would mean the end of Junkers Prussia, the predominance of Roman Catholics and conflict with Russia or
the world, a conflict which the Junker class to which Bismarck belonged, was not powerful enough to sustain.
In conclusion, we can say that the unification of Germany can be described as a "victory of Prussian imperialism" but it
should be noted that without the industrial development and economic prosperity which preceded the political movement,
Prussian imperialism could hardly be realised.
7. "The conquest of Germany by Prussia." Is this an accurate description of German
Unification.
The issue which brought Bismarck to power was the fear of German radicalism and the preservation of the domination of the
military caste, that is the Junker class, in Prussia. Bismarck was to set up a German Confederation under the domination of
Prussia and maintain Prussia's autonomy within the Confederation.
Bismarck belonged to the Junker caste which was the irreconcilable enemy of German unification. The Prussian army was the
enemy of radicialism and liberalism. Bismarck's deliberate expulsion of Austria from Germany indicated how very far indeed
Bismarck was from being the apostle of German nationalism. L. C. B. Seaman wrote "Bismarck's German Empire was based
on the division of Germany, not its unification." Therefore, Bismarck's campaigns were not derived from the notion of
German unification.
Bismarck conquered Germany in order to prevent its unification because a German Empire its unification because a German
Empire included Austria and Bohemia would lead to incompatible clash with Russia, whose co-operation was essential for the
maintenance of the Junker estates in Poland. A genuine German Empire would drive the Junker class to its ruins. Bismarck's
alliance with Russia indicated future war of Prussia would be against the liberal West, that is, France and the German radicals.
Bismarck annexed Schleswig-Holstein was not due to the wishes of the Germans but the prestige and strengthening of the
Junker class of Prussia. If Bismarck was a genuine nationalist, Schleswig-Holstein should have incorporated into the German
Confederation but not annexed by Prussia. The annexation marked the beginning of the conquest of Germany was Prussia.
Bismarck forced the Dual Monarchy into war in order to bring her to the sense of defeat and win her back to the conservative
cause. If Prussia was to unify Germany, the Hapsburg Monarchy should be incorporated into the German Confederation, or at
least its German population. However, Bismarck had no desire on Austrian territory because the saw the Hapsburg Monarchy
as an useful buffer state between the North German Confederation and Russia. This was a remarkable indication showing
Prussia was to conquer Germany to prevent its unification.
Moreover, most of the other German states were on the side of Austria Anti-Prussia feeling prevailed Germany. Hanover and
some other south German state withdrew from the Zollverein to show their antipathy. Therefore, the Austro-Prussian War, on
the Prussian side, was not a people's war. Hence, A. J. P. Taylor says "Germany was conquered, not unified" and described
Bismarck's campaigns as 'the conquest of Germany by Prussia." The North German Confederation was far from a democratic,
liberal organisation. It was dominated by Prussia, through its Imperial Chancellor, Bismarck.
Moreover, before Bismarck's diplomatic and military campaigns. Prussia economic pressure had forced the other German
states to join the Prussian Zollverein. The union of customs was based on Prussian form of customs. Although there were
conference between the Zollverein member-states, the power of signing commerical treaties with foreign nations were not
controlled by these conferences, but by Prussia. By this way, Germany was economically conquered.
A Prussian diplomat once said to Bismarck 'our power must fluid its limits when the supply of Junker officers given out."
Bismarck replied, "I could not say that in public, but it is the basis of my plans." This indicated all the work of Bismarck was
done for the benefit of the Junker caste, the dominating force in Prussia, not for Germany.
Bismarck's war against France was purely based on opportunism. Had Napoleon III been an absolute ruler in 1870, there
would be no Franco-Russian War. Bismarck saw the opportunity to use the Ems Telegram Incident to change humiliation into
prestige and triumph. Bismarck was nor to engage in a large-scale war in order to get the South German States incorporated
into the German Confederation. It was only by name that the south states were not under the Prussian Confederation.
Therefore, Bismarck's campaigns was the process of 'Prussianization of Germany'. Germany was conquered by Prussia
militarily, diplomatically and economically and Prussia was not absorbed into Germany until the reign of Kaiser William II.
Hence the statement of "the conquest of Germany by Prussia" was an very accurate description of German unification.
8. To what extent was the German Unification by 1871 the outcome of Prussianization?
"Prussianization" meant a process to transfer the Prussia idea of monarchical, aristocratic and military state to the rest of
Germany. However, after 1848, this process implied an assertion of the Conservatism of the Prussian type and the theory of
constitutional balance, rather than the pre-1848 absolutism.
The struggle with the Prussian and German liberalism. During the revolutionary turmoil of 1848-1850, the Prussian
conservatives of Bismarck's type were keenly aware of the liberal and democratic threat to the Prussian landed aristocracy, the
Junkers. In the following decade, Bismarck already visualized a grand design of Prussian policy be which the German liberal
and national sentiment could be harnessed to give the Prussian crown power. The conservative national assembly and still
'reap the thanks of the liberals' taking up the cause of little Germany was a double-edged move against liberalism and the
Austrian pretension.
In face of the crisis of 1862, Bismarck resolved on the policy of blood and iron. It was to undermine liberalism by giving
satisfaction to the popular demand for national unity and coupling it with the intoxications of military glory. During the Polish
crisis, he induced Alexander II to retreat from frivolity with liberalism. In 1864, instead of allowing Augustenburg's claim to
Schleswig-Holstein which would mean their union with the Confederation -- a victory of liberal nationalism, he conspired for
Prussian absorption of the two provinces.
Bismarck's military encountered in February 1866 advocate of censure passed in the Prussian Diet by 263 votes to 35. He
remarked "an old woman would sweep me into the gutter by a sway of her bosom, implying that his ministry might be
overthrown." Hence, the policy to divert the public attention from liberty and democracy at home glory in a foreign war.
The 1867 Constitution of the North German Confederation, the master --- piece of Bismarckian conservatism rather than
Prussian absolutism, preserved the Diving Right of the Prussian King, but the democratic franchise was also kept. The role of
Chancellor became an ever more essential element to the constitutional system. The Chancellor, though appointed by and
responsible to the Prussian King, was to serve as the president of the Bundesrat, the aristocracy and ministry were to function
as the pivot of the constitutional set-up, either to mediate between monarchical absolutism and democracy or to play off one
against the other. As long as Bismarck was in power, he could by his skillful leadership prevent a majority in Parliament from
rising to the opposition of the government.
Thus the North German Confederation was but a graft on the kingdom of Prussia. It registered the defeat of the German
political liberalism and the absorption of Germany to the North of River Main by the Prussian power.
Though Bismarck's outlook became German rather than Prussian as from 1867 onwards, his basic stand remained unchanged.
He was by no means German radicalist and Pan-Germanist. His remained to transfer the Prussian idea of the monarchical,
aristocratic and military state to the southern Germany.
He was not to wage a war simple to draw the south and north together. The War of 1870 was fought to rouse German
nationalism in support of the Prussian domination. And South Germany was brought into the Empire when it became a
military necessity to shorten the war, or to prevent South German states from concluding a separate peace with France.
The founding of the German Empire in 1871 meant the submission of liberalism and Catholicism of the south to Conservatism
and Protestantism of the North, and also a resounding victory of Prussian militarism.
In the end, the German Empire of 1871 was not a national state. It left out large sections of the German population --- the
Germans in Austria, Bohemia, Poland and Switzerland, and contained in it a range of non-German minorities --- Finns, Danes
in Schleswig-Holstein, the French in Alsace-Lorraine, the Jews and Poles.
But in view of the popular demand for economic integration of the Zollverein generated, and of the continuous growth of
liberal nationalism after 1850, Bismarck was not only compelled by the liberal opposition to take up the national mission, but
was actually the instrument by which the party of little Germany achieved its goals.
In one important respect, Germany was not conquered by Prussia. In the constitutional of 1861 and that of 1873, Prussia
absolutism was not to be the predominating feature. Since both pressured the democratic franchise and an elective Reichstag,
the Chancellor would need political talent and skill to make the constitutional system function successfully. Undoubtedly,
Bismarck made a significant concession to constitutional liberalism. Once he fell from power, the imperial government could
not prevent parliamentary opposition from blocking legislations without difficulty.
Before, 1871 most German would have agreed with their historian Baungarten, who at the end of 1866 renounced the old
liberalism of 1848 and said that Bismarck was now vindicated by his deeds --- "Complete liberty rests upon a complete
power." Only a few would have echoed Johann Jacobiy's bitter reply: "Unity without Liberty is a union of slaves." If this was
the case, it was Prussia to dissolve in Germany rather than to absorb it.
9. "German Unification as a 'victory of Prussian imperialism'". Comment.
The Congress of Vienna had deliberately drawn up the German settlement in the interest of the Great European powers. The
interest of the German people for a united German nation was completely ignored. But in establishing a balance between
Austria and Prussia, the powers set the stage for the political struggle between the two in the nineteenth century which finally
led to Prussian supremacy and an 'expanded Prussia' if not a truly united Germany.
The years before the emergence of Bismarck in Germany were years of popular unity movement. The spirit of nationalism,
once aroused by Napoleon, could never be smothered. Thus, at the Frankfurt Parliament 1849, the liberals offered the crown
to the King of Prussia. However, their dream of a new German Empire was shattered by Frederick William's refusal to pick up
'the crown from the gutter'. Again the princely movement for unity ended in failure of the Frankfurt Parliament. Thereafter the
work of German nationalism was destined to be Prussia's.
There is much truth in the statement that 'the unification of Germany is a victory for Prussian imperialism' and that 'Germany
was conquered not united.' But this is not the whole truth. Actually many long standing factors had been working in Prussia's
favour and it had been said with some justification that 'Germany was practically united before Bismarck began to work at all.'
The factors which worked for Prussian leadership in the unification movement were chiefly as follows: firstly, after 1815
Austria was on the defensive, unwilling to bear responsibility of German affairs safe in checking Prussian ambitions and
keeping the balance of power. Secondly, the settlement of 1815 provided Prussia territories stretching from the Rhine to the
Vistula thus making her the mistress of the whole of the North German Plain. She was in position to close the gap between the
east and the west. Thirdly, the industrial revolution gave Germany both an overriding motive and means for unification. The
Zollverein of the 1834, originally a device for making the unification of Germany less necessary, became in the long run a
powerful instrument in Prussia's control of Germany. According to A. J. P. Taylor, the 'Prussian statesman who made the
Zollverein had not the slightest idea of its political consequence, they saw only the rambling, unworkable frontiers and desired
to save money on their custom officers.' However, by forcing the German states one by one into the Prussian Tariff System,
Prussia had conquered Germany economically. The railway building movement and the German industrial revolution began
after 1850 were corner stones for the Bismarck empire of 1871. They enhanced the sense of Germany unity and were used by
Prussia empire in completing the task of the unification. Besides, Prussia was fortunate to possess the great coal fields of Ruhr
which enable her to outdistance Austria in the industrial development. The years of prosperity between 1850 and 1871 greatly
favoured Bismarck's policy. Economic prosperity enabled Bismarck to dissociate nationalism from liberalism.
Indeed, without Bismarck's military policy, German was never a complete fabric. The 'particularism' created by the 1815
settlement was still existent. Austria and France, the two mainstays of 'German particularism' who had worked for German
territorial disunity for their own selfish aims, still stood unchallenged. It was the work of Bismarck to remove the supporters
of German political disunity.
Bismarck's policy was clear from the outset when he declared in and address to the finance committee of the lower house that
'Germany looks not to the liberalism of Prussia, but its power....'. The great questions of the time cannot solve by speeches
and parliamentary majorities that was the mistakes of 1848 and 1849 --- but by 'blood and iron'. He saw it right that German
political unity could only be attained by the sword.
The first obstacle to German unity was Austria with Bismarck had long prepared to remove before he became prime minister.
Thus he wrote in 1856,"I desire to express my conviction that at no distant time we shall have to fight with Austria for our
existence." Again in 1859 he wrote that the embarrassments of Austria in Italy gave Prussia an exceptional opportunity to read
just its relations to Germany. In 1862, when he became prime minister, he was racking his brain for a pretext to fight Austria.
The Schleswig-Holstein Question gave chance for his plan. This was with Denmark, which ended in Austria's occupation of
Holstein and Prussia's occupation of Schleswig actually sowed the seed of the Austro-Prussian War in 1866. The Treaty of
Prague which terminated the War made Bismarck's dream of a united Germany under Prussian domination a reality. Austria
was henceforth excluded from Germany. A North German Confederation was created. It was composed of the states north of
the River Main. Schleswig-Holstein, however, Hasse-Cassel, Nassau and Frankfurt were annexed by Prussia. A constitution
was drawn up by Bismarck and accepted by or forced upon the government of the states; for in this year 1866 German
opinion as a whole was still on the side of Austria and even in Prussia, especially in the Rhinelands there was a resistance to
the war against Austria. They opposed to Prussia predominance in the Federal Council. The liberal class was alienated by
Bismarck's unconstitutional government. It is true to say that north Germany was conquered, not united, because Bismarck's
outlook on European politics was always Prussian rather than German. "Prussians we are and Prussians we will remain' he
said.
The Seven Weeks' War was milestone on the road of German Unification, by it Prussian hegemony was established, but
German unity was still incomplete. The South German State still remained out of the Prussian fold. The way Bismarck
prepared for the absorption of the south states was a war with France aiming at arousing the spirit of nationalism among them.
Cause for a Franco-Prussian War were not lacking. Napoleon III's irritation and alarm at the growth of Prussian power across
the Rhine and his failure to obtain territorial compensation as vaguely promised by Bismarck at Biarritz gave around for
conflict. Finally the problem about the purchase Luxembourg and the Spanish candidacy lighted the power barrel of the
Franco-Prussian War 1870. Exactly to the wish of Bismarck, the South German States placed their arms at the disposal of the
North German Confederation, so that when the Franco-Prussian War ended with the Treaty of Frankfurt 1871, the South
German states were swept into the embrace of Prussian and German Empire was declared at the coronation of the Prussian
King in the Hall of Mirrors in Versailles.
The imperial constitution was simply a revised edition of the North German Confederation 1867. In the new empire, the
equality of the federated state was formally not material when the empire Frederick William I said, "The empire is nothing but
an expanded in the Federal Council, her King was emperor, sole ruler who was to exercise power to control foreign affairs."
The German unity of 1871 was not a unity expressed in self-government by the German people. The new state was designed
not to represent the will of German people but to maintain as in the general past the subjection of the people to the will of a
privileged minority.
This was simply the result of the Bismarck's policy. He purposely created a 'Prussian Germany' instead of a 'Greater Germany'
which could mean the end of Junker Prussia, the predominance of Roman Catholics and conflict with Russia or the world, a
conflict which the Junker class to which Bismarck belonged, was not powerful enough to sustain.
In conclusion, we can say that the unification of Germany can be described as a 'victory of Prussian imperialism' but it should
also be noted that without the industrial development, and economic prosperity which proceeded the political movement,
Prussian imperialism could hardly be realised.
10. "Prussia created the New German Empire in its own image." Discuss.
The Congress of Vienna had deliberately drawn up the German settlement in the interest of the great European powers. The
interest of the German people for a united German nation was completely ignored. But in establishing a balance between
Austria and Prussia, the powers set the stage for political struggle between the two in the nineteenth century which finally led
to Prussian supremacy in the German Confederation and an appearance of an 'expanded' Prussia rather than a truly in the
statement that "the unification of Germany is a victory for Prussian imperialism" and that "Germany was conquered, not
unified." Actually many long standing factors had been working in Prussia's favour and the work of German unification was
destined to be Prussia's.
Unification of Germany of 1871 was highly characterised by Prussianization. In fact all the characteristics of the original
attempt of German unification was totally scarified for the Prusso-German Empire. On the other hand, the ideas of selfish
nationalism, militarism and autocracy helped to shape the 'New Germany' and laid down the foundation of Germany as a
military state.
Generally speaking, there was a great divergence between German nationalism and Prussian nationalism. During the Frankfurt
Parliament, the Germans showed their desire for freedom of press and liberty, in addition, they wanted to have a greater
Germany with all the Germans. However, for a patriotic Prussian, Bismarck favoured a form of government under the control
of monarchy. He had strong opposition of democracy and this explained his opposition of the 1848 Revolution. He believed
that Prussia was truly great unit the other German states had been united around her. He experienced that the policy of 'blood
and iron' was the most realistic and practical. Moreover, he was under the support of William I who favoured a PrussianGerman state with military forces. Unfortunately, German nationalism was doomed to fail from Frankfurt Parliament.
In 1848-49, the liberals invited William I to be the emperor of the united Germany with parliamentary democracy as the basic
system of government. But he preferred absolute government to democratic one. And his main objective was the interest of
Prussia instead of German unification. Moreover, he regarded it as 'a crown of shame'. His refusal marked the downfall of
Frankfurt Parliament. Prussia proposed a union with other states and presided by Prussia. Though it failed, it demonstrated
that Prussia intended to be the unifier of Germany on her own term.
It was very ironical because German Confederation was subordinated to Prussian nationalism. The idea of little Germany was
practiced instead of greater Germany. Bismarck regarded Austria as an obstacle which would prevent the supremacy of
Prussia among other German states. Due to aggressive Prussian nationalism, Austria was excluded from the union and was
treated as an alien state. The German liberals strongly opposed the military forces for they feared militarism. In addition,
Bismarck took illogical measures to drive opposition and collected taxes for re-organization of Prussian army. On the other
hand, after the Austro-Prussian war they were willing to support them.
The Schleswig and Holstein question was used for Bismarck to gain the support of German nationalists. He made full
advantages of Austria ambition to play off Austria. Prussia paved way for further disturbance and Austria was caught. German
nationalism was disturbance and Austria was caught. German nationalism was totally ignored due to aggressive Prussian
nationalism. It came to power at the expense of Germans.
Finally, Austro-Prussian War was broken out due to the Schleswig question. Austria was defeated in the Battle of Sadows. It
was not only a defeat of Austria but also of German liberalism.
The North German Confederation was characterized by Prussia. The King of Prussia became an all-power dictator, most of
the seats were occupied by the Prussians.
Bismarck did not have any intention of unification of Germany by advocating the brotherhood of all the Germans. He tried to
gain support of south German states by publishing the aggressive demand of France. His intention was to gain the support of
them for fighting against France and for the extension of Prussia. The unification was highly accidental and by-product of
Franco-Prussian War.
Success of Franco-Prussian War had great effect on the Germans because they believed that policy of 'blood and iron' was the
most effective way to become a great power. This policy made the liberals near to militarism and further away from
democracy and liberalism. It was impossible for democratic ideas to grow in Germany. On the other hand, militarism was one
of the most important characteristic of the unification.
After the unification of Germany, the government of new Empire was highly Prussianized; the whole government was a
Prussianized government. Prussians played a vital part in the Buderat and for the Reichstag only had limited power.
In the new empire, the equality of the federated state was formally not materialized when the emperor Frederick William I
said, "the empire is nothing but an expanded Prussia," he told the truth. In short, Prussia was predominant in the Federal
Council, her King was emperor, sole ruler who was to exercise power to control foreign affairs.
The German unity of 1871 was not a unity expressed in self-government by the German people. Prussians gained the upper
hand in the unification because of great statesmanship and the military base. It also showed the defeat of democracy and
liberalism. After the unification, the democratic ideas were uprooted and paved way for the totalitarianism. The victory of
Austro-Prussian War and the Franco-Prussian War demonstrated the triumph of 'blood and iron'.
The unification of Germany can be described as 'victory of Prussian imperialism'. After the Prusso-Danish War in 1864, the
Austro-Prussian War in 1866 and the French War in 1870-1871, the creation of the new German Empire in 1871 was founded.
To historians, the New German Empire was nothing but just an expanded Prussia and German Unification was a victory of
Prussian expansion. In other words, Germany was not unified but conquered by Prussia.
The Unification of German was greatly caused by Prussia. Although, it should also be noted that without the industrial
development and economic prosperity which preceded the political movement. Prussian imperialism could hardly be realised.
Prussia still played an important part of German Unification for it created the new German Empire in its own image.
11. Why did France and Prussia go to war in 1870?
After 1866 war between Prussia and the new German Confederation was inevitable. It lay, as Bismarck said, 'in the logic of
history.' It seems obvious that both had strong reasons to fight the war. France was determined to fight to stop the Prussian
expansion while Prussia had a clear objective to be achieved by defeating France.
France was alarmed at the success of Bismarck. Napoleon III was afraid to use the creation of a strong national state on her
eastern frontier. He was determined to fight rather than allow any further extension of Prussian War was such based on this
jealousy. Moreover, a unified Germany would be the logical outcome of Prussian conquest and expansion and this must
involve France in war with Prussia as Napoleon III long desired the national frontier of the Rhine and it was so true because
Napoleon III after 1866 and asked for Rhineland compensations and for vague hints of these had agreed at Biarritz to reman
neutral.
Furthermore, France wanted European balance of power preserved. A war with Prussia was necessary to prevent this from
being further upset by Prussia. For failing to receive compensation for Prussian expansion after 1866, the balance of power
tipped in Prussian favour and fear of France roused. The war was therefore fought to maintain European balance of power.
The internal development also prompted Napoleon III to war. He was faced with opposition at home. To divert attention and
to gratify these elements opposing him, glory must be sought and the war served well the purpose. It would not only divert
opposition and unite the nation behind him, but would be able to strengthen his position by glory and victory. Also, the
Empress Eugenie was anxious for a victorious was to save the tottering empire for her son. The war party at court added to the
impetus. After all, the clerical faction favoured Austria and inclined to condemn Protestant Prussia.
At last, it was believed that France must average on Prussia for the humiliations suffered after 1866 in the hands of Bismarck.
Bismarck had rejected French say in the Peace of Rickelsburg, and had refused to support French protection over Belgium
and had upset French purchase of Luxembourg.
On the other hand, Bismarck desired a war with France. Germany had had long-standing grievance against France because of
the bitter memories left by the conquest of Germany by Napoleon I and also France had had always endeavoured to keep
Germany weak and divided. To Bismarck, the war was inevitable if he was to unify Germany under Prussia. France stood in
the way. Napoleon III declared that further union of the three parts of the North German Confederation, South German states
and Austria would be opposed and if Bismarck should venture 'to touch the south German states', 'France guns would on off
by themselves'. Yet Bismarck wanted unification and as Germany demanded that the war lay in the logic of history. It was
necessary in the interest of Prussia and German unity. Bismarck believed France would oppose Prussia's growing power. He
thus wanted to strike at her at a time convenient to Prussia, not to France.
The European situation was favourable for Bismarck as France was diplomatically isolated. Bismarck did not really have to
do anything to isolate France from Italy, for the Italian resented the presence of the French garrison in Rome stationed there
since 1849. Besides, Italy had acquired Venetia through the help of Prussia. England resented the French claim to Belgium, a
claim revealed by Bismarck, as Belgian independence had been guaranteed by Britain. It was therefore very unlikely that she
would help France in the event of war with Prussia. Russia was on friendly terms with Prussia on account of the personal
friendship between Bismarck and the Russian Czar, so that Russian neutrality was more or less assured. Besides, Bismarck
had strengthened this friendship by promising to agree to tearing up of the Black Sea Clause of the Treaty of Paris. The Black
Sea had been neutralized so that no warships, not even Russian, could be kept in the Black Sear. Also, Bismarck know that
Austria would not be in a position to help France. She had not yet recovered from the Austro-Prussian War. She had to watch
Russia on her eastern frontiers. She felt grateful to Prussia for the moderate terms imposed on her in the Treaty of Prague.
Moreover, as Bismarck would envisage, a war against a common enemy would unite the whole Germany behind Austria. A
war with France would arouse a national spirit in Germany so that the South German states would surrender their
independence and to unite themselves with the North German Confederation, to feel the necessity of Prussian protection and
to realise that German unity was strength in face of French menace, overcoming cultural and religious differences, and
attachment to state rights.
Eventually, the Spanish succession question came to serve as the catalyst of the war. By 1868, the Prussian army was well
prepared and what Bismarck needed was a convenient pretext for war against France. The chance came when a revolution
occurred in Spain. The ruling queen was expelled and a constitutional government with a new sovereign was demanded by the
revolutionary party. They offered the throne to Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a relative of the Prussian King.
Bismarck encouraged the prince to accept the Spanish offer. But at this point Bismarck suffered a setback, for King William
himself was doubtful about provoking Napoleon III through what would be the "encirclement" of France by German influence.
The King persuaded Prince Leopold to withdraw his candidature. This, of course, appeared a distinct victory for Napoleon III,
who was not encouraged to make a further demand, namely, the German candidature should never again be renewed. This
demand, which William I received from the French ambassador at the German spa of Ems, was politely refused, and William
sent a telegram to Bismarck in Berlin describing what had occurred. It appeared that the whole affair had been reasonably
settled, but Bismarck determined that this should not be the result. He hit upon the unscrupulous ruse of altering the wording
of the telegram so that it appeared that William I had insulted the French Ambassador by refusing to see him. This version
was then sent to both the German and French press for publication. The ruse had intended effect. A war hysteria broke out in
France, strongly support by the Empress Eugenie and the war party. On July 14, 1870, France declared war but suffered
overwhelming defeat. The German Empire was proclaimed by Bismarck at Versailles in 1871.
As a conclusion, the French ambition and the Bismarck's wish combined with a convenient excuse led to the outbreak of the
Franco-Prussian War. This war directly contributed to the formation of the united German Empire.
12. Assess the role of Bismarck in the unification of Germany.
The two commonest interpretation of the events in the years 1862-70 were that: Bismarck unified Germany; Bismarck
planned the events of the sixties in advance, and the results turned out to be what he expected. Both interpretations were not
true. They should be abandoned in view of actual events.
First of all, Bismarck did not unite Germany. He did not even want to. He annexed, conquered or absorbed into Prussian
control all the states of the old German Confederation except Austria, in addition to Slesvig, Alsace and Lorraine and called
the result "the German Empire". It was a German Empire; but it was not the German Empire. It excluded deliberately all the
Germans living within the Hapsburg territories of Austria and Bohemia. So Bismarck's German Empire was based on the
division of Germany, not its unification. It was little Germany not Hitler's great Germany. This shows that Bismarck was a
man with a limited objective.
Secondly, it is commonly claimed that Bismarck had a master plan for the sixties which would lead to the unification of
Germany. His plan included:
a. securing the neutrality of Russia; by assisting the Russian in the Polish affair of 1863;
b. making war with Denmark in 1864 in alliance with Austria, for the purpose of having a war with Austria on this issue in
1866;
c. securing Napoleon III's benevolent neutrality in the war with Austria by deceiving him at Biarritz into thinking he would
get compensation for France when the war was over;
d. defeating Austria in 1866, but to take territory from her because he wanted her friendship in the coming war with France;
e. engineering the Hohenzollern candidature in Spain in order to provoke France into declaring war in 1870.
This view of Bismarck as a ruthless realist planning for the unification of Germany is based on a legend partly created by
Bismarck himself, especially by way of his Memoirs. His famous speech on 'blood and iron' is often said to show his intention
of unifying Germany by the force of Prussian arms. In fact it is a misinterpretation. It is only said as part of a vigourous
speech condemning the opposition of the Prussian liberals to the increased army estimates. From a technical point of view, the
distinctive achievement of Bismarck is to revise the balance of Europe with such an economy of blood and iron. The military
success of Prussia from 1864 to 1871 were brought about under the leadership of a civilian minister with a view to achieving
political ends. Throughout his career, Bismarck had a cautions, clearly calculating preference for limited objectives. He used
the army when it became impossible to achieve his diplomatic purpose without it; when diplomacy alone would suffice, he
used the army as a threat.
When Bismarck came to power in Prussia in 1861, favourable circumstance awaited him. Before 1853, any attempt by Prussia
to dominate even northern Germany would have involved war with Austria, Russia and event the German states. The Czar
was determined to maintain the Holy Alliance. From 1848 to 1851, he helped Austria to oppose the plans of Fredrick William
IV concerning the reform of Germany. In order to fight Austria. This would mean the liberalization of Prussia herself. This
was something the Prussian King did not want. The Prussian army too, unlike the Piedmontese army, was against liberalism.
Hence, the cause of German unity was hampered by unfavourable circumstance both inside and outside Germany before 1853.
When Bismarck assumed power in 1861, things had changed drastically. The Crimean War had isolated Austria from Russia
and had weakened Russia. The revolutionary policy of Napoleon III in Italy helped to undermine the old order and produced
an anticipation for change. Concerted action against Prussia was also not forthcoming. Britain was on bad terms with France,
Russia and Austria. Russia was on bad terms with Britain and Austria. Napoleon III and Russia were on good terms with each
other and both wanted to change the European system as it existed in 1862. Napoleon III was still in favour of destroying the
remnants of the 1815 settlement and Alexander II was solely concerned with destroying the Peace of Paris. So Bismarck must
make use of the Franco-Russian entente to continue the isolation of Austria.
So the Polish Affair of 1863 was a loss to Bismarck rather than gain. For it divided France and Russia since Napoleon III
spoke in favour of the Polish rebels. Bismarck's offer to assist Russia against the Poles was not taken well by the Russians for
they resented Bismarck's meddling in their affairs. So Russia's withdrawal of support to Austria against Prussia was not due to
Bismarck's diplomacy; it was due chiefly to her weakness after the Crimean War, her concentration on the abolition of the
Black Sea Clause, and her mistrust of Austria. In fact, Bismarck made a blunder with the Alvensleben Convention in which
Russia suggested a Prusso-Russian War against France and Austria. Bismarck did not agree. So Prussia did not obtain the
goodwill of Russia.
Meanwhile, Austria tried to strengthen her control over the German Confederation by allying with the force of liberalism. In
1863, at the Assembly of Princes at Frankfurt, Austria proposed a reform of Confederation, with the creation of an assembly
of delegates from the various Parliaments. Prussia rejected the Austrian proposal because it did not give Prussia equal status
with Austria.
When the Schleswig-Holstein affair arose, Bismarck intervened if he had to. All German opinion demanded action. So he
entered into an alliance with Austria to avoid sole identification with German liberal nationalism and to avoid antagonizing
Austria. So it was a defensive move by Bismarck to avoid conflict with Austria rather than an aggressive step to provoke war
with Austria. Instead, Bismarck wanted the question settled in the interests of Prussia rather than the interests of the German
Confederation, Austria also wanted to restrain Prussia with an alliance. Austria did not want to spend too much time and effort
in Schleswig-Holstein, because she worried about her control over Venetia and Hungary. So Austria was willing to let Prussia
annex the Duchies in return for the Prussian cession of Silesia and her guarantee of Austria's position in Venetia and Hungary.
Hence, the Schleswig-Holstein affair would not have provoked any war between Prussia and Austria because Austria's main
concern was in Italy and Hungary. So she would not struggle for the control of the Duchies with Prussia. Instead, Prussia did
not get the support of German national feeling for annexing the Duchies. So Bismarck aroused the opposition of German
nationalists instead of the support in the Schleswig-Holstein affair.
Bismarck did not see through Napoleon III as was commonly claimed by some historians. He was in fact afraid of Napoleon
III for his ambitions and unpredictability. Bismarck simply remained on good terms with Napoleon III and tried to get his
support for his policies, in return for certain price. Napoleon III also wanted to remain friendly with Prussia for the make of
enlisting her support in obtaining Venetia for Italy. So he did not opposed Prussia in Denmark. The French army was in no
condition to fight. The British were in no condition to help him. His mind was already on Mexico. The principle of nationality
inclined him to side with the Germans against the Danes. If he antagonised Prussia, he would lose his last European friend. In
other words, Bismarck did not create for deceive the French into a Franco-Prussian alliance. Circumstance had made it for
him.
When Napoleon III met Bismarck at Biarrtz, Bismarck did not want Napoleon III to do anything. To sit still while Bismarck
excluded Austria from northern Germany was a quite acceptable programme to Napoleon III. As for what he himself might
get out of it, he evidently refused to commit himself. He had made a bad mistake at Plombieres by committing himself in
advance of the event and he was not going to make the mistake a second time. He contented himself therefore with expressing
his anxiety to see Venetia handed over to the Italians.
Thus Bismarck did not deceive Napoleon III at Biarritz. Napoleon III tried to deceive Bismarck. Bismarck was to plunge into
as uncertain adventure not knowing how big a share of the spoils Napoleon III would demand, nor when he would demand it.
The military alliance between Prussia and Italy in 1866 was a triumph for Napoleon III rather than Bismarck. It meant the
achievement of Napoleon's aim - the Italian acquisition of Venetia. It also meant the end of negotiation between Prussia and
Austria. Without the alliance between Prussia and Italy, Austria could negotiate with Prussia; Duchies to Prussia in exchange
for Venetia for Austria. But the alliance with Italy meant war.
The treaty between Prussia and Italy ensured the neutrality of France. Then Bismarck had to gain the support of the German
states behind Prussia in the struggle against Austria. He therefore proposed the reform of German Confederation. A National
Assembly was to be elected, on the basis of universal suffrage, and the Austrians were to be excluded from the new Germany.
Bismarck's proposal did not meet the support of all German states. Many did not like the prospect of being dominated by
Prussia. They tended to look to the leadership of Austria as a balance against Prussian aggression.
The defeat of Austria at the Battle of Sadowa did not lead to the complete unification of Germany. Bismarck stopped at the
total defeat of Austria because of his fear of Napoleon III. He was not sure what Napoleon III's intention were. But France
was happy with the formation of the North German Confederation. It fitted in with the principles of nationality and balance of
power. It was a proper Prussian balance to the power of Austria. By making the south German States independent of Austria,
it made them potential allies of France, their only possible protector against Prussia. It had also strengthened Prussia against
Austria; this suited the needs of France and Russia, because they would like to see the reduction of Austrian power in Italy
and the Balkans respectively.
There was thus no particular reason why Napoleon III should either mobilize against Prussia or demand compensations.
France seemed to have benefited by the Treaty of Prague. It helped solve the issue of Venetia for Napoleon III; it created a
north German state but left the southern part of Germany open for French influence. In short, the Treaty of Prague achieved in
Germany exactly the sort of solution acceptable to France that the Peace of Zurich (Villafranca) had intended to provided in
Italy.
The demand for compensation was raised by the liberal opposition to embarrass the Emperor. The war party led by Empress
Eugenie and Rouher also persuaded Napoleon III to go to war with Prussia to restore imperial power. Both Bismarck and
Napoleon III therefore did not want to make war on each other. So Bismarck did not want use the Hohenzollern candidature
to provoke war with France. In fact, he intended to make Leopold King of Spain as France. It was when Benedetti demanded
compensation from Bismarck that he decided to publish the revised Ems Telegram and provoked war with France. In fact,
Bismarck did not need to go to war to unite Germany. All German state were united militarily and economically in practice if
not in same, before 1870. Besides, Bismarck was never a true nationalist. He simply acted top save the prestige and influence
of Prussia. The so-called German Empire was in reality a Prussian Empire. Bismarck wanted to prevent the unification of
Germany for Bismarck wanted to preserve Prussian and Hohenzollern power against the rising tide of liberalism and
Radicalism. German unity might mean the absorption of Prussia into Germany. Therefore, Bismarck worked very hard to
preserve the identity of Prussia and the result was the 'Prussianization' of Germany, that is, the domination of Prussian interest
in the united Germany- the imposition of Prussian system over the whole of Germany, the institutionalization of Prussian
control over the political process of the German Empire, the military command and executive supremacy of the Hohenzollern
monarchy. Between 1862 and 1871, Bismarck was fighting both Liberals and Radicals not only in Prussia but also in
Germany as a whole. From 1862 till just after Sadowa, the Liberals were against him. But the defeat of Austria helped justify
the military reforms and the unconstitutional act of the collection without the approval of the Prussian parliament. The
creation of the North German Confederation made the liberal forgive Bismarck with the Act of Indemnity of 1866. Prussian
liberalism surrendered completely after Sadows. When Bismarck asked the liberals to indemnify him for having collected
taxes for four years of defiance of the constitution, they gave what he wanted. The implication was clear: they would forgive
absolutism and militarism if they achieved military glory and national unity. The success of German unification was the
typical exemplification of the victory of nationalism over liberalism, of military glory over democratic ideals. German
nationalism was triumphant at the expense of German liberalism. But the German liberals and radicals were willing to pay the
price for the national unity and greatness of Germany. This overwhelming support to national glory and unity underlaid the
authoritarian traditions of the German people and the rise of charismatic dictatorships like Hitler's Nazism.
Hence, Bismarck was able to work against Prussian and German Liberalism and radicalism. He was able top use revolutionary
means to preserve and even extend the power and authority of the Prussian and German conservatives. This was both the
achievement and the failure of Bismarck in terms of the historical development of modern Germany. While Germany was
united and made strong by Bismarck, that strength was achieved without the proper check and balance of a liberal democratic
system of government based on popular sovereignty. As the economic and military might become the instrument of ambitious
and aggressive dictators like Hitler or absolute rulers like William II, the result would be disastrous for the whole of Europe
and even the world. Bismarck in fact were more intent on controlling the expansionism of German nationalism than on the
threat to conservative power of German liberalism. He knew that German expansion would destroy the peace of Europe. So
he was careful to maintain a policy of maintaining the friendship with other states. This explained his system of alliance from
1871-1890. In other words, Bismarck was not a willing ally of German nationalism and the German unification was a result of
circumstantial forces rather than Bismarck's deliberate policies and efforts.
13. "Circumstance makes the Man." Discuss the validity of the statement with reference to
the role of Bismarck in the Unification of Germany.
To answer this question, it is my opinion to give a definition to the quotation. Here I interpret the quotation as that a
favourable circumstance is more important than the contributions of man- Bismarck- in the unification of the country. In other
word, no matter what Bismarck had done, his contributions and efforts were only playing a subordinate role. In my opinion, I
only agree to part of the statement. To me, the contributions of Bismarck were at least on the par with a favourable
circumstance in their significance.
In the course of the unification of Germany, undeniably some favourable conditions conductive to an advantageous
circumstance emerged for Bismarck to exploit. Some of them were the blunders of Bismarck's opponents and some thorny
issues.
Basically, a favourable circumstance gradually took shape for Prussia to take up the initiative. After the 1848 Revolutions,
Austria was on the way of decline. She seemed unable to recover herself from the shock of 1848. Actually her survival from
that turmoil partly owed to the assistance from Russia. The defeat in 1859 by the French soldiers on behalf of the Italians
proved that Austria was only a 'paper tiger'. It was clear enough that the Austrians found it hard to maintain the status quo in
Germany. In fact, her loose control was accompanied by her outcast from the Zollverein in which Prussia enjoyed the single
supremacy. Since the main barrier in the way of German Unification was Austria, her military decline constituted a favourable
circumstance. But that did not ensured a certainty of victory for the Prussians. Austrians were weak and yet they still had
muscle. To move away the main obstacle, it was essential to build up a strong army. Here Bismarck provided his contribution.
He convinced other Germans that Prussia had to sacrifice liberalism at whatever cost for a strong Prussian army was the only
guarantee, and that the problem could only be solved by "blood and iron". Under his guidance, a vast military reform
programme was undertaken. The effect of the reform was great, for the Prussians tasted a rapid victory over the Austrian in
1866. Thus, the military weakness of Austria produced a favourable circumstance, but it still entailed human efforts to make it
a reality.
Another favourable circumstance appeared when Christian IX ascended to the British throne. He was so politically native as
he tried to incorporate the two German duchies, Schleswig and Holstein, into the Danish Empire. In the past, the two places
maintained a personal union with the Danish crown only. This blunder helped the Prussians a lot. For the status of these two
German duchies was guaranteed by an international settlement, the London Protocol of 1851. Any breach of the settlement
would provoke strong reaction. Now the Danish in fringed the rule and so no foreign sympathy could be secured. The
Prussians then had a favourable circumstance as they now had a strong and reasonable excuse. But this favourable
circumstance was fully exploited by Bismarck. He brilliantly ventured a joint-expedition with Austria instead of acting on
Prussian own or for sake of the German Confederation. For a joint-expedition would serve as a test of the Prussian strength
after reform and provide a good chance to understand the opponent. Moreover, it would pave the way to pick up quarrel in the
future on the matter of trophy distribution. The Danish were easily overcome, and Schleswig and Holstein were separately
administered by Prussia and Austria respectively.
Yet the most serious barrier, Austria, still blocked the way of unification. But Bismarck now possessed the confidence;
Austria could be easily overrun if no one came to aid her. Again on this point Bismarck found a favourable circumstance in
front of him. Austria had little ally in Europe; her relationship with Russia deteriorated after her neutrality in the Crimean War.
The Italians were certainly pleased to see the disgrace of their oppressors. The British were still indulged in their global
adventure and any continental commitment was totally unthinkable. Thus, the Austrians would have great difficulties to gain
assistance once she was in trouble. But Bismarck was careful and he would not allow any small chance to spoil his scheme.
The Austrians must stood on their own in the future war. Thus Bismarck vigourously sought allies and friends. He showed
signs of good will by thwarting the Polish refugees at the border when they showed defiance in 1863 against Russia. More
important was the cultivation of friendship with Napoleon III of France. In August 1865 Bismarck met the French emperor at
Biarritz and he left Napoleon III a false impression that Prussia would give a tacit approval for any French territorial gain if
she remained neutral in any conflict involving the two central European states. It was a pitfall because Bismarck never made
himself liable to any formal pledge. Furthermore, Bismarck made an agreement with Italy in 1866 for mutual benefit. Italy
would obtain Venetia if Austria was defeated. Of course, in return, Italy would offer military assistance to Prussia. By 1866
Austria was totally isolated as result of her own diplomatic ineptness and the efforts of Bismarck. Again a favourable
circumstance was forged and combined in good form with human efforts. When everything was settled down, the remaining
task was how to goad Austrian into a war.
The result, was foreseen, but its swiftness was unpredictable for within a few weeks the Austrians were totally subdued. The
foreign powers were not ready at all to intervene effectively. Somehow the unification scheme was intercepted. The French
made it known to the world that she would not tolerate a strong eastern neighbour with all the southern German states annexed.
Thus, Bismarck had to give a second thought before he came to a decisive halt to his unification scheme and the Prussians
were irritated by the arrogance of France. Yet an immediate war with France was disadvantageous since Prussia had already
used up her energy in the 1866 War. So Bismarck preferred to wait for a favourable circumstance to come.
After few years of the war preparation, Bismarck felt it the right time to strike. France would not have any assistance from
other powers as Bismarck ensured that the old friends were maintained and the old enemy Austria was condoned. France
herself was an irritant because of her excessive demands. She had asked the cession of the German territory on the Maniz and
the annexation of Belgium. Even Britain was made aware whether France was planning something evil again. Like Austria in
1866, France faced a similar diplomatic isolation. It was another favourable circumstance to be used. Bismarck did not waste
it. In 1870 when the Spanish throne was empty, he immediately seized the Chance. He deliberately assigned Prince Leopold
chasing for the title. The French were provoked and reacted severely. They made demands not only asking for the withdrawal
of the Hohenzollern candidature but a guarantee that the candidate would never be renewed. All the detail of interviews
between the French ambassador and the Prussian King was informed to Bismarck. When he received the continent, he gave a
slight touch of magic so that the telegram became inflammatory to provoke public opinion. To the German, the French
ambassador was imprudent to make excessive demands. To the French, the Prussian King was rude in manner. The public
furor for a war was so great that both governments had to uphold their national prestige. The war broke out in July 1870.
Everything went well with Bismarck pulling strings from behind. He gave the story of unification his finale. With French
defeated, the German Empire came into being in January 1871.
As a conclusion, the unification of Germany owed a great deal to Bismarck who could make use of every opportunity and
favourable circumstance to achieve what he wanted or to create a more favourable circumstance for future use. Thus, the
statement was not completely justified, in case of Bismarck.
14. In what ways do the unification of Italy and Germany resemble and different from other?
The unification of Italy, like the unification of Germany, was mainly the achievement of one of the states in much country,
namely Piedmont in Italy and Prussia in Germany. Both of them were monarchical aristocratic governments on the outset.
However, Piedmont had a liberal constitution, and can be said of the creation of the liberalism from 1848. Whilst Prussia
remained a aristocratic monarchy under the rule of the Chancellor Bismarck who greatly opposed the rising of the liberalism
as he was an intelligent and obedient servant of the Prussian military monarchy.
Both of the unifications were not totally achieved by Prussia and Piedmont. They were the results of the indirect and direct
consequence of the international affairs and specific circumstance. Both of Cavour and Bismarck primarily aimed not at the
unification of all the states in their countries, Cavour merely wanted to build up a northern Italy excluding of the southern
Italian states whilst Bismarck merely wanted to set up a large Prussian Empire. Both of them were anti-nationalist and antirevolutionary, they even wanted to prevent the cause of the unification of their countries.
Both Italy and Germany were given a valuable chance to unity as the old order of Europe had already been broken up by
Napoleon III and Russia, the defender of the Holy Alliance, which was strongly against the liberalism and nationalism, was
weakened by the Crimean War and thus could no longer intervene in their cause of unification.
Both Piedmont and Prussia had a dead enemy on their ways to unification and this was Austria. Austria continued to assert a
dominant position in the German Confederation and create considerate influence in Italy by holding the two important state,
Lombardy and Venetia. Thus both Prussia and Piedmont had to wipe out the Austria influence in order to unify their countries.
Both of them sought the assistance of France especially Piedmont. Prussia only needed the neutrality of France for her to deal
with Austria by means of a national war---- Austro-Prussian War. However, Piedmont was too weak to fight against Austria
single-handed. Cavour had to seek the France military assistance in the Franco-Sardinian alliance against Austria--- AustroSardinian War.
Both the unification of Italy and Germany were the consequent result of the outcry of principle of nationality since 1815 and
this force was further reinforced by the resolutions in both Piedmont and the Italian states and Prussia and the other German
states. The 1848 Revolution was a turning point in the history of both states. After the revolutions, Prussia and Piedmont
began to emerge as the leadering states of unification especially referred to Italy. The Italian saw the task of unification of
Italy could only be shouldered by Piedmont after the Pope had refused to aid in the Austro-Piedmontese War. However,
Prussia was considered as the most and suitable one for the task of unification only after the Austro-Prussian War which
formally excluded Austria from the North German Confederation. Prussia, though gradually in gaining more popularity in the
North was not very popular in the south states which turned to France as their protector against Prussia, her traditional enemy.
Thus this indicated the different situations of Piedmont and Prussia in their way for unity of their countries.
Both the unification of Italy and Germany was not very successful and they were termed in name only. German Empire,
declared in 1871, was merely a Prussian Empire. It was in reality a division rather than an unification. It was because the
Germans in the Bohemia and Austrian Empire were excluded for a deliberate purpose and there were little practical difference
between the fundamental structures of the political systems after 1866 and 1871. The liberalism was still given ways to the
cause of militarism and absolutism and the parliamentary system and the universal suffrage was merely a political frayed and
confining trick play by Bismarck who was very clever to use the conservative countryside against the radicals in town. The
Kingdom of Italy was also as fraudulent as the German Empire. Cavour did not want the unification of Italy accomplished in
the year of 1800. He was only forced hand to do so by the revolutionary Garibaldi's revolutionary activities in the southern
Italy. The unification of Italy actually contradicted the normal phase of the human history. Piedmont was neither ready or
fitted to unify the southern states which were fundamentally different in a social and economic affairs with Piedmont in 1860.
Only on very legalistic and narrowest tons that Italy was unified in 1860 since the troubles in the following years had clearly
shown the unification was a bad one.
Compared with Italy, German unification made Germany an enormous power and benefits and this made it as a new strong
power in Europe. However, the unified Italy was as weak as ever and her power influence were declining.
We can see that since Piedmont was small, its policy always to be influenced by the other powers. Whilst Prussia played a
more active role in the unification of Germany.
Though the Italian parliament was factions and unsuccessful, it was real in the sense of liberalism. On the other hand, the
German parliament and Constitution was also faction and unsuccessful but it was false in reality in sense of liberalism. Cavour
used liberalism versus radicalism whilst Bismarck opposed both of them. Thus the unification of Italy theoretically and
fundamentally was a real progress of liberalism whilst the German unification was merely a trick of Bismarck for alteration
the prestige and influence of the Prussian reactionary monarchy under the disguise of a liberal constitutional reign.
15. Compare and contrast the significance of 1848 for the Unification of Italy and Germany?
1848 was decisive, though its aims would not be achieved concurrently. In challenging the territorial and dynastic settlements
of Vienna, Prince Schwarzenberg was by no means another Metternich. A tempered revival of Austria hegemony would no
longer prevent the reshaping of Central Europe. Rather, at the expense of this rotten grant, the German and Italian nationalism
made their triumph two decades later not by the methods of 1848 but by revolutions from this time onwards, new tactics
began to take shape after the teaching of this lesson.
Both in Italy and Germany, the 1848 had a common aspiration for achieving national unification, but to each of them, there
was different nature of problems to face. To the German states, unification was primarily an internal affair. It was conceivable
at that time to have Germany merged into two leading German states, either Prussia or Austria. As Han Rothfels says, "For
one thing... the separate German political units, however, artificial in origin many of them were, had, in the main, a former
basis in dynastic allegiance; now was ruled by a foreigner, though the two predominant states were German and European at
the same time." In contrast to Germany, the unification of Italy, in nature, would be impossible if Austria was not driven out
from Italian peninsula. It was thus to Italy, more than a matter of internal affair and an act against foreign suppessors. This
difference made the process of unification of Italy to a lesser differ in stress from the German one. But nonetheless 1845 even
led Austria being the common enemy to the national unification of Germany and Italy.
The liberal movement for unification had made its temporary triumph in 1848. The Frankfurt Assembly marked the
uniqueness of having liberalism joined force with nationalism. The Frankfurt Assembly was looked as the symbol of
unification by consent and persuasion. A federal, liberal, constitutional and united Germany was the main concern of the
Frankfurt idealists. Unfortunately, the Frankfurt Assembly was bound to fail at the beginning because on one hand," it was a
voice crying in a void", lack of military power made the Assembly depend upon either Prussia or Austria, on the other hand,
the Frankfurt meant too liberal to both Prussia and Austria. Then, to Germans, liberalism in this sense was incompatible to
nationalism. And the complete revolutionary failures of 1848 and 1849 made the distrust of liberalism and parliamentary
methods go further and deeper.
To choose either Austria or Prussia as the leader of unification revealed two main conflicting programmes of unification. The
'Great German' was meant national unification under the domination of Austria and 'Little German' under Prussia. Basically,
Greater Germany was a need, conviction; Little Germany an expedient, a temporizing with reality. The reversion of Austria
back to despotism in November 1848 made her never regain the image as leader of the new 'Germany' in the eyes of the
moderates and realists, sometimes even was regarded as anti-German. Naturally, the federal crown was offered to the
Prussian king through Frederick William IV refused to accept it. And importantly, the 1848 legacy was that an expedient
policy of 'Little Germany' was chosen from that time onwards for the sake of national unification. And it was Hitler who later
tried to put the plan of Great Germans into reality.
By 1848, Prussia began to replace Austria as the leader of national unification. On the one hand, Austria had no initiative to
sacrifice her status quo just for the purpose of assuming leadership in a liberal 'Germany', on the other hand, the loss of
Austria's hegemony meant, in turn, the rise of Prussia. To Prussia, though militarism was victorious in the autumn of 1848, but
victorious without violence and without a beach with Frankfurt. And the Frankfurt Assembly excluded Austria from Germany
and offered the Imperial Crown to Prussia. Though Frederick William IV refused to accept the offer, he did hold to his
romantic vision of a Prussia merged into Germany. His proclamation of 21 March 1848 and the Erfurt union were the good
evidences.
To Germans, 1848 made a clear picture that liberalism was scarified to the national cause. In fact, it was the conflict on the
national frontiers that determined the fate of German liberalism. When faced the problem of defending their national cause in
Bohemia and in Posen, the realistic and liberals were willing to sacrifice themselves and welcomed the assertion of Austria
and Prussia military power. In the mind of the Germans, the triumph of national cause over liberalism in 1848 had already
paved the way for the coming of an age of 'blood and iron'.
As already mentioned that national integration would be impossible driving out Austria from Italian peninsula. To Italy, there
existed a comparatively clear cut geographical and linguistic frontiers. She did not have to face like Germany the conflict over
national frontiers. To expel the aliens was the central impulse; under which both liberal and national demands, in contrast to
Germany were mainly directed against foreign rulers. It was rather liberalism went parallel with nationalism to achieve one
common ultimate aim of national salvation. Unlike the military defeat, rather than caused the failure of the Italian revolutions
of 1848. So did trust of liberalism and parliamentary methods went less deeper than Germany.
By 1850, the House of Savoy became the only one that could Italy look for Salvation. As two possible leaders of national
unification --- Mazzini and Pope had destroyed each other in Rome. The fiasco of 1848 and 1849 had finally reduced the
three possible programmes of national unification into one only. Pope Pius of Papal liberalism. And the failure of Rome
Republic left constitutional monarchy of Piedmont the only solution for salvation. As force kept Italy political force of
disruption. Only the House of Savoy had such an ability to provide this alliance between liberalism, nationalism and
militarism.
Nonetheless, the failure of 1848 Revolutions to achieve national unifications had brought one common legacy to Italy and
Germany. They began to enter into a new age. 1848 proved that force was crucial to determine the fate in the future. A
transition from reliance upon liberalism idealism and popular enthusiasm to reliance upon realism and power was taken place
after 1848. Diplomacy and force were adopted as the new tactics for national salvation by both Italy and Germany. But in
contrast to Italy, Prussia and the other German States were more luckily to have their economic and financial positions
stronger. These advantages allowed Prussia to take a more aggressive diplomacy and enable Bismarck to bring Prussia into an
age of 'blood and iron'. Instead, Piedmont had no illusion about her actual strength. Diplomacy rather than force were
successfully manipulated to seek foreign help. The main purpose was to isolate Austria and finally to expel her. Again, the
Italian did much better to unit their countries by losing wars.
It was 1848 to decide the roads for national unification. At first, Prussia and Piedmont emerged as the sole leaders that could
Germany and Italy look for national unifications. Both of them were taught a lesson in the fiasco of 1848-9. This experience
made them successfully unify their countries without committing the same mistakes as their precursors of 1848 Realpolitik
dominated and determined the political theater of the coming decades. Apart, a quotation to conclude would be 'In Italy the
speed of parliamentary liberation; in Germany the triumph of the Prussia army.'