Federalism and Regionalism
in Contemporary Russia
by Igor Kossikov, expert of State Duma
Professor at the Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology
This speech has been pronounced during the Thirteenth International Seminar European
Union, Federalism and International Democracy, hold in Ventotene on September 1st-8th
1996
Issues of federalism are today and will for a long time remain critical for the political and
economic life of Russia. The contemporary Russian state is a special type of a federation which
knows no analogues in the world. It emerged as a result of the disintegration of the USSR, on the
basis of its largest republic which had no sovereignty before. Having adopted the Declaration of
sovereignty in 1990 and elected its own president, Russia became an independent state and a
subject of international law. At the same time, it inherited its internal structure from the Soviet
era - the division into administrative territories and ethnic (nation) state formations, as well as the
formal title "the Russian Federation", although it was a unitary state de facto as of the moment of
adopting the Declaration.
The entire development of Russia starting from 1990 until today has been a complicated
transitional period the transformation of a unitary state into a real federation. State reform
coincided with systemic reforms - the transition to democracy and market economy throughout
the entire former Soviet Union, and Russian in particular. That represents one of the key
differences in the emergence of the model of Russian federalism. This fact accounts for special
difficulties of this process.
In the course of 6 years (1990-1996) the Russian Federation (RF) has gone through several
phases in its transformation. Let me briefly remind the reader of them:
1. 1990-1992 (until March) - the so-called parade of sovereignties. During
that period the ethnic formations within Russia (former autonomous
republics and okrugs) sought to upgrade their political status, to win
recognition as independent republics as a part of the RF. Movements for
sovereignty were led by the republics of Tatarstan, Bashkorostan, Yakutia
and others. At the same time the national idea, the idea of the restoration
of ethnic states, language and culture clearly prevailed. It was by all
means promoted by small-scale ethnic movements and was taken up by
local and regional political elites which sought to retain power under new
conditions or obtain power from the hands of former party nomenklatura.
In 1991-1992 there existed a real threat of ethnic separatism, a split of the
unified country, and because the trend of decentralizing power obviously
dominated, and the power of the Center was extremely unstable.
2. The Federation Treaty concluded in March 1992 served to overcome
the increasing ethnic separatism. It presented the maximum possible
compromise of the central authorities and regional ruling elites as of the
moment of its conclusion, and preserved the unity and territorial integrity
of the Russian Federation within its historical borders. The time from
March 31 1992 until December 1993 is the first period when the RF
existed on this new legal basis. The Treaty failed to satisfy both unitarists
and separatists. although it played the positive role of dividing authority
within the Russian Federation for the first time, albeit not fully. Two
republics within Russia - Tatarstan and Chechnya - did not sign the
Federation Treaty in March ~992, having seriously challenged the
territorial integrity of Russia. They proclaimed themselves fully
independent states which were not a part of the federation. Chechnya's
location on the border worsened the situation by presenting the possibility
of real secession. The location of Tatarstan in the very center of the RF's
territory made the chance of its "secession" from the Federation rather
problematic. In 1992. neither republic suggested any formulas for
coexistence with the unified federation. The formulations that they used
were very vague. especially from the viewpoint of the international law phrases "together with Russia, but from without". For this reason, the
federal authorities did not recognize independence of Tatarstan and
Chechnya and instead considered them inseparable parts of a unified
Russia. The period after the Federation Treaty was been signed only
partially eased the separatist trends in Russia. A number of the republics
signed the Treaty, but ensured the legal priority of their republican
constitutions on their territory Russia entered a true legal crisis, for the RF
had no Constitution of its own, and it regions adopted their own
Constitutions without prior consent from each other and the Center. This
process affected not only the republics, but oblasts and other
administrative territories in the RF, which also sought the upgrading of
their status and the recognition of their rights equal to the republics.
Constitutions of their own (the Statutes of the obalsts) began to appear,
and there were attempts to proclaim independent states ( The Ural
republics, Far Eastern republic). Although in contrast to the republics, the
oblasts did not use ethnic slogans in their movement for greater
independence of the Center and autonomy, there emerged a threat of
Russia's disintegration, division into regions.
3. The time after December 1993. when the Constitution of the RF was
adopted, was the third period. The Federation Treaty, or, more precisely,
its main provision, became a part of the Constitution. In line with the
Treaty, the Constitution secures the composition of the federation: 89
members (in the Constitution of the RF they are referred to as the
"subjects of the federation"). Among them there are 21 republics, 6 krais,
49 oblasts, 10 autonomous okrug, 1 autonomous oblast and 2 cities of
federal significance. Two types of the subjects can be identified - nationstate formations, i.e. the members of the federation which have the
attributes of independent states (these are all republics) and administrative
territorial formations (krais, oblasts, cities - Moscow and St. Petersburg).
At present independent subjects of various kind are referred to as
"regions" in academic works and political practice.
The relations along the axis Center - regions (89 subjects), i.e. between the allfederal bodies of power and administration. on the one hand. and the leaders of
the regions. on the other hand. represent the main factor behind the stability and
effective development of the country.
The process of division of power between the bodies of federal and regional
authorities was not completed by the adoption of Constitution in 1993. It is still
under way and is being corrected by political, social and economic reforms in
Russia. The transformation of the Russian Federation is far from being complete.
We find ourselves at yet another transitional stage when the prospects of the
future state system and the mechanisms of its functioning are not entirely clear.
Discussions between the adherents of various models of Russian federalism who
have different views on the status of this or that region within the model have not
quieted. There is a provincial model (in Russian - gubernia) or unitary-provincial.
In accordance with this model, Russia would be divided into provinces roughly
equal in size (the territories which would be analogous to German lands or
American states), not taking into consideration the ethnic composition of the
peoples living on these territories or their social and cultural orientations. The
opponents of dividing Russian into provinces, on the contrary, tend to see the
current asymmetrical federation as an absolute and categorically deny the
possibility of allocating equal political rights to republics and oblast's - this is a
nationalist-federalist model. Theoreticians of federalism in general claim that
contemporary multisubject federation will not last long as administration is too
difficult. These skeptics think that in the future, the number of independent
regions in Russia will decrease as the regions themselves grow larger. Current
interregional associations formed as an instrument of cooperation for
neighbouring territories which are closely related one to another geographically
and economically are seen as prototypes of future Russian regions. There are
associations such as Chernozemie (oblasts of central Russia;), the Urals, the
Volga region, the Siberian agreement, etc.
As of today the Russian Federation seems to be still a long way from any of
these three models. It maintains its unique features:
- it consists of many subjects and is difficult to administer, with tensions
emerging not between the republics and oblasts, but between national okrugs
which are a part of the number of oblasts. For instance, there are two ethnic
okrugs on the territory of Tyumen oblast: Yamalo-Nenetz and Khanty-Mansi. All
three formations are equal subjects of federation, according to the Constitution of
the RF. However, it is unclear to whom the natural resources of these territories oil and gas - belong as of today, i.e. the issues of property have not been fully
resolved. There are quite a few of such cases.
- Federative relations in Russia are still formed by means of delegating proxies
"from the top down", i.e. from the federal bodies of power and administration to
the regional ones. Opposite examples, when the territories delegate their proxies
to the Center, are extremely uncommon. In this sense, Russia has so far preserved
the strong features of a unitary state with the elements of a federation. But a
certain unitarism seems to be saving the country from turning into a
confederation.
- In equalities in the rights of the subjects now are being evened out by means of
bilateral treaties between the executive federal authority and the administration of
the regions. It has become customary to talk about a Russian Federation that is
built on constitutional and contractual relations.
The treaties that the Center has concluded with the regions are meant to deal
with the political and legal problems which arise in their relations - in the sphere
of differentiating the areas of responsibility and adopting the decisions of federal
bodies of the state authority and the bodies of authority in the regions. The first
treaty was signed with the Republic of Tatarstan (RT) in February of 1994, it put
an end to the disputed relations between the federal authorities with this republic.
It partially smoothed over the contradictions and discrepancies between the
Constitution of the RF and the Constitution of the RT. A package of mostly
economic was appended to the Treaty. Currently (August 1996) more than 20
treaties with the subjects of federation have been signed. notably. not just with the
republics. but with oblasts and krais. Treaties with the republics of Tatarstan.
Bashkortostan, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia, etc. were the first to be signed.
as for the oblasts, they were Sverdlovsk oblast, Krasnodarsky krai,
Kaliningradsky and Orenburgsky oblast.. The treaties on the differentiation of
the issues of administration and mutual delegation of power between the
federal authority and the subjects of the RF are a new formula for relations
within the framework of the federation. They conform with Article II of the
Constitution of the RF and at the same time it considerably broaden the legal
framework for the activity of the regions.
Such a resolution of internal federal problems found many opponents among
lawyers, fiananciers and economists. The lawyers believe that the treaties with the
subjects of the federation violate the single legal place created by the Russian
Constitution. Financiers and businessmen express their doubts whether the
practice of concluding treaties will complicate the process of conducting
economic reforms according to common "rules of the game" for the whole
country. Undoubtedly, there are certain controversial aspects. However, life has
proven that the treaties, even not quite perfect, are better that open confrontation
which developed into the war with Chechnya.
The practice of concluding bilateral treaties between the center and the regions,
initially of a limited character, being 'trial" or "experimental" as in the case with
Tatarstan will be broadened in the nearest future. However it will not cover all 89
subjects, dealing only, according to our prognosis, with a number of problem
regions. Preparatory work to adopt the federal Law "On the general principles of
differentiating the issues of administration and proxies between the bodies of state
authority of the Russian Federation" is under way now. It will stipulate unified
demands to the process of concluding treaties, will lead to the unification of
approaches in this matter, for until now the developers of the treaties and
agreements have acted on the basis of the President of the RF's decrees.
Along with political and legal problems. the treaties and agreements deal with the
economic issues of the Center's interaction with the regions In this respect four
groups of problems can be identified:
1. budget and tax relations within the framework of the federation;
2. the differentiation of property rights of the subjects. which has turned into
an area of conflict in the course of privatization;
3. the rights of the regions and Center in foreign economic relations (customs
and currency regimes, border cooperation);
4. the mechanism of distribution of federal budget aid to regions in crisis and
depression. levelling of economic and social conditions of development
through regional policy.
Today there is undoubtedly a common trend in political and economic life of
Russia -a gradual delegation of authority from the top to below, the growth of the
independence of the Russian regions. At the same time, after the stage of
"sovereignization" which became especially noticeable in the republics, there
seems to have been a marked sobering both in the Center and in the republics.
The regional elites realized that quite often they were not capable of carrying out
market reforms without the assistance of the Center and close interregional
cooperation. The Center, in turn, has recognized the danger of absolutizing
regional peculiarities, which leads to the destruction of the territorial integrity of
the country.
The majority of experts who have studied the problems of modern state systems
in Russia and various aspects of Russian federalism agree that at present the
separatism of certain subjects of the Federation, especially national separatism has
to a large extent been overcome (with the exception of Chechnya). At the same
time, economic regionalism has become more pronounced, the development of
different regions in Russia are becoming more and more differentiated. Although
this differentiation existed from the start in such fields as natural resources,
climate, demography, social, economic and ethnic spheres, the very course of the
reforms has intensified it. Regions with varied economic specializations have
demonstrated different abilities to adapt to new market conditions, and, naturally,
their economic and political interest are quite diverse. It is absolutely necessary
for the Center to take this fact into consideration in order to prevent sharp
contrasts in the standards of living, income and rates of economic development
between the regions.
At present the following are recognized as the principal goals of federal policy. of
which regional policy is a part: the defense and maintenance of the interests of the
Russian Federation on a whole, maintaining the integrity of its territory, as well as
the integrity of its legal and economic space. In reality, the range of authority of
federal structures to ensure the defense of the interests of the Federation without
infringing upon the rights and the independence of the subjects granted by the
Constitution remains to be determined.
The most complicated issue in the formation of the Russian Federation is
Chechnya. This is related to both the history of the Chechen people and to serious
mistakes of the current Russian leadership in its ethnic policy. There appear to be
two mutually exclusive views on the role and status of Chechnya. In the view of
Moscow leaders, Chechnya is an integral part of Russia, one of the subjects of the
federation, whereas for the Chechens, or at least for their vast majority, the
republic is an independent state. The Chechen Republic, in their belief ,
determines the fate of its own people on its own but retains close ties with Russia.
Chechnya adopted a Declaration of state sovereignty back in 1990 and during all
the subsequent years under D.Dudayev's regime attempted to uphold
independence, not having signed any treaties with the RF, not taking part in
referendums on the Russian Constitution, etc. In the language of lawyers,
Chechnya remained within the legal space of Russia but functioned by its own
laws. At the same time, it had open borders with Russia, used Russian currency,
and enjoyed freedom of travel for its citizens and other advantages of a common
economic space.
Surprising as it may seem, Russia was extremely tolerant of Dudayev's regime
and the freedom of his actions for about four years, although it failed to recognize
him in the legal sense. Experts find it difficult to explain much of the bilateral
relations between Moscow and Grozny in 1991-1994. Undoubtedly there is a
background. hidden policy of either certain influential persons or groups of
people with their economic interests. It is precisely due to this that Chechnya has
in fact turned into a criminal zone. a shadow economy on the territory of Russia.
In Chechnya itself, there were many opponents of Dudayev's regime under his
rule, an opposition formed among politicians and common people who advocated
the preservation of former ties between the republic and the RF. The talks
between the Center and Chechnya on a bilateral treaty and resolving the issue of
the republic's status were slow and regularly interrupted.
The military actions started in December of 1994 by federal troops have only led
to the consolidation of a majority of the Chechen people against the federal
Center. The extreme cruelty of this war erased the line between the opponents and
proponents of independence, having united all people in their struggle for
independence as they understand it (often an idealistic concept). Today it is
obvious that this problem does not have a military solution. The prospects for
Chechnya's future are still unclear. One of the versions of a possible resolution
would be to giving the republic a status that no other Russian territory had ever
had. Such a formula would mean the following: Russia recognizes Chechnya's
independence, while Chechnya remains a part of Russia tinder a special
protectorate. In this respect, there is a possibility that the Chechens in the future
will demand a broader international representation and might claim admission to
the UN. Until now, the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria has not been recognized in
the international sense. The Chechen leaders have already made attempts to make
their power in Chechnya legitimate, in particular, by having turned to the
Organization of Unrepresented Peoples.
In the coming years the world public and international institutions may face the
necessity to either resolve or at least consider the issue of the participation of
several republics which are a part of the RF in international organizations. The
Republic of Tatarstan, for instance, which used to regard itself as the
"independent state, associated with Russia" would like to have an independent
representative in the UN. So far it seeks to broaden its presence in the EC and
other European economic organizations. In the future, this and other problems
will need to be taken into account when dealing with the whole complex of issues
related to reforming the UN.
Raphael Khakimov.
Path Forward for the Russian Federation.
After four years of debate and inconclusive results, the problems of regional policy and
ethnic relations have now come to the fore of the political agenda in the Russian
Federation. The 1993 Constitution left the issue of state structure far from resolved.
There has been no effective institution for implementing ethnic and regional policy (the
Russian Ministry for Nationalities and Regional Policy has had four different heads in
three years). The leadership in Moscow has declared a clear commitment to federalism.
In the current situation, however, ill-conceived attempts in the area of regional and ethnic
policy might result in a backtrack to unitarism and a compromise of democratic values in
an effort to strengthen central state control.
There is a dilemma at the heart of the problem: the current Russian Federation was
constituted on the basis of a mix of some ethnically-based and some purely
administrative territories. In the modem world, from the point of view of protecting the
right of all citizens regardless of their race or ethnic affiliation, it is in principle more
desirable for a state to replace the ethno-territorial principle with the concept of "cocitizenship," as was mentioned in President Yeltsin's annual address.
A multitude of ethnic problems have been engendered by the contradictory nature of two
principles which, from the very beginning, were established as the basis of the structure
of the Russian Federation: the ethno-territorial principle and the administrative-territorial
principle. This becomes clear today as a redistribution of functions and powers is taking
place between the federal government and subjects of the Federation. Under present
conditions, a historical necessity for both principles to co-exist persists. At the same time
the contradiction between them will diminish on the basis of a new notion of the nation as
co-citizenship (sograzhdanstvo). which is enshrined in the Constitution.1
If the Russian Federation had states (US), or Lands (Germany), or governorships
(Tsarist Russia) instead of ethnic republics, the argument goes, then the federal
government would be in a better position to protect the civil and political rights of
all citizens regardless of their ethnicity.
But the current state structure of the Russian federation is ≈ like it or not ≈ a
historical reality. On the face of it, the current structure seems absurd in many
ways: there are some ethnic republics that have a majority of the local ethnic
group and a strong sense of national identity (Tatarstan), while others, such as the
Republic of Sakha-Yakutia which have a majority of Russians (50% of the
population) and a minority of the titular ethnic group (33%). The creation of
many of these ethnic republics was part of a Stalinist policy of dividing and coopting local and national elites. There are also some non-ethnic subjects of the
Federation, such as Lipetsk Oblast, which relative to others is small and
economically less significant.
Even if it were in principle desirable to move toward "co-citizenship" as the key
principle for organizing the complex state structure of the Russian Federation,
what strategy would produce this outcome and over how much time? Over what
period must this be done in order not to threaten overall political stability? How
can existing ethnic groups be accommodated ?
Some regions pose a particular challenge. Though the Russian Federation is 82%
Russian, there are a few regions with a majority non-Russian population and a
history of their own governing structures. These regions were incorporated into
the Russian empire by conquest (Tatarstan, North Caucasus). These regions might
be compared to Quebec, a French-speaking region conquered by the English in
the eighteenth century. In the Volga-Ural region today, Russians account for 44%
of the population, while the share made up by indigenous ethnic groups is
growing. The peoples of the North Caucasus are not only an ethnic mosaic but
they differ dramatically from other groups in Russia in terms of worldview, value
systems and social structures, particularly in the persistence of clan identities. The
religious factor is also important: against the background of the Chechen conflict,
Islam as the dominant religion in the North Caucasus currently reinforces existing
ethnic cleavages with the traditionally Orthodox Russians. Islam is also the
dominant religion of Tatarstan, though it has not been a significant factor in
political developments to date.
It was precisely in these two regions that Moscow has had the greatest difficulty
in its efforts to build a new Federation. Tatarstan and Chechnya were the only two
republics that refused to sign the Federation Treaty of March 1992, which the
leadership in Moscow saw as an effort to preserve the integrity ≈ and stem the
possible breakdown ≈ of the Russian Federation in the face of the "parade of
sovereignties." Bashkortostan, a Republic bordering Tatarstan that has more
Tatars and Russians than Bashkirs, signed with specific reservations. There are
other areas with special historical circumstances such as Tyva (an independent
state until 1944). They signed the Federation Treaty but still represent
problematic cases.
In order to clarify the relations of Tatarstan and Chechnya with the federal center,
Moscow proposed to sign treaties with these two regions that did not sign the Federation
Treaty. Vice Premier Sergei Shakhrai has recently stated that the following principles
guided their actions:
∙ To sign framework treaties only with those subjects of the Russian Federation that were
not party to the 1992 Federation Treaty;
∙ To sign in advance concrete agreements on critical questions of social and economic
policy;
∙ To rely on the results of a legal analysis of the corresponding constitutions, laws and
other normative acts of the Federal Constitution and laws of Russia;
∙ Not to allow any specific subject of the Federation to obtain any "special" status not
envisaged by the Constitution of the Russian Federation or leading to infringement of the
rights of other subjects of the Federation.2
In actual fact, the federal leadership was so preoccupied with critical problems of
economic and political reform, as well as internal power struggles (where regional
support in the form of the Council of Heads of the Republics was used by President
Yeltsin in his battle with the old parliament), that some actions may have been more
improvisations or dictated by Realpolitik than by the above listed principles stated ex post
facto.
In practice, Moscow in large part signed treaties with those regions that were wellorganized and powerful ≈ politically and economically ≈ and where the internal political
situation was particularly complex, involving a risk of destabilization or separatism.
Tatarstan was a case of a powerful and well-organized republic where accommodation of
President Shaimiev could guarantee internal stability and the moderation of extreme
nationalist groups within Tatarstan. Moreover, Tatarstan possessed significant oil
resources, developed industry and trained personnel. Republics and regions that were
net contributors to the federal budget were in a stronger bargaining position vis-a-vis
Moscow and many managed to stray farther and exercise a greater degree of
independence. On the other hand, subsidized regions sought to garner more resources
from the Center by "behaving themselves" to a greater degree.
After three years of serious negotiations and the signing of twelve specific agreements,
Moscow signed a Treaty with Tatarstan in February 1994. At that time (in contrast to his
current position), Sergei Shakhrai stated that Moscow was ready to sign similar treaties
with any subject of the Federation that was willing to follow the same process. He
specifically mentioned Chechnya, but negotiations with General Dudayev, a nationalist
leader, failed and resulted in the current tragic outcome.
Subsequently, Moscow did sign a treaty with Bashkortostan in the Volga region (August
1994). In the North Caucasus, though no agreement was reached with General Dudayev
in Chechnya, Moscow did sign a treaty with Kabardino-Balkaria (November 1994) and
North Ossetia (March 1995). President Yeltsin personally supported these cases, but
Sergei Shakhrai, representing the government Commission on Preparation of Intra-State
Treaties, sent a memorandum to President Yeltsin right afterwards recommending that
the process of signing treaties be stopped immediately. Those standing in line to sign a
treaty include Udmurtia in the Volga region; Dagestan; Ingushetia and KarachaevoCherkessia in the North Caucasus; the Republic of Sakha-Yakutia (Far East) and the
Kaliningrad Oblast.
Again, we see a dilemma for the federal leadership. What if all 89 subjects of the Russian
Federation want to sign a separate treaty with Moscow? This would seem to threaten the
very basis of a coherent federation. Some experts argue that a federation can be
asymmetrical and give special status to a few select subjects, but not all subjects.
Moreover, businessmen do not want to have special laws in each region that might
contradict federal legislation. There is a need for a standard legal framework for market
relations to develop effectively.
At the same time, federal authorities cannot simply abolish the existing state structure
without serious risk of destabilization. Shakhrai has proposed that "territorialadministrative reforms be conducted before the June 1996 elections." The most
influential republican leader. President Shaimiev, has been highly critical of this proposal
and has warned publicly that altering the situation with the Treaty would "result in longterm destabilization of the Russian Federation. Citizens of the Republic of Tatarstan
would most definitely boycott elections to the Federal Assembly as well as the Russian
Presidency, as they did once already."3
The challenge, then, relates to finding a strategy to achieve over time a coherent
centralized government with a healthy degree of decentralization and accommodation of
ethnic groups. What is an appropriate degree of devolution of power in the Russian
Federation? We must keep in mind that the degree of local autonomy that obtained by
Tatarstan, the leader in the effort to devolve power to the local regions, is still on all
counts less than any US state such as California or Montana.4 From the perspective of
the traditionally highly centralized Soviet/Russian state, however, the degree of local
sovereignty obtained by Tatarstan may seem significant.
Though there are some common principles of federal relations, every federative country
has its unique experience such that the German model differs substantially from the
Canadian model. The experience of the United States or Switzerland cannot be
mechanically transplanted to Russian soil. At the same time it would be misguided not to
glean valuable lessons from the experience of other countries, m doing so one has to
bear in mind such peculiarities of Russia as its vast size, economic capacity and ethnic
and cultural diversity. Russia has a particularly complex historical legacy as a result of its
imperial conquests and the arbitrary territorial divisions and deportations of the
totalitarian Soviet period. As noted, there is also a complex political process underway in
Russian Federation today as it undergoes a political and economic transition of
unprecedented proportions. Any approach would need to take into account the mentality
and political culture of Russian society, the nature and character of existing and evolving
institutions, as well as their current capacity to grow and develop democratically.
In an effort to summarize the challenge, the following two primary goals can be stated.
First, there is a need to achieve a federation in Russia that is ultimately coherent, stable
and democratic, providing equal rights for all subjects. Simply put, this can be achieved
either by pushing down those regions ≈ like Tatarstan ≈ that have already achieved some
local decision-making power, or else by raising the status of other subjects, the oblasts
and krais, to the level of republics like Tatarstan. President Shaimiev has supported the
latter position and sees the status of Tatarstan as a step in the direction of a normal,
democratic Russian Federation.
The second main goal is to find ways to accommodate those particularly complex regions
where there is a genuinely challenging ethnic situation with special historical
circumstances, such as Tatarstan, the North Caucasus, and Tyva. These regions may
have a claim to some special arrangement or status, at least in the short-term. Any
political plan to eliminate the republics is fraught with destabilizing consequences. For
some ethnic groups that were forcibly deported under Soviet rule, the issue of preserving
their republics has an existential dimension: it represents a safeguard against the
possible recurrence of such tragedies in the future.
There is also the fact that behind the existing republics stand entrenched interests and
inertia formed over decades of Soviet rule. There are also new interests formed in the
post-Soviet period of redistribution of economic wealth controlled by local authority
figures. For all these reasons, any attempt at massive political restructuring entails
unpredictable and destabilizing elements.
In order to achieve these two aims, we elaborate an approach below, a step-by-step
strategy over five years:
1) Refrain from efforts to cancel the current infra-state treaties, which are pragmatic
responses to complex relationships needed to maintain stability in the process of building
a new Russian Federation. For the time being, there is a need to give special treatment
to particularly difficult cases to allow voluntary integration into the Federation. This is a
complex challenge for federal authorities throughout the world. As Donald Horowitz has
argued, central government authorities generally believe that devolution of power to
regions will lead to secession and the breakdown of the central state, hi fact, however,
such devolution can work in favor of moderate leaders and ultimately contribute to a
strong federation and preempt secession.
This analysis clearly holds for the case of Tatarstan, where early devolution of power
strengthened a moderate leader and basically eliminated the danger of secession, m the
case of Chechnya, however, the particular leader who took power. General Dudayev,
refused to accept less than total independence; his personal power in Chechen domestic
politics depended upon taking an extreme nationalist position. Had a more moderate
political leader been in power in Chechnya, Moscow might have succeeded in its effort to
sign a Tatarstan-like treaty and thus avoid the current tragedy. The Russian government
should make new efforts to sign such a treaty with a representative body of Chechens as
a way of ending the current violence and beginning the difficult path of bringing the
Chechen Republic back into the Russian Federation.
2) Declare a policy of raising over five years the status of all subjects of the Federation to
the level of current republics like Tatarstan, which allows for a local constitution and
symbols, election of local leader, and reasonable local decision-making power. These are
powers that are normally given to local regions in any modem federation. Some oblasts,
such as Nizhny Novgorod and Ekaterinburg, have unilaterally decided to elect their
leaders; most heads of administrations are still appointed from Moscow.
3) Over time it is possible to imagine that some existing subjects of the Federation will
voluntarily merge and form new subjects through regional economic associations. The
principle stimulus should be economic as opposed to political. Rather than endeavoring
to destroy old forms, new forms should be created in parallel to the old, allowing the latter
to fade away gradually.
1
Boris Yeltsin, "Federalizm I mezhnatsional'noe soglasie" in "Ob ukreplenii Rossiiskogo
gosudarstva" Rossiiskaya gazeta. 25 February, 1994, p.4
2
Sergei M. Shakhrai, Official Memorandum to President Boris N. Yeltsin No. 1576
(March 1995).
3
Izvestia Tatarstana. December 23, 1994, p.l.
4
The only exception is possibly the area of military service, where Tatarstan is claiming
the right for its young men to serve on the territory of Tatarstan and not to be involved in
ethnic conflicts within the Federation. In principle, Tatarstan has declared itself a neutral
and nuclear-free zone. As an enclave Tatarstan may be able to maintain some such
rights that would be impossible for a border region to claim (federal troops must defend
the border), but this is not clear.
Raphael Khakimov.
Prospects of Federalism in Russia: A View from Tatarstan.
1. Introduction
THE PECULIARITY of Russia is that democratic laws have rarely been adopted there,
and even when they have been adopted they have never been observed. Two points are
important for understanding the political situation in Russia: (1) Russian society has
traditionally been undemocratic, and (2) the existing constitution and laws have usually
been ignored. Each new leader considered creating a brand-new constitution to be of
primary importance, while that same leader rarely cared about observing that
constitution. There are quite a few cases in the history of Russia which demonstrate that
its leaders have often preferred the use of force to political methods for dealing with the
people and with different ethnic groups. The war in Chechnya conforms with those
traditions. The treaty with Tatarstan contradicts them.
One should not be so naive as to think that in Russia the age of democracy has now
arrived. Russia's Constitution may look pretty good as seen from Europe, but one should
not forget its dubious legitimacy. Only one third of the electors voted for it; it did not get
approval in 32 regions subjects of the Federation, while in Tatarstan no plebescite
whatsoever was held. Moreover, the legitimacy of the Federal Sobraniye (the Parliament)
is also very doubtful, for the subjects of the Federation did not take part in elaborating the
Statute of the representative bodies of Russia.
Moscow has exhausted its reformative potential. It has brought Russia to a dead end.
The army of officials, which has grown threefold since Soviet times, does not need
federalization or democratization of the country. What it needs is tax increases. The
interests of Russia and the interests of Moscow are not the same. Today it is the republic
and some administrative territories that are really interested in the federalization and
democratization of Russia.
2. An Approach to Federalism in Russia
'Democracy' and 'federalism' arc synonyms for poly-ethnic Russia; the one is impossible
without the other. National-state arrangements remain the key problem. Unless it is
solved, there can be no political stability, and the continuation of the political and
economic reforms is impossible.
Russia seems to be the only territory where its numerous peoples are able to maintain
their cultures. These peoples are indigenous, having lived there long before the Russians
came. That is why it is natural that they should demand to participate in forming the state
on an equal basis with the Russians. Russian federalism should be based on the
interests of all nations living in Russia. Any other approach would lay the foundation of
inter-ethnic tension. At the same time, however, there is a purely Russian problem
involving the development of Russian territories. On the all-country scale the variety of
the geographic, economic and cultural factors is too great for Russia: therefore it cannot
be ruled from one single place.
Federalism in Russia should be based on two principles: (1) the ethno-territorial principle,
which takes into account the interests of non-Russian peoples; and (2) the territorial
principle, which defines the status of predominantly Russian subjects.
There are two basic approaches to the federalization of Russia: one is constitutionaltreaty, the other is treaty-constitutional. The first approach was traditional for the official
structures of Russia; the second one has been asserted by Tatarstan and several other
republics. 'Constitutionalists' affirm that sovereignization of the republics can lead to the
breakup of the Russian Federation as was the case of the Soviet Union, therefore the
central government should pursue a policy of strict control over the republics and allow
them only minimal powers. Supporters of treaty-based federation do not consider Russia
a real federation; they keep to the principle of establishing relations with the central
government 'from below upwards', i.e. through the voluntary transfer of their authority by
means of bilateral treaties. In this case, sovereignty becomes a necessary legal basis for
the self-determination of the subjects of the Federation.
While supporters of the first approach assert that the constitutions of the , republics
should conform to the Constitution of Russia, advocates of 'concordant federation' Tatarstan among them - maintain that it is the Constitution of Russia that should be
brought into conformity with the constitutions of the republics, and the central government
should be under the control of the subjects of the Federation. The functions of the federal
governing bodies should consist of the authority voluntary transmitted to them by the
subjects of the Federation, each subject being entitled to determine the list of these
powers and to withdraw them at any time.
The source of power in any democratic federation is the people. Thus the foundation of
the state, the functions of the central governing bodies, etc. should all be determined by
the subjects of the federation. In post-imperial Russia, reformation of the state 'from
above' is impossible, because the 'center' is interested in preserving the unitary state and
not in decentralizing the system of government.
Tatarstan has always viewed decentralization and federalization of Russia as a means of
dismantling the state structures of the empire, enabling a change towards truly
democratic foundations of life.
3. Tatarstan's Sovereignty
Tatarstan consists of two main ethnic groups roughly equal in number: Tatars (48.5%)
and Russians (43.3%).1 Tatars all over the world regard the territory of Tatarstan as their
historical birthplace and the center of their cultural development.2 The Tatars enjoyed
statehood in the form of the Bulgar Khanate, the Golden Horde and Kazan Khanate.
They were later annexed by Russia under Ivan the Terrible, but the Tatars have always
played a special role in the history of Russia. Certain traits of state structure and social
life of Russia were influenced by the Golden Horde, while Russian culture experienced
some influence on the part of Tatar culture.
The Tatars accepted Islam in 922. Orthodox Christianity has been historically perceived
by the Tatars as the religion and culture of the Russian conquerors. Christianization is
associated with the most tragic pages in the annals of Kazan Khanate. Only since late
18th century, after Catherine the Great's decree on religious tolerance, were Muslims no
longer persecuted in Russia. In the 19th century Islam was reformed. This new version of
Islam which combined Muslim canons with the ideas of liberalism (the so-called jadidism)
could be called 'Euro-Islam'.
The Muslim movement in Russia has, both in the past and nowadays, been headed by
die Tatars. At the moment there are no religious frictions in Tatarstan. Indeed, the
republic can serve as an example of peaceful coexistence of the two world religions, and
its positive experience could be of use for other countries.
The Tatars have a level of culture and education high enough to claim their. own
statehood. The Russians understand that, but in their turn want to play the same role in
the republic as the Tatars.
The essence of Tatarstan's sovereignty lies not in its striving for complete independence
(although this option has been discussed in the parliament)3 but in getting guarantees for
the republic's autonomy and establishing new relations with Russia, relations in the
interests of the people. Tatarstan does have reason to distrust the central government
even if it is headed by democratic forces. In 1920 the republic got its autonomy from
Moscow, but then, in 1937 (after adopting 'Stalin's Constitution'), was completely
deprived of it. There arc no guarantees that if someone like Zhirinovsky comes to power
in Russia he will not try to follow Stalin's example, not least since the new Russian
Constitution makes the establishment of an authoritarian regime plausible. For this very
reason Tatarstan has become active on the international scene, signing bilateral treaties
with foreign countries and opening permanent representations.
Life in Tatarstan is largely determined by the decisions made by the local legislative and
executive bodies as well as by the activities of the local parties. All-Russia parties are not
very influential and do not have their structures in Tatarstan. Nevertheless, the political
and economic situation in Russia has considerable influence on Tatarstan, especially its
economy. That is why the republic has to coordinate its activities with the policy of
Moscow.
Article 61 of Tatarstan Constitution says: 'The Republic of Tatarstan is a sovereign state
and a subject of international law associated with the Russian Federation on the basis of
the Treaty on mutual transmission of authorities.' Tatarstan did not sign the Federative
Treaty, being determined to have a bilateral treaty with Russia. Relations of association
are more in the interests of Tatarstan, as they give the republic more independence than
the Constitution or the Federative Treaty.
Although the initiative came from Tatar community, the state sovereignty of Tatarstan
was declared on behalf of all its people. The Constitution of Tatarstan declares Tatar and
Russian as two offical languages. In areas where people of other nationalities live - the
Chuvashes, the Udmurtis, the Marts and the Mordvas - the languages of these people
are also used as official languages. (For example, in Tatarstan ballot papers are
published in six languages.) The policy of the Tatarstan government is directed at
keeping a balance between all ethnic groups and religious communities.
Nationalistic parties are not influential in Tatarstan. The recent elections and plebescites
have shown that ethnic belonging is not decisive in determining people's opinion. 4 Thus,
the poly-ethnic and multi-cultural society which is taking shape in Tatarstan is based on
the principle of territorial, not ethnic, sovereignty.
4. 'Tatarstan Model'
In August 1991; Moscow and Kazan started negotiations which on 15 February 1994
resulted in signing the Treaty on Delimiting the Jurisdictions and Mutual Transmission of
Authorities Between the Organs of State Power of The Russian Federation and The
Republic of Tatarstan. Along with this Treaty the two governments adopted a package of
agreements regulating relations between the two countries in the spheres of trade,
property, budget, finances, banking, defence, the military-industrial complex, customs
regulations, higher education, ecology, and the coordination of law-enforcement
activities.5
After the Treaty had been signed on the background of the Chechen events, the
international press began to speak about Tatarstan model'.6 Indeed, in the former Soviet
Union this is the only positive experience of conducting negotiations between the central
government and a region. Several factors determined the success of these negotiations.7
The political stability of Tatarstan helped it to stand up for its interests. Moscow, in rum,
had probably hoped for inter-ethnic dissent in the republic, and demanded that a
referendum be conducted on Tatarstan's status. Russia put forward this demand as a
precondition for the continuation of the negotiations. The referendum, scheduled for 21
March 1992, had the following question: 'Do you agree that the Republic of Tatarstan is a
sovereign state and a subject of international law which develops its relations with the
Russian Federation and other republics on the basis of bilateral treaties?'
Before the referendum (which was held according to procedures laid down by Russian
law) Tatarstan experienced some pressure on the part of Russia's General Office of
Public Prosecution, the Supreme Soviet and the President of Russia.8 Leaflets exhorting
the people to say 'no' streamed into Tatarstan from Russia. Army exercises were held
around me borders of the republic. Still, 61.1% of those who took part in the referendum
said 'yes'. Moscow had to continue the dialogue.
Negotiations were held simultaneously on three levels: (1) the top level, where the
'political' treaty was being worked out; (2) the government level, which was concerned
with working out the package of agreements determining the mechanisms for realization
of the 'big' treaty; and (3) the ministry level, where specific issues of finances, the budget,
the army, etc. were discussed. These tactics were to determine the basic principles of the
bilateral relations as well as the mechanisms of delimiting of powers.
The shortcoming of the Federative Treaty was not only its controversial character but the
lack of a mechanism for implementation. Despite tremendous efforts on the part of the
republics to bring it into force, it remained a mere declaration.9 The Tatarstan-Russian
Treaty, on the other hand, also involved a package of intergovernmental agreements on
the most important aspects of Tatarstan life, which made it a practical document.
One factor that assisted the success of the negotiations was the fact that year by year
the position of Tatarstan was reinforced by its newly developed domestic legislation.
Espedally important was the adoption of the Constitution, which Tatarstan carried out
before Russia.
Moscow was also put under pressure by the abstention of Tatarstan citizens from several
Russian plebescites. The changes in the numbers of Tatarstan voters participating (and
this is a reliable indication of the population's attitude to the policy of Russia) were as
follows:
(1) 36.5% of the voters took part in Russia's presidential elections of 1991. Only 16.4%
voted for Boris Yeltsin;
(2) 22.6% of the voters took part in the all-Russia referendum of April 1993, where 14.9%
expressed their trust to President Yeltsin;
(3) 13.8% of the voters took part in the elections to the Federal Sobranie and the
referendum on the Constitution of Russia of 12 December 1993, with 10% of Tatarstan
voters voting for the Russian Constitution.
The tendency was the same in Kazan and the towns and rural districts of Tatarstan with
a predominantly Russian population. The interest of Tatarstan citizens in all-Russia
political events was steadily going down, threatening to isolate Tatarstan political
processes from the political life of Russia. That worried the Federal government and
helped to make it more compliant.
Tatarstan made a certain use of the solidarity of the republics, especially its neighbors in
the Volga-Ural region, who have always been influenced by Tatarstan because of its
geographic closeness, ethnic similarity, economic cooperation, etc. The Volga-Ural
republics and Tatarstan had signed treaties on friendship and cooperation, and the
political leaders of those republics often issued joint declarations and demands.
Conducting negotiations on three levels simultaneously made it possible to broaden the
circle of the participants of the negotiation process. In Russia there was considerable
opposition to the 'separatist deal' with Tatarstan. From 1991 Moscow newspapers
published articles denouncing the very fact of conducting such negotiations. That is why
it was so important to have allies on all levels: in the circle of President Yeltsin's coworkers, in the government, in the parliament. Otherwise the great effort made by both
sides on the summit level could be brought to naught on the lower level: in the
government and especially in the ministries.
Finally, the success of the negotiations was assisted by the fact that Tatarstan delegation
acted as one team, always composed of the same members. By contrast, in the course
of three years, Russia changed all the members of its delegation.10
The Tatarstan-Russian Treaty is a means of settling the political conflict between Kazan
and Moscow which developed on the basis of two deeply rooted ' tendendes: the demand
for the decentralization of power and change to true federalization of Russia on the one
hand, and striving to keep the maximum power in the hands of the central government,
on the other hand. The latter tendency was the heritage of the old Soviet empire.
Moscow was here guided not by strategic, but by tactical considerations, hoping after
some time to force Tatarstan and other republics to obey the commands of the 'center'.
Although the Constitution of Russia stipulates the right to conclude treaties (Article 11,
paragraph 3), it does not set out the principles or the scope of concordant relations. By
contrast, for Tatarstan the concordant character of relations with Moscow is a policy of
principle reflected in many official documents.
The Treaty has historical significance, as it confirms Moscow's renunciation of the use of
force. In legal terms, the Treaty is to serve as a sort of buffer between the Russian and
the Tatarstan Constitutions. Essentially, the Treaty means that Moscow does not demand
that Tatarstan bring its Constitution into line with the Constitution of Russia. This in turn
implies recognition of the pre-eminence of Tatarstan laws over the laws of the Russian
Federation - between which there are considerable differences. For instance, Tatarstan
has adopted legislation on private property and land ownership. Its laws give privileges to
foreign investors which Russian laws do not.
The Treaty recognizes Tatarstan's right to introduce its citizenship along with Russian
citizenship, and also Tatarstan's right to participate (although not fully) in international
and foreign economic relations. The fact that many Tatars live in Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan influences the republic's foreign policy. The
religious factor is also salient in foreign policy: for instance, the stand of Tatarstan's
leadership and general public on the Bosnian problem differs from the official position of
Russia's Foreign Ministry.
The Treaty does not stipulate the creation of joint legislative or executive bodies. Russian
laws practiced on the territory of Tatarstan are limited to the powers that remain with the
Federal bodies (currency, finances, Russian citizenship and some others), for which
reason relations between Tatarstan and Russia are best described as association.
The political status of Tatarstan still needs to be elaborated in terms of a broader
interpretation of federative relations and their correspondence to international law. The
closest analogy would seem to be the status of Puerto Rico, whose relations with me
USA are set out in the 'Bill to approve the compact of permanent union between the
United States and Puerto Rico (1975)'. Tatarstan, however, has certain pecularities that
make it different from Puerto Rico. These pecularities are the result of Russia's postempire traditions and Tatarstan's enclave situation.
After the Tatarstan-Russian Treaty had been signed, there were attempts to stop the
concordant process between the two governments. Certain politicians began to speak of
establishing the Russian Federation solely on the territorial principle, as opposed to the
national (ethnic)-territorial principle.11 In spring and summer of 1995, two drafts of the bill
'On the principles of distribution of the 'jurisdiction and authorities between the organs of
state power of Russian Federation and the subjects of the Federation' were brought
before the Duma. The bill was aimed at interrupting the concordant process between
Tatarstan and Russia. The tougher draft (originating in the Duma itself) directly banned
any treaties between the Federal government and the subjects of the Federation. Both
drafts met with resistance from the republics and some oblast. In September, Boris
Yeltsin declared that treaties would be signed not only with the republics but with oblast
as well. Such treaties have been demanded by Kaliningradskaya oblast, Yekaterinburg
and some other oblast.
Thus the process of concluding treaties, initially considered an exception for Tatarstan
and Chechnya (the republics that did not sign the Federative Treaty), is now viewed as
normal and necessary for all subjects of the Federation. By the summer of 1995,
supporters of the treaty-constitutional foundation of the Russian Federation had
reinforced their positions and induced the head of Russia to speak in favour of the
concordant process.
5. The Asymmetry of Federative Relations
The Russian mentality, always inclined to egalitarianism, does not easily accept the
existence of some special relations between Kazan and Moscow, or differences in the
status of subjects of the Federation. The oblast are irritated by the 'privileges' that
Tatarstan enjoys, particularly by the lower share it has to contribute to the Federal
budget. At the same time, however, they fail to consider the greater responsibility that
these 'privileged' republics take upon themselves. The issue of symmetrical vs.
asymmetrical federation is in (he focus of political debates.
The asymmetry of relations between the Federal government and the subjects of the
Federation is a fact that cannot be ignored or eliminated. Differences in the status of the
republics, oblast, krai and autonomous okrug are obvious. The extent of the powers
devolved to Tatarstan and other republics are also different.
There are certain differences in the status of the subjects of the Federation that are
patently unfair. Although Russian Constitution considers all subjects of the Federation
equal, the krai and the oblast still do not have their Charters (Fundamental Laws) and
their heads are appointed, not elected. Thus, they can scarcely be considered as
subjects of full value. In the next few years the powers of the republics and administrative
territories are going to become more equal. The heads of several oblast and krai are now
speaking of making their powers equal to those of the authorities of Tatarstan. These
tendencies are becoming widespread. The case of Edward Rossel, head of the selfproclaimed Ural Republic, is significant here. Although dismissed by President Yeltsin, he
was elected Governor by the population of Yekaterinburg. At his first press conference,
Rossel said he wanted a treaty with Moscow similar to the treaty Tatarstan had. This
indicates another tendency: when elections take place among other subjects of Russia, it
will be very difficult for Moscow to control them.
At the same time, a certain asymmetry will survive. There are major disparities in the
levels of. economic development of the various regions. Border regions have their own
peculiarities. Subjects of the Federation have their historical and regional traditions.
Some cannot and will not accept greater responsibility for their regions. Finally, certain
republics have claims rooted in their ethnic interests.
Tatarstan has come out in favor of a flexible policy of the Federal government, one not
based on abstract egalitarian principles but oriented towards the ethnic and historical
peculiarities of the regions. In early 1995, the Presidents of Tatarstan, Bashkiria and
Yakutia sent President Boris Yeltsin a message entitled 'For Consistent Democratization
and Federalization of Russia' in which they state:
The policy of the central government with respect to its subjects should be flexible, taking
into consideration the political realities. There are and there will be differences between
the subjects of the Federation. This only reflects the natural variety of life. Unity and
stability of the state are achieved not by making everyone fit some artificial standard, but
by taking into account the peculiarities and requirements of each subject. 12
It is not the symmetry of relations that makes a federation firm but the possibility for the
subjects to find support for their interests in the face of the federal government - of
course, without prejudice to the interests of other subjects.
6. The Hague Initiative
The Tatarstan model' kindled interest on the part of those former Soviet republics that
had conflicts between the central power and the local governments. With some of these
republics Tatarstan had bilateral treaties and partnership relations.
In January 1995, within the framework of the international project 'Management of Ethnic
Conflicts in the Post-Soviet States' supported by the Administration of the President of
Tatarstan, the political leaders of Georgia, Abkhazia, the Ukraine, the Crimea, Moldova,
the Transdnestr Republic, Russia and Tatarstan had a round-table discussion in the
Peace Palace in The Hague, with the participation of international experts. The main
discussion topic was the conflicts in the former Soviet regions and the possible use of the
Tatarstan experience in settling them.13 The informal exchange of views showed that
Tatarstan had managed to find the solution for numerous complicated problems and,
although the 'Tatarstan model' could not be applied in situations where armed clashes
had taken place, the republic's experience was nevertheless useful in other
aspects.Tatarstan is interested in continuing The Hague initiative and in broadening die
circle of its participants. The next meeting is scheduled for early 1996.
7. Association as a Form of Self-determination
History can show no examples of direct transition of empires to federations.
Nevertheless, Tatarstan is trying to induce Russia to develop federalization. The
prerequisite for creating a true federation is the independence of its subjects: otherwise it
is impossible to provide them equal rights and reform the central power. But striving for
independence is fraught with conflicts. The 'Czechoslovak divorce' is an exeption in this
regard.
Relations of association can become the key factor that will allow the transition from
empire to federation without infringing upon the territorial integrity of the states, because
in this case the question of borders is not raised. Relations of association are flexible:
they do not require the creation of joint organs of government, nor do they place any
limitations on transferring powers to the central organs. This could be a possible form of
relations between Georgia and Abkhazia, the Ukraine and the Crimea, Moldova and the
Transdnestr Republic. The international community must, of course, be involved as the
guarantor of security in establishing such new relations.
8. Global Federalism
The international community cherishes the illusion that the world is made up of states. In
fact, it is made up of peoples. The leaders of the great powers believe that they
determine the world order and the development of political processes, but their conceit
comes into collision with the determination of peoples to gain their freedom and
independence.
Not infrequently, tension in international relations is caused by the confrontation between
people striving for self-determination and the state insisting on its territorial integrity.
International law does not provide any ready-made solutions to this problem. Pleading
the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, the international community prefers to
leave the solution of such problems to the discretion of the states involved. But as the
conflict worsens, it becomes difficult for the international community to remain aloof, and
finally it decides it has to interfere. But by this point the conflict has already reached the
stage when it is difficult to change anything. Bosnia and Chechnya are convincing
examples; the latter conflict had been brewing for three years before the eyes of the
whole world and the outcome had been predicted by many experts long before it started.
International relations are regulated by organizations like the UN. But, as life shows, the
development of political events is influenced not only by states, but by peoples who do
not have their own statehood and who are striving to gain it. The exclusion of these
peoples from world politics is one of the main reasons for the international instability
today.
Global federalism can become an effective instrument of preventing inter-ethnic and
political conflicts. Its essence lies in recognizing peoples, represented as such in
democratic institutions, as subjects of international relations on a par with states. The
most radical step towards a renewal of international relations would be to establish a
second chamber of the United Nations, one which would represent peoples and not
states. This would change the structure of many international organizations, including the
International Court of Justice. An approach like this changes priorities. It views the world
as a community of peoples and not of states. It puts forward values above and beyond
the interests of the national states, values of a global character.
For many peoples, the struggle for a state of their own is only a manifestation of struggle
for worthy living. The very fact of including them in international life will be enough for
many of them to dismiss the idea of creating their own independent state. Global
federalism makes the idea of statehood less attractive, and divests the border issue of its
conflict character. This is a real way of strengthening security on our planet.
Notes and references
1
Due to recent migration into Tatarstan, the Tatar population now numbers more than
50% of the total.
2
The total number of Volga Tatars in the world is now about 7 million.
3
See the Decree of the Supreme Soviet of Tatar Soviet Republic 'On the act of the state
independence of the Republic of Tatarstan' in: The White Paper on Tatarslan. The way to
sovereignty (collection of official documents) 1990-1995. Kazan, 1995, p. 12. (in Russian)
4
For example, at the elections to the Stale Soviet of Tatarstan in March 1995 in the
predominantly Russian-speaking district of Spasskii, a Tatar candidate was elected, while
in the Tatar-speaking Agryz district the majority voted for a Russian.
5
See the text of the Treaty and the 12 agreements in: The White Paper on Tatarstan...
and in journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 18, no. 1, Fall 1994.
6
Bruce Allyn, 'One Enclave's Solution to Ties with Mother Russia', Christian Science
Monitor, 12 October 1994; Trudy Rubin, 'Yeltsin Must Ease Ethnic Leaders to Negotiate
Peace in Chechnya', The Philadelphia Inquirer, 13 January 1995; John Lloyd, 'A Delicate
Balance', Financial Times, Weekend 25/26 February 1995.
7
Here let me add that I myself took part in the negotiations as a member of Tatarstan
delegation.
8
See President's Shaimiev's lecture at Harvard University. The text was published in
Izvesia Tatarstana, 14 October 1994 (in Russian).
9
Until October 1993 there was a group of experts of the Council of the Heads of the
Republics (of which I was a member) that paid special attention to working out the
mechanism of the realization of the Federative Treaty.
10
Negotiations started on 12 August 1991 under the supervision of Gennady Burbulis; he
was later replaced by Valery Tishkov, Sergei Shakhrai and, finally, Yury Yarov.
11
In early 1995, Sergei Shakhrai, Russian Vice Prime-Minister, in a memorandum to
President Yeltsin wrote that 'the practice of conducting internal treaties will complicate the
administrative-territorial reform which is so important for Russia and which it would be
important to carry out before the 1996 elections'. See Molodezh Tatarstana, 12-18 May
1995 (in Russian).
12
For the text of the message see Panorama-Forum, Kazan, 1995, no. 1, p. 7 (in
Russian).
13
See details in Raphael Khakimov, 'Russia and Tatarstan: at the Crossroad of History.
The Hague initiative' in Molodezh Tatarstana, 1995, no. 12 (in Russian); Bruce Allyn, The
Hague Initiative', Ethnic Conflict Management in the Former Soviet Union: Bulletin
(Cambridge, MA: Conflict Management Group, June 1995).
The Conference "Future of Russian Federalism: Political and Ethnic Factors"
February 25-26, 2000
Phillip A. Petersen,
Director of the Russian Programs, the Potomac Foundation (USA).
Russia's Place in the 21st Century?
Russia's government, and even most of its own critics in the Russian Federation,
chafe when its policies or actions are criticized by foreigners: ⌠Who are you to
criticize us?■ So I will attempt to avoid ⌠criticizing■ Russia. Instead, I shall discuss
the kind of world that is rapidly emerging and about how, even among those who do
have a pretty good sense for what's happening, there remains a fundamental
necessity to avoid breezily employing terms such as flexibility, liberalization, or even
privatization. Yet, make no mistake about it, behind the differences of
presentation≈the taboo words and the patriotic talk of defending traditional values≈in
economics and economic policy, a truly global common market is emerging.
Competition, innovation, and enterprise are now being understood to be directly
connected to lower unemployment and a higher standard of living. Lower taxes, less
public spending, and a lighter hand of regulation is the future. I'll leave it for the
reader to integrate the facts into his or her own frame of reference, but only argue
that competition makes for better business and even more effective government.
The Third Wave Builds
When Alvin Toffler offered his conceptual architecture for understanding the
economic basis for the advance of civilization in The Third Wave, he offered his
readers the opportunity to know ⌠the destinations toward which change is carrying
us.■1 Certainly, nobody needs to remind citizens of the Russian Federation about the
violence of the clash between the Agricultural Revolution of the First Wave and the
Industrial Revolution of the Second Wave. The Bolsheviks remain the epitome of a
political party of the Second Wave. Yet, when Nikita Khrushev was threatening to
⌠bury■ the United States in terms of industrial production, the country was already
entering the Third Wave n with more workers engaged in what was then referred to
as ⌠white collar work■ than in industrial production. Never a true ⌠nation-state,■ the
United States has become the womb of ⌠globalization■ and, thereby, the leading
edge of an Information Revolution. Moving humanity beyond mass production, as
noted by Toffler, the Third Wave ⌠provides the world's poorest nations, as well as the
richest, with wholly new opportunities.■2
In his book The Digital Economy, Don Tapscott pointed out that the Information
Revolution of the Third Wave has created ⌠a knowledge economy based on the
application of human know-how to everything we produce and how we produce it. In
the new economy, more and more of the economy's added value will be created by
brain rather than brawn.■3 The essence of industrial production today is ⌠masscustomized rather than mass-produced.■4
Tapscott argues that ⌠our traditional mind-set≈even if we use sophisticated
mathematical techniques and impenetrable sociological jargon≈has always somehow
perceived business as buying cheap and selling dear. The new approach defines a
business as the organization that adds value and creates wealth.■ 5 As a result, he
observes, ⌠success in the new economy will require inventing new business
processes, new business, new industries, and new customers≈not rearranging old
ones.■6 Tapscott concludes that ⌠what counts is a company's ability to attract, retain,
and continually grow the capabilities of knowledge workers and provide the
environment for innovation and creativity.■7
As technology was added to the Information Revolution, it increased dramatically the
tempo of change and, as this Information Technology Revolution expands its hold
over economic relations, will redefine the nature of these relations in ways that will
fundamentally reconstruct commerce itself. As observed by Don Tapscott a number
of years ago, the process of ⌠virtualization■ will mean that people will be working and
participating in one country's economy while physically located somewhere else.
Already between 1993 and 1999, the number of Americans connected to the Internet
rose from 3 million to 80 million.8 Yet, between 1995 and 1999, the percentage of
internet users, which grew from 26 million to 179 million, grew even more
dramatically outside Canada and the United States, from 16% to 43% of the total
internet users.9 While fewer that 1% of the population of China has access to the
Internet, for example, that still amounts to nearly 10 million users in China alone. 10 In
1998, the Internet generated about $301 billion in U.S. revenue, closing in on the
automobile industry. Business-to-business commerce alone is expected to increase
from $48 billion in 1998 to $1.3 trillion in 2003.11 According to The Economist,
⌠between 1995 and 1998 the IT sector, despite accounting for only about 8% of
America's GDP, contributed, on average, 35% of the country's economic growth.■ 12
Furthermore, ⌠U.S. high-tech companies poured a record $95 billion into international
markets in 1998, spreading the country's spectacular Internet wealth around the
globe and further stitching together the economies of the world.■13
Contrary to most perceptions, globalization is as enabling for small-businesses as
much as it is cost-cutting for large-business, largely because ⌠innovation drives every
aspect of economic and social life.■14 As Tapscott observes, ⌠in the innovation
economy, human imagination is the main source of value.■ He, therefore, argues that
⌠the critical challenge for any company in the digital economy is to create a climate in
which innovation is prized, rewarded, and encouraged. Every country needs
innovative workplaces and organizations that foster creativity. Growth in the
innovation economy comes from small- and medium-sized businesses rather than
large corporations or governments.■15 In the United States, for example, ⌠the federal
government estimates half the nation's output comes from businesses with fewer
than 100 employees.■16 As a result of the need for innovation, ⌠there is a concurrent
trend towards self-employment and the creation of small knowledge-based industries
providing work on a contract basis. In the digital economy, as intellectual capital
becomes the most valuable resource, the means of production shifts from the plant
floor into the innovative minds of knowledge workers≈those who create value.■ 17
Fearful of missing the opportunity to profit from this dynamic, venture capitalists are
pouring millions of dollars into the creation of small-business portals to bring ecommerce to the fragmented small-business community.18
While globalization and mergers draw much attention, the processes they represent
are not world-dominating predatory acts, but competition as much a threat to
lumbering giants and ⌠boon for the nippy little firms that create most of today's new
employment and wealth.■19 Deregulation has resulted in the growing importance of
foreign firms in national economies: they pay their workers more; create jobs faster;
spend heavily on research and development; and export more than domestic firms.20
What we are observing is the appearance of two economies in the industrialized
world, those of the old industrial dinosaurs and another ⌠dominated by aggressive
new entities in the software or Internet sectors, but including older concerns nimbly
adapting to the information age.■21
Bidding for the Future
The emerging global economic system is one is which whatever makes commercial
sense is no longer deterred by legal, cultural, or political uncertainty. As observed by
The Economist, ⌠behind this trend is a new generation of managers who understand
that firms belong to shareholders, not bosses or ⌠society■. 22 So-called ⌠hostile■
takeovers ⌠have recently succeeded in Italian telecomms and insurance, French
banking and energy. Venture capital, leveraged buy-outs and cross-border mergers
are booming. Old companies are shrinking and new ones springing up. Europe,
which has for years been exporting more capital than it imports, may finally start to
attract the investment from foreign financiers that it needs. And as a genuine market
for corporate control is forged, managers might at last be held to account for their
companies ⌠performance.■23
Underpinning the new corporate attitudes, is a fundamental shift in relations between
companies and their banks. ⌠Banks are pulling out of corporate lending, which offers
paltry returns. They are also treating industrial stakes more like other investments.■
At the same time that the banks are pulling out of corporate lending and becoming
more active as shareholders, ordinary middle-class folks are themselves piling into
shares. The arrival of shareholder capitalism has set the stage for increasing
corporate accountability and, as a result, a rapid increase in the pace of globalization.
All this, in turn, will drive the world toward a single standard of transparent efficiency.
If a company wants to lower its cost of capital, it needs to list its shares on America's
stockmarkets.24 ⌠The U.S. capital markets probably now comprise some 60-70% of
the world's available private capital resources. Should a company... lose access to
the U.S. bond market on a sustained basis, it would not only pay more for the funds it
raises elsewhere (e.g., in Europe or Asia) but would likely find itself unable to attract
the volume of funds required to meets its development needs.■25 It is for this reason,
for example, ⌠nine of Germany's biggest companies have already [listed on American
markets].■26
The movement toward a truly global (that is, it has been noted, American-dominated)
common market will not only provide for greater innovation and competition, but do it
transparently. ⌠In some countries, structural rigidities are delaying progress. The
failure to reform pensions affects national budgets, and also stunts the development
of institutional shareholders. Radical restructuring and deregulation are threatened by
union power and rigid labour markets.■ Yet, while there will be hesitations and
setbacks along the way to the globalization of economics, the direction is clear: ⌠a
capitalism more transparent, more efficient and, yes, redder in tooth and claw.■ 27 As
observed by British Prime Minister Tony Blair, ⌠there is now a new direction for
Europe, away from the social regulation agenda of the e80s and instead in the
direction of enterprise, innovation, competition and employment.■ 28
The New Left
Ever since the new left swept to power, in the United States (1992), Britain (1997),
France (1997), Germany (1998) and Italy (1998), all the governing center-left parties
follow conservative macro-economic policies. And in the United States and Britain,
Mr. Clinton and Mr. Blair have turned out to sound as market-minded on structural
reform as their conservative predecessors. Even their continental European counterparts, leading ⌠a majority of centre-left governments, [are] not clinging unthinkingly to
old ways.■ The rhetoric may sound similar to the past, but ⌠the political boilerplate is
deceptive. In fact, something more subtle is taking place: the gentle, growing, if
sometimes reluctant recognition by Europe's left that reform of the social model they
did so much to develop is necessary.■29 While delivering upon the details will involve
contentious debate, the general outline of government's role in the reconfiguration of
public participation in and administration of the new economy has been understood
for some years:
- Create the regulatory conditions for an open competitive marketplace for the
evolution of the information infrastructure.
- Use the new technologies to reinvent itself to cut costs and improve the delivery of
government programs. In doing so governments would not only deliver better and
cheaper service but as a significant purchaser place considerable demand on the
market.
- Take steps to ensure that technology serves people by implementing policies and
programs to ensure universal access, equity, privacy, and security.
- Act as a catalyst for new kinds of partnerships that would encourage demands for
networks, the growth of applications, and the use of the new technologies.30
⌠In the new economy, those workers with access to the new infrastructure can
participate fully in social and commercial life. Those without access, knowledge, and
motivation will tend to fall behind.■31 As demonstrated by Ford Motor Company and
Delta Air Lines, the companies that want to be successful in the 21st century will
provide such access to their workers to accelerate development of the skills in order
to fully utilize the Internet and related technologies.32 Individual knowledge workers
will be the new owners of the means of production, but require ⌠motivation and
trusting team relationships to be effective.■33 This new reality requires ⌠a reexamination of the basic power relationships of the workplace, marketplace,
household, and society. Knowledge work, the new consumer sovereignty, localized
infrastructure for the Net, all of these demand a reconfiguration of public participation
and administration.■34 While Russia's ⌠economy has now slid to something like one
percent of world output,■ it does not have to re-tool its industry by Second Wave
rules. In a global economy based increasingly on knowledge and technology, the
door is wide-open to all who submit to the normal rules of the digital economy.
Russia is faced with a clear choice. She cannot integrate into the global economy
and subsidize her antiquated industry of the tools of suppression. Those who know
him say that Vladimir Putin most certainly does understand that creating the strong
Russia he wants requires prosperity, and that this will require subordinating politics to
economic considerations. It was argued in late February 2000 by Marat Galeev of the
Presidium of the Republic of Tatarstan that ⌠Putin is not a black box, but a blank
sheet of paper.■ Rafael Khakimov, State Advisor to the President of Tatarstan,
agreed in arguing that Putin ⌠has no clear impulse towards a return to a unitary state
structure.■ The great Russian scientist Evgeny Velikhov, as well, urged that Putin be
judged only by his actions after the March 2000 Russian presidential elections. To
quote a more simple soul from Kazan: ⌠We shall live, and we shall see.■
1
Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave, New York: Bantam Books, April 1981, p. 4
2
Toffler, The Third Wave, p. 337.
3
Tapscott, p. 7.
4
Tapscott, p. 8.
5
Don Tapscott, The Digital Economy: Promise and Peril in the Age of Networked
Intelligence, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995, p. 85.
6
Don Tapscott, The Digital Economy: Promise and Peril in the Age of Networked
Intelligence, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995, p. 4.
7
Tapscott, p. 47.
8
Mark Leibovich, Tim Smart, and Lanthe Jeanne Dugan, ⌠Internet's E-conomy Gets
Real: New Business Math Gains Solid Ground,■ Washington Post, June 20, 1999, p.
A17.
9
New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century, Washington: The United
States Commission on National Security/21st Century, September 15, 1999, p. 6.
10
See Clay Chandler, ⌠Dot-Comrades Start Small,■ Washington Post, March 26,
2000, p. H1.
11
Mark Leibovich, Tim Smart, and Lanthe Jeanne Dugan, ⌠Internet's E-conomy Gets
Real: New Business Math Gains Solid Ground,■ Washington Post, June 20, 1999, p.
A1.
12
⌠The New Economy: Work in Progress,■ The Economist, July 25, 1999, p. 21.
13
Ariana Eunjung Xha, ⌠U.S. Firms Spin a Web Worldwide: High-Tech Dollars Flow
To International Markets,■ Washington Post, March 13, 2000, p. A2.
14
Tapscott, p. 61.
15
Tapscott, p. 62.
16
Leslie Walker, ⌠Web's Next Big Thing Is Small,■ Washington Post, February 17,
2000, p. E4.
17
Tapscott, pp. 66-67.
18
Walker, p. E4.
19
⌠The world's view of multinationals,■ The Economist, January 29, 2000, p. 22.
20
⌠Globalization: Foreign friends,■ The Economist, January 8, 2000, pp. 71-72.
21
Clay Chandler and Akiko Kashiwagi, ⌠Japan Inc.: Diverging Onto Dual Tracks?■,
Washington Post, February 16, 2000, p. E1.
22
⌠EUROPE'S NEW CAPITALISM: Bidding for the future,■ The Economist, February
12, 2000, p. 72.
23
Ibid., p. 71.
24
Ibid., p. 72.
25
Remarks of Hon. Roger W. Robinson, Jr., President and CEO of RWR Inc. and
former Senior Director of International Economic Affairs at the National Security
Council before the Non-Proliferation Policy Education Center, May 19, 1999.
26
⌠EUROPE'S NEW CAPITALISM: Bidding for the future,■ The Economist, February
12, 2000, p. 72.
27
Ibid., p. 74.
28
As quoted in William Drozdiak, ⌠EU to Push Growth in Innovation, Technology,■
Washington Post, March 25, 2000, p. E2.
29 ⌠EUROPE'S
NEW CAPITALISM: Bidding for the future,■ The Economist, February
12, 2000, p. 19.
30
Tapscott, p. 316.
31
Tapscott, p. 67.
32See,
for example, Warren Brown and Frank Swoboda, ⌠Ford Offers Home PC TO
Every Employee,■ Washington Post, February 4, 2000, p. A1 and p. A12; and Frank
Swoboda, ⌠Delta Joins Ford, Offers Home PCs To Workers,■ Washington Post,
February 5, 2000, p. E1 and p. E2.
33
Tapscott, p. 67.
34
Miller, as quoted in Tapscott, p. 318.
The Conference "Future of Russian Federalism: Political and Ethnic Factors"
February 25-26, 2000
Donna Bahry,
Doctor of Philosophy, Professor of Political Science at Vanderbilt University.
Rethinking Asymmetrical Federalism.
Introduction
The design of the federal system has prompted a long and contentious debate in Russia
since 1991. Efforts to balance central state interests with ethnic, regional and local
diversity have generated a succession of different approaches, from the federal treaty in
1992, to the Constitution of 1993, to region-by-region treaties and agreements from 1994
on. The net result since the mid-1990s has been an asymmetrical federal system with
substantial differences in powers across different regions. New initiatives by President
Putin in the spring of 2000 represent an effort to remake the system once again.
Much of the debate focuses on the issue of asymmetry.1 To its adherents, this plural brand
of federalism allows needed flexibility for a country that includes eleven time zones and
one of the most ethnically diverse populations in the world. Tailoring particular terms to
individual regions provides the opportunity for local resolution of local problems. It also
offers the prospect of broadening democracy, by increasing representation and
opportunities for participation beyond the level of the central state.
Critics, on the other hand, point to several drawbacks. One is an issue of principle:
asymmetry, so the argument goes, challenges the underlying assumption of equal rights
under democratic government. And differential powers based on ethnoterritorial criteria
imply the preeminence of group rights, while democracy should give primacy to the
individual. Other critiques rest on more pragmatic arguments. Differential powers across
regions can add to the difficulties of coordination across institutions and policies; and
inhibit the ability of the central state to reallocate resources across jurisdictions. The
ultimate criticism, of course, is that centrifugal forces can unravel the state itself.
While all of these arguments have some merit, they miss a crucial point. Asymmetry is a
common and growing feature of democratic federations, especially those with compactly
settled ethnic minorities. Individual territories and groups enjoy special status and rights
ranging from the cultural and linguistic to the political and economic realms. Moreover,
even unitary systems have increasingly devolved authority to the regional level and
granted asymmetrical rights to different regions in recent years. Globalization and broad
societal changes have made highly centralized states less and less able to cope with
demands for economic, social, and cultural development. The response has been to
reconfigure the allocation of state power between central and subnational governments.
Thus the idea of negotiated, asymmetrical federalism is hardly unique to Russia. My aim
here is to provide a comparative perspective on it, by exploring the sources of devolution
over the past 25 years, and the various forms of asymmetry in selected countries.
Patterns of Federalism
Federal systems, as Watts (1994; 1996) argues, have emerged in three broad waves
since the mid-nineteenth century.2 The first wave developed with the formation of nationstates in Western Europe and the British Commonwealth, as cities, states and regions
coalesced into larger units. This integrative form of federalism was exemplified in Germany
(1870), Switzerland (1848), Canada (1867), Australia (1901), the U.S. (1787), Austria
(1918) and Brazil (1891). The defining characteristic, according to Stepan, was the
primarily voluntary decision by smaller units to pool their sovereignty.
The second wave accompanied decolonization in the post World War II period. In this
case, newly emerging states confronted a mismatch between administrative boundaries
established by colonial powers on one hand, and pre-existing ethnic, linguistic or religious
communities on the other. Federalism thus provided a compromise, allowing the creation
of new nation-states while recognizing internal diversity. Examples of this attempt to knit
together distinct populations ranged from India (1950), Pakistan (1956), Indonesia (194549), Malaya (1948) and Malaysia (1963), to Nigeria (1954), French West Africa and the
Mali Federation (1959) (see Watts, 1996). In many cases, however, these efforts to forge
new states were unsuccessful as various groups and territories pushed for independence
and some federations simply dissolved.
The third wave has had a broader geographical focus, and a different trajectory. Beginning
in the mid-1970s, it has primarily brought devolution in existing nation states. Central
governments have increasingly handed responsibilities downward to the regional and local
level, and recognized special political and economic status for specific regions and
groups. Examples include devolution and recognition of special status for Quebec and the
Northern Territories in Canada; federalization of previously unitary states in Belgium and
Spain; and decentralization of economic and social policies in a host of other cases.
This emphasis on devolution and asymmetry can be traced to several broad trends in the
global economy, in politics, and in society over the past 25 years. Shifts in technology and
communications have transformed international trade and capital, and with them, the
economic role of central governments. National borders and economic barriers have
diminished in importance, allowing greater mobility of goods and capital. Protectionism
has grown both more difficult to sustain and more unpopular as an economic strategy.
These developments, plus the rise of the post-industrial information economy, have
prompted widespread reassessments of the efficiency of large, hierarchical firms. The
development of "turbo-capitalism," to use Edward Luttwak's (1999) phrase, has generated
ever greater demand for smaller, more flexible forms of corporate organization that can
react quickly to rapidly changing, global markets.
The same trends have also bred a reassessment of centralized, hierarchical government.
Declining barriers to trade and increased capital mobility suggest growing constraints on
governments' ability to regulate and tax business. The capacity to redistribute revenues is
thus increasingly limited.
The constraints pose a particular dilemma for the state's role as guarantor of social
welfare. The graying of the population in many countries suggests heightened
commitments but limited ability to continue to pay for social welfare programs such as
social security, health care, and public services. The common response has been to trim
welfare at the national level by handing various programs down to regions and localities. 3
Central governments can thus reduce their obligations while avoiding the political costs of
cutting or eliminating benefits.
The second broad trend behind devolution is political. The spread of democratization since
the early 1970s has prompted increased concern with representation and participation,
and these, in turn, heighten the role of regional and local governments (Faletti, 1999). The
expansion of democracy below the national level has also come to be seen as a potential
counterweight to the reemergence of authoritarianism.
A third source of devolution stems from broader societal changes during the same period.
There can be no doubt that ethnic and/or communal identity has become more important - making questions of cultural preservation, language use, and territorial autonomy all
much more salient. This is complemented by a parallel trend toward "individualization": the
appeal of centralized collective organizations such as political parties and trade unions
has diminished over time, while the role of the individual has increased. As a result,
people are less likely to see themselves as part of a large centralized organization, and
more likely to identify with local communities (Keating 1999).
Altogether, these trends have led to a paradox, heightening the role of transnational ties
but also enhancing the role of subnational governments. The diminishing importance of
national borders has facilitated increased efforts at integration across countries, as
evidenced in the European Union, and to lesser degrees in NAFTA, Mercosur and other
regional organizations. The same forces have also led to what Michael Keating (1999)
calls a "re-territorialization" of politics, moving the locus of responsibility for public policies
from the central to the regional and local level.
Patterns of devolution
Responses in individual countries have varied from radical and broad devolution to more
measured decentralization, primarily in the economic sphere. Space does not permit a
complete survey of all of them here. Instead, the following discussion focuses on cases
where the change has been most substantial, where unitary governments have evolved
into federal or quasi-federal ones.4
Spain's transformation since the mid-1970s offers one of the most radical examples.
Negotiations over the transition to democracy in the mid-1970s led to recognition of
regional autonomy in general, and of special status for historical communities in Catalonia
and the Basque country. The result, since 1978, has been substantial devolution of
powers from the center to the regions, especially to the two historical communities.5
Spain's seventeen autonomous regions (which include a total of 50 provinces) now have
six co-official languages and far more responsibility for domestic policy.
Degrees of devolution and asymmetry vary by policy area, however. With respect to
economic development, what had been a centralized industrial policy up through the early
1980s has been transformed into a regional concern. Special economic zones were
created to scale down subsidized enterprises in heavy industry and to give regions
authority over investment policy and tax credits (in conjunction with entry into the
European Community). The goal was to help promote research and development,
technical training, and the development of small business (Agranoff, 1994).
In health care, six regions conduct their own policy, while the other 11 have regional
managers to coordinate and implement federal health policies. In welfare, the federal
government stipulates minimum services and provides bloc grants to finance them; but
each region has its own policies and programs. And on budgetary matters, two regions
(the Basque country and Navarre) have a single-channel tax system, while the 15 other
regions rely on shared taxes (Agranoff and Gallarin, 1997).
The Spanish system also proves to be asymmetric in the fields of public order and
international economic ties: the Basque region alone among the 17 autonomous
communities has its own police force (subject to oversight from Madrid). And the Basque
country has its own representative in Brussells (Agranoff, 1994).
In Belgium, national government policies have long recognized the distinct languages and
cultures of the Flemish and Walloon communities, under a unitary state. The 1990s
brought a constitutional change from a unitary to a federal system, with separate
parliaments for Flanders, Wallonia and Brussells, and also for the three main language
communities (Dutch, French and German). The three regions now hold primary
responsibility for much of domestic policy, from economic development, public works and
transportation to foreign trade. Federal government functions include defense, foreign
affairs, social security, management of the public debt, and the criminal court system
(Judt, 1999).
Devolution in the United Kingdom has been even more recent. Here, too, some official
recognition had long been given to the distinct communities in Scotland and Wales, while
the state remained unitary. But growing local support for home rule beginning in the
1970s, and changing party fortunes at the national level in the 1990's (from Conservative
to Labour dominance) led to referenda on new legislative assemblies in both regions in
1997.
The two parliaments will differ, however: in Scotland, where local autonomy on some
issues had traditionally been broader, (and the movement for home rule was stronger), the
new assembly has primary powers of legislation in several areas -- economic
development, health care, education and manpower training, housing, social work,
regulation of local government, environmental matters, and the justice system (plus all
residual powers not specifically reserved to the national government) [Keating, 1998]. The
Welsh assembly is to have more limited powers of secondary legislation, i.e., the ability to
adjust legislation from Westminster (Keating, 1998). Both Scotland and Wales have
gained the right to participate in the British negotiations and delegations to the European
Community; and Scotland is now recognized as having the right to a representative in
Brussells.
Many more cases of devolution and asymmetry are focused primarily on the economic
sphere. In China, reforms since 1978 have created a variety of special regimes in different
regions. The first initiative in 1980 designated four southern regions as Special Economic
Zones (SEZ), offering preferential tax policies to lure foreign investment. That was
followed by the creation of 14 "Coastal Open Cities" (COC) in 1984; 32 "'Economic
Technology Development Zones;" 13 "Tax-Bonded Areas;" 52 "High-Technology Industrial
Development Zones," and other special regimes for regions and localities. (Cho and Tung,
1998; Dutta).6 Efforts to create 57 SEZ's have been launched in the four countries of Latin
America's Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay) [Kotabe, 1998]. The
SEZ's, with differential economic rights, are intended to help stem capital flight and
increase exports. These economic measures have accompanied a more general trend
across Latin America to devolve powers to the regional and local level since the 1980s
(Faletti, 1999).
Thus the shift from central to regional and local authority has extended across continents,
and across both new and old democracies. However, while similar trends seem to be at
work in virtually all the cases, both the process of devolution and its results have varied
from country to country. After all, decisions about when and what to decentralize are
inherently political. In many cases, they have depended on the fortunes of political parties
at the national and regional level. Madrid, for example, has varied over the years in its
willingness to cede power to the Spanish autonomies, depending on the strength of the
ruling party/coalition at any given time and the need to form alliances with regional parties
(Agranoff and Gallarin, 1997). And the push for home rule in Scotland and Wales
developed momentum once the Labour and Liberal parties signed on, and the
Conservatives' electoral support eroded (Keating, 1998).
The Dilemmas of Asymmetry
As devolution and asymmetry spread globally, they raise a host of questions about the
implications for democracy, equality, and national integration. With respect to the fit
between democracy and asymmetry, the standard argument, as noted earlier, is that
rights should be guaranteed to individuals rather than groups. But this is a narrow view:
democracy is also about protecting rights of minorities, and guaranteeing representation
and participation. As Stepan (1999b) notes, asymmetric federalism is an effort to
recognize these multiple dimensions of democratic rights.
Whether devolution and asymmetry do in fact broaden democracy, however, obviously
depends on how political institutions operate in specific cases. Stepan (1999b) argues, for
example, that democracy is enhanced where the transfer of authority between center and
regions is subject to open, transparent approval procedures at the national level -- that is,
where devolution is legitimized either through the constitution or by approval in the
national parliament.
Democracy is also enhanced when there are common rules of the game to promote
political competition and accountability within regions.7 Thus, in the Spanish case, the
autonomies hold uniform regional elections, using proportional representation and a
common formula for allocating seats; their legislators face term limits; their cabinets are
limited to ten members; and their legislators may vote a prime minister and cabinet out of
office via a constructive vote of no-confidence (Agranoff and Gallarin, 1997).8 In Germany,
each land has its own constitution -- and laender all have the right to decide on a
unicameral or bicameral legislature (only one state, Bavaria - has opted for bicameralism).
Laender also decide themselves whether the executive is directly or indirectly elected
(Boase, 1994).
Finally, democracy is enhanced where there are commonly accepted mechanisms for
resolving the inevitable conflicts that arise over central, regional and local jurisdiction. In
fact, it might be argued that democracy is valuable precisely because it provides a
framework for managing such disputes. Agranoff and Gallarin (1997) note, for example,
that both the Spanish central government and the autonomies have turned to the
constitutional court repeatedly since the 1980s to resolve federal conflicts. In 1981, the
central government challenged 41 percent of the laws and decrees issued by the 17
autonomies; but that number dropped over the years, to seven percent in 1990. Over the
same period, the autonomies (especially the two historical regions of the Basque country
and Catalonia) also raised hundreds of challenges to the national government through the
court system. But the number of challenges from the regions has also diminished over
time. The constitutional court, for its part, has ruled for both sides, upholding the principles
of devolution and asymmetry, but also recognizing the central government's prerogatives
in some areas. In addition to the legal system, some federations also possess other
mechanisms for resolving center-regional conflicts. In Germany, for example, the upper
house of parliament (Bundesrat) holds absolute veto power over questions affecting the
laender.
The question of inequality across regions is similarly complex. By definition, the provision
of asymmetrical powers to regions and localities means that regional policies should differ,
reflecting varied preferences for public goods and services. The problem, of course, is that
regional preferences and regional economic and fiscal resources are often mismatched.
Levels of economic development and corresponding revenue bases vary; as does
economic profile (e.g., between "rustbelt" versus "sunbelt" regions).
To add to the complexity, central governments' capacity to reduce these differences by
traditional methods has grown more difficult, due to the trends outlined above. As Keating
(1999) notes, federal-level governments have experienced a striking loss of capacity to
forge territorial economic compromises by traditional means: "Diversionary [i.e.,
redistributive] regional policy measures┘are much more difficult to implement in a
globalized economy because firms have a wide choice of location outside the boundaries
of the state." Thus old strategies for regional protection, such as tariffs, diversionary
regional policies, and state-directed investment strategies no longer prove as feasible or
effective (Keating 1999).
Instead, many central governments have handed more responsibility for economic
development to regions themselves. Central policies often focus on stimulating growth in
less developed regions by promoting local competitiveness -- for example, with credits for
infrastructure, high-technology, creation of special economic zones etc. These steps, so
the argument goes, reduce centralization and regulation, and thereby encourage
economic growth, as demonstrated with dramatic results in China. There, the adoption of
SEZ's yielded average growth rates in eastern regions (i.e., primarily coastal) of 11.4
percent per year during 1984-1993, while initiatives in Western regions yielded average
growth rates of 8.9 percent per year during the same period (Dutta).
However, most central governments have shown much less of a tendency to devolve
revenue sources to regions and localities. The preponderance of taxes remains
concentrated at the national level, since the ones with the highest yields generally tend to
be more easily and efficiently collected on a central rather than regional basis
(Norregaard, 1997). If anything, the advantages of national governments have increased
in this regard, given the impacts of globalization and increased capital mobility noted
above. Thus devolution in expenditures and in economic policy has not been matched by
a corresponding decentralization of revenues.
The alternative in most cases has been to rely instead on various mechanisms to reallocate federal funds, from tax-sharing to special-purpose grants for specific programs to
outright subsidies. And the choice of mechanism seems to depend on the goals of the
central government. Where these goals emphasize cross-regional equalization, as in
Germany and Canada, for example, federal revenue sharing emphasizes explicit
redistribution to offset regional differences in tax capacity (Krelove, Stotsky and Vehorn,
1997; Spahn and Fottinger, 1997). Where federal goals are more diverse, as in the U.S.,
mechanisms for central funding of state and local programs are less explicitly
redistributive.
Finally, the trend toward devolution also raises questions about the prospects for national
integration. It seems obvious that a diminished role for the central government and
divergent policies across regions would exert increased centrifugal pressures on the
national state. Belgium and Canada may be the clearest examples of the difficulties
involved in preserving the federal system overall. But whether they can be preserved
depends in part on identifying the real sources of devolution and responding to them. If
trends toward devolution are indeed products of global changes in economic and social
life, then ignoring them would seem to be a losing battle. The question is how to build
institutions that can adapt.
Conclusions
Asymmetry and devolution have become facts of life in both federal and unitary systems
over the past 25 years. My aim here has been to demonstrate that these are the result of
broader global trends in economics, society and politics. They suggest increasing limits on
the economic effectiveness of centralized states. However, whether regions actually
benefit from these changes depends on how governments at the grassroots adapt to the
global market and to commonly accepted democratic rules of the game.
References
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Boase, . 1994. In DeVilliers,
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Keating, Michael. 1999. "Asymmetrical Government: Multinational States in an Integrating
Europe," Publius, 29: 1, pp. 71-86.
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7:1, (spring 1998), pp. 38-46.
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pp. 201-25.
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Lynn, Nicholas and Alexei Novikov, 1997. "Refederalizing Russia: Debates on the Idea of
Federalism in Russia," Publius, 27:2, pp. 187-203.
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Impact of Institutions and Regionalist Conflicts," Paper Prepared for the American Political
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Moreno, Luis. 1994. "Ethnoterritorial Concurrence and Imperfect Federalism in Spain," in
DeVilliers, pp. 162-193.
Norregaard, John. 1997. "Tax Assignment," in Ter-Minassian, pp. 49-72.
Ordeshook, Peter and Olga Shvetsova. 1997. "Federalism and Constitutional Design,"
Journal of Democracy, 8:1,pp. 27-42. The
Solnick, Steven. 1995. "Federal Bargaining in Russia," East European Constitutional
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Spahn, Paul Bernd and Wolfgang Fottinger, 1997. "Germany," in Ter-Minassian, pp. 22648.
Stepan, Alfred. 1999a. "Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model," Journal of
Democracy, 10: 4, pp. 19-34.
Stepan, Alfred. 1999b. "Russian Federalism in Comparative Perspective: Problems of
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the Advancement of Slavic Studies, St. Louis.
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on the Devolution Process in Russia," Post-Soviet Affairs, 15: 1, pp. 87-106.
Teague, Elizabeth. "Russia and the Regions: The Uses of Ambiguity," in John Gibson and
Philip Hanson, Transformation from Below: Local Power and the Political Economy of
Post-Communist Transitions. Edward Elgar, 1996, pp. 13-36.
Ter-Minassian, Teresa, editor. 1997. Fiscal Federalism in Theory and Practice.
Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
Watts, Ronald. 1994. "Contemporary Views on Federalism," in DeVilliers, pp. 1-29.
Watts, Ronald. 1996. Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s. Kingston, Ontario:
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Decentralization in Latin America," Latin American Research Review, 34: 1, pp. 7-56.
Notes
1
For an overview of the debate, see Lynn and Novikov (1997).
2
In keeping with the common definition in the literature, I define a ⌠federal■ system here
as one with two or more levels of government holding distinct constitutional status and
separate (if overlapping) jurisdictions.
3
Devolution in social programs would be expected to limit expenditures, because regional
and local governments would find it more difficult to finance them (i.e., they have fewer
revenue sources of their own to draw on).
4
For a comparative overview, see Keating (1999).
5
Initially, the plan for devolution in 1978 provided for two kinds of paths to autonomy -- a
"fast track" for regions with a historical claim to differential status such as Catalonia and
Basque country; and a "slow track" for the fifteen others. In practice, all 17 regions have
witnessed substantial decentralization since then.
6
Cho and Tung (1998) write that these different regional economic regimes vary in
emphasis. Some, such as "High-Technology and Industrial Development Zones," are
generally built in university districts of major cities to promote investment in research and
development of high-technology sectors. Others may focus on the development of local
infrastructure to promote greater foreign investment, or on a host of other incentives to
generate economic growth.
7
Note, however, that devolution itself can also complicate the issue of accountability, as
voters are faced with a diverse array of elected officials with overlapping responsibilities.
See Downs (1999).
8
According to the Basque government, legislators also serve full-time, and may not be
members of the royal family, the government, electoral commission, the police or the
armed forces. I was unable to determine whether these provisions apply to all 17
autonomies. The autonomies do differ in defining electoral districts: some have a single
district encompassing the entire region; while others have multiple districts (Mershon and
Hamann, 1999).


List of publications of the team concerning the role of regions:
"Country Summaries: Situation after the Meeting at Mehrerau" in Newsletter 2 of
the project
Russian Regional Studies Network
Russian Regions
Regionalization of Russian Foreign and Security Policy: Interaction
between Regional Processes and the Interest of the Central State
The objective of this international research project is to analyze regional dimensions of
Russian foreign and security policy, an aspect of center-periphery relationship that has
not yet been researched systematically. The aim of the project is to determine whether
and how the central state understands the specific interests of Russian regions and to
what extent regional processes have an impact on Russia’s external relations and on
integration processes within the CIS space and beyond.
A main task of this project consists in establishing profiles of selected Russian regions
in order to examine their international security environment and relationship to the
Moscow center. In order to present a true picture of Russia’s uneven regional
landscape, the regions have been carefully selected according to various criteria.
Border regions and central regions, ethnic republics and oblasts and krais, poor
agrarian regions and rich oil- and gas-producing regions are among the regions
selected: the Tatarstan, Komi and Karelia republics, the Sverdlovsk, Kaliningrad, Pskov,
Nizhnii Novgorod, Novosibirsk, Volgograd, Kursk, Belgorod, and Ryzan olasts, the
Primorskii Krai, as well as the two cities of St.Petersburg and Moscow.
Apart from field research, several studies are planned to further elaborate on issues of a
more general and/or theoretical character. Problems such as the regions’ place in a
globalizing world, the understanding of “sovereignty” from a regional point of view, the
importance of external factors for Russia’s regionalization, the impact of information and
communication technology on center-periphery relations, and the role and political
orientation of Russia’s regional elite will among others be the issues included.
During the course of research, close cooperation has been established with research
institutions and organizations in Russia and several Western countries such as the
Centre for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Birmingham, the
Scottish Centre for International Security at the University of Aberdeen, the
Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, the Swedish Defence Research Agency, the
Royal Institute of International Affairs, the Nizhnii Novgorod Linguistic State University,
the Ulianovsk State Technical University, the Department of Political Science and
Sociology at Ural State University, the School of International Relations at St.
Petersburg State University, the Center of Geopolitical Studies at the Moscow Institute
of Geography, the Faculty of History and International Relations at Volgograd State
University or the Novosibirsk State Academy of Water-Transport Engineers.
Contacts:

Prof. Dr. Andreas Wenger
Regions Carp as Center Flounders
By MICHAEL DEMAR THURMAN
Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and Policy
With the campaign slogan "Break Moscow's Fetters," Nizhny
Novgorod mayoral candidate Dmitri Bednyakov seems to reflect the
opinion of an increasing number of Russians with greater confidence
in regional, rather than federal, authorities, as the latter are seen as
incompetent and unreliable. (1) The present economic and political
crisis has exacerbated this mistrust and has caused various regions
to react with creative, if not entirely desperate, techniques for
survival. The result has been an acceleration of the process of
political decentralization, which has developed quietly over the last
few years.
The effect of the present crisis on center-regional relations cannot
be known at this early stage, but judging by the constitutional
structure of the federal government and the inability of the federal
authorities to provide even minimal leadership, an increase in
regional autonomy is assured. Any shift in power may be permanent
or of long duration for, if history is any guide, power once given--or
taken--is loath to be surrendered. It is too soon to claim that
centralism is dead; but for the first time in modern Russian history,
significant political authority can be found in areas outside of
palace, party, or president. A review of the structure of Russian
federalism, the actions of the regions in response to the crisis and
Moscow's abrogation of leadership, suggests that some devolution
of power is occurring.
Constitutional Structure
Federalism is enshrined in the 1993 constitution in chapters 3, 5,
and 8. Chapter 3, "Russian Federation," recognizes 87 subjects
(states, Länder, provinces) of the federation with the status of
Moscow and St. Petersburg to be determined later. (2) Article 71
enumerates the powers reserved for the federal government, Article
72 discusses powers shared by the federal government and the
regional governments, (3) and Article 73, similar to the Tenth
Amendment to the United States' constitution, reserves "the entire
spectrum of state power" for the regions. (4)
Chapter 5, "The Federal Assembly," provides that regions will be
directly represented in the upper house of the Federal Assembly,
the Federation Council. Each region is given two seats in the
Federation Council, but unlike the American Senate, regions do not
elect representatives expressly for this purpose. Rather, Article 95
provides that "two deputies from each subject of the Federation
shall be members of Federation Council: one from the
representative and one from the executive body of state authority."
A subsequent presidential decree defined this to mean that each
region would be represented by its governor, or chief executive, and
the head of its regional parliament.
The Federation Council has the potential to save the flawed system
during this crisis. This is because the Federation Council is at once
both central and regional, and thus embodies both levels of
sovereignty within the federal system. Members of the upper house
of the Russian parliament do not merely represent the interests of
the regions--they are the regions. In other words, in an institutional
sense, the Federation Council is less about representation than it is
a caucus of regional authorities. During times of "normal" politics,
the Federation Council can be a terrible burden on the governor and
speakers or presidents of regional legislatures because direct
regional representation is not really necessary for the day-to-day
functions of government. However, during times of constitutional
crisis, the regional sovereignty within the Federation Council,
legitimated by a democratic process separate from the federal
source whose legitimacy would then be in question, can become the
"provisional" representation of the nation until the truly national
institutions--the president and/or the Duma--can re-establish
themselves. Most importantly, all of this is largely possible within
the confines of the constitution. In fact, governors have been
brought directly into the presidium of the government.
Chapter 5 provides for the election of the lower house of the Federal
Assembly, but is silent as to how the members are to be elected.
Article 95, Section 3 says only that the Duma shall consist of 450
members. A 1995 law on Duma elections provided that one-half of
the Duma be elected by single-member constituencies and one-half
by national party lists distributed by proportional representation. (5)
This election method has had a significant impact on the structure
of Russian political parties both inside and outside the Duma.
Single-member districts undercut the ability of Duma factions and
national parties to maintain party discipline. The existence of singlemember electoral districts makes for lawmakers whose concerns lie
more with their districts than with national party issues. In order to
survive, "national" parties which are managed from Moscow must
address the needs of specific regions. This too enhances regional
influence in the Duma.
Chapter 8, "Local Self-Government," may be the most important
section of the constitution for the development of federalism by
virtue of what it omits: It does not tell the regions how to set up or
run their governments. Article 130, Section 1 says that "local selfgovernmentŠshall ensure independent solution by the population of
local issues," and Article 131, Section 1 allows "the structure of
bodies of local self-government [to] be determined by the
population independently." Article 132, Section 1 empowers local
governments to "independently manage municipal property, form,
approve, and execute the local budget, establish local taxes and
levies, and ensure law and order and solve any other local issues."
This seemingly simple absence of instruction forced the regions to
become responsible for an entire host of post-Soviet transitional
issues, as well as the more quotidian affairs of government. It also
provides the regions with a broad constitutional argument for their
recent actions. Thus the constitution allows the creation, perhaps
unwittingly, of real centers of popular decision-making where only
hollow regional administration existed before.
The inability of the federal government to implement its own laws
contributes to the structural causes of increased regional autonomy.
The catastrophic disarray of the Russian bureaucracy is no secret,
but it seems often ignored in the debate about reform proposals.
Even if meaningful reform were to be introduced in Moscow, it is a
long way from the Kremlin to the regions, i.e., the average citizen's
front door. (6) The reverse is also true; the representatives of
regional governments often must go begging hat-in-hand to
particular federal bureaucrats who have the connections to dispense
the necessary help. The system is capricious, personalized, and
wildly ineffective. Regional governments often must find their own
way because they simply cannot trust the federal government to
make good on its promises.
Another obvious case of expanding regional competence is the
process of signing center-region treaties, themselves an admission
of the lack of federal control after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The process began more than four years ago with the Republic of
Tatarstan. Since then more than 40 other regions have signed such
agreements.
Crisis and the Changing Federal Relationship
In view of the federal nature of the Russian political structure, it is
hardly surprising that response to the present economic and
political crisis has come in a decentralized or regional form. From
regional currencies, to price caps, to trade prohibitions, the regions
are struggling to feed, house, and clothe their citizens because the
central government is incapable of doing so.
The crisis began with the effective devaluation of the ruble in
August. This led to a partial collapse of the banking system. (7) The
crisis was compounded politically with Prime Minister Sergei
Kirienko's dismissal as well as Viktor Chernomyrdin's nomination
and two-time rejection by the Duma, culminating in the Duma's
ratification of Yevgeni Primakov's prime ministerial candidacy on 11
September.
Responses to the crisis range widely, but several trends are clear.
Some, or most, regions are withdrawing from the Russian market as
a whole, and some are taking control of law enforcement agencies,
thereby taking control of their own borders. For instance, certain
regions, such as St. Petersburg, asked banks to invest not in federal
treasury bonds, but rather in regional bonds. Often those who
transferred their funds to regional bonds did better than those who
did not. But buyer beware: Several regions, such as Tatarstan, have
defaulted on their debts. (8)
The Tatarstan case makes an important point. Much of what is
presently happening is not necessarily the result of the crisis;
rather, regional authorities have used the center's mess to explain
the failure of local economies. Vechernyaya kazan reported that
Tatarstan would have defaulted on its debts anyway, regardless of
the ruble devaluation, because the money it raised was mishandled.
(9) Kaliningrad Governor Leonid Gorbenko noted that "it is
becoming ever more evident that power structures in the provinces
are trying to 'grab' a maximum of powers that unquestionably
belonged to the central administration as recently as a week agoŠ."
Gorbenko goes on to claim that this is understandable because
"Moscow is currently unable to control the situation in the state,"
(10) but another reason for the power struggle may be to lessen the
chance of future financial control by Moscow. In a July interview,
the speaker of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area, Sergei
Sobyanin, argued that the true sources of power in the regions were
not Moscow "oligarchs" or politicians but the finance ministry, since
79 out of 89 regions received federal subsidies and were therefore
subject to intimidation by the ministry. (11)
Times have changed, at least temporarily. As more and more
regions refuse to pay taxes or hand over central bank deposits,
federal treasury employees posted in the regions are finding
themselves increasingly at the mercy of regional authorities for
assistance in resolving matters of business, as well as for help in
day-to-day living. (12) For years, regional authorities had to beg
the federal treasury for attention. Now that the tables have turned,
it would be small wonder if a little retribution were not in order.
Sergei Sobyanin also noted that the "power" ministries play a
significant role in intimidating the regions. According to Sobyanin,
"they are engaged in collecting bags of compromising materials
against regional leaders." (13) Perhaps this is one reason why many
regional and local governments are setting up their own security
councils, chaired by the governor or mayor and including regional
and local representatives from law enforcement agencies. Duma
Security Council member Vladimir Lopatin says that, with Moscow
unable to pay the salaries of local law enforcement officers, they
turn to local authorities who, predictably, want control over how
enforcement groups operate. The regional and local officials then
gain control of agencies which are technically under the exclusive
purview of the federal authorities. The situation is illegal, says
Lopatin, but the regions find having their own security councils is
helpful for extracting more power from Moscow, (14) and possibly
protecting themselves from future abuses of federal authority.
Some regions have erected trading barriers in clear contravention of
the constitution. Chapter 3, Article 74, Section 1 states that "no
customs frontiers, duties, levies, or any other barriers for free
movement of goods, services, or financial means may be
establishedŠ," but many regions are doing just that. Tatarstan's
president, Mintimer Shaimiev, prevented exports of sugar and sugar
beets from the republic--as well as imports of alcohol from other
regions. (15) (It seems that several regions have created their own
monopoly on alcohol production.) In Volgograd, governor Nikolai
Maksuyuta sent the militia to prevent the shipment of 257 tons of
produce and the transfer of 200 sheep from the region, and some
Volgograd firms show signs of substituting local raw materials for
imported resources. (16) Sakha and Kemerovo are moving to set up
their own gold reserves, which could lead ultimately to their own
central banks. (17)
Many regions have ceased to pay federal taxes. Although the
regions that contribute most of the federal budget (Moscow,
Khanty-Mansi, Yamal-Nenets, Samara, Sverdlovsk and Krasnoyarsk)
are still paying, the chairman of the Federation Council, Yegor
Stroev, noted that presently, the "transit of financial resources is
the most difficult problem." (18) From Tomsk, to Omsk, to Irkutsk,
to Kakhassiya, regions are not sending their federal tax receipts to
Moscow. To illustrate the level of distrust between the regions and
center, Altai Krai is refusing to send 40 million rubles, in exchange
for a federal payment of 180 million rubles, because the krai
believes the promised payment would not be forthcoming. (19)
Better one in the hand than four and one-half in the bush.
Moreover, regions are taking control of federal shares in local
factories. For example, with the use of Eurobond money, the
administration of Nizhny Novgorod Oblast' purchased a controlling
share in many of its local companies and successfully lobbied the
federal government for the transfer of federally owned company
shares to them. Prime Minister Primakov recently endorsed this
measure. (20)
Regions are also developing their own financial systems based
largely on barter. Last year the Karpov commission reported that
the country's largest companies conducted 73 percent of their
business in barter and other non-monetary ways. (21) Interestingly,
they paid 80 percent of the taxes owed to the federal government,
but only 8 percent in cash. In the Udor District of the Komi
Republic, rent and utility bills are paid with potatoes: 1 kilogram of
potatoes = 2 rubles. A decree by the president of the Komi
Republic, Yuri Spiridonov, provides for the settlement of debts by
payments in kind. The public utility workers who were owed wages
quickly snapped up the potatoes. (22) In Tatarstan, the regional
government was told by Moscow that 24 local companies with
federal tax arrears could pay their debt by supplying the armed
forces stationed in Tatarstan with food and other consumables. (23)
Impact on Future Center-Region Relations
That the regions "circle their wagons" in slightly different ways, as
their specific crises warrant, is not surprising. What is important is
the possible shift in regional attitudes and the increasing
permanence of crisis-born regional institutions which may challenge
future attempts by Moscow to rein in the regions. If it is felt that
Moscow dithers while the regions wither, there may be a regional
reluctance to cooperate fully with Moscow and the regions may tend
to "squirrel away" assets rather than surrender them to a central
authority.
Institutional change may include: an expansion of regional financial
institutions and their close association with the regional authorities;
an increase in bilateral relationships, both inside and outside the
federation; and the continuation of barter economy and a distrust of
cash. Also evident is an increased profile for interregional
association, or super-regions, (24) the leaders of which have been
granted seats in the presidium of the government. The superregions may also constitute the basis for some future administration
of the economy, although the chances of that seem dim. (25)
Three things have changed permanently in Russian political culture
as a result: an increase in the number and type of players in the
Russian political system; the proliferation of power venues and
"entry points" into the political system; and the slide from political
power or authority as a singular concept to one which is increasingly
plural in nature. It is often said that adversity builds character.
Perhaps it will also build Russian federalism.
Notes:
1 Institute for East-West Studies, Russian Regional Report, Internet
Edition, 10 September 1998.
2 Presently they are recognized as full subjects of the federation,
bringing the total number of regions to 89.
3 I use region as a generic reference to all administrative subjects
of the federation.
4 All subsequent quotations from the Constitution of the Russian
Federation are taken from the copy found at .
5 President Yel'tsin suggested changing the law so that the entire
body would be elected by single-member districts, and predictably,
encountered fierce resistance from the national political parties.
6 Former Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov pointed to his
inability to overcome the opposition mounted by the entrenched
bureaucracy as one of the mistakes he made while in office. See
Obshchaya gazeta, 1-7 October 98; FBIS-SOV-98-287.
7 "Regional Newspapers and the Russian Crisis," The Business
Development Service of the Russian National Press Institute, 16
September 1998 (New York: The Center for War, Peace, and the
News Media, New York University).
8 Vechernyaya kazan, 11 September 98.
9 Ibid.
10 Kaliningradskaya pravda, 10 September 98, pp. 1-2; FBIS-SOV98-260.
11 Argumenty i fakty, No. 30, July 98 (Signed to press 21 July
1998), p. 4; FBIS-SOV-98-203.
12 Ekspert Magazine, 14 September 98.
13 Ibid.
14 Ruskii telegraf, 21 August 98.
15 Russian Regional Report, Internet Edition, 17 September 98.
16 Volgogradskaya pravda, 15 September 98.
17 Kommersant Daily, 10 September 98.
18 ITAR-TASS, 0946 GMT, 9 September 98; FBIS-SOV-98-252.
19 Finansovie izvestiya, 15 September 98.
20 ITAR -TASS, 0923 GMT, 3 October 98; FBIS-SOV-98-276.
21 The Interdepartmental Balance Commission headed by the
Deputy Director of the Federal Administration on Bankruptcy, Petyr
Karpov. The commission was instructed to collect tax from major
debtors. See Clifford G. Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes, "Russia's Virtual
Economy," Foreign Affairs (September/October 1998); Business
Week, 13 April 98.
22 Syktyvkar, Komi Republic. ITAR-TASS, 17 September 1998;
nexis.
23 See footnote 8.
24 The super-regions are: Greater Volga, Greater Urals, The North
Caucasus, Northwest, The Siberian Accord, Central Russia,
Chernozemye (The Black Earth Region), and Far-East and TransBaikal.
25 ITAR-TASS, 8 September 98.
Copyright ISCIP 1998
Unless otherwise indicated, all articles appearing in this journal have
been commissioned especially
for Perspective.
Perspective
Volume VI, No 3 (January-February 1996)
Send us a note to subscribe to Perspective.
The Crossroads of Russian Federalism
By VLADIMIR YEMELYANENKO
Moscow News
Since the system of local soviets was abolished in 1993, the power
struggle between the Kremlin and the Russian provinces on one
hand, and the local executive and legislative branches on the other,
can be characterized as open conflict, occasionally interrupted by
armed neutrality.
Issues concerning the rights of the "Federation Subjects" (Russia's
89 provinces and republics) emerged five years ago. The reasons
for complicated interactions between the organs of state power are
to be found in President Boris Yel'tsin's federal policy. Its direction
was formulated in 1991 when the president stated that "every
Subject of the Federation will try to assume as much sovereignty as
it can." In a short period of time, the national-territorial entities, the
republics, acquired some attributes of sovereignty after signing
treaties concerning delimitation of power with the Kremlin. The
republics managed to obtain agreements under which their
contributions to the federal budget were lowered. As a result, 21
republics, 12 of which are subsidized by the center (e.g., 90 percent
of Ingushetia's budget comes from federal subsidies, 92 percent in
the case of the Adygei republic, while Komi and Karelia are
subsidized to the tune of some 52 percent), were granted economic
privileges at the expense of the rest of the 68 Russian territorialadministrative formations such as krais, oblasts, and okrugs .(1)
Since then, the largest Russian regions, (Sverdlovsk oblast', which
is economically more powerful than the republic of Tatarstan,
Leningrad Oblast', (2) Maritime and Krasnodar krais, the five
regions of Siberia,(3) and Kaliningrad oblast') have embarked on a
permanent struggle for economic equity with the republics. Between
1993 and 1994 the regions lost the first battle. This was a period of
regional separatism, when the oblasts were trying to consolidate
into republics following the Tatarstan, Chechnya, or Yakutia models.
The proclamation of Ural, Siberian, and Far Eastern republics was a
provocative move vis-a-vis the Kremlin. However, these amorphous
entities, with a mere paper legitimacy, had a single objective -redistribution of the federal budget.
Under these circumstances, Moscow initiated treaties on
delimitation of power with individual administrative entities,
marking a new stage in the struggle of krais and oblast for equal
rights with the republics. In 1995 the federal government signed a
treaty "On Delimitation of Power With Orenburg Oblast '."
Subsequently, in January 1996, similar treaties were signed
between the Kremlin and Sverdlovsk, as well as between the center
and Kaliningrad. The difference in status between these oblasts and
the republics was narrowed, and it was clear that the government
had provided the basis for favoritism in its federal policy. The
preferential treatment Orenburg and Sverdlovsk received was not
accidental: Orenburg and Sverdlovsk, respectively, are Prime
Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's and President Yel'tsin's hometowns.
The establishment of direct bilateral relations between the Kremlin
and Sverdlovsk encouraged the Far East, Tyumen, Krasnodar, and
Kuzbass to solicit for special status.
There is no doubt that certain regions should be granted
prerogatives: the isolated enclave location of Kaliningrad and the
territorial remoteness of the Far Eastern Maritime province dictate a
different level of relations with the center than the "inner" regions.
It is easier for Kaliningrad to maintain trade relations with
neighboring Poland, Lithuania or Scandinavia, and it is more
sensible for the Far Eastern Maritime region to trade with China,
Japan, and Korea, than for either to deal with Central Russia.
Tyumen is also insisting on a special status, since it provides 69
percent of Russia's oil production, but is allowed to use the profits of
only one percent. Today Moscow views the signing of bilateral
treaties with the leading regions as a continuation of the trend
started with the republics.
Federation Council experts analyzed the treaties on delimitation of
power that were signed with Yakutia and Tatarstan and concluded
that, initially, the preferential treatment in taxation allowed these
republics to maintain lower prices in comparison with the
neighboring regions. However, as these analysts discovered,
eventually such a policy resulted in the disappearance of some
products and price increases of others. According to the experts,
such an outcome, stimulated by the Kremlin, is resulting in a type
of economic separatism. A similar tendency in Orenburg and
Sverdlovsk demonstrated the futility of the federal center trying to
appease the largest and most developed Subjects of the Federation.
In other words, delimitation of powers in bilateral agreements
inevitably entails recarving the federal budget, which is doomed to
become leaner with more regions in line for a piece of the federal
pie.
It is clear that the "special relations" and "bilateral agreements"
between the regions and the center have only a symbolic character.
The best solution, according to the former Minister on Nationality
Issues, Valeri Tishkov, derives not from "special status," but from
"regionalization," in other words, the unification of oblasts , krais ,
and republics into economic groups. For example, Bashkortostan,
Sverdlovsk, Perm, Orenburg could unify into a large Ural region; the
Siberian krais, oblasts and national entities into a Siberia region,
etc. In proposing this model Tishkov suggests a departure from
ethnic territorial entities as distinct economic areas. His idea is
supported by the governors of Nizhny Novgorod (Boris Nemtsov)
and Orel (Egor Stroev). However, the presidents of the ethnic
republics do not welcome this idea.
The Kremlin, so far, is aiming to preserve the status quo, while
giving favorite treatment to certain regions. At the same time, the
central government is trying to preserve maximum control over all
Federation Subjects. The roots of such a policy are seen in Moscow's
interference in the balance of power between the two branches of
regional power. It is clear that elections have become an effective
tool for the center to manipulate the regions. According to federal
law, the heads of local administrations (i.e., the governors), and the
chairmen of regional parliaments, soviets, or zemstvos (4)(the
representative branch) should be elected to office.
The results of such a supposedly democratic system were
demonstrated on December 17, 1995, when elections to the Federal
Duma coincided with gubernatorial elections in 12 Russian regions.
Yel'tsin succeeded again in placing "his" people in the periphery.
The gubernatorial elections were conducted in the absence of
electoral law and were based instead on a 1993 presidential edict.
In 1993, under a similar edict, an experimental set of elections was
conducted in nine regions. As a result, the newly elected local
executives, (representing a typical Yel'tsin electorate in cities like
Yekaterinburg, Moscow, St. Petersburg, Nizhny Novgorod,
Krasnoyarsk, and Irkutsk) usurped all functions of power. The
distribution of power became even more uneven after the legislative
functions of the local soviets were deprived of substance. In a
period of two years regional legislatures gradually lost their
authority, which was transferred into the hands of the governors.
These heads of administration became enamored with their widened
"responsibilities," performing executive and legislative tasks at the
same time. Since 1993, both chambers of the Russian parliament
have considered four versions of electoral law for gubernatorial
elections. Each met its demise in the Duma over the issue of
defining the limits of executive power. In the contest between the
branches the 17 December 1995 elections mark yet another victory
for the executive. In general, the results are also to Moscow's
advantage; incumbents, who were originally appointed by Yel'tsin,
won in nine of the 12 regions holding gubernatorial elections.
Moreover, these regions had substantially higher voter participation;
with 60% to 70% turnout in regions holding simultaneous
gubernatorial elections as compared to 58% to 62% in other parts
of Russia. The nine incumbent victors confirm the formation of a
vertical flow of power, from a powerful executive to a legislature
dependent upon him.
Only three regions elected new governors; a communist in
Novosibirsk and two former party apparatchiks in Tambov and Tver.
This development should not be viewed as simply a restoration of
the nomenklatura. Rather, it poses a more complicated problem;
namely, that communists candidates were victorious in precisely
those regions where the legislative branch was completely trampled
by the executive. Over the last couple of years, not a single piece of
legislation enacted by the regional parliament has been signed into
law in Tambov and Novosibirsk.
This "cold war" between the branches illuminates a rather
interesting alliance; nowadays, former CPSU obkom secretaries do
not rely solely on fellow communists. They have found new partners
among the motley composition of the powerless legislative branch.
"Offended" and "discouraged," local legislative representatives,
either Communists, members of the Congress of Russian
Communities or representatives of Zhirinovsky's LDPR, nominated
gubernatorial candidates in all 12 regions. A month after the
elections in Tver, Novosibirsk, and Tambov, where the united
opposition proved victorious, the rival branches have declared a
truce.
This truce is an unwelcome development for Moscow, which has lost
its levers in the periphery. The democratic parties originated in the
capital and have little influence or organizational strength outside
Moscow. The Communist party, on the other hand, is the only party
which maintained and developed its infrastructure in the provinces.
With this strategic disadvantage in mind, Moscow based the
elections on a presidential edict rather than electoral law and
forbade the most unreliable regions to hold elections. Such as
Kuzbass, where 51 percent of the electorate voted for the
Communists in the federal elections; Chita, where none of the laws
of the local Duma was approved by the head of their administration;
Volgograd, where the local soviet is constantly demanding the
resignation of the governor; and Saratov, where the oblast ' Duma
is in conflict with the city mayor. For four years all of these regions
have been demanding the right to hold gubernatorial elections. If
the new Duma passes legislation concerning gubernatorial elections,
a return of the far left-leaning legislatures is predestined.
In this context, Yel'tsin recently stated that those regions which had
been forbidden to hold elections in December would be allowed to
hold gubernatorial elections this spring. Such a move would
constitute a serious challenge by Moscow to the rebellious regional
elites. The Kremlin is giving assurances that such elections will not
be held on the basis of a presidential edict, but in accordance with a
to-be-adopted new law. If such legislation is passed by the Duma
and signed by the president, it would reflect Moscow's new political
course toward the regions, i.e., a shift from authoritarianism to real
federalism. However, this policy also reveals a paradox; more
federalism will legitimize the domination of Communists in the
political life of the regions.
Notes:
1. Republic -- territory with a non-Russian titular nationality; Krai -large region which contains smaller ethnic territorial formations,
such as okrugs; Oblast' -- administrative entity without specific
ethnic characteristics; Okrug - subdivision of a krai or oblast' -- Ed.
2. Although the city of Leningrad was renamed St. Petersburg, the
name of the oblast' remains unchanged. -- Ed.
3. Omsk, Novosibirsk, Tomsk, Chitinsk oblasts, and Krasnodar Krai.
--Ed.
4. Zemstvo -- elected district council in pre-revolutionary Russia
(the name has been re-adopted today) --Ed.
Perspective
Volume II, No 3 (January 1992)
Send us a note to subscribe to Perspective.
Turmoil in Russia's Mini-Empire
By MARJORIE MANDELSTAM BALZER
Georgetown University
A year ago, when Yel'tsin-leaning intellectuals criticized Gorbachev's
nationalities policies by saying "if he keeps this up he'll have
nothing left but Moscow," they were only half-joking. Their flippancy
also revealed an underlying savvy: various national bids for
sovereignty have been intertwined in the center-periphery dynamic.
Given such complex interactions, each case must be examined in
historical context. Even for Russia's "autonomous republics," specific
legacies must be reviewed, indigenous leaders heard, and interrepublic relations assessed before generalizations can be made
about whether a republic is likely to become a successful
"nationalist" domino. The five mini-empire cases outlined here are
in decreasing order of current secession-mindedness and turmoil.
Chechen-Ingushetia, in the incendiary North Caucasus tier, has a
sad legacy as home to two of Stalin's "punished peoples," who were
accused en masse of Nazism during World War II, deported to
Central Asia, and then returned to a cropped territory corresponding
neither to their self-defined homelands nor to the territory they had
before the war. By 1989, the Chechen numbered 956,879, and the
Ingush 237,438, respectively 58 percent and 13 percent of their
republic's population.(1) By 1991, they were ready for divorce from
each other, and the Chechen leader General Dudaev campaigned for
separation from Russia. He employed the rhetoric of Islamic
fundamentalism yet also advocated state secularism. Some of his
"Islamic Path" followers had volunteered to fight in the 1991 Gulf
War, for Iraq. Dudaev, perhaps symbolizing Russians' worst
nightmares, was furthered in his polarizing cause when Yel'tsin
declared a local state of emergency. After angry parliamentary
debate, Yel'tsin, and the speaker of the Russian parliament,
Khasbulatov, a Russified Chechen, backed down. A few Russian
troops in the region were surrounded by Chechen forces and sent
packing. In late 1991, the Chechen, Ingush, Kabardin, Balkar,
Karachai, Cherkess, Abkhas, Ossetians and others met for their
Third Congress of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus and vowed to
form their own confederation of independent states.(2)
Tatarstan presents only a slightly less anti-Russian, anti-Moscow
case. Like the Chechen, many Tatars are Islamic, but some are
proud of a reformist tradition, Jadidism, that at the turn of the
century advocated education for women and sponsored a satirical
journal called Kha, Kha, Kha. When Stalin's cronies were
apportioning union republics to peoples with over a million in
population, the Tatars qualified, but were denied the status,
perhaps a slap against their already jailed "National Communist"
leader Sultan Galiev. By 1989, the Tatars numbered 6,648,760. In
1991, their activist youth staged demonstrations demanding
secession from Russia and return of Tatar lands.(3) Tatars form
today about 50 percent of their republic, but nearly 75 percent live
outside the republic. A referendum on independence could leave
them within Russia, although radicals of the Ittifak (Alliance) Party
are trying to lower the percent necessary for secession to less than
50. By 1992, Tatar legislators, with republic President Shaimiev,
unilaterally declared Tatarstan to be a full member of the
Commonwealth.(4)
Tuva was a country, Tannu-Tuva, bordering on and analogous to
Mongolia, from 1918-1944. Incorporation into Russia meant loss of
some land, many resources, and much dignity. Today, Tuvans
agitate for boundary changes, ecological clean-up, and far greater
political autonomy, if not outright secession. Their popular front,
with both moderate (accommodate Russians) and radical (leave
yesterday) wings, has tried to discourage violence against the local
Russians, but serious violence occurred in May-July 1990,
concentrated in areas of high unemployment and recent Russian
settlement. Soviet troops were brought in to quell the disturbances,
angering Tuvans even further. Russian refugees, estimated at over
10,000, have been fleeing since 1989 across the high Altai
mountains, although local officials beg skilled workers and
professionals to stay.(5) Tuvans numbered 206,629, and were 64
percent of their republic, in 1989. They declared sovereignty as the
Tuvan Socialist Republic in 1990. Their regional orientation is
increasingly toward Mongolia.
Buryatia was gerrymandered in 1937. The homeland of the
Mongolic Buryats, surrounding Lake Baikal, was divided into the
Buryat Autonomous Republic, and the Agin and Ust-Orda Buryat
Autonomous Okrugs, with interspersed regions considered Russian.
Within the Buryat Republic, which declared sovereignty in 1990,
Buryats are only 24 percent, but this percentage would rise if lands
they claim were theirs. Buryats numbered 421,380 in 1989, when
non-communist party politicians began quietly trying to negotiate
increased economic, ecological and political rights. The Buryat
national movement, represented in part by the newspaper Tolon
(Sunrise), is strong and thus far not radical, with an educated
liberal intelligentsia whose roots go back to pre-revolutionary times
and a massive popular following. Buryat political and cultural revival
has included overtures to Mongolia and a resurgence of Buddhism,
publicized by a ceremonial visit of the Dalai Lama to Ulan-Ude in
July 1991.(6)
The Yakut-Sakha Republic, declaring sovereignty in 1990,
simultaneously signalled willingness to compromise with Russia by
hyphenating their name. "Yakut" is an outsider's (Russian) name for
the Sakha, who speak the farthest North Turkic language, and are
neither Islamic nor Russian Orthodox. A cultural and spiritual revival
that began before the Gorbachev era has led to resurgence of
traditional religion and to rebirth of the Sakha language and
literature. Although the Sakha occupy Siberian territory four times
the size of Texas, they numbered only 381,922 in 1989, and were
33 percent of their republic population. While they too claim land
(reaching to the Sea of Okhotsk) stolen from them under Stalin, this
has not been the focus of ethnic politics. Rather, since 1990, a
group called Sakha Omuk (the Sakha People) has led cultural,
ecological and, especially, economic rights campaigns. Many Sakha,
including republic president Nikolaev, reason that even if they had
direct control of a mere 30 percent of their natural resources (oil,
gas, gold and diamonds in abundance), they would be rich, and in a
position to align themselves with Japanese, Korean and Western
businessmen. Negotiations are proceeding, both with Yel'tsin's
Moscow and foreign businesses. Leery of Russian-led secessionist
Siberian regionalisms (which currently divide into at least three
geographical parts), Sakha leaders, some from the pragmatic,
reformist former communist party elite, are trying to navigate on
the thin ice of Moscow and local Russian rule.(7)
In sum, political and population dislocations produced by increasing
nationalisms have been considerable and painful, in both union and
autonomous republics. The flow of refugees from war zones into
Russia, estimated at over 1 million by 1992, creates yet another
tragic pull on resources stretched thin. Yet analysts must not jump
to conclusions that most of the 25 million Russians living outside
Russia will want to move back to its heartland, nor that most
refugees are Russian. Many refugees from violence in Central Asia
and the Caucasus are non-Russians (e.g., Mesketian Turks, Greeks,
Armenians, Azerbaijanis), who sometimes move to non-Russian
areas (e.g., Kazakhstan) before choosing Russia. Within Russia,
Russian outflow from Tuva has been the most dramatic. Several
thousand Slavic peoples also have been fleeing Chechen-Ingushetia,
including some Cossacks whose houses have been raided. The
Slavic majority in Tatarstan, Buryatia and Yakutia has been
shrinking more slowly, especially through decline of in-migration.
Estimates of refugee populations in the whole of the post-Soviet
deconstructivist world vary widely (from 1-7 million), and require
regional and comparative analysis.(8)
In most areas of Russia, non-Russian populations, who together
number over 30 million, have moved in the past decade from mildly
politicized ethnic consciousness to various forms of nationalism. But
this hardly means each of the over 16 autonomous republics
(depending on how unilateral claims are counted) is demanding the
same degree of secession as Chechen, Tatars and Tuvans. Many
want better deals with Moscow, and are negotiating with Yel'tsin
from an unaccustomed position of relative strength. How the
Russian parliament and Yel'tsin, whose learning curve has thus far
been dramatic, manage the details of this messy internal process of
genuine economic and political power sharing will make an
enormous difference in the transformation of Russia from a miniempire to a relatively democratic, perhaps smaller, federal state.
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
"Autonomous Formations"
"Autonomous Republics"
(Have Asserted Independence)
Tatarstan*
(Tatar Republic)
Buryatia*
(Buryat Republic)
Yakut-Sakha*
(Yakut Republic)
Chechen-Ingushetia*
(Chechen-Ingush Republic)
Tuvan Republic*
Kalmyk Republic
Other "Autonomous
Republics"
Kabardino-Balkar Republic
Severo-Osetin Republic
Dagestan
Mordov Republic
Chuvash Republic
Mari Republic
Udmurt Republic
Karel' Republic
Komi Republic
Other "Formations"
Adygei Region
Gorno-Altai Region
Karachai-Cherkess Region
Khakass Region
Aginsk Buryat Region
Evrei Region
Komi-Permyatsk Region
Koryak District
Nenetsk District
Taimyr District
Ust'-Ordyn Buryat District
Khanti-Mansiy District
Chukot District
Evenki District
Yamalo-Nenetsk District
Bashkortostan
(Bashkir Republic)
*Discussed in this article
Notes:
1Statistics here and below are from Natsional'ny Sostav Naseleniya
SSR Moskva: Finansy i Statistika, 1991. Data and analysis are
based in part on fieldwork, June-August 1991. See also Alexander
Nekrich, The Punished Peoples (New York: Norton, 1978).
2 Ann Sheehy, "Power Struggle in Checheno-Ingushetia," RL/RFE
Report on the USSR, November 15, 1991, pp. 20-26; Center for
Democracy in the USSR Bulletin, 004, January 14, 1991; D.
Mirzoev, "Dzhokhar Musaevich Dudaev," Argumenty i Fakty, 44,
1991, p. 8.
3 For example, "Tatarstan: Burlit Ploshchad' Svoboda," Pravda,
October 17, 1991, p. 1. See also A. Zyubchenko et al., "O tak
nazyvaemoi sultan-galievskoi kontrrevolyutsionnoi organizatsii"
Izvestia TsK KPSS, No. 10, 1990, pp. 75-88; Azade-Ayse Rorlich,
The Volga Tatars: A Profile in National Resilience (Stanford: Hoover,
1987).
4"Tatarstan Announces Joining Commonwealth," Moscow Radio,
FBIS, December 31, 1991, p. 50.
5 Ann Sheehy, "Russians the Target of Interethnic Violence in
Tuva," RL/RFE Report on the USSR, September 14, 1990, pp. 1317; M. Ya. Zhornitskaya "Natsional'naya situatsiya v Tuvinskoi ASSR
i Khakasskoi AO," Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, 1990
MS.
6 Vladimir Kornev, "Poznavaya vselenniyu: k 250 letiyu buddizma,"
Soyuz, No. 30, July 1991, p. 14; Urbanaeva, I. S. et al.,
Natsional'ny Vopros v Buryatii, Ulan-Ude: A.N., 1989. See also
Caroline Humphrey, Karl Marx Collective: Economy, Society and
Religion in a Siberian Collective Farm (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983).
7 "Deklaratsiya," Sotsialisticheskaya Yakutiya, September 28, 1990,
p. 1; "Ustav Sakha Omuka," August 10, 1990, MS.; interviews with
Sakha leaders, June-July 1991.
8 P. Rudeev, interview, Ekonomika i Zhizn', 26 June 1991, p. 10; L.
Krasnovsky, "Russkie bezhentsy v Rossii," Narodnoe Obrazovanie,
August 1990, pp. 21-23; Murray Feshbach, "Soviet Population
Movements: Internal, External and Nowhere," Oxford Analytica,
1991, MS.; Klaus Segbers, "Migration and Refugee Movements from
the USSR: Causes and Prospects," RL/RFE Report on the USSR,
November 15, 1991, pp. 6-14.
Russian Federalism: Looking Forward from Today
by Rashid Noureev
The Russian State, for different reasons, throughout its history was traditionally oriented
towards the goals of external policy (in struggle with Asian nomads, expansion of its
territories, active participation in European conflicts, in attempts of building a worldwide
"system of socialism"). Therefore the internal structure of power and social relationships
was built in such a way, so that the state could activate huge human masses and
resources for achievement of some titanic goal in short period of time. Only by the end
of the XX century a fragile hope is being born that Man, his Rights and Freedom will
become the supreme value of the Russian state.
Formally, Russia becomes a federal republic since the formation of the Soviet Union in
1918-1922. At that time main structural contradictions of the system were already
present. These contradictions lead to the fall of gigantic empire, and to the fire of
national conflicts on all post-Soviet territory nowadays (Abkhasia, Chechnya, Nagorny
Karabach, Pridnestrovye, Tajikistan, and many others). Bolshevics built the state on the
national territory basis in order to strengthen a weak, growing state. That meant that a
territory (state) of an ethnic group became a subject of the new Federation. This
principle was pursued and made absurd in the slogan "right of nation to secession",
which was successfully realized in later time. In 1970's in so called Soviet republics
emerged new national elites. Gradually they seized all the middle range positions in
local command administrative system of the totalitarian state. On a certain stage of
social and economical development (1970-80) administrative position was regarded by
the officer as his private property, be it a position in executive power institution, or
administration of a large industrial enterprise. The desire of regional elite leaders to
make their present status lawful forced them to use ethnocratic rhetorics to justify their
participation in the destruction of USSR.
These reason lead to the fact that Russia did not choose new model of federalism on
the basis of rationality, based on desire to harmonize the relations of society and state
on liberal and democratic principles. The process of federalization in Russia was a legal
form of struggle for redistribution of power and economical resources between central
and regional elites. The Federation Treaty of 1992 is the best evidence of that process.
The Treaty states that subjects of Russian Federation have different status and
competence to the benefit of those national republics that threatened to break away if
their claims were not satisfied. Thus, the Federation Treaty was rather a political effort
to cope with growing disintegration trends, than a result of a biased lawful agreement
between the Federal center and the subjects. The problems are not completely solved
in the Constitution of Russian Federation, accepted by national referendum, in which
three principles of federation construction are stated: national state, national region and
administrative region.
The Constitution (article 5) states the following principles of federalism: state integrity,
unity of government system, limitation of subjects of competence and powers between
the federal and regional governments, equality of subjects of federation in their
relationships with federal center, equality of rights for all the nations in Russian
Federation.
The Constitution of Russian Federation numbers the areas of social relationships that
are subject of competence of federal government, and also those, that are subject of
competence of both federal and regional governments. All the other issues, that are not
mentioned in the document are the exclusive subject of competence of regional
governments.
The Federal Constitution admits composition of federal laws and agreements in
limitation of subjects of competence on different levels of power. However, neither the
law, nor the Constitution solve the problem of correlation between these two norms.
Most of federation subjects signed such an agreement with the federal center, which
contents do not correspond with, and in some cases directly contradicts the
Constitution. The federal center in its attempts to keep its authority and loyalty of
regional governors has given more power to some regions, to the losses of the other. It
can be stated, that in contemporary Russia constitutional norms are being replaced by
the right of agreement.
In the field of taxation and economic policy vertical relationships are preserved.. Federal
taxes prevail in the budget incomes on all levels. Most tax rate limits and tax collection
bases are regulated by the federal laws. The budget system on different levels is
somewhat contradictory. The issue of property on land and other resources is not
solved, same as the issue of strict definition of rights and responsibilities in the usage of
public property objects, and so on.
Still, despite all the problems, we hope, that by the common efforts of politicians and
experts there will be developed a holistic conception of federative reform in Russia, that
would include not only concrete measures in some field of social relationships
(legislation, economy, national relationships), but would also aim to change the mere
political and law culture of Russian citizens.
SOME FEDERALISM FEATURES AND PROBLEMS RUSSIA IS FACING TODAY
by Tatiana Vinogradova (tatiana@strateg.spb.su)
Director
Economic Development Department
St.Petersburg Center of Humanities and Political Studies “Strategy”, Russia
Federalism in Russia is unique in many aspects. It is hard to find analogues to it in history and
modern world. The attempts to copy experience of USA, Germany and other states were not
successful, as did not correspond with Russia’s realities. Asymmetry, which exists in
constitutional statements on federal organization of Russia, reflects the complexity and the past
of the country.
Russian Federation includes 89 subjects of Federation - republics, regions (“oblasts”),
lands, cities of federal meaning (Moscow and St.Petersburg), autonomous regions and
autonomous districts. Republic is a national state within the Russian Federation; oblast
and land is an administrative-territorial or state-territorial formation; autonomous region
and district - administrative-national formation; city of federal meaning is a populated
area.
Republics within Russian Federations announced their sovereignty, and these principle
statements recognized by the Federal Agreement, declared in Constitutions of republics
and other documents. In early 90s oblasts, lands and largest cities, proceeding from
their economic potential, number of population and dimensions of territory, required to
widen their rights (particularly in economy field), at least to equalize them with republics
rights. The drive to change the status and get more independence was usual to
autonomous regions and districts as well.
The Constitution (1993) defined the composition of Federation and the most important
organizational principles, but did not complete the formation process.
We may consider Russian Federation has not an agreemental origins but constitutionalagreemental, which juridical base consists of Constitution and Federal Agreement. But
Constitution and the method of its adoption partly disavowed Agreement, deprived its
participants of corresponding status. For instance, it does not consider the subjects of
Federation in the capacity of sovereign states, but define the objects of joint
competence. The rest objects of competence are left to subjects of Federation
(distribution of competence repeated the Federal Agreement). If the statements of
Federal Agreement or agreements between subjects contradict the Constitution, then its
statements act.
We should notice here, that the issues of legislation process are not well regulated,
especially in the field of joint competence. Is it possible for federal legislator to regulate
everything detailed? What should the regional legislator do when on important issue for
his region the federal law has not been yet adopted? The majority of regions chose the
way of adoptions of their own regulations with a perspective to make them later
corresponding with federal, but how does this practice correspond with Constitution and
real federalism? At last, there are no acting mechanisms of Constitution defense from
breaking it by regional legislators (i.e. many regional regulations, limiting movements of
capital and goods).
As far as almost three forth of subjects of Federation do not possess the status of state
within Russia, and 32 of subjects are formed on the ethnical base, Russia, announced a
federal formation, maintain not a little amount of constructions, habitual to unitary state.
Many politicians because of a fact that the spontaneous economic reform in Russia
continues not decreasing inequality of regions but on the opposite now there are very
essential differences in regional financial resources excuse this.
On the other side (as shows Prof. Leorkadia Drobizgeva, Institute of Ethnology and
Anthropology of Russia Academy of Science), the idea of sovereignty of national
republics as well as many other regions is supported of majority of native inhabitants
and not only of local elite but nine tenth of respondents does not connect the idea of
sovereignty with separation from Russia. From the juridical point of view the paradoxical
thing would be the sovereign states which are included in the other sovereign subjects
of Federation - autonomous regions and national districts within lands and oblasts.
The main way of competence distribution in the situation of absence of clear legislation remains
the “beating them out” of the federal center, including the personal meetings with President of
Russian Federation. However rights received in this manner concern the separate issues, they do
not solve problem in complex, on the opposite, make situation more mixed.
The analysts see danger for Russia and its peoples in remaining this model. The
present political sympathies or antipathies may damage enormously the economic
development and neighborly relations of peoples in the country. It is necessary for
Russian Federation qualitatively different approach to the distribution of competence
between Federation, its subjects and local government.
MARKING OFF THE RIGHTS OF CENTER AND REGIONS SOLVING ONE OF THE KEY PROBLEMS OF RUSSIAN FEDERALISM
by Evgeny Zakablukovsky (mail@eugenezak.com)
Assistant to the Speaker
Nizhny Novgorod Legislative Assembly, Russia
One of the main federalism development problems in the Russian Federation is the distinction of
control matters and authority between the Federation and its subjects (republics, regions,
autonomies). The history of our country has shown that, with the exception of autonomies which
had special rights regarding language and national culture, Russia has been created and
developed as a centralized unitary state. The Declaration of State Sovereignty, passed on June
12, 1990 as well as the Federative Treaty, concluded in 1992, have not only formally but also de-
facto confirmed Russian political system developing according to the tenets of sovereign
nationhood. The new Russia announced the federative state structure in the Constitution of the
Russian Federation, passed by the plebiscite on December 12, 1993.
Articles 71 and 72 of the Russian Constitution determine the exclusive control matters
of the Federation and the matters under the joint supervision of the Federation and its
subjects. However, it remained indefinite, how to mark off those matters, what would be
the demarcating tools. It could be expected that right after the Constitution a special act
would be written which would have established the above principles and the order of
their implementation. However, there was no such act hitherto. In 1994, two treaties
were signed which specified a variety of issues regarding the relations between the
central power and subjects of the Federation, in particular, the republics. These are
treaties of the Federation with Tatarstan (October 15, 1994) and Bashkortostan (August
3, 1994). Other treaties followed immediately, for example such a document was signed
with Nizhny Novgorod oblast (region) on June 8, 1996. Having become quite brisk, the
practice of concluding treaties and agreements between governing institutions of the
center and the subjects of the Federation produced vivid debates on whether our
country is just a constitutional federation or a federation of the mixed constitutional and
treaty kind. Or: what to do if such a treaty contains provisions contrary to those of the
Russian Constitution. Many of the vexed problems go back to the events in the
Chechnya area.
Concluding treaties on power delegation actually is not a feature 'sine qua non' of the
Russian federalism development. At the same time, it may be considered necessary
and useful. Such treaties are to supplement and develop the provisions vested in the
Constitution, especially in cases when specific issues remain unsolved, e.g. which
matters must be controlled by the center and which by a subject of the Federation. The
concept of the joint control implies that both the center and a subject of the Federation
should know their regulation limits. The need for agreement can also emerge when a
subject of the Federation has particular natural, national, geographic and other
conditions. However, all treaties should be in congruence with the Constitution of the
Russian Federation. All aforesaid allows to define the Russian Federation as
constitutional. The treaty with Tatarstan stands somewhat apart but this is rather an
exception from the general rule.
It is hard, if even possible, to find something analogous to the Russian federalism, both
in the history and among the modern state models. It does not resolve itself to the
nation-state structure, what the Soviet model was like; at the same time it did not take
the path of just a territorial structure, the latter common to most foreign countries.
Smooth theoretical concepts, even being attractive externally, similar to the structures
already approved in the West could not eliminate, not even soften the complex and
contradictory processes generating crises and destabilizing Russian state structure.
Russian historical traditions, its population structure and huge territory, the mentality of
the nations and its geopolitical position are too essential for this country. It was
necessary to build federalism in a country where the relevant parameters of the state
constituents differ from each other: such as economic development, social
characteristics, scientific, educational as well as cultural formation. There are 89
subjects of the Federation with more than 150 nationalities in this country. The situation
in which two sovereignties are combined within a framework of one state, when the
sovereignty of a federative state encompasses, covers the sovereignty of its republics,
contributes to already quite a sophisticated design.
The federal act "On principles and order of distinction of control matters and authorities
between governing institutions of the Russian Federation and governing institutions of
the subjects of the Russian Federation" came into force on July 24, 1999. This act has
got across the forms of implementation of such authorities as well as across adoption
order for the federal acts regulating matters under the joint supervision of the center and
the subjects of the Russian Federation. The order of conclusion of the treaties and
agreements between them was also established. This document grants the right to the
subjects of the Federation, when federal acts are being prepared, to influence the
concept of such an act on the very first stage - by sending regional representatives (with
the right of advisory vote) to the applicable committees and commissions of the Lower
House of the Parliament - the State Duma. The controversies on the control matters'
distinction and the delegation of authorities will be now resolved by the parties
concerned during negotiations with using diverse conciliation procedures. Prior to this
act, the President could have signed a treaty with a governor or a chief of republic, and
the agreement was sometimes not even published in the newspapers; now all the
treaties may be signed only after having passed them through the regional Legislative
Assembly and through the Upper House of the Federal Parliament - the Federation
Council.
The law also requires that all the branches of the state power key their legal acts
according to the above Act within the period of six months. The treaties and agreements
operating presently at the territory of the Russian Federation are also to be keyed
according to the federal Act and the Constitution of the Russian Federation within a
period of three years. The subjects of the Russian Federation should do the same with
their acts within a period of one year.
As already was said, the federative structure of the Russian Federation is asymmetrical,
i.e. its subjects are not uniform, thus having their particular problems. The solutions are
also sometimes unique. However, the ways in which the solutions are made should be
legally clear. The above mentioned Act has to determine this order, in exact conformity
with provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.
Facts on Federalism
Federalism is based on (1) the dissolution of empires, (2) regional variation and (3) ease of
administration. Examples of the dissolution of empires are the British empire in North America
in 1776, the Russian empire in 1917, the USSR in 1991,the German Empire in 1918, the Nazi
"empire" in 1945 and Yugoslavia and Bosnia in the present. Examples of regional variation are
Switzerland, Canada, the USSR and Russia. As to ease of administration, even unitary states like
France and England are divided into departments or counties.
Constitutional basis of the US federal system is Article IV (admission of new states),
Article VI (national government supremacy), Amendment X (reserved powers) and
Amendment XIV (national control of state action). The "enumerated powers" in Article I,
Section 8, list the specific powers of the national government. While these are
supposedly the only powers it has, in fact the commerce and "elastic" clauses have
permitted great enlargement.
National laws that form the basis of the federal system include the laws admitting new
states into the union. Since Tennessee, 16th state, Congress has used the phrase that
the new state is admitted on an "equal footing" as the other states. A number of specific
laws define the federal relationship. Major examples are the decentralized programs like
welfare, employment services and environmental protection.
Grant program are a major factor in the federal system. Since 1862 the national
government has given grants for "land grant" colleges, highways, welfare (but not social
security old age pensions), environmental protection, Model Cities, and revenue
sharing. The grant authority is based on exchange, not on the Constitution. If a state
does not like the terms, it should refuse the money.
Interstate relations within the United States are handled much like foreign affairs. States
can negotiate and enter into treaties with other states. A historically important example
is the treaty negotiated in 1785 between Maryland and Virginia on use of the
Chesapeake Bay. Sometimes the states negotiate under the provisions of a national
law. The interstate compact on low level radioactive waste that led to the tentative
selection of Riga Township for a possible site for disposal was in this category. Because
Michigan failed to find a site, it was expelled and the responsibility now belongs to Ohio.
Another example of an interstate treaty is the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey.
The relationship between the state and local government is not a true example of
federalism. States have total authority to create, modify and abolish counties and
municipalities. The relationship is referred to as the "federal analogy."
In the United States the word "federal" also means the national government as in the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. As a means of emphasizing the word to mean the
relationship, for the ten weeks of the term, use the word federal exclusively for the
system, not for the government in Washington. Refer to that as the national government
or as US for an adjective.
"Federalization"
Beth Mitchneck, University of Arizona
Steven L. Solnick, Columbia University
Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Princeton University
Prepared for the Kennan Institute Workshop on Russia’s Regions.
Washington, D.C., August 1999
Russia offers a rare opportunity to examine the political and economic consequences of
decentralization in large states. One of the striking aspects of Russia’s decentralization
is its pace. Only ten years ago, the Russian provinces were almost totally under the
control of Moscow; even trade between provinces was almost completely controlled by
bureaucrats in central ministries. Regional leaders were dependent on central
institutions for their authority (especially the centralized apparatus of the Communist
Party), and even trains across all eleven time zones ran on Moscow time.
Today, while not a textbook federation in practice, Russia has moved far from the
unitary legacy of the Soviet Union. In contrast to the Soviet system, in which all political
and economic decisions at the subnational level were controlled and monitored by
Moscow, many of post-Soviet Russia’s 89 regional governments have taken the
initiative in determining the distribution of power across the Russian federation and in
extending power beyond that legislated by the center. Regional and urban governments
are now comprised of popularly elected executives and legislatures. They enjoy
considerable latitude in many areas of personnel administration, operate relatively
autonomously in policy areas such as social protection, education, and (with certain
constraints) municipal administration. In addition, they have been able to exert
considerable influence over regional financial and industrial organization, especially in
setting the pace of regional privatization and restructuring. The federal government, for
its part, has preserved a unified judiciary, defense structure, monetary system, and tax
administration. In many areas, such as fiscal policy and regulation of trade, the division
of responsibility between the center and regions remains murky and contested.
Decentralization, in some cases, has extended from the federal or regional level down
to the municipal or district level.
To understand the role and significance of political end economic decentralization within
the Russian federal structure, we examine the consequences of such decentralization.
In doing so, we will consider both political and economic factors. By examining the
actual and perceived consequences of structures that devolve power to the sub-national
level, we hope to better understand how institutions governing central-local relations in
Russia function, and how institutional alternatives might emerge from the intersection of
political and economic cross-pressures.
Our paper proceeds as follows. We first examine the political and economic benefits
and pitfalls of decentralization discussed in the broader literatures of political science,
economics, and political geography. We then turn to the Russian case, and ask whether
the particular configuration of institutions we encounter there has yielded the
consequences predicted by theory. This section consists of three parts, by each of the
co-authors, illustrating different approaches to understanding the Russian experience
with decentralization. A fourth section will provide some initial conclusions regarding the
extent to which the data indicate Russia is reaping the benefits of decentralization.
I. Why Decentralize: Theoretical Expectations
This section considers economic and political theories of decentralization, with particular
attention to theoretical predictions about the consequences of devolution of power.
I.a. The economic case for decentralization.
There is a wide range of efficiency-based arguments for decentralization within
government structure. Tiebout for instance, and those who followed his lead argued that
in the absence of barriers to mobility of population, decentralization can stimulate forces
in government analogous to market forces in the economy. Individuals "vote with their
feet" and are able to move to jurisdictions that provide the public goods they most
desire. Homogeneous subpopulations could emerge from within large heterogeneous
populations. In effect, such decentralization makes it possible to cater to regionally
diverse tastes, to take advantage of geographic specialization, and to deliver more
efficient government performance. In addition to the tonic effects of competition among
jurisdictions, decentralization lowers information barriers, thereby making it easier for
policy makers to perceive the demands and tastes of constituents, and rendering smallscale policy "experimentation" more feasible as a purely practical matter.
By a similar logic, Barry Weingast and others have argued that devolving control over
regional economic policies, while maintaining centralized control over enforcement of
property rights and free movement of factors across internal borders, can deliver
important benefits for economic performance. Weingast has classified these virtuous
institutions as a special sub-category of federalism: market-preserving. For Weingast,
as in Tiebout’s scheme, decentralization allows citizens to benefit from competition
among sub-national governments in the same way they benefit from competing
economic producers in the marketplace.
There are, however, analogous economic arguments for centralization. Certain public
goods--like a monetary system or navy, for instance--exhibit powerfully increasing
economies of scale. Some public goods are best provided on a large scale. More vexing
are the distributional consequences of decentralization. As Coase demonstrated, the
efficient provision of public goods through market mechanisms depends critically on the
absence of transaction costs. Where transaction costs are significant--as they are in the
real world, optimal equilibria may be unattainable, and all outcomes have important
distributional implications. Thus, allowing regional governments to set social protection
policies could result in some citizens being over-supplied while others in a different
territory are under-supplied (as some of our evidence from Russia indicates). Since both
citizens belong to the same national jurisdiction, such an outcome creates divisive
sources of inequality and social stratification. Centralization could therefore be
advocated as a means of restoring some standards of equity to this situation.
A related argument in favor of centralization stems from problems of externalities across
jurisdictions. Since citizens might be expected to flock to a region offering high levels of
social welfare, regions may engage in under-bidding to discourage an influx of benefitsseekers. This could trigger a "race to the bottom" among states, leading to the underprovision of public goods on a national scale. Such fears have been cited in the
American context as justification for federal re-assertion of control over welfare policy,
minimum-wage, and corporate regulation, though empirical validity of the "race to the
bottom" model is far from clear.
I.b. Political arguments for decentralization
Efficiency gains and economic growth are only one set of objectives that could drive
governmental decentralization. Often, devolution of political and economic power is
driven by more purely political motives. For instance, creating smaller electoral units as
the building blocks of a republic can enhance democratic accountability by magnifying
the influence of citizens’ votes for regional officials. Thus, citizens can more closely
monitor and better evaluate the performance of local officials--in part they can better
evaluate the quality of local government services and their interests are more likely to
be homogeneous. Conversely, local representatives should be expected to be more
responsive to the needs and demands of local constituencies, in part because
informational problems are less acute on the smaller scale. Finally, political
decentralization in a democracy can also help to train local leaders and enhance civic
consciousness.
In diverse societies, decentralization offers another important potential benefit. By
devolving authority over clusters of policy issues, national officials may be able to
achieve and sustain ethnic peace by eliminating direct arenas of policy conflict. While in
these societies, decentralization is a means of avoiding catastrophe rather than of
stimulating growth, many underlying assumptions in the federalist literature are that
polities that manage to achieve unity in the face of diversity are also poised to reap
positive economic or social gains. There are, therefore, benefits to hanging together
beyond the minimal standard of avoidance of disaster.
In spite of this long list of purported benefits from decentralization, there are also
political arguments for centralization. Decentralized polities multiply the opportunities for
graft, corruption and rent-seeking. Decentralized structures create institutional
mechanisms that may lock-in pork-barrel politics as a costly norm. With a proliferation of
lower-level jurisdictions, capital investments can easily become the price of political
support, divorced from any rational long-range investment plan on a national scale. As a
consequence, many theorists of development in the 1980s argued for centralizing
economic policy making in developing states to remove it from the politicized influence
of local and regional interests (as well as national lobbies).
II. State Structure and the Impact of Economic and Political Decentralization
How can we begin to understand the nature of decentralization in Russia and assess
whether decentralization in Russia is producing tangible economic and political benefits,
or pressures for recentralization? The preceding discussion of federalism and
decentralization in capitalist democracies highlights several implications for the utility of
those theories for the transition context and for analysis of the emerging Russian federal
structure. We also must consider how applicable these theories are for our particular
context. In other words, what are the effects of the context-specific conditions in
Russia?
The economic arguments for decentralization assume free factor mobility across space
(of both population and goods). We know that this condition does not exist in Russia
either in theory or reality. Many jurisdictions maintain barriers to free mobility. Additional
constraints include underdeveloped (and in some cases non-existent) housing markets,
high rates of unemployment and underemployment, and poor information flows. These
conditions suggest that the economic arguments for decentralization hold little salience
for our case. On the other hand, if local and regional policymakers do respond to local
conditions and tastes in ways that enhance economic welfare, then decentralization
may be producing economic benefits through some other mechanism, not well captured
in current theories.
In Russia, decentralization and centralization occur almost simultaneously. De facto
decentralization is one consequence of the weakening of the Russian central state in
the wake of the Soviet collapse. Within this context, neither centralization nor
decentralization can deliver the banafits anticipated by theory without regional and
central governments coordinating their expectations on the division of jurisdictions?
Conflict over the scope of responsibilities of each level of government may erode
support for federal structure, since it denies the benefits of either devolution or of strong
central policy making.
Theory also suggests that strong economic performance should be linked with a clear
property rights regime enforced by the center, and unambiguous devolution of economic
regulatory powers to the region. Though the model of "market-preserving federalism"
would require these conditions to hold across the entire federation, we should still see
some marginal gains in economic performance in those regions where these conditions
are more closely met. Theory then predicts that aggregate regional economic
performance would improve in some regions.
Theory also suggests that an important political benefit of central intervention in
economic policy making is the possibility of restoring some measure of equity among
regions. Favoritism of certain regions would undermine the "market-forces" that
theoretically drive federal polities toward greater economic efficiency, and would also
undermine any political benefits driving from more responsive regional representation.
In addition, any difference in treatment between ethnically defined regions could erode
the "ethnic peace" presumably supported by federal institutions. We need to ask,
therefore, whether decentralization in Russia has been accompanied by a rise or fall in
favoritism in the treatment of privileged regions. If they do favoritism has fallen, then we
should expect to see improved aggregate regional economic performance and some
measure of equitable regional social policy. If, however, favoritism is on the rise, then
our task is to explain the variation and impact across space.
III. Russia’s Decentralization: Alternative Perspectives
In this section, we consider three perspectives on the impact of decentralization on
Russian political and economic dynamics. We hope these capsule analyses will help us
better understand whether the political and economic benefits of decentralization are
being reaped in Russia today and whether, in turn, we might expect to see the
emergence of constituencies for greater devolution or a return to centralization. In the
first part of this section, Mitchneck looks at how the urban and regional governments
perceive interactions with federal authorities and suggests that decentralization has not
disempowered federal authorities in local politics but modified the nature of participation
in local affairs. In part two of this section, Stoner-Weiss analyzes the extent to which de
facto authority has devolved to the subnational level in Russia. The evidence here
indicates that some tangible economic benefits have flowed to some regions from this
process. Despite this, the central government’s marked inability in many instances to
enforce national policy at the local level undermines the full realization of the economic
and political benefits that might otherwise come from a truly federal structure. In the
third part of this section, Solnick examines whether or not and why certain regions enjoy
benefits in their relationships with the federal government.
III. a. The View From The Regional And Urban Governments
Since the break up of the former Soviet Union, the distribution of power between levels
of government has fluctuated. In the absence of a highly centralized system, the new
federal structure, however, has by necessity begun to use a variety of measures,
including new fiscal ones, to influence local politics. Within the context of decentralized
government and variable power relations between the local and central government,
local governments for their part have also begun to use a variety of measures to govern.
How do local (regional and urban) government actors view the role of the federal
government for the determination of local policy priorities and then the implementation
of policy measures and strategies? Has the system decentralized to the degree that the
federal government has become irrelevant to local governance? Do local government
actors view the federal role as one of partner or adversary?
An argument against decentralization is that the federal level loses the ability to directly
influence actions at the subnational level. That is, the local level will not respond to
federal level stimuli. Many have suggested that this has occurred in Russia. In fact, the
discourse in the middle 1990s consisted of the necessity of constructing mechanisms to
insure compliance with federal policies (e.g., the placement of presidential
representatives in Russian regions). The discourse further suggested that those
runaway Russian regions did not respond to federal policy objectives and thus
recentralization was necessary. Evidence presented below from a 1997 survey of close
to 700 regional and urban policy makers in seventy regions suggests that the opposite
has occurred. In the perception of urban, oblast, and republic policy makers, legislators
and executive bureaucrats (hereafter referred to as local policy makers), federal level
stimuli strongly influence the way that local policy makers identify policy priorities. In
fact, federal level stimuli are as important as place-specific economic conditions.
Furthermore, local actors view the participation of federal level actors as an essential
component of carrying out local policies. The respondents viewed fiscal measures and
partnerships between central and local authorities as highly important means of
influencing and participating in local politics. Whether the results of such interactions
include following national policy and improving the national economy is debatable.
III.a.i. Federal Influence Over Local Policy Priorities
The survey examined two main explanations for the variation of local policy that include
the role of the federal level of government, the economic structure thesis and urban
regime theory. The economic structure thesis maintains that local policies are
constructed in order to respond to local demographic and economic conditions and thus
vary according to those conditions. The federal level can influence those conditions
through its own policies. Urban regime theory, on the other hand, suggests that local
policies vary because of the motivations of and relationships between politicians,
business people, and community leaders.
The survey incorporated these approaches by including three sections where
respondents were asked to evaluate the importance of a variety of potential influences
over the determination of local priorities: (1) demographic and economic conditions, (2)
political relations within the government structure, and (3) individual participants both
within and outside of government. We used a five point scale where five indicated the
most important and 1 the least. We then calculated mean scores and compared them
over government branch (executive and representative), government scale (regional
and urban; oblast/kray and republic), length of time in government (holdovers from the
Soviet period or new entrants during the post-Soviet period). We also compared mean
scores over broad regions. Respondents consistently rated the influence of the federal
level among the most important influences over the determination of policy priorities - in
fact, greater than actual local demographic and economic conditions.
Respondents were given a list of demographic and economic factors that may influence
their determination of policy priorities. While demographic factors were not cited as
important influences over the formulation of policy priorities, economic ones were (see
Table 1). Displaying amazing consistency over branch, scale, and length of service,
policy makers cited federal tax rates as the most important influence over their choice of
policy priorities. Unemployment, inflation, bank credit rates, and a desire to maintain
previous economic structure were also highly rated but not as highly as federal tax
rates. The strong weighting given to federal tax rates suggests that the federal level can
and does influence local policies using fiscal means. Despite fiscal decentralization, the
federal government maintained a relatively strong influence in the local arena using
economic measures.
As urban regime theory suggests, local policy makers rate political relations as the most
influential group of factors (see Table 2). While political relations within the regional
environment appear most important to the determination of local policy priorities,
respondents highly rated federal political influence in the local arena. Local policy
makers consistently rated the influence of federal laws and presidential decrees and
federal financing rated among the highest in influence for all respondents (4.2 and 4.1
respectively). Respondents, however, gave the presidential representative the lowest
rating within this category of factors (2.7). The distinction between the federal influences
suggests that direct political interference by federal agents in local affairs is less
influential than federal decrees or fiscal measures.
Urban regime theory also suggests that a variety of social and economic actors outside
of local government institutions influence the determination of policy priorities. Russian
local policy makers, however, view the identification of policy priorities as a government
centered process without broad participation by social actors. While the respondents
clearly view political relations as the most important set of factors, political participants
are important, perhaps less so than economic conditions. When asked about the
influence of particular participants in the policy making process, the respondents are
once again fairly consistent in their ratings. Respondents rated the influence of federal
authorities among the most important (3.7) with local self-government and local and
regional business circles as the other two most important influence (3.9 and 3.4
respectively) (see Table 3). The press certainly deserves honorable mention as many
respondents view its role as having the same importance as that of local and business
circles (3.3). The respondents remained consistent with the view that the presidential
representative was not an influential part of the policy making process by rating this
participant among the lowest in importance (2.4). Only social actors (labor unions, the
church, and other social organizations) rate lower or at the same level as the
presidential representative.
The evidence suggests that local policymakers do have a strong role to play in local
politics. Local policy makers, however, voice a somewhat different view of the role
federal authorities should play in a purely local issue like land use policy. When
respondents were asked their view of whose voice should be decisive in determining
land use policies, federal authorities ranked a distant third or fourth behind urban
authorities and residents (Table 4).
III.a.ii. Federal Influence Over Local Policy Implementation
I suggest above that local policy makers consider the federal level as very influential in
determining local priorities and that policy making is a government centered process.
Additional evidence from the survey suggests that policy implementation is also
government centered with respect to both the measures used and the participants;
however, policy implementation is closely connected with the business community not
with the broader community of local population. The local policy makers appear to hold
the view that the central-local and business-government relationships are ones rooted in
partnership. Imbalances in those partnerships undoubtedly exist.
Respondents were asked to identify which policy instruments and strategies they use
and which are most successful for local policy implementation. We then asked with
whom they worked most successfully on policy implementation. Local policymakers use
fiscal strategies and partnerships between government levels and private business most
often (see Table 5). Despite the fact that two-thirds of the respondents noted that they
use federal partnerships, very few believe federal partnerships are one of three most
useful strategies. The same policy makers though cited federal authorities as one of
three most successful participants in policy implementation (see Table 6). The apparent
contradiction actually underscores the importance of working in partnership with federal
authorities and working with them in indirect ways, perhaps as facilitators rather than
controllers. It also underscores the importance of individual interactions over
institutional.
When asked about the three most successful participants in policy implementation, local
policy makers overwhelmingly noted the importance of local business and regional
government actors (see Table 6). Next in importance came federal authorities and the
mass media. Again, the responses are highly consistent across categories of
respondents. Respondents from republics, however, gave very different responses to
the question of participation in policy implementation. Republic level respondents cited
higher successful participation for the federal level and lower successful participation for
local business than did the urban and oblast respondents. The variation across
government scale with respect to successful cooperation in the policy arena
underscores that the federal level’s influence is not the same across the country.
III.a.iii. Summary and Conclusion
In local policy makers’ views, neither federal laws nor authorities have become
irrelevant to urban and regional policymaking. The strong consistency over government
branch, scale, and region suggest that within Russian federalism, the central
government remains one of the most important players. Despite decentralization,
federal laws, decrees, and tax regimes are among the most important factors
stimulating and directing local policy choices. We know that those choices are not
always the most efficient ones (see next section). But the dominance of federal
influences over local economic and social ones has several implications. First, the
theory that competition among jurisdictions produces economic efficiency and regionally
appropriate bundles of provision of public goods and services should receive serious
skepticism in the Russian case. Also supporting the lack of relevance of the Tiebout
thesis is the configuration of important individual and public participants in shaping local
policy agendas and in implementing policy. The evidence from the survey indicates that
local policy makers rely most on local business interests and federal authorities to
shape agendas and carry out policies. Public preferences then are dependent on a nonlocal group and on a group whose individual interests may diverge radically from that of
the general population. As stated previously, decisions that produce aggregate gains in
regional economic performance may not produce concomitant gains in social welfare.
Has the post-Soviet federalism reproduced the Soviet patterns of non-local interference
and dominance? Not at all. Fiscal influence has replaced the directives in the command
economy. The minor importance given to the presidential representative highlights the
diminished importance of central directives in the local arena. The direct interference of
Soviet central authorities appears to have given way to a combination of partnerships
with the federal authorities or the complete lack of assistance on the part of federal
authorities (see section III.b.). The switch to partnerships, however, brings up the critical
issue of asymmetry in the political and economic relationship between the federal and
regional governments (see section III.c. for a discussion of the implications). The
dominance of the local business community in both influencing priorities and carrying
out objectives also distinguishes the new from the old system. One could venture that
business leaders have replaced central ones in the primary influence over local politics.
III.b. The De Facto Devolution of Power in Russia
The previous section presented evidence indicating that the federal government plays a
strong role in Russia in determining local and regional policy priorities. This section
looks more deeply into the concrete relationships between federal and regional policy
actors. Like the previous section, this section illustrates the point that although the
central government plays a role in policy formation, other actors (regional governments
and local business) often must play a role in policy implementation as the center is often
too weak to enforce uniformity in this regard. This may serve to undermine the
realization of the positive political and economic efficiency gains of decentralization
outlined earlier in this paper as Russians in different regions enjoy radically different
levels of public policy provision. As we noted earlier, this may encourage divisive
sources of inequality and social stratification. Stronger central political institutions would
serve as a means of restoring some uniform standard of service provision in key areas
to remedy this situation, although in the Russian case it is difficult to see what
institutional solutions would be effective.
Since February, 1994, the federal government in Russia has signed bilateral treaties
with more than half of the 89 constituent units of the Russian Federation. While central
government officials intended for these treaties to place center-periphery relations on a
more stable and predictable footing in Russia, it is important to note that many regions
in practice actually exercise autonomy beyond what is provided for in either the bilateral
agreements, the constitution or existing federal law. That is, the treaties are far from
definitive in terms of lending predictability into center-periphery relations, nor in ensuring
implementation of and adherence to central policy at the provincial level.
To a great extent de facto policy autonomy has arisen because the center, through
weakness in certain key policy areas, has defaulted on many of its jurisdictional
responsibilities. Regions, to the degree that they are able, are left to fill the empty policy
space as best they can. Others cannot afford to implement central policy and so have
carved out for themselves a different sort of autonomy -- the freedom to do nothing.
Examples of policy autonomy taken (as opposed to granted by Moscow) come from a
whole host of regions and policy areas. De facto policy autonomy is particularly evident
in the area of social welfare – a sphere of the utmost importance in a country whose
economy all but collapsed in the early 1990’s and is only now showing flickering signs of
positive economic growth.
According to article 72, point j of the constitution of the Russian Federation, social
welfare is under the joint jurisdiction of the regions and the federal government. As early
as 1993, however, before it concluded its bilateral treaty with Moscow, the Republic of
Tatarstan embarked independently on its own need-based set of social assistance
programs (that is, prior to the conclusion of the republic’s bilateral treaty with Moscow or
the adoption of the December, 1993 federal constitution). Social assistance at the
federal level is not yet need-based – that is, certain categories of citizens receive
assistance from the state regardless of whether they actually have a financial need for
this assistance (e.g. single parent families). According to the officials in Tatarstan’s
ministry of social welfare, however, national policy in this regard was essentially
unimplementable since the federal government was not providing sufficient funds to
support such an approach to social assistance. Tatarstan’s approach then, was to
simply seize the initiative and adopt a need based system regardless of central policy
dictates at the time.
Issues of Culture and Identity:
"Cultural Entrepreneurship" in Russia’s Regions
by
Nicolai N. Petro, University of Rhode Island
Lawrence Robertson, University of Miami
The decentralization of post-communist Russia has dramatically changed the focus of
post-Soviet studies. While Soviet studies concentrated on understanding the situation in
Moscow, post-Soviet Russia has been wracked by the rise of localism and a concomitant
revival of interest in issues of identity and culture, both national and regional. This has
forced analysts of the region to go beyond political, economic, and social issues to
examine questions of culture.
Although culture first became a core concept in anthropology, it has recently been
utilized by scholars to understand distinctly political phenomena. From this perspective,
cultural analysis explains why and how individuals and groups behave as they do, and
why people are likely to act in the particular ways they do. It does so by providing a
system of meaning and identity to participants in a variety of distinct and discernible
ways. First, it orders the political priorities of a society. Second, it is at the very core of
how political communities define themselves. It is therefore key to the establishment of
legitimate authority in society. Finally, culture shapes political conflict by defining what is
worth fighting about, how such conflict should be undertaken and, ultimately, resolved.
Culture therefore provides a crucial link between the individual and his social identity,
defining group boundaries and organizing actions between them. It provides a
framework for interpreting the actions and motives of political actors and linking them
again to the broader social setting.
To date cultural contributions to the study of post-Soviet politics have been few and far
between. One major reason has been the difficulty of defining culture. Factors as diverse
as territory, language, religion, descent, and norms have all been linked to culture and
have served to unite some people and differentiate them from others on cultural grounds
(by general consensus, this differentiation is one of the central functions of culture). But
such differentiation can arise from many different sources, greatly complicating the quest
for causal explanations. Because writers are rarely explicit about the mechanisms linking
culture to political behavior, cultural analysis has frequently been shunned as a means of
accounting for political change. As a result, a singularly important concept for
understanding politics in transition societies has been overlooked.
Since culture is funadmentally about the construction of boundaries and the production
of meaning, it can be used both to determine the members of a group and to divide them
from others. The late Ernest Gellner defined culture as a "system of ideas and signs and
associations and ways of behaving and communicating." According to this definition, the
cultural basis of any group is only revealed through the actions of the group. Culture then
is not objective but subjective — the subjective self-interpretation of the meaning of
actions by group members defines their culture. Identity can be defined as the
recognition of group membership by individuals. Such membership carries with it both
obligations and privileges.
Given these close ties to identity and behavior, it is not surprising to find cultural
attributes being used to construct and manipulate groups for all sorts of political,
economic, and social goals. Culture, while embodying a host of specific attributes that
vary for any group as well as among group members, can also foster a strong sense of
group identity. The absence of such a common cultural identity has emerged as one of
the central problems in post-Soviet society. While the transformations of the past decade
have undermined the Soviet cultural identity that lay at the center of associational life
before 1991, nothing has emerged to replace it. An ominous cultural void has appeared
that manifests itself most clearly in the weakness of civil society. In general, the
movements and groups that grew up and accompanied democratization have been weak
ones with few members, lacing both cohesion and resources. These circumstances leave
both individuals and elites uncertain about what cultural foundations should be used to
constitute the civic groups that are the basis of the society and the polity. Nearly a decade
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia remains a society without any strong sense
of attachment to the state, primarily because the state has failed to define itself. How to
reconnect state and society on a new, democratic cultural foundation (and the
encouragement of associational life along with it), has become one of the country’s most
pressing tasks.
Culture and the Prospects for Creating Community
Culture and identity are constructed, varied, and flexible. This view of culture clashes
with two other common approaches to the subject. The first sees culture as given and
fixed; the second views culture as irrelevant and illusory. Both of these views address
only one aspect of culture which, in reality, has attributes of both perspectives. On the
one hand, identities appears as real and given; something that can be searched for and
discovered. On the other hand, identities can be constructed and reconstructed as social
opportunities change. It is particularly this second aspect of culture that affects how elites
form support groups, and shapes the lines members of society use to associate with likeminded individuals to promote their interests. The process of group creation thus lies at
the intersection of both politics and culture. Culture matters in conjunction with - rather
than in opposition to - interests and institutions precisely because it is such a powerful
resource in defining community. But most importantly for the purposes of our study,
culture provides resources for political organization and mobilization. Frequently, groups
and leaders use cultural organizations to pursue goals that they cannot achieve directly.
Anthropologist Abner Cohen has identified six political problems that cultural
organizations in society help to resolve. They include, helping to establish a group's
distinctiveness; meeting the political need for internal communications among the
group's constituent parts; developing mechanisms for decision-making; providing
authority for implementing decisions and speaking on behalf of the group; providing a
political ideology that lends legitimacy to power and converts it into authority; and,
finally, providing discipline of ritual, needed to connect the ideology to current
community problems.
Culture then can be a vehicle for creating not just a common identity, but a common
political identity for individual members of the community. This process is reinforced by
a lifelong process of socialization and learning. But culture and identity remain fluid
rather than static concepts, which makes the analysis of culture and identity all the more
difficult. In addition, no one identity is exclusive or all encompassing. Instead, individuals
generally hold a number of different, overlapping identities simultaneously and have even
more potential identities to add to this mix. This means that in the absence of a stable,
well established pattern of cultural expectations, individuals may find it very difficult to
form civic associations—they simply don’t know how to interpret the behavior of their
fellow citizens.
One of the most notable transitions in the post-Soviet period is the devolution of power,
authority, and responsibility away from Moscow. To the extent this actually takes place, it
marks a tremendous change in the nation’s civic tradition, forcing individuals to begin
the process of creating a new political culture. This might even be equated with
democratization, if the collective culture were but the sum of the culture of its individual
members. But here politicians as well as political and social institutions invariably intrude.
Culture creates expectations about the allocation of goods and future possibilities for
cultural group members since it provides powerful tools for political and economic
transformations, enabling new regimes to shift the objectives of society, break down old
taboos (and erect new ones), as well as endorse new possibilities. The rising appeal of
nationalism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union illustrates the increasing
recognition by politicians of the importance of setting the political agenda through the
manipulation of cultural symbols and rituals. This can have either positive or negative
consequences for democracy.
The importance of having a common cultural framework comes sharply into focus when
a society undergoes rapid transformations. In such "transition" societies new patterns will
tend to emerge only very slowly and only at a high cost to social stability. Second, the
cultural discontinuity that inevitably accompanies social upheavals will tend to lead not to
the embrace of radical change, but to a prolonged period of what Harry Eckstein calls
"formlessness." Since culture has lost its ability to make allow individuals to make sense
of the world around them, the "cognitions that make experience intelligible and
normative dispositions must be learned again." It is precisely during such periods of
orientational uncertainty that, as Edmund Burke remarked of the French Revolution,
"the worst rise to the top." Post-Soviet Russia would therefore seem to be a good test of
the impact culture has on politics, particularly in the regions. From a culturalist
perspective, after all, the fact that socialization occurs at many different levels of society
should alert us to the existence of cultural differences within a society as well as between
societies.
We have therefore chosen two cases that illustrate the very different uses to which the
political manipulation of culture, or what we call "cultural entrepreneurship," can be put.
Lawrence Robertson argues that a comparison of language policies pursued in Russia’s
twenty ethnic republics shows that the "national revival" in native language usage is
generally far more motivated by the political needs of the local elites (regardless of ethnic
identity) than by the demands of constituents. The republics support titular peoples and
cultures in a very limited manner, and the ever present role of the state in these revivals
also suggests that their impact in forging a greater sense of community identity and civic
participation has been limited.
By contrast, Nicolai N. Petro argues that the key to political stability in the
homogeneously Russian region of Novgorod, lies in the fact that local politicians have
used culture to build a broader base of public support for reforms. By portraying local
policies as a return to lost traditions, rather than as something imported from abroad, the
local elite has increased the level of public support for far reaching economic and
political reforms.
Civic versus Cultural Entrepreneurs: The Case of the Republics
In the ethnic republics within Russia, cultural questions complicate the formation of
associational life and regional identity. One broad cleavage in the republics is an ethnic
one - based on cultural constructions of groups as ethnic nations that are indigenous to
the territory - as Buryats, Kumyks, and so on. This notion of "us" leaves out members of
different cultures, in particular ethnic Russians that are a majority or a plurality of the
population in sixteen of the twenty republics. Cultural entrepreneurs emphasize this
ethnic definition of "us" while civic entrepreneurs stress inclusive definitions of the
citizenry (us) based on residence._ This notion of "us" is more inclusive and less divisive
in the multiethnic republics. Language and cultural politics are important for both
conceptions of community and central to state action in the republics, which must decide
on which languages to use in administration and in education as well as on resource flows
to literature, the arts, and mass communications. All of these decisions and flows have
distributional consequences for in and out-group members._ Cultures in contact become
cultures in conflict in these areas where different definitions of us have consequences for
current as well as future welfare of individuals._ And some argue for normative
consequences for language choices as well, where the lack of a state role has encouraged
a bad - the mass extinction of small languages across the globe. While language and
cultural choices are not exclusive - the choice of one language does not preclude
knowledge and use of another - these choices strengthen and weaken languages and the
underlying culture by varying the premium placed on any language by its users, by others,
and by the state.
In the twenty ethnic republics in Russia, republican institutions and cultural movements
promote the linguistic revival above through titular language schooling, support for
titular culture, and native language media. And there is some evidence that the linguistic
choices reported by individuals through the census and sample census in 1989 and 1994
suggests national identities - or at least knowledge of and affiliation with the languages of
these groups - appears to be increasing among titular peoples in Russia. Although the
strength of titular languages varied widely among the populations of these groups in
1989, there is little variation in the slight turn to titular languages by group members
across the republics . The research in this part of the chapter suggests that "national
revivals" are less national in content than they are in form. While the revivals are
conducted through ethnofederal institutions, it appears to be the state via republican
institutions and governing elites rather than "real" nationalists that drive the revivals. The
republics support titular peoples and cultures in a limited manner, and the role of the
state also suggest the limited nature of these revivals.
Republican Language and Cultural Policies
Russia contains many different ethnic groups with diverse languages and cultures. The
old Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) was the only federal republic in
the USSR because of the large number of indigenous minority groups that lived in
concentrated areas within its borders. The same principles of ethnic federalism that
resulted in the creation of union republics for some ethnic groups, such as the Uzbek
Soviet Socialist Republic for Uzbeks, led to the creation of 16 autonomous Soviet
socialist republics (respubliky), five autonomous regions (oblasty), and ten autonomous
districts (okrugy) for minority groups within Russia. The republics were explicitly
designed for ethnic groups and designated as their homelands to promote their cultural
and economic development. The official ideology, based on Marxist, Leninist, and
Stalinist concepts, held that the flourishing (rastsvet) of nations would lead towards the
merging (sblizheniye) and ultimate fusion (sliyaniye) of nations. In the Brezhnev period,
fusion receded as a central concept and was replaced by an emphasis on asymmetrical
bilingualism through the promotion of the Russian language on top of titular languages.
In contrast to these ideological expectations, under the permissive politics of the
Gorbachev period, national assertiveness among the titular peoples of the Union
republics grew and led them to declare sovereignty and demand greater control over their
republics. The ethnic components of Russia also sought increased local power and
prerogatives and moved to declare sovereignty as well, usually from both the Union and
Federation. Sovereignty was proclaimed in the name of the population of the republic
and often in the name of the indigenous population as well. Greater autonomy implied
increased attention to the cultures and languages of these peoples, and such provisions
were often explicit in the sovereignty declarations of the republics.
With the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia remained a federation under a new name,
with the names Russia and the Russian Federation given equal status in December 1991.
The following year the Federation recognized the activism of some national components
by officially upgrading four of the five autonomous oblasts to republics as well as
accepting the split of the Chechen-Ingush republic into its two components, Chechnya
and Ingushetia. Independent Russia is thus formally composed of 21 republics, although
Chechnya declared independence in 1991, refused to sign the Federation Treaties in
1992, and has maintained de-facto independence despite the attempt to crush the
separatist regime by military force from 1994 to 1996. Since little information on
language use or cultural policies is available from the devastated Chechen
Republic/Ichkeria, the following section examines patterns of language use among the
titular groups of the twenty remaining republics. Titular groups are the peoples for which
the region is named. For examples, Tatars are the titular group in Tatarstan and the
Khakass are the titular people of the Republic of Khakassia. Additional complexity is
presented by other republics with more than one titular group. For these republics, the
analysis examines all of the groups in the titles of these regions: the Karachai and the
Cherkess for the Karachai-Cherkess Republic and the Kabardins and the Balkars for the
Kabardino-Balkar Republic. And in yet another exception, I examine the six largest
"peoples of Dagestan" as the titular peoples in the Republic of Dagestan: the Avars,
Dargins, Kumyks, Lezgins, Tabasarans, and Laks. The linguistic characteristics and any
changes with greater local prerogatives devolving to the eleven smaller autonomous
regions in Russia are not examined below.
Political struggles in these republics centers on questions of group and regional identity
as well as on issues in economic reform. Questions of group membership arise almost
immediately since determining the members of the polity precedes the shaping of policies
for that polity. Questions about how to define rather than simply defend national
interests - the interests of ethnic constituents - are at issue and debated by current office-
holders and the leaders of national movements in the republics. Disputes between
governing elites and the leaders of national movements focus on two opposed sets of
ideas about membership of the republic. Broadly framed, a republic can be constituted
on either an ethnic or a civic identity. Ethnic conceptions of republican citizenship
emphasize the cultural basis of the territory and republican status rests on particular
characteristics of titular groups. But these ethnic notions of republican identity and civic
conceptions of republican citizenship are often combined by republican politicians, who
appeal to constituents on both civic and ethnic criteria with little attention to
inconsistencies between these different programs. Civic arguments emphasize the
benefits of sovereignty and greater local control for the region as a whole. Ethnic
arguments instead push for cultural policies and the distribution of these economic
benefits to favor titular groups. Many republican administrations seem to have
successfully created coalitions that link these opposed policy programs even in times of
economic stringency.
Despite seven years of independence, the national republics and the central government
of are still determining the parameters of the lose asymmetrical federation in Russia. With
the policy choices of republican administrations only loosely restricted by the federal
authorities, the republics have a wide range of options in determining their polities.
Despite the provisions of the 1993 Russian Constitution that assert that the members of
the federation are equal, center-periphery relations are characterized by large asymmetries
in power and resources between components of the federation and a contentious
bargaining process over bilateral treaties with the central government. The development
of federalism from the top has been ad hoc, which has created an asymmetrical
federalism that generally favors the republics with greater prerogatives than the
territories, regions, and districts. But the powers of the republics vary widely as well, due
to the appropriation of prerogatives at different rates and to different extents by these 20
republics. Formally, while the residual clause in the Russian basic law reads like the
American constitution and grants all powers not vested in the federal government or in
"joint jurisdiction" between the center and the regions to the members of the federation,
in fact all powers are contested.
Language, as one of the main parameters of most ethnic groups, is central to their
cultures. And cultural policies are also integrated into issues of language use and status in
the republics. The republics were granted the right under the 1991 law "On the languages
of the peoples of the RSFSR" and in the 1993 Russian constitution to establish their own
state languages. But before this right was granted by the center, many republics
developed their own language laws and programs that focused on the rebirth and
strengthening of titular languages in 1990 and 1991. The typical practice was to declare
the titular language and Russian as the state languages of the republic, with equal status.
This was the practice in Chuvashia and Kalmykia. On the other hand, some republics
such as Tuva declared the titular language the sole state language and left Russian, as the
official language of the USSR and Russia, as the language of interethnic communication
in the republic. But implementing the new language legislation proved difficult in all the
republics. This often led to follow-up resolutions, as in Chuvashia, that noted the failure
to meet targets set in the earlier legislation and to establish new, less ambitious goals for
the future promotion of titular languages and cultures.
Demographic Characteristics of the Republics
These twenty republics and twenty-seven titular groups vary widely in all sorts of
attributes. Some of the most politically consequential demographic differences are in the
size of republic, the size of the minority group, the percentage of the population of the
republic that members of their respective titular groups, and the percentage of the titular
group that reside in their republic (Table 1). The absolute size of the republics is one of
the ways that these regions matter in Russian politics and minority group size is another
indicator that suggests the political relevance of these ethnic groups in federal politics.
The extent the republic is demographically dominated by the titular group addresses
another way ethnic groups may matter in politics by considering ethnic politics within the
republic. The extent to the minority group is concentrated in the republic is often
another consequential aspect of ethnic politics for these titular groups, as examined
below. The republics vary in size at the start of 1997 from over four million inhabitants
of Bashkortostan to a mere 200,000 people in the Republic of Altai. Eight republics have
populations of over a million people and many of these units are located in central
Russia. The titular groups of these republics within Russia in 1989 ranged in size from
five and a half million Tatars to 78 thousand Khakass and Balkars, 69 thousand Altai, and
50 thousand Balkars. Five titular groups had populations above a million people within
Russia in 1989. But few minorities were demographically dominant within their republics.
Only the Republic of Ingushetia, the Chuvash Republic, the Republic of Tuva, North
Ossetia/Alaniya, and the Chechen Republic have an absolute majority of the population
of the titular group. In addition, together the six largest peoples of Dagestan comprised
76.5 percent of the population in 1989 and the Kabardins and Balkars together made up
57.6 percent of their republic in the last Soviet census. And ethnic Tatars were close to
becoming a demographic majority of the population of their republic in 1989 and have
likely become one since then due to ethnic differences in fertility and mortality rates as
well as migration to and from the republic since the last Soviet census. On the other
hand, titular minorities made up a mere 10 percent of the population of Karelia and 11
percent of all residents of Khakassia. Titular minorities were between twenty and thirtynine percent of the population of eight other republics. While many republics were
largely non-titular, the extent to which the titular population in Russia lived in their
republics varied as well. Although the concentration of titular ethnic groups within
Russia in their republics remained high for almost all groups, only a third of ethnic Tatars
and Mordovans and about half of all ethnic Chuvash and Mari lived within their
republics. Most of these dispersed minorities outside their republics were in neighboring
regions or republics. On the other hand, Ossetians and Lezgins had substantial numbers
of coethnics that lived in neighboring Union republics which became independent of
Russia at the end of 1991. Relations with coethnics across more consequential
international borders and the nationalizing states of Georgia and Azerbaijan pose difficult
problems for both of these ethnic groups.
Table 1: Demographic Statistics for the Republics and Their Titular Groups
Republic/Titular Group(s)
Population
Titular
Percentage Percentage
of
Population
of
Republic
Republic
Start of
1998
of Titulars
in Russia
Titular
in
Republic
1989
1989
1989
Republic of Adygeya/Adygey
449,903
122,908
22.1
77.7
Altai Republic/Altai
201,742
69,409
31.0
85.2
Republic of
Bashkortostan/Bashkirs
4,104,004
1,345,273
21.9
64.2
Republic of Buryatia/Buryats
1,042,669
417,425
24.0
59.8
Republic of Dagestan
2,094,200
Avars
544,016
27.5
91.2
Dargins
353,344
15.6
79.4
Kumyks
277,163
12.9
83.6
Lezgins
257,270
11.3
79.4
93,587
4.3
83.6
106,245
5.1
86.3
792,488
898,999
57.8
81.7
312,6445
215,068
74.5
76.1
386,055
48.2
94.2
78,341
9.4
90.4
165,821
45.4
88.2
Karachai
150,332
31.2
86.1
Cherkess
50,764
9.7
79.3
Tabasarans
Laks
Chechen Republic
(Ichkeriya)/Chechens
Republic of
Ingushetia/Ingush
Kabardino-Balkar Republic
785,848
Kabardins
Balkars
Republic of Kalmykia
(Khalmg-Tangch)/Kalmyks
317,069
Karachai-Cherkess Republic
433,690
Republic of Karelia/Karelians
775,189
124,921
10.0
63.2
1,162,888
336,309
23.3
86.7
Republic of Mari El/Mari
762,957
643,698
43.3
50.4
Republic of
Mordovia/Mordovans
943,668
1,072,939
32.5
29.2
1,016,017
380,242
33.4
96.1
661,552
402,275
53.0
83.2
3,777,767
5,522,096
48.5
32.0
309,731
206,160
64.3
96.3
Udmurt Republic/Udmurts
1,632,581
714,833
30.9
69.5
Khakass Republic/Khakass
582,412
78,500
11.1
80.1
Chuvash Republic/Chuvash
1,360,868
1,773,645
67.8
51.1
Komi Republic/Komi
Republic of Sakha
(Yakutia)/Sakha (Yakuts)
Republic of North Ossetia
(Alaniya)/Ossetians
Republic of Tatarstan/Tatars
Republic of Tuva/Tuvans
Data for Tables 1-3 were taken from USSR Goskomstat, Itogi Vsesoyuznoy perepisi
naseleniya 1989 goda. Tom VII: Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniya SSSR, Chast' I [Results of
the 1989 all-union population census. Volume 7: The national composition of the
population of the USSR, Part 1] (Minneapolis: Eastview, 1992). 1998 population data was
taken from Goskomstat Rossii, Demograficheskiy ezhegodnik Rossii [The demographic
yearbook of Russia] (Moscow: Goskomstat, 1998).
Language Use
Data on language use in the Russian republics is self-reported. The information comes
from census data that surveyed the entire population of the RSFSR in 1989, the sample
census of five percent of the population of the Russian Federation in 1994, and from a
number of polls in particular republics. All three of these kinds of data reflects the
subjective evaluations of ethnic group members themselves. The attitudes towards and
attributes of individual members of ethnic groups towards language use are often taken
as a proxy measure to assess ethnic nationalism. Language data provides one way to
tentatively evaluate the effects of national revivals on members of these ethnic groups
throughout Russia and in their national regions.
Soviet and Russian censuses asked respondents for their "native language" (rodnoi yazyk)
as well as whether they "freely command" (svobodno vladet') another language of the
country. While neither term is defined carefully, both elicit subjective answers from
respondents that provides aggregate information about the characteristics of ethnic
groups. Soviet ethnographers and demographers were critical of these vague
formulations and the lack of clarity about relationships between these two questions and
actual language use. As a partial response to this criticism, the 1994 Russian sample
included two additional questions. The first asked about the language spoken at home
and the second queried language use in the workplace. Tables 2 and 3 contain language
data for the titular ethnic groups of the Republics from the 1989 Soviet census and the
1994 Russian micro-census. The information is presented in language use per thousand
ethnic group members. Each entry gives the subset of every 1,000 people that claimed to
be a members of these ethnic groups that assert that their native language is the language
of their group, they speak Russian as a first or second language, and use their native
language at home and at work.
The native languages of peoples with autonomous republics in the RSFSR, like most
titular minority groups in the USSR, were overwhelmingly the language of their groups
throughout the Soviet period. Avars spoke Avar, Bashkirs spoke Bashkir, Tuvans spoke
Tuvan, and so on. And this trend has continued in the Russian Federation. And in
general, groups did not vary much in their selection of the titular language as their native
language. Only Bashkirs, Karelians, Komi, and Mordovans reported titular languages as
their native languages at rates of less than 800 per 1000 group members in 1989.
However census data shows a gradual decline in the identification of indigenous
languages as native languages for some groups. For the titular groups in Table 2, the
mean per 1000 population that answered that the language of their group was their native
language was declining and fell slightly to 871 for 26 groups in 1989. But not all groups
followed this trend; the titular groups became less alike over time. Linguistic groups in
the Caucuses tended to remain native language speakers while some groups in central and
northern Russia shifted to Russian. This shift is most notable for the Karelians who have
received the most attention in Western work on cultural and linguistic Russification.
Table 2: Native Language and Russian as a Second Language in Russia (per 1,000
population)
Ethnic
Group
Native
Native
Speak
Language Language Russian
as
Speaker
1989
Speak
Russian
as
Speaker a Second a Second
1994
Language Language
1989
1994
Adygey
952
959
821
857
Altai
851
890
656
734
Bashkirs
728
738
726
753
Buryats
866
872
723
771
Avars
977
974
653
777
Dargins
979
977
680
807
Kumyks
977
981
747
869
Lezgins
939
953
687
782
Tabasarans
-
979
-
785
Laks
-
943
-
882
Chechens
988
-
740
-
Ingush
982
980
803
875
Kabardins
976
980
781
812
Balkars
953
983
803
871
Kalmyks
931
951
869
928
Karachay
977
984
798
891
Cherkess
915
810
772
859
Karelians
486
428
463
415
Komi
710
706
627
651
Mari
819
826
695
752
Mordovans
690
597
643
578
Erzya
-
896
-
852
Moksha
-
904
-
844
Sakha
(Yakuts)
940
963
650
677
Ossetians
932
931
832
835
Tatars
856
855
727
761
Tuvans
986
985
592
634
Udmurts
708
726
623
654
Khakass
766
733
673
711
Chuvash
775
784
659
689
Additional data for Tables 2 and 3 were taken from Goskomstat Rossii, Raspredeleniye
naseleniya Rossii po vladeniyu yazykami [The distribution of the population of Russia by
language] (Moscow: Goskomstat, 1995).
But with national revival and sovereignization of the former autonomous republics, this
gradual decline of titular language use as the native language among members of these
groups appears to have been reversed. Although the data are imperfect and a direct
comparison of the sample census and with the actual census is problematic, over the five
year period from 1989 to 1994, the mean assertion that the titular language was the native
language increased slightly - by 1 person per 1000 - to 876 for 29 groups. While this
mean is affected by a number of outliers, it appears that there is a slowdown in the rate
of decline of titular languages as native languages for some of these groups and a small
increase in titular as native language for many other groups. And over this short five-year
time period, the variation between ethnic groups continued to grow, with the standard
deviation of titular language as native language per 1000 group members rising to 135.
Particularly pronounced increases in titular language as native language per 1000 are
apparent among the Altai (39), Balkars (30), Kalmyks (20), Sakha (23), and Udmurts (18).
On the other hand, the use of Cherkess as the native language of self-identified members
of the group fell dramatically by 105 per 1000, which seems to be an implausibly high
rate of decline in just five years. Karelians (down 58 per 1000) and Khakass (down 33 per
1000) continue to shift away from their titular languages just as in prior census periods.
Table 3: Native Language and Russian as a Second Language in the Republics (per 1,000
population)
Ethnic
Group
Native
Language
Speaker
1989
Native
Speak
Speak
Language Russian as Russian as
Speaker
a Second a Second
Language Language
1994
1989
1994
Speak
Native
Language
at Work
1994
Speak
Spea
Native
Nati
Language Langu
at Home at Ho
1994
199
(Al
Russ
Adygey
984
988
832
866
316
929
858
Altai
896
920
673
753
617
790
743
Bashkirs
747
760
739
770
342
643
558
Buryats
894
899
736
779
286
682
648
Avars
989
987
645
781
492
942
912
Dargins
989
992
661
805
394
930
893
Kumyks
990
993
743
880
275
922
896
Lezgins
980
990
682
788
498
938
842
Tabasarans
984
995
598
781
487
956
897
Laks
977
984
783
909
123
807
724
Chechens
998
-
734
-
-
-
-
Ingush
996
975
796
881
220
990
960
Kabardins
989
993
786
828
410
960
933
Balkars
984
992
824
879
202
916
896
Kalmyks
961
981
897
957
16
364
351
Karachai
992
995
797
899
183
940
907
Cherkess
979
990
782
874
245
890
699
Karelians
515
475
492
458
34
175
146
Komi
744
736
653
676
284
432
399
Mari
884
902
753
830
357
637
527
Mordovans
885
919
803
856
331
696
236
Erzya
-
894
-
853
322
565
598
Moksha
-
909
-
767
286
665
647
Sakha
(Yakuts)
951
971
650
681
776
917
907
Ossetians
982
977
869
866
193
834
753
Tatars
966
978
773
827
335
816
608
Tuvans
990
990
583
633
708
967
956
Udmurts
757
773
676
718
311
470
423
Khakass
832
804
724
777
108
492
418
Chuvash
850
860
692
727
517
671
508
Skepticism about the utility and veracity of Soviet census data on knowledge of Russian
as a second language has been widespread since the question was introduced in the 1970
census. The acquisition of Russian as a second language was promoted by the Soviet
state and the development of bilingualism taken as an indicator of the merging of
nationalities in the Brezhnev period and after. The number of minority group members
throughout the Federation that could "freely command" Russian as a second language
appears to have grown for most of the titular minorities of the Russian republics in the
early 1990s. Karelians and the Khakass, two of the groups that appear to have shifted to
Russian as their native languages instead, stand out as exceptions.
However, despite high retention levels for national languages as native languages, other
evidence suggests that the meaning of this measure varies widely among the members of
ethnic groups. One survey of five republics found that while 90 percent of Bashkirs
claimed their native language was Bashkir, only 54 percent of them could freely use
Bashkir for reading and writing. Similarly, only 36.9 percent of the 84.7 percent of
Kalmyks that claimed their language was their native one felt comfortable reading and
writing in Kalmyk. This survey found Udmurts and Karelians called their titular
languages their native ones at lower rates, 59.1 and 42 percent of respondents
respectively.
And the 1994 sample suggested similarly that native language did not mean that the
language chosen was the one used at home. Respondents indicated that they used their
native language at home less frequently than they asserted their titular language was their
native language for all but ethnic Ingush in Ingushetiya. Interethnic marriages, for
example, are one way that the use of titular languages is reduced within the home. Native
language use at work was far less frequent than at home. Majorities of only the Altai,
Sakha (Yakuts), Tuvans, and Chuvash stated that they used their native language at work,
and barely a majority in case of the Chuvash. Russian remained the language of the
workplace for most members of these titular groups even within their national republics.
Karelian and Kalmyk in particular have almost no economic role within their republics.
Language Use in Education in the Republics
One of the ways republican administrations were to promote titular languages was
through education and the school system. But Russian has overwhelmingly remained the
language of general education across the republics. Tuva is the only exception to this
general pattern; 60.5 percent of all students in the republic were educated in Tuvan rather
than Russian in the 1994-1995 school year. The absence of change rather than much of a
national revival is the dominant trend in the language used in general education in most
republics, although in several republics the percentage of students educated in the titular
language has grown substantially. This growth pattern is clear in calculations that
compare the percentage of students in general schools educated in the titular languages
of the republics between 1990/91 and 1994/95. In addition to Tuva, the percentage of
students educated in their native (korennoy) language has grown and been in double-digit
proportions in five other republics: from 10.1 to 21.3 percent in Dagestan, 5.4 to 15.1
percent in Kabardino-Balkariya, 23.3 to 34.8 percent in Sakha (Yakutia), 12.8 to 19.1
percent in Tatarstan, and less dramatically 11.2 to 11.8 percent in the Altai Republic.
However, even for these six relatively nationalizing republics, only half had titular
language schooling at higher rates in 1994/95 than in the Brezhnev period of
"stagnation" (zastoy) of 1980/81: Sakha (Yakutiya), Dagestan, and the Altai Republic.
And in Chuvashiya, while almost 15 percent of students were in Chuvash-language
schools in 1994/95, this proportion was down slightly from 1990/91 and down
substantially from 1980/81. National movements, such as the Chuvash National
Congress, dissatisfied with this trajectory have focused on the need to open more
national schools and classes to support their language and culture.
The Altai republic, like the four other former autonomous oblasts promoted to
republican status in 1992, had no general schooling in their titular languages in the late
Brezhnev period and have thus achieved important linguistic gains with upgrading to
republican status. This is the case for six other republics as well; Buryatia, KabardinoBalkaria, North Ossetia, Mari-El, Chechnya, and Ingushetia began their linguistic revival
in the schools in 1990/91 from an all-Russian basis in 1980/81. The nativization of the
schools has not gone very far in most of these republics. Except in the Altai and
Kabardino-Balkar Republics, none of these or the rest of the republics use the titular
language as the language of instruction in more than 8 percent of the schools in the
region, although the use of these languages grew between 1991/92 and 1994/95 in all but
Buryatia and Mari-El where these figures were unchanged. Khakass remains the language
least used in education: under one percent of the schools of the republic were in the
language in 1994/95.
The remaining three republics have not moved to institute titular language schooling at
all in the general schools. In Karelia, Komi, and the Udmurt Republics, all students in
1994/95 were still taught in Russian, although some students took titular languages as
elective subjects. But only in the Komi and Udmurt Republics were significant numbers
of students attracted to titular languages as electives; 15.3 percent of students in the
Komi Republic and 12.7 percent of students in Udmurtia took these languages as
electives. In Karelia, Finnish was more popular than Karelian, although only a few
thousand students took either language as an elective (6.2 and 1.3 percent of all students
respectively).
Some other scattered evidence suggests efforts to broaden the understanding of titular
languages by making them required subjects for all students although the main language
of instruction would remain Russian. For example, Khakass was supposed to become a
required subject in schools in the Republic of Khakassia in accordance with a new
education policy approved by the republican government at the end of July 1998. The
plan also envisages courses in Khakass history and the environment in the republic. And
some other schools in the republic were due to offer language courses in Chuvash. But
the republican plan remains dependent on the federal government and must be
coordinated with the federal Education Ministry before implementation can begin.
Cultural Outreach Programs
Since the boundaries of the republics do not coincide with the territory inhabited by all
the members of these 27 republican titular groups, some portions of each nation are left
outside the republic. The protection and support for titular languages from republican
administrations extends only to their members within the republics. But, as noted in
Table 1, a large proportion of some ethnic groups lives outside their nominal
"homelands." This is especially true for the largest and most dispersed titular minority in
Russia, the Tatars.
As part of their cultural policies, republican administrations have sought to support the
language and culture of members of their ethnic groups that live outside of the republic.
These outreach activities are typically conducted on a government to government basis,
with the participation of prominent intellectuals, local members of the ethnic group, and
members of the national movements of the group from the republic. Bilateral agreements
seek to guarantee linguistic and cultural rights for concentrated minorities and ensure that
support from "their" republic flows to promote cultural autonomy. But minority
populations outside their national regions are sometimes distinct from the rest of "their"
group. This is because the definition of the group can be seen differently by both
populations. Many Tatars in Siberia view themselves as members of a separate ethnic
group - the Siberian Tatars. While the 1989 Census did not accept this self-defined group
as an ethnic groups, the 1994 sample census enumerated Siberian Tatars as a separate
group. And some members of the group has organized to seek national-cultural
autonomy. In their effort to form the first national-cultural autonomy in Russia, they
stress their separateness from the Tatars of the Middle Volga region and that they do not
receive aid from Kazan'. And the main goal noted for the proposed autonomy is the use
of Tatar in national schools. While reportedly already 35 percent of Tatar children in the
oblast study in their native language, the expansion of Tatar schools is sought for more
than just linguistic reasons. The schools are also to help "protect and develop their
national culture, traditions, way of life, ethnography, arts, national products and
handicrafts, and traditional working ways."
Conclusions
Regional elites are widely seen as influential in Russian regional politics. In the Republics,
elected leaders tend to be members of the titular minority group or groups. While
arguments for sovereignty and economic autonomy tend to focus on the civic, nonnational benefits for the entire population of the republics, this policy program is often
supplemented with language policies with a more ethnic orientation. And language
policies is one arena for ethnic counter-elites to argue for a more nationalistic policy.
Alternatives to the "party in power" come from national movements in the republics,
who may strengthen republican language policies through competition with republican
authorities.
These data and the above analysis suggest that at least some aspects of titular minority
cultures remain strong and have increased in strength across Russia with these national
revivals. But regional governments in the federal system appear to have little to do with
these national revivals, at least in terms of language change. Republican governments
empowered by sovereignty and with greater local prerogatives do not seem to have
dramatically altered the pattern of titular language use or the language of education
among the peoples of Russia. Titular preference policies and education systems that at
least in party functioned through native languages encouraged the retention of titular
languages in the Republics. Members of these republican nationalities that lived outside
their republic lacked this institutional support for their language and culture and were
systematically less likely to call the titular language their native language in the 1989
census. While this pattern grew more pronounced with national revivals after 1989, the
differences in titular language as native language are small.
Other scattered evidence about the Russian republics argues that in some ways
republican governments systematically favor titular ethnic groups at the expense of
ethnic Russians. Russian journalists in the regions and in Moscow write about ethnic
tensions in daily life as well as republican ethnic policies, and argue over the extent to
which ethnic Russians are disadvantaged by these policies. And some public opinion data
measures popular attitudes towards republican leaders and their policies directly. While
public opinion polling suffers from many problems in Russia, pollsters are far better at
conducting polls in urban areas. Polling data from November 1994, before the Chechen
debacle worsened center-periphery relations, suggests that urban titular populations and
ethnic Russians in the cities of some Russian republics have dramatically different views
of the central government and republican authorities. In the ethnofederal system in
Russia, the governments of the republics are led and dominated by members of the
titular group, just as these groups had predominated in republican administrations the
USSR. While precise data on the ethnic composition of republican administrations is
unavailable, the most visible positions in the republics are overwhelmingly held by
titulars, and each republic has continued to expand its prerogatives and sovereignty. On
the other hand, the central government is overwhelmingly made up of ethnic Russians.
As in other countries, the general pattern across the Federation is for people to provide
stronger support for local political leaders than for the central government. For example,
one 1993 poll found support for the federal government, State Duma, and Federation
Council at 10, 9, and 8 percent of respondents respectively, while 28 percent of those
polled assessed the affairs of their regional government positively. But in the ethnic
republics, ethnicity leads to different a different pattern of support for local and central
political institutions. The pattern was split by national cleavage in one comparative survey
of 4,000 people in four republics (North Ossetia, Sakha (Yakutia), Tatarstan, and Tuva).
This survey found that the members of titular groups demonstrated greater trust in the
organs of republican power than did ethnic Russians. And in contrast trust in the central
government was higher among Russians that titulars in all four republics. Almost 40
percent of the urban populations of each titular ethnic group had greater trust in the
republican than central government, while greater trust in republican rather than central
authorities was asserted by only 8.5 percent of Russians in Tuva, 11.1 percent of Russians
in North Ossetia, 18.7 percent of Russians in Sakha (Yakutia), and 20.8 percent of
Russians in Tatarstan. These data suggest that other kinds of subjective evaluations of
ethnic politics may divide members of titular ethnic groups from ethnic Russians in the
republics. On the other hand, other politicians strive to construct coalitions that unite
titular and non-titular populations in the republics, with at least some success. These
effects are evident in the elections of Presidents in 19 of the republics. While ethnic
gerrymandering affects legislative elections and has some effects on the elections of
heads of the republics as well, it appears that Russians as well as titular group members
voted for the titular presidents that lead most of the republics today.
But other aspects of central government policies towards Russia's "nationalities problem"
may lead to more republican policies that endeavor to reinforce titular groups and their
languages. This tendency is apparent in the reaction of many republican administrations
to dropping Article 5, which that indicated "objective" nationality in Soviet internal
passports, on new Russian passports in 1997. The State Council of Tatarstan called not
designating nationality in the new passports the "biggest provocation in the history of
Russia" and asserted hyperbolically that this measure may "destroy inter ethnic harmony
in the country." But despite the verbal hysteria, the practical reaction has been more
measured. Tatarstan and other republics are considering creating their own passports or
their own official documents which would include nationality.
Despite the concerns expressed by a number of republican governments over the
removal of the category "nationality" from the new Russian passports, other selfidentified characteristics of nationality such as language retain strong support among
group members of the largest indigenous minorities in Russia. And these trends are
pronounced even with the neglect of ethnic politics and republican concerns in the
central government. As one critic has noted, the government in Moscow has apparently
"not financing the extra budget Fund for national-cultural rebirth of the peoples of
Russia" instead of using fiscal policies and other sources of funding to shape national
revivals. And the disarray from the rapid turnover of Russian Prime Ministers and
governments in 1998 and 1999, as well as repeated organizational changes at the Ministry
for Nationalities and Regional Affairs, hampered central policymaking all the more.
The data and analysis of trends in language use and cultural policies in the republics casts
doubt on explanations that look to the national uprisings as a cause of the disintegration
of the USSR and the threat of minority nationalisms for the integrity of Russia. If the
"major reason behind the disintegration of the USSR as a multi-ethnic state was the
diminished status of and discrimination against the non-Russian peoples whose cultures
and identities were forcibly suppressed," the devolution of greater power and authority to
these titular regions should be accompanied by substantial efforts to redress these results
through republican policies. Such policies are readily apparent in a number of the newly
independent states. But within Russia, while titular preference policies and new language
laws have been strengthened or created in almost all of the republics, the results to date
appear meager. Perhaps the short five-year time period is insufficient to capture the
magnitude of linguistic or cultural change. Alternatively perhaps other differences in
demographic change between ethnic groups swamps any linguistic changes. Further
analysis and the results of the next Russian census, if it is finally held in 2001, ought to
clarify the position of titular languages and cultures in Russia today and in the future.
Civic and Cultural Entrepreneurship: The case of Novgorod-the-Great
In the midst of Russia’s general turmoil, the Novgorod region shows how culture can
also be used to promote democratization and economic progress. In just a few short
years, Novgorod-the-Great (not to be confused with Nizhny Novgorod) has gone from
the bottom third of Soviet regions in terms of economic productivity, to one of the most
prosperous and stable in Russia.
Situated in the northwestern economic area of Russia, approximately three hours
southeast from St. Petersburg along the main highway to Moscow, the region has a
population of approximately 740,000 and covers an area approximately the size of West
Virginia. The largest city, Novgorod-the-Great, has 230,000 inhabitants, and the second
largest town is Borovichi, with about 61,000 inhabitants. The urban population
constitutes about 71% of the region’s inhabitants, 96% of whom are ethnic Russians.
Despite its lack of natural resources, extensive military-industrial infrastructure, and large
rural population, foreign direct investment in the region increased twenty-fold between
1994 and 1997. By the end of 1997, Novgorod had the second highest level of per capita
foreign investment in Russia, 94% of local industry had been privatized, and small
businesses provide over 20% of local budget revenues.
In a nutshell, the administration has begun a massive reorganization of the economic
structure of the region that is aimed at replacing the declining industrial tax base with one
that relies on personal income tax. It has paid for reforms (such as a regional stabilization
fund and regional small business fund) from the money it saves on communal housing
expenditures, and social and cultural initiatives, and has managed to substantially reduce
its dependence of federal subsidies. In fact, during two of the last four years, the regional
budget has actually shown a small surplus (Tyshkevich and Bryushkin, 1998, p.12).
The impact of these economic reforms on people’s lives has been dramatic. Between
1995 and 1997 real incomes in the region grew 1.7 times (Ruble and Popson, 1998, p.
441). They continued to rise by 6.6% between January -April 1998, compared with same
period in 1997. By contrast, incomes in Russia during this period fell by 7.2%, and in the
northwest excluding Novgorod, they fell by nearly 8% (O sotsialno-ekonomicheskom . .
., 1998, p. 106). The first seven months of 1998 also saw a 5.2% increase in industrial
production in Novgorod compared with same period in 1997, while industrial production
in Russia as a whole fell (Starostenkova, 1998). Had the crisis of August 1998 not
occurred, First Deputy Governor Skibar estimates that economic growth in the region
for 1998 would have been around 9% (Kolotnecha, 1999, p.3).At the same time the
official poverty and unemployment rates remain significantly lower than the national
average, even falling during the first half of 1998 (Ruble and Popson, 1998, pp. 441-2).
To be sure, Novgorod still faces many problems as its pursues economic reforms. While
official unemployment is low, if one uses the methodology of the World Labor
Organization to project hidden unemployment, regional unemployment stood at 9.4% in
1996, well above the Russian average of 8.7% (Tyshkevich and Bryuzgin, 1998, p. 4).
This rate is unlikely to be reduced any time soon since nearly half of the remaining large
industrial enterprises are showing losses (O sotsialno-ekonomicheskom . . , 1998, p. 90).
Sometimes, as in the case of "Start", which provides specialized electronic components
for the military, the defense industry will not allow the company to privatize, but will not
pay its arrears either (Izmailov, 1997). And despite the efforts of the administration to
promote local agriculture and private farming, neighboring
Leningrad region produces 3.3 times more agricultural produce, despite having 20% less
cultivated land (Tyshkevich and Bryuzgin, 1998, p. 9).
The ruble devaluation of August 1998 hit the region hard, though less so than many
other regions of the country. Overall industrial output for the year rose a bare 1.7%,
while output for Russia as a whole fell 5.2%. Housing starts, one of the region’s more
stable economic indicators in recent years, fell by 16.2% for the year, although somehow
construction of individual homes continued to rise by 7.2% (Sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoe .
. ., 1999).
New foreign direct investments in the region have been scaled back more than forty
percent in 1998 compared to 1997, which translated into a 21 million ruble shortfall in
the 1998 budget. Commercial lending within the region fell by nearly a quarter, and for
the first time in years pension payments were delayed 2-3 weeks in August and
September. The region’s flagship investor, Cadbury-Schweppes, suspended production
for a month in September (Koval’, 1998). Still, by March 1999 the region’s other major
investor, the Danish chewing gum manufacturer Dirol, had returned to a level of
profitability that allowed it to cut short its tax holiday from regional and local taxes. In
June 1999 Dirol opened a second multi-million dollar facility in the region that will allow
for both packaging and local manufacture of their products. Indeed, of twenty potential
new investments (totaling a possible 1.1 billion dollars) that were being negotiated in
latter half of 1998, only one--a Yugoslavian pharmaceutical manufacturer--has
withdrawn.
The region’s success in attracting foreign investment has largely overshadowed its other
accomplishments but, as local officials never tire of repeating, attracting foreign
investment is just one part of a broader agenda of social transformations. This
transformation centers around reviving local self-government or, as the region’s governor
Mikhail Prusak has put it, "returning to the roots of our system of government" (Prusak,
1998b).
Self-government: "Our system of government:"
Unlike most other regions of Russia, when the new administration was appointed in
1991, it faced a popularly elected local city government that was already quite active in
promoting reform. Relations between the administration and the city Soviet were not
always easy during this period. At the time the leadership of the Novgorod City Council
was firmly in the hands of the United Democrats, a group of local businessmen and civic
leaders bent on a radical democratization of city politics. Many of them worried that the
new governor would be beholden to Moscow interests, and might chose political
expediency over democratic principles They felt their worst fears confirmed when,
instead of holding speedy elections for local office, the governor argued that the legal
basis for such elections had not yet been established by the Supreme Soviet. The
governor’s implementation of Yeltsin’s decree # 1760 of October 26, 1993 abolishing all
Soviets (even those that had supported the President) left a bitter taste in the mouth of
those who felt the local administration should have been more supportive of local
government institutions.
Despite there initial tensions, however, the regional administration has turned out to be
very supportive of local self-government, if for no other reason than as an important cost
cutting measure. In 1997, Novgorod became the first region in Russia to successfully
conduct elections for every level of government, ushering in a new era of political
accountability.
If local self-government is to mean anything, adequate financing would be key.
Developing an economic foundation for self-government meant first and foremost,
economic decentralization.
Economic decentralization in turn required the adoption of a revolutionary approach to
budgeting, amounting to having all financial decisions made and executed not at the
regional level, but in each city and district. Forming the budget at the district level
revealed that nine of the region’s twenty-one districts could not cover their expenses with
their current tax base. As a result, richer districts were asked to share their revenues. This
put tremendous pressure on local administrators to become more effective managers.
Thanks to these and other economies, the region has been able to reduce federal
subsidies to the budget from 40% in 1993-94 to between 5 and 10% in 1996-1997
(Tyshkevich and Bryuzgin, 1998, p. 14). Eventually, the regional administration would
like each district be directly responsible for attracting investors, thus shoring up their
own tax base just as the region has done (Khoroshukhin and Shchegol, 1998, p.
46.Shifting the burden for social expenditures from the region to the districts has also
meant finding adequate funding, since budgetary expenditures(in particular for social
needs) are now primarily the responsibility of each district. This has been a difficult
transition for the region since only two of its twenty-two districts, Chudovo and
Novgorod-the-Great, are "donor" districts within the region. In effect, they provide
transfer payments to the poorer region through the regional stabilization fund
(Soldatova, 1997, pp. 38-9).
In the city of Novgorod-the-Great, all tax receipts collected within the city are
transferred from Moscow directly to the city coffers, entirely bypassing the region.
Despite the increased burden this has placed on the city budget, for the mayor, Aleksandr
Korsunov, the new system’s benefits far outweigh its shortcomings; it has even led
improved social cohesion, since people are now more likely to turn to city rather than
regional or federal officials for help (Korsunov, 1997, pp. 10-11).
Korsunov seems to be right. In the past two years nearly 900 people have sought out
their representative in the Novgorod City Duma seeking redress of grievances. City and
regional officials now hold monthly "open house" meetings, which any citizen can sign
up for. These are publicized in the local newspaper, Novgorod, which is distributed free to
each family in the city. In addition, each year regional officials organize some two
hundred meetings with local groups around the region to explain local policies and hear
people’s grievances (Fabrichnyi, 1996, p. 40).
The most innovative self-government initiative, however, has undoubtedly been
territorial’no obshchestevennoe samoupravlenie, or simply TOS. The TOS derive from the need
to reduce government expenditures on housing by encouraging residents to assume
maintenance responsibilities themselves. Reasoning that there are few areas more likely to
elicit civic involvement than the condition of one’s neighborhood, the administration has
encouraged the formation of what are, in effect, neighborhood associations, and given
them the ability to raise funds, represent their interests before the city council, and even
sue in local courts (O vremennom . . ., 1997, pp.8-9). In the first stage, condominium or
cooperative housing owners would set up a TOS to resolve issues affecting their
neighborhoods. In the long run, however, the hope is that the TOS will form the basis
for new cooperative arrangements throughout the city, and perhaps even the basis for
new electoral districts (Korsunov, 1997, p.11).
By the end of 1998, five district TOS were in operation, including four with an average of
200 apartments, while the smaller, fifth one has only fifty apartments. Four have
registered with the city administration, while the head of the fifth feels that since he was
elected to serve the neighborhood, official registration is superfluous (Bessonov, 1998).
The TOS illustrate the administration’s willingness to extend self-government to the
most basic grass roots level. Still, some supporters fear that administration sponsorship
discourages self-reliance. Others fear that the TOS will become a mechanism for
mobilizing the electorate in favor of government candidates. By far the greatest
impediment to the development of the TOS, however, is the fact that with wage earnings
so low, few can afford to become property owners.
Civic Associations: "To unleash and stimulate people’s initiative"
With local self-government on the rise, it is not surprising to find civic associations in
Novgorod thriving as well. At the end of 1998, there were some 521 officially registered
civic organizations and many more that are active but not registered.
Before 1991, civic activism in Novgorod lagged significantly behind the rest of Russia.
From 1987, when the first neformaly received Mikhail Gorbachev’s blessing, to the end of
1991, the number of civic associations in Russia quadrupled. In Novgorod official
statistics go back only as far as 1991, and there is no evidence of significant activity by
neformaly before that time.
Since 1991, however, the rate of growth of civic organizations has slowed in Russia as a
whole, but increased dramatically in the Novgorod region. A recent survey of civic
associations in 35 regions of Russia shows that between 1991 and 1996 the total number
of civic associations increased by 63% (Alekseyeva, 1998). During the same period, the
number of civic associations in Novgorod increased 16 fold. As a result, according to
Goskomstat, Novgorod is now among the top quarter of all Russian regions in number
of clubs and cultural associations per capita (Marsh, 1998, pp.152-4). Even more
interestingly, Table 2 suggests that unlike the rest of Russia, this rate of growth has not
slowed in 1997 and 1998.
Civic associations in Novgorod fall into one of six broad categories, represented
graphically in Table 3. About two-thirds are either charities, political groups or
professional and trade associations, with the latter being the largest single category.
Robert Putnam, who has studied the successes and failures of regions in Italy, has argued
persuasively that "participation in civic organizations inculcates skills of cooperation as
well as a sense of shared responsibility for collective endeavors. Moreover, when
individuals belong to ‘cross-cutting’ groups with diverse goals and members, their
attitudes will tend to moderate as a result of group interaction and cross-cutting
pressures." (Putnam, 1993, p. 89).
Table 2*
Total Number of Associations Registered in Novgorod Region, 1991-1998
Table 3*
Comparing Italian regions to Novgorod reveals some interesting differences.For one
thing, nearly three-quarters of all civic associations in Italy are sports clubs; all other
groups have very low rates of participation. By contrast, in Novgorod sports associations
form less than 10% of the total; instead most civic associations are manifestly political or
economic in nature. Removing sports clubs from the total reveals a "high" participation
rate of one club for every 1050 inhabitants in Trentino/Alto-Adige and 2117 in Liguria at
one extreme, and a very "low" participation rate of one club for every 13,100 inhabitants
in Sardinia at the other extreme (Putnam, 1993, p. 92). Applying the same methodology
to Novgorod results in a participation rate of one club for every 1643 inhabitants, which
is quite high by Italian standards. This high level of participation is less surprising if one
views civic associations as, first and foremost, a response to the government’s failure to
cope with economic crisis, a point suggested by the steady growth of charitable
organizations shown in Table 6.
Table 6*
Major Categories of Civic Associations in the Novgorod Region, 1991-1997
Civic activism is another characteristic of Novgorod. Its impact is most visible in the
Obshchestvennaya Palata, or "Social Chamber," where representatives of registered social
organizations can participate in the review of legislation pending before the Duma and
offer their alternatives. The Social Chamber meets no less than once every 2 months and
is chaired by either the head of the regional Duma or the governor.
Such co-optation has worked well for the administration in its dealings with civic
associations. But unlike many other regions, the Novgorod administration actually seeks
the input of these groups and has consistently sought to expand contacts with them. For
example, the original decree from Moscow advocated setting up a Social Chamber
attached to the governor’s office. Prusak, however, decided that it should be attached not
only to his office, but also to the regional Duma and the entire administration, thereby
giving civic associations legal access to all levels of local government.
To encourage public involvement and debate, the law setting up the Social Chamber
stipulates that all decisions of the Chamber must be conveyed to the media, along with
any minority opinions supported by no fewer than one-fifth of those present. The
administration has also encouraged trade union participation, which has formed the basis
for subsequent legislation on "social partnership" between business, labor and
government leadership.
Yet another example of this policy of inclusion is the proliferation of "social councils for
. . . " [obshchetvennye sovety . . . pri gorodskoi/oblastnoi administratsii ] within the city and
regional administrations. Any major initiative being considered by local government is
generally put before such a council for preliminary evaluation and coordination. There
were seventeen administrative committees in the Novgorod city administration in 1996,
each handling 3-4 social councils, and each with a membership of roughly 15-20
members chosen from the city’s leading citizens. Thus, in this town of slightly more than
200,000 inhabitants, roughly a thousand are involved in one or another aspect of public
policy. Membership in such councils is an important facet of two-way contact between
the government and key social groups (Alexandrov, 1998).
These examples sum up the administration’s strategy toward independent civic
organizations. First, whenever possible co-opt potential opponents. Second, whenever
possible make politics more inclusive by expanding public participation. By encouraging
civic participation in regional decision making, the administration has built up a reservoir
of trust with local civic activists and made the region a haven of social tranquility even as
it introduces painful social and economic changes.
Why has civic engagement worked in Novgorod when it has met with such mixed
success in the rest of Russia? The answer seems to lie in the local elite’s ability to ease the
psychological tensions of change by utilizing Novgorod’s past as an alternative cultural
model. By tapping into the city’s ancient heritage as medieval mercantile republic and the
cradle of Russian democracy, the local elite has created what anthropologist Clifford
Geertz might term a new "political imaginary"— one that offers a Russian historical
reference point to the Soviet past of economic and political overcentralization. This has
resulted in an unusually high level of public confidence in local government and
increased the level of public support for far reaching economic and political reforms.
The Novgorod Model: Inventing a Democratic Cultural Tradition
While the governor’s personal charisma may account for a good part of his popularity,
they do not fully explain the region’s remarkable political and economic achievements, or
the popular support his policies have received. After all, as the example of Nizhny
Novgorod shows, there have been other charismatic governors in far more industrially
developed regions who have failed. A comment by the Archbishop Lev of Novgorod
and Staraya Russa, may shed light on the distinctive cultural environment in Novgorod.
In an interview he remarked that: "Novgorod may have been fortunate to get someone
like Prusak, but Prusak was also quite fortunate to get Novgorod." (Lev, 1999).
The Archbishop is alluding here to a factor often mentioned by both civic activists and
government officials—the region’s "intuitive feeling for history." Although the average
inhabitant of Novgorod remains unconcerned about the region’s mythical history as the
cradle of Russian democracy, for the more highly educated elite, it has been a frequent
source of inspiration. During lengthy interviews that I conducted in October and
November, 1998 with sixteen senior members of the administration and seven members
of the local intelligentsia active in civic affairs, in response to the question: "Do you
believe that Novgorod’s distinctive history plays any role in how the region has
developed politically and economically since 1991?," nine respondents responded
affirmatively and showed extensive familiarity with the history of the Novgorod
Republic, four answered no, and the remainder were neutral but skeptical. Some of the
most positive responses came from senior and mid-level regional officials.
One leading activist explains the level of civic activism by drawing an analogy to religion.
During the Soviet era period people clung to their faith even though few churches were
open for worship. Yet today, after generations of official atheism, religious sentiment is
undergoing an astonishing revival. "Political activism in Novgorod is high," he concludes,
"not because of Soviet ideals, but because of the historical ideals of the past"
(Alexandrov, 1998)
The spontaneous emergence of such a regional consensus implies the existence of a
common set of values (a regional political culture) attuned to the myth of "Lord
Novgorod-the-Great" as a democratic and trade-oriented mercantile republic that
dominated northwest Russia from the 12th to 15th centuries. The emergence of this myth
as a factor uniting the elite and helping it to forge a common agenda was made more
likely by the coincidence of several factors.
First, the collapse of the official communist party ideology and the constraints that it
imposed on the discussion of local history made it possible to discuss the significance of
Novgorod’s history for the present. Second, the blanket restoration of old street names
(an initiative promulgated by the City Soviet), the restoration of churches, including the
politically and historically significant Cathedral of St. Sophia in 1993, the revival and
official recognition granted to local holidays and festivals, all set the stage for a critical
assessment of the Soviet era and broader public acceptance of alternatives to it.
Third, to many local activists the problems facing Novgorod today seem not that
dissimilar to those it faced in the past. Then, as now, the city must expand trade to
survive, introduce local self-government, and keep a safe distance from Moscow to
preserve its freedom. As any medieval historian can attest, these are precisely the issues
that Novgorodians had to grapple with in the 12th to 15th centuries. Finally, issues of
regionalism and regional autonomy were very much in the public eye at the time, as the
shape the new federation would take under the 1993 constitution was being hotly
debated.
Given this context, it is not all that surprising that the local elite should look to the past
for solutions to their current problems. Examples abound. When the local research
center "Dialog" was given the task of developing the region’s housing reform initiatives,
one of their first efforts was a study entitled, "The Establishment of the Communal
Economy of Novgorod-the-Great, 12th -17th Centuries," with appendix and charts
comparing that period with the present (Panov and Ovcharov, 1997).
A 1996 conference on local self-government in historical perspective included
presentations from the mayor, the deputy head of the regional Duma, and leaders of local
civic associations, as well as professors. The head of the university’s history department,
Vasily F. Andreyev, another former a member of the City Soviet, even presented a paper
noting the similarities between the current Russian federal structure and that of
republican Novgorod (Andreyev, 1997, pp. 19-24). Strikingly, whenever the history
department of the local state university (named, interestingly, for Prince Yaroslav-theWise) organizes a conference dealing with public affairs, senior administration officials
are generally in attendance and present papers (Romashov, 1996 and Moiseev, 1998).
Governor Prusak himself has written poignantly on the significance of Novgorod’s past
for his administration:
Not only time, but location determines the nature of events
and dictates the logical conduct of its participants. Each of
us, upon beginning some new task, has probably been
tempted to overlook the past. This would scarcely be possible
in Novgorod, a city with its own distinctive history and
former national greatness, embodied in the monument, "One
Thousand Years of Russia."
When, after the well-known events of August 1991, a new
administration was formed in the region, it faced the age-old
question: "What is to be done?" We decided to study more
deeply the traditional capabilities of our region, to meet with
long time residents, to listen to young people, and to review
the archives. As a result, we saw very clearly that the history
of Russia did not begin in 1991 or in 1917, but far earlier.
Our generation has a unique chance and, most importantly, a
duty to restore the broken thread of time, to create a normal
way of life, and to unleash and stimulate people’s
initiative.(Prusak, 1997)
Eric Hobsbawn calls such creative use of the past "the invention of
tradition."(Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983) Anthony P. Cohen in his study of the
Newfoundland community has referred to it as "the management of myth." (Cohen,
1975) Murray Edelman, writing primarily about the United States, has written about "the
symbolic uses of politics" (Edelman, 1970) In each case, the authors point to one
constant—as governments strive for legitimacy, they promote those traditions that best
serve their needs.
Similarly, in Novgorod after 1991, we find officials encouraging those traditions that
stress self-government and openness to trade with the West. The former coincided with
the interests and aspirations of local civic activists (which the administration was
courting), while the latter could be used to promote public acceptance of massive foreign
investment. Conveniently, Novgorod’s reputation as "the cradle of Russian democracy"
and "Russia’s European gateway" has been so widely mythologized by Russian historians
and writers that these two salient features are quite familiar to the public.
But if the past were only a convenient tool for implementing whatever policies the
government wanted, it would hardly be evidence of self-sustaining democratic practices.
For this, we need evidence of new patterns of behavior and mutual accountability
developing between the government and the populace.
This is where the unintended consequences of political myths loom large. Initiatives
embraced by the local elite for very specific purposes, often wind up assuming a life of
their own. Thus, with the financial impact of Western investment now accounting for
more than half of local GDP, regional administrators find themselves forced to be more
efficient managers. The shift in the regional tax base requires on-going attention to the
improvement of legislation so that it meets the needs of investors. In other words,
dependence on investment has created a situation where just balancing the budget
requires a government that is constantly reinventing and improving itself.
Second, the impact of foreign assistance projects aimed at Novgorod, while much more
recent, has already led to a reduction in state tutelage over civic associations. At a
meeting of the non-official Social Chamber in 1998, one senior regional official
reportedly remarked that the administration had not foreseen the number of projects that
would arise in response to such funding. Since it does not have enough administrators to
deal with them all, such groups would increasingly have to fend for themselves.
(Alexandrov, 1998) Third, in addition to increasing the variety of new housing
associations, the TOS initiative has restructured the work of city government. Each
elected representative to the Novgorod City Duma now has 2-3 "social assistants"
[obshchetvennye pomoshchniki] who act as liaisons between the deputy and his district. In a
few electoral districts of the city, "social councils" have formed to tackle local problems
(Shaikovksii, 1998, p.3).
But while Novgorod has made a good start toward developing a sound government and
a sound economy, the process is still fragile, since it depends so largely on economic
conditions in the country and on political stability in Moscow. Nor can we say that
Novgorod has fully met the criteria of democratic local government. Local officials are
still too keen on bringing as much of civil society as possible in to the fold of
government. A vice-governor, for example, still sits on the editorial board of the region’s
only commercial newspaper, Novgorodskie vedomosti. Still, it is largely thanks to such
support that grass roots activism is steadily growing, and people are beginning to utilize
their institutions of local self-government.
While the preconditions for civil society to play an important role certainly exist, future
progress will require even broader public participation in local politics. This in turn
presupposes a more sharply defined sense of regional identity. To help anchor this
regional identity in people’s consciousness, local opinion makers will probably emphasize
the positive myths about Novgorod’s past even more prominently in the future, and
encourage the population to draw clear distinctions between the "Novgorod heritage" of
democracy and openness and the "Muscovite heritage" of centralization and isolation.
Recently, the governor has made this contrast a prominent part of his own political
agenda. In his book, Reform in the Provinces (Prusak, 1999) the final chapter is devoted to
addressing why the country remains so divided after nearly a fifteen years of reforms.
Clearly, he says, people are searching for some unifying national ideal that avoids the
propagandistic bombast of both Soviet ideology and western mass consumerism. His
analysis of what the country needs is a text book example of inventing a tradition to suits
current political objectives. Not surprisingly, it rings very much like a campaign platform:
"There is no need to invent artificial ideas, no need to mechanically transfer
the American dream onto Russian soil. If we refer to our own past, and we
see that in Russian history there was a city that was able to combine
democracy, free market relations and other accomplishments of civilizaiton
with national traditions. That city was Lord Novgorod-the-Great, the
capitol of a once flourishing civic republic that extended form the White
Sea to the Urals.
Academician Yanin, who has devoted his entire life to studying Novgorod’s
history, has shown conclusively that Rus’ originated here. In contrast to the
starkly centralized model that Muscovite Rus inherited from Kievan Rus
(adding its own absolutist tendencies to it), the Novgorod model was
characterized by greater openness and democracy. All major decisions were
taken by the popular assembly –the veche. It elected the its spiritual leader—
the archbishop—who was the leading figure in the city, while the prince
fulfilled the role of military commander.
The Novgorod model has shown its viability by giving the world a unique
culture, creating enormous material and spiritual wealth. But history
decreed that the nation should take another path. The eastern tradition,
represented by the principality of Vladimir-Suzdal, and later Moscow,
gained the upper hand. The Novgorod Republic was forcibly destroyed and
yet, over the course of centuries, she continued to exist in the people’s
memory. Today, this model has received a new historical chance. Our
generation can return to the principals of our ancestors, but on a new basis.
Self-government, elections, public accountability of authority, private
property, individual liberty—the very cornerstones of the Novgorod
Republic—are regaining their former significance.
On January 27, 1998 a joint session of the city and regional dumas took a
truly symbolic step. The deputies unanimously resolved to restore to
Novgorod her previous historical name—Novgorod-the-Great. In taking
this decision, the deputies not only rectified a historical injustice, but
reaffirmed their commitment to those principles by which our ancient city
lived. Without foisting our views on anyone, it seems to us that it is
precisely in these principles that one must seek the roots of that national
idea that the new Russia so desperately needs. (Prusak, 1999, pp. 94-96)
Novgorod success in forging a social consensus suggests some practical lessons for the
rest of the former Soviet Union. First, ideas and symbols matter and they can have a
direct impact on the formation of social capital. Second, with a bit of ingenuity, local
governments can be not only passive respondents to crisis, they can take the initiative in
defining common social values and priorities for the community. Third, localism is more
conducive to the development of democratic authority patterns than centralization.
The example of Novgorod, which has avoided confrontation with the center while
assuming greater responsibility for its own well being, suggests that a consensus
preserving regional distinctions within a vision of national unity is not impossible. It
remains to be seen whether such a consensus will be realized at the national level, or
remain merely the preserve of a few fortunate regions.
Conclusion:
Culture remains not only an essential factor in Russian political life, it has been made
more so by the harsh impact of economic and political transitions from socialism. The
radical change in orientations of the country’s leadership has created a profound sense of
discomfort among older generations socialized into unquestioning faith in the country’s
previous ideals. People are searching for value orientations that allow them to make sense
of the present change. This makes them particularly susceptible to the manipulation of
cultural values by both new and old elites. The cultural vision adopted by the elite is
therefore of primary importance, but it is equally important to understand that cultural
options are just as fragmented and competitive as the new political landscape of Russia.
With the regionalization of Russian politics, the rather primitive vision of "law and
order" (read: centralization) proposed by Moscow authorities can be easily countered by
regional cultural entrepreneurs seeking to launch their political careers. This applies both
to "ethnic" regions" and to homogeneously Russian ones.
Second, while the manipulation of culture often serves to reinforce the control of
traditional, Soviet elites, this is not the only possibility. At different times and for various
reasons, regional elites have expanded access and participation in political and economic
life to non-traditional groups. One of the regions that has gone furthest in this direction
is Novgorod, in no small measure because the regional elite there has rallied around a
quite well defined alternative vision of Russian political culture.
As a result, we can conclude that regional elites will be the main groups shaping the
cultural foundations of the new Russian polity. Although this suggests a large measure of
continuity with previous, Soviet-era cultural values (now wedded to ethnic, patriotic and
religious, rather than communist themes), sharp discontinuities within regions are
possible if people are presented with a sufficiently compelling cultural alternative. To
achieve broad support such a "discontinuous" alternative must give meaning to the
present by connecting it symbolically with the broader stream of history (either Russian
or that of other ethnic groups). In this regard, it is highly suggestive that an avowed
atheist like Governor Prusak nevertheless argues that the "Slavic worldview rests on
spiritual and ethical norms rooted in Eastern Orthodoxy (Prusak, 1999, p. 94)."
For the foreseeable future, until those generations that have been socialized under
communism die out, the national culture will continue to be highly fragmented. Moscow
has neither the resources nor the cultural appeal that would allow it to forge a unified
cultural vision for the country of the kind that guided Imperial or Soviet Russia. What
many observers have aptly described as the new "Time of Troubles" is therefore likely to
continue for several generations. During this period the question of what cultural values
should lie at the root of Russian self-identity (and political identity) will be hotly
contested, forcing regions to define their own cultural distinctiveness from the center,
and perhaps even to offer their own vision of a common political culture. If, out of this
competition, a new national ideal for Russia does emerge, it will most likely be because
one particular regional cultural ideal triumphs of over the rest, rather than as a result of
combining bits and pieces of several alternatives. While Moscow has many advantages in
this competition, it is no longer the sole player. In the end, culture is what the local elites
successfully make of it.
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"Sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoe polozhenie v oblasti v 1998 godu (The socio-economic
situation in the region in 1998)" from the Novgorod Regional Administration’s web site
at <http:niac.telecom.nov.ru>.
Starostenkova, Yelena, "The Economic slump is over, but growth has yet to begin,"
Finansovye izvestiya, May 14, 1998.
Timofeyeva, Ludmila, "Inostrannye proizvoditeli veryat v Rossiyu (Foreign
manufacturers believe in Russia)" Ekonomika WPS reprinted in "Novgorodskaya oblast
po soobshcheniyam pressy i informatsiannykh agentsv s 16.10.98 po 21.10.98," prepared
by the informational and analytical center of the regional administration.
Trofimov, Valery I. Inteviewed by Nicolai N. Petro, April 10, 1997.
Tyshkevich, Evgeny and Bryuzgin, Kirill, "Novgorodskaya oblast (The Novgorod
Region)," a research report prepared by the Russian Development Bank, Moscow,
February 1998.
Yanin V. L., "Na zemliakh drevnego Novgoroda: u istokov Rossiiskoi gosudarstennosti
(In the lands of ancient Novgorod: at the origins of Russian government)," Novgorod,
October 22, 1998.
Yarysh, T. N., "Svyaz’ s obshchestvennostyu: vos’midesyatye gody--nachalo dialoga
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konsultirovanie 1:40-42, 1998.
Zavidovsky Dmitry G., interviewed by Nicolai N. Petro, October 29, 1998.
Endnotes
Globalization: the international relations of Russia’s regions
By
Andrey S. Makarychev, University of Nizhniy Novgorod, Russian and
Michael J. Bradshaw, University of Birmingham, UK
INTRODUCTION
There can be little question that the processes of systemic transformation (which
includes the internationalization of the economy) and regionalization in Russia that are
the topic of this book are taking place in increasing globalised political economic
system. Events in one part of the world are quickly translated to others. Thus, the Asian
Crisis of 1997 quickly became the Russian Crisis of 1998. Together, the two crises
triggered talk of global economic recession, which, so far, has been avoided.
It is widely recognised that globalisation is a geographically uneven process.
Consequently, some cities and regions are far more prominent in the global system,
while others remain relatively untouched. The first order World Cities such as New York,
London and Tokyo are seen as key nodes in this global network. The process of
globalisation also poses a fundamental challenge to the state, national governments
now find themselves unable to fend off the speculative attacks of the global financial
system and some cities and regions now find their fortunes tied to the global system,
rather than their home economies. In such a context, it is no surprise that many of
Russia's regions have sought to create an independent identity in the global political
economy. Moscow has emerged as Russia’s node in the global system, but other cities
and regions are also seeking a place in the hierarchy. In Russia today the vertical
relationship between the global and the local, transects the relationship between centre
and periphery. Regions are seeking to develop economic and political links with the
international system to compensate for failings in the Russian federal system. Equally,
regions are seeking to shape their own international political relations with bordering
states. At the same time, foreign assistance programs and the investment strategies of
multinational corporations are seeking to bypass the federal authorities in Moscow to
deal directly with the governments in Russia’s regions.
This chapter presents a preliminary exploration of the interrelationships between the
global and the local and the centre and the regions. The chapter is divided into two
sections: the first section, by Andrey Makarychev, considers the international political
activities of Russia's regions and the second section, by Michael Bradshaw, analyses
the adoption Russia's regions by the global system. The conclusion focuses on the
relationship between globalization and the potential fragmentation of Russia.
THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF RUSSIA'S REGIONS
The contemporary world is characterized by apparently paradoxical trends. On the one
hand, the process of internationalization is underway as national governments respond
to an expanding range of international linkages, economic interdependencies and the
demands of policy issues that can no longer be managed within the framework of
individual political systems. On the other hand, there is a growing alertness on the part
of subnational interests, both governmental and non-governmental, to those same
pressures.
Underpinning these trends are two developments which both reflect and help to explain
this apparent paradox: the expanding agenda of foreign policy and the diminishing
distinctions between domestic and foreign policy. Traditional distinctions between ‘high’
and ‘low’ politics, or perhaps even ‘national’ and ‘local politics’ now appear far removed
from reality.
When subnational units establish their own cross-national links with foreign
counterparts, they represent a true departure from the traditional concept according to
which the conduct of all international relations is the exclusive domain of the central
government. The most important driving forces for economic regionalization come from
markets, from private trade and investment flows, and from the policies of individual
companies. Regionalization is therefore often conceptualized in terms of ‘complexes’,
‘networks’, ‘flows’, or ‘mosaics’. Yet patterns of regionalization do not necessarily
coincide with the borders of states. Migration, markets and social networks may lead to
increased interaction and interconnectedness tying together parts of existing states and
creating new cross-border regions. The core of such ‘transnational regionalism’ might
be economic (as in the development of industrial corridors, or networks linking major
industrial centers), or it can be built around high levels of human interaction.
At one level, therefore, the international economy is becoming increasingly integrated
whilst many individual polities are becoming more and more fragmented. Thus,
fragmentation is not a problem unique to the post-socialist world. This, in turn, is related
to another casual factor in the foreign policy localization process, namely the frequent
inability of modern governments to manage political systems and satisfy the demands
generated within them. State sovereignty is weakening. It cannot maintain its ordering of
social life across the endless play of multiple forces of fragmentation and integration.
The growing desire on the part of localities to become involved in ever-larger sectors of
public policy reflects the fact that national governments often find it impossible to serve
community interests from a single center of power. In countries where that national
government is ineffective in dealing with the concerns of subnational communities,
provincial or local governments have been asserting themselves. Witness the recent
creation Welsh and Scottish regional assemblies in the United Kingdom, a unitary state.
This process has also been supported by the creation of trade blocks such as the
European Union that provide a supranational authority that the regions can appeal to
while circumventing the national state.
At the level of non-central governments there is recognition that the needs of the locality
cannot be satisfied without greater involvement in the international system. This is
particularly true when it comes to attracting foreign investment. Here, regions within
states see themselves competing with on another to attract investment from ‘footloose’
multinational corporations. By the same token, national governments may seek to divert
some pressures by delegating their responsibilities. This may occur in specific functional
areas (encouraging local export promotion, ecology, etc.)
Several general factors are promoting the international activities of non-central
governments:
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Geographic contiguity in transborder regionalism;
Imperatives of global and regional interdependence;
Extension of national foreign policy into non-security issue-areas traditionally within the
jurisdiction of noncentral governments;
Populist resentment against big and distant national government;
Dwindling national resources available for provincial/state developmental programs;
Provincial/state/cantonal/municipal capacity to influence national foreign policy by
means of taxation, political protests, etc;
‘Me-Tooism’ (external activities as a status symbol or political patronage);
Separatism.
Many of the most pressing contemporary global problems, such as ecology, epidemics,
education, and social welfare, represent issues that remained within the competencies of
provincial governments. Here, the local and provincial authorities assumed increased
roles in the shaping of many international issues.
The combination of local domestic problems and broader international relationships can
create significant problems for foreign policy managers. There are many issues-specific
groupings, such as environmental organizations, whose strategies involve the
internationalization of the domestic and the domestication of the international. The rise
of social activism at the local level is symptomatic of a new form of politics, which is
bypassing legal and territorial definitions.
In such a context, there are two ways in which Russia's regions can interact with the
international political arena. First, they can try to influence the decision-making process
of the central state from within. Second, they can establish and develop their own
networks of transitional contacts and start to develop their own foreign policy. This
section considers both processes in turn.
Regional influences on Federal policymaking
The political decentralisation of the Russian Federation has significantly complicated the
foreign policy making process. In the Soviet system the constituent republics and
regions had no part to play in the policy-making process and regional leaders were
unlikely to question Moscow's policy direction. Now policy makers in Moscow must be
sensitive to the interests of the regions, particularly those regions that form Russia's
borders with the outside world. Increasingly foreign policy formulation involves
consultation with regional authorities. Governors are now invited to joint diplomatic visits
as official members of the Russian delegation. For example, when the then Prime
Minister Primakov attended the APEC summit in Malaysia in December 1998 the
Governor of Primorskiy Kray accompanied him. Similarly, the Governor of Sakhalin has
been part of Russian delegations visiting Japan. Regional representatives are also
gaining access to discussions between the Federal Government and international
organisations.
Regional leaders have become increasingly outspoken on matters of foreign policy that
have traditionally been the purview of official Moscow. In many cases the regions may
be in a position to assist the Federal Government. For example, the regional authorities
in Dagestan, Astrakhan and Kalmykia could help support Russia's position over the
control of the Caspian Sea's oil resources. It was to promote such cooperation that the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs set up a consultative council with the constituent parts of the
Russian Federation. Yevgeny Primakov, then Foreign Minister, promised that the
Federal Government would help the regions to develop their external relations. In 1996
he noted that the number of Russia regions with representative office abroad would
increase to 37 and stressed that the regions must play an active part in the preparation
of international agreements. Primakov particularly favoured the development of interregional ties with other CIS members.
At the same time, such interventions are not always constructive. For example,
Yevgeny Nazdratenko, the Governor of Primorskiy Kray, was openly critical of the
agreement reached between Moscow and Bejing to demarcate the Sino-Russian border
in the Russian Far East. The Foreign Ministry criticised some regions for bypassing
Russian embassies in their dealings with foreign partners. Despite these positive
developments, it is still the case that the necessary legal arrangements and procedures
to enable the incorporation of regional interests in Russian foreign policy making have
yet to be created. Regional authorities continue to make statements and take actions
that impact upon Russian foreign policy, but Moscow seems unable to include such
concerns in its policy making process. Thus, for example, there was no official reaction
to the appeal made by several governors of Central Russian regions to reconsider the
terms and conditions for the chemical weapons located on their territories on the
grounds that their implementation might adversely affect regional budgets.
The development of a legal framework to co-ordinate the international activity of
Russia's regions is still in its infancy. Part of the reason for this lies in the lack of a
coherent 'regional voice' in Moscow that might co-ordinate with government ministries.
The upper chamber of the Parliament -- the Federation Council -- is composed of the
governors and legislative leaders of the regions, but its members, loosely tied and
circumscribed by the narrow interests of their political careers, have failed to create a
forum with a strong regional voice in the Russian legislature. Similarly, the federal
government structure has spread responsibility for regional issues and regional
programmes among various ministries.
The impact of the regions upon Russia's international relations takes many different
forms, but most of them are informal and non-institutionalised. In many fields the
regions share the same problems in their dealings with the federal government, but in
many respects regions have divergent and even competing interests. The Presidential
Administration and the Federal Government have pursued a policy of 'divide and rule',
granting favours and special status to particular regions. This approach is enshrined in
the various 'power-sharing agreements' between the regional administrations and the
Federal Government. The weakness of the inter-regional associations is further
testament to the success of the Federal Government's policies. Nevertheless, the
Federal Government does have to respond to grassroots pressure from the regions. It is
noteworthy that the short-lived Primakov government sought to involve the heads of
these regional associations in policy discussion in Moscow. Very often regional
authorities lobby in favour of specific foreign economic decisions, such as control over
oil and gas export quotas and taxes or the revision of production-sharing legislation.
The struggle between regional elites over discontinuing the State's gold export
monopoly has had a strong regional dimension. One of the major proponents of the demonopolisation of this lucrative sector was the deputy governor of gold-rich Irkutsk
Oblast, who was also the deputy chairman of the Lenzoloto Company. He insisted that
the gold market be freed from state control and that Russian regional banks be allowed
to export gold. Another example is the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) which extracts 90
per cent of Russian diamonds, its interests have often collided with those of the Federal
Government over negotiations with the DeBeers diamond cartel and the division of
export revenues. In the aftermath of the economic crisis in the summer of 1998, Sakha
sought to restrict the export of gold beyond its borders. Irkutsk oblast also protested
loudly when the Kirylenko government tired to close the tax loopholes that permit tolling
operations in the non-ferrous metals industry. The regions have also challenged the
right of the Federal Government to tax their export operations. For example, the
governor of Khabarovsk Kray challenged the imposition of Federal export taxes on the
grounds that they would damage already established links with the region's foreign
partners.
Some regions have been eager to introduce their own legislation framing their external
contacts in certain areas, thus provoking a 'demonstration effect' across the country. For
example, Tula, Omsk and some other cities have imposed their own limitation upon the
operations of foreign religious missions, at a time when there was no federal legislation
governing religious freedom. These decisions were explained by declarations that many
organisations coming from abroad "are explicitly inimical to the traditional Russian
outlook, spiritual, aesthetic and cultural values". The restrictive practices of local
authorities triggered complaints from Christian charitable groups in Moscow, Roman
Catholic priests in Siberia and the Far East, Lutheran pastors in Khakassia, the
Salvation Army in St. Petersburg, the Jewish congregation in Bryansk, Pentecostals in
Yaroslavl', and Baptists in Mari El, to mention a few. These groups were expressing
their disappointment at the attempts of local officials to censor their activities, to expel
then from the region or to substantially increase the rent on their buildings. Since all of
these religious groups have direct links with foreign organisations (and receive financial
support from abroad), many officials in Western Europe and the United States protested
about the actions of the regional authorities. To a large degree, it was these regional
practices of restricting the operations of foreign religious groups that led the State Duma
and the Federal Government in 1997 to adopt new legislation, which placed restrictions
on the activities of foreign missions in Russia. Thus, initiatives, however regressive they
might be, taken at the regional level prompted a change in national legislation.
The issue of troop withdrawal was another area where international agreements have
fed into regional problems. Troops evacuated from the Central Europe and the 'Near
Abroad' have placed an additional burden upon the regional authorities in the regions
where they have 'returned'. The regional response to this additional burden has
complicated Russia's ability to carry out its international obligations. The capacity of the
regions to accommodate the troops pulled out from abroad directly influenced the
schedule of evacuation and, thus, Russia's relations with neighbouring countries. Under
the present economic realities, the regional authorities have protested the additional
burdens placed upon them as a consequence of troop stationing, military exercise,
logistics, food supply and border regime maintenance. These burdens have been
exacerbated by the inability of the Federal Government to finance the operations of its
armed forces. Thus, federal activities have contributed to the non-payments problems in
many regions. Since the degree of regional leaders' support now has a clear bearing
upon the state's defence capacity, they are now consulted on a wide range of military
issues. The Pskov region, which borders Latvia, Estonia and Belarus, is considered by
the federal ministries as a test case for resolving major border security problems. The
mobilisation of local resources is seen as important part of the strategy for dealing with
the new border realities. For example, most contractors serving as border guards are
recruited locally. Thus, the reconfiguration of Russia's external borders has created a
new opportunity for cooperation, and conflict, between the federal centre and the
constituent regions of Russia.
Foreign policymaking in Russia's regions
The second form in which regions participate in international affairs is through the
creation of their own 'paradiplomatic' contacts with foreign partners, skirting the
regulations of the central authorities. On the one hand, these communications might
take the rather benign shape of transborder cooperation between neighbouring
territories, sister relations between cities and municipalities, cooperation between NGOs
within the framework of 'people's diplomacy' or 'global microdiplomacy' concepts. On the
other hand, the regional state might promote its own foreign policy independent of
Moscow. The latter is potentially far more damaging to the central state, especially
when regional policy contradicts and undermines central policy.
The Federal authorities have little choice but to recognize the leading role of Moscow
(the city) in such issues as investments, foreign contracts in banking and financial
spheres. However, Russian MID and other federal ministries disapprovingly observe the
number of new foreign initiatives of the Moscow mayor. He openly obstructed the treaty
between Russia and Ukraine in the Federation Council. The Moscow municipality is
eager to serve as a chief organizer of the Russian pilgrimage to the Holy Land in the
Year 2000, which might give big profits to Moscow-based tourist agencies. Yuri Luzhkov
was successful in obtaining the confirmation from the Israeli government to be its chief
Russian partner, despite the protests of other Russian mayors. According to a Russian
diplomat, contacts between Moscow and Jerusalem reflect bilateral relations between
two capitals, however, Russia does not recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.
Certain public pronouncements by Alexander Lebed, Governor of Krasnoyarsk kray,
have also challenged the federal authorities. In 1998 he threatened to subordinate to
the kray authorities (i.e. to himself) nuclear forces located near Krasnoyarsk unless the
Ministry of Defense reimbursed all its debts to the military in the regions. Several
months later he refused to keep fulfilling previous arrangements with Ukraine according
to which the Krasnoyarsk Enterprise for Mining Chemistry was reprocessing nuclear
waste from Ukraine. Lebed insisted on increasing the payment received for that
operation threefold, thus provoking sharp reaction from Kiev.
The Federal Security Service (FSB) also pays attention to the international activities of
Russian regions. For example, A.Antipov, Chairman of the FSB Board in Tyumen
oblast, has claimed that foreign companies were actively looking for access to classified
information, including the commercial data related to geology, geophysics. Similar
accusations have been made in Sakhalin oblast in relation to foreign interest in the
offshore oil and gas projects.
Notwithstanding the activities of the Federal Government, many regions in Russia have
adopted their own measures to gain access to foreign markets or to restore direct
contacts interrupted by the collapse of the USSR. The latter have been particularly
important in terms of relations with the former Soviet Republics, the so-called 'Near
Abroad' and the CMEA. At the same time, many regions have been disappointed by the
effectiveness of Russia's trade missions abroad and have looked for ways to promote
their own identity on the international stage. Among the most active regions, in terms of
agreements signed with foreign partners, are Bashkortostan which has signed treaties
with the Province of Bergamo, Kustanay Oblast in Kazakhstan, the Republic of
Kyrgyzstan, the Crimean Republic, Turkey, the Latvian Ministry of Economics, as well
as individual firms from Germany and France; Tatarstan which has opened missions in
Australia, Ukraine, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, Mordova has
established a mission in Syria; Nizhny Novgorod has a number of pilot projects with
international organisations, as does Novgorod. In the Russian Far East, the Republic of
Sakha (Yakutia) has a trade mission in Tokyo, while Sakhalin Oblast has signed various
agreements with the State of Alaska and the Japanese Prefecture of Hokkaido.
Sakhalin has trade offices in Seattle and is considering opening a mission in
Anchorage.
Regional authorities are anxious not to miss a single opportunity to advertise their
regions as dynamic and open entities. Many regional authorities have their own internet
sites, which advertise the opportunities available to foreign. Novogord region led by the
dynamic governor Mikhail Prussak, has won a number of international tenders which
have allowed the region top procure finances for housing and public transportation.
Effective the tax policies and positive attitude of Novgorod Oblast have attracted large-
scale foreign investors. For example, Novgorod provides investors in the productive
sphere with a tax holiday until they achieve full return on their capital investment. The
UK Confectionery Company Cadbury is said to have chosen a location in Novgorod
Oblast from a list of 100 potential sites in Russia. Novgorod was chose because of the
positive attitude of the regional administrators towards foreign investors. However, the
plant is actually located in the city of Chudovo and its strategic location on the railway
between Moscow and St. Petersburg was also a key factor.
In addition to trying to market themselves to potential foreign investors, some regions
have managed to borrow from abroad. Three issued Eurobonds in 1997 (Moscow, St.
Petersburg and Nizhniy Novgorod) and another 10 had planned to follow suit; however,
these plans fell foul of the Federal Government and have been postponed indefinitely by
the financial crisis of August 1998. In a situation where the Federal Government cannot
service its debt, regional authorities are unlikely to be able to borrow in their own right
for the simple reason that such loans require a sovereign guarantee from the central
state. Thus, the financial problems of the central state have constrained to abilities of
the regions to raise capital. Furthermore, many of the regions that have resorted to
external borrowing now find themselves unable to service their debts following the
devaluation of the rouble. This is unfortunate as it likely penalises the most progressive
regions. As economist Alexei Uliukaev puts it: "the higher the degree of liberal reform
implemented in a region (less administrative interference in business matters, less
bureaucratic regulation, more successful privatisation, no attempts to control prices or
redistribute income), the better the local investment climate. However, as we shall see
in the second section of this paper, the geographical distribution of foreign investment is
no measure of regional attitudes to market reform, access to natural resources and
geographical location are also a key factors in attracting investment.
The special case of border regions
Trans-border cooperation is treated by the Council of Europe Convention of 1980 as
any joint activity undertaken in order to enforce neighbor contacts between communities
and territorial authorities of two or more parties. Trans-border cooperation is restricted
by the prerogatives of local communities and territorial units as defined by domestic
laws.
From a theoretical perspective, a ‘trans-border region’ is a territory which crosses at
least one state border, and which contains at least two social-economical spaces of
polycentric organization. In a narrow sense, trans-border cooperation implies mutually
fruitful linkages between immediate neighbors; in a wider sense, this notion might be
used for describing a relationship between two subjects with no common border (which
is synonymous to ‘inter-regional’ cooperation). Near-border and inter-regional
cooperation are widely viewed in Europe as first the steps towards further integration at
the continental scale.
Yet border regions might be divided into two broad categories. In the first we have
borders that perform the role of frontier guards or barriers that defend Russia's military,
economic and political security. The second type might be described as 'open border'
regions, where the function of contact with foreign territories, and not that of separation
from them, is predominant. Hence, there is the possibility of two different versions of
border: exclusive and inclusive. In the context of Post-Soviet Russia, some regions that
were garrison frontiers in the Soviet period have now become more open and are
promoting cross-border cooperation and openness. At the same time, many regions that
were not external borders in the Soviet period have now become international points of
contact between the post-Soviet republics. For these regions their role as a border
region is new. In addition, because they were not borders during the Soviet period they
have not inherited the paraphernalia associated by neither border regions nor the
strategic or psychological baggage of having been a garrison.
An exclusive border "marks the limit of the milieu, the beginning of an alien area, often
conceived as strange and full of perils" which often results in practical conflicts over the
delineation of land claimed by two parties. This is the case in regions bordering with
Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Baltic States where the border region assumes the role of
'Russian outpost'. Not all of these regions have adjusted smoothly to this new task.
Mobilization of local resources is of growing importance for sustaining international
obligations and responsibilities of the federation. Lack of a fully-fledged border
infrastructure has made many of these regions a paradise for smuggling operations and
the movement of illegal immigrants. This has become a matter of paramount concern
for the Russian security services. It is symptomatic that institutions like Security
Councils have been established in the majority of Russia's borders regions in the past
two or three years. In the absence of adequate financial and material support from
Moscow, Regional Administrations are often left to find their own solutions to problems
of illegal immigration, fortification of borders, customs regulations and anti-crime
measures. Thus, being a border region may bestow additional costs and
responsibilities.
Historically, the Cossacks played a major role in securing and patrolling Russia's
borders. Today, the Russian Government and Regional Administrations have again
turned to the Cossacks for additional forces to secure border regions. For example, in
the Russian Far East, the Primorskiy Kray administration has encouraged Cossacks to
settle in the border region with China. Liberals fear that the regional Cossack regiments
could become out of control and form alliances with nationalist forces. The Russian
Human Rights activist Sergey Kovaliov has publicly accused the administration of
Krasnodar Kray of privileging Cossacks and discriminating against major migrant
groups coming from the Caucasus, the Fergana Valley and Tashkent.
One of the most striking examples of regional interference in Russia's foreign policy is
the stand taken by Primorskiy Kray with regard to China. At the heart of their concern is
the demographic imbalance between the bordering provinces of China and the Russian
Far East, "while the Russian Far East is populated by about 8 million people, the three
north-eastern provinces of China alone have a population of 92 million". Furthermore,
the Governor of Primorskiy Kray Evgeny Nazdratenko has refused to recognise the
agreement reached between Russia and China with regard to the delineation of a
common border. The sticking point is a protracted dispute over islands in the Argun and
Amur rivers and some other segments totalling 21 kilometres. The Governor has
repeatedly declared that territorial concessions to China will inevitably damage the
Russian ports and dislodge Russia from the Far East. Since Nazdratenko's appeals on
this subject have significantly complicated bilateral relations, President Yeltsin has
instructed him to coordinate all future public pronouncements with the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. However, Nazdratenko was in no hurry to obey. The so-called 'Maritime
Party', created under his patronage, began a campaign aimed at collecting signatures to
support of referendum to reverse the transfer of territory to China. One observer has
described Nazdratenko as "a populist whose idea of politics is to demand money with
menaces to the federal government".
Despite the actions of Nazdratenko, it would be misleading to reduce the problems of
the Russian Far East to the personality of a single governor. The position of the Russian
Far East and the role of its regions have raised considerable controversy. From one
side, the Russian Far East gravitates toward the Asia-Pacific region where APEC (of
which Russia is now a member) promotes the virtues of 'open regionalism'. For the
Russian Far East, increased trade with its neighbours is seen as a means of addressing
the regions most pressing economic problems. In fact, cross border trade with China
has helped to alleviate the shortage of goods in the Russian Far East following the
break-up of the USSR. In the longer run, it is hoped that the Tumen River project can
serve to develop the border region between Russia, China and North Korea. However,
in both cases, border trade and the Tumen River, the xenophobic fears of Primorskiy
Kray have undermined cooperation. Starting in 1994, the Russian Government stopped
its 'open border' policy with China and introduced visa and border controls. The result
was a substantial decline in cross border trade. Both ‘Asian Financial Crisis’ and the
‘Russian Financial Crisis’ have hit the region hard. Depressed markets in Asia have
reduced demand for the Far East’s exports, while the devaluation of the rouble has
reducing the region’s purchasing power.
A good illustration of ‘tug-of-war’ between the federal and regional authorities is the
debate over the subordination of major Russian ports. Regional authorities in
Novorossiysk, Magadan, Makhachkala and some other port cities are claiming to have
full financial control over their operations. Should the ambitions of the local leaders be
implemented, the federal center would certainly lose the control over sea export,
including oil.
Bordering territories, especially those adjacent to Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine,
Belarus, Finland and Norway) may also frequently play the role of 'contact regions', as
opposed to the 'border barriers' discussed above. The larger the territory of a state, the
greater the chance that regions having at their disposal direct entry to foreign states find
themselves within that state's 'gravitational field'. It may even be the case that these
contact regions develop external links at the expense of contacts with their own centre.
Thus, the Federal Programme for the development of the Russian Far East and
Transbaykal talks of the 'distancing' of the region from European Russia. This
distancing results in the regions of the Far East forming trade with relations their foreign
neighbours to replace linkages that are no longer feasible under the current economic
conditions in Russia. Thus, for example, Magadan and Kamchatka have used funds
provided by the Federal Government to purchase fuel and food from the United States.
Following the August 1998 financial crisis Moscow was unable to provide the Far North
with the funds to purchase supplies, this resulted in hardship and increased reliance
upon foreign humanitarian aid.
The nature and specificity of border problems varies from region to region. Thus, it is a
part of the practice of interstate relations between Russia and former USSR republics
(including Baltic countries, Belarus and Ukraine) to hold working meeting of customs
officers in bordering cities where the training centers are located.
Officials from Leningrad oblast are permanent participants of the Russian-Estonian
Commision on Trade and Cooperation. The key issues related to the interests of
Leningrad oblast are:
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the hydroelectric station in Narva. The problem is that in the Narva water reservoir, the
state border is drawn on the middle of the dam, which makes its technical maintenance
from the Russian side complicated due to visa regulations;
water supply of Ivangorod. The Estonian side requires quick reimbursement of the
existing financial debts;
bituminous shale processing from Leningrad oblast in Estonia, under the conditions of
barter exchanges.
In the Barents Sea and Baltic regions one can observe the emergence of subregional
structures, sometimes called ‘euroregions’. Thus, Karelia and adjacent communes of
Eastern Finland are discussing the perspectives of forming a new ‘euroregion’, a
concept that is compatible with the formation of Free Economic zone in Kostomuksha.
The idea of such a ‘euroregion’ includes pipeline construction from Karelia to Finland
and further eventually to Sweden, collaboration in forestry, hotel building,
communication, etc. Of course, many problems remain, including budgetary and legal
procedures. There is evident interest on the part of the Scandinavian countries to
develop transborder relations. For instance, the Norwegian Ministry of Justice has
decided to provide legal status to the Russian small vendors doing their business in
Norway. The Governor of Murmansk oblast is advocating the idea of creating a
transnational institution to bring together all subnational territories adjacent to the North
Sea. This initiative was presented to Goskomsever (which is now part of the RF Ministry
of Regional Policy), the Russian governmental agency in charge of the northern
territories.
Another example would be the inclusion of the European North in the 'Barents EuroArctic region'. Here the Russian regions of Murmansk, Arkhangelsk and the Karelia
participate in the Barents Euro-Arctic initiative alongside neighbouring provinces in
Norway, Sweden and Finland. As part of this initiative, Finnish authorities have
promoted trans-border cooperation between Lappenranta - Vyborg and Imarta Svetlogorsk. Joenniemmi suggests that Finland has a clear interest in fostering
cooperation with Karelia as an alternative to staking territorial claims on the border
regions. For Joenniemmi, border transparency is a special importance to those citizens
of Finland whose ancestors used to live in Karelia. One can contrast this transparency
with the current situation in the Russian Far East where Japanese citizens have
ancestors buried on the disputed Kurile Islands. In the past they have been allowed to
visit these ancestral graves; however, Japanese citizens do not have easy access to the
islands. Despite the improvement in Russian-Japanese relations, no resolution of the
dispute seems imminent and the Governor of Sakhalin has spoken against any
agreement that is reached without regional approval. Also in the Russian Far East, the
Tumen River project can be seen as an equivalent of the Euroregion concept, with the
major distinction that none of the participants is willing or able to finance the scheme.
There would seem to the potential to extend the Euroregion concept to the border
regions of the CIS. For example, the Belgorod - Kharkov - Lugansk - Kuban' - Crimea Rostov - Donbass axis has been mentioned as a potential pioneer of post-Soviet
transborder cooperation. However, such a scheme has its problems. For the Russian
side it presents both political and economic problems, the Russian border regions are
economically depressed and form part of the so-called 'Red Belt' which is dominated by
Communist leaders. For the Ukraine the scheme has to potential to pull the ethnically
Russian border regions towards Russia and may stir up the irrendentist claims of
Russian nationalists towards the Crimea. It is probably the case that neither the border
regions nor the central states involved are sufficiently stable to promote such
cooperation at present.
Clearly the disintegration of the Soviet Union has strongly affected the state of regional
affairs within the Russian Federation. Previously, out of the 11 economic regions of
Russia, only 6 had an outlet to state borders or the ocean. At present only the VolgaVyatka region lacks such an outlet. Before 1991, 29 territorial units in Russia were
border areas; today there are 46 such border areas. As Alexander Granberg, adviser to
the Russian President, put it: "these changes gave rise to new problems of production
specialisation, the structure of goods turnover, protection of the local markets of
neighbouring states, population migration, relocation of armed forces, creation of new
jobs and accelerated development of the social infrastructure. By virtue of their
unpreparedness they lie as an additional heavy burden on the regional authorities". It
may be the case that there are substantial differences between those border regions
that served such a function during the Soviet period and those have been made border
regions by the break up of the Soviet Union. On the one hand, the old Soviet border
regions now bear the burden of a heavy military-industrial presence and a tradition as
'exclusive' frontier region. This is certainly true of the Far East, but less so of Karelia.
One the other hand, for the new created border regions the concerns are more
economic than strategic, here problems stem from the break up of old linkages and the
imposition of barriers between regions that were previously part of a single economic
space. For such regions the priority may to promote a more open and 'inclusive' border
regime.
Ethnicity and internationalisation
Today in Russia's regions many initiatives to promote transnational regionalism are
promoted by strong ethnic and cultural traditions. The collapse of the Soviet Union has
allowed non-Russian ethnic groups to join international networks. Thus, the Republics
of Bashkortostan, Mary El and Mordova are playing an important role in the World
Council of Finno-Urgian Peoples. In Tatarstan, the city of Ufa has been selected as
home for the International Organisation of Turkic Youth. Since the Tatar diaspora is
concentrated in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, it is conceivable that the Kazan
government has a special interest in developing closer links with those two countries. In
the Far East, the President of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) Mikhail Nikolaev is
publicly developing ideas aimed at bringing together peoples belonging to the 'northern
circumpolar civilisation'. Elsewhere in the Russian North the indigenous peoples
(referred to in Russia as the small peoples of the north) are developing international ties
with other northern peoples. At the same time, international organisations such as
Survival International are taking an interest in the plight of the peoples of the Russian
North.
In 1994-95 some of the Republics within the Russian Federation (Tatarstan,
Bashkortostan and Kabardino-Balkaria) signed bilateral treaties with the Republic of
Abkhazia which was then struggling to separate from Georgia. At that time the Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed its 'regret' about the encroachment upon its
prerogative by constituent parts of the Federation, since the actions of those republics
contradicted the commitments made by the Russian Federal Government in the
Russian-Georgian Friendship Treaty signed in 1994. However, it is increasingly the
case that Russia's foreign policy makers have to take into account the political attitudes
of the different minorities that reside within the Federation. Thus, for example, it is
inconceivable to develop a strategy of countering Islamic fundamentalism in the
southern borders of Russia without taking into account the religious feelings that
dominate in Tatarstan or Bashkortostan. For example, it is an important factor that after
the outbreak of war in Chechnya, the President of Tatarstan distanced himself from all
radical versions of Islamic fundamentalism, including those of foreign origin. At the
same time, Tatarstan has demanded that it is recognised as a 'subject of international
relations', a status denied it by Moscow. Nevertheless, in matters to do with the Middle
East, such as Iraq, it may suit Moscow to play the Islamic card.
Given its potential to break up the Russian Federation, it is very important to examine
how ethnic problems are tackled at the regional level. For example, Orenburg oblast,
has 1,800 km of borders shared with Kazakhstan, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. In
1992, the President of Bashkortostan Murtaza Rakhimov declared that his republic
would never be resigned to the fact that 38 kilometres of the territory of Orenburg that
separate his republic from Kazakhstan. Implying that Bashkortostan would not be
satisfied until it has a common border with Kazakhstan. Elsewhere, 'divided peoples'
could become an important factor shaping transborder regimes, for instance, Lezgins
reside on both sides of the Russian-Azeri border.
The problems of irredentism, nationalism and territorial conflict that now abound in the
former Soviet Union are symptomatic of the break up of empire. The post-colonial
history of Africa is replete with examples of conflict resulting from the inheritance of
colonial boundaries that paid little regard to the pre-colonial ethnic landscape. Now, in
the former Soviet Union and within the Russian Federation, those same stresses are
appearing. It may be that increased interaction between the regions and the outside
world can help diffuse tensions created by the heavy hand of the dominant ethnic
groups and the central state. At the same time, it is likely that the central state will see
the international activities of the regions as a threat to its integrity. Thus, the
international activities of the regions create a tension between the axes of global-local
relations and centre-regional relations. So far this analysis has considered how the
regions themselves have sought to influence the policies of the central state and how,
by their own actions, they have sought to establish new linkages with the international
system. The second section considers the action of the international community in
terms of the regional patterns of foreign investment in Russia and the regional
dimensions of multi-lateral and bi-lateral technical assistance programmes.
GLOBAL ACTORS IN RUSSIA'S REGIONS
This section considers the ways in which various global actors have adopted Russia's
regions. Three sets of actors are considered. First, private international actors,
principally, multinational corporations that have invested in the Russian economy and
whose investment decisions generate a geography of foreign investment activity.
Second, the programmes of foreign state organisations, such as the US American
Business Centres, whose role it is to promote the foreign policy goals and commercial
interests of their state. Third, the programmes of multilateral international organisation,
such as the European Union's Technical Assistance for the CIS (TACIS) programme
and the EBRD's regional venture capital funds, which are targeted at particular regions.
Before examining the activities of these three groups of actors, the next sub-section
consider the 'regional risk ratings' that have been produced in the last year or so. These
ratings aim to identify those that are most likely to attract the attention of global actors.
In trying to explain the geography of 'globalisation' across Russia, the ratings can be
compared to the actions of the global players. In sum, this section seeks to identify
those regions in Russia, which are being coming integrated into global political and
economic networks.
Rating Russia's Regions
Given that the Russian Federation is comprised of 89 federal subjects, each with its
own resource endowment, demographic and ethnic structure and political culture, it is
no surprise that there have been a number of attempts to assess the relative merits of
the regions from the viewpoint of the would-be investor. During the Soviet period when
the Ministry of Foreign Trade exercised a monopoly over foreign economic relations,
and when foreign companies were not permitted to invest in Soviet enterprises, the first,
and last, port of call for the foreign business representative was the relevant Foreign
Trade Organisation in Moscow. In contemporary Russia it has become somewhat of a
cliché to state that it is necessary to go 'beyond Moscow'. However, it is now the case
that foreign businesses need to engage directly with potential Russian partners and that
they need to pay as much attention to the administrative structures in the regions as
they do do to Moscow. Not surprisingly, foreign companies often find themselves 'piggy
in the middle", caught between the demands and rules and regulations of the Central
Government and the Regional Administration. For large-scale resource development
projects, failure to gain the support of the Regional Administration can effectively stop
the investment process. Therefore, when first approaching Russia, it is advantageous to
gain some sense of the relative political and economic standing of the various regions
and their attitudes to economic reform and foreign investment.
The information presented in Table 1 summarises the finding of five regional-ranking
exercises. All of the analyses presented here have used statistical material for 1995 and
1996; therefore their finding should be comparable. However, each survey employs a
different methodology and some have a quite specific intent. In addition, some, like the
Troika Dialog, are modest exercises focusing on the top ten regions; while others, like
the Ekspert Institute and Bank Austria analysis, are substantial undertakings generating
a large amount of data and lengthy publications. The CS-First Boston analysis is more
specialised, focusing upon the credit worthiness of the regions. Both the Bank Austria
and Ekspert Magazine analyses are repeat exercises. The Bank Austria sponsored
ratings were first calculated in 1995, while for the last three years Ekspert Magazine has
published a set of regional ratings. There is not the time, nor the need, to delve into the
details of the methodologies employed in each analysis. Unfortunately, some of the
analyses say very little about the methodologies employed or the date used. They all
create a composite index using a number of dimensions of 'risk'. For example, the Bank
Austria study creates indices for five sub-groups: natural environment, ecological
situation and related risk; political environment and related risk; social environment and
related risk; risk associated with the economic environment; and the experience of
foreign and joint enterprises. Each of these sub-groups uses a number of indicators to
arrive at an overall index for that risk. The five indexes are then standardised to produce
a general risk rating. In some of the analyses differential weighting is given to certain
sub-groups. For example, the CS-First Boston analysis gives the fiscal sub-group a 40
percent weighting and the economic and political sub-groups 30 per cent each. In
constructing each index, it is necessary to decide which direction is 'good' and which is
'bad'. This can be a complicated matter. For example, is a high level of unemployment a
good or a bad thing? In a Western economy it is usually considered a bad thing,
depressing a region's standard of living and causing social unrest. The same is true in
Russia today; however, one could see high unemployment a good thing if it is an
indication that economic restructuring is taking place within a region. Similarly, low cost
of living and low inflation are normally considered good; in Russia they might be
considered bad because they might indicate the use of local price controls and
subsidies. Thus, the process of choosing indicators and deciding how to interpret them
is directly informed by how one interprets the transition process in Russia.
Consequently, each set of ratings should be treated with caution and, despite the fact
that they use the same data, they are not directly comparable. Those that generate a
numerical index, do so in a different way, some rate regions relative to the national
average, others relative to Moscow.
Having said that the various ratings are not comparable, they do generate a very similar
set of top ten regions. This is likely because they make similar judgements as to what is
good and bad. If they place particular emphasis on economic indicators they are likely
to be using the similar data sets. Similarly, if they use electoral data to assess political
risk, be it at federal or regional level, they will, again, be using the same data sets. A
comparison of the results of the five analyses reveals that four regions appear in all of
the top tens - - Moscow City, Tyumen, Samara and Sverdlovsk -- and four regions
appear in four out of five -- St Petersburg, Nizhniy Novgorod, Krasnoyarsk and Irkutsk.
A simple computation of the average placing of all the regions in Table 1 produces a
aggregate top five of: Moscow City, Tyumen, St Petersburg, Moscow Oblast and
Samara. The results of these analyses tell us as much about the data and criteria
employed as they do about the 'top' regions. It is no surprise that Moscow City is a clear
winner and that St Petersburg and Moscow Oblast are in the top five. The position of
Tyumen (which in some analyses includes Khanty-Mansy) is explained by its
dominance of oil and gas production. In fact, these analyses show a strong bias towards
resource-producing regions -- Khanty-Mansy, Krasnoyarsk, Kemerovo and Irkutsk. This
is because they have tended to vote pro-Yeltsin, they have faired between in economic
terms and, as we shall see below, are the regions most involved in foreign trade and
investment. The remaining regions one might consider major industrial centres and
potential 'hubs', namely Samara in the Volga, Nizhny Novgorod in the Volga-Vyatka
(potentially in competition with Samara), Chelyabinsk (in the Southern Urals) and
Sverdlovsk (in the northern Urals). Tatarstan and Bashkortostan are hybrid regions
being both resource producers and industrial centres; but they are also among the most
independently minded Republics in the Federation. Perm seems somewhat of an outlier
here, but it has resources and a substantial industrial base. What is perhaps more
interesting is the regions that are not here, most obviously Novgorod. Also missing are
the southern and eastern gateways of Krasnodar and Primorskiy Krays. Before
considering these omissions, it is necessary to consider which regions have succeeded
in attracting foreign investment.
Investing in Russia's Regions
The internationalisation of the domestic economy is a critical component in the reform
programme of any transition economy. In Russia the 'opening-up' of the economy
predates the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1987, as part of the programme of
perestroyka, foreign companies were able to form joint ventures with Soviet enterprises.
The liberalisation of the foreign trade and investment process gained momentum in the
early 1990s and today there are a variety of ways a foreign company may operate in the
Russian economy. First, a company may create a joint venture with a Russian
enterprise -- this provides certain tax benefits and the advantage of local knowledge,
however, it may also mean a loss of control of the business to the Russian partner.
Second, a foreign company may create a 100% owned foreign subsidiary -- this has the
advantage of retaining control, but at the cost of local knowledge and identity. Thirdly, a
foreign company or individual may buy shares in quoted Russian companies -- unless
the foreign company has a substantial holding they are unlikely to be able to influence
the management of the company. In addition there have been instances where Russian
companies have refused to recognise the foreign ownership of shares, or they have
issued additional shares to reduce the level of foreign control. More recently there has
been a fourth route into the Russian economy, that is through the purchase of state and
municipal bonds. The Federal Government has used bond issues (so-called GKOs) to
fund its deficit and, as noted above, some regions in Russia have issued Eurobonds.
However, in August 1998 the Russia government defaulted on its GKOs and it still
remains unclear how it will meet its medium- and long-term loan obligations. The
following analysis focuses on two components of the flow of foreign capital into Russia's
regions, foreign direct investment (FDI) and and the activity of joint ventures and socalled enterprises with foreign involvement (EFIs).
Before examining the regional distribution of foreign investment in Russia, it is
necessary to put the scale of investment in an international context. According to a
study by staff from the EBRD, the cumulative FDI inflow into Russia between 1989 and
1996 was US $ 5. 8 billion, 46.8 percent of the total FDI inflow into the CIS during that
period, but only 13.3 percent of the total inflow into the 25 transition economies of
Eastern Europe, the Baltic States and the Commonwealth of Independent States. On a
country-by-country basis, Russia ranked third behind Hungary (US $ 13.3 billion) and
the Czech Republic (US $ 7.1 billion). On the basis of per capita total FDI inflow, Russia
ranked 16th with $ 40 per capita. In short, Russia has massively under performed when
it comes to attracting foreign investment. Given the size of its domestic economy, its
resource wealth and the size of the domestic economy, it should have attracted
substantially more foreign capital. In 1997 the Economy Ministry stated that Russia
needed to attract $ 10-12 billion in foreign investment a year to achieve economic
growth and assist serious economic restructuring. By the end of 1998 total accumulated
FDI amounted to $ 13.7 billion. Therefore, when discussing the role of foreign
investment in the Russian economy one must be conscious of its modest proportions.
There are, however, at least two reasons to suppose that the impact of foreign capital
might be greater than it might first seem. First, in an environment of a total collapse in
domestic investment, foreign capital is often the only source of 'new'. Second, if that
foreign investment is concentrated in particular economic sectors and regions, its
impact on those regions may be much greater than its impact upon the national
economy (see Map 1).
As Figure 1 shows, the mid-1990s saw a steady increase in the volume of foreign
investment in Russia; however, the majority of that increase was due to the finance of
state debt (classified as other). Foreign direct investment did not grow very quickly and
portfolio investment remained modest. During 1998 the level of FDI and portfolio
investment actually fell compared to the previous year. Anecdotal evidence for early
1999 suggests that investment is already substantially lower than 1998. In fact most
observers suggest that substantial foreign investment in Russia is unlikely until after the
2000 presidential campaign. Examination of the sectoral distribution of foreign
investment shows that of the US $ 6.5 billion invested in Russia in 1996, 33 percent
went to industry (11.5 percent to the food industry), 29.6 per cent went to financial
services (finance, credit, insurance and pensions) and 23.6 percent went to other
market-related commercial activities (such as retail activity). Data for 1998 show that the
fuel industry was the major recipient of foreign investment, followed by the food, trade
and consumer goods sectors. The geographical origins of foreign direct investment in
1998 are shown in Figure 2. The most important investors are the US, the Netherlands,
Cyprus, Germany, the UK and Finland. The presence of Cyprus and Switzerland
suggest the return of Russian flight capital. What is also noteworthy is the absence of
Japan the world's largest source of foreign investment.
Which regions have been the major recipients of foreign investment activity? Whatever
measure one looks at, the most striking feature of the geography of foreign investment
is the dominance of Moscow City. In 1997, Moscow City accounted for 67.4 percent of
total foreign investment in Russia, 78.4 percent of FDI, 85.9 percent of portfolio and 60
percent of 'other' forms of investment (see Table 2). However, its relative prominence
declined dramatically during 1998. In 1998 it also accounted for 51 percent of the joint
ventures operational in Russia and in 1998 56.4 percent of EFIs (see Table 3). A certain
amount of this dominance may be due to reporting bias, in other words investment
bound for elsewhere in Russia is registered in a firm's Moscow head office,
nevertheless, even the most casual observer can not help but be struck by the rapid
internationalisation of the Moscow economy. Until August 1998 this was seen as a
distinct advantage, now it may seen as Moscow's Achilles' heel. In the aftermath of the
August crisis, a number of foreign companies have downsized their Moscow offices, but
the city seems to have weathered the crisis.
Tables 2 and 3 present the 'top-ten' ranking regions for the period 1995 through 1997 in
terms of FDI and the number of operating joint ventures. Both show a high degree of
concentration with St Petersburg and Moscow oblast in competition for second place.
The regions listed on these tables show a strong bias towards port/gateway regions and
resource producing regions. This pattern is also illustrated on Map 1, which shows the
regional distribution of cumulative FDI on a per capita basis. The gateway/port regions
include St Petersburg in the northwest, Krasnodar, Rostov and Stavropol in the south
and Khabarovsk and Primorskiy in the east. The resource regions are divided between
the oil and gas regions such as Tyumen (and Khanty-Mansy) and Sakhalin, metalprocessing and mining centres such as Irkutsk and Magadan. Given the resourceorientation of Russian exports (in 1998 energy and metals accounted for 55.8 percent of
Russian exports, these resource regions are also those regions most likely to be
involved in foreign trade. Goskomstat data for 1997, based on customs information,
show that Moscow accounted for 25.2 per cent of Russia exports to non-CIS states,
followed by: Tyumen (14.5 percent), Krasnoyarsk (4.9 percent), Sverdlovsk (3.5
percent) and Irkutsk (3.1). In total, the top ten regions accounted for 64 per cent of
Russia’s exports and all, with the exception of Moscow, Samara and St Petersburg,
were resource-producing regions. There is also another group of regions attracting
investment, represented by regions like Samara, Sverdlovsk and Nizhniy Novgorod, that
are the hubs of large manufacturing regions aimed at serving the domestic market.
Thus, we see regional expressions of both export-oriented growth and importsubstituting activity.
The information presented in Table 4 tells us something about the activities of joint
ventures in 1997. The column entitled workers ranks regions by the average size of the
workforce in joint ventures in that region. The dominance of Moscow and the second
play of St Petersburg are confirmed. However, the resource-orientation of joint venture
activity is clear. This table also highlights the role of the exclave of Kaliningrad as an
entrepot into the Russia economy. Thus, geographical location appears to be a key
factor in determining the level of internationalisation across Russia's regions.
Supporting Russia's Regions
This final section considers the assistance programmes of foreign governments of
multilateral organisations that are targeted at Russia's regions. This analysis makes no
claim to be exhaustive and it must be recognised that all forms of assistance, either
directly or indirectly, will have a differential impact upon Russia's regions. According to
the G7, between 1991 and late 1997 the international community provide Russia with
US $ 90.5 billion in external assistance. Of that sum, $ 55.0 billion (61 percent) came
from bilateral sources (G7 countries, the European Commission, Denmark, Finland,
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland) while $ 33.2 billion dollars (37 percent)
came from international financial institutions. The remaining $ 2.3 billion (3 percent)
came from other sources. These figures exclude debt rescheduling and represent five
main categories of external assistance: balance of payments and budget support (29
percent); investment (34 percent); export credits (25 percent); technical assistance (7
percent) and humanitarian and food aid (4 percent). Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the
regional and sectoral distribution of this assistance during the 1991-1997 period. The
patterns parallel that of foreign investment, a concentration on the Central region and
upon the energy sector. As one might expect, foreign assistance is also channelled into
education and science sector as well as various social services.
This brief review of the regional dimensions of foreign assistance focuses upon four
programmes: the EBRD Regional Venture Funds, the European Commission's TACIS
Programme; US-Russia Binational Commission's (which started life as the GoreChernomyrdin Commission) Regional Investment Initiative; and finally, the US
Department of Commerce's American Business Centres. The focus of the review is
upon the intent of the programmes and the choice of regions targeted for support.
The EBRD's programme of Regional Venture Funds was part of an agreement reached
between the G7-governments and the European Union at the Tokyo Summit in 1993.
The aim of the programme is to support Russian enterprises that were privatised under
the Russian Government's mass privatisation scheme. The funds are designed to assist
selected enterprises to restructure and adapt to operating in a market economy. The
first fund was established in Smolensk oblast in January 1994, a further three were
established in 1994, six during 1995 and the eleventh and final funds was established in
the Black Earth region in 1996. The programme of 11 funds involves a commitment of
US $ 312 million in equity from the EBRD and US $ 208 million from the donor
governments. Table 5 shows the regional structure of the funds, which do not cover all
of Russia. In each case a consortium of companies from the donor countries manages
the fund. For example, the Black Earth Fund is known as the 'Rabo Black Earth
Regional Venture Fund' and is managed by a consortium which is led by the Dutch
Rabobank International. The fund is committed to investing 75 percent of its funds in the
region; the remaining 25 percent can be invested elsewhere in Russia. As of 2nd July
1998, the Regional Venture Funds has made 40 investments in 25 privatised and 15
private companies. The total amount invested was $ 64 million and the average
investment was $ 1.6 million. The major problem faced by this regional initiative has
been the shortage of fundable projects. It would seem that such initiatives can only work
if the regional economic situation is supportive of new entrepreneurial activity. The
venture funds alone cannot support economic restructuring and market reform.
At present, the European Union's TACIS programme lacks an explicit regional
programme. Instead it funds specific structural programmes. The TACIS Action
Programme for 1998 includes the following programme components: human resources
development, social protection, enterprise support, transport and telecommunications,
environment and energy, food production, processing and distribution. Each of these
programmes delivers assistance to particular regions. The one element of the TACIS
programme that has an explicit regional identity is the system of TACIS technical
offices, which have been set up across Russia to promote TACIS' activities. At present,
TACIS technical offices are located in St Petersburg and Petrozavodsk (with special
involvement in the Cross-border programme), Krasnodar, Novosibirsk, Ekaterinburg
(capital of Sverdlovsk oblast) and Irkutsk. Through TACIS, the European Union is also
helping the Russian Federal Government to devise its own set of regional policies.
Following the recent economic crisis, the European Union may look at providing more
direct assistance to Russia's regions.
The US-Russia Binational Commission (U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on Economic
and Technical Cooperation also known as the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission) was
created at the summit between President Clinton and President Yeltsin in Vancouver in
April 1993. The Commission's original mandate was to enhance cooperation in the
areas of space and energy, but is has since widened its activities to promote trade,
assist in the development of Russian capital markets and environmental protection.
There are two components related to the commission that have an explicit regional
focus. The first is the U.S. West Coast-Russian Far East Ad Hoc Working Group that
seeks to promote trade and investment. The priorities established by the group include:
customs policy and administration, telecommunications, transport, creation of a regional
investment fund, modernisation of air traffic control and implementation of commercial
development of the Sakhalin shelf oil and gas deposits as well as resources in Sakha
(Yakutia). The second, is the Commission's Regional Investment Initiative. This initiative
was announced in February 1997 following the 8th Meeting of Gore-Chernomyrdin
Commission. The aim of the initiative is to work closely with several Russian regions 'to
improve their investment climates, promote normal trading relationships, and attract
private investment, both foreign and domestic'. The initial programme was a pilot project
and the U.S. hoped to extend it to other regions in Russia over time. The programme is
see as a tripartite collaborative effort between the U.S., the Russian Federal
Government and the Regional Authorities. Three regions were chosen for the pilot
scheme: Novgord, Samara and Khabarovsk-Sakhalin. Judging by the information on
their web site, the Novgorod programme has made the most progress.
The final regional programme considered here is the network of American Business
Centers set up by the U.S. Department of Commerce to help support American
businesses in Russia and elsewhere in the CIS. The aim of the ABC is to provide a
'home away from home' for the visiting American businessperson. The ABC also
provides various services that will help American business gain a foothold in Russia's
regions. Among the services provided are: telecommunications, the finding of business
partners, key contacts in the local administration and business community, temporary
office space and on-site logistics. The ABC also helps run trade events and conferences
to promote their regions and/or raise the profile of US business in their region. At
present the following locations have ABC: Chelyabinsk, Khabarovsk, Nizhny Novgorod,
Samara, St Petersburg, Vladivostok, Yekaterinburg and Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. It is
noteworthy that following the establishment of the network of ABC's in the Russian Far
East the Japanese Government felt compelled to create a competing set of Japan
Centres.
The various programmes discussed above show the wide variety of assistance and the
difference in intent between multinational and bilateral support. The EBRD and TACIS
programmes have a general goal of promoting economic restructuring and
marketisation in Russia, while the US programmes have a clear goal of support
American political and economic interests. The two are not contradictory, but they do
point to a duplication of effort between the various national and international agencies.
The fact that the same regions seem to come up again and again suggests that there
are a few regions of Russia swarming with western consultants and government officials
(and academics for that matter), while the bulk of Russian territory is relatively ignored.
This geographical concentration of technical assistance is paralleled by the
concentration of foreign investment into a relatively small number of regions. Those
same regions are also the ones favored by the various risk assessments. This is
because those analyses pick up the relatively good economic performance of resourceproducing regions, as well as the advantages of port regions and large urban
agglomerations. However, case study research on Russia’s regions suggests that many
of these regions have less than progressive local administrations, which, rather than
encouraging inward investment and the development of market institutions, seek to
maintain local control over the key region-forming sectors. The exceptions are those
regions that possess no natural resource endowment or geographical advantage and
have little alternative but to try and attract foreign investment and technical assistance.
Novgorod and Nizhny Novogorod are the most obvious examples. The problem here is
that this model of ‘success’ is not readily transferable and is a limited benefit the
majority of Russia’s regions, which remain isolated from the global system.
CONCLUSIONS
It is less than a decade since the Soviet Union collapsed, yet, as this chapter attests,
the political landscape of Russia has been totally transformed. The fact that this process
of systemic transformation is taking place in an era of globalization is of great
significance. The central state has the task of orchestrating the transformation of
Russia’s political and economic systems at a time when the evolution of the global
system is eroding the ability of all states to control their economies and regions. In the
context of contemporary Russia, as elsewhere, globalization is both a positive and
negative force in terms of its impact upon centre-region relations. It is a positive force in
the sense that it liberates regions and localities and enables them to develop new links
with the outside world. Thus, it is a force promoting democratization. At the sametime, it
enables regions to attract foreign investment and assistance in their own right and to us
external sources of capital and technology to restructure and rejuvenate local
economies. Thus, it is a force promoting marketization. However, these same
processes also have negative consequences.
First, globalization is a spatially selective process, only certain regions and localities are
able to ‘hold down the global’ to attract the attention of international lending agencies,
bi-lateral assistance programs and multinational corporations. Thus, globalization
promotes uneven development and regional inequality as certain regions benefit
politically and materially and others remain neglected. A clear example of this is the
massive gap between living standards in Moscow and in the North Caucasus. Second,
while globalization can emancipate the regions, it creates tension with the centre. The
independent actions of Russia’s regions are a source of suspicion in Moscow. Thus,
globalization complicates the relationship between the centre and the regions and it
does this in an uneven way, adding to the asymmetrical nature of Russian federalism.
For example, border and port regions, as well as resource rich regions find that they
have greater leverage in their dealings with the federal centre because of their role in
Russia’s international relations. Third, for some regions globalization represents a
transfer and/or a loss of local control. This is particularly evident in Russian attitudes
towards foreign investment. Having been the victims of seventy years of external
control, those in charge of Russia’s regions are benefiting from a period of enhanced
relative autonomy. This is in part because the federal government in Moscow has
abdicated its responsibilities to the regions. True, most regional politicians still look to
Moscow for financial support, but there are anxious to maintain local control over their
economies. In such a context, the prospect of foreign (and even Moscow-based) control
of key enterprises is seen as a threat. The net result is that few regions in Russia have
actually sought to increase the level of foreign investment in their economies, quite the
reverse, they have sought to protect local interests. This is particularly true of the
regions that have natural resource endowments and specific geographical advantages.
However, as the analysis above suggests, these regions attract investment despite the
actions of the regional authorities. Thus, you have the paradoxical situation of Russia’s
southern (Krasnodar Kray) and eastern (Primorskiy Kray) gateways being controlled by
governors with xenophobic attitudes. As a consequence, Russia is failing to make the
most of the potential advantages offered by increased integration into the global system.
That said, increased integration in the future could promote the fragmentation of the
Russian State unless a more durable relationship is cemented between the federal state
and the regions. In short, for Russia to benefit from, and manage, both the benefits and
the costs of globalization it must first deal with the challenges of federalization.
Notes
Spatial Differentiation and Stratification
Grigory Ioffe, Olga Medvedkov, Yuri Medvedkov, Tatyana Nefedova, and Natalya
Vlasova
1. Introduction
Spatial variance is in the very nature of socio-economic life, so much so that it is
instances of monotonous homogeneity that warrant special scrutiny rather than spatial
differentiation. In regard to Russia quite a few factors underscore the significance of
spatial variance. Among these are the sheer size of the country, its uneven population
distribution, and the relatively low horizontal mobility compared to similarly sized or
smaller economically advanced countries. Lingering restrictions of domestic mobility -particularly when it comes to Russia’s largest cities and high "friction" of distance due to
low motorization and an inadequate road system reinforce the mutual separation of
population clusters and enhance their potential to develop differently from one another
and to stay different.
In the 1990s, at least two other prominent factors added themselves to the list of spatial
variance "providers." These are the rather systematic attempts of regional authorities to
fence off their respective areas from the rest of the country by drastically limiting the
outflow of commodities (food, first of all) in short supply, and the 1992 advent of the
population decline, which has a huge potential for making the traditional migration
magnets of Russia even more attractive while aggravating the labor supply and already
tenuous human capital in less attractive areas.
In the context of this chapter, and this book in general, this outcome seems to have a
dual implication. First, the notion of fragmented space assumes graphic literary meaning
as Russia’s space comes to resemble an archipelago: scattered pockets of intensive
land use and vibrant economic life in a sea of social stagnation and decay. Secondly, a
seemingly inherent link between spatial variance and social stratification appears to be
gaining in prominence simply because more prestigious areas are becoming more
restrictive and exclusive than before. Whereas in the past getting a residence permit in
Moscow by means short of marrying a Muscovite required connections or duping the
system, now one has to circumvent this no longer constitutional residential restriction by
paying a sum equivalent to 500 minimum monthly salaries to the city. The ensuing
financial filtering of prospective migrants contributes to social stratification most directly.
The link between spatial differentiation and social stratification has another side. In
many instances socio-economic variance leads to the emergence of spatial units of
unequal quality with respect to achieving a certain societal goal. It is in such instances
when differentiation may imply diverging or uneven quality of socio-economic space,
whose emerging divisions thus lend themselves to value judgment or fitness ranking.
Spatial processes in population have been carefully monitored and theorized upon in
the West. In the US, for example, population deconcentration has been unfolding over
the whole post-war period. From 1950 to 1994, major cities in the American Northeast
and Midwest lost 20-45% of their populations. This was caused by the flight of wealthier
households to the suburbs, the inhabitants of which came to outnumber those of the
central city by 1970. Spatial dispersal in America is ongoing and apparently no longer
confined to suburbs, as suburbanites show signs of relocation to communities more and
more distant from the city core, oftentimes outside the metropolitan realm.
In the 1970s, population decline in large cities of northwestern Europe commenced and
was similarly accompanied by the vigorous growth of suburbs and some freestanding
small towns. This phenomenon was perceived as the waning of long-lasting
urbanization trends and spawned numerous publications on the stages of urbanization
viewed as consecutive patterns in a population’s spatial redistribution. According to
some authors, "the move towards ‘counterurbanization’ – identified as a negative
correlation between net migration rates and population densities of regions in a country
– was most conspicuous in the Netherlands, Denmark, the UK, and Switzerland. It was
also evident in Sweden, Germany, Belgium, and France, but Italy, Spain, Portugal,
Ireland, and Norway continued to experience regional concentration." On this basis a
distinction was drawn between a pattern of population redistribution that gained the
upper hand in some US regions and in northwest Europe and was associated with a
complete reversal of migration in favor of suburban and rural regions and that which
occurred in the rest of Western Europe, where the flows from periphery to core merely
diminished. One of the most straightforward stage approaches to population
redistribution belongs to Hermanus Geyer and Thomas Kontuly. According to them,
"counterurbanization represents the final phase in the first cycle of urban development,"
so it is not only preceded by a population’s spatial concentration (unfolding earlier within
the same cycle) but is followed by it as well (which signifies the commencement of the
next cycle).
In Russia things look different than in Western Europe and North America. Specifically,
a stage "of population redistribution in which the larger settlements decline (or stagnate)
in their populations due to net migration losses, while the smaller ones, such as villages
and small or medium-sized 'free-standing' towns, increase their populations through net
migration gains" has never actually arrived in Russia. The 1991-1994 period during
which the rural population experienced sudden growth stands as an exception; it was a
short-lived phenomenon exclusively driven by the acute crisis in cities in the wake of the
removal of state price controls and stalling industry. Already by 1995, the situation had,
formally speaking, returned to what had been normal for Russia for over a century: a
positive relationship between a settlement's growth rate and size.
What we discern in the Russia of today, though, is not exactly a throwback to the pre1991 situation. First, the overall negative rate of natural increase has suppressed
population growth everywhere it takes place at all. Second, draining the periphery of
population is not as vigorous as before. Third, although essential preconditions for
Western-style suburbanization (financially feasible consumer demand, spatially flexible
housing market and tertiary job base, as well as quality roads and means of
transportation) are largely unavailable in Russia, the pent-up desire to relocate from
congested cities has already materialized in some modest population shifts. That
resulting suburbanization is for the most part a seasonal (summer) phenomenon in part
derives from inertia and in part from the still tight system of residential permits. Were it
not for the fear of irretrievably losing the privilege of being, say, a Muscovite, more
people would opt for permanent residence outside the central city even now.
That centrifugal (periphery-directed) shifts in population distribution in Russia have not
been nearly as significant as in the West also has something to do with the overall
spatial pattern of Russia’s population. Russia is a country with a very sparse urban
network. Even in the Industrial Center and the Northwest, there is just one town per
2000 – 2500 square km of land area; in the Volga and Ural regions, there are 5000 –
6000 square km per one town; in Western Siberia 30,000 square km; and in the Far
East as much as 90,000 square km per one town.
"Being a country of large cities, Russia suffers from their deficit," write Georgy Lappo
and Pawel Polyan, the leading Russian experts on the issue, pointing out that zones
within the immediate influence of big cities account for but a small percentage of
Russia's land. Russia is a sparsely settled country, and the notion of sparse settlement
by no means applies only to Siberia, whose territory is "literally torn apart by distance."
Siberia is Russia's classic periphery, that is, an area that not only is perceived but
actually is remote from the heartland. However, many Westerners do not realize that a
sense of remoteness is far more acute in areas barely 150 km from Moscow and Saint
Petersburg, for example, where the perception of living in the middle of nowhere belies
the actual proximity to those population centers. Of course, the primitive conditions of
roads and other means of communications create this perception in the first place. But
so does a sparse network of vibrant urban cores, and long-lasting centripetal trends in
migration only add to this polarized pattern. Even in European Russia the average
distance between cities with populations over 250,000 is twice as large as in Western
Europe (314 km vs. 158 km, according to our calculations). While American cities are illsuited for such comparison (one probably needs to take the entire Standard
Metropolitan Areas into account, given that the level of infrastructure available there is
comparable to what is available in Russian cities or within their corporate limits), in
America and in Canada the densely settled heartlands and sparsely settled hinterlands
are spatially disunited. In Russia, however, they interpenetrate. For example, today the
population densities in Pskov, Novgorod, and Tver oblasts (13-19 people per square km
with rural population densities being 4-5 persons per square km) are on a par with many
areas in Siberia and in European Russia's North. Millions of hectares of previously
cultivated land have been abandoned owing to rural depopulation. Note that the three
oblasts just mentioned lie between Moscow and Saint Petersburg, two principal
population centers 651 km apart, comparable to the distance between the northern and
the southern tips of the North American megalopolis. It appears that in Russia the area
of old colonization has shed its spatial continuity and dissociated into its original nuclei,
large and small. Looking like oases in a rural vastness, these nuclei have been able to
cast a web of intense social interactions upon only a relatively small part of the
interurban space. Social conditions for large-scale population deconcentration have not
matured in Russia and are unlikely to do so in the near future. This stands in contrast to
North America and Western Europe.
The above casts light upon the special role of areas located just outside the boundaries
of large cities. In view of the advanced process of rural polarization, one side of which is
the drastic depopulation of most areas beyond two hours accessibility to big cities (in
Central Russia and in the Northwest, and to some extent in the Central Black Earth
Region as well), the outskirts of those cities today contain almost the only pockets of
viable commercial farming. And they are also the only areas where one can find the
best features of both urban and rural ways of life.
The core-periphery approach, naturally, works not only at the local and micro-regional
level; it can be elevated to the level of large chunks of Russia’s social space, like the
Industrial Center or West Siberia. For several centuries Russia’s space expanded
resulting in higher population growth rates in the newly acquired periphery. Today, the
reverse seems to be the case: populated space in Russia is shrinking and becoming
more fragmented at all levels of spatial resolution. There are numerous implications of
this development, one of which concerns agricultural location.
This chapter examines the differentiation of urban (section 2) and intra-urban (section 3)
socio-economic space in the Russia of the 1990s. The "urban" section begins with
factors of spatial concentration of economic activities and proceeds to analyze regional
patterns of population dynamics. The "rural part" begins with the demographic situation
in the countryside and then focuses on Moscow Oblast, the internal divisions of which
become units of spatial analysis.
2. Urban Areas
The popular Russian attitude to contrasts between cores and peripheries has always
been negative (despite the fact that even or equitable spatial development is hardly
possible.) This attitude is well captured in phrases like "Moscow is a wart on Russia’s
body," which Russian politicians, primarily on the left, like to quote. Understanding this
leads from the repudiation of spatial contrasts and value judgments to detailed studies
of the causes of polarization and inequality. They can be undertaken at different spatial
levels: macro (Russia’s economic regions consisting of several oblasts), meso (center
vs periphery within any oblast), and micro (within an urban settlement).
Our objective is to discuss available information on spatial polarization in Russia’s urban
realm as such and from the perspective of relevant theories. We will specifically focus
on large urban centers with over 1,000,000 population. Cities of this size are major
regional foci and so processes of polarization are detectable at several spatial levels
simultaneously, including meso and micro (that is, intra-urban) scale.
2.1. Meso-Territorial Concentration and its Causes
Center-periphery contrasts at this level of spatial resolution have been theorized
by
such classics of economic geography and regional science as Walter Christaller, August
Losch, and Johann Heinrich von Thunen. While Thunen viewed urban centers as
markets for agricultural goods, Christaller and Losch dealt with cities as central places
in an hierarchial order. Perroux’s theory of growth poles emphasized urban-based
economic multipliers. Because all the above models are based on some crucial
assumptions pertaining to market economy with mobile production factors, these
models lead to the conclusion that cities belonging to one and the same level of spatial
hierarchy should converge in terms of achieved level of development and quality of life.
If this outcome, however, is not realized, it is primarily because the mobility of
production factors and externalities is less than perfect.
What is the situation in Russia like? What spatial process is dominant here? It is our
hypothesis that concentration and polarization continue to prevail over de-concentration
and a trend toward even development.
We believe that administration, geopolitics, economy of scale, demand, location, and
prestige exert their centripetal or core-directed pull on population and regional economy.
The administration factor is privileges in the distribution of state investment that centers
of regional administration enjoyed for a long time. Many Soviet researchers
underscored the significance and implications of this preferential treatment. The newly
acquired status of Russian Federation’s "subjects" (by oblasts and former autonomous
republics) only reinforces the capital-city functions of large cities since the overwhelming
majority of them serve as regional centers. If anything, the role of each region’s center
has grown appreciably and in part at the expense of Moscow. Other circumstances, like
the political weight of a regional leader and even physical distance from Moscow have
bearing on the overall significance of the administration factor. We believe that it will
continue to exert its influence in the years to come.
The geopolitical factor stems from the dissolution of the USSR. As a result regional
centers situated along new national borders have acquired new foreign trade and
border control functions. At the same time, gravitation to cross-border centers has
sharply declined. What were formerly nearby regional centers are now parts of foreign
countries. Their previous economic and social functions must now be taken over by the
centers that have become Russian border settlements. The example of Belgorod’s longterm gravitation to the Ukrainian city of Kharkov is a case in point, as is the now
heightened significance of Pskov, whose oblast is now located along tightly controlled
national borders.
Economy of scale has yet to exhaust itself in Russia. So heightened efficiency of large
enterprises ensuring higher return on investment continues to be a factor of spatial
concentration.
Consumer demand acts to sustain the already achieved concentration through a
growing inequity in per capita incomes, which tend to be highest in regional centers.
This, in its turn, fosters entrepreneurial activity whose concentration has no immediate
connection with investment priorities.
Location of businesses and new residences does not enjoy the flexibility it does in
countries with higher quality roads and transportation. In Russia suburbanization does
not develop vigorously, in part, because transportation costs outweigh gains associated
with lower population density. As a result, the concentration of population and
investment within the confines of existing urban areas goes on.
Finally, prestige, however secondary a factor, reinforces spatial concentration as well.
Prestige is especially important for dealing with wealthy clients, so banks, law firms,
fashion design, boutiques, etc. all gravitate to clusters of such clientele, which are
located primarily in large regional centers.
2.2. Factors of Deconcentration
Several factors may potentially lead to a more even distribution of economic activities.
These are local self-governance, regional policy, competition, growth of
entrepreneurship, and communications.
Self-governance invokes new political actors with ties to local economic life.
Regional policy at the federal level includes such blueprints as The Federal Complex
Program of Revival and Development of Small Towns of the Russian Federation Under
a Condition of Economic Reform and The Federal Program of Revival and Restoration
of Historic Small and Medium Towns of Russia. These blueprints, initiated in 1991 and
adopted by the Federal government in 1992, may potentially lead to the development of
alternative growth poles in regions. Both programs were based on a broad societal and
institutional consensus regarding to the necessity of boosting smaller urban settlements,
particularly those with historical landmarks.
In recent years, oblasts and republics dissatisfied with the scale of implementation of
these programs began to adopt measures of their own. For example, in Irkutsk Oblast a
law "On the Oblast Equity Fund" has been adopted This fund aids economically weak
raions by assigning financial transfers proportional to the difference between per capita
local budget revenues and a minimum threshold spending. This fund is divided into two
components: current financial aid (70%) and investment (30%). The analogous
measures are practiced by Sverdlovsk Oblast. Some region-based programs earmark
funds for the development of the new growth poles. For example, in Sverdlovsk Oblast,
a program was adopted in 1996 focused on the restoration of the historic landmarks of
the town of Verkhoturye within the period between 1996 and 2005. This program links
economic revival of the town with functions of a religious, historic, and cultural center.
Unfortunately many such programs remain on paper because of the drastic shortage of
financial assets.
Factors of competition and demand can potentially influence the decentralization of
economic activities, but a substantial income inequality keeps this influence in check.
The entrepreneurial activity and spread of small enterprises may also play a role of
decentralizer as may higher land values in large cities, zoning ordinances, and
ecological restrictions. However, the significance of these factors is still low in Russia.
2.3. Empirical evidence
Most Russian oblasts and republics are mono-centric with the oblast/republic capitals
accounting, on average, for 32% of the entire population with the maximum in Leningrad
Oblast (74%) and minimum in Krasnodar and Stavropol krays (13% in both cases).
Figure 1 provides some examples of oblasts in the median range of population
concentration. Usually the share of the oblast capital in its (oblasts’s) population grows
fast at first and then approaches the level of saturation. The city of Ekaterinburg as the
administrative center of Sverdlovsk Oblast is a case in point (Fig. 2).
[Place Fig. 1, Fig. 2, and Table 1 here]
The concentration of economic activities may, of course, deviate from that of population.
In Soviet times, though, the concentration of industrial output in large cities was very
high (Table 1) and exceeding that of population. However, the economic crisis
somewhat reduces the significance of this indicator, because it is in the largest cities
that the industrial decline has been most dramatic. Thus the concentration of other
functions, such as managerial, commercial, and financial, comes to the forefront. Small
production units and joint ventures are representative of these functions, if only because
they promptly react to the emerging demand. For example, in the city of Chelyabinsk
are located 68% of all joint ventures of Chelyabinsk Oblast; they account for 52.7% of
all
oblast’s joint-venture employment. In 1995, in Russia as a whole the average regional
center’s share of joint ventures was slightly above 60%. Small enterprises in general are
also concentrated in oblast capitals. For example, Ekaterinburg hosts 72% of all small
enterprises of Sverdlovsk oblast, and in Novosibirsk and Nizhnii Novgorod the share is
close to 90%.
[Place Figure 3 here]
As a rule, in oblast centers the level of general unemployment is lower than in their
regions (Fig. 3) because of better opportunities for side employment and selfemployment. The ratio of registered job seekers to job vacancies is more spatially
variable than the numerator of this ratio, that is, general unemployment. And so in this
regard the situation is much more favorable in large cities, where vacancies in many
cases outnumber job seekers. Also, the possibility of youth employment and,
correspondingly, life chances of youths are better in large cities. Figure 4 shows the
share of unemployed under thirty years of age in the overall unemployment.
[Place Figure 4 and Table 2 here]
Statistics reveal that average income depends upon settlement size. For example, in
the countryside incomes are almost two times lower than in urban areas. Table 2 shows
differences between incomes in regional capitals and regions as a whole. Higher
personal incomes immediately lead to higher buying power and thus create better
conditions for entrepreneurship. True, one has to exercise caution when using income
statistics. First, there are a lot of unrecorded earnings from personal auxiliary farming in
the countryside and the dacha plots of urbanites. Secondly, the possibilities of side
employment and a shadow economy put smaller settlements at a considerable
disadvantage in terms of personal incomes. If, however, one takes cost of living into
account, then the advantages of large and largest cities will look even more vivid and
pronounced. For example, whereas 1995 recorded personal incomes in Moscow were
three times as high as the Russian average, the cost of a standard consumer basket in
Moscow exceeded the Russian average cost only by a factor of 1.3. Such income
superiority typifies the city of Moscow at the most. According to the calculations of
Andrei Treivish, the city of Moscow accounts for about one-third of the country's excess
of officially recorded income over the normative consumer-basket spending. Even Saint
Petersburg shows a much more modest income polarization vis-à-vis the rest of Russia.
And yet virtually each oblast center towers over its oblast as far as income level is
concerned.
The gravitation of economic activity toward one center can also be viewed from the
perspective of spatial differentiation in per capita housing construction and sales of
automobiles and other durables. In recent years, the largest cities have substantially
exceeded the Russian average in motorization. As for housing, in Soviet times the
principal policy was the leveling or smoothing out the inequity in quality of life. Table 3
shows the results of this policy.
[Place Table 3 and Figure 5 here]
However, in the 1990s, it is unlikely that the situation continued to evolve in line with this
policy. Figure 5 shows that Chelyabinsk’s share in the oblast’s housing construction has
come to exceed Chelyabinsk’s share in the oblast’s population. As far as we know,
similar developments take place in Eketerinburg, Nizhnii Novgorod, and Samara.
Just as before, the largest cities stand out in terms of access to institutions of higher
learning, because the latter are located overwhelmingly in such cities. Also of
importance is the location of tutoring facilities, which are also primarily located in the
large cities. Without resorting to their services, it is difficult to get accepted by a college
because enrollment decisions are based on passing entrance exams. Although large
cities do not stand out in terms of sheer capacity of secondary schooling relative to
student population, they do in terms of quality of secondary schools. For example, in
1996, the city of Ekaterinburg accounted for 74% of all gymnaziya and 95% of all
lyceum students in Sverslovsk Oblast, and 10 of the 15 private secondary schools in the
oblast were located in the capital. It should be noted that while enrollment in such
schools does not guarantee higher levels of education, all three mentioned school
categories are characterized by better equipment, smaller classes, and higher social
prestige. Polarization in education is worth mentioning, if only because schooling is one
of the major channels of upward mobility.
The above evidence allows us to conclude that concentration of socio-economic
functions in Russia’s largest cities typifies their current stage of development. Although
some growth impulses have spread out a bit, as shows up in the emerging outlying
affiliates of banks and insurance companies, the largest cities appear to be the major
beneficiaries even of this process. Spatial imbalances are very tenacious and
smoothing them out will take a lot of time and investment.
There is a growing concern in Russia that its largest urban centers develop at the
expense of the hinterlands, pumping out their material and intellectual resources. Given
Russia’s vast geographic space, the poles of spatial concentration typically do not
overlap, which exacerbates social decay in the periphery. Such polarization is clearly at
odds with political decentralization and local self-governance and can lead to social
conflicts.
Polarization is not derived from the transition economy. It has been inherited from the
Soviet period with its ostensibly unlimited freedom of maneuver in the area of resource
allocation. During the transition period of the 1990s, the largest cities have managed to
take advantage of their enormous concentration of resources. Economic restructuring,
the development of housing, labor, land, and capital markets are more vigorous in such
cities than elsewhere in Russia, which spawns a new wave of polarization, this time not
immediately related to government and/or central planning.
In some ways processes at micro-level, that is, within large cities, resemble those at
meso-level. This similarity does not necessarily show up in the concentration of
economic output in certain urban quarters, but it shows up in new business formation,
relative prestige, and corresponding population re-distribution. Recent publications
focusing on the city of Moscow show the immense social prestige of the historical
downtown and some other circumscribed areas inside the city. For example, Olga
Gritsai mapped locations of new business services in the city of Moscow based on the
1995 telephone directory. She came to the conclusion that most law firms, stockbrokers,
real estate agencies, and almost all international banks are confined to the relatively
small central prefecture of Moscow. Figure 6 singles out real estate agencies as another
example. The downtown and the Southwest continue to be the most prestigious areas
of the city. Downtown pockets of new housing construction and renovation attract those
wielding power. The ensuing spatial segregation of social groups unfolded in Soviet
times as well, but it is in the 1990s that it was given a major boost. Location is now the
most important component of housing prices in Russia’s large cities.
[Place Figure 6 here]
The average Russian does not change his or her place of residence nearly as
frequently as the average American. Evidently lack of capital rivets a person to one and
the same place. In contrast, possessing capital ensures one’s presence in several
places simultaneously due to unlimited access to transportation and communication. In
today’s Russia one’s place of residence is a no less meaningful aspect of one’s social
status than income, education, and origin. The lower level of spatial mobility only
increases the significance of location. According to Weber’s sociological tradition, lifechances are one’s opportunities to take advantage of the economic and cultural benefits
supplied by the society. With the spatial distribution of such benefits being exceedingly
polarized, life-chances appear to be polarized as well. It is safe to say, for example, that
the larger the settlement size that one was born in, in Russia, the better are the odds for
professional success.
2.4. Urbanization and Population Decline
Russia’s population decline has been widely publicized and analyzed. However,
between 1992 and 1999, the decline in the numbers of de jure urban residents was 2.4
million, whereas total population declined by 2 million. Why did the decline of urban
population exceed that of the total population? How was this urban population loss
distributed among cities of different size categories? How was it distributed among
Russia’s regions? In this section we attempt to address these questions.
Figure 7 shows the "S" shape curve that is well known in the theory of urbanization
stages. The curve has a distinct turning point and indicates the entry of Russia into the
terminal stage of urbanization. The same figure shows that the initial stage of
urbanization was dominant in Russia up to 1926. From 1914 to 1926 the percent of
urban population in the territory of present-day Russia had barely increased (17% and
17.4%). By 1923, World War I, followed by the Civil War and the Red Terror, resulted in
urbanization dropping to 14.9%. By 1926, Russia was at the urbanization level that the
United States had attained in 1855. Russia had a millennium of history behind its major
cities, unlike the US. Potentially, this could have led to an early commencement of the
acceleration stage. Instead, within the first three decades of the 20th century, Russia's
urbanization was delayed.
[Place Figure 7 and Figure 8 here]
The acceleration stage took place in Russia between 1926 and the late 1980s.
It was long overdue when it started. The acceleration stage was accompanied by heavy
cost and the sacrifice of millions of human lives, a consequence of devastating wars
and of cruel political decisions. Much was changed in the urban hierarchy of Russia
because
the state run economy favored the largest cities, which reshaped, in turn, the geodemography of the nation. Socialist urban life-styles in congested cities and the
constant shortage of housing accelerated the demographic transition.
Figure 8 shows the curves of population change in Russia's cities by size group. These
curves reveal a flip-flop in the rates of urban population change. Until 1987, the urban
hierarchy was being shaped by the trend towards "bigness". Figure 8 confirms that the
fastest growth rates characterized the group of cities with more than 1,000,000
residents. As soon as the acceleration stage finished and the terminal stage
commenced, the growth paths of these "millionaires" were disrupted. And in 1992-1996,
the fastest growth of "millionaire" cities eventually gave way to the fastest decline.
Incidentally the resident population of Volgograd, the smallest "millionaire," actually
oscillates around the 1,000,000 mark. As a result, fluctuations occur in the upper curve
(Fig. 8), because Volgograd is intermittently in and out of the largest size group.
Between 1992 and 1998, the combined population of cities with more than 1,000,000
residents decreased by 2.2 million. This was the largest change across all size groups
of cities. Both in 1992 and 1998, Volgograd was part of the group, so overall population
decline is not due to this city’s erratic trajectory. During the same period, 1992 to 1998,
the combined population of cities from 250,000 to 1,000,000 residents, declined by 0.6
million. In contrast to that, the smaller sized cities had collectively gained 1.6 million.
Although the advent of population decline in Russia does not seem to be immediately
related to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, we believe that population losses in the
largest size group of cities may be associated with this event. In the Soviet period
"millionaire" cities depended heavily on the long-distance exchange of goods with other
union republics. Thus, cities of more than a million residents became the casualties of
the Soviet Union’s disintegration as long-distance trade decreased.
The regions with urban population loss or gain in 1992-1998 are specified in Figure 9.
The eastern margin of the Ural region and the diagonal across the North region serve
as a dividing line on the map. It separates areas with a preponderance of growing cities
from areas in which most cities’ population numbers decline. East of the Urals cases of
growing cities with more than 250,000 residents are nearly absent. Tyumen and Surgut,
cities of the oil industry, are exceptions to this rule as is Khabarovsk, a city that profits
from border trade with China. The opposite case is found in the Central Chernozem
region, wherein between 1992 and 1998, all cities larger than 100,000 gained
populations. The Central region, Northwest, and Volgo-Vyatka showed population
decline in major cities and growth in numerous smaller cities. In Povolzhye (Volga
region) growing cities are located mainly in Tatarstan. In contrast, in the North
Caucasus the cities with non-Russian majorities lost population, primarily due to outmigrating ethnic Russians.
[Place Figure 9 here]
It appears, therefore, that, on the one hand, regions with marginally developed urban
systems have approached the terminal stage of urbanization, whereas this stage is
reached also by regions with advanced urban levels such as the Central and Northwest.
The former case is associated with the inflated demand for labor in Siberian and Far
Eastern cities during the Soviet time. For several decades the Soviets attempted to
hastily extract important resources in those frontier areas by injecting manual labor.
Problems emerged in the post-Soviet years as soon as economic efficiency became
important and the subsidies from the federal budget stopped or drastically decreased.
The Russian media features numerous reports about the exodus from the frontier
communities due to unemployment, under-employment, and non-payment of wages by
bankrupt enterprises.
Urban population decline in more developed European regions of Russia is conditioned
by factors similar to those in some developed nations of Western Europe. The most
influential factor is changing age structure. Specifically, deaths outnumber births
because the former occur, mainly, in the large cohorts of seniors while the latter occur in
small cohorts of young people.
[Place Table 4 here]
The current numerical decline of Russia’s urban population does not lead to population
decline in all cities. Table 4 provides evidence for 69 cities that experienced growth
during the period of the overall urban population decline. From 1992 to 1998, these
cities increased their populations notwithstanding the terminal stage of urbanization. All
of them are sizable communities with over 100,000 residents. In 27 cities the average
annual rates of growth from 1992 to 1998 were even higher that in the last Soviet years,
1989 to 1991. We have discovered that the most prominent post-Soviet growth occurs
in cities with "import substitution" operations. These cities took over functions that were
formerly fulfilled by other parts of the Soviet Union. For example, Stary Oskol of
Belgorod Oblast grew by compensating for the loss of iron ore from Krivoy Rog,
Ukraine. From 1992 to 1998, Stary Oskol increased its population from 184,200 to
109,800 – a 2.2% average annual rate. Cherepovets, a city in the North economic
region, grew modestly but steadily, at 0.3% per year, because its integrated steel works
replace the metal that Russia got previously from Donbass, Ukraine. Novorossiysk and
Kaliningrad grew, at 1.03% and 0.63% per year respectively, because they expanded
port operations and replaced the services of Odessa and Riga, now foreign ports.
Volodga grew, at an average annual rate of 0.77% from 1992 to 1998, because of its
lucrative trade in timber. There is a growing market for timber in Russia and also in
forest-poor Ukraine and Kazakhstan.
2.5 Overall and Regional Components of Urban Population Decline
There are three components to urban population change: natural increase, migration,
and re-classification, that is, change in settlement status. Figure 10 provides information
on their relative significance in 1992-1996. The main component of population "loss" is
negative natural population increase, minus 2.51 million over these years.
[Place Figure 10 here]
This moves Russia's urbanization further into the terminal stage. The birth rate in urban
places is typically low. The crude birth rate per 1000 urban population has decreased
from 9.8 in 1992 to 8.3 in 1996. The crude death rate in the urban population is typically
high, the result of a larger proportion of aged people. The rate was 13.4 in 1996, 14.4 in
1995, 15.0 in 1994, 13.8 in 1993, and 11.5 in 1992. Poor medical care and
environmental degradation are contributing causes of unfavorable mortality rates. Net
migration to cities was negative in 1991 and 1992. Those two years stand as an
exception to the overall powerful migration pull of Russia’s cities. Prior to 1991 and after
1992, Russia’s cities have been gaining from net migration. In 1993, net migration
compensated for 43% of the population decline in cities caused by the excess of deaths
over births. In 1997, the compensation increased to 57%.
That the negative rate of natural increase in urban areas is not outweighed by migration
explains why Russia’s urban population has declined more significantly than its entire
population. A minor component in urban population dynamic, reclassification,
exacerbated the decline. The most frequent case of reclassification involves moving a
small urban place (poselok gorodskogo tipa) to a rural settlement status. In most cases,
this change in status stems from population decline as well as from the recognition that
the settlement in question lacks what Russians perceive as mostly urban amenities. In
1997, the reclassification rate for the country as a whole amounted to –0.41 per 1000
urban residents. This was little changed from the 1993 rate of minus 0.65 per 1000.
During 1992-1998, the number of settlements in the ‘poselok’ category dropped from
2164 to 1963.
Figures 11 and 12 show distinct regional patterns in urban population change due to the
discussed demographic causes. All regions with gains from net migration are in the
densely populated part of Russia's territory and in the oil- and metallic ore-rich areas of
West Siberia. For example in 1997, the Altai Republic, Khanty-Mansi Okrug, and
Belgorod Oblast showed the highest gains from net migration. Belgorod Oblast has held
the most stable place amidst the most attractive migration magnets of Russia. Other
stable migration destinations have been Stavropol and Krasnodar Krais and Ulyanovsk
and Volgograd oblasts.
[Place Figures 11 (A & B) and 12 (A & B) here]
Urban settlements in East Siberia, Far East, and in the European North experienced
population decline due to out-migration (Fig. 11). Homelands of Siberian aboriginal
peoples stand out in this regard. In 1997, Chukotka had the highest out-migration (-57.5
per 1000 people) and Taimyr had the second-highest rate (minus 33.9 per 1000.) Evenk
and Koriak Okrugs experienced heavy outflow as well. In contrast, many cities of
Russia’s European section gained from net migration. This is certainly so for the Central
economic region, Russia’s heartland. In 1996 this region added 116,300 newcomers to
its urban residents. Net migration to the Center accounted for nearly 35% of all Russian
regions’ population gain through migration. In 1997, the Central region got 120,100 new
urban residents from net migration, which represented 40.5% of that gain in the nation.
The heartland attracts many people because of diverse job opportunities. The
heartland, with its highest level of privatization of industrial assets, also leads in making
money.
Generally, provinces sorted into groups by net migration rates mirror those sorted by
natural increase. Provinces that lose urban population from one demographic cause are
not losers from another demographic cause. Urban communities in thinly settled frontier
areas are losers from net migration, but they gain from natural increase because of
preponderance of younger age cohorts.
Russia’s main triangle of settlement, with Saint Petersburg, Novosibirsk, and RostovDon at its apices, has plenty of urban communities that gain population from net
migration, but lose population due to negative natural increase. More often than not,
gain is outpaced by loss, because of a very high percentage of aged urban dwellers.
The regional pattern of reclassification is island-like. Each year it is limited to a few
provinces. Between 1992 and 1998, the most dramatic decline in the number of small
urban places, poseloks, took place in Karelia (from 40 to 11), in Tomsk province (from
16 to 1), and in the Komi republic (from 43 to 38). All of them were demoted to rural
villages. Settlements subjected to this downward reclassification are usually attached to
unproductive mines, sawmills, and to abandoned military camps.
The above analysis shows that population-related generalizations at the all-Russia level
of data aggregation may be misleading. Trends in several regions do not replicate the
curves of Figure 8 or bar graphs of Figure 10. The urban population of the Far East, for
example, was negatively affected by all three processes: migration, natural increase,
and reclassification. In other words, urban settlements in that region lost population
because the death rate exceeded birth rate, out-migration prevailed over in-migration,
and reclassification turned former urban communities into villages. In 1997 the total
decline in the resident urban population of the Far East from all three causes was
59,000. In 1993 the decline had been as high as 100,200. The situation is quite similar
in East Siberia.
The total population change for all urban communities of Russia in 1997 was negative:
the decline of 264,900 residents at the rate of –2.47 per 1000. But at the same time the
Central Chernozem region and West Siberia gained population.
----The above sections on urban population allow for important conclusions that we
relegate to the end of this chapter. However, one question still needs to be addressed at
this point: how to reconcile the huge significance attached to spatial polarization with the
fact that the largest cities have experienced the most significant population losses in the
1990s?
In our view, two circumstances have to be considered in this regard. First, population
numbers in the largest cities may be substantially under-recorded. Although currently
unconstitutional, the practice of issuing residence permits has not been discontinued by
large-city authorities. This leads to significant contingents of migrants whose status is
not unlike that of illegal immigrants in the USA, only in Russia most of these illegals are
actually fellow countrymen. Quite a few seasonal and temporary workers from former
Soviet republics and from other foreign countries are not recorded as permanent
residents either, even though some of them may in fact overstay their permits. This by
no means undermines the significance of the above observations in regard to
population decline in large cities: in any case those in transition form a special
population category anyway and there is no assurance that they will stay in large cities
for good.
Secondly, the spatial polarization at a meso-geographical level (pertaining to cities and
their oblast-size regions) evidently coexists with some local de-concentration. In other
words, the foci of population concentration expand as areas immediately adjacent to the
city line enter the stage of accelerated growth.
With this in mind we now move to examine developments in the Russia’s vast intraurban space.
3. Rural Areas
1. Factors of spatial differentiation
Based on available research, we assume that there are at least three underlying factors
of spatial differentiation of Russia’s extensive rural or inter-urban space.
First, Russia is a country of widely separated large cities. Historically it has been their
primary role to cast a net of social contacts upon surrounding areas thus integrating the
region’s population into one society. Both Russian geographers and demographers
have pointed to the dearth of these integrating focal points in Russia – and not just east
of the Urals, but in the heartland as well. Accessibility to these sparsely distributed cities
under conditions imposed by an inferior network of paved roads could not help but
become a powerful stratifier of Russia’s inter-urban space. We ought to expect that rural
areas are made different by varying accessibility to cities and towns. As mentioned by
Ioffe and Nefedova, "in European Russia a second-order (non-classic) periphery, a kind
of hinterland within a heartland" has always existed; and the Russian prigorod appears
to be vastly different from the western, particularly American suburb, of which prigorod
is a direct lexical equivalent.
Secondly, prior to 1991, Russia’s rural population had been declining for decades. The
pace of this decline was spatially variable. The variable pace and length of rural outmigration affected upon the age composition of rural populations, because migration is
normally age-selective with young adults and their children having a higher propensity
to move out of economically and socially disadvantaged areas. The age composition, in
turn, exerted influence on population dynamics with a highly asynchronous
commencement of negative natural increase in Russia’s rural regions. We thus ought to
expect that today’s rural demographics are spatially variable.
Thirdly, rural demographics cannot help but affect prospects for economic reform in
agriculture. A point was made by Wegren, Ioffe, and Nefedova that, until recently,
"almost exclusive attention has been paid to the reform of legislation, rural institutions
and policies in the agricultural food system". And while this emphasis has not been
entirely misplaced, "lost among analyses of the Russian rural sector has been an
awareness that people matter to the outcome of reform." Indeed for reform to succeed
an adequate base of human capital must exist. We may, therefore, expect that while the
legislative base of reform is being taken care of – or rather neglected – at the federal
level, the actual and vitally important proceedings and accomplishments, e.g.,
privatization of land and production activities, are spatially variable, not in the least
because of the differential accessibility of rural areas and varying rural demographics.
We begin with what can be called the spatial re-alignment of the rural demographic
situation in the 1990s. The oblast will serve as our unit of analysis. We will then proceed
to uncovering spatial changes in rural population dynamics within a single oblast –
Moscow – which has oftentimes been in the vanguard of changes subsequently
replicated by other Russian areas.
3.2 Spatial Change in Russia’s Rural Population Dynamics
After 1989, Russia’s long-lasting trend of rural population decline was reversed, and in
1991-92, migration from urban areas to the countryside exceeded the opposite flow.
However, by 1994, the migration flow into urban areas already had effectively recovered
its late 1980s level, and the "normal" direction of net migration (that is, out of the
countryside) had been restored as well. Some flow into the countryside, though,
continues; but it is declining and is being sustained almost exclusively by migrants from
former Soviet republics.
What has been the spatial pattern of Russia’s rural population changes?
We distinguish between two groups of rural regions: A) those with a positive rate of
natural increase in population, and B) those with a negative rate of natural increase.
Group A is further subdivided into A1) those with net migration inflow and A2) those with
net migration outflow. In its turn, group B has three subgroups: B1) those with net
migration outflow; B2) those with net migration inflow short of the natural population
decline; and B3) those with net migration inflow offsetting the natural population decline.
We then compare 1990-91, 1993-94, and 1996-97 regional groupings.
The logic of the whole analysis is reflected by Table 5, while three maps (Figures 13,
14, and 15) and Table 6 reflect our attempt at regional classification.
[Place Table 5, Figures 13, 14, and 15, and Table 6 here, exactly in this order]
We believe that the type of population dynamics, from A1 to B3 (Table 5) creates a
specific environment more or less conducive to a robust rural economy. It seems clear
that while B3 can be labeled revival, B1 is more like decay with B2 being a transitional
case. Likewise, A-regions are those with a healthy demographic situation, with the
qualification that A2s may in fact be regions with delayed or lagging demographic
evolution.
In 1990-91, 62% of Russia’s rural population still lived in A-regions. Because age-
specific fertility has been traditionally high in the countryside, it takes a long time for outmigration to reduce the total fertility rate through aging. While age-specific fertility
remains higher than in urban areas (as is the case in most societies; Russia is no
exception), the number of prospective parents declines gradually as out-migration
drains them from the countryside. In 1990-91, only in the Industrial Center, Central
Chernozem Region, and Volga-Viatka, from which country folk have migrated for a very
long time, was the rate of natural increase negative. In 1990-91, the dominant or largest
single group of regions was A2 (Fig. 13, Table 6). It included 53% of all regions, and
accounted for 43% of the total rural population. These regions had positive natural
increase (that is, births outnumbered deaths) and negative net migration (that is, outmigration exceeded in-migration) with the latter typically outweighing the former. This
group included the east and north of European Russia and most of Siberia. However,
because migration is almost always age-selective, it is bound to change the age
composition of population and
reverse the ratio of births to deaths.
This is exactly what happened between 1990-91 and 1993-94. In 1990, the rate of
natural increase in rural Russia was 2.2 per 1000 population; by 1995, it had dropped to
minus 5.6. While it is primarily the long-lasting migration outflow that had been actually
instrumental in this change, two other factors also contributed. First, numerically small
generations born in the 1960s and ‘70s entered the childbearing age (the echo of the
World War 2 and a sharp reduction in fertility in the 1960s are to blame). Secondly, child
bearing was often postponed due to economic crisis.
One of the crucial changes between 1990-91 and 1993-94 shown by Table 5 is that the
overall number of people living in A-regions had been reduced from 62% to 17%! It is
highly ironic that this rapid deterioration in rural demographics occurred simultaneously
with the reversal of rural-urban migration flows favorable to the countryside. Indeed,
whereas in 1990-91, only 37% of rural population lived in areas with the net migration
inflow, in 1993-94, as much as 74% did. In 1993-94, the largest single group of regions
was B3, indicating signs of rural revival. It included the southern part of European
Russia (North Caucasus, southern Volga, part of Central Chernozem, and south Ural.
On a map it was a continuous zone ( see Figure 14) and it looked like rural revival was
northbound. This could not help but fuel optimism as to the prospects of this revival.
No sweeping change occurred between 1993-94 and 1996-97, yet the grounds for
optimism were shattered. While 71% of the rural population still lives in areas with
migration inflow, the sweep of negative rates of natural increase is even wider: 89% of
rural population now lived in such regions. On the other hand, B3 regions reveal neither
clustering nor the spatial continuity of the previous period (compare Figures 14 and 15).
In 1996-97, four separate pockets of rural revival show up: ethnically Russian areas in
the North Caucasus (Krasnodar, Rostov, and Stavropol) -- long-term migration
magnets; Leningrad Oblast; Bashkortostan, Samara, and Sverdlovsk oblasts; and
Novosibirsk, Tomsk, and Tyumen oblasts in Siberia. On the other hand, B2 regions,
forming the single largest group in 1996-97, are contiguous and include quite a few
regions of European Russia. Rural population continues to decline in these regions; but
newcomers, predominantly ethnic Russians from Central Asia, are relatively plentiful.
What is unfolding in the countryside of these regions is a kind of rural revival, but on a
narrower demographic basis than in B3 and than could have been expected in 1993-94.
It is unclear, however, how lasting this trend will be.
3.3. Spatial Change Inside Oblasts
Earlier research summarized in Ioffe 1990, 1991 and in Ioffe and Nefedova 1997
showed that of all spatial trends affecting rural development within oblasts, polarization
is the most pervasive one. To some extent this polarization is rooted in natural, coreperiphery contrasts in population density and land use intensity associated with the
radial pattern of road networks. What is significant, however, is that core-periphery
gradients in population density have been consistently getting steeper as outlying rural
areas have been subjected to a more intensive out-migration compared with peri-urban
ones.
There are numerous implications of this demographic polarization, particularly in the
agricultural sphere. First, agricultural output per unit of land becomes subject to the
same spatial gradients that typify rural population density. In other words Russian
"suburbia" accounts for an ever-increasing share of this output, an outcome alien to
most Western countries. This outcome, however, is nothing unexpected considering the
importance of manual labor in the Russian agriculture. Since it is the so-called periphery
-- located in most cases outside the two-hour accessibility range to oblast capitals -- that
is the single largest segment in most oblasts, the result is clear. It is, in fact, the most
all-encompassing and profound decay that the Russian countryside has been subjected
to since the years of Ivan the Terrible. This time there has been no outright coercion
that immediately led to decay; it is the cumulative legacy of so many coercive periods in
the past that has brought this situation about. By now more agricultural land has been
abandoned in the Non-Chernozem Zone of Russia alone than is under farming in the
whole of the European Union. We are witnessing the formation of what literally amounts
to fragmented space with pockets of viable rural economy resembling small islands in
an ocean of spontaneous/wild reforestation and social degradation.
Secondly, as in post-Soviet years, multiple forms of farming have come to co-exist; but
their penetration of each of the above segments of the countryside appears to be formspecific. Most economically viable socialized farms, that is, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and
their surrogates in the 1990s (in keeping with a purely nominal change of status), are to
be found in the Russian-style suburbia, while whatever is alive in the periphery is for the
most part subsidiary farms languishing under the umbrella of the same kolkhozes or
joint-stock companies that only exist on paper to allow for channeling some supplies
and services (seeds, veterinary aid, fertilizers, and pesticides) to rural families.
In most Russian oblasts there is also a transitional case that we would call the semi-
periphery. The semi-periphery forms a special, transitional case. Whereas the periphery
contains archaic but occasionally robust subsidiary farms, and exurbia boasts of viable
socialist agriculture, the semi-periphery seems to be a no-man's land. Depopulation has
affected the semi-periphery to almost the same extent it has the most outlying districts,
leaving myriads of abandoned villages. On the other hand, unlike in exurbia and the
periphery, neither viable collective farms nor a robust subsistence economy (for those
who choose to stay) are available. So the void is now being filled by two kinds of
developments: summer-time recreational land-use (dachas or recreational second
dwellings) and, to a lesser extent, private family farming. Both developments would in
fact gravitate toward exurbia if land were available there, but since in most cases it is
not, the semi-periphery, located 1-2 hours from provincial centers, becomes the only
option. People now populating the semi-periphery tend to be the most open-minded:
they are relatively less addicted to archaic communal bonds or to reliance on strong
leadership and socialist enterprises. Dacha-owners, private farmers, and forced
migrants at the crossroads of their lives may constitute the human capital with which the
long-term prospects of the Russian countryside at large rest. However, the
infrastructure in the semi-periphery cannot be upgraded solely on the basis of private
investment, and its current condition is not conducive to economic development. Thus
the irony of the situation is that, at this formative stage of the market economy in
Russia, there is an unavoidably crucial role for the government in creating extrinsic
conditions for economic growth.
3.4. Moscow Oblast: a Case Study of Fragmented Space
We would now like to characterize changes which have been unfolding through the
1990s within the confines of one oblast. We will specifically focus on changes in
population distribution and agriculture. Our task is to show that these changes have
been unfolding in a spatially stratified environment: what matters in particular is the
distance from the center, the city of Moscow in this case. The nature of this task,
therefore, requires that we preface our brief analysis by a description of the network of
spatial units that we used.
Internal Divisions
The principal features of the area's spatial structure are the overwhelming dominance of
one center; radial spokes and concentric rings; an asymmetric "green west -- smoky
east"; and the availability of significant urban-industrial clusters, including those at
junctures with other oblasts. The complexity of the spatial structure and the economic
functions performed by the area has given rise to a multiplicity of division patterns. We
followed two habitual patterns: radial sectors and concentric rings. The analysis in this
section will be based only on the latter pattern.
[Place Figure 16 here]
Grouping all 39 raions by the order of their proximity to Moscow, we identify four rings
(Fig. 16). The first, inner ring has about a 20 km radius and more or less comprises the
so-called Forest-and-Park Protective Belt. The second ring, including second-order
neighbors of the central city, is within a 20-60 km radius and is more or less equivalent
to the Exurban Zone (Prigorodnaya Zona) in physical planning schemes. The oblast's
shape is far from a circle and the second zone's outer limits coincide with the border of
the whole oblast in the northeast and southwest. The third ring is 60-100 km away from
the city of Moscow, while the fourth ring includes the remote eastern and western
raions.
Spatial Pattern of Population
The current population distribution by concentric ring is featured in Table 7. Altogether
the inner ring or the first zone, which is the closest to the city (Fig. 16), accounts for
26% of the oblast's population and only 6% of its land area. The zone's average
population density, 603 people per square km, is close to that in New York City's
suburbs and declines steeply with distance from Moscow (Table 7). Note that the 199098 increase in population density in the inner ring is associated with the continuing
contraction of this ring due to cession of some of its land to the city of Moscow (over
30,000 ha in 1990-98), not with population growth. If the land area of the first zone had
remained the same as in 1990, its population density would be 541 people per square
km or about the same as in 1990. The largest share of the oblast's total population
(39%) lives
in the second zone/ring. The distribution of rural population reveals the same pattern
(Table 7), and the average size of a rural settlement declines from 480 residents within
a 10-km radius from the city line to 130 residents in rayons located beyond 100 km,
while the number of rural settlements per 100 square km declines from 23 to 8 over the
same zonal range.
[Place Table 7 here]
Planners have attempted to reduce the settlement contrasts around the city of Moscow
by restricting growth in its nearest satellites and promoting growth in the most distant
ones. In reality, however, it was the two closest concentric rings where population grew
the fastest.
In the 1990s, statistics have recorded population declines both in the city of Moscow
and in Moscow Oblast. This is associated less with migration than with the about-face in
the natural increase of population. This change has been characteristic for Russia as a
whole; however, the aging population of Moscow and its oblast took a heavier toll than
elsewhere. In 1990, for example, the natural increase was plus 22 per 10,000 in Russia
as a whole, while it was minus 22 in Moscow Oblast. By 1995, the former indicator
reached minus 57, while the latter, minus 104. Net migration in 1995, plus 34 in Russia
and plus 60 in Moscow Oblast, could not outweigh losses incurred by the landslide
excess of deaths over births. In 1996 and 1997, the negative rate of natural increase in
Moscow Oblast somewhat lessened but was still significant: minus 91 and minus 84 per
10,000 population respectively.
The 1990s population dynamics by rings is revealed by Table 8. In the beginning of the
1990s, population losses in the two most remote rings slowed down. We believe it was
because at the start of the economic crisis it seemed to many people in Russia that it
would be easier to make ends meet in a provincial or semi-provincial environment than
in the vicinity of a large city. This perception was still there in 1992-93 but was waning. It
was waning because many people realized that they could maintain the inflow of food
from their household farms without permanently living in the countryside and small
towns, and it was only in Moscow and its immediate environs that multiple employment
opportunities are available and extra earnings possible. As a result, after 1993 the rates
of both urban and rural population decline began to mirror the traditional core-periphery
gradient with peripheral population decline being steeper than exurban or peri-urban.
And in 1996-97, population growth even resumed in the inner ring while rural population
losses in the periphery intensified (Table 8).
[Place Table 8 here]
It thus appears that what seemed to be the forerunner of a consistent, Western-style
population de-concentration was no more than a 1990-92 glitch related to the most
acute stage of urban crisis. In other words, the voids between fragmented pockets of
vibrant socio-economic space are not filling up. Also the urban way of life continues to
be more attractive in the oblast; and those unable to enter the central city as permanent
residents choose to cast anchor immediately outside Moscow, usually in an urban
apartment complex.
Among other things, suburbanization is kept in check by low motorization and inferior
roads. In 1995, the number of private vehicles per 1000 population in Moscow Oblast
did not significantly exceed that of the Russian Federation as a whole (89 and 84
respectively). However, in the city of Moscow, it was considerably higher (138).
Although the paved road network density in the oblast is the highest in Russia -- 308 km
per 1000 square km of land area versus 27 km per 1000 square km on average in the
Russian Federation – it is substantially lower than in the West and even below the level
of Estonia and Latvia.
In the 1990s, the net inflow of migrants to Moscow Oblast began to exceed that to the
city of Moscow. Thus in 1995 and 96, the former was 53 and 63 per 10,000 population
respectively, while the latter was only 28 and 41. However, observations of Moscowbased experts give reason to believe that this central city vs. oblast ratio of incoming
migrants may be a statistical artifact. It most probably derives from Soviet style
migration restrictions that the city of Moscow clings to despite their unconstitutionality;
as a result throngs of de facto residents of Moscow are unaccounted for. According to
some estimates, for example, up to 80% of bus and trolley bus drivers in Moscow are
temporary employees from CIS countries. And this is but one population category that
skirts migration records. That migration to the city of Moscow may in fact exceed
migration to Moscow Oblast does not mean, of course, that the latter is insignificant.
Significant it surely is: during the first six months of 1996 alone, net migration amounted
to 20,100 people. Of them 8300 came from other post-Soviet republics. The number
one "supplier" of migrants, just as for Russia as a whole, was Ukraine, with 31% of all
migrants; 13% came from Kazakhstan, 12% from Uzbekistan, and 23% from the
Transcaucasus. Of those migrants whose place of origin was in Russia, 34% came from
the Industrial Center (including a few Muscovites, but unfortunately not identified in the
statistics); Siberia and the Far East contributed 31%; the European North, 8%; and
Northern Caucasus, 7%. Three-quarters of all incoming migrants settled in urban places
in Moscow Oblast. This is short of the percentage of urban population in Moscow
Oblast. However, the few who settled in the countryside are not enough to increase
population there appreciably.
In 1993-96, the rate of migration inflow was inversely proportional to distance from the
city of Moscow. Thus, 81 migrants per 10,000 population were recorded in the first ring;
64 in the second; 33 in the third; and only 25 in the most remote ring. Thus the
distribution of migrants testifies to the on-going packing of the already most densely
packed areas of the oblast.
Agriculture
As everywhere in Russia, agricultural output draws from three major sources: big or
socialized agriculture represented by former collective and state farms and their current
incarnation in the face of joint-stock companies, etc.; subsidiary or household farming,
that is, growing food in rural residences’ backyards; and registered private farms. A
quite substantial additional source of food comes from parcels of land located in the
country but owned by urbanites.
In Moscow Oblast the proportions of agricultural output shape up differently from Russia
as a whole. For decades large farms have fared better in Moscow Oblast that almost
anywhere else in Russia, primarily because the oblast was better supplied with labor in
terms of both quality and quantity and received more investment per unit of land than
any other Russian sub-division. The largest urban market for perishable produce
influenced this preferential treatment, while the better labor supply largely derived from
higher quality of rural infrastructure. Subsidiary or household farming in Moscow Oblast,
while also a sizable asset, has never had all the spontaneous incentives it typically
gains in areas poorly supplied with domestic and foreign food through local retail
outlets.
[Place Figures 17, 18, and 19, and Table 9 here]
In Russia the notion of exurban (prigorodnoye) agriculture has long commanded the
attention of agrarian analysts because of its heightened intensity and concentration on
perishables. In fact, rings of outwardly declining agricultural land use intensity -- of the
kind shown in Figure 17 that applies to the late 1980s -- still girdle every Russian city
and constitute another peculiar dimension to the whole issue of fragmented Russian
space. Because we lack statistics for the 1990s that would be comparable to those of
Figure 17, we illustrate the point with characteristics like those in Figure 18 and Table 9.
Note that dairy is the leading specialization of the oblast’s agriculture. Figure 18,
however, shows a slightly different picture: it looks like two factors explain the variance
in grain yields: proximity to Moscow and fertility of soil, the latter being the highest in
the southeast (Zaoch’e). However, in the mid-80s, when we compared the significance
of these two factors by means of multiple regression of public farms productivity, it
appeared that 65% of the variation in agricultural output per unit of land in Moscow
Oblast was due to proximity to the city of Moscow, whereas only 7% was due to the
impact of variation in natural fertility. This result has definitely been influenced by a
substantial co-periphery gradient in the number of cattle (Fig. 19).
Because the first classic work on land use intensity and specialization of farms
surrounding a market center was authored by Iohann Heinrich von Thunen in 1826,
rings shown in Figure 17 and implied by Figures 18 and 19, are usually referred to as
Thunian rings. In the West, however, the Thunian model has long abandoned its original
area of specialty and migrated to intra-urban studies (as a means to explain a bid rent
and land values).
Western textbooks on economic geography still feature examples that fit the original
contribution Thunen made to the field of agriculture, but these examples are sought in
poor, Third World countries. For instance, Peter Dicken and Peter Lloyd focus on the
environs of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, while Frederick Stutz and Antony de Souza make
their case based on the surroundings of Jaipur, India. It appears from our analysis that
the area around Moscow in fact should quite satisfy those in pursuit of Thunen’s
persistent relevance to agricultural location.
The chief reason his model is no longer appropriate to Western farming patterns is
because the enormous progress in transportation of perishables to urban markets has
made formerly steep location rent gradients gentle. In other words, it is no longer
economically necessary to assign, say, production of animal feed or milk, let alone
potatoes, to suburbia/exurbia where residential developers always outbid farmers. Thus
the differential rent associated with the natural fertility of soil by far outweighs Thunian
location rent (that is, the significance of proximity to consumers) as a factor of farm
location. Obviously this has not been the case all along. As Jean Gottmann noted as
recently as 1961 in his classic study of the North-American Megalopolis, "a farm with
good soil usually commands a better price than one of the same size with poor soil, but
only if their locations are equal. The rockiest pasture ten miles from Boston is more
valuable than the finest black loam in central Illinois." Now this observation of Gottmann
is obsolete: what used to be a rocky pasture ten miles from Boston is most probably a
densely packed suburban subdivision with some of the highest real estate prices in the
nation. The same observation, however, is by no means obsolete as far as Russia is
concerned, as our analysis has purported to demonstrate.
True, in the 1990s agricultural land uses eventually began to be squeezed out of the
Moscow environs’ inner ring: just in 1991-96, the inner ring, containing only 5% of the
total agricultural land of the oblast, accounted for as much as 30% of the overall
reduction of agricultural land (374,000 hectares = 100%) of agricultural land in the
oblast. However, an average hectare of farmland in the innermost ring still produces 10
times more meat and 3-4 times more vegetables than in the remaining rings combined.
Given such a core-periphery gradient in agricultural land use intensity, the expediency
of land transfers from exurban agriculture may be called in question. At a time when the
overall agricultural output is declining almost everywhere in Russia, intensive exurban
farming grows in importance, especially amid popular anxiety over the alleged loss of
national food provision security.
4. Conclusion
Polarization is the most pervasive spatial trend both in urban and intra-urban realms of
Russia. It spells not only strikingly uneven population distribution but also the uneven
distribution of life-chances. The largest cities of Russia and their immediate environs
continue to be islands of relative prosperity. The factors of spatial de-concentration of
population and economic activity have not gained importance.
The above spatial trend exists against the backdrop of Russia’s population decline.
Although it suppresses growth of large cities, it does not allow for alternative growth
poles either. This is particularly true for Siberia, where almost all cities larger than
250,000 residents have declining populations.
In Russia spatial polarization of populated space also unfolds against the backdrop of
initially sparse settlement. Its layout is different from the world’s other vast countries and
so the outcome of polarization is different as well. While in the United States, Canada,
Australia, and China densely packed heartlands and sparsely packed hinterlands are
spatially disunited, in Russia they inter-penetrate. That is, even the areas of oldest
human colonization, like those between Moscow and Saint Petersburg are "torn apart"
by distance: there are islands of dense settlement immersed in depopulated vastness,
so the whole settlement pattern resembles an archipelago.
That people are currently migrating back to the most socially hospitable western and
southwestern regions of Russia does not alter the above pattern, because most
migrants set down in cities or in their immediate environs.
After a short-lived reversal of rural-urban migration, the countryside resumed losing
population. Rural depopulation, resulting from the excess of deaths over births, could
not be reversed even for a short time. Instead the trend accelerated. There are,
nonetheless, several pockets of rural revival in Russia.
Inside Moscow Oblast, spatial developments are in line with the general polarization
trend. Not only population re-distribution, but also the spatial pattern of agriculture are
marked by steep core-periphery contrasts.
When this chapter was completed we came across a provocative article by Boris
Rodoman, a keen observer of Russian life. The thrust of his article is in line with our
conclusions. According to Rodoman, the polarization of Russian space has deepened
over the 1990s. He divides this space into three segments: capital cities and their
immediate environs, provinces (all the remaining land within 2 km from railway lines,
highways, and paved streets with year-round traffic), and the boondocks. The last
category encompasses 10 million square kilometers or about two-thirds of Russia.
Developments within this last segment are the antithesis of the modernization that has
affected capitals and their surroundings. Pervasive signs of regress include abandoned
villages, spontaneous reforestation of previously cultivated fields, rapacious cutting
down of forests, lack of social services, and the profound decay of communication
infrastructure – in contrast with the communication revolution in and around the capital
cities with their widening access to internet and cellular phones. "The spread of internet
and mobile phones," writes Rodoman, "does not preclude but only sets off a paradoxical
situation: in most of Russia, population is being alienated from transport and
communication because of rising prices and lowering incomes. An ordinary telephone is
still off-limits to rank-and-file villagers, and the radio-broadcasting network dies away
while postmen no longer reach outlying villages, and more and more people cannot buy
a TV set or repair an old one….One way or another most Russians are plugged into
‘global civilization’ because they keep close to roads. But the minority that do not are cut
off as is the bulk of the land."
This spatial polarization is inherently linked with social stratification. Those services that
are of no use for the elite disappear. For example, in many instances a peripheral
settlement is unplugged from a cable telephone network precisely at the moment that
local bosses acquire cellular phones. "Owners of bio-toilets, air conditioners, and buyers
of bottled drinking water are less interested in mass sewage treatment, and in quality of
piped water and street air. The clean and lively space equipped with modern
conveniences lessens, shrinks around the elite, and the remaining space is driven into
dirt and dark."
For those who frequent only the large cities of Russia, the above image may seem
surreal. However, it is not. The notion of "fragmented space" that appears in the title of
this book is far from just metaphorical. Russia’s space is indeed torn apart and pockets
of vibrant socio-economic life are like oases in a social desert or islands in a sea of
stagnation and decay.
Notes
DEMOCRATIZATION
Introduction: Is Democracy Developing in Russia’s Regions ?
Vladimir Gel’man, The European University at St.Petersburg*
James Alexander, Northeastern State University
Andrei Degtyarev, Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences
For most Western and Russian scholars who have observed recent political
developments in Russia, the evaluation of the Russian political regime as something
"between authoritarianism and democracy" is common. Scholars have widely employed
"quasi-," "semi-," "pseudo-," "proto-" and other descriptive adjectives to qualify
evaluations of democratic development in Russia over the last several years. How
relevant are these approaches for analyzing democratization in Russia, however? To
provide a complete answer to this question, one must take a comparative perspective.
There are two different, but overlapping dimensions to the comparative study of national
politics: First, political researchers often make cross national (i.e. inter-national)
comparisons. There are many examples of scholarship comparing the experiences of
Russia and Eastern Europe, Latin America and Southern Europe as they make (or
made) the transition from authoritarian regimes. Although the theoretical foundations, as
well as the implications, of such comparative studies are still uncertain, this approach
has become quite common in contemporary Russian politics.
The second dimension of comparative studies of Russian politics, involving crossregional (i.e. intra-national) comparisons, is still neglected among Western and Russian
scholars. Although several comparative cross-regional studies have appeared in recent
years, they have been primarily concerned with governance, separatist activism, the
elections of regional governors or have simply described current developments without
employing specific theoretical frameworks. Furthermore, numerous case studies of
transition at the regional level have been published, but they often ignore the
comparative potential of such case studies.
An interesting puzzle arises from actual cross-regional comparison, as well as the
comparison of multi-level (national and regional) political developments: If democracy is
developing in Russia’s regions, how can we explain the significant diversity of these
developments? Are the regions less "democratic" than Russia as a whole, and why are
some regions more or less democratic than others ? The varying perspectives
presented in this chapter go a long way toward solving this puzzle.
Part of the solution includes the application and development of theoretical concepts.
When examining the development of democracy, Robert Dahl’s model of democracy,
polyarchy, is a good place to start. Including two vital dimensions of democracy,
competitiveness and participation, Dahl used polyarchy to establish a matrix of political
regime ideal types:
Table 1. Dahl’s model of political regimes
Competitiveness/Participation Low
High
High
Polyarchy
Competitive
oligarchy
Low
Hegemony
Inclusive
hegemony
While the application of such a neatly constructed model would seem to be relatively
straightforward, for Russia’s developing political regimes — both on national and
regional levels – such is not the case. On the one hand, the application of a minimalist
view of competitiveness and participation in the regions shows clear evidence of
democratic development. The competitive elections of governors, as well as regional
legislatures, accompanied by inclusive participation, based on universal suffrage. Thus,
Dahl’s test of polyarchy seems to be clearly confirmed as almost half of the regional
governors (primarily appointed by President Yeltsin) lost their offices in a wave of
elections in 1996-1997.
On the other hand, such a picture is analogous to making conclusions about the
average world temperature through calculations based solely on the temperatures of
Antarctica and California’s Death Valley in mid-August. There is great variance across a
spectrum of intervening measurements that is ignored. This is the case for Russia,
where there are many possible paths of political change across the 89 regions.
Furthermore, despite clear signs of democratic development, the frequency of officially
sponsored interference in electoral contests and the ineffectiveness of public
participation undermines such an evaluation. These practices are widespread in
Russia’s regions. As discussed below, developments in the city of Moscow and the
Komi Republic show the challenges to democratic development in most regions.
Moreover, political developments in even the most "democratic" regions are still highly
fragile, often depending on the political allegiances of political actors. Such was the
case in Nizhnii Novgorod’s 1998 mayoral elections, where regional authorities quickly
denounced the results when the "wrong" candidate came to power. Using that
candidate’s criminal past as the official pretext, the election was quickly invalidated.
These issues raise the question of whether Russia’s regions have achieved what Dahl
refers to as the "procedural" and "substantive" dimensions of democracy. Procedural
notions of democracy generally focus on the existence of formally democratic
institutions, such as a written constitution that recognizes a practice of regularly
scheduled elections. Substantive democracy goes farther to add the norms of behavior
and belief that underlie the political activities of elected officials and the existence of
popular liberties. Within this context, the political institutions of Russia’s regions,
including the legislature, the executives, and judicial branches must be investigated.
There are many other issues that must be examined in a comparative fashion,
including: law making, the existence of separation of powers, local government
autonomy, electoral practices, the role of political parties and interest groups, voluntary
associations and more. Taking such a broadly comparative perspective, Vladimir
Gel’man highlights important distinctions among formal and informal political institutions
and their impact on regional political developments. Gel’man’s contribution begins the
discussion of regional democratization through the development of an analytical model
that builds on the democratization theory developed over the last few decades.
Adapting the contentions of Valerie Bunce that traditional approaches to
democratization focusing on Latin America and Southern Europe may not be applicable
to post-Soviet developments, Gel’man constructs a four-celled matrix for evaluating
political change in the Russian regions. For analytical purposes, he examines the
regions as if they were independent, national entities. In doing so, Gel’man’s
presentation underlines the diversity of political change within the regions and shows
the challenges of democratization in a country as large and varied as Russia.
The controversies of regional democratization in Russia are, of course, only a part of
the general problems of democratization. Narrow explanations, such as provided by
theories of socio-economic modernization and political culture fail to solve the regional
puzzle. As there are many difficulties in explaining the democratic possibilities of a
whole country, the in-depth examination of particular regions, and their unique political
challenges, provides a valuable perspective that informs the larger, national question of
democratization. As the sections by Andrei Degtyarev and James Alexander clearly
show, however, although polar opposites in many areas of development, the city of
Moscow and the Komi Republic have more similarities than differences in terms of
electoral competitiveness, popular participation and the operation of regional political
institutions.
As for Gel’man, Degtyarev takes an institutional approach to the analysis of Moscow’s
city politics. He shows the emergence of a single actor, Mayor Yurii Luzhkov, resulted
from the assertion of executive power, the concentration of overwhelming political and
economic resources, the limitation of representative institutions as well as local
government, and the elimination of political alternatives to the mayor’s office. Indeed,
state-based semi-corporatist forms of political representation developed a form of
horizontal accountability, as the political machine penetrated all levels of city politics and
undermined any previously existing vertical accountability. The case of Moscow
demonstrates the effective strategies of regional political elites to avoid political
competition. Thus, democratization is still pending in Russia’s capital.
In his examination of the Komi Republic, Alexander departs from the institutional
analyses presented by Gel’man and Degtyarev. While institutional development is not
absent from the discussion– in fact, this section does address post-Soviet institution
building in the region– the focus of the analysis is upon the relative development of
pluralism in Komi. In this fashion, Alexander employs a civil society approach to assess
the impact of competing groups on policy-making within the Republic. Rather than
examine policy-making as a whole, however, he focuses on the political controversy
concerning the establishment of local self-government, an issue that several local
organizations identify as key to the substantive development of Komi’s procedural
democracy. Ultimately, Alexander finds that the establishment of local self-government
emerges less from internal Komi political struggles than from the intervention of the
federal courts.
This chapter draws together the general and the particular in order to portray the
complexities of Russian regional political development. As you will see, an answer to
the question heading this section is still in process. In striving to solve Russia’s regional
puzzle, the discussion that follows further contributes to the ongoing search for new
frameworks of analysis, which could be helpful for understanding Russian politics as a
whole.
Regional Regime Transitions in Russia: Actors, Institutions and Uncertainty
Regional Political Regimes in the Russian Context: A Framework for Analysis
The term "political regime" is commonly applied in varying political contexts – such as
constitutional models (parliamentary or presidential regimes) or forms of government as
a whole (democratic or authoritarian regimes). However, these classifications are not
always applicable to studies of politics in transition, where such forms are ill-defined and
sometimes change very rapidly. In light of these issues, the understanding of political
regime in cases of transitional society should be reexamined. Thus, my use of the
concept of "political regime" is purely functional. It is a set of: 1) actors with resources
and strategies and 2) political institutions (which are understood here not as a set of
organization, but as a set of rules and norms). This definition is not related to
institutional designs or ideological schema such as, for example, totalitarian regimes.
The first dimension of a regime includes two ideal types: on one extreme is the
dominant actor, who structures all political opportunities for other actors; on the other
extreme is the unlimited competition of actors for dominance. Thus, we create a
dichotomy of a monocentric non-competitive regime and a polycentric competitive
regime. The second dimension of a regime is based on the distinction between formal
and informal institutionalization processes in "new democracies." This dimension also
includes two polar types, related to the supremacy of formal institutions (such as
legislation, separation of powers, local government autonomy, elections, political
parties, etc.) and informal institutions or arrangements of informal practices (such as
particularism, clientelism, shadow economic relations). The former is associated with
the principle of "rule of law", while the latter could be classified as "arbitrary rule".
Applying this concept of political regimes to regional politics in Russia gives rise to new
challenges. One might argue that the dependence of regional regimes on national
political developments must be accounted for in making such an analysis. Yet, there is
no empirical evidence of consistency in federal policies toward the regions, either
nationwide or toward particular regions. Since the late 1980s, the degree of political
independence in Russia’s regions has increased. After the wave of gubernatorial
elections from 1995-97, the federal influence on regional politics became even more
insignificant. Therefore, it is useful to analyze regional political regimes in Russia, and to
treat these regional entities as if they were nation-states. Within this framework, national
authorities (as well as other actors outside of the region) may be regarded as "external"
actors. That is, one may consider their impact on regional politics as if analyzing the
impact of international influence on national polities.
As noted above, the post-Soviet period of political development clearly demonstrates
the large-scale effects of diversity in Russian regional political regimes. In the late
1990s, the variety of political regimes includes features of pluralist democracy in
St.Petersburg, authoritarianism in Moscow, a semi-democratic "elite settlement" in
Nizhnii Novgorod Oblast’, and even "warlordism" in Primorskii krai, as well as hybrid
regimes in other regions. The scholars of Russian regional politics need to explain this
variation. Why have once nearly identical administrative units in the Soviet empire
developed in such different directions over the last ten years? And in which regions can
we expect, if any, movement toward democracy — in terms of political competition
within the framework of formal institutions ?
There are two approaches for solving this regional "puzzle" from a comparative
perspective. First, the "structural" framework connects the causes and consequences of
political changes on macro-level variables, such as the level of socio-economic
development, or on popular values and attitudes as well as social capital. Initially,
however, these explanations are at the very least challenged by the actual practices of
Russia’s regional politics. We cannot truly employ the prism of socio-economic
determinism to show that the absence of political competitiveness and the domination of
informal institutions makes the political regime of pre-industrial Kalmykiya equal to that
of advanced industrial Tatarstan. It is also hard to explain the emergence of completely
different political regimes in the city of Moscow and in the Sverdlovsk Oblast’, as both
regions exhibit clearly pro-democratic and pro-market orientations in mass voting
behavior. As a result, the issue of applicability of this framework to Russian regional
politics will remain on the agenda of future discussions.
Second, the "procedural" framework explicitly rejects the idea of "objective" preconditions to democracy or other forms of political regime. Instead, this approach
generally explains the causes and consequences of political regime change through the
analysis of the transition process itself. This approach uses the composition of actors,
their interactions and their strategies during the transition period as the main set of
variables. This view, however, is also insufficient for solving the aforementioned
regional puzzle. It seems useful for understanding how transition processes occur, but
not why particular political events occur (or do not occur). This approach is undermined
by a teleological schema of political development, or some kind of "iron law of
democratization." According to such a perspective, all transitions will eventually arrive at
democracy as the final stage. Yet, there are no well-founded reasons for why this
should be so, save for macro-historical speculations. At least, in the case of Russia we
know the point of departure (authoritarianism), but there is no way of knowing a priori
the destination.
The potential gains of these frameworks can be combined (while their "flaws" can be
eliminated) by the use of a configurative (or "genetic") methodological approach. The
core idea of such an approach includes analysis of the role of different factors in a new
regime’s emergence--from the beginning until the end of the transition process--and
then tests their impact through a number of case studies. Such an empirically-based
theoretical model might then be explored and generalized. In this discussion, I shall
employ genetic methodology to analyze the impact of late-Soviet regional political
development (or the prior regime type) on post-Soviet regime transition and
consolidation. Following previously defined dimensions of political regimes —
competitiveness and institutional type — what can we learn from this link? Or, more
concretely, what kind of regional peculiarities (if any) were more favorable for the
emergence of post-Soviet political competition within the framework of formal
institutions (i.e. for emergence of democracy)? For this purpose, I will analyze the
genesis of political competition in advanced democracies and then apply the
implications to nascent Russian regional regimes. I will begin by considering certain
theoretical and methodological issues. I shall then attempt to explain the emergence of
differing political regimes in the post-Soviet transition by examining the development of
particular regions. I will close by presenting the implications and generalizations
emerging from this discussion.
Cleavage Structures and Institutional Changes
Those scholars who initially observed historical roots in the development of the
competitive political systems in advanced democracies, commonly accepted the central
place of conflicts over modernization in the emergence of democratic politics. The
structure of these cleavages reproduced conflicts between social groups during the
industrial revolution and nation-state building, and then became "frozen" in the form of
the party systems in these societies. These social cleavages had been carried into the
political competition by mediators (or political entrepreneurs). Thus, intra-elite conflicts
rather than societal conflicts are regarded as the foundation for the development of
political competitiveness. In a broader sense, the main dimensions of a political regime
— actors’ competitiveness and the predominant institutions — is significantly dependent
on the structure of social cleavages, which emerge during the transition process. Intraelite cleavages emerging from the ancien regime can make or break the inevitable
competition among actors during the early stages of the regime transition. This is
especially important for the mode of the breakdown of the ancien regime. The "freezing"
of intra-elite cleavages at the final stage of regime transition creates the conditions for
the consolidation of new regimes. Yet, how does the formation and mobilization of these
cleavages impact the regime transition process in Russia’s regions ?
Cleavages — both on a societal and elite level — only became evident during elections
in Russia. They are a byproduct of the Soviet modernization process. Industrialization,
urbanization and mass migration formed the basis for societal cleavage, which may be
seen in conflicts between a developed "center" and an underdeveloped "periphery."
However, for regional politics, at least in those regions focused on the politics of the
capital city, this cleavage has simultaneoulsy been referred to urban-rural and centerperiphery cleavages. Big cities — regional capitals and their metropolitan areas--were
centers of simultaneous social, economic and cultural modernization for the surrounding
area, while the remainder of the region falls into the semi-periphery or even periphery.
This latent cleavage in the late-Soviet period is still neglected. Political regimes that
existed in the USSR from the mid-1950s until the late 1980s — both on national and
regional levels — were commonly regarded as non-competitive. Even pluralistrevisionist scholars, who analyzed regional politics in the Soviet Union during that
period, observed significant limitations on competition among actors and the
development of interest groups that was not accompanied by public contestation in the
electoral arena. The center-periphery cleavage in the late-Soviet period was
accompanied by contradictions in the two systems of economic governance of regional
resources — industry and agriculture. The industrial system of governance, primarily
associated with the large-scale military-industrial and fuel and energy complexes, was
decentralized on the regional level and highly dependent on national ministries. In
contrast, the agricultural system of governance was highly decentralized on the national
level, but centralized in the regions, especially in grain producing regions. These
systems of government produced, respectively, phenomena of departmentalism and
localism (vedomstvennost’ and mestnichestvo, i.e. sectoral- or local-based clientelist
networks)- EXPLAIN. Regional Communist party committees served as mediators
between the two systems and integrated the regional government as a whole, while also
pursuing their own interests.
Modernization processes tend to lead to differentiation and rising complexity in the local
governance of big cities, in which most regional resources are concentrated. Thus, city
governments acquired more autonomy than the regional governments (more "ruralized"
than "urbanized"). This autonomy provided structural pre-conditions for city-region
conflict, which was different, although overlapping, with the industry-agriculture
dichotomy. Thus, in the late-Soviet period the structural conditions of actor
differentiation and interest conflicts had appeared. Yet, due to the continuing existence
of the non-competitive Soviet political regime, these contradictions were latent. The
balance of resources among the major latent actors (i.e. agrarians, industrial leaders,
and city governments ) varied from region to region. Therefore, the allocation of these
resources provided grounds for future cleavages and for the emergence of competition
among actors during regime transitions. Cleavages could not emerge at all in some
underdeveloped regions with weak latent actors, and either had limited significance due
to the relative domination of some of actors over others or, conversely, played a crucial
role in the future competition among actors.
The opening of the political system and emergence of open intra-elite conflicts during
the early stages of transition was not the classic clash between "hard-liners" and
"softliners", but was related to the changing balance of power and the fluctuating values
of regional resources that emerged out of policies from the center, in this case an
external actor. During the 1990s, the center was a major source of institutional
innovations, which determined the foundations of the formal institutions in regional
political regimes. The major institutional changes which are important here were: 1)
changes in the separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches; 2)
a more autonomous system of local government; and, 3) the installation of electoral
practices. These innovations were inconsistently realized due to the way in which they
were implemented, and their impact was contradictory — across and within the different
regions. The explanation for these contradictions is directly related to the structural
characteristics of regional political developments. The center launched political
innovations as discrete institutional changes. Yet, on the regional level these
innovations were either accompanied or not by their incremental implementation. In
other words, these innovations acted as a seed which had the potential to sprout in soil
that had not been well prepared. Obviously the political consequences of institutional
changes in the regions depends highly on the existence of internal actors who are
interested in using these innovations for their own purposes. They serve to translate the
innovations into concrete institutional change. Thus, the regional cleavage structure
determined the limits of an actor’s political opportunities and the limits of institutional
change.
Therefore, structural cleavages and the opportunities to overcome them during the
regional regime transition processes were the main factors impacting the institutional
changes. In those regions where cleavage structures have negligible impact on regional
political regimes or where their role was eliminated by effective patronage politics,
institutional changes were successfully adopted by dominant actors to their own
purposes. Yet, in regions where structural cleavages provided a number of competitive
actors or where patronage politics was insufficient to establish a non-competitive elite
settlement, these cleavages created a framework for successful installation of
institutional changes.
During the conflict for power, the main agents of institutional change and the installation
of formal institutions were those actors who did not have enough resources to become
the dominant actor. In contrast, dominant actors, or those actors who try to acquire this
position, have little interest in the formal limitation of his/her strategies. Thus, for the
"weak" competitors, the construction of formal institutions serves as a weapon in the
struggle for survival. The opportunity for local government autonomy secured city
governments (i.e. mayors) a number of arbitrary powers, while elections provided an
opportunity to increase their political resources, even if these powers were not used for
a decisive victory over their competitors.
The launch of formal institutions in regions with structural cleavages that are unavoiable
narrows the sphere of informal institutions and undermines the basis of patronage
politics. The establishment of institutional guarantees for local actors autonomy
strengthens these cleavages and limits the chances of a return to patronage politics.
The additional process of regional political development, the adaptation of social
cleavages to electoral politics, tends to occur through mass mobilization. Thus, actors
were needed to create their own vehicles in the form of competitive "parties of power."
The sustainability of these cleavages prevented a "zero-sum" outcome from electoral
competition. Thus, if a condition of actor autonomy exists, holding competitive elections
means the survival of: 1) the political competitiveness of actors through mechanisms of
mass politics; and, 2) the inevitable role of formal institutions to create the rules and
norms of regional political regimes. These circumstances have a significant impact on
the crucial stages of regime transition: uncertainty and outcome.
Regime Transition and Uncertainty
Early in their seminal book on regime transition, O’Donnell and Phillipe Schmitter raise
the issue of transition from certain authoritarian rule to uncertain "something else",
which could be democracy or a new authoritarian regime. Despite this acknowledged
degree of uncertainty, almost all works in this field are based on some kind of "iron law
of democratization." Explicitly or implicitly, this type of research has been based on
teleological schema of political development. According to such an approach, all
transitions will sooner or later achieve democracy (at least, in Dahl’s "procedural"
sense) as the final goal of political development. But there are no well-founded reasons
why this should be so, save for macro-historical speculations. This kind of teleology of
history seems similar to a pure Marxist-Leninist paradigm of "historical materialism." But
why not employ an alternative paradigmatic approach to analyzing regime transition-transition as an open-ended process?
Speaking purely in functional terms, the process of regime transition (i.e. the shift of one
political regime to another), regardless of the regime type itself, includes several stages:
1) the decline and breakdown of the previously-existing "ancien regime"; 2) some kind
of uncertainty in all elements of the political regime, 3) the outcome of uncertainty,
meaning the installment of a new political regime; and, 4) the institutionalization of a
new political regime (regardless of whether it is a democracy or something else).
The crucial points in the process of regime transition are stages 2) and 4) – the
breakdown of the ancien regime (i.e. "entry" into uncertainty), and the installation of the
new regime (i.e. "exit" or "outcome" of uncertainty). This "gap" of uncertainty differs
completely from the "transition to democracy" model, where the installation of
democracy results from the breakdown of the authoritarian regime by default.
Uncertainty is a crucial stage of transition, which is distinct from uncertainty in stable
regimes. As Valerie Bunce has noted, the distinction is that within authoritarian regimes
the positions of actors are more or less certain, yet the institutions are ill-defined (or
uncertain). In democratic polities, however, the institutions are defined (or certain), while
the positions of actors are uncertain or, at least, not defined a priori. During transition
periods, both these elements of political regimes - the position of actors and the
institutions – are uncertain to varying degrees.
The key characteristics of uncertainty lie in the uncertain position of actors and an
institution-free environment. Actors are free to fight for domination within the polity using
all means of power maximization, but not for the creation of democracy. Even those
politicians who call themselves democrats have no intentions of losing their positions to
other actors. Such rational actors would reject an idea of competitive democracy, which
needs an establishment of formal institutions for free and fair political competition, and
threatens the loss (or, at least, limitation) of their powers. Indeed, the maximization of
one’s own powers and the minimization of the powers of any other actors who
potentially could challenge his/her position, fulfills a rational actor’s strategy in a stage of
uncertainty. For certain regimes, this strategy is limited either by institutions (in
democratic regimes) or by the opportunities of other actors, such as their positions or
resources (in authoritarian regimes). During a period of uncertainty, actors either have
no institutional limitations or have insufficient information about other actors’ resources.
If one actor has enough resources to overwhelm all others, s/he simply occupies the
position of the dominant actor. This position means an absence of limitations on the
"leader" due to the relative weaknesses of other actors. If the resources of several
actors are more or less equal, their struggle for survival could develop into a form of
bargaining, if actors use a compromise strategy, or, in the case of the use of force, in a
form of permanent violent conflict, such as Thomas Hobbes’ "war of all against all".
A period of uncertainty – even large-scale and long-run – cannot exist forever. This
stage must inevitably come to completion. The outcome (or exit) of uncertainty is a kind
of reaction to the "entry" into uncertainty. Thus, a partial application of the
aforementioned Karl/Schmitter schema of modes of transition engenders the
development of a matrix similar to Table 4 that focuses on scenarios of outcomes of
uncertainty. Variables in such a matrix include: 1) the position of actors and 2) their use
of strategies during the period of outcome of uncertainty.
The first of four possible outcomes of uncertainty, war of all against all involves a
decision by actors about outcomes, but does not yet qualify as an "exit" from
uncertainty. If actors use force strategies of force, without one actor possessing
overwhelming resources over others, the war of all against all will continue, probably
evolving into new forms. The "warlordism" described by Kirkow in Primorskii Krai's
political regime is the typical result of such a scenario. Nevertheless, from the viewpoint
of new regime installation, this scenario of outcome of uncertainty is not regarded as a
unit for future analysis. A second scenario could be realized if the use of a force
strategy became successful for one of the actors, and s/he achieved the position of the
dominant actor. The result of this scenario is a dominant actor victory in a zero-sum
game based on the principle of winner takes all. The third scenario of outcome of
uncertainty could be developed as a result of an explicit or implicit agreement between
the dominant actor and other actors over the common acceptance of institutions, which
secured them their positions. This scenario is called an elite settlement, using the term
by John Higley and other authors. The final outcome of uncertainty is the balance of
force among actors, as well as the danger of defeat in a zero-sum conflict, that leads to
the use of "weapons" in the struggle for survival. These self-perpetuating weapons are
the regular use of democratic and/or legal institutions to define the field of combat. This
outcome is called a struggle over the rules, quite the opposite of war of all against all
(i.e. struggle without formal rules).
As will be shown below, the varieties of scenarios of outcomes of uncertainty in
Russia’s regions were contingent upon previously existing cleavage structures as well
as upon modes of transition. Those regions, where intra-elite cleavages either did not
emerge, or had been eliminated due to the policies of dominant actors, are generally
close to the winner takes all or elite settlement scenarios. Only if cleavages strengthen
during the outcome of uncertainty in the form of formal institutions will a struggle over
the rules became inevitable.
Recognizing that the matrix is simply an analytical tool, I examine several Russian
regions representing these ideal-types provides for a clearer explanation of each
scenario and its impact on a new political regime. This brings us from theoretical
considerations to the comparative analysis of Russia’s regional political regimes.
Scenarios of Outcomes of Uncertainty
Winner Takes All: Saratov Oblast’
The reasons for the emergence of a dominant actor, who maximizes his/her power
through the use of force strategies, may vary widely. The long duration of uncertainty
and weakness of cleavages in underdeveloped regions provides opportunities for
"outsider" populists to seize all power. This assertion of power by top executives in new
democratic polities is an option in the winner takes all scenario. It may result from the
decay of the previous political regime after long-run and large-scale uncertainty in a war
of all against all. The case of Saratov Oblast’ is typical in this respect. Sergey
Ryzhenkov evaluated the political struggle in this region during 1991-96 as the
aspiration for the (re)establishment and assertion of the "obkom" position.
This position is characterized by total political, economic and ideological
control over the state sector and public life through the establishment of a
hierarchical system of government without any control over the governing
group".
Yet, none of actors in Saratov were able to achieve such a goal. Despite strong localism
in the late-Soviet period and the emergence of an intra-elite cleavage in the form of a
conflict between the city government and an agrarian group in the post-Soviet period, a
"rebellion" of subordinate city groups failed due to a lack of resources. This conflict
continued over a period of five years, and the position of all actors have been
weakened. Under these conditions, most of the actors were forced to agree to an
assertion of executive power as a "lesser evil." Thus, conflict was resolved as a zerosum game when the former vice-mayor of Saratov, Dmitrii Ayatskov, came to occupy
the position of the Governor. With the rebellious actors weakened, the political
competition in Saratov Oblast’ has fully disappeared.
The winner takes all scenario is similar to those "scenarios" without any breakdown of
the ancien regime. These types of political regimes have emerged in some Russian
republics, such as Tatarstan, where the ancien regime of the late-Soviet period directly
transformed during the post-Soviet period into a power monopoly of the governing elite
without open intra-elite conflict. In referring to the political development in Brazil, Juan
Linz classified these regimes as an "authoritarian situation" rather than an "authoritarian
regime." The principal distinction here is that the formal institutions of a democratic
regime still survive (i.e. legislatures, legislation, elections, and political parties), but they
have little influence on the decision-making process. The dominant actor has no
obstacles to exclude other actors from the political process and secure direct or indirect
control over the political society and the media. Any expectations that the dominant
actors will disappear in the future have little foundation: under conditions of an absence
of real alternatives, successful governments can survive, secure popular support, and
diminish any evidence of uncontrolled political activity.
Overall, the winner takes all scenario is likely to enhance the power monopoly of the
dominant actor and the supremacy of informal institutions. The consequences of this
scenario are the emergence of political regimes with numerous aspects of authoritarian
rule. These regimes could be relatively stable, and the prospects for their
democratization are minimal.
Elite Settlement: Nizhnii Novgorod Oblast’
The scenario of elite settlement is similar to a "pact" which includes the reorganization
of elite interests and the achievement of substantial compromises among competing
actors over the crucial political issues. This perspective is commonly accepted by
scholars of political transition that see pacts as the most effective (fast and peaceful)
means of democratization. However, pacts which occur during the breakdown of the
ancien regime are quite distinct from agreements achieved among actors simply for the
sake of an end to uncertainty. The former (such as classical Spanish "Moncloa Pact")
focused on defining formal institutions, such as the rules of public contestation during
regime transition. Alternatively, the latter is based on the actors’ intentions to secure
their positions and, thus, to consolidate the new regime under conditions that minimize
competitiveness. In a transition to democracy framework, pacts serve as a mode of
democratization. But the outcome of uncertainty through pact scenario serves to keep
democratization pending, or, at least, to diminish the unpleasant consequences of
democracy, such as the danger of an actor losing his/her power through public
contestation.
This kind of elite settlement is based on explicit or implicit agreements between the
dominant actor and his/her competitors over the sharing of powers, or the sharing of
spheres of influence in a political market. The formation of a "minimal winning coalition"
of dominant and subordinate actors is an immediate result of these agreements. The
formation of this coalition has multiple goals, including preventing the breakthrough of
political outsiders (who are not included in the elite settlement) to powerful positions.
Among Russia’s regions, the case of Nizhnii Novgorod Oblast’ is typical of this scenario.
This region had developed departmentalism in the late-Soviet period, and an
autonomous city government as well as an industrial directorate which led to some
intra-elite cleavages in the post-Soviet period. When appointed in 1991, Governor Boris
Nemtsov had no influence over regional elites. Nemtsov was limited to an ineffective
force strategy, yet achieved several important informal agreements with the majority in
the regional legislature, a number of enterprise directors, and parts of the regional
administrative elite. Ultimately, intra-elite conflicts were eliminated, and subordinate
actors became loyal to Nemtsov as the dominant actor, yet they had acquired greater
security in their previous positions. Nemtsov used this strategy to establish more
effective regional government performance and for successful conflict resolution within
and outside the region in ways that worked to his own benefit. At the same time, the
political competition of actors had been limited. During the 1995 gubernatorial elections,
Nemtsov won with an overwhelming majority; his vote totals were more than twice that
of his closest challenger. In 1997, however, Nemtsov was appointed as a first deputy
prime minister of the Russian government and left Nizhnii Novgorod. Thus, the basis for
the regional elite settlement was undermined.
A scholar in Nizhnii Novgorod has characterized the main features of the regional
political regime under Nemtsov as follows: 1) the prevalence of executive authority over
the legislature; 2) an informal contract of mutual loyalty between regional and national
authorities; 3) the indirect control of regional authorities over the media; 4) the
neutralization or limitation of real or potential centers of political opposition in the region;
and, 5) the patronage of regional executives over public associations (both over political
groups and "third sector" NGO’s) in exchange for their loyalty. Although he referred to
these features as "regional authoritarianism," the relative autonomy of the legislature
and political parties, the absence of explicit violations of political and civil rights provided
more grounds for classifying the impact of Nizhnii Novgorod’s elite settlement on
regional politics as a hybrid regime, or "semi-democracy."
The achievement of the elite settlement does not mean, however, the sustainability of
the political regime itself. It is challenged by the informal institutionalization of arbitrary
rule that undermines functioning democratic institutions. In the case of Nizhnii Novgorod
Oblast’, core decisions about a regional program of economic reform in 1992 were
issued not by the legislature (or by any other formal institution), but by an informal
coordinating council, which included the executive and legislative heads of the region
and City of Nizhnii Novgorod. The continuation of these informal practices of decisionmaking provides a pre-condition for the danger of power assertion, such as occurred
when the "wrong" candidate (discussed above) won the mayoral race. Regional
authorities quickly invalidated the elections and called for a new race. Thus, public
contestation was limited from above. Nevertheless, in the next round another challenger
won, finally breaking the "elite settlement".
This kind of elite settlement is generally fragile, and changes in the balance of
resources among actors easily undermine its stability. The breakdown of the elite
settlement either results in movement toward an "authoritarian situation" (if the
dominant actor strengthens his/her position), or "entry" into a new cycle of uncertainty (if
the dominant actor loses his/her position). The elite settlement scenario of outcome of
uncertainty includes the sharing of powers between dominant and subordinate actors in
order to limit public political contestation, and establish the supremacy of informal,
rather than formal, institutions. These regimes are fragile and very dependent on
changes in the political situation. Speaking more generally, this scenario tends to act as
a transition between winner takes all and the following scenario – struggle over the
rules.
Struggle Over the Rules: Sverdlovsk oblast’
In this scenario, a struggle over the rules develops when intra-elite cleavages cannot be
eliminated due to patronage policies. When force strategies are exhausted, and the
level of uncertainty is relatively high, the positions of political actors threatened, either
as a result of defeat in a "war" or due to unsuccessful bargaining over the elite
settlement. Therefore, the installation and adherence to formal institutions becomes the
only opportunity for actors to survive within a regime. Moreover, while supremacy of one
actor tends to be fixed in the institutional design, the uncertainty or balance of forces are
likely to lead to the general acceptance of those rules, which allows actors to avoid the
winner takes all outcome.
The case of the Sverdlovsk Oblast’ demonstrates a more advanced version in the
development of the struggle over the rules scenario. The cleavage between naturalresource rich mining districts, the city of Yekaterinburg, and the rest of the oblast’, was
formed during the Soviet period, and was associated with strong departmentalism.
During that period, the cleavage was formed on the basis of three competitive actors,
while the struggle of elites for power maximization was forced to develop within the
framework of formal institutions. The use of this framework really limited the
opportunities for the assertion of individual powers and opened opportunities for actor
contestation; the use of formal institutions as "weapons" was accompanied by the
electoral competition of actors. Under the arbitrary rule of a dominant actor, mass
politics have been based on "political machines" and administrative mobilization.
Alternatively, the struggle over the rules scenario created an environment for the
emergence of a competitive party system.
After the 1993 dissolution of the "Urals Republic" and the resignation of regional
governor Eduard Rossel’, regional elites in the Sverdlovsk Oblast’ have lost their unity,
and no actors occupied a dominant position. On the one hand, having lost access to
administrative resources, Rossel’ was forced to use alternative mechanisms of electoral
mobilization for his return to power; he headed his own political party, an organization
labeled as the non-party movement "Transformation of the Urals". On the other hand,
the use of formal rules/institutions likely underlay the legislative decisions to create
political institutions which excluded a winner takes all outcome (such as a PR electoral
system and the autonomy of local government). Thus, even after victory in the 1995
gubernatorial elections, Rossel’ was still unable to monopolize power in the region.
Simultaneously, his main contenders (the city government led by the mayor of
Yekaterinburg and representatives of mining districts) were forced to establish their own
parties for elections to the regional legislature: "Our Home is Our City" and "Mining
Industrial Urals." After the series of 1995-1998 electoral campaigns, the party system of
Sverdlovsk Oblast’ became the basis for competition among political actors.
Speaking more generally, limitations of political struggle by formal institutions makes it
unlikely that actors will return to positions of power employing force strategies.
Transferring this struggle into the field of electoral competition created an environment
for contending with the various alternatives through the structure of a party system. In
this sense, elite conflicts, rather than settlements, are more likely to limit the influence of
informal institutions and aid in the growth of political society as a whole.
In the end, the struggle over the rules scenario of outcome of uncertainty is likely to
provide an institutional framework as a precondition to democratization in the sense of
horizontal accountability through the institutional limitation on assertions of power.
Nevertheless, this outcome has not yet achieved a full-fledged, democratic regime as
there has been no turnover of political actors within these same institutions.
Huntington’s test of democratization based on the achievement of a second electoral
cycle is very helpful in this sense. Until the institutionalization of the new regime through
the second elections of chief executives, it is still quite fragile. In contrast with
"authoritarian situations," the consequences of the struggle over the rules scenario may
refer to a "democratic situation".
Conclusion: Prospects for Democratization
It is still difficult to provide definitive conclusions concerning Russia’s regional puzzle
without systematic comparative study of regime transition in a large number of cases of
regions. Adding a more in-depth perspective to this discussion, the following analyses of
political developments in Moscow and Komi by Andrei Degtyarev and James Alexander,
respectively, provide empirical evidence of the applicability of my approach to the
analysis of Russian regional politics. Even based on a limited number of case studies,
tentative conclusions can be made about conditions of democratization in Russia.
So, what of the conditions for successful democratization in Russia’s regions ? First, the
emergence of competitive politics within the framework of formal institutions becomes
possible as an outcome of intra-elite conflicts, not due to the intentions of competitive
actors. Second, these conflicts are not likely to be resolved as a zero-sum game (i.e. as
a full-fledged victory of one actor). Third, these conflicts are unlikely to be eliminated
under conditions of patronage politics and elite settlements. Finally, the installation of
institutional changes and formal institutions (i.e. competitive elections) inevitably
transfers intra-elite conflicts into the legal framework and the electoral arena. In the light
of these observations, the case of successful democratization can be explained as a
path-contingent model through the diachronic projection of the following qualifications:
1) structural cleavages provide political opportunities and make actor
competitiveness inevitable. With the cleavages at the base of the political
regime, actor competitiveness become indispensable;
2) actualization of elite cleavages for the installation of formal institutions
tends to make the use of these institutions a weapon in the struggle for
political survival;
3) translation of intra-elite and societal cleavages in the electoral arena in
the fixed configuration of competitive actors by a framework of formal
institutions, makes the democratization process self-sustainable.
The Trials and Tribulations of Moscow: The Untold Story
Democratization and the Komi Republic: The Struggle for Competitive Politics
As the processes of political development in Russia’s regions have often been
characterized more by the creation of political fiefdoms than the flowering of democracy
in a new age, Gel’man’s regime typology provides a nice sub-text to this more
empirically based discussion of political events in the Komi Republic. As he has shown,
a significant trend in these developments has been the centralization process around a
group of regional elites at the expense of other contenders. In concert with this process
are the varying degrees to which certain key regional leaders represent an extension of
Soviet nomenklatura privileges and their extension into post-communist Russia in new
and variegated forms.
Overall, the trend toward regional elite dominance has been exhibited in constraints on
the activity of independent groups and individuals that might interfere with the
centralized, regional authority. By striving to constrain the evolution of civil society,
political leaders are impeding the transition toward substantive democracy. Part of the
strategy to guide regional affairs has been expressed in the open resistance of many
regional elites to the directives of central authorities. As a result, the many regional
fiefdoms that have emerged in post-Soviet Russia are the targets of both federal policy
and local political opposition alike–from above and from below. This scenario describes
political development in the Komi Republic. Rather than a font for democratic
development, Komi models the obstacles to political reform in a post-communist
society. Over the past several years, political power in Komi has shifted along a
spectrum between the winner take all and elite settlement scenarios of Gel’man’s
typology, thus falling into the category of a hybrid regime.
The Politics of Pluralism
This discussion emerges from thoughts concerning the development of pluralism in
Russia. If one simply conceives of pluralism as the division of power across society
through the presence of autonomous entities, it is reasonably accurate to argue that at
the national level Russia has achieved at least a semi-pluralistic political system, with
numerous "national" parties and the clear influence of business interests. While other
groups--including unions and the church--carry varying, and clearly lesser, degrees of
influence, Russia has moved beyond nascent pluralism. When considering the
resistance of the regions to central directives and their simultaneous attempts to
influence central political decision-making, this becomes even more evident, although
one may question whether this is an entirely healthy development for the Russian
Federation. As exemplified by the power-sharing treaties between the Kremlin and
various regional governments since Tatarstan began the process in 1994, the regions
carry significant influence on the center. As discussed above, the political regimes
within the regions themselves have shown much greater resistance to politically
liberalizing forces. Looking to both strengthen federal authority and expand local
competition, federal authorities have sought to break the regional political hierarchies.
At the center of this policy has been the August 1995 federal law directing the
establishment of local self-governments throughout the 89 regional entities of Russia.
Resisted by many regions from the start, the difficulties of establishing local selfgovernment have been two-fold: 1) getting regional elites to open political processes by
relinquishing a degree of control over sub-regional politics; and 2) whether sufficiently
strong independent local interests exist, or can be developed, to take advantage of the
competitive opportunity. By early 1999 most regions had to some degree complied with
the federal legislation. The Komi Republic, however, had consistently resisted all efforts
to break the vertical authority structure constructed by Republic Head Yuri Spiridonov
and his political and economic allies. Moreover, federal difficulties dividing local political
resources from above have been mirrored in ineffective attempts from below by local
political parties, socio-political groups and movements. The center ofthe struggle rests
on who–the people or the head–has the right to elect/appoint the 21 sub-regional heads
of administration that have been part of the executive chain of command. If, as has
been the practice, the head appoints these officials, they are dependent on him for their
livelihood.
This discussion looks at the struggle over the establishment of local self-government in
Komi as the vehicle for assessing the relative development of pluralism, or politically
competitive activity, in the republic. In linking federal and sub-regional activity, I will
detail the Spiridonov regime’s efforts to resist central edicts while ignoring political
opposition within the republic. While neither level of government has been particularly
effective in altering the character of Spiridonov’s rule, events in 1998 and the first half of
1999 (court decisions and economic and political crises) appear to have sparked some
movement toward the eventual development of independent local self-government and
the expanding influence among liberal-democratic organizations.
Located in the far north of Russia and bordering the western Ural Mountains, the Komi
Republic is most identifiable as a location for Stalinist state labor camps (gulags), its
ethnic divisions and abundant natural resources. On the political front, Spiridonov has
been a strong figure in Komi politics since the late 1980s (he was the last First
Secretary of the Komi Communist party) and is serving his second term as Head of the
Republic. He is an independent-minded leader, who has been willing to resist central
Russian directives, both in the interests of the republic and his own political future. As
the regional executive, Spiridonov is a member of the Federation Council and has been
active in pursuing the interests of Russia’s Northern Regions. As a fellow "oil man,"
Spiridonov was closely linked to former Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.
His dismissal in March 1998 and failure to be re-appointed in September 1998 appear
to have had a marked influence on Spiridonov’s policy calculations.
Komi is a multi-ethnic region in which Russians comprise over half of the population,
while the indigenous Komi are less than 25%. While ethnicity issues are important in
Komi, they do not threaten to destabilize the republic. Overall, an already declining
population of 1,163,000 is expected to decline further to 1,034,00 by 2015. Komi would
seem to have a bright economic future. Fuel (oil, coal and gas) is the largest industry in
the region, making up approximately 50% of Komi’s GDP. Oil is the main export,
providing 63% of total export revenue, followed by timber related products (16%) and
coal (11%). Komi has trade relations with over 40 foreign countries and has been
actively expanding its ties with other regions in Russia.
The discussion is organized into three sections. The first section briefly details the
political formation of Komi since 1990, showing the movement from an elite settlement
preceding the 1993 political struggle in Moscow to a regime more closely approximating
a winner takes all scenario by early 1995. The second section examines the cycle of
attempts and failures of parties and socio-political groups to participate in Komi political
processes that characterize the winner takes all period. This section continues by
showing how one particular group reacted to this failure by challenging the Spiridonov
regime in regional and federal courts. In a way that steps outside of Gel’man’s typology,
the use of the federal courts represents a form of the "struggle over the rules" outcome
of uncertainty, but one that includes an external actor. This section further examines the
interplay of the legal system and legislation as Spiridonov has sought to delay
implementing federal directives and court rulings that have threatened his position of
power. Finally, I evaluate the mixed signals that have emerged from governing circles
as Spiridonov has reacted to increasing federal and local pressure with greater
recognition of "opposition" political forces and the formation and elections of institutions
of local self-government in February 1999. In this fashion we find the political playing
field widening as Komi–at least on the surface–moves back toward an elite settlement.
The Cycles of Komi Politics
Elite Settlement: Pre-October 1993
As the first Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic to declare sovereignty from the
dictates of the Soviet Union in August 1990, the Komi political leadership had to have
had a basic level of consensus to make such a drastic step in the face of 70 years of
Soviet control. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in late-1991, Komi continued to
express its independent streak within the Russian Federation. At that time the power
structure revolved around the Komi Supreme Soviet, headed by Spiridonov, and the
Council of Ministers (the government), headed by Viacheslav Khudiaev. Part of the
balance existed along ethnic lines as well, recognizing the Soviet policy of dividing
authority in the ethnic republics (Spiridonov is Russian, while Khudiaev is Komi). The
simple alliance among these institutions and the leaders of the enterprises producing
Komi’s natural resources signified basic peace in the republic and a unified stance
toward federal authorities. In this vein, Komi was a signatory to the short-lived 1992
Federation Treaty, which recognized national republics as state entities, providing the
republics with complete legislative and executive authority over their territories.
With the violent confrontation between President Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet in
October 1993, the Komi alliance for developing the republic’s sovereignty was ultimately
broken by Yeltsin’s decree (although more of a recommendation at the republic level)
dissolving all regional soviets (including the Komi Supreme Soviet). It also undermined
the elite settlement then existing in the republic. With his position of power threatened,
Spiridonov began a drive (initiating a zero-sum game) to become the singular leader
within Komi. Furthermore, the release of the draft Russian Constitution in November
1993 pushed Spiridonov toward a more aggressive assertion of Komi sovereignty as the
text did not carry the same degree of regional independence found in the Federation
Treaty. Together, these two events were the catalyst for Spiridonov’s drive for sole
leadership in Komi and his spirited resistance to federal authority.
Winner-Takes-All: 1994-early 1998
In order to construct his power base, Spiridonov delayed the implementation of Yeltsin’s
edict to dissolve the Supreme Soviet until January 1995 elections to the new legislature,
the Komi State Council. During 1994, Spiridonov augmented his powers while
"eliminating" his opposition, as represented by Khudiaev and his supporters. Early that
year, he used his leadership in the Supreme Soviet to develop a constitution for Komi.
In this document, Spiridonov discounted a 1993 defeat of a popular referendum item
designed to create a Komi presidency to introduce an equivalent post, Head of the
Republic. In May elections he soundly defeated Khudiaev to become the individual
center of authority in Komi. That fall, Spiridonov employed his continued authority in the
Supreme Soviet to pass the Komi Law on Executive Authority that ensured the election
of a State Council dependent on his rule. These two documents created the vertical
power structure within the republic. In this process, there have been many parallels with
the consolidation of executive power in other regions, including Primorskii Krai and
Omsk. By early 1995, Spiridonov had completed the task of marginalizing his
opposition. This was shown when Spiridonov’s candidate for State Council Chairman,
Vladimir Torlopov, overwhelmingly defeated an increasingly weak Khudiaev. Until
recently, he and his supporters would largely disappear from significant Komi political
activity.
The Constitution identifies 20 districts in Komi of regional/ territorial importance.
Additionally, the leadership position of each district (and an additional territorial
subdistrict near Syktyvkar) was initially included in the executive branch under the
direction of the head. These 21 heads of administration have been (until recently)
appointed by the head of the republic. In turn, these heads of administration have been
in the position to appoint local administrators in towns and villages, thus ensuring
vertical control of the region. Overall, the 20 regional/territorial districts overlap with 30
electoral districts based on population to comprise the 50 electoral districts of the
current State Council. With an inherent advantage in January 1995 elections, 13 of the
administrative heads would be elected to the State Council along with others who were,
or would become, beholden to the Head through ministerial appointments to the
executive branch. Furthermore, although not as beholden to Spiridonov, 16 of the
"generals" of Komi industry (oil, timber, gas, etc.) were elected to the Council as well.
Ultimately, half of the council has been said to be in the "pocket" of the Head.
In a corporatist arrangement that has been exhibited across Russia in various forms,
the industry generals have generally supported the head. As the Spiridonov government
is in a position to reward (i.e. tax breaks, subsidies, advantageous lending terms, etc.)
or punish (tax inspection, higher tax rates, etc.) these industries, they have developed a
mutually beneficial alliance. In this type of an alliance, Komi politics carry aspects of the
elite settlement model. In part, the alliance is an important aspect explaining
Spiridonov’s struggle to keep the republic vertically structured. Komi is a large region
with various natural power centers. The Ukhta region is the primary center for the oil
industry. Vorkuta is a center of coal production, an industry that has been traditionally
the province of federal, rather than regional control. Thus, from Spiridonov’s
perspective, keeping the Republic "unified" is vitally important.
Spiridonov has used his position to influence State Council votes on issues he
considers important. Probably most telling has been his ability to get the council to
amend the Constitution, as shown in events leading up to November 1997 elections for
head. Originally scheduled for May 1998, Spiridonov wanted to move the elections up to
take advantage of relatively favorable economic conditions and avoid the uncertainties
of the ruble re-denomination scheduled for January 1998. It would also put him in a
significant advantage over his opponents, who would have little time to prepare for the
election. To re-schedule the elections, the Constitution was quickly amended by an
overwhelming 39-4 vote, well beyond the two-third majority needed. Spiridonov would
go on to defeat his main opponent, State Duma Deputy Rita Chistokhodova, by an
almost three-to-one margin in the popular vote. Although not always the case,
Spiridonov has been a master at using the legislature and the legal system to his
advantage.
The Challenge To Authority
The "Opposition" and Political Group Influence
During the winner takes all period, independent political organizations (whether political
parties or interest groups) have not had much success influencing political
developments in Komi. Leaders in Komi’s weak civil society have, however, attempted
numerous strategies to break the stranglehold of the executive branch. These have
included the temporary union of opposition groups to present a more powerful block and
the push for the creation of independent local government institutions to (hopefully)
widen access to political processes and allow for more competitive, pluralist government
in the region. While it might appear that the impetus of such a union was solely the
acquisition of political resources, the development of "democracy from below" came to
be seen as the only way they and other Komi residents could have influence over
policy-making in the republic.
The varying positions on this issue have been quite stark. The administration’s position
then and through mid-1999 would be that Komi was neither sufficiently mature (i.e. the
people are not ready) nor were there sufficient financial means to successfully
implement the institutional changes leading to independent local self-government.
Arguing that such a division of authority would place the republic in a particularly weak
position in its relations with the Kremlin, then press secretary for the Syktyvkar Mayor,
Andrei Borodikin, claimed that Komi’s vertical power structure was the most effective
means of government. From opposition circles, a far different view emerged: only
through the development of independent local government institutions--in which the
people elected their local head of administration directly--could the Komi people ensure
that local executives would fulfill their duties. These local politicians needed to be
beholden to the people rather than the head. In this fashion, substantive democratic
processes would develop.
The difficulties for opposition groups to affect policy in Komi went beyond issues of local
self-government, and extended into the regional legislature, underlining the broad,
informal agreement among a narrow elite. Particularly vexing for representatives of the
local political parties, none of the deputies elected in 1995 represented national parties,
with only three of the 50 seats occupied by deputies carrying some affiliation with the
local communists. For many of the successful candidates, rather than being beholden to
a party, they could individually rely on their relative fame as local heads of
administration, economic leaders or former CPSU elite to ensure election. Without any
representation, it is difficult for the parties both to grow and press their diverse agendas
as one would find in a Western legislature. Without a party structure, there were few
clear points of interest around which to rally groups of deputies beyond the personal
presence of the Head of the Republic.
Whether or not political parties were to achieve representative status, the Komi
Constitution provides little to recommend the Council as an effective legislature. The
immediate stumbling block is the Council's non-professional status, a major victory for
Spiridonov during 1994 constitutional debates. As a result, the legislature only meets
once a month for two days. For some, the development of a professional parliament
would return a balance to Komi political institutions, by creating a more independent
legislative body. If being a deputy were a full-time job, the industrial generals that make
up the "corporatist bloc" would go back to running their companies, ultimately unwilling
to give up their large salaries for a deputy’s wage. Furthermore, this would also limit the
number of heads of administration in the council when faced with such an increase in
responsibility. Currently, however, because it is difficult for the body to address the
majority of questions brought to each session, the head has greater leeway in running
the Republic.
In addition to concerns about the effectiveness of the State Council, temporary political
unions have formed across a spectrum of parties. During the winner takes all period,
however, these unions were linked by their almost universal failure. The Electoral
Association of Democratic Organizations (PADORK) organized in 1995 to prepare for
elections to the State Duma and to ensure that the Komi Constitution functioned in
accordance with the Russian Constitution. Furthermore, since the release of the federal
law on local self-government in August 1995, a primary focus for local political groups,
including PADORK, has been upon establishing local self-government in Komi. Thus,
these blocks have sought to unite their resources in pushing for access to Komi policymaking decisions on a number of levels.
While PADORK brought together the self-proclaimed democratic opposition in Komi, in
1996 SOORK (Council of Public Organization of the Republic of Komi) combined the
opposition groups regardless of political positions and ranged from the local branches of
Democratic Choice of Russia, to the Communists and LDPR. Seeking a consultative
role in the policy-making process of legislative and executive authority, SOORK had
marginally greater success than PADORK: an agreement requiring the council to inform
and consult the group about prospective bills and bills in process was signed by State
Council Chairman Vladimir Torlopov. As would become clear relatively quickly, this
agreement was ignored by Komi authorities despite SOORK’s public accusations of
executive arrogance and legislative dependence on the executive scarcely two months
later.
Despite an impressive number of successes in resisting political parties, socio-political
groups and even sub-regional legislatures, the Komi authorities have not been able to
rebuff all challenges. Ultimately, the most effective means of interest articulation has
occurred in court. By bringing suit against Komi authorities, the Komi division of the
communist-leaning Popular Patriotic Union of Russia (NPSR) has taken the most
successful path to overcoming official resistance to the federal law on local selfgovernment. Accompanied by the changing federal governments during 1998 and the
sudden economic crisis following the August 17, 1998 collapse of the ruble, the judicial
challenge to the vertical power structure in Komi is what eventually moves political
authorities back in the direction of an elite settlement.
The Judiciary and Local Self-government
The vertical power structure in Komi has provided very few opportunities for "outsiders"
to enter the policy-making process whether as elected officials or as political pressure
groups. Thus, like the civil rights movement in the United States from the 1950s onward,
political opposition groups that have been frozen out of local political circles have turned
their attention to the court system to achieve political "justice." In Komi, various
interests, from the administration in Vorkuta to groups of pensioners have brought suit
against the Komi administration in republican and federal courts. While it has not been
unusual for the plaintiffs to emerge victorious, it is also not unusual for Komi authorities
to ignore or subvert the rulings through the implementation of ineffective "half"
measures, or delay implementation through countersuits. Overall, the reform of legal
standards in post-Soviet Russia has been a slow and uneven process, and Komi is no
exception. While the implementation of the 1995 federal law would seem relatively
straight-forward, ensuing court battles leading up to 999 elections to institutions of local
government have been long and heated.
The first half of 1996 saw the Spiridonov regime active in republic and federal courts. In
seeking to avoid local government elections by March 1 as mandated in the federal law,
Spiridonov complied with a "directive" from the State Council to bring suit to the Russian
Constitutional Court with the claim that provisions of the federal law were in violation of
the Russian Constitution. While Komi would lose the suit in May, Spiridonov was
successful in delaying local elections past the original deadline, although this deadline
had already been extended nationally by Yeltsin. It was during this period that the Komi
affiliate of NPSR entered the local government issue as a litigant pushing for
implementation of the federal law. There would follow a series of judicial rulings from
1997-1999 that are connected to the NPSR quest.
A March 1997 ruling of the Komi Supreme Court noted that the Komi laws relating to
local self-government violated federal standards. As a result, the court set October 19,
1997 as the last possible date by which elections could be held. With this ruling, the
State Council passed a bill to identify the administrative divisions in which local
government institutions were to be instituted. Ultimately, several legislative proposals
were "replaced" by a proposal made by the Head's representative to establish local selfgovernment at the level of village, settlement, country village and parts/sections of the
cities and districts subordinate to the republic. The eventual Law on the Formation of
Municipal Districts was widely criticized for the potential of dividing functioning
administrative regions into sub-districts with inadequate financial and service bases.
From the head’s perspective, however, this "compromise" position ensured that he
would continue to name the 21 Heads of Administration, rather than lose authority that
would come with making these posts elected. In this fashion, the head subverted the
federal law by essentially directing the State Council to adopt an unworkable
institutional framework.
The law on the formation of municipal districts underlined the all out attempt by the head
to keep the vertical power structure intact, even if it meant the continual violation of
federal laws and various court rulings. With the law falling far short of developments in
pluralism envisioned by some federal authorities and local opposition, elections were
delayed by the Russian Supreme Court when it chose to examine the constitutionality of
two articles relating to local government in the Komi Constitution. This decision came at
an opportune moment for the head, who was concerned about the electoral effect of
holding the re-scheduled elections for head alongside local government elections. As a
face saving measure, the State Council included a non-binding plebiscite on the
November ballot. The item asked Komi voters: "Do you think that the formation of
municipalities in the Komi Republic should include the entirety of the republic's
subordinate districts and cities along with their entire territories?" As Viktor Kovalev
notes, the question itself was particularly vague as to whether local institutions would be
limited to the territorial districts or could be formed on another level and it ignored the
central issue of how the territorial head of administration would be chosen. Still, the
plebiscite passed overwhelmingly by 72.6% of voters, with a 48.5% turnout. As the
question was unclear, the results of the vote were also unclear. Nevertheless, in a June
1997 survey, the populace had indicated that it was overwhelmingly in favor of the head
of administration being a popularly elected post. This set the stage for the January 15,
1998 Constitutional Court ruling overturning the Komi law on the formation of municipal
districts.
With the ruling, Spiridonov variously claimed that the ruling violated provisions in the bilateral treaty signed in 1996, which gave the republic the right to determine
independently its local institutions, and that the court did not consider provisions of the
Federation Treaty. Yet, he would back off from his resistance and the State Council
scheduled local self-government elections to coincide with State Council elections set
for February 7, 1999. In preparation for the elections, the council prepared and passed
a law in June 1998 on the formation of local governmental institutions. As before, this
law provided for the popular election of the regional legislatures. Yet, while this law
removed the Head’s authority to name the local heads of administration, it did not
provide for their popular election, either. Instead, it allowed the head to recommend
candidates to those locally elected legislatures. In this way, the head of the republic can
ensure that candidates meet his specifications, even if he can no longer directly appoint
them. Thus, while aspects of the vertical power structure were weakened, Spiridonov
found a way to continue to manage the local institutions.
It should be no surprise that NPSR Chairman Leonid Musinov would again file suit in
the Komi Supreme Court challenging the law as a violation of the Russian Constitution.
In a November 2, 1998 ruling the court agreed with Musinov. The case was appealed to
the Russian Supreme Court by Komi authorities. In a December 25, 1998 ruling, the
Russian court also agreed with Musinov. Again, it seemed that local groups would
achieve their wish, the creation of independent local governmental entities. Again,
however, they would be disappointed. Because the official ruling of the Russian
Supreme Court had not been publicly released, Komi authorities argued that they were
duty bound to follow the extant laws. The ruling was not released until late May 1999,
well after the elections had been held in February. In the interim, Spiridonov followed
the guidelines of the Komi law and nominated his candidates to the local head positions.
Although there were a few obstacles to be overcome, all 21 candidates were eventually
approved by the newly elected local legislatures. To ensure this would occur, Spiridonov
attended the sessions of those legislatures that were predicted to be the most
"troublesome."
Toward Openness: The Return to Elite Settlement?
With the February 1999 elections it would seem that Spiridonov has maintained the
winner takes all aspects of the republic’s political situation. And, truthfully, the
simultaneous elections to the State Council would seem to support such a conclusion,
particularly as the number of heads of administration elected to the body has actually
increased (16 of 21 were chosen). Yet, there were a number of events in 1998 that both
bolster and undermine the winner takes all outcome of uncertainty. Three 1998
legislative decisions expanded the opportunities for him and his cohort. The first
decision alters the law on state service that required retirement by age 60, thus allowing
some (who are approaching, or have passed, age 60, including Spiridonov) of
Spiridonov's team to continue working. Perhaps more significantly, a constitutional
amendment was approved "rescinding the prohibition of the president or his deputies to
hold posts in commercial and civic organizations." This amendment seemingly removes
the de jure legal separation between the state and private sectors, and increases the
corporatist relationship of the top actors in the republic. Perhaps most significant,
however, the State Council bolstered Spiridonov’s political position by passing an
amendment that removed the two term limit on the head, thus freeing Spiridonov to
remain in his position (as the opposition quickly points out) until his death.
Yet, there are also signs that "outsiders" might eventually infect political authority. One
sign emerges from Komi’s compliance with the May 1998 Russian Constitutional Court
ruling that led to the resignation of State Council Deputies who had simultaneously
worked as civil servants (i.e. under the authority of the head). Another comes from the
current redrawing of electoral districts more in line with federal laws mandating relatively
equal population distribution across districts. Thus, for example, the more resistant
Vorkuta region will gain greater representation in 2003 elections.
Probably the most intriguing development in Komi political circles over the past year has
been the reaction to the crisis conditions in Russia. There have been two collective
organizations formed with Spiridonov’s blessing and would seem to be linked to the
misfortunes of Spiridonov’s "patron" former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.
Forming on the heels of Chernomyrdin’s dismissal in March 1998, the first group
brought together 14 regional organizations into a consultative body to the head. This
group basically aims outward, toward federal and international relations. The second
group, "Union for the Transformation of the North" brought together seven reformoriented political parties/movements (since expanded to 13) following the leadership of
the local party of power, Our Home is Russia. With Spiridonov in attendance, this
movement’s founding conference was held in October 1998. This latter group appears
to have been the most durable, and is founded with the general goal of a unified
defense of Komi (even the entire northern region) in the face of anti-reformist elements
regionally and in the national government. In recognizing that a unified republic may
help Komi contend with the vacillating federal government and rising economic
instability, Spiridonov may be coming to a compromise position with the heretofore
democratic opposition.
There continues to be skepticism following failed agreements in the past, both within the
political union and among those who either refuse to join and/or are excluded due to
extreme views. Particularly vocal is the leader of the local Yabloko affiliate, Nikolai
Moiseev, who views this organization as a meaningless play by the Head to coopt much
of the political opposition. An important goal of the organization, however, is the election
of a "democratic" representative to the national State Duma in December 1999
elections. To this point, Komi has only been represented by at least nominal
communists and they hope that the union will lead to a focused vote for a democratic,
reform-oriented candidate. Thus, to the extent that a group such as Transformation of
the North is successful, there seems to be a rising consensus (if not surrender) that has
not been seen in Komi since before the events of October 1993 and the assertion of
Russian executive power.
Conclusion
It should now be clear how the development of competitive politics within Komi has
been retarded by the consistent resistance of executive authority to more open political
processes. Spiridonov’s dogged refusal to implement the law on local self-government
and other federal directives allowed the head to construct a vertical structure of
authority in the republic. Yet, Spiridonov’s administration has not been entirely immune
to federal and regional pressure. Having succeeded in constructing a political regime
that focuses authority on himself and a limited elite, Spiridonov has nevertheless been
forced to give ground. Coupled with uncertainties in the federal government and
continuing economic crises, he may have come to the realization that it is better to
include the "outsiders" on some level rather than entirely ignore their interests. In this
respect, Komi may be tracking toward a wider elite settlement.
Out of this whole process of development, can one say that Komi politics have become
more substantively democratic? I would say, "yes," even if it is not yet evident. From
summer 1999 interviews, local opposition leaders are in agreement, calling the elections
to local self-government a small step in that direction. While NPSR Chairman Leonid
Musinov may again bring suit against the Komi government for violating the federal laws
on local self-government, he believes that they have made progress toward popular
rule. The same can be said for Yabloko Chairman Nikolai Moiseev who proudly pointed
to the small blocks (up to 25%) of Yabloko deputies that were elected to several of the
local councils in February.
The pressures emerging from local opposition have intertwined with federal laws and
court rulings to force some concessions from Spiridonov on a number of levels. Again,
part of the process has been driven by continuing crises in Russia, leading the head to
look to certain reform-oriented factions for support in the face of potential conservative
challenges at the national level. While it may be the case that the ruling elite has simply
extended a narrow foothold to a new set of actors (in this sense, coopting the former
opposition), the reality is that the number of actors around governing circles would seem
to be expanding. This along with the local government reforms and future redistricting of
State Council districts offer the potential for an expanded number of voices that may
carry the region toward greater pluralism, even if movement can only be measured in
inches rather than miles.
Conclusion: Regional Roadblocks to Democratic Transition ?
In closing this chapter, it should become clear that many Russian regions still lack a
number of procedural aspects of democracy, let alone having achieved its substantive
form. Moreover, save for a few cases of struggle over the rules, there are no evident
internal political forces capable of moving Russia further toward the fulfillment of
democratization – neither on an elite or mass level. On the one hand, regional elites
have no strong incentives for establishing competitive politics within the framework of
formal institutions, especially if there are no pre-existing internal divisions. Instead, the
strategy of regional leaders to protect their positions, on the way by-passing democratic
forms of government (such as horizontal as well as vertical accountability), is quite
rational. On the other hand, the seeds of civil society in Russia continue to be
developed within a tiny strata of society, while mass dependence on political authorities
provides the regional leaders the capacity for administrative mobilization and electoral
corruption, often associated in Russia with the regional development of a dominant
party of power.
What then are the prospects for democratization in the Russian regions? Put another
way, will the regional roadblocks to a democratic transition survive across space and
time? As of yet, there is no clear answer.. At least three possible short-term factors
could challenge the current state of affairs: 1) the influence of external actors, 2) the
impact of mass politics, and 3) the dynamics of institutional change. Until now, however,
none of these factors have played a significant role in the development of regional
political regimes.
The influence of external actors is an important source of democratization. External
pressure – either from national organizations (such as the federal judicial branch in the
case of Komi), or from national-based politicians (like former Prime Minister Kirienko’s
criticisms of Moscow Mayor Luzhkov) – could provide some political opportunities for
competitiveness and the growth of popular participation. To this point, however, political
power is more often connected to the personalities who occupy powerful positions, not
to the regional political regimes themselves. This lack of influence can be explained in
two ways: First, state-building, which is based on the principle of rule of law, continues
to be a low priority item for Russian authorities. Second, the administrative resources of
the center, as well as its capacity to employ force strategies with the regions, were
exhausted after the 1994-1996 Chechen war, the 1996-1997 gubernatorial elections,
and the 1998 financial crisis. Although the center has used some substitute measures
during the last several years (such as pushing particular economic policies in the
regions, the strengthening of presidential representatives, and the development of local
government autonomy), it has not been very successful. On the eve of a new wave of
political struggles at the national level (especially during 1999-2000 national elections),
a compromise strategy of the center toward the regions (i.e. an exchange of loyalty for
the promise of non-intervention) seems the most rational.
The impact of the Russian masses under conditions of widespread clientelism (a feature
of Russia’s political culturei) is limited. "Political machines" as a tool of mass
mobilization are more effective than the mobilization of the societal cleavages which can
be transferred into forms of political competition if recognized by the elites.ii There is no
basis to assume these will develop, however, given the uncertainty of regime transition.
In the long-run, machine politics in American or Southern Italian cities have been
undermined by modernization processes; after the breakdown of systems of mass
patronage, mass politics has played crucial role in political competition. iii Yet, in the near
term such a development is doubtful under conditions of arbitrary rule, which, pending
the developments of incentives to develop a party system in the regions, seems to be
the only alternative to the patron-client linkages exhibited across Russia.
Ultimately, political institutionalization in Russia has strengthened rather than
undermined regional political regimes. Arbitrary rule not only resulted from the decay of
the ancien regime, but serves to strengthen actors in new political regimes, especially
due to their use of rent-seeking strategies. There are no actors as of yet who believe
that it is in their interest to shift institutional frameworks from arbitrary rule toward a rule
of law. The emergence of such actors may come to be linked either with the
institutionalization of democratic situations during the struggle over the rules scenario,
or with the breakdown of those regimes and the resulting winner takes all and elite
settlement outcomes of uncertainty.
Thus, the democratizaiton experiences of regional Russia confirm Philippe Schmitter’s
perspective on the dangers for new democracies:
Democracy in its most generic sense persists after the demise of
autocracy, but never gels into a specific, reliable, and generally accepted
set of rules. These countries are "doomed" to remain democratic almost
by default... Elections are held; associations are tolerated; rights may be
respected; arbitrary treatment by authorities may decline — in other
words, the procedural minima are met with some degree of regularity —
but regular, acceptable and predictable democratic patterns never quite
crystallize. Democracy is not replaced, it just persists by acting in ad hoc
and ad hominem ways as successive problems arise.vv
Speaking more broadly, democracy is not emerging "by default" (or even "by design"). It
has not become inevitable because politicians who call themselves "democrats" occupy
positions of power (even if they have good intentions). Democracy is a "contingent
outcome of conflict,"v and nothing else. If political competition among actors continues
to develop, transitions to democracy may occur. In this sense, Churchill’s well-known
comment on democracy as a bad form of government, save for all others, means that
political competition within the framework of formal institutions is simply the "lesser evil"
for actors. The question, however, is whether Russia’s actors – on both national and
regional levels – could actually view the evil of democracy in this way.
Table 2. Political Regimes: Actors and Institutions
Competitiveness of actors/
Informal
Formal
Predominant institutions
("arbitrary rule")
("rule of law")
Competitive
Hybrid regime
Democracy
Non-competitive
Authoritarian regime
Table 3. Stages of Regime Transition: "Transition to Democracy" and "Open-ended"
Models
"Transition to Democracy"
"Open-ended" Model
1. Liberalization
1. Decline of ancien regime
2. Transition = Installation of
2. Breakdown of ancien regime
democracy
3. Uncertainty
3. Consolidation
4. Outcome of uncertainty =
Installation of new regime
5. Institutionalization of new regime
Table 4. Scenarios of outcomes of uncertainty
Positions of actors/
Compromise
Force
Dominant actor
"elite settlement"
"winner takes all"
Uncertainty or balance of forces
"struggle over the
"war of all against all"
Strategies of actors
rules"
Table 5. Elite Cleavages, Scenarios of Outcomes of Uncertainty and Characteristics of
New Regimes: The Case of Russia’s Regions
Scenario of
Previously –
Intra-elite
Consequences of Characteristics
outcome of
existed elite
conflicts
outcome of
of the new
uncertainty
cleavage
during
uncertainty
political regimes
transition
period
"Winner takes
city
resolved as a
"authoritarian
monopoly of a
all" (Saratov
government
zero-sum
situation"
dominant actor,
Oblast’)
vs. agrarians
game
informal
institutions
"Elite settlement" city
eliminated by
hybrid regime
(Nizhnii
government
informal
powers between
Novgorod
vs. enterprise
agreements
dominant and
Oblast’)
directors vs.
on power-
subordinated
oblast’
sharing
actors, informal
government
sharing of
institutions
"Struggle over
city
unresolved
"democratic
competition of
the rules"
government
and provided
situation"
actors, formal
(Sverdlovsk
vs. mining
a basis of
institutions,
Oblast’)
districts vs.
electoral
moving toward
oblast’
competition
rule of law
government