Mission Command – Mission Leadership (Creating the Climate for Maximising
Performance) – A Corporate Philosophy – Colonel Bryan Watters
Mission (Command) Leadership: Historical Background
Mission Command or to give it a less military connotation ‘Mission Leadership’ is a doctrinal
philosophy adapted formally by the British Army in 1987 from the Prussian concept of
Auftragstaktik, a revolution in Prussian military thinking and leadership, developed after their
defeat by Napoleon in the twin battles of Jena and Auerstedt, which first shattered and then
scattered the Prussian army delivering a humiliating defeat. Auftragstaktik represented a
shift from a leadership methodology based on iron discipline and control where officers
sought to counter the chaos of battle by imposing order based on mathematical principles;
where the military leader sought victory by triumphing over the intrinsic chaos of the
battlefield by imposing order based on pre ordained tactical and operational choreography.
The shift was away from a doctrine based on orders (‘Befehl’) to one focused on the task
(‘Auftrag’). The point being that it was the achievement of the task that was important, not
how it was done.
In 1869 General Helmut Graf Von Moltke (Commander in Chief of the Prussian Army)
promulgated and partly wrote the new Field Service Regulations which explained; Senior
Commanders should ‘not order more than is absolutely necessary but should ensure the goal
is clear. In case of doubt subordinate commanders should seize the initiative’. This ‘invisible
secret weapon’ developed by the Prussians delivered them victory in the return match with
the French (now without Napoleon) and later with the Russians. Choreography had been
replaced by improvisation with a guiding philosophy, which reconciled alignment with
autonomy to achieve the desired outcome.
The deadlock and resulting industrialised attrition of the Western Front in the First World War
was not a scenario in which Auftragstaktik was able to triumph. Its application, towards the
end of the War, in strategically desperate circumstances, by General Eric Ludendorff, nearly
pushed the Allies back to the North Sea coast. In General Douglas Haig’s words, it required
them ‘to fight with their backs to the wall’. Unfortunately for Ludendorff and Germany, his
‘Storm Trooper’ led attack was the last Harrah of the Kaiser’s Army. Germany’s last
offensive of the war was defeated by a combination of Allied resilience, leadership and
firepower and an inability on the part of Ludendorff to resource and support his gains.
The zenith of Auftragstaktik was in the Second World War. Von Kleist, Guderian, Von
Manstein and Rommel in their Generalship epitomised the Moltke philosophy.
However the Axis lost again, despite a doctrine that is now emulated by NATO. Why
Auftragstaktik failed to deliver a victory to the German military machine is complex and not a
subject for this paper. The lesson for today might be; if an operating philosophy is to deliver
a strategic advantage its application must be inculcated, practiced and seamlessly applied
throughout the organisation. Hitler’s contempt for its principles and increasing obsession
with control undid the advantage of Auftragstaktik as Field Marshal Von Manstein explained
in his book ‘War in the East’ (p 383). Another example is Normandy prior to D-Day. Hitler’s
insistence on personally controlling the deployment of the Panzer reserves delayed their
response and thus enabled the Allies to establish their Beach Heads.
A neutral Russian, General Woide observing the Prussian defeat of the French in 1870 (the
return match) wrote ‘Every German subordinate commander felt himself to be part of a
unified whole; in taking action, each one of them therefore had the interests of the whole at
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the forefront of their mind, none hesitated in deciding what to do, not a man waited to be told
or even reminded’. Discipline in the German Army tradition did not mean following orders but
acting in accordance with intentions. A last word on the German model from Von Manstein:
‘Two well established German leadership principals:
Always conduct operations elastically and resourcefully
Give every possible scope to the self-sufficiency of commanders at all levels’.
The introduction of Mission Command formally into British Military Doctrine did not happen
until the late 1980s, which is hardly surprising since it was not until that date that the British
Army adopted a common Doctrine: Design for Military Operations – 1987 thus addressing an
increasingly recognised deficiency. With the establishment of The Higher Command and
Staff Course at Camberley and the publication of a common doctrine the focus of British
military thinking was raised above tactical excellence to the more intellectual arena of the
Operational Art. This process is largely attributed to the then General Sir Nigel Bagnall and
his reforms that restructured the Army in Germany to meet new (or recognised) Soviet
operational capabilities. (Hot War Cold War, Colin Mcinnes–Brassey’s, Chapter 3.)
Contemporary British Thinking on Mission (Command) Leadership
The contemporary philosophy of Mission (Command) Leadership has 4 enduring tenets:




Timely decision-making
The importance of understanding a superior Commander’s (Senior
Manager’s/Leader’s) intention.
A clear responsibility to fulfil that intention.
An ability (underpinned by the superior’s planning) on the part of the
subordinate to meet the superior’s remit.
The underlying requirement is the fundamental responsibility to act (or decide not to act if
that is the right thing to do) within the framework of the Commander’s (Senior Manager’s)
intentions.
This (Mission Leadership as a corporate Philosophy) requires a style/styles of strategic
leadership which promote:



Decentralized decision making (Formal delegation/empowerment).
Freedom (and speed) of action.
Initiative.
Key Elements of ‘Mission Leadership
1.
A Commander (Senior Manager/CEO etc) structures his/her orders (Formal
directions) to ensure ‘subordinates’ (the team) understand his/her intentions, their own
missions and the context of these missions.
2.
Subordinate Leaders have explained to them what effect they are to achieve and the
reason why it needs to be achieved. (They are not told how to achieve it.)
3.
Subordinate Leaders are allocated the appropriate resources to carry out their
missions. (In order to allocate the resources the ‘Line Leader’ will have focused 2 levels
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down on conceptually how his/her tasks can be carried out.) Subordinate Leaders during or
after their planning can, with justification ask for additional resources. (They may indeed
have been given too many resources and can offer some back.)
4.
A ‘Line Leader’ has a minimum of control measures so as not to limit unnecessarily
the freedom of action of his/her subordinate leaders.
5.
Subordinate Leaders then decide within their delegated freedom of action how best to
achieve their missions.
Principles of Mission Command





Unity of Effort (across the organisation).
Decentralisation.
Trust (mutual, deep and enduring).
Mutual Understanding.
Timely and Effective Decision-Making.
The principles of Mission Command are largely self-evident. Unity of Effort may warrant
some explanation: In order to achieve Unity of Effort the following criteria should be met:
o
o
o
Clear head and sense of purpose.
Identification of “Main Effort” (That activity the Commander/Line Leader
considers crucial to the success of his/her mission at that time) by
Commander/Line Leader.
Understanding Intentions


Immediate Commander (Line Leader).
2 levels up.
Consistency of aim at 3 levels promotes mutual understanding: It also provides the basis of
decentralisation of decision making in fluid operations (crisis/change). Subordinates who are
aware of the context (‘the big picture’) are far more likely to continue acting purposefully in
the light of an unexpected situation. In order to understand the ‘big picture’ the ‘Estimate’
decision tool includes a procedure called Mission Analysis, which is explored later.
Mission
The task(s) and the purpose (e.g. I want you to do X (task) in order to achieve Y (purpose).
The second step in the Estimate decision making process is to analyse your Mission.
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The Estimate (A decision making tool)
The Estimate: Defence Doctrine proposes a decision making cycle called The Estimate
which is a 7 step decision making tool designed to deliver a course of action, appropriate to
the level of leadership, from a body of information.
o
Stage 1 Review of Situation
This entails a review of as much background information as possible relevant to
the situation/crisis. This geo/cultural/economic/political/social/
diplomatic/environmental Strategic analysis should be wide ranging. It should
examine anything and everything that pertains to the background, current
situation and future implications of the situation or crisis. This submersion and
orientation is fundamental to the success of the Estimate.
o
Stage 2 Mission Analysis
A logical analysis of the mission set in order to deduce the tasks necessary to
fulfil the mission. The analysis places the effect you are required to generate in
the wider context of the overall design and recognises the constraints that
apply in time and space. This step is both the trigger and regulator of the
estimate and is thus a dynamic process. It is reviewed at anytime in the
Estimate or during the operation if the situation changes to such a degree that
the validity of the plan is questioned. This process is explored later in the
paper. At the conclusion of the analysis the Commander/Leader will give
direction to; focus his teams planning effort, ensure subordinate teams are able
to conduct concurrent activity and confirm the clarification required from above.
o
Stage 3 Evaluation of Factors
The factors that bear on the tasks are then considered to deduce/identify;
tasks, constraints and points for clarification. The product of this stage is a list
of these tasks, constraints and points for clarification that shape the thought
process, underpin future detailed planning and produce key tasks that will need
to be accomplished to fulfil the Mission.
o
Stage 4 Commander’s/CEO’s Course of Action (COA) Guidance
The Commander/CEO should give direction on all the potential Courses of
Action that the planning team are to develop based on his/her judgement of
what may be within the art of the possible and potentially decisive. The
development of this guidance is an intuitive process based on intellect and
experience.
o
Stage 5 Development of COAs
Following the direction of the Commander/CEO the planning team develop
COAs as options as to how the Mission can be accomplished based on the
evaluation of factors product. Each COA option must be achievable and
credible. Each COA should be explained in sufficient detail to; demonstrate it
fulfils the mission, broadly quantify the resources it requires and identify the
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time and space needed. In order to validate each COA, the effect of possible
adverse reactions to its implementation must be researched. This can be done
with simple action/reaction modelling or more sophisticated computer
generated scenario models.
o
Stage 6 Consideration of COAs
For each of the identified course of action, a ‘cost benefit’ analysis is
conducted. The criteria used to assess the relative advantages (benefits) and
disadvantages (costs) of each possible course of action in relation to the
Mission are down to the judgement of the leader. The criteria need to be
consistent, objective and relevant to the scenario. This allows the
Commander/CEO to assess the high risk/high gain options together with the
low risk/low gain courses. The COAs should also be compared against your
own and if relevant in the scenario the oppositions Centre of Gravity (Centre of
Gravity is defined as: that aspect of an organisations capability which if lost
would pre-empt the demise of the organisation. The Commander/CEO then
makes their decision on the preferred course of action.
o
Stage 7 The Commander’s/CEO’s Decision
The leader’s decision is the logical and intuitive result of the Estimate. The
Decision constitutes the directive for the completion of the detailed planning
and thus all future action. The CEO may not be involved with all of the detailed
planning as this is an opportunity to demonstrate faith in the team and get out
of the headquarters and visit the organisation. The CEO will however write the
‘Commander’s intent’ or the design for the operation. The product of this stage
is a clear statement of the Commander’s/CEO’s decision; what the organisation
is to do explaining as appropriate When, Where How and Why.
The plan having been made, directives are designed written and formatted to explain the
scope and detail of the overall plan and each participant’s part in it, including their Mission.
These are distributed prior, in the military tradition, to a face to face or if necessary ‘on line’
formatted brief (again modelled on a German style exemplified by General Heintz Guderian:
Panzer Leader Futura 1982) led by the Line Leader and his staff. These briefs serve many
purposes, not least the opportunity for the leader to present his plan and ‘sell’ it through the
power of its compelling rational and the strength of his conviction. The formatted brief is
followed by questions from the leader and the floor to ensure a complete understanding of
the plan and everyone’s part in it. At any time the situation can change requiring a reassessment of the Estimate to confirm the relevance of the plan. In all military operations
commanders are required to engage in ‘risk assessment’ throughout the planning process
and later when executing the mission. The Estimate is a dynamic and demanding process
requiring stamina, focus, and a depth of moral courage on the part of the leader and his/her
close and extended team.
The Levels of Military Command
The Estimate is a decision making tool which is used at all levels of military endeavour. At
the operational (middle) level we use something called The Campaign Planning Tools, which
convert direction from the Strategic (Highest) level into Campaigns or major operations,
which the tactical (lowest) level delivers through tactical success in the Battle Space.
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The Essentials of British Military Doctrine; A Summary
Complementing the underpinning philosophy of Mission Command there is the doctrine of
The Manoeuverist Approach (Lateral thinking, to develop competitive advantage).
Military tasks are planned around the Core Functions – Find, Fix and Strike (Analyse, nail
down the issue and solve the problem); these are organised and conducted within a
conceptual framework of Deep (strategic shaping of future operations), Close (The
customer interface) and Rear (The means of delivery) operations.
I have used a number of sources for this short paper, specifically; expurgate pieces from the
British Army’s British Military Doctrine (BMD) series of handbooks, British Defence Doctrine,
attributed works in the text and an article not yet published by Stephan Bungay.
 Bryan Watters
2002-09-24
Shrivenham
Enclosure:
1. A Format for Mission Analysis.
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Mission Analysis: The Format
Question
1a
(Why) Intention of
Superior
Commander


1b
2
(What) Tasks
Specified
Implied
What tasks must I
complete to fulfil my
mission
(What not? When?)
Constraints
a. Time.
b. Space.
c. Resources.
4
How must my action
directly support my
immediate superior taking
into account his intent and
intent 2 levels up.
My Role in his Plan


3
2 levels up
1 level up
Consideration/Deduction
Changes - to
Situation


What limitations are
there on my
freedom of action
Why when do I
need to decide.
Since I received my orders
(Instructions) has the
situation changed to such
a degree as to require me
to have my mission
clarified?
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Task/Constraints
5
Commanders
Direction



Critical
Information
Requirement
to focus staff
(Planning)
effort.
Planning
Guidance
(downensures
concurrency).
Clarification of
issues. (Up).
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