Faye Donnelly, University of St Andrews, Redefining the Rules of the Game?: A
Critical Analysis of the Bush Administration’s Foreign Policy Discourse
Introduction:
This paper analyses how President George W. Bush and his team attempted to redefine the
international order after September 11, 2001. Particularly examined is how their justifications for
the 2003 Iraq war were constructed against this backdrop. Highlighting the importance of change,
specific consideration is on how the language employed by the Bush administration at this ‘defining
moment’ affected their agency in subsequent spheres of engagement. Hence, I explore how words
not only cause but also constitute international codes of conduct. Keeping with this theme I
address the legitimisation of democracy as an unquestioned reality. Using Abu Ghraib as another
‘defining moment’ in the Bush administration’s foreign policy, I argue that the same concept
actually weakened rather than strengthened America’s defence when this scandal broke. Needless
to say these unexpected paradoxes severely challenge conventional wisdoms circulating in the
vernacular of mainstream IR literature and US foreign policy.
Redefining the world after September 11, 2001
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 marked a monumental turning point for the
conceptualisation of world affairs. Or so the Bush administration asserted. Proof of the latter is the
repetitive references to enormous transformations omnipresent in their foreign policy discourses
thereafter1.
Responding to what were labeled “acts of war”2, security became America’s top priority. Once
again change was advocated as being instrumental for succeeding in this mission. According to the
President, “the mind-set of war must change. It is a different type of battle. It's a different type of
battlefield. It's a different type of war” (Bush, 2001: b).
Such grandiose designs are unsurprising given the shock and suffering America encountered3. Nor
are they revolutionary in US foreign policy terms4. Significantly distinctive, I argue, are the vast yet
vague purviews articulated within the Bush administration’s foreign policy5.
A distinctive narrowness quickly enveloped this overarching strategy, however. Tellingly the US
‘war on terrorism’ was portrayed by its leading proponents as a black and white matter. For them
the decision was crystal clear, “either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” (Bush, 2001: c).
As shown, while such dualisms were imperative in formulating the Bush administration’s foreign
policy they became more limiting as events evolved.
Ultimately they proved insufficient for
enabling it to adapt during the wars6 they created. On the contrary, when faced with unintended
1
Setting the tone just hours after the hijacked planes had crashed into the World Trade Centre, for instance,
the President said, “Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series
of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts” (Bush, 2001: a). Speaking soon after Donald Rumsfeld remarked,
“Yesterday, America and the cause of human freedom came under attack, and the first great crisis of
America's 21st century was suddenly upon us” (Rumsfeld, 2001).
2
President Bush declared them as such on September 12, 2001.
Full speech available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010912-4.html
Here I am not simply referring to the human fatalities and material damage caused on September 11, 2001.
While these were certainly major points of trauma other issues were also at play, including the shock that
American soil had actually been attacked and by non-state actors at that. Reading through the Bush
administration’s responses to September it is very apparent that both seriously hurt the pride and identity of
the sole-superpower.
Anthony Lang (2006: 270) outlines this history very concisely in his piece “The Role of International Law
and Ethics”
Casting aside old boundaries the Vice President stressed that, “world shifted in some respects”.
3
4
5
6 I use the plural here to denote both the Iraq war itself and the larger war on terrorism. Clearly it is important to remember and portray that the former is a derivative of the latter
crises the rigid line drawn between good and evil came to entrap their creators. Nowhere is this
more apparent than in Iraq. Declaring this to be the case, of course, necessitates closely analysing
the broader language games constructed to justify this war.
Justifying the Iraq War:
Manifestly security was certainly a, if not the, major selling point for Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Admittedly the battle fits neatly into the Bush administrations promise to undertake offensive
measure overseas as part if its “two front” war on terrorism7. A closer inspection reveals, however,
that these larger “war on terror” discursive frameworks had to be specifically tailored to justify the
invasion of Iraq8.
The principle of state sovereignty9 was one immediate hurdle necessitating such re-definitions.
Aware of the inherent rules associated with this principle and the implication these had on
determining what constituted a legal war in the international arena, powerful cases for pre-emptive
self-defense were subsequently constructed.
7
Explaining the latter the President stated, “We fight a war at home”, yet simultaneously, “our military is
conducting a campaign to bring the terrorists to justice” (Bush, 2001: d).
In no way am I suggesting that the war on terror initiated post-September 11 receded in importance. Rather
my point is to emphasis that while this slogan became a rountinised fact in and of daily parlance it was itself
altered.
This is a highly contested term in international relations and affairs. I do not have the space here to outline
all the different interpretations and conceptualisations of what the term itself means or represents. What I
am simply referring to here is the absolute power states have to use military force within their territorial
jurisdiction. Hence once war is launched against any sovereign states the aggressor is defying this rule.
8
9
Descriptions of looming dangers posed by Saddam Hussein’s regime, their weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and links to al Qaeda were advanced to substantiate such claims10. Employing
oppositional, ‘us versus them’, categorisations also helped convince the world about the near and
present dangers this country posed. Measured by such discursive yardsticks, Iraq is conveyed as
having made the case against itself11. Noticeably as the charges leveled against Saddam Hussein
grew within the Bush administration discourse, inaction turned from being being highly dangerous
to non-debatable. Simply, “we cannot wait for the final proof – the smoking gun – that could come
in a form of a mushroom cloud” (Bush, 2002: a)12.
There is no need to rehearse the causes of the Iraq war here. For as Hakan Tunç (2005: 335)
correctly notes, “the least understood aspect of the ongoing war in Iraq is what caused the United
States to invade the country in the first place”. Instead this paper contends that this invalidation
marks another defining moment after which exporting democracy was increasingly entered the
foreground of the Bush administration’s foreign policy proclamations.
10
Indicatively, by January 2002, Iraq had been branded as part of “an axis of evil, arming to threaten the
peace of the world” (Bush, 2002). From September 2002 onwards there is a notable shift away from Iraq as
part of a troublesome trio to the gravest threat posed to US and worldwide security. President Bush’s address
to the United Nations General Assembly in New York in the same month explicitly exemplifies this. Here
overthrowing Saddam Hussein is presented as being the only viable option.
11
Speaking on September 14, 2002, Bush stated, “that Saddam Hussein has made the case against himself.
He has broken every pledge he made to the United Nations and the world since his invasion of Kuwait was
rolled back in 1991. Sixteen times the United Nations Security Council has passed resolutions designed to
ensure that Iraq does not pose a threat to international peace and security. Saddam Hussein has violated
every
one
of
these
16
resolutions
-not
once,
but
many
times”:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020914.html
12
A more detailed argument was presented by Colin Powell at the UN in February 2003 shortly before the
war began. Etching a similar pattern Iraq being in material breach of its obligations under Security Council
resolutions Condoleezza Rice held the way to proceed was now be clear since, “by both its actions and its
inactions, Iraq is proving not that it is a nation bent on disarmament, but that it is a nation with something to
hide. Iraq is still treating inspections as a game. It should know that time is running out” (Rice,
2003).
Once the chief weapons inspectors submitted their finding on January, 2003, for instance, Colin
Powell noted, “We in the world community desire to help Iraqis move their country toward
democracy and prosperity. We want to help the Iraqi people establish a government that accepts
principles of justice, observes the rule of law and respects the rights of all citizens” (Powell, 2003:
b). Concurring President Bush noted, “The nation of Iraq -- with its proud heritage, abundant
resources and skilled and educated people -- is fully capable of moving toward democracy and
living in freedom” just as “the world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values, because
stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder” (Bush, 2003: a)13. His second
Inaugural Address was more explicit, declaring, “We are led, by events and common sense, to one
conclusion: The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in
other lands […]. So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of
democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending
tyranny in our world” (Bush, 2005)14.
Inevitably this shifting focus represents an astonishing alteration the Bush administrations foreign
policy, especially given their avid rebuttal of nation-building as a US objective. Quoting the
President directly, “in this administration we’re not into nation building, we’re focused on justice
and we are going to get justice” (2001: j). Today this dramatic transformative u-turn is simply taken
for granted. More consequentially, the Bush administration was able to claim that this apparent
contradiction was no contradiction at all.
Conversely, they made a convincing case that the
spreading democracy to initiate regional and global change had always been on the agenda. In the
process, I claim that they actively redefined the rules of the game.
13
February 26, 2003
Labeling the same mission as ‘transformational diplomacy’ in early 2006, Condoleezza Rice explained
America’s position as follows, “in these momentous times, American diplomacy three great tasks. First, unite
the community of democracies in building an international system that is based on our shared values and the
rule of law. Second, we will strengthen the community of democracies to fight the threats to our common
security and alleviate terror. And third, spread freedom and democracy throughout the globe.”
14
To clarify, I am not asserting this government never spoke about democracy post-September 11,
2001, or throughout its global ‘war on terror’ campaign. Evidently this word was presented
intermittently or seriously implied in the Bush administrations remarks on both matters15. Indeed
Jonathan Moten (2005:112) claims, “the promotion of democracy is central to the George W. Bush
administration’s prosecution of both the war on terrorism and its overall grand strategy, in which it
is assumed that U.S. political and security interests are advanced by the spread of liberal political
institutions and values abroad”. While this observation is correct I approach the issue from a
different angle. Rather than assuming the immediate continuation of democracy promotion, as
Monten does, I aim to outline how democratic references in US foreign policy discourse grew
exponentially once the President and his team began to distance themselves from their original
agendas of preventive force and WMD.
Importantly Monten does address variations in the current Bush administrations democracy
promotion strategy, examining, “the long-term shift from exemplarism to vindicationism”
(2005:115). However, his conclusion omits the crucial fact that neither scheme took precedence in
legitimising this government’s goals after September 11, 2001. Actually, apart from his address the
very next day16, President Bush made only scant and fleeting references to democracy in his public
speeches or press statements in the immediate aftermath of this event. Freedom instead was
predominant heading used to define America’s global foreign policy objectives. In a nutshell,
‘freedom and fear’ were war17.
15
Subsidiary themes of delivering humanitarian aid and liberating innocent Iraqi civilian were clearly present
in the run up to the war. For example on October 11, 2001 The President announced an ‘American Fund
for Afghan Children’: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011011-8.html
President G. W Bush (2001a): “Remarks by the President In Photo Opportunity with the National Security
Team”: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010912-4.html
This slogan has been continuously used by Bush official following the September 11 attacks, originating
from the President’s Address to a Joint Congress and the American People in a matter of days. Full speech
available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html
16
17
th
Furthermore, where the concept of democracy was explicitly mention in the early stages of the ‘war
on terror’, it was not in a promotional capacity but rather as something to be defended18.
Noticeably, at the outset, democracy was also viewed as a short term solution rather than a long
term investment from the US perspective. Consequently it was presented in their foreign policy
discourse, as well as on the ground in Iraq, in a largely institutionalised capacity. Expressing this
dimension early on Bush declared, “The United States has no intention of determining the precise
form of Iraq's new government. That choice belongs to the Iraqi people. Yet, we will ensure that
one brutal dictator is not replaced by another”. Undercutting any permanent US involvement,
however, he upheld that, “rebuilding Iraq will require a sustained commitment from many nations,
including our own: we will remain in Iraq as long as necessary, and not a day more.” (Bush, 2003:
b).19
These limited and pluralist visions are a far cry from the universal promise to promote global
democracy explicitly advanced by the Bush from 2005 onwards.
Exposing such miniscule or what some would perceive as purely grammatical distinctions may seem
awfully petty. Nevertheless, I contend that paying closer attention to the language employed by the
Bush administration affords greater insight into the grand-strategic adjustments they instigated to the
contours of US foreign policy. Honing in on their discourse reveals this government advocated a
very particular iteration of democracy. Ultimately I proclaim that it served as a legitimising device
when their central justification for launching the Iraq war became nullified.
18
Answering “why do they hate us?”, for instance, Bush stated, “they hate what we see right here in this
chamber -- a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms - our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each
other” (Bush 2001:d).
19
Bush (2003) February 6: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030206-17.html
Observing the Bush administrations shift to democracy as the epicentre of it foreign policy also
showcases how the same discursive frame became problematic later. Essentially I maintain this
defining moment opened up the space for inconsistencies between their words and deeds and,
consequently, alternative interpretations of their stated objectives. In light of the Abu Ghraib
scandal20 this language was severely contested. No longer was democracy seen as the idealistic
standard or the moral enterprise espoused by Bush and his cohort but rather, for many, as a
disguise for US torture.
Neither did this word succeed in dispelling tough criticisms which
potentially implicated this government in human rights abuses. Instead, as highlighted below, after
this defining moment the Bush administration clearly became trapped in their own language.
Before outlining how this unexpected transformation occurred I will provide a more robust
theoretical overview of what I mean by defining moments.
Situating the latter within wider
constructivist and discourse analysis scholarship also draws comprehensive insights for examining
and explaining these profound turning points within the Bush administrations foreign policy.
Defining Moments and Theoretical Developments:
Demonstrably the Bush administrations foreign policy altered in the run up to the war. Indeed this
paper has already mentioned three central ‘defining moments’ in relation to the Iraq war.
Respectively these are:
20
This is not the sole scandal that called the Bush administration’s democratic credentials into question,
rather the one that this paper focuses on
1) Framing the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 as acts of war and synchronically inferring
that preemptive self-defence as the best way to protect America and the world thereafter
2) The shifting focus away from disarming Saddam Hussein of his WMD stockpiles to promoting
democracy as the central justification for the 2003 Iraq war.
3) The erosion of democracy as the keystone of US foreign policy following the Abu Ghraib
scandal.
Plainly these particular shifts represent moments of acute crisis for the US21. Discursively, the latter
two showcases how the Bush administration constructed its response to the same in democratic
terms. Deciphering these linguistic modifications also lends credence to my argument that the
Bush administration chose among a series of viable and alternative options rather than simply
acting unilaterally or friviously. What become apparent on closer investigation is that they were
keenly aware of both the relevant contexts and audiences necessary to address so as to turn their
ideas into action. In sum, I argue that the Bush administration actively set out to define and
redefine existing structures to justify their foreign policy during these turbulent times.
These empirical junctures have been labelled ‘defining moments’ rather than tipping points22 since
this heading better captures the ideas and language underscoring my overall arguments.
Furthermore, this terminology is more appropriate since it illuminates the subtle alterations
underlying the Bush administrations foreign policy discourse rather than merely focusing on the
great instances of change associated with tipping points. While empirical snippets of the US foreign
policy analysed in this paper share an affinity with the transformational dynamics associated with the
latter, it offers a more thorough investigation into the role that language plays in initially framing and
operationalising these dynamics of change. Additionally captured is how the Bush administration
21
1) the failure to actually find any WMD in Iraq 2) the emergence of explicit evidence that US conducted
prisoner abuse and torture while proclaiming to spread democracy and peace.
See Martha Finnemore and Katherine Sikkink (1998: 895) for starting point on normative and political
transformations.
22
actively set out to redefine existing rules and structures to pursue their own foreign policy
objectives. Indeed I examine how the discourse employed by the Bush administration helped
constitute the boundaries of what was permissible in and possible at different stages of its foreign
policy. Speaking of defining moments literally also helps to express the importance these two had
incidents in constructing, reconstructing and deconstructing the different language games present in
US foreign policy during this epoch23.
Taking all this on board I now apply it to show how the foreign policy discourse of the Bush
administration attempted to craft an appropriate response to the Abu Ghraib abuse scandal in
democratic terms.
‘Defining’ Abu Ghraib
The Abu Ghraib incident is the final defining moment under investigation in this paper. Mainly it
has been selected to examine how the concept of democracy was undermined in and by emerging
evidence that American’s conducted torture there.
Scathing comparisons made between the
morality promised in the first and the immorality proven by the latter were clearly problematic for
the Bush administration to confront or defend. For as Alberto Mora, and John Shattuck (2007)
stress, “the promotion of democracy and human rights is a key element of U.S. foreign policy and
fosters a rules-based international system anchored in the protection of human dignity. But our
ability to achieve this goal -- indeed, even our adherence to this strategic objective -- is severely
compromised when our own conduct is widely perceived to violate human rights”. A serious
23
Worth re-emphasizing here is that I do not think that these are the only metamorphic points. Rather they
are the ones that I have selected to support my argument. Subsequently I will make it quite clear that these
discourses did not arise in a vacuum. Conversely the goal is to demonstrate how they are socially constructed
and, in turn, represent links in a broader linguistic chain.
tension arises in this respect since, as I illustrate, the Bush administration itself did not abandon the
concept. On the contrary they strongly reinforced it.
Contextual Background
While Abu Ghraib prison never symbolised cheerful images24, the actual and perceived agents of
torture manning it have altered. Following the public release of graphic photographs on 28 April
2004, Abu Ghraib is now tantamount with the torture of Iraqi prisoners at the hands of America
soldiers. Unsurprisingly, the provocative pictures aired on 60 Minutes II25 sparked global shock,
anger and disgust.
What is surprising, especially given the sullying of America’s image is how little impact the incident
appears to have had on the Bush administrations foreign policy rhetoric or agendas.
Retrospectively, I believe that the manner in which this government framed its response to the Abu
Ghraib crisis offers imperative insights into solving this quandary.
Analysing how the Bush
administration constructed its own defence under mounting global pressure also offers insights into
the policies and practices governing their behavior.
To do precisely this I have undertaken an extensive study of the rejoinders given by key players
serving at different levels in the administration26. Using a critical constructivist discourse analysis I
24
24
While the full extent of what occurred there during his reign in power remains shrouded in secrecy ,
accounts of the unabated violations to human rights witnessed there do exist .
60 Minutes is a weekly primetime television programme broadcast in the US by CBS.
The reason that I mention the different levels of the administration is because, in the Abu Ghraib affair, the
military played a pivotal role in defending the actions taken. In many respects both the Executive and
Congressional branches of the US government identified the Army along with the Pentagon as the actors in
charge of rectifying this situation.
24
25
26
identified several core themes underscoring them27. Due to space limitations the predominant
focus is on the reclamation of democracy as an outstanding American practice to refute claims of
torture levelled against the Bush administration and classify these events as being ‘un-American’.
Deconstructing Democracy
Noticeably the term democracy frequently reoccurred during the Bush administration’s handling of
the Abu Ghraib crisis. On May 25 2004, for instance, Colin Powell proclaimed, “people can see
how we handle something like this: with our democratic system, with congressional oversight, with
investigations that are underway, with people being brought to justice”. Also decontaminating the
negative images of the US Condoleezza Rice noted, “one good thing about democracies is that
when something like this happens, democracies themselves react. The American people are
reacting. The American Congress is reacting. The American President is reacting because no
American wants to be associated with any dehumanizations now of the Iraqi people” (May, 3:
2004)28.
The President was very vocal in valorising American efforts of protecting and promoting
democracy. Indeed Bush quickly clarified that, “important for the people of Iraq to know that in a
democracy, everything is not perfect, that mistakes are made. But in a democracy, as well, those
mistakes will be investigated and people will be brought to justice. We're an open society. We're a
27
Others categories I am working with in my PhD include a deep sense of shock and disgust, the
representation of this as Un-American behavior, the limited nature placed around these events both
numerically and geographically, the clear refusal to alter US foreign policy agendas, outlines of the corrective
measures being taken to bring those responsible to justice, the conviction that they are not as bad as Saddam
Hussein even after the abuses come to light and a focus towards the positive future and accomplishments that
have been achieve so far.
28
On December 8, 2005, she further acknowledged that, “just because you are a democracy, it doesn't mean
that you're perfect. We saw in Iraq at Abu Ghraib under the traditional framework of the Geneva Convention
that we had actions that were outside of U.S. policy and those actions were investigated, investigated
thoroughly, and people have been punished”.
society that is willing to investigate, fully investigate in this case, what took place in that prison” (May
5, 2004)29.
An additional aspect he brought to the fore when discussing democracy was, “the goodness and the
character of the United States Armed Forces. No military in the history of the world has fought so
hard and so often for the freedom of others. Today, our soldiers and sailors and airmen and
Marines are keeping terrorists across the world on the run. They're helping the people of
Afghanistan and Iraq build democratic societies. They're defending America with unselfish courage.
And these achievements have brought pride and credit to this nation” (Bush, May 10: 2004)30.
Besides representing what America symbolized and its remedial actions, the concept of democracy
was also deeply rooted in the Bush administration’s avid denial that they condoned the use of
torture. To use discursive terminology the later operates as a silent category.
Indeed the Bush
administration never admits that what occurred at Abu Ghraib constitutes as torture. Conversely
they opt for softer categories such as abuse, interrogation or human rights violations. Moreover, all
of the latter were presented as being ‘alleged’ to begin with. Whatever the intention for defining
American acts in this way31, the point raised here is that the Bush administration engaged in a
dialogue about torture without ever fully adopting this terminology.
29
Seconding this position later that same day, he stressed “it's important for people to understand that in a
democracy that there will be a full investigation. In other words, we want to know the truth” [...] “We're a
great country because we're a free country, and we do not tolerate these kind of abuses” (Bush, May 5: 2004:
b).
30
Scott McClellan, former White House Press Secretary, also made it plain that, “we must continue to speak
out about what America does stand for, and what America does represent. America stands for freedom and
democracy. America stands for promoting human rights and promoting human dignity. America stands for
treating all people with dignity and respect, and that includes treating prisoners humanely and consistent with
international accords” (May 6, 2004).
31
The legal implication of torture is one reason the Bush administration distance themselves from such
branding. In fact, as shown later, the Geneva Conventions and become crucial benchmarks here. Evidently
being found guilty of torture rather than human rights abuse appears to carry far greater reputational costs.
Beginning with a snippet from Donald Rumsfeld is quite appropriate here since he immediately
clarified, “I think that - - I’m not a lawyer. My impression is that what has been charged thus far is
abuse, which I believe is technically different than torture” […] “I don’t know if – it is correct to say
what you just said, that torture has taken place, or that there’s been a conviction for torture. And
therefore I’m not going to address the torture word” (Rumsfeld, May 4: 2004).
Denying similar charges on June 27, 2004, Colin Powell remarked, “Abu Ghraib was a big hit.
There's no question about it [...] It's also absolutely clear that the President never, in any way,
condoned the use of torture”.
Verifying the official U.S. position of torture Condoleezza Rice iterated32, “renditions take terrorists
out of action, and save lives. In conducting such renditions, it is the policy of the United States, and
I presume of any other democracies who use this procedure, to comply with its laws and comply
with its treaty obligations, including those under the Convention Against Torture. Torture is a term
that is defined by law. We rely on our law to govern our operations. The United States does not
permit, tolerate, or condone torture under any circumstances” […] Torture, and conspiracy to
commit torture, are crimes under U.S. law, wherever they may occur in the world. There have been
cases of unlawful treatment of detainees, such as the abuse of a detainee by an intelligence agency
contractor in Afghanistan or the horrible mistreatment of some prisoners at Abu Ghraib that
sickened us all and which arose under the different legal framework that applies to armed conflict
in Iraq” (Rice, December 5, 2005)33.
Another possible taboo about the uttering the torture word is that it defines the antithesis of democratic
conduct.
I find the very fact that the America felt obliged to clarify its policy on torture interesting, perhaps showing
that the legitimacy of their arguments were being questioned.
32
33
Remarks by the Vice President glean further insights into how the Bush administration sidestepped calling
what happened in Abu Ghraib as physical torture without dismissing the need for interrogation policies
themselves. Being explicit on using the word torture he verified, “I don't want to characterize it beyond what
I have. I just -- I think it would be inappropriate for me to do that. It's clear that there -- as say, there was a
Un-American Category:
These denials of torture envelop insistences that what occurred at Abu Ghraib were totally ‘unAmerican’. Articulating this sentiment Bush stressed, “We've discovered these abuses; they're
abhorrent abuses. They do not reflect -- the actions of these few people do not reflect the hearts of
the American people […] This is not America. America is a country of justice and law and freedom
and treating people with respect” (Bush, May 5: 2004)34.
This conceptualisation is very revealing when explored as a self and other identity construction.
From this a constructivist vantage point this language demonstrates how the Bush administration
tried once again to muster up legitimacy using binary divisions. While the latter framework
functioned for defining a polar external other, like a terrorist, it proved to be less so in this scenario
since the culprits themselves are American. Indeed, after the Abu Ghraib photos were globally
disseminated the Bush administrations stark boundaries between good and evil became exceeding
blurry and disputed.
Although designed to signal out the guilty the un-American categorisation
proved too narrow for the Bush administration to escape. Conversely, they themselves became a
scapegoat of blame.
fundamental breakdown there someplace. People were doing things they should not have been doing under
those circumstances, and it's important that it be thoroughly investigated. And it will be -- it is being” (Cheney
May 11, 2004). Safeguarding America’s right to gain better intelligence, nonetheless, Cheney advocated,
“Well, there's no question, there was a desire -- there always is -- when you've got ongoing military operations,
attacks being launched against our troops and soldiers, as well as innocent civilians over there, to learn as
much as you can from people that have been detained in order to prevent further attacks and/or to be able to
go prosecute guilty parties. But there's a right way to do it and a wrong way to do it” (May 11, 2004).
34
Secretary Powell also claimed that this is unacceptable and un-American conduct. Indeed on May 15 he
lamented that, “It was so inconsistent with what I have seen during my years as a solider”. On October 18,
2004 he recalled, “These are my, my kids. And it was wrong, and there's nothing else to be said about it. It
was wrong, and they’ll be punished”. Donald Rumsfeld was equally astute in articulating that the abuse was an
exception in the behavior of American troops. On May 4, 2004 for instance he surmised that, "the actions of
the soldiers in those photographs are totally unacceptable and un-American". Equally he stressed here, “the
images that we have seen that include U.S. forces are deeply disturbing -- both because of the fundamental
unacceptability of what they depicted, and because the actions of U.S. military personnel in those photos do
not in any way represent the values of our country or the armed forces” (Garamone, 2004: b).
The demarcation of the Abu Ghraib perpetrators as un-American did permit President Bush and
his allies to represent these abuses as exceptional rather than normal behaviour. Earmarking
agentive culpability at an individual level, rather than on a systemic one, also mitigated direct
involvement in and responsibility for what took place under their leadership.
Repudiating such disturbing actions and quickly allocating blame to a few transgressors is obviously
not unexpected. Nor is the employment of democracy by the Bush administration to positively
signify its ideals and distinguish itself from the evil terrorists. Compounding the problem of being
simply ‘un-American’, however, these abuses negated international expectations of democratic
behaviour. Legal rules and regulations were similarly unkind in their judgements of such practices,
albeit easier for the Bush administration to circumvent in the short term35.
Even so, the very fact that America’s democratic credentials were legally questioned during this
crisis suggests a denial of recognition that it previously enjoyed as the noble protector of liberty and
freedom. In polar opposition, the vivid photographs of abuse in Abu Ghraib confirmed its
deliberate suspension of individual empathy and wanton cruelty. Crucially, Richard Jackson notes,
“in these images, it was the American ‘heroes’ who looked liked the savage barbarians, animals, and
evildoers, while the ‘terrorists’ looked like the innocent victims of American terror” (working
paper). More importantly from the perspective of this paper, and in stark contrast to the Bush
administration’s response to the WMD crisis, Abu Ghraib could not be glossed over or excused
with democratic rhetoric. Within these circumstances, that is, it was no longer applicable or
appropriate to use the same basic discourse.
Quite simply the language framing what was
permissible had changed.
35
What I mean here is that the laws surrounding these human rights abuses and torture incidents were not
implemented immediately, or, in some case at all. Furthermore, any charges that the Bush administration
faced were nipped in the bud via their allocation of blame to and punishment of the few bad apples directly
responsible for such deeply undemocratic behaviour.
Conclusion
This paper has critically examined the language, speech acts and discourse underpinning American
foreign policy after September 11, 2001. By inspecting official reactions to the affair, and the
consequences these executive decisions had, neglected dialectical dimensions were also
incorporated.
Nevertheless, I advocated pushing past the Bush administrations claims that everything is changing
to examine what exactly is. Subsequently I focused on how such transformations became possible
in the first place. Terming these ‘defining moments’ I outlined how the Bush administration’s
foreign policy justifications altered in response to different challenges. Illuminating such discursive
shifts helped expose how America later became entrapped in and by its own language. Having
blatantly justified the Iraq war on the grounds of immanent WMD threats and preemptive self
defence, for instance, US invoked the concept of democracy to muster up creditability. Today this
subtle shift in policy is taken for granted. However, the theoretical approach adopted in this paper
portrayed that subtleness of this major shift could only be upheld by excluding dimensions of social
construction from view. In short, it verified that the Bush administration chose36 to modify their
foreign policy.
Needless to say this government could not have foreseen the impact of this re-definition, which has
been tremendous.
The point is that they presented their foreign policy in absolute terms.
Consequently any alteration in their fixed objectives clouded the discursive horizon on which the
36
Emphasis added by author
Bush administration could defend itself and its previous actions. Furthermore such rigid
categorisation increasingly blurred rather than clarified who was good and who was evil.
In
defining moments of acute crisis such as Abu Ghraib, moreover, the existence of these frames of
reference in the Bush administration foreign policy discourse foreclosed alternative benchmarks
against which they could defend themselves. Their democratic discourse was crucial in generating
this outcome. This element of paradox is worthy of closer examination since essentially the US
used it to shore up support and to silence harsh criticisms levelled against it at defining moments.
Yet, rather than fulfilling these functions, I posited that the Bush administrations overt reliance on
democracy in later stages of its foreign policy weakened its own defence. In short, Abu Ghraib
enabled America to be criticised for not upholding its own standards.
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