Copleston
Morality and Religion
I. Kant’s Aim
A. Moral Knowledge: not knowledge of what is, that is of how men actually behave, but of
what ought to be, that is to say, of how men ought to behave (308)
1. A priori in that it does not depend on men’s actual behavior – true independently of
the conduct of men (308)
2. “For Kant the primary task of the moral philosopher should be that of isolating the a
priori elements in our moral knowledge and showing their origin. In this sense we
can depict the moral philosopher as asking how the synthetic a priori propositions of
morals are possible” (309)
3. “Our moral knowledge taken as a whole contains a variety of elements; and it is the
primary task, though not the only possible task, of the moral philosopher to lay bare
the a priori element, freeing it from all empirically derived elements, and to show its
origin in the practical reason.” (309)
B. Practical Reason: reason in its practical (moral) function
1. “In the final analysis there can only be one and the same reason which is to be
differentiated solely in its application.” (GMM, 391)
2. “Though ultimately one, reason can be concerned with its object in two ways. It can
determine the object, the latter being originally given from some other source than
reason itself. Or it can make the object real” (310-311)
3. “The first is theoretical, the second practical rational knowledge.” (B x)
4. “In its theoretical function reason determines or constitutes the object given in
intuition…It applies itself, as it were, to a datum given from another source than
reason itself. In its practical function, however, reason is the source of its objects; it is
concerned with moral choice, not with applying categories to the data sense
intuition.” (310)
5. “Theoretical reason is directed towards knowledge, while practical reason is directed
towards choice in accordance with moral law and, when physically possible, to the
implementation of choice in action.
6. “For Kant the moral philosopher must find in the practical reason the source of the a
priori element in the moral judgment.” (310)
a. “[This] statement implies that there is an a posteriori element, which is given
empirically…We can distinguish between the concept of moral obligation as such
and the empirically given conditions of this particular duty.” (311)
b. “Further, when Kant speaks of the practical reason or rational will as the fount of
the moral law, he is thinking of practical reason as such, not of the practical
reason as found in a specific class of finite beings, that is, in human beings. True,
he does not intend to state that there are finite rational beings other than men. But
he is concerned with the moral imperative as bearing on all beings which are
capable of being subject to obligation, whether they are men or not. Hence, he is
concerned with the moral imperative regarded as antecedent to
consideration of human nature and its empirical conditions.”1
1
311
c. “And if practical reason is looked on in this extremely abstract way, it follows
that moral laws, in so far as they make sense only on the supposition that there are
human beings, cannot be deduced from the concept of practical reason. For
instance, it would be absurd to think of the commandment ‘Thou shall not commit
adultery’ applying to pure spirits, for it presupposes bodies and the institution of
marriage.”2
d. “We have to distinguish between pure ethics or the metaphysics or morals, which
deals with the supreme principle or principles of morality and with the nature of
moral obligation as such, and applied ethics, which applies the supreme principle
or principles to the conditions of human nature.”3
7. “According to Kant, there is need for a metaphysics of morals which will prescind
from all empirical factors.”4
8. Kant’s main point: “The ground of obligation here must there be sought not in the
nature of man nor in the circumstances of the world in which man is placed, but must
be sought a priori solely in the concepts of pure reason; he must grant that every
other precept which is founded on principles of mere experience – even a precept that
may in certain respects be universal insofar as it rests in the least on empirical
grounds, perhaps only in its motive – can indeed be called a practical rule, but never a
moral law.”5
a. A pure ethics must be worked out which, “When applied to man, it does not in the
least borrow from acquaintance with him (anthropology) but gives a priori laws
to him as a rational being.”6
b. Kant wants to find within reason itself the “basis of the a priori element in the
moral judgment, the element which makes possible the synthetic a priori
propositions of morals.”7
c. He is searching for the “ultimate source of the principles of the moral law in
reason considered in itself, without reference to specifically human conditions.”8
d. “Kant rejects empiricism and must be classed as a rationalist in ethics, provided
that this word is not taken to mean someone who thinks that the whole moral law
is deducible by mere analysis from some fundamental concept.”9
9. For Kant, “belief in God is grounded in the moral consciousness rather than the moral
law on belief in God.”10
II. The Good Will
A. “There is no possibility of thinking of anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which
can be regarded as good without qualifications, except a good will.”11
1. A good will is good without qualification; it cannot be bad in any circumstances
2. E.g. wealth can be misused, courage can be misused, etc.
2
Copleston, 311.
Copleston, 311.
4
Copleston, 312.
5
GMM, 389.
6
GMM, 389.
7
Copleston, 312-313.
8
Copleston, 313.
9
Copleston, 313.
10
Copleston, 313.
11
GMM, 393.
3
3. “A good will is good itself and not merely in relation to something else.”12
4. “The Kantian concept of a good will is the concept of a will which is always good in
itself by virtue of its intrinsic value, and not simply in relation to the production of
some end, for example, happiness.”13
5. “According to Kant, a will cannot be said to be good in itself simply because it
causes, for instance, good actions.”14
B. “To elucidate the meaning of the term ‘good’ when applied to the will, Kant turns his
attention to the concept of duty which is for him the salient feature of the moral
consciousness. A will which acts for the sake of duty is a good will.”15
1. Can’t say that “a good will is a will which acts for the sake of duty”
III.
Duty and Inclination
A. Must distinguish between “actions which are in accordance with duty and acts which are
done for the sake of duty.”16
1. The former is wider
2. Only latter have moral worth.
3. Kant does not explicitly say that it is morally wrong to act according to one’s
inclinations17
4. An action can be in accordance with duty, but such an action has no moral value
B. Kant gives the impression “that in his opinion, the moral value of an action performed for
the sake of duty is increased in proportion to a decrease in inclination to perform the
action. In other words…in his view, the less inclination we have to do our duty, the
greater is the moral value of our action if we actually perform what it is our duty to do.”18
1. “It seems to follow that the baser a man’s inclinations are, the higher is his moral
value, provided that he overcomes his evil tendencies
2. However, “His main point is simply that when a man performs his duty contrary to
his inclinations, the fact that he acts for the sake of duty and not simply out of
inclinations is clearer than it would be if he had a natural attraction to the action.”19
a. Regardless, Kant is still maintaining that inclinations have no value in an ethical
system except to act as a measuring stick. The empirical world holds no value in
Kant’s ethical system.
3. For Kant, “the action of doing good to others has no moral worth if it is simply the
effect of a natural inclination…but he does not say that there is anything wrong or
undesirable in possessing such a temperament.”20
IV.
Duty and Law
A. “Duty is necessity of an action done out of respect for the law.”21
12
Copleston, 315.
Copleston, 315.
14
Copleston, 315.
15
Copleston, 315.
16
Copleston, 316.
17
Copleston, 316.
18
Copleston, 316-317
19
Copleston, 317.
20
Copleston, 317.
21
GMM, 400.
13
1. Law means law as such
2. “The essential characteristic (the form, we may say) of law as such is universality;
that is to say, strict universality which does not admit of exceptions.”22
3. “Physical laws are universal; and so is the moral law. But whereas all physical things,
including man as a purely physical thing, conform unconsciously and necessarily to
physical law, rational beings, and they alone, are capable of acting in accordance with
the idea of law.”23
4. Kant distinguishes between principles and maxims (318)
V.
The Categorical Imperative
A. Kant rejects any type of hypothetical imperative – whether problematic or assertoric – “as
qualifying for the title of moral imperative”24
1. “The moral imperative must be categorical. That is to say, it must command actions,
not as means to any end, but as good in themselves.”25
2. What we can purely a priori say about this categorical imperative is that it commands
“that the maxims which serve as our principles of volition should conform to universal
law.”26
3. “Kant’s general notion is that the practical or moral law as such is strictly universal.”27
VI.
The Rational Being as an End in Itself
A. “The question arises whether it is a practically necessary law (that is, a law imposing
obligation) for all rational beings that they should always judge their actions by maxims
which they can will to be universal.”28
2. “If this is actually the case, there must be a synthetic a priori connection between the
concept of the will of a rational being as such and the categorical imperative.”29
3. Why should rational beings judge their actions by maxims which they can will to be
universal laws? Because rational beings are ends in themselves.
B. “[Kant] argues that that which serves the will as the objective ground of its selfdetermination is the end…this end cannot be a relative end, fixed by desire; for such ends
give rise only to hypothetical imperatives. It must be, therefore, an end in itself, possessing
absolute, and not merely relative, value.
1. “Kant postulates that man, and indeed any rational being, is an end in itself. The
concept of a rational being as an end in itself can therefore serve as the ground for a
supreme practically principle or law.
2. “The ground of this principle is this: rational nature exists as an end in itself…The
practical imperative will thus be as follows. So act as to treat humanity, whether in
22
Copleston, 318.
Copleston, 318.
24
Copleston, 323.
25
Copleston, 323.
26
Copleston, 323.
27
Copleston, 324.
28
Copleston, 327.
29
Copleston, 327.
23
your own person or in that of any other, always at the same time as an end and never
merely as a means.”30
a. A rational being must never be used as a mere means, “as though he had no value
in himself except as a means to my subjective end.”
VII. The Autonomy of the Will
A. “The will of man considered as a rational being must be regarded as the source of the law
which he recognizes as universally binding. This is the principle of the autonomy, as
contrasted with the heteronomy, of the will.”31
2. “All imperatives which are conditioned by desire or inclination or, as Kant puts it, by
‘interest’ are hypothetical imperatives. A categorical imperative, therefore, must be
unconditioned. And the moral will, which obeys the categorical imperative, must not
be determined by interest. That is to say, it must not be heteronomous, at the mercy,
as it were, of desires and inclinations which form part of a causally determined series.
It must, therefore, be autonomous. And to say that a moral will is autonomous is to
say that it gives itself the law which it obeys.”32
B. “Kant speaks of the will as ‘the supreme principle of morality’ (GMM, 440) and as ‘the
sole principle of all moral laws and of the corresponding duties.’ Heteronomy of the will,
on the other hand, is ‘the source of all spurious principles of morality.”33
1. “If we accept the heteronomy of the will, we accept the assumption that the will is
subject to moral laws which are not the result of its own legislation as a rational
will.”34
2. see page 330
3. “The concept of the autonomy of the morally legislating will makes no sense unless
we make a distinction in man between man considered purely as a rational being, a
moral will, and man as a creature who is also subject to desires and inclinations which
may conflict with the dictates of reason. And this is, of course, what Kant
presupposes. The will or practical reason, considered as such, legislates, and man,
considered as being subject to a diversity of desires, impulses and inclinations, ought
to obey.”35
VIII. The Kingdom of Ends
A. “The idea of rational beings as ends in themselves, coupled with that of the rational will
or practical reason as morally legislating, brings us to the concept of a kingdom of
ends.”36
2. Man belongs to this kingdom in either of two ways. “He belongs to it as a member
when, although giving laws, he is also subject to them. He belongs to it as a sovereign
or supreme head when, while legislating, he is not subject to the will of any other.”37
30
GMM, 429.
Copleston, 329.
32
Copleston, 329.
33
Copleston, 329.
34
Copleston, 329.
35
Copleston, 330.
36
Copleston, 331.
37
Copleston, 331.
31
3. “Kant goes on to say that a rational being can occupy the place of supreme head “only
if he is a completely independent being without needs and with unlimited power
adequate to his will.”38
A. “This kingdom of ends is to be thought according to an analogy with the kingdom of
Nature, the self-imposed rules of the former being analogous to the causal laws of the
latter.”39
IX.
38
Freedom as the Condition of the Possibility of the Categorical Imperative
A. “Now, the categorical imperative states that all rational beings…ought to act only on
those maxims which they can at the same time, will, without contradiction, to be
universal laws. The imperative thus states an obligation. But it is, according to Kant, a
synthetic a priori proposition."40
2. “On the one hand, the obligation cannot be obtained by mere analysis of the concept
of a rational will. And the categorical imperative is thus not an analytic proposition”
3. “On the other hand, the predicate must be connected necessarily with the subject. For
the categorical imperative, unlike a hypothetical imperative, is unconditioned and
necessarily binds or obliges the will to act in a certain way.”
4. “It is, indeed, a practical synthetic a priori proposition…it does not extend our
theoretical knowledge of objects…It is directed towards action, towards the
performance of actions good in themselves, not towards our knowledge of empirical
reality”41
A. How are such propositions possible? What is the ‘third term’ that makes possible a
necessary connection between predicate and subject?
5. “This ‘third term’ cannot be anything in the sensible world. We cannot establish the
possibility of a categorical imperative to refer to anything in the causal series of
phenomena. Physical necessity would give us heteronomy, whereas we are looking
for that which makes possible the principle of autonomy. And Kant finds it in the idea
of freedom.”42
6. “Obviously, what he does is to look for the necessary condition of the possibility of
obligation and of acting for the sake of duty alone, in accordance with a categorical
imperative; and he finds this necessary condition in the idea of freedom.”43
7. However, according to Kant, “freedom cannot be proved. Hence it is perhaps more
accurate to say that the condition of the possibility of a categorical imperative is to be
found ‘in the idea of freedom’. To say this is not, indeed, to say that the idea of
freedom is a mere fiction in any ordinary sense. In the first place the Critique of Pure
Reason has shown that freedom is a negative possibility, in the sense that the idea of
freedom does not involve a logical contradiction. And in the second place we cannot
act morally, for the sake of duty, except under the idea of freedom. Obligation,
‘ought’, implies freedom, freedom to obey or disobey the law. Nor can we regard
ourselves as making universal laws as morally autonomous, save under the idea of
GMM, 435.
Copleston, 331.
40
Copleston, 331-332.
41
Copleston, 332.
42
Copleston, 333.
43
Copleston, 333.
39
freedom. Practical reason or the will of a rational being ‘must regard itself as free;
that is, the will of such a being cannot be a will of its own except under the idea of
freedom (GMM, 448).”44
8. “The idea of freedom is thus practically necessary; it is a necessary condition of
morality.”45
9. “At the same time the Critique of Pure Reason showed that freedom is not logically
contradictory by showing that it must belong to the sphere of noumenal reality, and
that the existence of such a sphere is not logically contradictory. And as our
theoretical knowledge does not extend into this sphere, freedom is not susceptible of
theoretical proof. But the assumption of freedom is a practical necessity for the moral
agent; and it is thus no mere arbitrary fiction.”46
A. “The practical necessity of the idea of freedom involves, therefore, our regarding
ourselves as belonging, not only to the world of sense, the world which is ruled by
determined causality, but also to the intelligible or noumenal world. Man can regard
himself from two points of view. As belonging to the world of sense, he finds himself
subject to natural laws (heteronomy). As belonging to the intelligible world, he finds
himself under laws which have their foundations in reason alone.”47
10. Implicit metaphysics – assuming noumenal world
11. “And thus are categorical possible because the idea of freedom makes me a member
of an intelligible world. Now if I were a member of only that world, all my actions
would always accord with the autonomy of the will. But since I intuit myself at the
same time as a member of the world of sense, my actions ought so to accord. This
categorical ought presents a synthetic a priori proposition, whereby in addition to my
will as affected by sensuous desires, there is added further the idea of the same will,
but as belonging to the intelligible world, pure and practical of itself, and as
containing the supreme condition of the former will insofar as reason is concerned.”48
12. The condition of the will of the phenomenal world is found in the noumenal world –
in a world we can know nothing of, not even its existence…contingency upon
something we cannot even know…
13. “Thus the question as to how a categorical imperative is possible can be answered to
the extent that there can be supplied the sole presupposition under which such an
imperative is alone possible – namely, the idea of freedom. The necessity of this
presupposition is discernible, and this much is sufficient for the practical use of
reason, i.e., for being convinced as to the validity of this imperative, and hence also of
the moral law; but how this presupposition itself is possible can never be discerned by
any human reason. However, on the presupposition of freedom of the will of an
intelligence, there necessarily follows the will’s autonomy as the formal condition
under which alone the will can be determined.”49
14. “In saying here that no human reason can discern the possibility of freedom Kant is
referring of course, to positive possibility. We enjoy no intuitive insight into the
44
Copleston, 333.
Copleston, 333.
46
Copleston, 333.
47
Copleston, 333-334.
48
GMM, 454.
49
GMM, 461.
45
sphere of noumenal reality. We cannot prove freedom and hence we cannot prove
the possibility of a categorical imperative. But we can indicate the condition under
which alone a categorical imperative is possible. And the idea of this condition under
which alone a categorical imperative is possible. And the idea of this condition is a
practical necessity for the moral agent. This, in Kant’s view, is quite sufficient for
morality, though the impossibility of proving freedom, indicates, of course, the
limitations of human theoretical knowledge.”50
15. Kant can know nothing of this noumenal world b/c he can only know appearances.
But now he is implicitly claiming that it exists and claiming that since it exists, it
allows man to be free. Thus, he is claiming at least 2 things he cannot know b/c they
lay outside of the phenomenal world. Once again, his philosophy is implicitly
metaphysics. Or if not, it is contingent. “If a noumenal world exists, then it is in this
world that freedom exists…if freedom exists, then the categorical imperative is
possible.”
16. It’s not even just a condition, it’s the idea of a condition.
17. Necessity is grounded in contingency!
18. Morality essentially becomes impossible after Kant’s first Critique because the
freedom required for moral action cannot be proven, due to the restrictions placed on
theoretical knowledge in the Critique. If morality is to be possible, it must rely on a
condition and if it lies on a condition, it is contingent…as if…but obviously man is
free…
19. But the very impetus to act comes from the causal world…if I am free, then…
The Postulates of Practical Reason; Freedom, Kant’s idea of the perfect good, immortality,
God, the general theory of the postulates
1. “The ideas, therefore, which Kant declared to be the main themes of metaphysics but
which he also judged to transcend the limitations of reason in its theoretical use are here
reintroduced as postulates of reason in its practical or moral use.”51
2. Freedom: “A theoretical proof that a rational being is free is, according to Kant,
impossible for the human reason. Nonetheless it cannot be shown that freedom is not
possible. And the moral law compels us to assume it and therefore authorizes us to
assume it.
a. “We must note the difficult position in which Kant involves himself. As there is no
faculty of intellectual intuition, we cannot observe actions which belong to the
noumenal sphere: all the actions which we can observe, either internally or externally,
must be objects of the internal or external sense. This means that they are all given in
time and subject to the laws of causality. We cannot, therefore, make a distinction
between two types of actions, saying that these are free while those are determined.
If, then, we assume that man, as a rational being, is free, we are compelled to hold
that the same actions can be both determined and free.”52
b. “Kant is, of course, well aware of this difficulty. If we wish to save freedom, he
remarks, ‘no other way remains than to ascribe the existence of a thing, so far as it is
determinable in time, and therefore also its causality according to the law of natural
50
Copleston, 334.
Copleston, 334.
52
Copleston, 335
51
necessity, to appearance alone, and to ascribe freedom to precisely the same being as
a thing in itself’” (CPrR, 171)
c. “Insofar as a man’s existence is subject to time-conditions, his actions form part of
the mechanical system of Nature and are determined by antecedent causes. ‘But the
very same subject, being on the other hand also conscious of himself as a thing-initself, considers his existence also in so far as it is not subject to time-conditions, and
he regards himself as determinable only through laws which he gives himself through
reason.’(CPr.R., 175) And to be determinable only through self-imposed laws is to be
free.”
d. Again, Kant is claiming to have knowledge of unknowables.
e. “The statement, however, that man is noumenally free and empirically determined in
regard to the very same actions is a hard saying. But is in one in which, given his
premises, Kant cannot avoid.”53
3. Certain things (transcendental Ideas) in Kant’s philosophy can only be true if “I am
justified in thinking that I exist, not only as a physical object in the sensible world, but
also as a noumenon in an intelligible sphere and supersensible world. And the moral law,
being inseparable connected with the idea of freedom, demands that I should believe
this.”54
a. We are demanded to believe in something we cannot know.
Kant on Religion
1. “Morality leads inevitably to religion” – perhaps this inversion that Kant makes is largely
responsible for the overwhelming attitude people – at least in the US – have toward
religion. Virtually all of the problems people have with religion are over moral
codes…interesting to note…loss of the sacred!
2. “Everything which, apart from a moral way of life, man believes himself capable of
doing to please God is mere religious delusion and spurious worship of God.”
a. Reduction of religion to morality has led to secularization  Kant’s philosophy led to
relativism, despite his reactions against it…When morality becomes relative, the very
thing that grounds practical faith in God is destroyed and hence faith in God is lost
completely. Kant didn’t protect people from atheism, he drove them to it.
3. “Kant’s interpretation of religion was moralistic and rationalistic in character.”55
Concluding Remarks
1. “It cannot be denied, I think, that there is a certain grandeur in Kant’s ethical theory. His
uncompromising exaltation of duty and his insistence of the value of the human
personality certainly merit respect.”56
2. “We are left here and now with a juxtaposition of the realm of natural necessity and that
of freedom. Inasmuch as reason tells us that there is no logically compatible. But this is
hardly enough to satisfy the demands of philosophical reflection. For one thing, freedom
finds expression in actions which belong to the empirical, natural order. And the mind
seeks to find some connection between the two orders or realms. It may not, indeed be
53
Copleston, 336.
Copleston, 338.
55
Copleston, 345.
56
Copleston, 345.
54
able to find an objective connection in the sense that it can prove theoretically the
existence of noumenal reality and show precisely how empirical and noumenal reality are
objectively related. But it seeks at least a subjective connection in the sense of a
justification, on the side of the mind itself, of the transition from the way of thinking
which is in accordance with the principles of Nature to the way of thinking which is in
accordance with the principles for freedom.”57
Belief in God cannot be reduced to practical faith b/c God is a mystery and thus faith in God
is necessarily personal. To strip man of this personal aspect of faith runs the risk of
eventually propelling him into atheism
To act for any reason other than for the sake of duty is to substitute heteronomy for autonomy
Ultimately, Kant realizes that nothing is possible without the transcendental Ideas – morality
itself is contingent upon them (and thus seems to lose the a priori character it sought after) yet,
even though they are the conditions for his system of ethics, he still maintains that nothing can be
known of them…man simply must act as if they existed
57
Copleston, 348.