Media Debate and Theories on
American Foreign Policy
September 1939 – August 1941
Liza Groeneveld
Liza Groeneveld
Media Debate and Theories on American Foreign Policy
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Liza Groeneveld
Media Debate and Theories on American Foreign Policy
Contents
Introduction
5
1. American Neutrality
14
2. Lend-Lease
35
3. Atlantic Charter
54
Conclusion
77
Bibliography
87
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Introduction
In the face of great perils never before encountered, our strong purpose is to protect and to perpetuate the integrity of
democracy. For this we muster the spirit of America, and the faith of America.
We do not retreat. We are not content to stand still. As Americans, we go forward, in the service of our country,
by the will of God.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Third Inaugural Address, January 20 1941
We are on the verge of war, but it is not yet too late to stay out. It is not too late to show that no amount of money,
or propaganda, or patronage can force a free and independent people into war against its will. It is not yet too late
to retrieve and to maintain the independent American destiny that our forefathers established in this new world.
The entire future rests upon our shoulders. It depends upon our action, our courage, and our intelligence. If you
oppose our intervention in the war, now is the time to make your voice heard.
Charles A. Lindbergh, September 11 1941
These fragments from speeches by President Roosevelt and Charles Lindbergh illustrate the two
contending thoughts about American intervention in the Second World War before the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor very well. Many Americans were worried about getting involved in
another war on the European continent since the outbreak of German hostilities in September
1939. Even though they helped hope for an allied victory over Nazi Germany, the main concern
was to keep the U.S. out of the war. The majority of the American people was still disillusioned
over Woodrow Wilson’s entry in the first World War: a 1937 poll showed that almost seventy
percent of Americans thought that America’s entry in the war had been a mistake. The new war
had only strengthened the belief that the U.S. should not get involved. These non-interventionists
or isolationists were often connected to the opposition of the Roosevelt administration and the
Democratic Party, but it also appealed to Democrats who disagreed with the President’s foreign
policy, communists, pacifists, parents and young men and women who did not want to go to
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foreign battle fields, etc. They were organized in among others the National Council for the
Prevention of War, Keep America Out of War Congress and from September 1940, the
influential America First.
In government, the isolationist position was foremost represented by Republican
Senators, such as William E. Borah, Gerald Nye and Charles E. Lindbergh, who wanted the U.S.
to return to the Jeffersonian ideals of focusing on liberty at home, while being an example to the
rest of the world. They preferred American unilateralism and avoidance of war. If there was one
thing they learned from the First World War, it was that war was a threat to the economy and to
political liberty and that America could not solve problems on the European continent. This
general aversion to war had led to the passing of neutrality laws during the 1930’s. After the war
had begun, the U.S. tried to stay out of the war by holding on to the Neutrality Act.
On the other hand, when one European state after the other fell to the Germans, some
Americans became more concerned about their own security and they thought measures should
be taken to strengthen defenses. These interventionists were concerned that Great Britain might
fall into German hands, and that Germany could become a real threat to the U.S. From the
middle of 1940 onward, a majority of the Americans thought it was more important to help
assure British victory than it was for the U.S. to stay out of the war. Thus, British victory over the
Axis was the main objective, but they did not agree on how to achieve this. Some interventionists
believed that all-out aid short of war to Britain would do the job, others thought that the U.S.
needed to actually intervene, to enter the war with its full military capacity. The interventionists
were organized in organizations such as the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies
and the Fight for Freedom Committee.
President Roosevelt did not want to go to war abroad either, but the developments in
Europe did happen to provide his administration with necessary domestic successes. During his
second term he moved his focus from domestic affairs to foreign affairs. Even though the
President was reluctant to go to war, he shared with Wilson the notion that international
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lawlessness was unacceptable and that America should lead the way to international freedom and
peace. Since the outbreak of the first hostilities Roosevelt and the isolationists struggled over
American policy toward the war.1
Many theories on American foreign policies have been voiced in the twentieth century.
Among the most influential theorists are George F. Kennan, William Appleman Williams, Walter
LaFeber and Michael H. Hunt. I want to touch upon their theories here shortly. In his American
Diplomacy, George Kennan argues that American foreign policy lacks an accepted, enduring
doctrine for relating military strength to political policy. Foreign policy is also more concerned
with creating a pleasing image of America rather than achieving concrete results. 2 America
policymakers are therefore more easily influenced by the short-term trends of public opinion.
Another major flaw of American diplomacy is that it is too legalistic and too moralistic in
its approach. From the Spanish-American War onward the U.S. has shown a tendency to judge
other states by its own Anglo-Saxon laws and to preach morality to the rest of the world.
According to Kennan, all states or even a large number of states cannot be judged by the one
international legal system. First of all, this would imply that these countries have the same values
and standards as America. Also, applying the same law to all states would be saying these states
are all equal: it ignores many differences between sovereign national states.
Elaborating on this theme, it also implies that the nation state is a fixed and static
concept. Another critique on the American concept of world law is that it ignores certain
international offenses that bypass or exploit national institutions, such as the creation of satellite
states. The concept also assumes that domestic issues will not grow into international problems,
because each people will be able to solve its own problems. Another major flaw in this approach
lies with the assumption that military sanctions can be successfully applied. It forgets the
Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, (New Haven and London 1987) 135-150; Manfred Jonas,
Isolationism in America 1935-1941, (Ithaca 1966) 169-172; Wayne S. Cole, America First. The Battle against
Intervention 1940-1941, (Madison 1953) 3-16; Wayne S. Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists 1932-1945, 1-14
2 George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy. Expanded Edition, (Chicago 1984) vii-viii
1
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limitations of military coalitions: the greater the coalition, the harder it becomes to control them
and to obtain political unity and agreement on the course of action.
But the most dangerous aspect of the legalistic moralistic foreign policy is bringing the
concepts of right and wrong into the international legal arena. This leads to a feeling of moral
superiority to the offender, which makes total victory over the offender the only acceptable
outcome in military struggle. In other words, Manichaean views will only prolong and deepen the
violence of war. There is no such thing as total victory, in war everyone loses. But you can limit
the losses by setting limited and realistic objectives instead of moralistic and ideological ones.3
Kennan also sees signs of this flawed approach in American foreign policy toward the Second
World War: it took a long time for the U.S. to enter the war, but as soon as America went to war
it did so with emotional fervor. This made it harder to set rational limits.4
William Williams’ The Tragedy of American Diplomacy agrees with Kennan only on the fact
that American diplomacy is flawed. However, he studied American foreign policy through an
economic lens. He found that the tragedy lies in the fact that American foreign policy driven by
economic expansionism formed a break with American heritage: the open door policy denied and
subverted American ideas and ideals. America’s foreign policy was driven by economic motives
and it followed the foreign policy of economic imperialistic expansion for half a century, namely
the open door policy. This would eventually lead to a Pax Americana, a peaceful world order
under U.S. leadership.
Williams calls American foreign policy since the Spanish-American war a realistic, as well
as an ideological and moral failure. The U.S. relied on an imbalance in its economic relations with
poorer and underdeveloped countries, to achieve a higher standard of living. But this higher
standard of living is not spread equally among Americans and while the open door policy built an
American empire, it never brought improvement into the areas in which it expanded. Also, this
3
4
Ibidem, 91-103
Ibidem, 83
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policy never brought the greater military security that is set out to acquire. The open door policy
only led to more distrust and dislike of the U.S. throughout the world.5
According to Williams, the strategy of the open door led to involvement in the war. Even
before America was involved in the war, Roosevelt foresaw the creation of an international
framework committed to the open door policy, which would enable the U.S. to continue to
develop the world. At first American businessmen were against getting involved in the war, even
though it might benefit them financially. However, by 1941 the Roosevelt administration and
American business had reached a consensus on taking action in the war. Williams contends that
economic objectives caused American economic leaders to be supportive of the Roosevelt
administration’s policies. They reconciled their economic drive for expansion with a moral calling
to transform the world, which resulted in the vision of an American Century.6
Walter LaFeber’s The New Empire. An Interpretation of American Expansion 1860-1898
sustains Williams argument. He too describes a foreign policy driven by the economic objectives
of the American elite, which led to the creation of an American empire. Even though LaFeber
only deals with the period between 1860-1898, his thesis supports Williams’. LaFeber explains
how, due to the industrial revolution, economic objectives came to weigh more heavily on
foreign policy decisions until they came to control American international relations. American
expansionism was the result and it set the tone for American policy in the twentieth century.7
Finally, Michael Hunt proposes that American foreign policy is mainly driven by ideology,
based on ideas of national greatness and liberty, a hierarchical conception of race, and fear of
revolution. The views that depict American foreign policy in terms of economic expansion or as
a struggle between realists and moralists are incomplete, because they ignore the impact of
ideology. This ideology can also be found within Franklin Roosevelt’s views and policies. He
believed that democracies brought peace in the world because they acted on the peace-loving
William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, (New York 1972) 291-293
Ibidem, 196-201
7 Walter LaFeber, The New Empire. An Interpretation of American Expansionism 1860-1898, (Ithaca and London
1963)
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tendencies of the common man. In contrast, serious conflicts between nations were caused by
militaristic and despotic regimes, in which the authoritarian government represented only the
aggression of the minority at the expense and in defiance of the enlightened majority. Roosevelt
believed that democracies had to unite and fight these aggressive regimes: the United States
would lead the way. He believed in American national greatness, which was linked to America’s
democratic foundations.
Roosevelt did not start his presidency with plans for an assertive foreign policy. He
preferred not to get involved with European and Asian problems, mainly because his own
experiences with war and the Depression kept him focused on domestic problems. However,
Roosevelt became a proponent of an assertive foreign policy between 1937 and 1941. Hunt
suggests that ideological reasons drove Roosevelt to his assertive stance toward the war in
Europe. The international lawlessness displayed by Germany and Japan was intolerable and
should be checked by the democracies. Roosevelt regained his Wilsonian faith and set out to
accomplish what Wilson could not: a thorough reform of the international system within a league
of nations. This vision came true in August 1941, with the Atlantic Charter.
The foreign policy ideology was also apparent in the debate between the isolationists and
interventionists. Both parties drew their arguments from the ideological notions of national
greatness and liberty, racial hierarchy and fear of revolutions. Isolationists argued that the U.S.
should stay out of European affairs because the continent was prone to violence and strife: the
U.S. could not prevent the European tendency to self-destruct. America was better off focusing
on cultivating its own liberty, without any involvement in foreign matters. By reforming
American liberty, America would grow even stronger and could really break free from the
destructive Old World. Isolationists, like Charles Lindbergh, also professed anti-British
sentiments. They blamed the British for dividing and distracting Europe. According to them, the
differences between Europe and the United States were mainly cultural instead of racial
differences. But other peoples were seen as racially inferior, like the Asians.
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The interventionists argued in turn that American democracy should be protected by
preserving Britain as the first line of defense and maintaining the European balance of power.
Contrary to the isolationists, the interventionists had sentimental ties to Britain. They wanted to
create a better world order on the foundations of international law and democracy, in
cooperation with Great Britain.8
Thus, Kennan, Williams and LaFeber, and Hunt provide us with three different
perspectives on American foreign policy: a legalistic moralistic, an economic, and an ideological
approach. Kennan, Williams, LaFeber and Hunt all view American foreign policy through a
different lens, and offer different perceptions and explanations. In this research paper, I want to
try and determine which of these theories best describes and explains the contending visions of
interventionism and isolationism on American foreign policy before the Pearl Harbor attacks.
Which one of these paradigmatic views can help understand these positions on foreign policy
best? To do this thoroughly, I turned to the primary sources of societal debate : newspapers.
I will research how the different views on American foreign policy were expressed in
different newspapers. I will look at the reporting on the war in three newspapers: two major,
namely The New York Times and the Chicago Daily Tribune, and one local: The Concord Daily Monitor.
The New York Times has been known for its more interventionist position, while The Chicago Daily
Tribune is more inclined to oppose American intervention. The Concord Daily Monitor has not been
specifically placed with either side and can offer insight in the local, New England point of view.
I will be comparing the three newspapers on their reporting on three major issues over
which the interventionists and isolationists have clashed. These issues are the Neutrality Act after
the invasion of Poland in September 1939, Roosevelt’s lend lease proposal to aid Britain in
January 1941 and the Atlantic Conference between Roosevelt and Churchill in August 1941. I
have chosen these events because they were all controversial and caused much debate. Also, they
show whether perceptions change over time and if so, how they have changed, because I will be
8
Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, 145-150
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looking at opinions directly after the start of the war, after a year and a half and three months
before the U.S. actually gets drawn into the war. I chose three events because this will reduce the
chance that my findings are coincidental. After comparing the articles on these issues, I will apply
the theories to them to assert whether the newspapers fit any theoretical framework and to see
which theorist can best explain the different positions.
The first chapter deals with the news coverage of the war for the first two weeks after
Hitler invaded Poland. The reporting of the first two weeks after the invasion offer sufficient
insight in The second chapter focuses on Roosevelt’s lend lease proposal, which hit the news in
the beginning of January 1941. I will track this issue from January 1st until January 20th; even
though the Congress votes on the Lend Lease Act on March 11th, the debate is most heated
directly after Roosevelt proposes it. The third chapter is concerned with the Atlantic Conference
in august 1941. The secret meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill took place in the beginning
of August, but the first official statement was made on August 14th, when Roosevelt announces
the Atlantic Charter. I will look at articles on the Conference and the Atlantic Charter from the
first announcement on August 14th and August 31st.
I expect that Michael Hunt’s approach to American foreign policy will explain the debate
between the isolationists and interventionists best. His theory is all-encompassing: out of the four
authors, he is the only one who traced American foreign policy from the onset all the way into
the twentieth century. Hunt does not dismiss Kennan’s or Williams’ theories, but sees them as a
too narrow approach. I think that the reporting and the editorializing on the debates on foreign
policy in the three newspapers will reflect Michael Hunt’s ideological notions most.
Hunt is furthermore the only one of the authors who has dealt with this specific debate.
He set out to explain the continuous drive behind American foreign policy, while both George
Kennan and William Williams offer a critique rather than an explanation. They specifically focus
on what they see as the specific flaw within the conduct American foreign policy. Only Hunt
offers a greater framework fitting the debate on intervention.
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I hope this research will offer better insight in the complexities of American foreign
policy and therefore also better insight the difficulties of formulating a suitable foreign policy
theory.
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1. American Neutrality
During the thirties, signs of another great conflict on the European continent became visible, and
this did not go unnoticed in America. Congress passed numerous neutrality laws in reaction to
the increasing unrest in Europe. The first Neutrality Act, passed in August 1935, prohibited the
shipment of arms to belligerents, barred American ships from carrying war materials to nations
involved in war, and brought the armament industry under state control with the establishment
of the National Munitions Board. In February 1936, the Neutrality Act was extended for fourteen
months and a ban on American loans to warring nations was added to the law, even though the
Johnson Act of 1934 already prohibited loans to nations failing to pay their debts to the U.S.,
which had targeted most belligerents from the First World War. With no end of the European
turmoil in sight, the Neutrality Act was made permanent in 1937. The new legislation also
contained the cash-and-carry provision, which made it possible for warring nations to obtain
strategic materials in the U.S. if they were willing to come get them with their own ships and paid
in cash. However, this provision had a two year limit and expired before the war broke out in
September 1939.
America’s neutral position was thus thought to be firmly in place when Hitler invaded
Poland on September 1, 1939. However, the neutrality laws were not passed without a fight. The
controversial debate over foreign policy between isolationists and the Roosevelt administration
raged from 1935 onward. Before Congress went into recess for the summer of 1939, the
administration had proposed a new cash-and-carry provision which also covered arms and
ammunition. Isolationists regarded the proposal as an attempt to weaken the neutrality legislation
and the administration was not able to put the proposal through Congress.9 When hostilities
finally did break out in 1939, the battle between the interventionists and isolationists grew even
more intense. In this chapter I will discuss how the Chicago Daily Tribune, The New York Times and
9
Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in America 1935-1941, (Ithaca 1966), 1-7, 169-205
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The Concord Daily Monitor reflect the fierce debate on the Neutrality Act in September 1939. I
tracked the debate for two weeks from September 1 until September 16, and I will begin this
chapter with a brief outline of the main events concerning American foreign policy discussed in
the newspapers. After this, I will explain what issues concerned the different newspapers most
and what the reasons for concern were. After this I will look at how this fits in the broader
theoretical frameworks offered by George F. Kennan, William A. Williams and Walter LaFeber,
and Michael Hunt.10
The Second World War Begins
When Germany invaded Poland on September 1, President Roosevelt first reacted by appealing,
within two hours after being notified of the hostilities, to all the belligerents to pledge against
bombarding civilian populations or unfortified cities. He requested an immediate reply to his
appeal. At the press conference held that day, neutrality was high on the agenda. The President
responded to the question whether America can remain neutral: “I not only sincerely hope so,
but I believe we can and that every effort will be made by the administration so to do.” 11 The
press conference further dealt with the official proclamation of neutrality and the President’s
intention to call Congress into special session to urge repeal of the arms embargo in the neutrality
law.
Roosevelt delayed the proclamation of American neutrality until Great Britain officially
declared war to Germany on September 3. That night, the President addressed the nation for the
first time since the start of the war. In his speech, he asked the nation to observe true neutrality
and to remain united. He announced that the proclamation on neutrality was being drafted and
that American neutrality would soon be made official. However, Roosevelt also stated that he
Kennan, American Diplomacy. Expanded Edition; William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American
Diplomacy; LaFeber, The New Empire. An Interpretation of American Expansionism 1860-1898; Hunt, Ideology
and U.S. Foreign Policy
11 “President Will Make Every Effort To Keep This Nation Neutral”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (September 1
1939) 1
10
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could not ask every American to remain neutral in thought as well, because even neutrals should
take the facts into account. This was a reference to Woodrow Wilson’s appeal to the nation in
1914, when he asked the American people to be neutral in thought as well as action. Roosevelt
contended that despite the wars, the U.S. should remain committed to the effort to restore peace.
The President furthermore informed the people of his plan to summon Congress to revise or
repeal the neutrality legislation.12 Roosevelt himself regarded the Neutrality Act in its current
form un-neutral, as it aided Nazi Germany indirectly. The President’s sympathies were with
Britain and France, but the neutrality legislation prevented him from aiding them. The White
House issued a statement confirming that neutrality and other proclamations, among others to
protect the financial system, had been written and that these would be issued as soon as the
President has been formally notified of the war declarations. The administration’s spokesmen
further confirmed the plans to summon Congress and explained that the administration wanted
to revise the neutrality legislation, because the current laws denied Great Britain and France the
advantage of getting arms in the U.S.. They were entitled to this advantage because they had
control of the seas.13
On September 5, the administration issued two neutrality proclamations: one declaring
American neutrality in the war and a separate one putting the arms embargo in effect. Another
proclamation dealt with the use of the Panama Canal by warring countries. Listed as belligerents
were Great Britain, France, Germany, New Zealand, Australia, Poland and India; Canada was not
yet counted as a belligerent since it had not officially declared war. The President also ordered the
U.S. Navy to set up a scout force to patrol the east coast.14
Roosevelt took unexpected measures on September 8, when he declared a ‘limited’ state
of emergency. The White House argued that the emergency proclamation was issued to grant the
“Fateful Statements of World Leaders”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (September 4 1939) 1
Ibidem
14 “Text of President Roosevelt’s Proclamation on American Neutrality”, The New York Times, (September 6 1939)
2; “Arms Embargo and Neutrality Put into Effect”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (September 6 1939) 1; Willard Edwards,
“Roosevelt Sets Up Scout Force Off the East Coast”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (September 7 1939) 1
12
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President the appropriate powers needed “for the proper observance, safeguarding and
enforcement of such neutrality, and the strengthening of the national defense.”15 Immediately,
the President issued a series of executive orders providing for increase in the enlisted strength of
all armed forces.
For the following days, the newspapers were mostly concerned with the upcoming special
session of Congress and the possible revision of the Neutrality Act. On September 11 Canada
was added to the list of belligerents, as it had declared war to Germany the previous day. 16 This
closed the one loophole in the arms embargo, since Canada would no longer be able to
redistribute American arms to Great Britain and France. In the press conference of September
12, Roosevelt referred to his promise to defend Canada from foreign aggressors and repeated this
pledge. He then recalled in great detail how the Monroe Doctrine was formulated and reminded
the reporters how the principles of this doctrine still applied, Canada included. 17 The President’s
call to Congress was expected to follow soon after and the opposition in Congress increased
arguing publicly against repeal of the legislation. Immediately after Roosevelt summoned
Congress for September 21 on the 14, prominent isolationists William Borah and Charles
Lindbergh sought publicity for their arguments through radio broadcasts.18
Chicago Daily Tribune
The articles and the editorials of the Chicago Tribune, during the first two weeks after the outbreak
of the second great war on the European continent, clearly reflect isolationist concerns. Before
Roosevelt proclaimed American neutrality, the Tribune stated that America did not want this war
and should not get involved. These sentiments were repeated in the editorials “The War the
World Feared” and “Not Our War.” The first editorial warned against the sympathy and
“Emergency Proclamation”, The New York Times, (September 9 1939) 6
“Proclamation Extending Arms Embargo to Canada”, The New York Times, (September 11 1939) 7
17 Willard Edwards, “Senators Push To Keep Arms Embargo”, Chicago Daily Tribune, 1
18 Chesly Manly, “America Enters Conflict If It Sells Arms, He Says”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (September 15 1939)
1; “Keep America Out of War, Is Lindbergh Plea”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (September 16 1939) 1
15
16
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emotionalism that the American people would inevitably feel for the people suffering from the
war. However, America should not be tempted again, by the illusion that it was fighting the war
to end all wars, to enter the conflict. The latter editorial also argued against American
involvement, claiming the U.S. was not responsible for the outbreak of the war. Europe had
brought this upon herself and should deal with it alone: “Americans will be told that it is their
fight. That is not true. The frontiers of American democracy are not in Europe, Asia or Africa.”
Both editorials argue from isolationist points of view.19
Another reason for the U.S. to stay out of the war can be found in the speech of Col.
Robert R. McCormick, both publisher and editor of the Chicago Daily Tribune, and a well-known
isolationist. McCormick spoke at an annual fall festival of the Fox river valley community in St.
Charles, and his speech was broadcasted. His address, published under the headline “Col.
McCormick Traces Europe’s Centuries of Carnage and Intrigue”, leaves no confusion about his
point of view: American intervention in European affairs would be useless, since it would only
aid one side in a centuries old conflict and a peace would never be long-lasting. As McCormick
argued: “The union of the American states – always heralded as the greatest achievement of
statesmanship – was comparatively simple through the similarity of race and history. A like
accomplishment in Europe, with its variety of races, languages, and religious beliefs, seems
beyond human power. Obviously it cannot be helped by the interposition of an outside nation
like our own (…) The most that could be accomplished is what was accomplished twenty years
ago – the slaughter of American youth – to strengthen one side of the quarrel – and afterwards
ingratitude and abuse.”20 This article was printed next to the article on Roosevelt’s address to the
nation on September 3.
The editorial, “The End of a Truce”, further emphasized that America could not solve
the European problems. The editorial argued that the interwar period was simply a truce in the
“The War The World Feared”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (September 2 1939) 10; “Not Our War”, Chicago Daily
Tribune, (September 2 1939) 10
20 “Col. McCormick Traces Europe’s Centuries of Carnage and Intrigue”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (September 4
1939), 1 and 5
19
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continuing European struggles. It went on to state that the people from the old world have a
tendency to go mad from time to time: “to kill, to destroy, to violate every precept of
Christianity. The madness is contagious, as we Americans well know.” The editor further claimed
that America was created because of the very fact that American forefathers escaped the madness
of the old world, with all its wars and tyrannies. American democracy would run the risk of being
destroyed if the U.S. would get involved. It would be better to stay out and “preserve for the
world its brightest hope for the future.”21
When Roosevelt declared the nation to be in a state of emergency, the Tribune was very
worried about the increase in executive powers. In the article “President Scans Law Books For
More Authority”, it was put forward that Roosevelt declared the emergency to get more power:
“It has been made clear, however, that Mr. Roosevelt believes the chief executive possesses the
powers of a virtual dictator in a war emergency.” The Tribune was concerned that the President
might invoke censorship, expand the army even more and take over industry. 22 All this was
further emphasized in the day’s editorial, “There Is No National Emergency”, which argued that
there was no national emergency for several reasons. The war was in Europe and the U.S. had
nothing to do with the causes. Furthermore, the belligerents decided to fight and Great Britain
and France were strong enough to fight their own battle, so let them. Finally, the U.S. was not
threatened, so there was no reason to invoke the national defense act. This act was invoked with
ulterior motives and contained dictatorial powers: “The American people must use vigilance and
be on their guard to protect their liberties and preserve their peace against their own war
conspirators.”23 Another editorial, “The Alleged National Emergency”, called the national
defense act a contradiction of the facts: America was at peace and the people wanted to keep that
peace, so the executive did not need the broad executive powers implied in the national
“The End of a Truce”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (September 4 1939), 18
“President Scans Law Books For More Authority”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (September 10 1939), 8
23 “There Is No National Emergency”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (September 10 1939) 18
21
22
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emergency. Congress should check these extraordinary executive powers since they were a threat
to America’s private affairs.24
The possible repeal of the arms embargo was another source of anxiety for the Chicago
Daily Tribune. The front page article on the expected special session ended with the following
paragraph: “The neutrality and non-intervention advocates have not abandoned hope of retaining
the arms embargo (…) They believe that many members of congress who oppose the neutrality
act in theory will hesitate to vote for its revision because they lack confidence in Mr. Roosevelt,
with his ardent sympathies and impulsive temperament, to keep the country out of war.” The
reporter, Chesly Manly, did not quote any member of the opposition here, these were his own
words, a clear stab at the President and his foreign policy.25
The discontent over Roosevelt’s foreign policy was furthermore reflected in the support
shown for opposition senators. The newspaper can be considered a mouthpiece for the
opposition, as on many occasions the Tribune printed articles on their point of view. To illustrate
this, on September 15 and 16, the Tribune printed prominent front page articles on the speeches
made by Borah and Lindbergh, complete with the full text of their anti-interventionist
addresses.26 The editorial “American Peace and Neutrality” supported the senators’ stance. The
Tribune almost wished that there were no neutrality laws at all. Perhaps that old fashioned
international law would not have placed the U.S. in such a dangerous situation, where it was
changing the law to aid one side of the belligerents, while a war was already going on. The
present legislation was based upon the concepts that war trade and international loans got the
U.S. involved in the last war. The “steps short of war”, as the Roosevelt administration called it,
were not possible according to the editorial. This was not America’s war, it was not engaged in
“The Alleged National Emergency”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (September 14 1939) 14
“Arms Embargo Repeal Session Expected Oct. 2”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (September 11 1939) 1 and 3
26 “America Enters Conflict If It Sells Arms, He Says. Senator Calls Upon Nation to Cling to Neutrality”, Chicago
Daily Tribune, (September 14 1939) 1; “Keep America Out of War, Is Lindbergh Plea”, Chicago Daily Tribune,
(September 16 1939) 1
24
25
20
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imperial competition like the European nations. The best course of action for the U.S. was to
protect democracy at home, so it will be preserved for the rest of the world.27
The Chicago Daily Tribune’s reporting and editorializing show a very firm anti-war position.
In editorials and articles alike, it was emphasized that this was not America’s war, since the U.S.
had nothing to do with its causes and has no interests in the conflict. The war in Europe was the
result of age old strife, in which America could not bring peace. Since America could not solve
European problems and Americans did not want to get involved in the war in the first place, the
U.S. should make every effort to stay out of it. It should hold on to the neutrality legislation as it
is, because any changes would mean entry in a war which would in turn threaten democracy at
home.
The New York Times
From the first day of the war it is obvious that The New York Times had a different view on the
administration’s foreign policy. The Times reckons it was hard to remain neutral, since it was clear
that Hitler was the aggressor and American sympathies were with Great Britain and France. 28
Even though America did not want to get involved, it was clearly not a matter of simply staying
neutral.
Already on September 1, Arthur Krock, renowned author of the editorial “In The
Nation”, discussed American isolationism under the headline “Despite Isolationism, Europe
Draws Close.” Krock recognized that isolationism was no longer a passive factor: it had become
a matter of choice and political struggle. That was the main difference between the situation in
1914 and the situation in 1939. Both isolationists and interventionists agreed that the war would
affect American economic and social systems. The issue at hand here was what the nation and
the government should do, because America was going to feel the war repercussions even when
“American Peace and Neutrality”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (September 13 1939) 14
“The Sword Unsheathed”, The New York Times, (September 4 1939) 18; “War Guilt”, The New York Times,
(September 4 1939) 18
27
28
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it remained neutral: isolation no longer existed even if isolationism remained. Krock lauded
Roosevelt’s appeals and suggestions for peaceful solutions.29
In contrast to the Tribune, The Times was very much in favor of repeal of the arms
embargo. Several editorials and articles argued against the 1937 Act and the newspaper published
many articles containing pleas from proponents of the repeal. On September 6, an anonymous
editorial called the neutrality act costly and ill-considered, in breach with American tradition, not
realistic in its approach to the problems it tried to solve and definitely not in American interest:
“We do not conserve our interests when we deny the democracies of Europe the opportunities
to find in this nation the instruments of self-defense.” The democracies of Europe had every
right under international law to buy arms in America to defend themselves.30 On the same page,
Arthur Krock distinguished between real neutrality under international law and sham neutrality in
the neutrality legislation. He called the neutrality law an isolationist-pacifist doctrine, that went
against international law and was un-neutral: it was aiding Hitler. Krock supported Roosevelt in
his battle to get the arms embargo repealed.31 Canada was cited as an example of how un-neutral
the legislation was: Roosevelt was bound by law to deny the American neighbor and ally the
airplanes it desperately needed for its defense.32
As could be expected, the President’s plan to call Congress into special session to repeal
the troublesome arms embargo was hailed by The Times. The newspaper saw in the special session
the “real test of the democratic method” and hoped that the President and Congress would rise
to the occasion by debating the issue at hand “without panic, without partisanship and with a
single eye to the best interest of the American people.”33 The Times did not agree with the
Congressional opposition’s reasoning that repeal of the embargo would mean getting involved in
the war. This was the main argument made by Senator Borah in his speech on September 15.
Arthur Krock, “Despite Isolationism, Europe Draws Near”, The New York Times, (September 1 1939) 16
“American Neutrality”, The New York Times, (September 6 1939) 22
31 Arthur Krock, “In The Nation. Two Brands of Neutrality, Real and False”, The New York Times, (September 6
1939) 22
32 “ ‘Neutrality’ In Practice”, The New York Times, (September 12 1939) 24
33 “The Special Session”, The New York Times, (September 11 1939) 18
29
30
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This line of reasoning did not hold up according to The Times, especially not since there was no
ban on the shipping of other products to belligerents: as Arthur Krock emphasizes, ninety
percent of the materials needed to wage war were still being shipped to Britain and France. This
was a fake neutrality.34
In another editorial, Krock saw America assuming the roles “of political neutral, chief
salesman to the belligerents which control the seas, and guarantor of peace in the Western
Hemisphere. Every move the President and his government have made since the war began in
Europe has been to establish these functions.”35 However, The Times’ support for the
administration’s foreign policy was not unconditional. Like the Tribune, The Times is suspicious of
Roosevelt’s emergency proclamation. The proclamation of emergency was not considered
necessary for the nation’s defense. Krock warned on September 3 that even though the power to
declare war still laid with Congress, the President could use his vast peacetime powers to lead the
U.S. either into war or away from it. And now the President was even more powerful: “Much is
said of the absolute authorities of the dictators, and of the broad delegations of power to the
executive in Great Britain and France. But the fact is that if and when the President declares the
existence of a national emergency he becomes almost as potent as these.”36
The Times did not think the national emergency was a wise move: now Congress would
feel it should be at hand as long as there was an emergency. Roosevelt had shot himself in the
foot with the limited emergency, as it could result in a long session on the repeal of the arms
embargo, with fierce opposition. Congress is likely use the special session to get certain proposals
renewed.37
Another difference with the Chicago Tribune is The Times’ focus on finances and trade.
More than the Tribune, The New York Times was concerned how the economy would be affected
“Mr. Borah’s Argument”, The New York Times, (September 15 1939) 22; Arthur Krock, “In The Nation. Looking
Forward to the Debate in Congress”, The New York Times, (September 15 1939) 22
35 Arthur Krock, “America Is Mobilized As A Watchful Neutral”, The New York Times, (September 10 1939) E3
36 Arthur Krock, “Vast War Powers Put In Hand of President”, The New York Times, (September 3 1939) E3
37 Arthur Krock, “In The Nation. Congress and the ‘Limited’ National Emergency”, The New York Times,
(September 14 1939) 22
34
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by the war. On September 1, an article reassured the public that neither the Reconstruction
Finance Bank nor the Export-Import Bank were affected by the neutrality legislation or the
Johnson Act. Even though arms trade was not possible, regular commodities could still be sold
to France and Britain through these institutions. Furthermore, the President of the ExportImport Bank had already traveled across Europe for several weeks to find other outlets for
American surpluses.38 The Latin American markets were also seen as replacements for the lost
European ones and pushing trade within the Americas was regarded as a positive and necessary
development.39
The Times was furthermore happy to report that protecting the financial system was one of
the government’s first concerns when the war broke out and emphasized how strong the basis of
the American credit system was these days: in contrast to 1914, there was no panic on the stock
markets as a result from the outbreak of the war.40 Arthur Krock dedicated one of his editorials
to the American businessman. He regarded the fact that “the business man is being recognized
again” as a positive consequence from the war. The New Dealers had been using the American
capitalist and the American industrialist as their scapegoat, as their actions had supposedly
plunged the country into the economic abyss in 1929. But in these times of crisis, men of
business were conscripted by the administration to “do the hard, technical jobs and to provide
the talent of good management.”41 The Times was critical of the administration’s policy towards
business and seems pleased that the American businessman was no longer treated as the black
sheep.
The reporting by The New York Times during these first two weeks of the Second World
War differs in many ways from the Chicago Daily Tribune’s. First of all, unlike the Tribune, The Times
did not support the neutrality legislation and was in favor of repeal of the arms embargo.
“RFC Can Finance Buying By Europe”, The New York Times, (September 1 1939) 10
Charles E. Egan, “U.S. To Push Trade With Latin America”, The New York Times, (September 3 1939) F17;
“Hull Issues Order”, The New York Times, (September 5 1939) 17
40 “The Markets”, The New York Times, (September 2 1939) 16
41 Arthur Krock, “In The Nation. The Business Man Is Being Recognized Again”, The New York Times,
(September 8 1939) 22
38
39
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International law was considered a sounder basis for American foreign policy. The newspaper
rooted fervently for the special session of Congress and hoped the democratic process will be
able to bring back the U.S. on the right course of real neutrality under international law. The Times
wanted to stay out of the war just as much as the Tribune, but did not believe that the neutrality
legislation was the right method to maintain neutral. The newspaper doubted whether true
neutrality was even possible, since America was not as isolated as isolationists want to believe,
and American sentiments favor Great Britain and France. The Times was also concerned about the
powers Roosevelt had acquired through the national emergency, as these seemed excessive and
unnecessary for the objectives Roosevelt had set out in his speeches. This shows that the
newspaper was certainly not an unconditional supporter of the administration’s policies. It
maintained a critical attitude. Lastly, The New York Times focused more on trade and finances than
the Tribune, again with a critical eye on the actions taken by the White House.
The Concord Daily Monitor
The Monitor offered readers a broad range of editorial opinions. Besides the newspaper’s own
anonymous editorials, The Daily Monitor also published Walter Lippmann’s Pulitzer Prize-winning
column “Today and Tomorrow” and Dorothy Thompson’s column “On the Record.” Both were
famed journalists and worked for The New York Herald Tribune. Lippmann was a staunch
supporter of Woodrow Wilson and was closely involved in drafting the Fourteen Points. He also
was a member of the American delegation to the Peace Conference of 1919 in Paris and worked
on the League of Nations covenant. His column was published nationwide. Dorothy Thompson
was the first American journalist to be expelled from Germany, after her reporting had angered
the Nazi government in 1934. According to Time Magazine, she was the second most popular
American woman, Eleanor Roosevelt being number one. Her column for The Herald Tribune was
also syndicated throughout America.
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From this broad editorial scope and the articles on neutrality, a couple of matters stand
out. The Monitor’s own editorials dealt foremost with the issues of neutrality and staying out of the
war. Like The New York Times, The Monitor did not believe neutrality is possible, but linked it even
more to business and trade. In the anonymous editorial on September 2, The Monitor first voiced
the opinion that it was impossible to remain neutral in this conflict. True neutrality would isolate
the U.S. from the rest of the world and this would disrupt the economy: not only would certain
commodities no longer be available, but the U.S. was also connected through investments in
foreign nations.42
Two developments were seen as evidence that the U.S. was not even thinking as a neutral:
stock prices were rising because of frenzied buying and several American industrial plants already
had sealed orders from Washington just in case the U.S. did go to war. Almost sixty New
Hampshire industrial plants had secured an order from Washington. American business and the
government were clearly expecting war and were not thinking in a neutral way: therefore America
could not be neutral.43 This point of view was further emphasized in the editorial “Forget the
Quick Dollar.” It explained how neutrality was a thing of the spirit, and America did not seem to
have that spirit: sympathies for the allies were used as an excuse to profit from the war. Neither
the current neutrality legislation nor the repeal of the arms embargo could keep America out of
the European war.44
The link between business and war was also voiced in the article “Always Hard For
Nation To Stay Neutral.” Referring to American history, the article gave three reasons why the
U.S. cannot avoid war. First of all, the very effort to maintain neutrality usually dragged the
Americans into conflict. Unfortunately, this first aspect is not explained any further by The
“Can We Stay Out?”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (September 2 1939) 4
“Deluding Ourselves”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (September 6 1939) 4; “59 New Hampshire Plants Have
Sealed War Orders”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (September 5 1939) 1
44 “Forget the Quick Dollar”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (September 12 1939) 4
42
43
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Media Debate and Theories on American Foreign Policy
Monitor. Second, business made it impossible to maintain neutrality: America needed world trade.
Finally, American emotionalism did not allow the country to stay neutral for long.45
Thus, besides the economic aspect of neutrality, it was obvious that American sympathies
for Great Britain and France further complicated a true neutral position. The Monitor pleaded
repeal of the entire neutrality law: “the best thing we can do is not to have a neutrality act at all,
and to proceed on the admittedly old-fashioned concept of international law that unless we
declare war formally we are neutral.” This would be the best policy to avoid getting involved in
the conflict, even though The Monitor believed the U.S. could not stay out of the war for long,
especially if the conflict was prolonged.46
Walter Lippmann’s columns during these two weeks dealt with domestic politics. His first
concern was America’s need to strengthen itself. This could only be achieved through a national
administration, in which the President cooperated with the representative leaders of Congress
without personal, factional, and partisan politics.47 According to Lippmann, the President no
longer had the authority to conduct American affairs, because he was in his last term of office, he
had a divided party and he had lost control of Congress. To regain authority over American
affairs, Roosevelt should call upon the leaders of the opposition to share in his responsibility. He
should share all his information with the opposition, because “while the President is well
informed, his judgment is often impulsive and frequently biased.” By working closely with the
opposition, a real national government representing the whole nation would form and only this
could safeguard American interest and provide the nation with peace of mind.48
He further stressed this point of view in his column on the convening of Congress.
Lippmann was in favor of the special session of Congress and wanted to see the arms embargo
repealed, but he again argued for cooperation between the administration and the opposition. As
45
Morgan M. Beatty, “Always Hard For Nation To Stay Neutral”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (September 13 1939)
7
“Can We Stay Out?”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (September 2 1939) 4
Walter Lippmann, “Today and Tomorrow. America Needs Must Make Self Strong”, The Concord Daily Monitor,
(September 2 1939) 4
48 Walter Lippmann, “Today and Tomorrow. The President’s Radio Speech”, The Concord Daily Monitor,
(September 5 1939) 4
46
47
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he saw it, an effective method of consultation between the administration and the representative
leaders should be arranged before the session, to avoid that partisan quarrels would lead away
from the real issues. It was Roosevelt’s responsibility to reassure the opposition, he should create
a moral atmosphere to create national unity. If he wanted the embargo repealed, he should rise
above personal and factional resentments underlying partisanship.
If the President failed to unite Congress, it would not repeal the embargo and this would
mean a devastating blow to the democracies, a catastrophe for all free nations and
encouragement for Nazi Germany, Communist Russia, Fascist Italy and Japan.49 As he saw it, “an
American neutrality which weakens the British and French will almost certainly encourage the
Italians to practice a neutrality which ends in intervention if ever the British and French are
sufficiently weakened. And Stalin will certainly help a victorious Germany much more than a
failing Germany.” According to Lippmann neither of the so-called neutrals was truly neutral in
this conflict and they were likely to prolong this war, while they exercised influence in one way or
another.50
Dorothy Thompson blamed the Nazi’s for increasing the American divide over foreign
policy. She considered the U.S. as another victim in the Nazi’s war: the Nazi’s were trying to
divide, paralyze and dominate American politics through propaganda, and the opposition was
influenced by this strategy. The U.S. could not be a neutral, since the Nazi’s already had declared
war on America and were using the neutrality law to weaken the country. Her sympathies were
also with the allies, as Great Britain and France “do not wish to sow dissension in this country or
overthrow our established institutions and the latter [Germany] does.”51
In conclusion, The Monitor wanted to stay out of the war as much as the other
newspapers, but like The Times clearly does not believe true neutrality was possible. The American
economy would suffer from isolationism and American sympathies laid with the allies, so
Walter Lippmann, “Today and Tomorrow. Before Congress Is Called”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (September 9
1939) 4
50 Walter Lippmann, “Today and Tomorrow. Looking Ahead”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (September 7 1939) 4
51 Dorothy Thompson, “On the Record. Neutral’s problem”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (September 11 1939) 1
49
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neutrality could not last long. Furthermore, government and business preparing for war showed
that America did not think as a neutral. The neutrality legislation could not maintain this so-called
neutrality, it would more likely bring the U.S. closer to the war. Like The New York Times, The
Monitor regarded international law as the best guide for American foreign policy. America should
stay out of the war unless and until it was attacked, and should do everything possible to avoid
provocation of attack. International law was not a guarantee for peace but it was the best method
for keeping America out.52 More than The Times however, The Monitor seemed to think American
involvement in the war was unavoidable. It also expressed the connection between business and
involvement in the war more clearly than either one of the other newspapers. It did not reflect
concerns on the increased executive powers.
In the neutrality debate The Concord Daily Monitor can be placed on the side of The New
York Times. However, more than The Times, The Monitor tried to avoid clearly favoring one party.
The paper seemed to be voicing its own opinions instead of supporting the arguments made by
the different parties. The publication of three different editorials and the lack of articles on
proponents and opponents of the neutrality legislation illustrated this. Walter Lippmann’s
columns added emphasis on unity and cooperation between Roosevelt and the isolationist
opposition. Even though it wanted the neutrality law repealed, The Monitor seemed to be trying to
avoid siding with either the administration or the opposition in the neutrality debate like The
Times and The Tribune do.
Theoretical Framework
To start off with George Kennan’s critique of American foreign policy, in my opinion the
emotional approach can be found within all three newspapers. Kennan is concerned with the fact
that American statesmen are prone to be influenced in their conduct of foreign policy by public
opinion. Because there is no foreign policy doctrine, public opinion carries much weight in
52
“Back To International Law”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (September 8 1939) 4
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Media Debate and Theories on American Foreign Policy
policymakers’ decisions. Especially the executive is easily influenced by the short-term trends of
public opinion and what Kennan sees as the “erratic and subjective nature of public reaction to
foreign policy questions.”53 According to him, this fault is inherent in the American political
system. This way of handling foreign policy focuses too much on domestic issues. It not only
puts the effect of American foreign policy on the relationship with other nations on a second
place, it also instigates a moral, emotional and often not well-informed reaction.54
The Chicago Tribune, The Daily Monitor as well as The New York Times mentioned the
emotionalism Kennan fears. The Chicago Tribune warned against emotionalism as it could drag
America into the war for the wrong reasons.55 The Monitor was also very aware of this danger:
“Americans wear their hearts on their sleeves, and will find it difficult, as they have in the recent
past, to stand by unmoved when modern bombers rain death on old-world cities.”56 The Times
further stresses this point. It believes that the dislike of Nazi Germany will bring the national
reaction to a focal point and that Roosevelt proclaimed the national emergency to bring the
public into a state of alertness.57
All newspapers demonstrate how much American foreign policy was concerned with
public opinion. The Chicago Daily Tribune uses the column “The Inquiring Reporter” to emphasize
that Americans wanted to stay out of the war and do not want the neutrality legislation altered.
“The Inquiring Reporter” was a regular feature in which a reporter interviews the common
Chicago citizen, and more often than not the isolationist position was voiced.58 Furthermore, in
editorials an articles alike public opinion was used to defend positions on foreign policy.59
Kennan, American Diplomacy, 93
Ibidem, 176-178
55 “The War The World Feared”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (September 2 1939) 10
56 Morgan M. Beatty, “Always Hard For Nation To Stay Neutral”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (September 13 1939)
7
57 Harold B. Hinton“Can The United States Keep Out Of War”, The New York Times, (September 3 1939) E3;
Arthur Krock, “In The Nation. The Psychology of Alertness in Executive Policy”, The New York Times,
(September 12 1939) 24
58 “The Inquiring Reporter”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (September 4 1939) 14; “The Inquiring Reporter”, Chicago
Daily Tribune, (September 5 1939) 14
59 “War In Europe – How Americans Feel About It”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (September 2 1939) 6
53
54
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The legalistic tendency is also obvious. Like Kennan, both The Concord Daily Monitor and
The New York Times want to return to international law as the foundation of American foreign
policy. I want to stress that while the newspapers use the term “international law”, they do not
mean the international law within the framework of a league of nations, as we interpret
international law nowadays. They refer to the more diplomatic realistic approach for which
Kennan argues. They want to evaluate the proper response for each situation as it arrives, and
not be stuck in a legalistic straight-jacket like the neutrality legislation, which prescribes a certain
reaction. The conduct of foreign policy is guided by national interests, according to this
interpretation of international law.
Some evidence supporting the economic point of view voiced by Williams and LaFeber
can also be found. According to Williams, economic objectives played a role in the Roosevelt
administration’s shift to a more assertive policy. Policymakers could not agree on foreign policy
beyond economic expansion and essential peace and division over policy cut across political lines.
The same could be said of American business leaders. As Williams sees it: “A good many of them
remained unconvinced even by 1939 that it was the greater part of wisdom to make war in order
to make peace. (…) such leaders opposed war as a “great destroyer and unsettler of their
affairs.”60 Economic leaders proclaimed not to want war, but their objectives were hard to
reconcile with their anti-war stance. However, by 1940 a consensus was formed between
American economic leaders and the Roosevelt administration on policy towards the Axis. Men of
business were prominent in the Roosevelt administration and their mission became extending the
American frontier. The economic mission converged with a moral calling to transform the world,
which led to the vision of the American Century.61
The reporting in the newspapers illustrated the anti-war stance of business in 1939 which
Williams describes. An editorial in the Chicago Tribune proclaimed that if the Roosevelt
administration went to war, it would be in spite of business opposition. The editor based this on
60
61
Williams, The Tragedy Of American Diplomacy, 197
Ibidem 196-201
31
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the fact that the Illinois Manufacturer’s Association adopted a resolution, saying the proper policy
towards the conflict in Europe would be to stay out.62 Signs of consensus forming between the
administration and business were also already visible. Arthur Krock mentioned how the
Roosevelt administration drew more men of business into the administration.63 The New York
Times further focused on expanding trade with Latin America, which the newspaper saw as an
important development.64
However, none of the newspapers offered overwhelming evidence supporting Williams’
or LaFeber’s thesis that business influenced foreign policy decisions. Business was clearly not the
top priority in the discussion on neutrality. Of the three papers, The Concord Daily Monitor focused
most on business and trade and, at least during these weeks, the emphasis was more on how the
war would affect the economy than the other way around. It did not mention any members of
the business community who were either in favor or against American involvement.
More can be found on Michael Hunt’s ideological view on American foreign policy. All
three newspapers showed at least parts of the ideology based on ideas of national greatness and
liberty, hierarchical racial notions and fear of revolution. Interestingly, the Chicago Tribune used the
ideology for the isolationist argument as much as The Times and The Monitor drew on the
ideological concepts in their reasoning. For example, the Tribune’s publisher McCormick referred
to what he saw as the vast differences between American and European civilization in his
argument against American intervention. A great accomplishment like the American republic was
simply not possible in diverse and troubled Europe. In his rant on Europe’s violent history,
McCormick did not hide his dislike of Britain. The publisher and editor used all ingredient of the
“The Voice Of Business”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (September 15 1939) 14
Arthur Krock, “In The Nation. The Business Man Is Being Recognized Again”, The New York Times,
(September 8 1939) 22
64 Charles E. Egan, “U.S. To Push Trade With Latin America”, The New York Times, (September 3 1939) F17;
“Hull Issues Order”, The New York Times, (September 5 1939) 17
62
63
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foreign policy ideology to urge America to stay out of European affairs: American national
greatness, racial hierarchy and the threat of revolution.65
Many other of the Tribune’s articles and editorials reflected the isolationist point of view
based upon Jeffersonian tradition and the preoccupation with race and revolution, which was in
exact keeping with Hunt’s theory. The Tribune explicitly cautioned not to bring the contagious
madness from Europe to the U.S. and argued in different editorials that European problems
could not be solved by the U.S., as European nations were naturally prone to violence and war.
America should focus on protecting liberty and democracy at home, as these were threatened by
the warmongering administration.66
In contrast, The New York Times and The Concord Daily Monitor show how the ideology
supported the interventionists’ stance in the debate. According to Hunt, the interventionists
contended that the U.S. was no longer isolated and could therefore not maintain a neutral
position. Britain was essential for American defense and America should work with Britain to
restore the balance of power in Europe. The interventionists furthermore wanted to build a
better world in which international law was upheld and democracy could flourish. The U.S. could
create such a world order in cooperation with Britain.67
Both newspapers clearly supported these viewpoints. The Times as well as The Monitor
argued repeatedly for a foreign policy based on international law, since true neutrality was
impossible to maintain. America was entangled with the rest of the world through loans and trade
and should face the fact that it could not and will not remain isolated from the conflict. It was
also America’s job to protect the democracies in Europe.68
“Col. McCormick Traces Europe’s Centuries of Carnage and Intrigue”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (September 4
1939), 1 and 5
66 “The End of a Truce”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (September 4 1939), 18; “There Is No National Emergency”,
Chicago Daily Tribune, (September 10 1939) 18; “The Alleged National Emergency”, Chicago Daily Tribune,
(September 14 1939) 14; “American Peace and Neutrality”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (September 13 1939) 14
67 Hunt, Ideology And U.S. Foreign Policy, 149-150
68 “Can We Stay Out?”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (September 2 1939) 4; “Back To International Law”, The
Concord Daily Monitor, (September 8 1939) 4; Walter Lippmann, “Today and Tomorrow. Before Congress Is
Called”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (September 9 1939) 4; Morgan M. Beatty, “Always Hard For Nation To Stay
Neutral”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (September 13 1939) 7; Walter Lippmann, “Today And Tomorrow. The
65
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Conclusion
To recapitulate, the three newspapers reflect the fierce debate on American neutrality well. The
Chicago Daily Tribune represents the isolationist stance, while the reporting of The New York Times
and The Concord Daily Monitor is more in accordance with interventionist views. The isolationist
position is not surprising, since the Chicago Tribune was published and edited by a notorious
isolationist, Robert R. McCormick. Both The Times and The Monitor published editorials by
nationally well-known authors like Arthur Krock, Walter Lippmann and Dorothy Thompson, but
The Monitor was the only paper who printed three different editorials, two of which where printed
nationwide. I think it is likely that the local The Monitor represents best what the average American
thought, whereas the Tribune and The Times voice the more extreme positions in the neutrality
debate. However, the stance of The Monitor corresponds to the interventionist position of The
New York Times.
When held against the light of the three foreign policies theories, it is clear that Michael
Hunt’s ideological approach fits the reporting of all newspapers best. Even though the moralist
legalistic and economic aspects can also be found in the articles and editorials, Hunt’s theory
encompasses most of the arguments brought forward by the different newspapers.
Character Of This War”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (September 12 1939) 4; Arthur Krock, “Despite Isolationism,
Europe Draws Near”, The New York Times, (September 1 1939) 16; “American Neutrality”, The New York Times,
(September 6 1939) 22; Arthur Krock, “In The Nation. Two Brands of Neutrality, Real and False”, The New York
Times, (September 6 1939) 22; “ ‘Neutrality’ In Practice”, The New York Times, (September 12 1939) 24
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2. Lend-Lease
After a relatively short session of Congress, the arms embargo of the Neutrality Act was repealed
on November 4 1939, allowing for Britain and other allies to buy arms in America. However, the
fight between Roosevelt and the isolationists continued relentlessly. Even with American arms,
Great Britain was under tremendous strain in the war and by the end of 1940 it had run out of
cash necessary to obtain war supplies. Winston Churchill appealed to Roosevelt for help in
Britain’s precarious financial situation. Roosevelt reacted with the proposal for so-called LendLease aid to Britain, which meant that the U.S. would supply the allies with weapons for which
they could pay after the war. President Roosevelt announced his plans during the broadcast of a
fireside chat on December 1940. He compared Lend-Lease to lending your garden hose to a
neighbor, to put out a fire in his home. In the beginning of January the debate on the Lend-Lease
started to gain momentum. I have tracked the debate from January 1, when the newspapers
started to discuss the Lend-Lease proposal, until January 20, when President Roosevelt was
inaugurated the third time.
The session of the 77th Congress opened on January 3, anticipating another vehement
battle between isolationists and interventionists over foreign policy. By that time, the isolationists
were organized in the America First Committee. Roosevelt officially presented his Lend-Lease
proposal in his annual address to Congress on January 6. The famous “four freedoms” speech
was a direct attack on isolationism and an argument for utopian internationalism. Besides asking
Congress for the authority and funds to aid the allied nations, Roosevelt pleaded for a world
founded on the four essential freedoms: freedom of speech and expression, freedom of worship,
freedom from want and freedom from fear. On isolationism, he said: “Today, thinking of our
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children and their children, we oppose enforced isolation for ourselves or any other part of the
America’s.”69
On January 9 Roosevelt presented the record breaking annual budget of 17.5 billion
dollars. This peacetime budget exceeded the wartime budgets during the last world war and was
considered colossal. It did not even contained the costs of the Lend-Lease plan, which were
estimated to be an additional seven billion dollars. Congress was shocked and the isolationists
were appalled.70 Three days later the administration’s bill went to the House of Representatives as
H.R. 1776, the irony implied in the bill’s name not escaping anyone. The bill was simultaneously
send to the Senate as S. 275. The proposed bill would give President Roosevelt practically
unlimited personal authority, “notwithstanding the provisions of any other law”, to place
American war equipment, both new and old, at the disposal of foreign nations by lending, selling,
exchanging, leasing or otherwise disposing it, if this was vital to the interest of the defense of the
United States.71
The isolationists’ offensive commenced on January 11, when General Wood, chairman of
the America First Committee, announced that the committee would oppose the Lend-Lease
vigorously.72 America First immediately came into action. The Chicago chapter of the
organization urged Americans nationwide to join in protest against Lend-Lease.73 The next day
Senator Wheeler delivered his infamous radio speech opposing the Lend-Lease aid. Wheeler
stated that approval of the bill would mean war and American dictatorship, and called LendLease “the New Deal’s Triple A foreign policy – plow under every fourth American boy.”74
Cole, Roosevelt And The Isolationists 1932-1945, 409-413; “Text of President Roosevelt’s Message to Congress
on Defense Requirements and Plans”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (September 7 1941) 8
70 “17.5 Billion Sum Omits Cost Of Aid For Britain”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 9 1941) 1; Walter Trohan,
“Expect Defense Cost To Be 100% Over World War”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 9 1941) 9; “Budget Demand
Of 17.5 Billions Jolts Congress”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 9 1941) 9
71 Turner Catledge, “Bill Gives President Unlimited Power to Lend War Equipment and Resources”, The New York
Times, (January 11 1941) 1; Cole, Roosevelt And The Isolationists 1932-1945, 421-422
72 Cole, Roosevelt And The Isolationists 1932-1945, 414
73 “America First Group Urges War Aid Bill Foes To Join Protest”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 13 1941) 1
74 Cole, Roosevelt And The Isolationists 1932-1945, 415; “Protests Mount; Wheeler Warns Of Dictatorship”,
Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 13 1941) 1
69
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Supporters of the Lend-Lease bill did not sit idly by. The Committee to Defend America
by Aiding the Allies send a statement to Congress urging quick passage of the President’s bill to
ensure American security.75 An interesting twist occurred when former Republican presidential
candidate Wendell L. Willkie announced his full support of the Lend-Lease bill. Even though he
argued for a time limit on the authority to be given to the President, he was in favor of all out aid
to Britain.76 Furthermore, Roosevelt showed his anger when he directly reacted to Wheeler’s
attack during his press conference on January 15: “That is not to answer at all to those who talk
about plowing under every fourth American boy, which I regard as the most untruthful, as the
most dastardly, unpatriotic thing that has ever been said. Quote me on that. That really is the
rottenest thing that has been said in public life in my generation.”77
On the same day the Congressional hearings on the Lend-Lease bill before the House
Foreign Affairs Committee began. Among others the following were invited to be heard on the
bill: Secretary of State Hull, Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau,
Charles Lindbergh, Ambassador Kennedy, former President Hoover and Col. McCormick.78 The
hearings further intensified the debate in the newspapers.
Aware of Roosevelt’s problems with American public opinion, Churchill emphasized the
British need for American weapons on January 17. During a speech in Glasgow, accompanied by
personal representative of the President Harry L. Hopkins, Churchill repeated his plea for
American aid and stressed that Britain did not require large armies from overseas in 1941.79 Three
days later President Roosevelt took his third term oath, while Willkie traveled to Great Britain for
“Quick Passage Urged For President’s Bill”, The New York Times, (January 12 1941) 2
“Willkie Endorses “All Out” Aid Bill With Time Limit On President’s Powers”, The New York Times, (January
13 1941) 1
77 Frank L. Kluckhohn, “ ‘Rotten’, ‘Dastardly’, Roosevelt Says Of War Charge Made By Wheeler”, The New York
Times, (January 15 1941) 1
78 “House Hearings On War Aid To Open With Cabinet Views; President Angered By Critic”, The New York
Times, (January 15 1941) 1
79 “Churchill Calls For U.S. Weapons, Not Big Overseas Armies, In 1941”, The New York Times, (January 18 1941)
1
75
76
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a fact-finding mission. At the same time, the Foreign Affairs Committee prepared to hear
opponents and critics of the Lend-Lease bill.80
Chicago Tribune
Even more than in 1939, the Chicago Tribune was voicing isolationist point of views. Practically
every day various articles on America First and other opponents of any American involvement in
the war were published and articles and editorials alike reflected isolationist arguments and
criticized the Roosevelt administration. The Tribune’s primary concerns were that the Lend-Lease
aid to Britain would lead to involvement in the war and dictatorship at home. The paper
commented on Roosevelt’s announcement of the Lend-Lease plan in Congress: “The President
defied the dictators to regard American aid to their enemies as an act of war. Conspicuously
lacking from the message was any such pledge as Mr. Roosevelt and his party gave in the
presidential election campaign that American troops will not be sent overseas.” 81 The Lend-Lease
equated to a declaration of war according to the Tribune, it even renamed the bill ‘war bill’ or
‘dictatorship bill’.
The notion that the Lend-Lease bill was a disguised war declaration is further emphasized
in various articles and editorials: “This is not a bill to aid Britain short of war. It is a bill to put
America into the war and to destroy the republican form of government in this country.” 82
Another editorial saw the government already acting and speaking as a nation at war. The editor
warned that America cannot be involved in the war and not send troops at the same time: if the
Turner Catledge, “Roosevelt Has A Talk With Willkie And Gives Him Letter To Churchill; To Take The ThirdTerm Oath Today”, The New York Times, (January 20 1941) 1; Frederick R. Barkley, “Lease-Lend Forces To
Resume Battle”, (January 20 1941) 1
81 Arthur Sears Henning, “President Asks Full U.S. Aid To Beat Dictators”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 7 1941)
1
82 “It Is Not A Bill To Help England”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 14 1941) 10 ; “Roosevelt Has Put U.S. In
War, Flynn Charges”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 8 1941) 7; Chesly Manly, “Senators Map Fight To Revise War
Aid Bill”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 13 1941) 1; “Aid Allies Group Starts Talking Of Going To War”, Chicago
Daily Tribune, (January 13 1941) 2; “Protest Mount; Wheeler Warns Of Dictatorship”, Chicago Daily Tribune,
(January 13 1941) 1
80
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Lend-Lease proposal would be approved, American soldiers would fight in Europe.83 Leader of
the senate isolationists, Senator Wheeler, took it even further by stating that the British already
demanded that America declared war to Germany immediately and that President Roosevelt was
complying to that request, leap by leap: “The next step will be an expeditionary force. Every
American ought to realize that Mr. Roosevelt is leading us down the road to war.”84
The view that Lend-Lease meant war, was inextricably linked to the idea that it would also
lead to a dictatorship at home. As the Tribune explained it in a front page editorial: “The people
who call this a war dictatorship have named it correctly. It is supported by persons who want to
put the United States into the war and who will sacrifice their country to the dictatorship if that is
the price to be paid for what they want; and by persons who will take the war if it is the means of
getting the dictatorship.”85 According to the Tribune, Roosevelt asked too much authority from
Congress, he practically asked for a blank check. No limitations were set to the time, value or
quantity of aid to Britain.86 The day after Roosevelt’s address to Congress, the Tribune opened
with the headline “Scheme To Lend Arms Is Cast As One Man Show – Plan to Vest Powers in
Roosevelt”, which illustrates that the newspaper was strongly opposed to increasing the executive
powers.87 The following day, the editorial voiced more critique on Roosevelt. It contended that
the President took in a lot of territory in his address: “For whatever length of time it may acquire,
Mr. Roosevelt, so far as he is personally able to do so, drafts the power of the United States
against the governments at present dominant in Europe and Asia.” The Tribune regarded the
speech as a lot of loose talk, but as dangerous loose talk.88
After the bill was sent to Congress, criticism of the President and his administration
reached a new level. On January 11 the outraged headlines read: “Senators To Fight FDR Bill –
Unlimited Power Over Arms Stuns Congress – Scheme Called A Dictatorship And A War
“The War Bill Under Attack”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 16 1941) 12
“Wheeler Tells British Demand We Enter War”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 18 1941) 1
85 “War and Dictatorship”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 17 1941) 1
86 Chesly Manly, “President’s Bid for Defense Spending Power Foretold.”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 4 1941) 1
87 Chesly Manly, “Scheme To Lend Arms Is Cast As One Man Show – Plan to Vest Powers in Roosevelt”, Chicago
Daily Tribune, (January 7 1941) 1
88 “A Lot Of Loose Talk”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 8 1941) 10
83
84
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Move.” The Tribune was appalled at the vast powers the President sought. If Roosevelt were to
be granted these powers, the U.S. would become a totalitarian dictatorship.89 The authority to
declare war would no longer lie with Congress, as the Lend-Lease bill would empower the
President to commit acts of war. Because it would take away so much power from Congress, it
was seen “as an attempt to abolish free government in the United States.”90 The Tribune saw in
this bill the destruction of the American Republic: “It is a bill for unlimited dictatorship with
power over the possessions and lives of the American people, with power to make war and
alliances for war. (…) From that cradle the American dictator will arise. Congress is asked to
abdicate. All other laws are to be suspended. Mr. Roosevelt decides and his decision is final.” 91
Another editorial accused Roosevelt of trying to sidestep the constitution by taking the decision
to declare war out of Congress’ hands. The Lend-Lease bill was just another step in the New
Deal scheme to rule the country and everyone without interference. The people had to stand up
against the warmongering New Dealers, if they did not want to be ruled by a military dictator and
wanted to avoid sending their sons to war and want to hold on to their savings.92
There was fierce opposition to the Lend-Lease bill in Congress and limitations and
amendments to the bill were proposed. The administration was prepared to set a time limit on
the authorities extended to the President, but the Tribune was not satisfied with that compromise:
“you can’t time limit a dictator.” Ever since Roosevelt came into office he asked for extraordinary
authorities for a limited amount of time, and now he was still asking for more power. It was the
duty of the Republicans to save the republic from the dictator.93
Roosevelt’s dictatorial tendencies were also regarded as a danger to American security.
The industrial capacities on which the U.S. based its defenses rest upon economic freedom. Since
dictatorial power would not tolerate political or economic freedom, American defense was
“Senators To Fight FDR Bill – Unlimited Power Over Arms Stuns Congress – Scheme Called A Dictatorship And
A War Move”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 11 1941) 1
90 “Dewey Rips Into Aid Bill; Says It Perils Liberty”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 11 1941) 2
91 “A Bill To Destroy the Republic”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 12 1941) 1
92 “Dictatorship Thru Conspiracy”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 13 1941) 8
93 “You Can’t Time Limit a Dictator”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 15 1941) 12
89
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threatened.94 The editorial stating this was published on the front page on January 20, the day of
President Roosevelt’s third inauguration.
Besides staying out of the war and avoiding American dictatorship, the isolationists had
several other reasons to oppose the Lend-Lease bill. First of all the financial aspect: during the
first great war the American people had given the British and the French massive financial aid,
which they never paid back.95 Why should America lend them even more now? The previous
loans had left the U.S. with large debts, which the Tribune saw as a threat to political freedom.
According to the editorial on January 11, it was the debts and war ravages that created the
dictatorships of Europe: American liberties were also threatened by the same factors. 96 Several
isolationists argued in the Tribune for British collateral. For instance, rubber was seen as a valuable
and therefore sound basis as collateral. Other suggestions for collateral were Bermuda and the
British islands in the Caribbean, or the priceless collections of the British museum.97 It was also
argued that the British were not in desperate need of American financial aid, as they still had a
large gold reserve.98
The well-known argument that America simply could not solve Europe’s problems,
because it has a violent history and war is unavoidable in the old world, was also uttered several
times.99 Furthermore, Britain was not needed for American defense. Instead of aiding Britain
with American money and arms, America should invest in its own defense, which was not nearly
as strong as it needed to be.100
“America Wants Defense, Not a Revolution”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 20 1941) 1
“II. British-American War Finance.” Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 5 1941) 12; “III. British-American War
Finance.” Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 12 1941) 12
96 “The Superstate and The Subject”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 11 1941) 10
97 “Suggest British Pledge Rubber For U.S. Credits”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 9 1941) 3; “Wiley Demands
Collateral For War Item Loans”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 10 1941) 6; “Suggests U.S. Ask British to Hock
Museum”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 8 1941) 1
98 Arthur Sears Henning, “Tell Roosevelt Plan To Evade War Loan Ban”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 6 1941) 1
and 6
99 “The Critical Year In Washington”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 4 1941) 10; “Not This Agony Again”,
Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 19 1941) 16
100 “Put U.S. Defense Above Britain’s, Hammond Urges”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 9 1941) 2; “Business And
Politics Look At War”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 10 1941) 12; Willard Edwards, “Bulk of U.S. Plane Output
Sent to Britain, House Quiz Reveals”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 14 1941) 2
94
95
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The last issue which figured prominently in the pages of the Chicago Daily Tribune was
Willkie’s betrayal of the Republican party. The Tribune was shocked that the former presidential
candidate supported Roosevelt’s war bill, and accused Willkie of being part of the propaganda
machine of the dictatorial administration. Even worse, he infiltrated the Republican party as part
of a Democratic conspiracy to acquire more executive powers for Roosevelt. The American
people and democracy were tricked.101
During these first three weeks of January 1941, the Chicago Daily Tribune was still reporting
from an isolationist point of view. However, the newspaper was not explicitly arguing against
aiding Britain. This is not very surprising, since the U.S. had been supplying the allies with arms
and ammunition for over a year through the cash-and-carry provision of the Neutrality Act. It is
mostly concerned that the proposed Lend-Lease bill would bring America into the war and that
the extensive executive powers which came with it would turn the U.S. in a dictatorship. The
Tribune sees the free American republic threatened by the extended executive powers. The costs
of the aid also played a role in the opposition to the bill, but are of secondary concern. The
suggested conspiracy involving Willkie illustrates how distrustful the Chicago Daily Tribune was of
the administration.
The New York Times
The New York Times did not share the Tribune’s concerns of war and dictatorship. Of course, the
newspaper did not want to go to war and hoped that the U.S. could stay out of it, but aiding
Britain was regarded as a priority. Instead of comparing Roosevelt to a dictator, The Times saw in
the situation at hand a test of democracy and expressed the hope that the U.S. could rise to the
occasion. While the Tribune published mostly articles supporting isolationist organizations and
“Willkie’s View – and Landon’s”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 13 1941) 2; Arthur Sears Henning, “G.O.P.
Disturbed By Willkie’s Aid To Pro-War Bill”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 15 1941) 2; “Wheeler Calls Willkie As
War Minded As F.D.R.”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 14 1941) 3; Arthur Sears Henning, “Radio Talk Exposes
Willkie Link to Propaganda”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 18 1941) 8; “Mr. Willkie Checks Out”, Chicago Daily
Tribune, (January 18 1941) 8; “The Framed Timbers Of A War Conspiracy”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 20
1941) 10
101
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points of view, The New York Times reported more on interventionist organizations like the
Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies and other proponents of the Lend-Lease
proposal.102
The Times was in favor of aiding Britain for several reasons. First of all, the majority of the
American people wanted to aid Britain. The results of a Gallup poll were published on the front
page on January 3, reporting that over the last two years, Americans supported two aims in
foreign policy: staying out of war and giving the British every possible aid short of the actual
sending of troops to Europe. Americans saw American security linked to Britain.103 The New York
Times agreed with this point of view: “Whatever differences there may be regarding details or
methods, the country is now overwhelmingly convinced that our own security and ability to
remain at peace will be increased the longer Britain is able to hold the Axis Powers in check.”
The same editorial was concerned with American war production, not because the supplies were
needed for U.S. defense but because it feared America could not give Britain enough aid.104 A
clear contrast with the Tribune, which was more worried about American defenses. The Times also
referred to the last presidential election for evidence that Americans want to help Britain. Both
presidential candidates urged full aid to Britain in their campaigns: “Yet by many tests the great
majority of the American people have registered approval of this policy, although knowledge of
this risk [war] is now widespread.”105 Roosevelt’s policy clearly was a bipartisan policy, enjoying
the full support of the American people.106
After Roosevelt’s famous speech to Congress, The Times was ambivalent in its reactions.
One editorial was full of praise of Roosevelt’s pledge to stand by the democracies in peril and
regarded this policy the only right course of action for the U.S. The same line of reasoning used
“Mayor Aids White Group”, The New York Times, (January 2 1941) 6; “Vandenberg Takes New Stand On War”,
The New York Times, (January 2 1941) 1; “Roosevelt’s Plea For Britain Hailed”, The New York Times, (January 5
1941) 35
103 “U.S. Securities Seen Linked to Britain – Roosevelt Views Backed”, The New York Times, (January 3 1941) 1
104 “To Speed Up Our Aid”, The New York Times, (January 6 1941) 14; “The President’s Bill”, The New York
Times, (January 11 1941) 16
105 “New Congress In Mood To Back Up Roosevelt”, The New York Times, (January 5 1941) E3
106 “Above Partisanship”, The New York Times, (January 8 1941) 18
102
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in the discussion on the Neutrality Act was used here again: “It discards, as unrealistic and
dishonorable, that proposed “neutrality” which drew no distinction between aggressor and his
victims, between the criminal violator of international law and the nations which uphold it,
between the tyrant and the defenders of our own democratic ways and institutions.” 107 Arthur
Krock was more critical of Roosevelt’s pledge. He discussed the lack of enthusiasm in Congress
for the President’s speech and argued that the senators were right to only show a temperate
reaction. The President’s proposal could have very serious implications for the U.S., especially
since Roosevelt’s proposed policy covered a lot of territory.108
The New York Times expected that Congress would be favorable to the Lend-Lease bill,
because there was agreement on the main objectives.109 However, it was anxious about the
unlimited powers that came with the Lend-Lease bill. Like the Tribune, The Times criticized
Roosevelt’s quest for power, although not in the same harsh terms. The newspaper thought that
the bill in its present form “will create grave doubts in the minds even of many who are most
eager to send prompt and effective aid to Britain (…) because of the extend to which they call for
the surrender of democratic methods.”110 Especially Krock was very critical of the Roosevelt
administration: the Lend-Lease bill demonstrated that Washington was now fighting the devil
with fire. The government’s policy went directly against both domestic laws and international
laws.111 Roosevelt could just as well have declared war: at least this would justify the emergency
powers.112
Since the extension of power could be unavoidable, The Times urged the President to
consult with the broad opposition, which consisted not only of isolationists. The President would
probably win the fight in Congress, but the Lend-Lease bill could paralyze Congress for a long
“Our Purpose And Our Pledge”, The New York Times, (January 7 1941) 22
Arthur Krock, “In The Nation. Congress and the All-Out Aid Policy”, The New York Times, (January 7 1941) 22
109 “Congress Reaction Widely Favorable”, The New York Times, (January 7 1941) 1; Harold Hinton, “Congress
Leaders Willing To Study Aid-Bill Changes But Want Main Objectives”, The New York Times, (January 12 1941) 1
110 “The President’s Bill”, The New York Times, (January 11 1941) 16
111 Arthur Krock, “In The Nation”, The New York Times, (January 15 1941) 22
112 Arthur Krock, “War Aid Bill Arouses Many-Sided Opposition”, The New York Times, (January 19 1941) E3
107
108
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time and hamper aid to Britain.113 Even though the great powers to make swift decisions on
foreign policy should maybe lie with a centralized authority in these times, the President should
share the responsibility of the power to determine foreign policy. Since the President was
assuming “unprecedented personal authority in this emergency, then he must have personal
envoys, reliable sources of personal information.”114
Furthermore, it was most essential to present a united front to the world and Roosevelt
should make an effort to create American unity. The nation looked to Roosevelt to live up to the
great leadership role he had assigned to himself, and The New York Times had high expectations.115
In the end, The Times considered the aid to Britain to be more important than quarreling over the
Lend-Lease bill in Congress. Roosevelt should clearly define the presidential powers and a time
limit should be imposed on the bill, to ensure large Congressional support of the bill and aid to
the British people.116
Wendell Willkie’s backing of Roosevelt’s bill was also discussed in The Times, although not
as extensively as in the Chicago Tribune. The Times was not nearly as suspicious of Willkie as the
Tribune was, since it mainly considered Willkie’s support of the Lend-Lease bill another sign that
this foreign policy enjoyed much popular support, among Democrats and Republicans alike.
According to Arthur Krock, Willkie’s dilemma also illustrated the dilemma with which the
opposition struggled: many who were in favor of aiding Britain were hesitant to vote in favor of
the Lend-Lease bill, because they did not want to grant the President that much authority. Willkie
decided to take a chance on Roosevelt, even though it could pose a risk to American
democracy.117
In conclusion, The Times was very much in favor of the full-out aid to Britain proposed in
the Lend-Lease bill, because the defense of Britain was regarded as clearly linked to American
“For National Unity”, The New York Times, (January 14 1941) 20
Anne O’Hare McCormick, “Europe. The President’s Powers and the New World Order”, The New York Times,
(January 13 1941) 14
115 “While History Pauses”, The New York Times, (January 20 1941) 16
116 “H.R. 1776”, The New York Times, (January 20 1941) 16
117 Arthur Krock, “In The Nation. Willkie Statement Acceptance of Total Challenge”, The New York Times,
(January 14 1941) 30
113
114
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security and most Americans supported this foreign policy. However, The Times was critical of
Roosevelt’s requests for increasing his powers. These were regarded as a strain on democracy and
Roosevelt should clearly define the scope of authorities and set a time limit to them. However,
The Times’ critique was nowhere near as harsh as the Chicago Tribune’s. Further in contrast to the
Tribune, The Times was open to the objections of Roosevelt’s opponents and urged consultation
between the President and opposition leaders. Unity and bipartisanship were considered essential
in these critical times.
The Concord Daily Monitor
In January 1941, The Concord Daily Monitor still published the various editorials by among others
Dorothy Thompson and Walter Lippmann. Even more so than in 1939, these editorials offered
different point of views. I will discuss them separately in order to avoid confusion.
Dorothy Thompson was a staunch supporter of Roosevelt and his Lend-Lease bill. Like
The New York Times, Thompson considered American security to be dependent on Britain’s
survival: “The next six months will determine whether the island fortress of democracy and the
continental arsenal of democracy hold, and whether the ocean still binds them.”118 The day after
the state of the union, Thompson pointed out the dangers to the U.S. of a Nazi-victory. An
invasion was not even necessary to subject America, since the U.S. could be easily brought to her
knees by economic strangulation, isolated in a Nazi-dominated world. America’s markets were
primarily in Europe and Asia, and they would be lost.119 This was another reason to support
President Roosevelt’s Lend-Lease. Thompson did not have a problem with extending more
authority to the President. In fact, it was the only way to achieve the two clashing foreign policy
objectives: aid Britain and do not go to war. As she sees it “there are times when republics must
have coordinated leadership and authority or perish.”120
Dorothy Thompson, “On the Record. 1941 – First Half”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (January 3 1941) 4
Dorothy Thompson, “On the Record. The President’s Speech”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (January 8 1941) 4
120 Dorothy Thompson, “For Strengthening Of Authority”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (January 13 1941) 4
118
119
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Thompson was furthermore full of praise of Wendell Willkie, her view was the absolute
opposite of the Chicago Tribune’s: “Mr. Willkie, by insisting on being an American and a realistic
patriotic before he is a Republican, may well be saving the political future of that ill-starred party
which suffers more from its friends than from its enemies.” His efforts to achieve national unity
were an example to the whole nation.121 According to Thompson, it was the party system plagued
by partisanship that threatened American democracy. The Congressional hearings on the LendLease bill were illustrating this. Instead of performing their democratic duty of shedding light and
offering guidance, they were hijacked by partisans.122 Her support of the President reached a new
high on January 20. After her ode to the office of the American President, Thompson contended
that Roosevelt had no greater powers than the Presidents before him, only greater
responsibilities.123
During these three weeks, only one editorial of Walter Lippmann was published. In this
editorial he expressed his concern about American democracy, but not because he saw it
threatened by President Roosevelt like The Times and the Tribune. He regarded Congress as the
biggest threat to democracy. Lippmann applauded that Roosevelt had made it official American
foreign policy to support the struggle for a free world order and to resist the establishment of a
totalitarian order. This was exactly what the American people wanted. The democratic process
had already proven this during three quarters of a year full of free discussion. It was proven in the
press, in political conventions and finally in the presidential election. But now Congress was
going to discuss the aid to Britain all over again and according to Lippmann, they would talk
themselves into inaction and confusion. The real issue here was not what American policy should
be, but whether democracy worked: “For if democracy does not work in America because it gets
Dorothy Thompson, “On the Record. Willkie’s Voyage”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (January 15 1941) 4
Dorothy Thompson, “On the Record. The Congressional Hearing”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (January 17
1941) 4
123 Dorothy Thompson, “On the Record. The President of the United States”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (January
20 1941) 4
121
122
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bogged down in unending agitation and repetitive debate and a legislative filibuster, then it is
defeated here, and it will not survive the test to which it is subjected.”124
The anonymous editorials of The Monitor were more critical than either Thompson or
Lippmann. Overall they were supportive of the Lend-Lease and aid to Britain, but not
unconditionally. At first, The Monitor agreed with Thompson and Lippmann that the President
merely expressed the will of the majority and indicated his purpose to give direction. This was
considered appropriate: “In a non-neutral state, arming against declared foes, the government
must provide the leadership”, and this was definitely one of those times.125
However, after the bill went to Congress, the editorials began to sound more like the
Tribune’s. Roosevelt was accused of declaring war by linking America’s purpose to that of
Britain’s.126 The new foreign policy covered too much ground: “Mr. Roosevelt’s new foreign
policy – if it has any meaning – means that we have invoked the Monroe Doctrine on a
worldwide basis. We have, in short, guaranteed to police the world with our Armies and
Navies.”127 Roosevelt was called a “virtual generalissimo directing over-all operations against the
dictator powers” and “the world’s economic and military dictator.” 128
The Monitor’s editorials further regarded the Lend-Lease bill as a grave threat to American
ideals and the democratic process: “if this great surrender of power to his office is necessary then
passage of house bill H.R. 1776 will become and admission that the democratic way has finally
failed in America too.”129 The fact that the President was about to start his third term did not
help. According to The Monitor, this left people even more confused about democracy. The bill
gave the President the authority to declare war and The Monitor did not see why Roosevelt should
need that authority. However, if Churchill and the administration were right about the imminent
Walter Lippmann, “Today an Tomorrow. Does Democracy Work in U.S.?”, The Concord Daily Monitor,
(January 7 1941) 4
125 “Priorities Next”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (January 8 1941) 4
126 “Our New National Policy”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (January 10 1941) 4
127 Ray Tucker, “National Whirligig. News Behind The News”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (January 10 1941) 4
128 Ray Tucker, “National Whirligig. News Behind The News”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (January 15 1941) 4;
Ray Tucker, “National Whirligig. News Behind The News”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (January 17 1941) 4
129 “America Changes Direction”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (January 11 1941) 4
124
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crisis, then the emphasis should be more on the production and shipping of war supplies instead
of debating the Lend-Lease endlessly. The Monitor argued for giving the war supplies without any
strings attached, because this method of aiding Britain posed the lowest risk of getting involved
in hostilities.130
It is interesting how the point of views of the different editorials published in The Monitor
diverge. Practically every day the columns by Thompson and Lippmann, both supporting the
administration, share the same page with the fault-finding anonymous editorials. Where
Thompson and Lippmann both argue for all-out aid to Britain while praising President
Roosevelt, The Monitor’s editorials take the same stand as the Chicago Tribune. Roosevelt was
considered to be covering too much ground in the Lend-Lease bill and asked for too much
authority. Like the Tribune, The Monitor regards Roosevelt a dictatorial threat to American
democracy.
In my opinion, The Monitor probably reflects the dilemma with which the American
people struggled best. By publishing both editorials in favor of and against the Lend-Lease
proposal, the newspaper is the only one of the three that covers the whole debate from both
points of view. The New York Times tries to be unbiased, by arguing that the administration’s
opposition has legitimate objections and by advising Roosevelt to consult with Congressional
leaders. But The Times is clearly in favor of the Lend-Lease and the reporting reflects this. The
Chicago Tribune does not even bother to try to appear objective: both articles and editorials express
a fierce isolationist stance. It is an interesting development to see The Concord Daily Monitor
propagate both the interventionist and the isolationist position.
Theoretical Framework
The discussion on the Lend-Lease aid to Britain reflects Kennan’s legalistic moralistic theory on
American foreign policy in some ways. However, in can be less clearly discerned than in the
“The Great Debate”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (January 18 1941) 4; “Another Lincoln”, The Concord Daily
Monitor, (January 20 1941) 4
130
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debate on the Neutrality Act. The legalistic side of his approach is hardly present in this
discussion, probably since the basis of American foreign policy is not an issue questioned here, as
it was in the debate on the Neutrality Act. The question was which method of the Lend-Lease
could keep the U.S. out of the war and uphold American democracy. The Neutrality Act still
underlies foreign policy, so international law is not a central issue here. Only one editorial of The
Times questions whether joining the League of Nations would not have been a better option for
conducting foreign policy: the U.S. was again on the verge of war just like in 1917 and again was
not prepared. The New York Times further acknowledged the moralistic tendency Kennan speaks
of: “Flush with a decade of great prosperity, in the ten years after we laid down on the League,
we almost drowned the rest of the world with good advice. There was nothing we were going to
do about things, but as a nation of supermen, with a couple of cars in every garage, we were
willing to tell everyone else how they should manage their affairs.” This period was followed by
an “ostrich foreign policy”: while Hitler was fast building up Germany’s armaments, the U.S. was
still preaching disarmament without taking any action. The U.S. stood by doing nothing and now
“we are in peril from one of those purely European matters.” The League of Nations might have
been a better alternative for America, according to The New York Times.131
The Tribune also touched upon Kennan’s warning of moral superiority. Like Kennan, the
newspaper argued that Roosevelt’s vision would not only lead the U.S. to war, it would also
prolong it because his reasoning made only an absolute victory acceptable: “Congress may have
made so complete a surrender by establishing a war dictatorship intended to decide the outcome
of a war that it may be too weakened to vote against full participation and the sending of millions
of American soldiers into a conflict to be prolonged for years.”132
Public opinion obviously did still play an important role in foreign policy. All three
newspapers made the argument that the majority of the American people supports their position
a significant part of their line of reasoning. The Chicago Tribune maintains that since most
131
132
Edwin L. James, “As to a Foreign Policy Behind the Procession”, The New York Times, (January 19 1941) E3
“War and Dictatorship”, The New York Times, (January 17 1941) 1
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Americans did not want to go to war, most Americans were also against the Lend-Lease.
Meanwhile, The Times and The Monitor both used the fact that the majority of the American people
were in favor of aiding Britain to back their argument. The Times emphasized that Americans had
made it very clear through the democratic process how they felt about the Lend-Lease aid to
Britain. At the same time, The Times argued that the decision on aid was primarily a military and
not a sentimental one.133
Little more can be found to support Williams’ economic emphasis on foreign policy.
There are some signs that American business was more supportive of the administration than it
was in 1939, but the evidence is certainly not overwhelming. The Times mentioned twice that an
American businessman is in favor of the Lend-Lease bill.134 There are no clear signs of
cooperation between business and the Roosevelt administration. The Chicago Tribune even argued
that the administration was hampering industry by restraining economic freedom.135 Furthermore,
where trade and finances still played a role in the debate on the Neutrality Act, the economic
perspective seems to be almost absent from the debate over the Lend-Lease. In The Concord
Monitor, Dorothy Thompson did mention how the loss of foreign markets would be dangerous
for the U.S., but the business aspect never plays a significant role in any other articles and
editorials.136 Besides being concerned about the costs of aiding Britain, the Tribune also is not
occupied with financial aspects of foreign policy.
This leaves Michael Hunt’s ideological approach, and, similar to the neutrality debate, his
theoretical framework fits the discussion on the Lend-Lease bill best. Just like in 1939,
components of the American foreign policy ideology can be found in all three newspapers. Both
interventionist and isolationist drew on the ideology for their arguments. The Tribune again
emphasized that America could not solve European problems, because there were no solutions
“To Speed Up Our Aid”, The New York Times, (January 6 1941) 14
“Aldrich Approves of Lend-Lease Plan”, The New York Times, (January 15 1941) 1; “Wallace Warns of Peril to
Trade If Totalitarianism Is Triumphant”, The New York Times, (January 18 1941) 6
135 “America Wants Defense, Not a Revolution”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 20 1941) 1
136 Dorothy Thompson, “On the Record. The President’s Speech”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (January 8 1941) 4
133
134
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to the age old strife. The anti-British sentiments mentioned by Hunt were also reflected again by
the isolationist newspaper, as were other signs of the hierarchical racial notions. This position is
illustrated by the comment on the broad territory covered in Roosevelt’s four freedoms-speech:
“Just where the inferior peoples in many other lands fit into the American program is not
indicated. Mr. Roosevelt didn’t have all his specifications.”137 The Tribune was suspicious of
Britain’s objectives in asking for aid. It suspected that Britain was in fact able to buy more
weapons through the cash-and-carry provision, but that it was trying to get America involved in
the war.
Obviously, the three newspapers were also very concerned with liberty. On one level or
another, they all see American democracy threatened by the Lend-Lease bill. Interesting detail is
that both the Tribune and The Monitor quote Benjamin Franklin on liberty, the Tribune for the
isolationist and The Monitor for the interventionist point of view: “They that give up essential
liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.” 138 In The Concord
Monitor, the editorials used the argument of liberty for both the interventionist and the isolationist
point of view. Lippmann and Thompson wanted the U.S. to defend democratic freedom in
Europe and the anonymous editorials argued that the administration should focus on democracy
at home. The Lend-Lease bill was a test for American democracy, according to both parties. 139
The New York Times also regarded the Lend-Lease as both a threat to and a test for democracy.
Furthermore, the fear of revolution could be found in the reporting again, although not
as prominently as in 1939. The Tribune was afraid that Roosevelt and his Lend-Lease powers
would cause a revolution: “What it [America] does not need, what it cannot survive and remain
“A Lot Of Loose Talk”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 8 1941) 10
Cartoon by Parrish, “The Men of 1776 Look at Bill 1776”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 17 1941) 1; Dorothy
Thompson, “On the Record. 1941 – First Half”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (January 3 1941) 4
139 “America Changes Direction”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (January 11 1941) 4; Walter Lippmann, “Today an
Tomorrow. Does Democracy Work in U.S.?”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (January 7 1941) 4
137
138
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free, is a social revolution thru powers sought on the pretense that they are needed for national
defense.”140
Conclusion
The discussion on Roosevelt’s Lend-Lease bill H.R. 1776 caused much anxiety. All three
newspapers primarily feared for the continuance of American democracy and getting involved in
the war. The Chicago Tribune was fiercer in proclaiming its isolationist stance and in attacking the
Roosevelt administration. More than in 1939, the paper’s viewpoint was noticeable in the articles.
The New York Times remained true to the interventionist position, while keeping a critical eye on
the administration. Meanwhile, The Concord Daily Monitor’s various editorials started to diverge. A
clear isolationist tendency can be discerned in the anonymous editorials while the national
columns by Dorothy Thompson and Walter Lippmann reflect the interventionist point of view.
The reporting, like in September 1939, fits best in Michael Hunt’s foreign policy
framework focusing on the ideology based on notions of liberty, racial hierarchy and fear of
revolutions. The arguments drawing on the ideology were again used by both isolationists and
interventionists. The newspapers were less concerned with the aspects of business and
international law, which means that little could be found supporting the theories offered by
Kennan and Williams.
140
“America Wants Defense, Not a Revolution”, Chicago Daily Tribune, (January 20 1941) 1
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3. The Atlantic Charter
The Lend-Lease bill was approved in March 1941 and Roosevelt was able to give Britain its much
needed arms. However, getting American aid to the British was problematic, since German
submarines, surface raiders and bombers harassed the transport across the Atlantic. Roosevelt
allocated as much protection as he could to the British supply lines. He extended America’s
security zone and patrols to the mid-Atlantic under the pretext of strengthening defense of the
Western hemisphere and the U.S. took over the defense of Greenland and Iceland to protect the
North Atlantic supply lines. Without actually declaring war, America got involved in naval war
with Germany over the course of 1941.
Then, in the summer of 1941, Hitler unexpectedly unleashed his blitzkrieg onto the
Russians. Both Churchill and Roosevelt contended that Nazi victory over Russia would make the
Axis virtually invincible and this had to be prevented at all costs. Even though they condemned
Stalin’s dictatorship, they both were determined to aid Communist Russia in the battle against
Nazi Germany.141 Even though the Roosevelt administration and its opponents focused mainly
on Europe instead of on Asia and the Pacific, Japanese expansionism in the southwest Pacific
was also perceived as a threat to American security. Still, the debate between isolationists and
interventionists paid little attention to the Asian aspect of the war. The Russo-German war
brought Japan more to the administration’s attention, since the Tripartite Pact made Russia also
vulnerable to Japanese strikes. At the same time, because Russia was occupied with Germany,
Japan was free to maneuver in Asia.142
The Nazi war was continuing relentlessly in Europe during 1941 and Churchill and
Roosevelt cooperated closely. The two leaders had wanted to schedule a meeting since January to
discuss the defeat of Germany, but the pending Lend-Lease legislation made it impossible for
141
142
Cole, Roosevelt And The Isolationists 1932-1945, 423-434
Ibidem, 488-491
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Roosevelt to leave the country. After the Lend-Lease bill was passed in early spring, Churchill
was unavailable because he was occupied with the war in Greece. Finally a meeting was scheduled
the beginning of August. Churchill and Roosevelt met each other in secret at sea in Argentia Bay
off the coast of Newfoundland from August 9 to 12. Churchill had sailed from Scotland on
August 4 on the H.M.S. Prince of Wales, accompanied by Roosevelt’s personal delegate Harry
Hopkins, Admiral Pound, General Dill, Air Marshal Freeman and the Permanent Under
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Alexander Cadogan. Roosevelt left the U.S. under the
guise of a much needed vacation on the presidential yacht the Potomac and brought Admiral
Stark, General Marshall, General Arnold, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, and Averell
Harriman.
During the conference, which lasted three days, Roosevelt and Churchill discussed in
depth their combined war aims against Germany and the other Axis nations. The leaders
deliberated on policies towards Germany and Japan and professed their visions of the post-war
world. The meeting resulted in the Atlantic Charter, which outlined the Anglo-American
objectives for the post-war world. The eight-point charter, agreed upon on August 12 and made
public on August 15, contained the following resolutions:
-
The U.S. and Great Britain would seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;
-
Territorial adjustments could only occur in accord with the freely expressed wishes of the
peoples concerned;
-
The peoples had a right to self-determination: to choose their own form of government,
and the sovereign rights and self-government was to be restored to those who had been
forcibly deprived of them;
-
Trade was to be conducted on an equal basis to give economic prosperity to all;
-
There was to be global economic cooperation and advancement of social welfare;
-
There was to be a peace established that enabled freedom of want and fear;
-
There was to be freedom of the seas;
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-
Media Debate and Theories on American Foreign Policy
Aggressor nations would be disarmed and postwar common disarmament would
follow.143
The Atlantic Charter is regarded as one of the first steps towards the formation of the United
Nations.
The Atlantic conference was organized in the greatest secrecy, not in the least to
guarantee the safety of both world leaders. Neither the English nor the American press was
notified and only rumors circulated in the newspapers. After the Potomac failed to send press
releases four days in a row, reports on a potential secret meeting increased. The joint declaration
was the focal point of the press after the news of the meeting was announced to the world, but
there was also speculation on the real reason behind the secret meeting between the leaders of
the United States and Great Britain.
I tracked the debate on the Atlantic Charter from August 14, when the official statement
was made, until August 31, when the discussion began to tone down. On August 14 the
newspapers were filled with rumors on the secret meeting, while on August 15 the Charter
dominated the news after London and Washington released the official statement. 144 The
following day it was made known that Stalin had accepted Roosevelt’s and Churchill’s proposal
for a meeting in Moscow to discuss the long term defeat of the Axis powers.145 There was much
speculation on undisclosed promises Roosevelt was said to have made to Churchill and to what
extent the President had committed the U.S. to the European war. The speculations were
reinforced by the lack of official statements, since Roosevelt only returned to the U.S. on August
16.146 He kept the public waiting for his first official press conference until August 19, probably
“The Official Statement”, The New York Times, (August 15 1941) 1
“Expect Lid to Be Lifted on F.D.R. Trip Today”, Chicago Tribune, (August 14 1941) 1; Arthur Sears Henning,
“F.D.R. Alliance With Churchill Rocks Capital”, The New York Times, (August 15 1941) 1
145 “U.S., Britain And Soviet to Confer In Moscow”, The New York Times, (August 16 1941) 1; Arthur Sears
Henning, “Pledge To Reds Signed By U.S., British Chiefs”, Chicago Tribune, (August 16 1941) 1
146 John H. Crider, “ The President Debarks”, The New York Times, (August 17 1941) 1
143
144
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awaiting the British prime minister’s safe return. Churchill reached Britain on August 18, after a
short stop-over in Iceland to inspect British and American troops stationed there.147
That same day, Congressional leaders were invited to the White House for a conference
with Roosevelt.148 On August 21, the President addressed Congress to inform it officially of his
Atlantic conference with Churchill. Responding to criticism, he added freedom of religion and
freedom of information to the eight points of the Atlantic Charter.149 Prime minister Churchill
made his official statement on the parley on August 24.150
Chicago Daily Tribune
The news of the secret conference with Churchill stirred up the isolationist fire in the Chicago
Tribune. Similar to the reporting on the Lend-Lease, the Tribune was foremost concerned that
Roosevelt’s reckless behavior was going to land the U.S. in the war. Responding to the rumors
about the meeting, the newspaper reminded the public how Roosevelt and his “war party” had
been conspiring for a long time to involve Americans in the war abroad. The same editorial
emphasized how resentment among the American people was rising against the warmongering
Roosevelt administration. The Tribune further accused Roosevelt of trying to provoke the Axis to
conduct an act of war against America and predicted: “Possibly Japan will give the great
opportunity for which the conspiracy has been looking. (…) Then, to war with all our drafted
young men.”151
On August 15 the newspaper opened with the headline “Pact Pushes U.S. Near War”,
while the accompanying article stated that the announcement of the Atlantic Charter shocked the
capital. Roosevelt had no authority to commit America to the Charter, which the Tribune regarded
Frank L. Kluckhorn, “Roosevelt Is Grim”, The New York Times, (August 20 1941) 1; Robert P. Post, “Churchill
Home, Plans Radio Talk; Cheered by Convoy, Visited Iceland”, The New York Times, (August 19 1941) 1
148 Chesley Manly, “U.S.-British Scheme Told After Parley With Roosevelt”, Chicago Tribune, (August 19 1941) 1
149 Frank L. Kluckhorn, “Religion Secure, Roosevelt Says”, The New York Times, (August 22 1941) 1
150 “Text of Prime Minister Churchill’s Address on Meeting With President Roosevelt”, The New York Times,
(August 25 1941) 4
151 “The Rising Resentment Against Warmongering”, Chicago Tribune, (August 14 1941) 12
147
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as a declaration of war.152 An article on London’s expectation that the U.S. would fight next
illustrates this point.153 The isolationist paper was livid and the day’s editorial was a direct attack
on Roosevelt’s person. He was called “thoroly un-American”, and it hinted that Roosevelt was a
traitor like one of his ancestors, a Tory who remained loyal to the British king during the
Revolution. Like his forefather, the President was manipulated by the British. Churchill did not
come to the meeting to create the Atlantic Charter, he wanted soldiers and Roosevelt had
pledged them.154
On 19 August, Chesly Manly reported on the conference between the President and
Congressional leaders, claiming that Roosevelt and Churchill agreed that a British invasion of the
European continent was necessary to defeat Germany. The invasion would be contingent upon
the support of a large American expeditionary force. More Lend-Lease was also said to be
expected, both to Britain and to the Soviet Union. The American commitment to war was
implied in both the joint declaration and in the White House discussion of its implications.155
This article got the Tribune into a conflict between interventionists and isolationists in the
senate, in which also The New York Times got involved. During the following day’s session, the
senate’s Democratic majority leader Alben W. Barkley called the article by Manly to be “a
deliberate and malicious falsehood.” Barkley denied that a possible American assistance to a
British invasion was discussed and accused Manly of making the whole story up. The majority
leader further stated that none of those present at the White House conference had disclosed
anything, he had personal assurances from all. Senator Vandenberg retorted by asking Barkley
how it was possible then that The New York Times had printed practically the same storyline.
Barkley replied saying he had nothing but the greatest respect for The Times’ reporter Turner
Catledge, but that the story simply was not true.
Arthur Sears Henning, “Pact Pushes U.S. Near War – F.D.R. Alliance With Churchill Rocks Capital”, Chicago
Tribune, (August 15 1941) 1
153 Larry Rue, “Roosevelt Plea To Fight Next”, Chicago Tribune, (August 15 1941) 1
154 “What Has Roosevelt Promised Churchill?”, Chicago Tribune, (August 15 1941) ?
155 Chesly Manly, “U.S.-British Scheme Told After Parley with Roosevelt”, Chicago Tribune, (August 19 1941) 1
152
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The Tribune responded with a front page article on August 20 stating that Manly stood by
his story, which was based on statements from a reliable informant: a Democratic leader who
participated in the conference and who was a supporter of Roosevelt’s war policy.156 The editorial
on the same day regarded the whole situation as very embarrassing for Barkley, especially since
Roosevelt at the same time practically announced that the U.S. indeed was at war during his press
conference: “It would seem that the statement Mr. Barkley was calling a malicious lie was in
effect being repeated by Mr. Roosevelt himself as a revelation to the country of what it was to
expect.”157 The editorial referred to Roosevelt’s press conference on August 19, in which he
quoted Abraham Lincoln on the civil war, saying the people “have no idea that the war is to be
carried on and put through by hard, tough fighting.” The President saw a parallel between those
days and the situation at hand and feared that many Americans had not yet awakened to the
present danger, like many people all over the world had not realized how dangerous the situation
was.158
The Tribune defended Manly’s controversial article by claiming that the truth of the
information could be found in everything that Roosevelt did and was doing: he was a
warmonger.159 Even while he was preaching American neutrality, he led the U.S. closer to the war
with every step he took while deceiving the American people. According to the Tribune, he
certainly was no man of peace, as he liked to see himself.160 In fact, Roosevelt and his war party
were deceiving everyone: the British thought he pledged to send troops, but the President was
not even authorized to make such a pledge. This was regarded as his strategy: to distract from the
fact that his policies were supported by a diminishing minority, he shocked people with far
reaching policy measures, followed by a cooling off period. Just as the people got used to the new
situation, he took it a step further. Roosevelt’s strategy was considered dark, devious, calculating
Arthur Sears Henning, “Tribune Writer Stands On Story Hit By Barkley”
Roosevelt, Barkley and the Tribune”, Chicago Tribune, (August 21 1941) 10
158 Frank L. Kluckhorn, “Roosevelt Is Grim”, The New York Times, (August 20 1941) 1
159 “Roosevelt, Barkley and the Tribune”, Chicago Tribune, (August 21 1941) 10
160 “Which Mr. Roosevelt Is Meant?”, Chicago Tribune, (August 19 1941) 10
156
157
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secretive, overly dramatic and desperate: it was not working however, the American people still
did not want to go to war.161
The Tribune considered Churchill’s address on the parley on August 25 as further evidence
of Roosevelt’s deceiving warmongering: “Charge War Pledge Bared by Churchill.” The
isolationist opposition in Congress contended that Roosevelt pledged the U.S. to war, by
committing himself to deal with Japanese aggression in the Pacific. Churchill manipulated
Roosevelt into promising he would take the lead against Japan, “thereby committing Mr.
Roosevelt to a pledge to take the country into war, if necessary, to pull Britain’s chestnuts out of
the fire in the Pacific.”162 The Tribune was outraged that the American people had to learn about
the true cause underlying the meeting from the British prime minister: “London is speaking as
the capital of America as well as of the British Empire. Washington seems to be a provincial
capital.” The newspaper smirked at Churchill’s promise of British support in the Far East.
According to the Tribune, America did not have any interests in the Far East and Churchill’s
promise was hollow.163
Roosevelt had gone too far this time. Not only had he committed American troops to the
European war, through the Atlantic Charter he had made the U.S. the world’s policeman: “He
has signed a contract for the perpetual custody of Europe and the rest of the world. The four
freedoms, the eight freedoms, the ten freedoms are to have 10 million American bayonets and
the world is to have peace as Mr. Roosevelt likes it. The U.S. is to have perpetual war.”164 The
American people had already made up their mind about interventionism when they rejected the
League of Nations and they had not changed their mind since: “What they said then is what they
have been saying at every opportunity since 1916. The American democracy is against
intervention and always has been.”165
“Roosevelt War Monger”, Chicago Tribune, (August 23 1941) 10
Arthur Sears Henning, “Charge War Pledge Bared by Churchill”, Chicago Tribune, (August 26 1941) 1
163 “Mr. Churchill Tells Us”, Chicago Tribune, (August 26 1941) 8
164 “Mr. Roosevelt Back To Versailles”, Chicago Tribune, (August 29 1941) 12
165 “Again, and Again, and Again!”, Chicago Tribune, (August 31 1941) 1
161
162
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Besides the charge of warmongering, the Tribune also regarded President Roosevelt still as
a threat to American democracy. Roosevelt entered a war alliance without a declaration of war by
Congress and this was clearly a breach of the constitution. He was acting outside his office
because he acted without authority. The President was a threat to the American republic. He was
under “hypnotic British influence”, having “delusions of grandeur”, making rash decisions: “The
sorcerer’s apprentice is at the floodgates. The life of the republic depends upon congress.”166 The
Tribune furthermore warned that Roosevelt was easily impressed by royal European visits and that
he always obliged to European royalty. They could have anything they desired. The European
despotism rubbed off on the President and gave him a misplaced feeling of grandeur: “Mr.
Roosevelt was much given that way himself before he became infatuated with the surviving
trappings of the old European régime.”167 In the editorial of August 25, the Roosevelt
administration is even compared to the Fuhrer’s, because the administration had subjected the
installment buying of commodities to rules laid down by the federal reserve board. Roosevelt was
accused of introducing Nazism to the U.S.168
The threat to democracy was also seen in the alliance with Russia. Roosevelt’s plan to aid
Stalin posed a direct danger to America. He had formed an alliance with the bloodiest tyranny the
world had ever seen, and he was already compromising American democracy: “To clear the way
for the alliance Mr. Roosevelt in his joint statement with Mr. Churchill dropped religious freedom
from the list of the four freedoms for which we are supposed to be concerned.” Roosevelt
volunteered to aid Stalin, he did not wait for Russia’s request for assistance as is the custom. And
again, the President did not have the consent of the American people to form this dangerous
alliance.169 According to the Chicago Tribune, the communists and the New Dealers were
conspiring to “send American conscripts to Europe to die trying to save the Red revolution, to
“Mr. Roosevelt’s Behavior”, Chicago Tribune, (August 24 1941) 14
“Mr. Roosevelt And Royalty’, Chicago Tribune, (August 27 1941) 12
168 “Roosevelt Introduces Naziism”, Chicago Tribune, (August 25 1941) 14
169 “Meeting in Moscow”, Chicago Tribune, (August 18 1941) 12
166
167
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preserve Joe Stalin, and so to weaken the United States that the revolutionaries will get their
chance here.”170
In an editorial reacting to the boycott of the Chicago Tribune organized by, among others,
the communist party, the newspaper practically declared war to the American communists: “The
communist party can never succeed in the United States while The Tribune lasts. This paper,
therefore, is a natural objective for attack in the revolution which is being started here under the
auspices of the personal alliance of Mr. Roosevelt and Joe Stalin.” The Tribune accepted the
challenge: “We shall be glad to be the first to go up under the standard of a free and independent
America or to go down under the rule of communist Russia.”171 The conflict between the
isolationist newspaper and the communist was featured prominently in the Tribune. On August 19
the Tribune declared in a full-page advertisement that it had accepted the challenge and would
continue to fight for the truth and American rights.172 The newspaper was proud to declare its
anti-communist stance.
Lastly, the Tribune was concerned about the costs of the war. The newspaper expected
that the common people would carry the financial burden, because that was what was happening
in Britain.173 Still, after the war America would be stuck with an enormous debt: already the
government owed 50 billion dollars and this would only increase exponentially. This would pose
a burden for centuries to come: “long after the unspeakable Hitler has disappeared from the
scene, people in the United States will be obliged to devote much of their earnings to service the
debt incurred in the administration of President Roosevelt.”174
In its reaction to the Atlantic Charter, the Chicago Daily Tribune was charging Roosevelt
mainly with warmongering. The newspaper was accusing Roosevelt of declaring war and forming
war alliances without a declaration of war by Congress or even consulting it. He not only agreed
“The Commies and The Tribune”, Chicago Tribune, (August 22 1941) 10
Attack The Tribune For Its Anti-War Fight”, Chicago Tribune, (August 15 1941) 2; “We Accept The
Challenge”, Chicago Tribune, (August 16 1941) 8
172 Advertisement, “The Tribune Accepts The Challenge”, Chicago Tribune, (August 19 1941) 8
173 “Who Pays for War”, Chicago Tribune, (August 16 1941) 1
174 “Long To Be Remembered”, Chicago Tribune, (August 20 1941) 12
170
171“Reds
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to go to war, he also planned to police the whole world after the war is over. The President’s
commitment to war was considered a threat to the American democracy in itself, and the danger
only increased when he formed an alliance with Stalin. The warmongering Roosevelt, under
influence of European despotism, was sacrificing American democracy. The Tribune put itself up
as the first line of defense against the communist threat and vowed to continue to fight for
American civil liberties. It was the first time that the Tribune actually got involved in political
conflict with the administration and the communist party because of its isolationist position.
The New York Times
As the war is proceeding in Europe and America seemed to moving closer to it, the Tribune’s and
The New York Times’ point of view are diverging more and more. The Times had nothing but good
words for the Atlantic Charter, which was regarded as a document of immense importance.
After the world learned of the eight points, The Times’ reported only wide acclaim for
them. The first reactions in Washington were highly favorable, except for the usual criticism of
Roosevelt’s opponents. But even some members of the opposition supported Roosevelt’s eight
point declaration.175 Notwithstanding the pledge to destroy the Nazi tyranny, the paper called the
points peace aims most of the time, as opposed to the Tribune naming them a declaration of
war.176 The first editorial on the Atlantic Charter was also overflowing with praise for Roosevelt’s
and Churchill’s Charter: “This is a war of personified forces, leaders performing as nations,
human wills and passions blown up into storming armies – and Franklin Roosevelt and Winston
Churchill incarnate in their own persons the force of democracy.” Of all the world leaders in the
war, only Roosevelt and Churchill were still speaking in the name of the people and The Times
applauded the fact that Great Britain and the United States were united and determined in their
Turner Catledge, “Another Aid Bill Is Seen In Capital”, The New York Times, (August 15 1941) 1; “Diplomats
Wary Though Jubilant”, The New York Times, (August 15 1941) 3; “Wide Acclaim Here For ‘Eight Points’”, The
New York Times, (August 15 1941) 4;
176 Frank L. Kluckhorn, “Roosevelt, Churchill Draft 8 Peace Aims, Pledging Destruction of Nazi Tyranny; Joint
Steps Believed Charted At Parley”, The New York Times, (August 15 1941) 1
175
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purpose, as this was destiny. A sharp contrast with the Tribune, which regarded the Charter a
betrayal of democracy.
The editorial furthermore called the Atlantic Charter “without precedent in AngloAmerican history”, and sided firmly with the administration in the debate on isolationism: “so
long as the leadership of Franklin Roosevelt prevails, and so long as a great majority of the
American people endorse his views on world affairs – as they unquestionably do today – the
prestige and the influence and the resources of this country will be marshaled on the side of
international law and order. This is the end of isolationism. It is the beginning of a new era in
which the United States assumes the responsibilities which fall naturally to a great world
power.”177
The newspaper expected that action would follow from the sea conference and the
British minister of supply lord Beaverbrook’s arrival in Washington illustrated this.178 The Times
further contended that the Charter could have a profound effect upon the course of the war, and
chances were that America was going to have to fight. In order to make use of the rising
discontent in Europe a clear set of objectives was needed. However, just how effective the eight
points would be depended upon military successes as well. Total defeat of Germany would
probably only be feasible for Britain if the U.S. participated in the fighting. Maybe by aiding
Russia and Britain extensively, the U.S. could stay out, but the aid would have to be massive. The
Battle of Britain, the Battle of the Middle East, the Battle of the Far East, the Battle of Russia: all
depended on American supplies. “In other words, still up to the United States – strategically,
militarily, industrially, even psychologically. The burden of any defeat of Germany rests mainly
upon us.”179
Besides providing psychological support to the occupied countries, the Atlantic Charter
also prevented a possible peace offer from Hitler. It was expected that Hitler might make such an
“The Rendezvous With Destiny”, The New York Times, (August 15 1941) 16
Frank L. Kluckhorn, “Roosevelt, Churchill Draft 8 Peace Aims, Pledging Destruction of Nazi Tyranny; Joint
Steps Believed Charted At Parley”, The New York Times, (August 15 1941) 1
179 Hanon W. Baldwin, “Twofold Allied Program”, The New York Times, (August 16 1941) 7
177
178
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offer if he were to succeed in his offensive against Russia, and the hungry and war-weary people
of Europe might be inclined to accept it. But Europe deserved better than a Hitler peace, and
Roosevelt had provided the alternative.180 Furthermore, Roosevelt gave a clear signal to the world
and especially to Japan, that the U.S. could and certainly would act.181
The New York Times professed to be pro-intervention very clearly. Not only did the paper
welcome the end of the isolationist era, it also stated that it was inherent to the American faith to
take positive action: “What America has become is the result of an idea turned into action. (…)
All-out action is the first principle of normal life in a modern industrial country. In ordinary
affairs that is our American faith. Any one who believes in passive action to safeguard the
security of democracy is not applying to the gravest issue of our national life the common sense
of the American spirit.” In short, isolationism was un-American.182 Finally the U.S. had
abandoned the “cold and anemic neutrality” and was moving forward “toward the use of
American power as the decisive factor in the winning of this war.”183
In stark contrast to the Chicago Tribune, The Times concurred with Roosevelt that America
could no longer pretend that the war would not effect the U.S. America was not isolated and
should wield its power to help decide the outcome. Whether the United States would enter the
war depended on the Axis however, not on Roosevelt. And even though the war was going to be
long and hard, The Times stood behind President Roosevelt’s foreign policy.184
What is more, The New York Times was worried about the public apathy concerning the
war. People still abhorred the war fundamentally, because they did not see how the war was
connected to the United States. The administration was torn about what to do about this, since it
wanted the American people to be aware without panicking. But it was not able to take
appropriate action while the public was still failing to face the full extent of the war and how it
Anne O’Hare McCormick, “Europe. Give-and-Take Between Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill”, The New York
Times, (August 16 1941) 14;
181 “Dramatic Talks At Sea Spike A Hitler ‘Peace’”, The New York Times, (August 17 1941) E3
182 “The American Faith”, The New York Times, (August 17 1941) E6
183 “The Course Is Forward”, The New York Times, (August 19 1941) 20
184 “The President’s Warning”, The New York Times, (August 21 1941) 16
180
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affected the U.S. The Times thought the link to America’s interests in the war should have been
emphasized more, but an international incident would probably have a better effect in getting the
public opinion to face the emergency.185
Unlike the Tribune, The Times did appreciate Churchill’s commitment to stand by the U.S.
in the Pacific. The paper clearly did think that America had interests in the Far East and that
these could be threatened by Japanese aggression. It furthermore praised Churchill for making
the most out of the Atlantic Charter in his address: he used it to give the occupied people of
Europe hope, to encourage the British and to warn the American people that Hitler would be the
one who decides the issue of war or peace for America, like he did for Europe.186
In August, The Times had also completely abandoned the viewpoint that Roosevelt’s
presidency could pose a threat to American democracy and civil liberties. In an editorial on
August 16, the newspaper retorted to Lindbergh’s isolationist thesis that Roosevelt practically
committed a coup d’etat, by forcing an unpopular foreign policy upon the American people.
Perhaps Roosevelt could have handled his relations with Congress on foreign policy matters
better, The Times admitted. The paper itself had criticized Roosevelt frequently for this, but
thought it was ridiculous to say that the conduct of foreign policy did not lie with the executive.
Neither Monroe nor Jefferson had consulted Congress before announcing respectively the
Monroe Doctrine and the acquisition of the Louisiana Territory, because they had popular
consent. Congress upheld their judgment in both cases. Roosevelt was also expressing the
sentiment of the American people with the Atlantic Charter, public support for his policy was
evident.187
Neither did The Times see democracy threatened by Roosevelt’s aid to the Soviet Union.
Hitler had raised the challenge of world domination or destruction and the U.S. had accepted that
challenge. In order to defeat Hitler, forming an alliance with Stalin was necessary. This did not
Turner Catledge, “ ‘Apathy’ In War Effort Traced To Many Causes”, The New York Times, (August 24 1941) E3
“A Prophecy Fulfilled”, The New York Times, (August 25 1941) 14
187 “President And The People”, The New York Times, (August 16 1941) 14
185
186
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mean that America and Russia had the same objectives for the post-war world: “The post-war
world which the British and American people hope to create bears no resemblance to the world
that is planned by Joseph Stalin.”188 The Times was not worried about the communists.
Finally, The Times hardly spent any attention to the conflict between Barkley and the
Chicago Tribune. It reported on the incident in the senate between Barkley and Vandenberg, but
did not offer any comment.189
In August 1941, The New York Times was more supportive than ever of the Roosevelt
administration’s foreign policy. It hailed the principles outlined in the Atlantic Charter and
praised both Roosevelt and Churchill. The Charter provided Europe with new hope and sent out
a warning to the Axis that the U.S. was not afraid to take action. The New York Times was not
concerned that Roosevelt might have pledged the U.S. to war and was confident that American
participation in the war depended on the behavior of the Axis. The Times considered it the duty of
the U.S. to do everything in its power to save the European democracies and protect the world
against tyranny. America was truly the arsenal for democracy, which was inherent to the
American faith and desired by the majority of the American people. Americans supported
Roosevelt’s foreign policy and the President had provided nothing but strong leadership. It was
granted that Roosevelt could have handled his cooperation with Congress better, but he had not
stepped outside the bounds of his office. Neither was he putting American democracy at risk by
forming an alliance with the Soviet Union. Cooperation with Stalin was a necessary evil to defeat
Hitler. Less than four months before America declared war, The New York Times’ reporting was
more interventionist than ever.
188
189
The President to Congress”, The New York Times, (August 22 1941) 14
“Frederick R. Barkley”, The New York Times, (August 20 1941) 1
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The Concord Daily Monitor
Similar to September 1939 and January 1941, The Concord Monitor still published Dorothy
Thompson and Walter Lippmann’s columns next to its own editorials in August 1941. I will start
with their views on the Atlantic Charter before outlining The Monitor’s thoughts.
Dorothy Thompson had only one column published in the second half of August. She
was very enthusiastic about the Atlantic Charter: “The eight points jointly put forward by the
Prime Minister of Great Britain and the President of the United States as a basis of world peace
are a revolutionary document. Simple, axiomatic, economical phraseology, they constitute a bill
of rights for nations and for the people in those nations.” Thompson applauded the close
collaboration between the countries of the English-speaking world and hoped the declaration
would lead to action, that the U.S. would assume the responsibilities suitable to a great power :
“Does the United States intend again, as it did in 1776, to throw down the gauntlet to history and
make a bid for the future or will she linger on in the futility of the last 20 years?”190
Walter Lippmann was also supportive of the agreement reached at the sea conference. To
contrast the Axis propaganda, which was professing that the Charter was a revival and imitation
of Wilson’s fourteen points, Lippmann compared the two declarations. First of all, the Atlantic
agreement was multilateral instead of unilateral, like Wilson’s fourteen points. It was a binding
public Anglo-American commitment and there were no secret treaties countering the principles,
as was the case in 1918. The most important difference is that Roosevelt and Churchill realized
that a stable peace can only be organized around the continuing collaboration of Great Britain
and the United States. Furthermore, Lippmann argued like The New York Times, Roosevelt did not
step outside the bounds of his office. His commitment to the Charter was comparable to the
audacity of the Monroe Doctrine and like that important contribution to American history, “this
joint declaration, because of the practical and necessary collaboration which it advertises, will also
stand the test of time and come to be universally accepted in this country. For there is no turning
Dorothy Thompson, “On the Record. An International Bill of Rights”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (August 15
1941) 4
190
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away from the fact that the interdependence and the security of the English-speaking people
requires their close and unbroken collaboration.”191
Lippmann was further supportive of Roosevelt’s partnership with the Soviet Union. The
Atlantic Charter made this move possible, since it prevented an agreement with Stalin at the
expense of Turkey, Finland or Poland. Clearly Churchill and Roosevelt discussed Russia’s
problematic role in this war and the Charter provided a way to cooperate successfully with Stalin
against the Axis. The Russian front in Asia was considered very important to contain Japanese
aggression.192
Lastly Lippmann urged Roosevelt to provide strong leadership by waking the American
people up to the reality of the war. Like The Times, Lippmann saw danger in the fact that
Americans had not fully realized how dangerous the situation was and that it would certainly
affect America. The state of the public mind reflected the leadership and he encouraged
Roosevelt to tell the people bluntly what they were up against and what they needed to sacrifice
to secure their country’s future: “The world is on fire. The alarm has to be rung and kept ringing,
first and without stopping by the President, until the fire is put out. However, much pleasanter it
might be to do so, the American people cannot sleep through that fire, or they will be trapped in
the flames.”193
The Monitor’s own editorials again took a whole different position than Thompson and
Lippmann. Before the Atlantic Charter was officially announced, the newspaper attacked the
secrecy surrounding the meeting between the world leaders. It did not want to wait on the
explanation to comment on the Atlantic conference, as there was enough that could be said
about it. The strategy for the meeting “resembles that used by Hitler and Mussolini in their
Brenner Pass consultations to scare the rest of the world.” It accused the U.S. and Great Britain
of playing a war of nerves, for lack of adequate military means to defeat Hitler. But neither
Walter Lippmann, “Today and Tomorrow. Roosevelt Avoids Wilson’s Mistakes”, The Concord Daily Monitor,
(August 16 1941) 4
192 Walter Lippmann, “Today and Tomorrow. Russia’s War Role”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (August 19 1941) 4
193 Walter Lippmann, “Today and Tomorrow. Our Leaders”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (August 21 1941) 4
191
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Churchill nor Roosevelt had authority to speak for his country. The secrecy was to some point
validated by the war, but it was also a very undemocratic tactic. Roosevelt was leading the U.S.
ever further away from democracy: “Under the guise of war emergency we are traveling even
more rapidly now towards state socialism. It will not be so easy again to slip back into democratic
ways. (…) We are forgetting democracy.”194 The Monitor was worried that the administration was
gain increasing control of the private life of American citizens, through its unrelenting quest for
more authority.
After the eight points were announced, The Monitor saw them as war aims like the Chicago
Tribune. In contrast to Lippmann, the anonymous editorial contended that Wilson’s fourteen
points were more worthy of praise than the eight points of the Charter. Even though the general
concept was not faulty, the eight points had a hidden agenda: “It is only as the exact words of
the eight points are studied that what has not been said by the conferees can be guessed at more
accurately. (…) Premier Churchill and President Roosevelt are trying to restore the balance of
world power to Great Britain.”195 No signs of the idealistic enthusiasm displayed by The New York
Times can be found within the articles and editorials of The Monitor.
The secrecy was further assailed in the editorial of August 19. The Monitor thought the
secrecy to be more dangerous than censorship. The secretary of the navy, Frank Knox, had lied
to the American press about the real reason of Roosevelt’s trip. Knox had told that the President
was going on a much needed vacation and had asked the press to leave him alone. The result was
that the American press had misled the American people, through no fault of their own. There
was no reason for this misplaced secrecy, as the American press had always respected confidential
military procedures. The secrecy was another move by the New Deal administration toward
authoritarianism. Roosevelt’s powers had gone to his head: “Congress, the Courts, and most
important of all, the people, are expected only to applaud, not to think. Of course the people are
expected to take orders, too. It is the old-fashioned and democratically distasteful: ‘Theirs not to
194
195
“Revelations”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (August 14 1941) 4
“They Talk Peace When They Mean War”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (August 15 1941) 4
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question why, theirs only to do and die.’”196 According to The Monitor, the politicians in
Washington were also furious that the British press seemed to be better briefed.197 The fact that
Churchill’s address was more revealing than any statement by Roosevelt added further to the
insult.198
The Monitor saw nothing of the strong leadership The Times was talking about. The
President failed to provide the American people with the leadership they needed to get the war
production going at full speed. The U.S. still needed to strengthen its defenses and Americans
wanted to work on that: “What they want is an inspired leadership which will put them to work
on a coordinated production basis.” Roosevelt did not meet the people’s needs.199
The reporting of The Monitor was even more diverging than it was in January. Both
Lippmann and Thompson sided with the Roosevelt administration and were very positive about
the principles outlined in the Atlantic Charters. The only criticism Walter Lippmann offered,
namely that Roosevelt needed to make the American people more aware of the dangers, was also
the only point of critique The New York Times mentioned. The Times, Lippmann and Thompson
clearly pronounced the interventionist position and were very supportive of the Roosevelt
administration.
The Monitor’s own editorials were on the other hand extremely critical of Roosevelt.
However, the critique was very different from the Tribune’s. The Monitor was not concerned about
going to war, but more worried about Roosevelt’s authoritarianism. The secret meeting did not
go down well with The Monitor and it regarded it as another sign of the administrations
undemocratic ways. Potential American participation in the European war as a result of the
Charter was hardly mentioned. Conversely, the Tribune’s editorials and articles dealt mainly with
Roosevelt’s alleged pledge to war. His warmongering was also considered a risk to democracy,
but getting involved in the European war was the main concern.
“Franklin, Frank and Frankness”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (August 19 1941) 4
Ray Tucker, “National Whirligig”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (August 19 1941) 4
198 “U.S. Policy, Via London”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (August 28 1941) 4
199 “Third Year At Hand”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (August 25 1941) 4
196
197
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Theoretical Framework
In the reporting on the Atlantic Charter, The New York Times was most reflecting George
Kennan’s moralistic legalistic theory. The Times hailed the Atlantic Charter as the long awaited
return to international law as the foundation of American foreign policy. Isolationism no longer
dictated American actions and the U.S. could finally take the responsibilities that came with being
a world power. Whether that meant helping the allies with massive military aid or actually fighting
in Europe, depended on the Axis. The American people should therefore also wake up to the full
extend of the war in order to wield American power efficiently.200
Thompson and Lippmann, whose points of view corresponded The Times’, were also
pleased with the Charter. The legalistic tendency can be found within both their columns.
Thompson called it an international bill of rights and praises its realism, while Lippmann
approved the administration’s strategic choices based upon the principles of the Charter. This
was no time for moralistic preaching: the alliance with Russia was necessary and the Charter
made it possible for the U.S. to work with dictatorial Russia to create the peaceful world order.
As Lippmann saw it: “This is our opportunity – the first since this world struggle began – to deal
with our opponents as they have dealt with their victims – singly and when they are isolated –
before they can unite their forces, and in a place where we have powerful allies, superior forces,
and the strategic advantages.”201 The Atlantic Charter had set out the clear objectives, war aims or
peace aims, needed to defeat Germany.
The international law to which the newspapers referred in this debate actually resembled
the international law Kennan warned for more, namely an international legal system which
200“The
Rendezvous With Destiny”, The New York Times, (August 15 1941) 16
Dorothy Thompson, “On the Record. An International Bill of Rights”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (August 15
1941) 4; Walter Lippmann, “Today and Tomorrow. Roosevelt Avoids Wilson’s Mistakes”, The Concord Daily
Monitor, (August 16 1941) 4; Walter Lippmann, “Today and Tomorrow. Russia’s War Role”, The Concord Daily
Monitor, (August 19 1941) 4
201
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judged states by an universal set of standards, instead of the national interest approach to foreign
policy.
The emotionalism inherent in public opinion was further evident, mostly in The Chicago
Tribune and The Times. Both newspapers drew heavily on the support of the majority of the
Americans to sustain their argument. According to the Tribune, most people were against the war,
and this was exactly why Roosevelt’s actions were so undemocratic. In numerous articles and
editorials this argument surfaced. However, The Times claimed the opposite: Roosevelt had
complete support of the American people, therefore his actions were justified and did not need
to be approved by Congress beforehand. Public opinion played a very large role in the conduct of
American foreign policy, as both newspapers show.
Now that the U.S. was nearer to war, the newspapers seemed hardly concerned with
business interests. The war production was mentioned, but only in relation to the weaknesses in
American defense. There was no indication that economic objectives were driving America closer
to the war. The fourth point of the Atlantic Charter, lowering of trade barriers, was never
mentioned or discussed as an important feature in any of the newspapers. The Atlantic Charter
would probably be what Williams saw as Roosevelt’s framework committed to the open door
policy, but in the discussion of the Charter this aspect was hardly recognized. Business interests
in Asia and the Pacific were not considered very important, both The Times and the Tribune
contended that Britain had far larger interests in those areas. The Chicago Tribune even went so far
as to deny any American interests in the Far East. The reporting on the Atlantic Charter showed
no evidence supporting William A. Williams’ economic expansionistic approach.
Not surprisingly, it is again Michael Hunt’s ideology that fits the debate on the Atlantic
Charter like a glove. First of all, the notion of national greatness and liberty was evident in The
New York Times. The newspaper was very pleased that the United States had finally freed itself
from the isolationist shackles and could now assume “the responsibilities which fall naturally to a
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great World Power.”202 The U.S. was finally moving towards the nations fighting for their
freedom.
Concern about fraternizing with Stalin can be linked to the apprehension about
revolutions, which can be found within all three newspapers. The Times was not worried about
revolutionary forces threatening the U.S., since Roosevelt had added freedom of religion and
freedom of information to the eight points to assure the American people that the moral
depravity of the Soviet Union would not affect America. This was illustrated by the editorials of
The Times and Lippmann, who both regarded the alliance with Stalin as a necessary evil. The Times
saw it as America’s duty to fight again the world revolution Hitler was trying to force 203, while
both the Tribune and The Monitor saw socialist tendencies threatening American democracy: “We
are forgetting democracy. We are already unwittingly requiring the habit of thought of
socialists.”204 The Tribune obviously was most concerned with the communists threatening the
U.S., as it called itself the enemy of the U.S.-Russian alliance and revolution. The newspaper was
extremely opposed to aiding Russia, it saw no immediate necessity for working with Stalin: “We
can resist the filthy disease.” It was fighting communists in America and even devoted a pagewide advertisement to spreading the anti-communist message. According to the Tribune,
Roosevelt and Stalin were instigating a revolution in America and the newspaper was proud to be
defending the U.S. against the communist threat.205
Furthermore, the racial hierarchical thinking is evident in the Tribune and The Monitor,
mostly expressed in cultural differences between the old world, Europe, and America, the new
democracy. Neither the Tribune nor The Monitor trusted the British. The Monitor thought the British
Prime Minister was manipulating Roosevelt to restore British hegemony. The Tribune saw the
same manipulation by Churchill, trying to get the U.S. to fight the British war. It further
contended that Roosevelt was easily influenced by the European despotic monarchs. The British
“The Rendezvous With Destiny”, The New York Times, (August 15 1941) 16
“President And The People”, The New York Times, (August 16 1941) 14
204 “Revelations”, The Concord Daily Monitor, (August 14 1941) 4
205 “We Accept The Challenge”, Chicago Tribune, (August 16 1941) 8
202
203
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had not been able to rid themselves from despotism, like the Americans had. They used it to
manipulate the United States in the war.
Lastly, all three newspapers focused on liberty. The Times praised the President because he
was fighting for freedom, while The Monitor and the Tribune were concerned that Roosevelt was
putting American democracy and civil liberties at risk. Again, all components of Hunt’s theory
can be easily distinguished in the debate on the Atlantic Charter.
Conclusion
The discussion on the Atlantic Charter shows how the struggle between isolationists and
interventionists was reaching its climax over the course of 1941. The isolationist stance reached
its focal point in the Chicago Tribune, as it concentrated its argument on the warmongering charge.
America did not want to go to war, but Roosevelt was nevertheless pushing the country ever
closer to war with his undemocratic ways. He had no authority to commit to the broad principles
of the Atlantic Charter. His cooperation with Stalin added revolutionary threats to the already
endangered democracy. This attitude brought the Tribune in direct conflict with the
administration and the communist party.
The New York Times’ position was the complete opposite of the Tribune’s. The
commitment to the Atlantic Charter was considered a great development, as it signified the
return to international law and the end of isolationism. The Times stood squarely behind Roosevelt
and his foreign policy and was not particularly concerned about getting involved in the war. Of
course The Times did not want the U.S. to fight in Europe, but maybe the Axis would leave the
Americans no choice but to participate. In that case America had to be prepared and until that
time came the U.S. would do everything in its power to aid the allies.
The Concord Daily Monitor’s editorials were even more diverging than in January. The
columns by Lippmann and Thompson resembled The Times’ stance, while the anonymous
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editorials were very critical. Surprisingly, the critique was not strictly isolationist in nature. It
focused more on Roosevelt’s alleged authoritarianism.
Neither isolationists nor interventionists were concerned with the business aspects of the
war as the debate reached its focal point. Williams’ economic explanation does not seem to hold
much ground, when looking at the articles on the Atlantic Charter. More evidence of Kennan’s
moralistic legalistic theory can be found, but his theory also is not explaining the findings
sufficiently. As was the case for the news coverage of the debate on the Neutrality Act and the
Lend Lease Act, Michael Hunt’s ideological explanation of the event covers the reporting of the
three newspaper best.
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Conclusion
The Newspapers
The outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939 brought the battle over American
foreign policy between the isolationists and the interventionists to a head. When looking at the
three different newspapers during these three key debates on America’s policy towards the
European war, it is very interesting to see how their arguments have evolved over two years.
In the debate on the Neutrality Act, all the newspapers were concerned about how the
war was going to affect the United States. None of them wanted to get drawn into the hostilities
and the discussion focused naturally on the best method to accomplish this. The Tribune argued
heatedly to hold on to the Neutrality Act as it was passed in Congress in 1937, since changing the
legislation while the war was already going on would go against the whole reasoning behind the
law. It was argued during the thirties that the best way to remain neutral, was to have neutrality
legislation in effect at the moment hostilities broke out. Furthermore, the proposed repeal of the
arms embargo of the Neutrality Act would render the legislation useless: the U.S. would not be
neutral if it was supplying one side of the belligerents with weapons.
The isolationist newspaper saw American democracy threatened by both Roosevelt’s
intention to repeal the embargo and by his attempt to increase the executive powers through the
unnecessary national emergency. The Tribune was further concerned that sympathies for the allies
would bring the United States dangerously close to the war. The American emotions were
understandable, but the public needed to realize that Americans would be unable to bring peace
to the violent Old World. This was definitely not America’s war and Americans should stay out
of it. The U.S. was better off protecting and preserving democracy at home.
Neither The Times nor The Monitor wanted to get dragged into the war, but they were in
favor of the arms repeal. Both newspapers contended that the neutrality legislation provided the
U.S. only with a neutral appearance. By denying the British and the French their rights of buying
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arms, the U.S. was in fact aiding Hitler indirectly. The papers did not think that the sale of arms
to the allies would lead to American involvement in the war, since the U.S. was still able to sell
the belligerents almost all the other materials used in war. America was not truly neutral under
the current legislation and the arms embargo had to be repealed. It would be better if the U.S.
could go back to conducting foreign policy under international law, this was the only way to be a
true neutral and to stay out of the war.
However, both newspapers knew it was going to be difficult to remain neutral in this war.
Hitler was clearly the aggressor and American sympathies rightly lay with Great Britain and
France, who were defending their countries. The U.S. was further connected to Europe through
trade and finances, which made neutrality even more difficult. Unlike the Tribune, The Times and
The Monitor were concerned how the war was going to affect American economy. The Monitor
especially emphasized that the linked economies would affect American neutrality.
Both newspapers were mainly supportive of the Roosevelt administration’s policies and
very much against the neutrality legislation. However, The Times was suspicious of the national
emergency, which was unnecessary and could hamper the repeal of the neutrality legislation. The
paper urged Roosevelt to take his responsibilities as a strong leader, while The Monitor called upon
the President to create national unity.
In the debate on Lend-Lease, none of the papers was opposed to aiding Britain, but all
were concerned about the bill in which Roosevelt proposed the aid. The bill gave Roosevelt again
more authority, and only The Monitor’s Dorothy Thompson applauded the President for taking on
so much responsibility. She represented the most positive view on the President’s policies in this
period.
In January 1941, the Chicago Tribune was still voicing the isolationist position strongly. In
1939 the isolationist point of view was mainly expressed through editorials and articles on
prominent isolationists, but in 1941 the Tribune seemed to have stopped trying to appear
unbiased. The isolationist arguments were now no longer limited to the editorials, but were also
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prominently expressed in the articles on the Lend-Lease bill. The paper based its position against
the Lend-Lease bill on two arguments: first, that the Lend-Lease would bring the U.S. into the
war, and second, that it would transform American democracy in a dictatorship. The Tribune was
appalled by the fact that Roosevelt was seeking greater executive powers yet again. The LendLease bill shifted powers from Congress to the executive, thereby wrecking the checks-andbalance-system and destroying American democracy. This policy did not represent what the
American people wanted. Roosevelt was turning the United States into a totalitarian dictatorship,
which also posed a threat to American security.
The main difference between the Tribune in 1939 and in 1941 is that the isolationist views
are pronounced more powerfully in 1941. This is not surprising, since the isolationists were better
organized than they were in 1939. It makes sense that their arguments became more prominently
featured. The isolationist line of reasoning also became more extreme: for example, Roosevelt
went from being a threat to being a dictator. There was also continuity, of course in the
isolationist stance and more specifically in the reasoning that Roosevelt was bringing the U.S.
closer to a war which was none of America’s business, since war was unavoidable in Europe and
the U.S. could not bring peace. Roosevelt was also still perceived as a threat to American
democracy, even more so.
An interesting development is that The Monitor changed position in January 1941. The
paper was more aligned with The New York Times in 1939, but can be placed with the Chicago
Tribune in the debate on Lend-Lease. The three different editorials published in The Concord
Monitor also became very divergent: while Thompson and Lippmann were staunch supporters of
the President and his policies and perceived partisanship as the main threat of democracy, the
anonymous editorials became very critical of Roosevelt. Like the Tribune, The Monitor’s editorials
saw dictatorial tendencies in the President and his Lend-Lease. Roosevelt was covering too much
ground in the Lend-Lease bill and asked for too much power. The fact that he was starting his
third term in the White House certainly did not help matters.
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The editorials of The Monitor were neither clearly critical nor clearly supportive of the
administration in the discussion on the Neutrality Act. Roosevelt’s request for more powers was
not even discussed in 1939, but in the debate on the Lend-Lease bill it had become the paper’s
gravest concern. The editorials focused on how it would affect American democracy, but unlike
the Tribune was not worried that the Lend-Lease aid would get the U.S. involved in the war. It is
not clear why The Monitor had shifted to the isolationist side of the debate. Even a change in
editors would not explain why the extremely supportive editorials by Lippmann and Thompson
were still being published. Another change in The Monitor’s editorializing was that the editorials no
longer dealt with the economic effect of the war, while this was one of the main issues in 1939.
The New York Times was more supportive of Roosevelt, like Lippmann and Thompson.
The Times remained committed to aiding the allies and regarded the all-out aid to Britain as a
priority. Like Thompson and Lippmann, The Times contended that the majority of the Americans
wanted to follow this course. The Times held on to the same line of reasoning it had followed in
the neutrality debate: neutrality was not possible, America rightly sympathized with Britain and
France because Hitler was clearly the aggressor, and America should do everything in its power
to aid the democracies of Europe. A new argument is that British defense is linked to American
security.
The Times also held on to its critical attitude towards the administration, but was more
acquiescent than The Monitor and The Tribune. The paper was concerned about Roosevelt’s
proposal for unlimited powers, but saw it more as a strain on democracy and as a move that
could obstruct the much-needed aid for Britain. The Times therefore urged the President to
cooperate with the opposition to provide the country with unity and leadership. All in all, The
New York Times was very consistent in its reasoning in articles and editorials, and the only
newspaper in support of the Lend-Lease bill. The only difference between September 1939 and
January 1941 was that the economic perspective on the war was practically absent in the LendLease debate.
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By August 1941, the newspapers’ points of view had crystallized into complete opposing
views on the administration’s foreign policy. The Chicago Tribune fiercely propagated the
isolationists position when confronted with the declaration of the Atlantic Charter, while The
Times gave its full support to the White House. The Concord Daily Monitor continued to publish the
diverging editorials: the anonymous editorials were very critical of Roosevelt’s conduct, while
Thompson and Lippmann stood behind the President.
First and foremost, the Tribune was furious about Roosevelt’s warmongering. According
to the isolationist newspaper the Atlantic Charter was practically a declaration of war. The Tribune
was furthermore certain that Roosevelt had committed the U.S. to the European war because the
British asked him for troops. The paper made no attempt to hide the outrage, it was not only
attacking Roosevelt’s policies but also his person. The President had deceived the American
people, just like his treacherous ancestor did: he was certainly no man of peace, rather a man of
war. Influenced by the British, he had promised to bring American troops to Europe and to
police the world after the war.
Just like in ‘39 and in January ’41, Roosevelt was regarded as danger to democracy, a
dictator even, since his acting outside of his office and breaching the Constitution by pledging the
country to war. He even entered into an alliance with dictatorial Russia, which was seen as
another threat to the democratic principles. The Tribune also still argued that it was representing
the opinion of the majority of the American people.
In these two years, the Tribune remained consistent in its isolationist reasoning: the only
development is that the paper was professing its point of view fiercer in each debate and became
more vehement in its attacks on Roosevelt, his foreign policy and anyone who supported the
President. The arguments remained basically the same: Americans did not want to go to war, so
the administration should not take them to the European front. Besides the fact that the U.S. had
nothing to do with the European strife, there was nothing it could do about it. America should
protect its own democracy, which was threatened by the authoritarian Roosevelt administration.
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The New York Times was mainly supportive of the Roosevelt administration in the three
debates, but also maintained a critical attitude. In the discussion on the Atlantic Charter, the
paper was full of praise however. It hailed the Atlantic Charter, as this would finally mean the end
of isolationism in America. According to The Times, it was America’s duty to take action in the
war, this was exactly what the American faith was all about. The Charter was just what was
needed, because not only did it prevent a peace offer from Hitler, it also provided much needed
objectives for the dangerous situation.
In August ’41, The Times was fully backing Roosevelt’s foreign policy. He was no longer
accused of undemocratic ways, The Times now argued that the conduct of foreign policy was in
fact the prerogative of the executive. It was the President’s duty to provide the nation with strong
leadership and that was exactly what he was doing. The obvious lack of criticism is the main
difference with the articles and editorials in September ’39 and January ’41. Like the Tribune,
which was fully embracing its isolationists position, The Times was now firmly standing by its
interventionist stance and supporting the President.
In The Concord Daily Monitor the opposing views also came to a head. Dorothy Thompson
and Walter Lippmann took up the same position as The New York Times, while The Monitor’s own
editorials grew extremely critical of Roosevelt. While The Monitor was upset with the secrecy
surrounding the meeting between the two world leaders and, like the Tribune, was convinced that
the President had pledged the U.S. to war, the paper’s main critique focused on Roosevelt’s
dictatorial tendencies. He had no authority to commit America to the war aims of the eight
points and he was accused of leading America further away from democracy: he was creating an
authoritarian state.
The editorials and articles in The Monitor developed practically in the same way as the ones
in The Times and the Tribune: both the supportive and critical opinions were voiced more strongly.
The only difference is that the critical arguments in The Monitor and the Tribune developed in a
different direction. The Monitor’s own editorials’ critique focused more on the dangers posed by
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Roosevelt’s authoritarianism, while the Tribune was more concerned that Roosevelt was leading
the U.S. to war. The Monitor was critical like the Tribune, but was not especially concerned about
going to war.
It is logical that the debate on American foreign policy became more heated as the war in
Europe dragged on and chances increased that the U.S. was going to take action, either by an
American declaration of war, or by an act of war by the Axis. Since the Chicago Tribune was owned
by the prominent isolationist Robert R. McCormick, it is not surprising that the newspaper was
voicing the isolationist stance and that it kept doing so over these two years. Furthermore, the
Mid-West was an isolationist region: the seven members of the America First executive
committee all came from the Mid-West and the isolationist organization had the largest chapters
in that region. One of its biggest chapters was based in Chicago.206
The East coast was known to be more interventionist, which explains why The New York
Times was more supportive of Roosevelt’s assertive foreign policy. It also explains why Dorothy
Thompson and Walter Lippmann were propagating the interventionist point of view, since both
their columns were originally published in The New York Herald Tribune. Their interventionist
position apparently sold well in the area around Concord, because The Daily Monitor continued to
publish their columns even when they became more divergent from its own editorials. New
Hampshire was probably not opposed to taking action in the European war, but was opposed to
Roosevelt’s conduct of foreign policy. There is no apparent reason for the radicalization of The
Monitor’s own editorials, although the editor during those years was James M. Langley, who also
owned the newspaper. Langley was a politician and became the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan
under President Eisenhower.207 Little could be found about Langley’s political views, but I expect
that he was probably responsible for the extremely critical editorials on Roosevelt.
Cole, Roosevelt and the Isolationists 1932-1945, 380-381; Jonas, Isolationism in America 1935-1941, 70-71
Website of the Embassy of the United States in Islamabad,
http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/pakistan/former_ambassadors.html, December 12 2006
206
207
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Theories
In all three debates on American foreign policy, Michael Hunt’s approach was reflected most in
the newspapers. While George Kennan’s legalistic moralistic theory can certainly be discerned in
the discussions, Hunt’s ideology overall fitted the arguments better. There was little evidence
supporting Williams’ economic approach.
In September 1939, the ideological line of reasoning was used by both interventionists
and isolationists. The Tribune argued that the great achievement of American democracy should
not be put to risk by entering the European war, because the European continent was prone to
war. America should not try to bridge the vast differences between the civilizations, as it would
damage democracy at home: the European madness could contaminate America. The Monitor and
The Times meanwhile contended that the U.S. was no longer isolated and should use its
exceptional power to work with Britain in order to protect European democracies. The notions
of national greatness and liberty were clearly there, while the Tribune also focused on racial and
cultural differences between America and Europe.
During the discussion on the Lend-Lease bill, all newspapers were concerned with
American liberty, because they saw American democracy endangered by the administration’s
policies on one level or another. Also, The Times, Thompson and Lippmann argued that America
should protect the European democracies, and that the Lend-Lease bill was a test for American
democracy. The Tribune further expressed anti-British sentiments and other hierarchical
cultural/racial notions and repeated the argument that the European violence could not be
solved: America and Europe were different. The Chicago Tribune was also afraid that Roosevelt
was causing a socialist revolution.
In August 1941 the ideology was again strongly represented in the newspapers. The Times
celebrated American national greatness and was pleased that the U.S. was now able to assume the
responsibilities suitable to a world power: aiding the countries in Europe fighting for their
freedom. Thompson and Lippmann shared this point of view. The Tribune and the Monitor’s
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editorials saw socialist tendencies threatening American democracy, while the Chicago Tribune was
most concerned about a communist revolution caused by Stalin and Roosevelt. The hierarchical
cultural/racial notions were again represented in the perceived differences between the U.S. and
Europe.
Kennan’s theory can mainly be found in the continuous prominent role of public opinion
in both interventionist and isolationist reasoning, which could lead to moralistic tendencies, and
in the desire to return to international law, which is expressed mostly by The New York Times.
However, Hunt also mentions Roosevelt’s plans to create an international legal framework and
explains this by illustrating how Roosevelt rediscovered his Wilsonian faith, based upon notions
of American greatness and liberty.
Hardly any evidence in support of the economic theory by Williams could be found. In
1939 The Monitor and The Times mention how businessmen were recruited by the administration.
The further wonder how the war is going to affect the economy, but there were no signs that
economic motives played a large role in the administration’s decision making. This does not
change in January and August 1941.
In conclusion, Hunt’s theory explained the debate in the newspapers best. There was
some of Kennan’s theory in there, but Hunt also described the legalistic framework of which
Kennan warns. Hunt explains why America moved towards a foreign policy that aimed for the
creation of a world order based upon international law within his ideological framework. The
closer look at the debate between interventionists and isolationists offered by this research shows
that the theoretical approaches to American foreign policy by Kennan and Williams are limited
and incomplete: they deal with a smaller portion of American history and study it through one
lens, which results in an distorted view. I am certainly not saying that their findings are false, or
that Michael Hunt’s approach is airtight, but I do think that Hunt is offering a more
comprehensive and complete theory: both Kennan’s and Williams’ theories could be
incorporated within his larger ideological framework.
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This research has shown how difficult it is to explain American foreign policy
satisfactorily with an all-encompassing theory. The heated debate in the Chicago Daily Tribune, The
New York Times and The Concord Daily Monitor supports George Kennan’s observation that
America was lacking a foreign policy doctrine during the twentieth century, a dilemma still not
solved today.
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Bibliography
Books
Cole, Wayne S., America First. The Battle against Intervention 1940-1941, (Madison 1953)
Cole, Wayne S., Roosevelt and the Isolationists 1932-1945, (Lincoln and London 1983)
Hunt, Michael H., Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, (New Haven and London 1987)
Jonas, Manfred, Isolationism in America 1935-1941, (Ithaca 1966)
Kennan, George F., American Diplomacy. Expanded Edition, (Chicago 1984)
LaFeber, Walter, The New Empire. An Interpretation of American Expansionism 1860-1898,
(Ithaca and London 1963)
Williams, William Appleman, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, (New York 1972)
Newspapers
The Chicago Tribune
The Concord Daily Monitor
The New York Times
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