RESEARCH AND THE FUTURE OF THE TECHNOSPHERE
by David A. Bella
Department of Civil Engineering Oregon State University Corvallis, OR 973312302
Presented at SIGMA XI, The Scientific Research Society, Annual Initiation and Awards
Oregon State University Corvallis, OR May 19, 1992
Introduction
The Adaptation Panel (AP) of the National Academy of Sciences (1991) released a
controversial report on the impacts of global climate change due to greenhouse warming.
Roberts (1991) describes the message of the AP report as follows:
“… the impact of greenhouse warming in the United States will be, by and large,
mild and the nation should have little trouble adapting to the several degree
temperature rise predicted over the middle of the next century”
The AP report assumed future conditions and then examined our ability to cope with
environmental changes. Hence, technological abilities and their development over time are of
paramount importance to the panel. For some, the report’s findings are reassuring; they imply
that we can adapt to climatic changes without great cots, risks, or sacrifice.
One panel member, Jane Lubchenco objected to the complacent tone of the report.
Lubchenco reasoned that the AP approach is misleading because it implies that “the activities
and systems are independent and distinct from one another.” She reasoned that a comprehensive
assessment “ must include the interactions and interdependencies among the various activities
and systems.” Of particular concern to Lubchenco are the “indirect costs, such as the
environmental costs of various adaptations.” By isolating specific activities, examining their
sensitivities to climate change alone, and neglecting the consequences of our responses to
environmental change, a false impression of the adaptation problem is given.
In the preface of the AP report, Chairman P.E. Waggoner appears to reply to
Lubchenco’s criticism as follows:
“[The report] does not attempt to assess all the numerous environmental changes
that will be taking place simultaneously, including loss of habitat, destruction of
ozone layer and marine pollution, to name a few. The panel was not charged with
assessing the entire question of “environmental sustainable development”
This response, such as it is, appears to acknowledge the importance of interactions but justifies
the AP approach by pointing to the limited charge of the panel. Other portions of the report
seem to claim that Lubchenco’s concern are too broad. The panel reasoned that, “The impacts of
climate change must be sorted out from other effects caused by simultaneous changes in other
factors” (p. 16).
To describe these different viewpoints, it is useful to employ two terms: tactical and
strategic (Bella and Overton, 1972). Tactical views (the Panel’s) are directed toward specific
problems, proximate causes, and applications of particular abilities. Strategic views
(Lubchenco’s) are directed toward systemic outcomes and failures that cannot be addressed in a
piecewise manner. Tactical approaches tend to be reductionist; strategic, holistic. The AP
approach reflects a tactical perspective on technology. The panel identified specific categories of
potential problems and changes that could arise in the future. Then, for each category, it
assessed the technological resources available to cope with or, if possible, benefit from these
conditions. The total cost of adaptation to changing conditions was taken to be the sum of
technical costs minus the net benefits in all categories of change.
From this tactical perspective, technology is seen as a collection of abilities gained
through such things as technical methods, expertise, skills, tools, equipment, and knowhow.
Thus, for any particular problem that might arise, one looks into this collection for those
particular abilities that could best solve the problem and benefit from the new condition. From
such a tactical perspective, growing problems need not be a cause of concern because the
collection of technological abilities is also growing. A study of any particular ability – waste
treatment, as an example – demonstrates expanding abilities over time. Thus, the total collection
of technological abilities can be expected to expand.
The AP report reasons that expanding technological abilities will allow us to adapt to
changing environmental conditions. As examples, we can construct new irrigation systems and
build levies to hold back rising sea levels. Any static view of such abilities, they reason, will
overstate the negative impacts of global environmental change. Because technological abilities
can be expected to increase with time, the AP reasoned that the costs to adapt to climate change
would be lower than the cost estimates arising from “dumb people scenarios” that did not include
expanding abilities. The implication of the AP report is that the cost to adapt to global climate
change would not be great. For only two of its eleven categories was adaptation found to be
“questionable” (“the natural landscape” and “marine ecosystems”). The remaining categories
were found to have either “low sensitivity” (“industry and energy,” and “health”) or could be
“adapted at a cost.” Total adaptation costs were found to be relatively low in comparison to the
national economy with the costs to farming the highest. A “small net cost” might occur to
counteract winnings and losses.
Others, such as Simon (1983) and Hayek (1989), have made similar assessments claiming
that, because of expanding technological abilities, we need not be concerned over population
growth, resource depletion, or environmental degradation. Such views should not be taken
lightly. They are implied in environmental impact assessments, economic analyses, and U.S.
administration policy in recent years. This paper challenges such views. It accepts that
technological abilities are expanding – no disagreement here. The paper challenges the tactical
perspective that sees technology merely as a collection of technical abilities. This is an
insufficient and dangerously misleading perspective on technology. The risks we face in the 21st
Century require a more strategic view of technology, a broader perspective. There is much more
involved than an expanding collection of technological abilities.
A Strategic View of Technology
To gain a strategic perspective, we must not think of technology as a collection of technical
abilities. Instead, we must think of a vast socialtechnical system, a human process, that sustains
widespread adapting networks through which resources and information are distributed in ways
that coordinate the countless activities of many millions of people throughout the world. Its “global
web” of interrelationships extends far beyond the old boundaries of companies and organizations
(Reich, 1991). It is constantly adapting and expanding its influence. The global web of human
activity and the technologicalinstitutional infrastructure it sustains are defined herein as the
technosphere.
The technosphere has become our life support system. For increasing numbers of us
throughout the world, the food we eat, clothes we wear, and even the air we breath, come to us
through its networks and infrastructure. Individuals, groups, and entire cultures must develop the
skills, practices, and relationships needed to survive within the technosphere. Those that fail
suffer. Even those willing to forego the benefits of the technosphere will be forced to conform;
global climate change will transform their native lands so that traditional practices no longer fit.
Let us examine the systemic character of the technosphere.
The technological world that you and I depend upon – for a drink of water, as an example
– is developed and sustained through the actions and decisions of countless human beings
throughout the world. Each individual action involves local and immediate concerns, completing
particular assignments, meeting specified deadlines, performing specialized tasks. Most of us
can consider our own job requirements as examples. The actions of individuals, however, are
linked to those of other individuals through formal contracts, administrative arrangements,
schedules, and assignments, along with informal exchanges, discourse, and pressures. Each
individual or group is directly linked to only a tiny portion of the total within the technosphere.
Collectively, however, the linkages form extensive relational networks that connect individuals
and groups. The networks extend outward, far beyond the view of any individual within the
network. Throughout the networks are countless relational pathways – sequences of linkages –
that form multiple loops and envelop the entire earth. This adapting global network distributes
information and resources in ways that coordinate the activities of many millions of individuals
throughout the world so that collectively they are able to produce and distribute countless
products and services and sustain a vast technical infrastructure. This is the technosphere.
Market mechanisms are important elements in the self-regulating mechanisms of the
technosphere, but far more is required. Hayek (1989) is correct when he describes the
importance of information reflected in prices. As an example, prices provide information to
allow engineers to select more efficient design alternatives. But prices don’t tell engineers, as an
example, how to determine loads on structural members, how much steel is required in
reinforced concrete beams, or where the steel should be placed. Prices don’t tell environmental
engineers what pollutant loading will deplete dissolved oxygen within a particular river and what
level of treatment is needed. A multidisciplinary team performing an environmental impact
assessment of a proposed project needs information quite different than prices; indeed, by
omitting environmental costs, including risks, prices can be extremely misleading. In addition to
the information provided by prices – described in Hayek’s market model – technological abilities
depend upon countless procedures, techniques, standards, specifications, and models, in addition
to more fundamental principles (e.g., conservation of mass, momentum, and energy). The
development and distribution of such diverse information is widespread and continuous, far
exceeding the capabilities of any group to plan, organize, direct, coordinate, or control. As with
prices, such information emerges from a complex adaptive process far beyond the capabilities of
individuals.
If we are to make any sense of the technosphere as a whole, we must come to grips with
two premises. First, the technosphere is a highly organized system able to coordinate the actions
of hundreds of millions of people on a global scale. Second, the complexity of the technosphere
is far beyond the capacity of any individual or group to grasp, much less control (Winner, 1977;
Bella, 1992). It is difficult for us to imagine organized human activity without an organizing
individual or group. Certainly there are many organizing groups in our world. Nevertheless, it is
wrong to presume that the technosphere as a whole is organized by some global group. It is
misleading to think of technology on the whole as a tool, a device, or machine subject to the
rational control of an operator. It is also misleading to merely claim that the “global market”
explains such global organization. The metaphor of the market implies free individuals
exchanging goods and services with each other in a “market place.” This is an insufficient
metaphor; it fails to adequately describe the highly organized activities that technology requires
on vast scales and the controlled tasks, highly specialized assignments, and tight schedules
placed upon many millions of individuals and groups. How then should we think of the
technosphere and discuss its systemic properties?
Science has come to realize that the natural world is full of highly complex and organized
systems that are far beyond the capacity of anyone to fully grasp or control (Prigogine and
Stengers, 1984). A single cell organism or the entire biosphere are examples. These organized
systems develop and sustain themselves without anyone of us in charge. They are “selforganizing” and “self-regulating” systems. From a broad perspective, such systems appear to
share common characteristics. In brief, they are complex, adapting, and nonlinear (CANL)
systems which tend to share the following general characteristics.
· They have many components.
· Each component is directly linked to (influenced by) only a few other components
(a tiny fraction of the total).
· The links between components form vast networks through which multiple pathways of
influence and exchange can be traced.
· These networks contain multiple loops of influence and exchange which can dampen or
amplify deviations (negative or positive reinforcements) in nonlinear ways.
· The formation of these networks is an adaptive process that involves the interplay of order
and disorder over time (i.e., structure emerges from a history of tests, challenges, and
influences).
· The adaptive tendency is toward mutually reinforcing networks of influence and
exchange that serve to prevent the growth and spread of disorders and coordinate the
activities of many components far beyond the direct influence of any component.
· This systemic coordination leads to “emergent” behaviors, outcomes, and capabilities that
cannot be reduced to the behaviors of components.
The technosphere shares these general characteristics. Thus, from a strategic perspective, we can
see the technosphere as a member of a broad class of CANL systems with common behavioral
tendencies.
The study of CANL systems in many fields of science (Mauryama, 1963; Prigogine and
Stengers, 1984; Shal, 1982; Kaplan and Kalan, 1989; Kauffman, 1991; Bak and Chen, 1991) is
leading to general lessons, observations, and insights that can be applied to a strategic
assessment
of technology and its global impacts. Complexity and nonlinearity involve far more than a lot of
parts arranged in nonsimple ways. Complexity, Jeremy Campbell tells us, “turns out to be a
special property in its own right, and it makes complex systems different in kind from simple
ones, enabling them to do things and be things we might not have expected” (Campbell, 1982, p.
102). In the face of ongoing fluctuations and development, CANL systems can sustain coherent
behaviors on scales far beyond the direct influence of any of their components. They must be
addressed as wholes – not merely as collections of parts – because their systemic coherence
leads to capabilities and behaviors quite different from those of their parts. They are adaptive and
able to evolve through the ongoing interplay of order and disorder. History, order, disorder,
structure, and behavior are all interrelated within an adaptive process that tends toward selfregulating mechanisms that limit the growth and spread of internal disorders. Within the same
process, disorders serve to promote the emergence of new order, structure, and behavior. A
“process of creative destruction” (Schumpeter, 1942) can lead to the emergence of new levels of
order.
New and unforeseen outcomes, arrangements, and behaviors, including chaos and
catastrophic shifts, can emerge on vast scales (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984). One cannot
predict such shifts from past trends or explain systemic behaviors by adding up the behaviors of
the parts. CANL systems can experience internal change while sustaining overall behaviors and
properties and then, reaching some critical state, new behaviors can suddenly emerge. The
transition from water to steam as the temperature rises can serve as a physical example of such a
nonlinear shift. One cannot simply extrapolate the response of water to rising temperatures to
describe steam. The properties of steam emerge not gradually with rising temperature but
suddenly when the boiling point is reached. CANL systems can dampen fluctuations but,
pressed past some complex threshold, they suddenly amplify fluctuations, sustain chaotic
behavior, or become unstable. The transition from laminar to turbulent flow in a fluid serves as
an illustration, and the “Reynolds number” used by engineers is their attempt to define the
threshold beyond which the transition emerges. CANL systems can sustain order and consistent
behavior despite changing conditions and demands but then, as though some complex threshold
were exceeded, a catastrophic shift can emerge the cause of which is not so much the immediate
external demand – the straw that broke the camel’s back – but rather the accumulated demands
placed on the system. As CANL systems adapt to accommodate conditions over time, they can
reach a system state where a minor event can trigger a catastrophic shift, much like a nervous
breakdown. The minor event is not so much the cause as is the history of development and
conditioning that led to a system state able to amplify minor events to catastrophic levels. The
outbreak of World War I is an example.
Traditional science and engineering tend to presume simple linear systems for which a
reductionist approach and specialization are appropriate. Administrative management is based
upon similar presumptions; “complex” problems are addressed by breaking them down into
workable parts. These two forms of reductionism – technical and administrative – reinforced a
tactical perspective that dominates applied research so that discourse on strategic concerns
(nonlinear interactions, indirect impacts, etc.) tends to be dismissed as nontechnical and
impractical. The AP report, including its avoidance of Lubchenco’s concerns, is an example.
The use of computer models was intended to put the pieces of complex systems back together in
an orderly manner. In fact, however, the most significant discoveries of such efforts may well be
a greater appreciation for CANL systems in their own right and the shortcomings of tactical
approaches.
Scientists are now among the foremost critics of those who attempt to study complex
systems merely through a tactical (reductionist) perspective. With respect to the environmental
consequences of our technological actions, however, the need for a more strategic
(nonreductionist) approach involves far more than the intellectual challenges posed by such
scientists. We and our children’s children will live within these systems. Our lives depend upon
the technosphere. A simple act such as turning on the water for a drink depends upon its vast
networks of human exchange to produce and sustain the pipes, pumps, wires, computers, valves,
and countless other devices and services upon which a drink of water depends. The
technosphere is a CANL system that is altering the entire biosphere (also a CANL systems) with
unknown and unpredictable consequences. Our dependency upon the global technosphere is
growing. Topics of recent scientific inquiry – chaos, instability, catastrophe, and other CANL
systemic responses – have unprecedented implications for suffering and destruction on a global
scale. There is more involved here than a paradigm shift among scientists.
Consider an example. The space shuttle and its launch facilities are remarkable
technological achievements. Each launch depends upon a host of technical abilities performed
by thousands of individuals. But this technological accomplishment involves far more than
collections of devices, abilities, and individuals. Each launch is a systemic outcome.
Catastrophic failures, such as the 1986 Challenger explosion, should also be seen as systemic
outcomes. To explain catastrophic outcomes merely in terms of their proximate causes, as
though on particular devices or individuals failed, is reductionism that makes no more sense than
explaining ecosystems or the entire biosphere merely in terms of their isolated components.
From a strategic perspective, the Challenger explosion was a systemic outcome rooted in history
(U.S. Commission, 1986; Vaughan, 1990). Global catastrophes should also be seen as emergent
outcomes of a global technosphere. Both involve CANL systems, but the latter involve more
passengers.
A Strategic Perspective on Catastrophic Risks
The AP panel assumed gradual rates of climate change without great change in
variability. Its methodology assumed that the technosphere would serve to dampen (lessen,
mitigate) the adverse effects of such changes. Given these assumptions, the AP reasoned that
climate change would produce winners and losers, but the net loss would not be great.
From a strategic perspective, however, the AP assumptions should not be taken for
granted. There is no assurance that climate change will be gradual without significant variations
(Kerr, 1992b). The global climate system is complex and nonlinear. While it is impossible to
make specific predictions, we do know that complex and nonlinear systems are capable of rapid
shifts and chaotic behaviors. They may behave smoothly until a complex threshold is passed;
then, widespread changes emerge. As an example, a nonlinear reorganization of ocean currents
could suddenly emerge resulting in serious climatic shifts not reflected in mean global
temperatures (Broecker, 1987). Such widespread and rapid shifts make social and technological
adaptation more difficult. From the limited charge of the AP panel and its methodology – a
tactical perspective – the nonlinear behaviors of complex global systems were not
accommodated. From the strategic perspective, however, they must not be denied because the
most significant risks are most likely to arise from the unpredictable shifts that emerge from such
systems.
From the strategic perspective, the global climate is not the only CANL system that must
concern us. Even with gradual climate change, cumulative impacts can shift ecosystems to
unstable states. We depend upon socialtechnological
systems, the technosphere, to dampen the adverse effects of such changes, but, these systems
are also complex and nonlinear. We must not forget that social and technological systems can
themselves be the cause of adverse outcomes. There are thresholds beyond which they tend to
amplify rather than dampen adverse events. There are conditions under which the growth of
adverse consequences through CANL interactions exceeds the tactical (isolated, separate)
solution of problems within the technosphere.
Initially, the amplification of disorders may not be noticed because the system adapts to
resolve immediate disorders while longer term consequences, not immediately apparent,
accumulate. With time, however, accumulated consequences contribute to disorders beyond the
assimilative capacity of the system; a point is reached beyond which disorders rapidly grow and
spread. Thus, the “causes” of chaotic and catastrophic outcomes are rooted in a history that
appeared well behaved. Nervous breakdowns, social revolutions, or outbreaks of contagious
diseases are examples of such nonlinear responses. In such examples, disorders rapidly emerge
within systems that appeared to have been well ordered.
World War I was triggered by an assassination. It would be foolish, however, to accept
this assassination as the cause of the war (Tuchman, 1962; Snyder, 1984; Van Evera, 1984).
Instead, the cause was rooted in a history that transformed vast socialtechnical
systems so that, in effect, an unspecified, complex, and catastrophic threshold was approached.
The system that had developed over time reached a state that rapidly amplified relatively minor
events to catastrophic levels. A new system state emerged so horrible that civilized nations
slaughtered millions until victor and vanquished were both decimated. The lesson should be clear.
Although catastrophic thresholds for complex socialtechnical systems cannot be precisely defined
in advance, one must take seriously the conditions that press systems towards states from which
catastrophic shifts emerge.
While it is impossible to precisely predict catastrophic events within the technosphere –
or other CANL systems – one can identify destabilizing conditions that tend to shift socialtechnical
systems toward thresholds beyond which nonlinear amplifications of disorder emerge.
Such conditions include the following.
1. Extreme conditions become more frequent, widespread, and severe.
2. The gaps between winners and losers expand, the numbers of losers expand, and
the consequences to losers become more sever.
3. Pressures to mobilize socialtechnological systems for rapid action expand while
time for assessments declines.
4. The rate and scale of demands rapidly exceed the historical levels from which institutions
evolved.
Of course, such conditions and the resulting instabilities can arise without the pressures of global
environmental change. History provides examples. However, environmental change is
increasingly becoming a potential promoter of such conditions. As an example, nonlinear shifts
in climate that are rapid and widespread would tend to promote such conditions pressing the
technosphere towards thresholds beyond which adverse events are more likely to be amplified
rather than dampened. The technosphere could become increasingly chaotic. Shifts could
emerge in nonlinear and unpredictable ways. While outcomes cannot be predicted, the range of
possibilities suggest far more threatening outcomes than assumed by the AP.
Instabilities could rapidly expand within the technosphere drastically disrupting the
services that we and our children’s children depend upon. In such a chaotic world, the enormous
power of the technosphere could emerge in horrible and destructive ways, including wars. A less
dramatic but more persistent shift, a deep and chaotic depression, could emerge in a world
overwhelmed by expanding problems. Draconian social measures might be taken to restore
order. The 20th Century provides dramatic examples of such nonlinear social shifts and
reconfigurations on vast scales. The outbreak of World War I and its aftermath provide lessons
from the first half of the century. The dramatic breakup of the Soviet Union and the entire
Eastern Bloc provide more recent examples, the outcomes of which are not yet clear.
The “cold war” experience suggests that liberal democratic societies are more selfcorrecting
than totalitarian regimes. Public deliberation has made a positive difference (Paehlke,
1988). Those societies that took measures to suppress a free citizenry and insulate its institutions
from public deliberation suffered more severe environmental insults than those that did not
(Ember, 1990; Janear, 1990). In contrast to this reassuring view, however, Walter Lippmann
(1955) found that the chaos and tyranny that followed the ending of World War I arose in large
measure from deficiencies in liberal democracies. Given the extreme and rapidly changing
events of the time, mass opinion rather than public deliberation, shaped outcomes. “The
movement of opinion is slower than the movement of events,” Lippmann warned. “So before
the multitude have caught up with the old events, there are likely to be new ones coming up on
the horizon.” Mass opinion led to dangerous social instabilities. Lippmann’s warning cannot be
easily dismissed. Much of what he says makes sense and sounds familiar. How then can we
resolve Lippmann’s warnings with the evidence of recent decades that liberal democracies are
more self-correcting, environmentally competent, and less prone, in the long run, to chaos and
catastrophic shifts.
Lippmann’s assessment arose form his experiences during a time when a series of
dramatic demands were suddenly placed upon democratic societies. The four destabilizing
conditions described above were extreme. In a period of time shorter than the cold war, two
horrible world wars and a deep global depression occurred. So far reaching were these events
that their imprint is clearly seen in the record of art, literature, technology, and global carbon
dioxide emissions. The period ended with the holocaust, nuclear weapons, and a vast military
industrial complex that remains to this day. In contrast, the cold war era, despite its threats, has
been a time of relative stability and growth for democratic societies. It was during this period
that President Eisenhower (1961) warned that “only an alert and informed citizenry” could force
the proper meshing of the machinery of a technological society. The evidence suggest that
Eisenhower was correct (Bella, 1992). Does this negate Lippmann’s warning? I think not.
Consider a hypothesis. Liberal democracies themselves should be viewed as CANL
systems. When the rate, severity, and extent of destabilizing demands pass some complex and
changing threshold, the influence of mass opinion exceeds that of public discourse and
deliberation. Then, the world that Lippmann experienced and feared emerges; liberal
democracies tend to amplify adverse events rather than provide a public forum where
shallowness and shortsightedness can be exposed. Then, denial, chaos, and radical
reconfigurations are more likely to emerge. What is new for the next century is the degree to
which environmental impacts could become contributing factors to such social instabilities. To
deny the possibilities of such instabilities is to deny the history of the last century. To deny the
potential contribution of global environmental change to such instabilities is to deny the
challenges of the next century. In the next century, risks new in kind and degree will arise as the
potential instabilities of environmental, social, and technological systems become increasingly
codependent on a global scale.
Tight Coupling within the Techno Biosphere
As population and the power of the technosphere expand, environmental impacts
increasingly exceed the assimilative capacities of natural systems. The technological response
has been to develop institutions, regulations, and treatment facilities (i.e., technological fixes), to
protect the environment. As population, consumption, and technological development expand,
technological fixes are increasingly required to mitigate environmental consequences. A
widespread and increasingly complex activity within the technosphere involves protecting the
biosphere from the potentially destructive influences of the technosphere itself. From a tactical
perspective, this response provides reassuring evidence that technological abilities have
expanded to solve the environmental problems that have arisen.
From a strategic perspective, however, this trend involves ominous systemic changes. To
illustrate, consider a river. Expanding populations produce wastes that exceed the assimilative
capacity of the river (Streeter and Phelps, 1925). Thus, sewage treatment facilities are
constructed to reduce pollutant loads. Environmental consequences (depletion of dissolved
oxygen in the river, fish kills, odors, etc.) are avoided. Clearly this is beneficial. As populations
expand, treatment facilities must expand and become more sophisticated (i.e., higher levels of
treatment are required) to maintain the same pollutant loads to the river. The consequences of
technological failure become more severe. The more sophisticated treatments require broader
ranges of services and supplies from the technosphere (energy, chemicals, information,
equipment, specialists, etc.). Thus, conditions in the river become increasingly dependent upon
the ability of the technosphere to sustain ever more complex services. The river becomes more
tightly coupled to the technosphere. Design engineers, however, need not be concerned that
environmental shifts in the river would disrupt the supplies and services needed to operate the
treatment facilities in an acceptable manner. From their tactical perspective, the river depends
upon the technosphere, but not the other way around.
From the strategic perspective, however, the entire biosphere is becoming ever more
tightly coupled to the technosphere. A treatment plant is only one of an expanding array of
complex linkages. When considering such linkages in total, the technosphere is indeed
dependent upon the biosphere. Shifts in the biosphere, global environmental change, could
overload the technosphere, contributing to conditions that press the technosphere beyond
stability thresholds. Misallocations, breakdowns of services, and systemic chaos could emerge
on a global scale contributing further to the global outbreak of adverse environmental outcomes.
The technosphere and biosphere are becoming mutually dependent spheres. Through expanding
technological fixes, they are becoming more tightly coupled in complex and nonlinear ways.
Under well behaved conditions, this coupling allows the technosphere and the population it
serves to expand without suffering environmental consequences. But this coupling also means
that instabilities or shifts in these spheres could become mutually reinforcing. Thus, nonlinear
shifts could emerge: from well behaved global states – where technological expansions occur
without corresponding expansions of environmental impacts – to adverse states – where
disruptive conditions become mutually reinforcing.
Perrow’s (1984) assessment of complex and tightly coupled systems finds that they
become so inherently prone to catastrophic failures that accidents within them should be
considered as “normal.” Higher levels of connectivity or connectance can lead to greater
potentials for amplifying fluctuations. Gardener and Ashby (1970) suggest that “all large
complex dynamic systems may be expected to show the property of being stable up to a critical
level of connectance, and then, as the connectance increases to go suddenly unstable.” Thus,
without denying the benefits of the well behaved system states, tighter coupling (higher
connectivity or connectance) within a technobiosphere should concern us.
Increasingly, we depend upon the technosphere; through its vast networks, institutions, and
infrastructure, to hold back virtual torrents of potential impacts that far exceed the assimilative
capacities of natural systems. Disruptions within the technosphere could thus lead to serious
environmental disruptions which in turn could further disrupt the technosphere thus
expanding disruptions further. The greater we depend upon the orderly behavior of the
technosphere to protect us from its own environmental consequences, the greater we should be
concerned over the CANL instabilities that could arise within a more tightly coupled
technobiosphere. Consider an illustration.
Activities of the technosphere (especially emission of SO2) contribute substantially to
atmospheric aerosols which scatter short wave radiation from the sun. Research suggests that the
climatic influence is comparable to that of greenhouse gases but opposite in sign (Mitchell, 1972;
Charlson et al., 1992; Kerr, 1992a). That is, greenhouse gases warm, aerosols cool. Though
research results are sketchy, particularly on aerosols, these warming and cooling effects appear
to be of the same order of magnitude. Because of the compensating nature of these effects,
global warming, particularly daytime warming, may be less than if greenhouse warming alone
had occurred. Such compensating effects may help explain why actual global warming has been
less than greenhouse models calculate. Perhaps such compensating effects will allow the
technosphere and population to expand without immediately suffering the more severe
consequences. In other words, the compensating effects would constitute a technological fix,
allowing the continued expansion of populations and consumption without severe consequences,
perhaps even with benefits. From a strategic perspective, however, this is not at all reassuring.
Within the atmosphere, greenhouse gases have lifetimes on the order of years to
centuries. The lifetimes of sulfate aerosols, however, are considerably shorter, days to weeks.
Given such differences, the stability of the climate becomes increasingly dependent upon the
stability of the technosphere. If compensation occurs for a time, then the more extreme climatic
changes may be delayed, as long as the technosphere expands smoothly. If, however, the
technosphere shifts in a nonlinear manner that suddenly reduces its atmospheric emissions, then
the cooling effect of the aerosols would rapidly decline while the greenhouse warming effect
would continue. Warming effects that had been avoided through compensating influences would
rapidly emerge. The net effect could be a rapid climatic shift to warming, particularly daytime
warming. Such a shift could further disrupt the technosphere, compounding the problem
further.
The problem is, of course, far more complex than described above (Charlson et al.,
1992). Spatial and temporal shifts could result in problems at local levels far more severe than
global averages would indicate. Other environmental impacts caused by SO 2 emissions (i.e.,
acid deposition) would compound problems. The point of this simple example, however, is not
to describe a particular (tactical) problem that needs to be addressed. Rather, it is to illustrate
how the technosphere and biosphere are becoming more tightly coupled through complex and
nonlinear interactions and how such tighter coupling could lead to mutually reinforcing
(amplified) instabilities.
Ever expanding technological fixes lead to ever greater vulnerability to nonlinear shifts in
the technosphere. Biosphere and technosphere become more able to amplify nonlinear shifts
between them. Given the expanding power of technology, the potential scale of systemic shifts
continues to expand until catastrophic shifts on a global scale become real possibilities. If
catastrophic shifts were to emerge, the impacts would not arise in the well-behaved
manner assumed by the AP. Environmental extremes and technological failures would not be
independent. Given tight coupling between technosphere and biosphere, environmental extremes
would tend to emerge when the technosphere is more vulnerable to increased demands;
technological failures would tend to emerge when environmental conditions are most
demanding. From a tactical perspective that considers the adverse outcomes (environmental and
technological) in a piecewise manner – one at a time – the probability of all these outcomes
emerging at the same time is infinitesimally small; that is, the catastrophic occurrence of all these
adverse outcomes together is essentially impossible. From the strategic perspective, however,
such outcomes should be expected at the same time if a nonlinear shift in the technobiosphere
occurs. While such shifts cannot be predicted, they are not “essentially impossible.” Moreover,
there are good reasons to believe that the probability of such shifts increases as the technosphere
and biosphere become more tightly coupled.
In the past, weather and climate were seen as independent facts that could adversely
influence farming, disease, depressions, and even wars. Technological development was seen as
a means to reduce such influences. We have entered a new age. Technosphere, atmosphere, and
biosphere are becoming mutually dependent spheres ever more tightly coupled in complex and
nonlinear ways. Climate and weather no longer merely happen to us. The environment is no
longer outside the boundaries of technological systems. Current trends are leading us into an age
where climatic and environmental extremes are becoming more tightly coupled to social and
technical extremes. The potential for mutually reinforcing extremes is growing in scope and
complexity. Our ability to predict climatic and environmental shifts in the next century may be
no better than our ability to predict social and technical shifts and could be worse.
The AP assumed conditions where technology dampened (reduced, corrected,
compensated for, etc.) environmental impacts. Under such assumptions, technological fixes
appear as reasonable substitutes for behavioral changes to reduce population growth, promote
less consumptive life styles and protect natural processes. Such tactical assessments, however,
contain an inconsistency that is potentially tragic and catastrophic. Tactical assessments
examine outcomes as if they could be uncoupled from the whole (see quote of AP chairman)
given in the introduction of this paper), while the recommendations of such assessments
(technological fixes) lead to ever tighter coupling within the technobiosphere.
In the past, we could get away with such inconsistencies – no longer! Clearly more consistent
strategies are called for. Without denying the contributions of modern technology toward human
welfare, such strategies must not view technological fixes as substitutes for reducing population
growth, promoting conservation, developing less demanding lifestyles, and protecting more natural
(i.e., less technologically dependent) processes. In other words, technology must not serve as an
excuse to avoid moderation and prudence.
Denial and Burden of Proof
The above assessment leads one to conclude that tactical assessments, including the AP’s,
fail to address the most catastrophic risks we face. In other words, when you break problems
down into workable pieces, the most catastrophic outcomes disappear from view. This is a
critical deficiency. It leads one to believe that a trial and error approach – adaptation after
consequences become clearly apparent – is reasonable and even prudent. Denial of catastrophic
possibilities leads one to put off prevention measures, reasoning that technological fixes can be
applied as any problems arise. We will need technological fixes, trial and error will continue,
and technological abilities will likely expand, but all this makes sense only within strategic
constraints that serve to avoid catastrophic outcomes.
One might reason that, while the catastrophic risks describe above need to be considered,
information is far too incomplete to justify strategic actions at this time. This perspective has
been central to the Reagan and Bush administrations with respect to global climate change. In
1988, John Sununu, then White House Chief of Staff, was reported to say, “you do not establish
policies on the basis of incomplete models” (Newsweek, 1989). The goals and objectives of the
U.S. global climate change research problem appear to follow this rationale (Committee, 1990).
But, is this a reasonable expectation? If we lived in a static world, then, we could expect that
with time our ability to foresee consequences would improve. The AP is correct, we do not live
in a static world! Our technological abilities are expanding. From a strategic perspective, such
expanding abilities can lead to ever more complex coupling between the technosphere and
biosphere. It is presumptuous and imprudent to assume that our predictive abilities will expand
more rapidly than the complexity and scale of risks we face. Waiting for complete models is a
dangerous form of denial.
We must face the fact that disagreements, uncertainties, surprises, and incomplete
information will not go away despite our best efforts. Clearly, we can and should improve our
understanding of global systems, but we should not fool ourselves into believing that decisions
can be delayed until a complete understanding is approached. Instead, we face a future of
continual decisions in the face of changing conditions, limited information, incomplete models,
inconclusive assessments, surprises, and risks. We must learn to make better decisions within
such a world (Walters and Hollins, 1990).
One scenario for misguided decisions within such a world involves pressures from a
poorly informed public that confuses remote possibilities with certainties, thus promoting drastic
actions that cause more problems than they solve. Within such a panic scenario, prudence
involves resisting the pressure to jump headlong into drastic policies not justified by the
evidence. The panic scenario must be taken seriously, but it must not serve as the paradigm for
misguided decisions and the basis for defining prudence. A denial scenario is equally plausible
and potentially more catastrophic. The events leading to the 1986 explosion of the space shuttle
Challenger illustrate the denial scenario.
The proximal cause of the shuttle accident was a faulty seal in a solid fuel rocket motor.
Under the unusually cold conditions at the time of the launch, the seal leaked during launch,
setting off the fatal explosion. Public testimony reveals the frame of mind and discourse that
prevented the proper use of evidence. Rodger Boisjoly, an engineer who opposed the launch at a
preflight meeting, testified as follows:
“This was a meeting where the determination was to launch, and it was up to us
to prove beyond a shadow of doubt that it was not safe to do so. This is in total
reverse to what the position usually is in a preflight conversation or a flight
readiness review. It is usually exactly opposite that.” (Presidential Commission,
1986, p. 93.)
Robert K. Lund, an engineer and manager who played a key role in this meeting, testified:
“We had to prove to them that we weren’t ready, and so we got ourselves in the
thought process that we were trying to find some way to prove to them it wouldn’t
work, and we were unable to do that. We couldn’t prove absolutely that the
motor wouldn’t work.” (Presidential Commission, 1986, p. 94)
Under the denial scenario, the complexity of a problem and the limited time frame for
decisions made it impossible for scientific and engineering evidence to prove conclusively and in
advance that specific problems will occur. With little discourse, the burden of proof falls upon
those who propose to alter the current course of events. An impossible burden of proof is placed
on those who would redirect the ongoing process. The process continues – despite general
evidence that argues against it. The key factor in the decisions leading to the catastrophe is not
the available evidence; it is the burden of proof assigned to those who present that evidence.
Evidence is unwittingly denied by presuming a burden of proof that available evidence could not
reasonably meet. In effect, a decision has been made by default to continue the ongoing process
regardless of the evidence. Denial continues until the consequences become so severe that they
can no longer be denied.
When tactical thinking dominates, a denial scenario is all but inevitable. When complex
problems are broken into manageable parts, the analyses of the parts do, of course, become more
manageable. Messy interactions are avoided from the start. One can then divide up the far
simpler tasks of gathering information on the well behaved parts. But, of course, this is an
illusion! The interactions will not go away simply because we fail to adequately consider them.
Nevertheless, having simplified complex problems to permit more manageable analyses, tactical
thinkers are inclined to deny the significance of interactions because of insufficient evidence.
Evidence of interactions and their significance is denied by tactical experts because such
evidence does not measure up to the standards of tidiness found within their far simpler tactical
tasks. Furthermore, administrators are often unwilling to fund studies that address difficult
interactions because measurable progress is less assured. Thus, denial (of interactions, indirect
impacts, nonlinear shifts, etc.) is to be expected, particularly when the synergisms between
administrative arrangements and tactical experts are threatened.
Tactical denial is evident in a paper by Jesse H. Ausabel (1991), a key AP member. After
examining historical trends, Ausabel concluded that technological developments (umbrellas, air
conditioned enclosures, refrigerators, etc.) have made us less vulnerable to climate. Based upon
such trends, he concluded that, “the general direction in technology and civilization is heartening
for those anxious about climate change.” He finds that it would be “sensible” to continue this
course. Ausabel’s approach – identifying general trends and projecting them into the future –
does not accommodate strategic nonlinear shifts (including what scientists in many fields call
chaos, catastrophe, instability, and bifurcation). Such messy outcomes have no place in his
assessment. Ausabel’s projections of trends might be appropriate for a world far more linear and
less complex than the one that holds our fate. The technosphere, biosphere, and the interactions
between them, however, are complex and nonlinear. Trends may be a little more than
approaches to unprojected shifts and sudden transitions, flight paths toward nonlinear crashes.
If, however, you insist that we produce evidence for this in the tidy manner of Ausabel, we are
unable to do so, not because we are unwilling or incompetent, but because complex nonlinear
systems are not tidy.
Given a tactical perspective, there is a paradoxical tendency for environmental research
itself to reinforce rather than correct denial. A general denial scenario proceeds as follows. An
environmental problem is identified and limited actions are taken. Among these actions –
perhaps the only actions – are research efforts. From a strategic perspective, such research
discovers that real world systems are indeed complex. Simple models are found to be deficient.
From a tactical perspective the problem itself appears doubtful. Early proponents of action
appear to be mistaken and alarmist. Opponents dismiss their assessments as “unproven
speculations” that imply incompetence and even unethical behavior. Researchers become
extremely cautious in their assessments. Efforts to explain the complexity of problems appear as
tentative, weak, and evasive. Concerning actions, researchers appear to agree on little more than
“more research is needed.” The public becomes confused. Political pressure for action declines.
The problem may virtually disappear from public discourse. Denial continues until
consequences arise that cannot be denied, consequences that remind us again that the real world
is indeed complex, nonlinear, and full of surprises.
In 1974, the threat to the earth’s ozone “shield” by CFCs was published in a paper by
Rowland and Molina (1974). By 1978, in response to public pressure, CFCs used in aerosols
were banned in the United States. Despite this initial strong public support, the burden of proof
then shifted to those favoring further reductions in CFC production (Roan, 1989). Denial set in.
Nonaerosol uses of CFCs soared to new heights. There were no lack of studies during this
period, but they seemed to lead to greater confusion. Public pressure declined. Efforts to find
substitutes for CFCs had been given up (Brodeur, 1986). By 1984 domestic and worldwide CFC
production returned to levels before the aerosol ban. Roan (1989) writes:
“the Reagan administration had appeared to have blind faith in the nation’s
scientists and technology when it came to pollution matters … The idea of
preventing environmental catastrophe apparently didn’t occur to anyone in the
White House during that brief but unhappy era”
Science and technology became the “opiate of the people.”
In the summer of 1984, one of the original discoverers of the CFCozone threat, F.S.
Rowland, stated
“… from what I’ve seen over the past 10 years, nothing will be done about the
problem until there is further evidence that a significant loss of ozone has
occurred. Unfortunately, this means that if there is a disaster in the making in the
stratosphere we are probably not going to avoid it.” (quoted in Brodeur, 1986)
In fact, unknown to Rowland at the time, a surprise disaster was in the making. For nearly three
years a small and largely unknown research team had evidence of an enormous hole in the ozone
layer over Antarctica. They had held back their results in order to check their work. They knew
that they would be severely challenged and, if they were wrong in their interpretation, the little
support that they had would vanish. They were not wrong. The ozone hole was real. It was an
unforeseen consequence that disrupted the denial that had set in.
We can do better than this. How? To begin, we should assume from the start that global
systems, including the technosphere, are indeed complex and nonlinear. Our knowledge will
always be limited and surprises will arise. Then, when research finds that this is indeed the case,
we need not become immobilized by confusion, unable to take any corrective action – other than
more research – until the consequences become impossible to deny. Having accepted
complexity, nonlinearity, surprises, and ignorance as realities that won’t go away, we can,
nevertheless, guide our decisions to reduce the probability of catastrophic outcomes.
A common characteristic of outcomes that makes them catastrophic is that they cannot be
readily transformed to more desirable states. They lack correctability. We are forced to live
with them. Thus, an environmental strategy should serve to influence our decisions in ways that
tend to preserve correctability. Strategic principles such as 1) avoid large scale irreversible
change and 2) preserve options would favor correctability and shift burdens of proof accordingly
(Bella and Overton, 1972).
As an example, the burden of proof would have fallen more heavily on those favoring
CFC production and use. After all, CFCs were known to be persistent and simple mass balances
showed that their concentrations would continue to increase and spread to levels that we could
not reverse. As evidence of environmental damage became available, the burden of proof would
have shifted more strongly onto those favoring CFC production.
In brief, we must recognize that the decisions we make – through action and inaction –
and their eventual consequences will depend as much upon the burdens of proof we accept as the
evidence we gather. We face grave dangers that denial scenarios will unfold with ever
increasing consequences. Modern society must establish principles and norms so that the
relationships between evidence and decisions are appropriate to the complexities, ignorance, and
risks that we face. The development of appropriate social norms for burdens of proof are as
essential to our future as the research we conduct. To avoid the former while pursuing the later
is denial.
Conclusion
We have passed the time when technology could be seen as a mere collection of abilities;
groups of individuals with special skills, tools, and equipment. Such views bear little
resemblance to the vast infrastructure our lives depend upon and the organizational systems that
coordinate the countless activities needed to sustain it throughout the world. Technological
advancement can no longer be seen as merely the expansion of technical abilities. It is also the
relentless entanglement of virtually everyone into complex networks of dependency. It is the
relentless intrusion into natural processes establishing technology itself in a codependent
role with the entire biosphere. We now live within a technosphere that envelopes the entire earth, a
global life support system upon which our food, drink, shelter, waste disposal, and much more
depend. Our lives are shaped by its demands. Our day to day existence depends upon its
infrastructure and vast organizational networks.
The technosphere emerged from the technological developments of the 20th Century, and
this fact must shape our view of the 21st Century and the risks it contains. The tactical view of
the AP is no longer sufficient. It is archaic, belonging to an age that is gone. Ironically, the
technological progress so central to the AP’s conclusions has made their view obsolete and
dangerously insufficient in the world that emerged through technological progress itself.
In the 20th Century, we devoted considerable efforts to protect ourselves from the
extremes of the biosphere (e.g., floods, droughts, storms). Through research we gained an
appreciation for the biosphere, its complexities, and our dependency upon it. We came to realize
that its ability to assimilate our demands is not unlimited; we should not take its stability for
granted. This paper reasons that for the 21st Century we must devote considerable efforts to
protect ourselves from the extremes of the technosphere. Without denying the benefits it
provides, we must recognize that its capabilities are not unlimited; we should not take its stability
for granted. The coupling between biosphere and technosphere poses new risks that older ways
of thinking cannot grasp. We can no longer presume unlimited capabilities of the biosphere to
accommodate technological excesses. We can no longer assume unlimited capabilities of the
technosphere to accommodate expanding threats to the biosphere. Without denying the benefits
of modern technology, it is unreasonable and irresponsible to consider technological
development as a substitute for moderation and prudence.
Finally, I have several questions that have troubled me and led me to wonder if this paper
has been an exercise in futility. Has research become so specialized that strategic inquiry is
beyond the interests and abilities of researchers? Have research communities become so
fragmented that only tactical discourse can be sustained? Has research become so dependent
upon the funding provided by organizational systems that is unable to challenge them? Is the
direction of research so much determined by prior approval of questions and methods – as an
example, through research proposals – that it is unable to explore concerns not likely to be
approved? Are researchers so busy that they have no time to pursue questions that might divert
their attention away from the institutional demands and deadlines they face? I look forward to
your responses.
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