Scheffler’s “Doing and Allowing”
Scheffler’s “Doing and Allowing”
Abstract
In his paper “Doing and Allowing” (Ethics, 2004) Scheffler argues that our
normative practices assume some version of the doing/allowing distinction.
Bradley and Stocker (Ethics, 2005) claim that Scheffler’s argument is not
successful. My paper argues that Scheffler’s view can be read in a way that
escapes Bradley & Stocker’s critique by incorporating a section of Scheffler’s
paper which Bradley and Stocker do not consider. So construed, however,
Scheffler’s argument is open to some further objections: some premises of the
argument are not fully established and there is some doubt whether the
conclusion supported by the argument fully matches the traditional
doing/allowing distinction. I conclude by noting that Scheffler has still
provided new reasons to doubt the moral symmetry of doing and allowing.
2
Scheffler’s “Doing and Allowing”
Scheffler’s “Doing and Allowing”
In “Doing and Allowing”, Samuel Scheffler seeks to justify the familiar, but
controversial, claim that there is a normatively significant distinction between
what we do and what we merely allow, or fail to prevent. He does this by
arguing that our very practice of seeing each other as responsible agents
demands such a distinction.
Scheffler links three main notions:
norms of responsibility, the
distinction between primary and secondary manifestations of agency, and the
doing /allowing distinction (D.A.D). Norms of responsibility are central to
Scheffler’s picture of our normative practices, for he follows R. Jay Wallace in
holding that treating people as responsible agents is essentially about holding
them to norms of responsibility (standards of behaviour) where this involves
seeing them as having reason to conform to these standards and as
appropriate subjects of reactive attitudes if they fail to do so.1 He argues that
seeing oneself and others as subject to norms of responsibility in this way
presupposes making a distinction between primary and secondary
manifestations of agency.2 This distinction is then seen to either be identical
to or to entail the D.A.D.3 Therefore Scheffler’s target, the consequentialist
who accepts norms of responsibility but advocates their radical expansion 4, is
also apparently committed to the D.A.D. – and thus, if he is to remain
consistent, must abandon his consequentialism.
I shall first briefly discuss the relationship between the distinction
between primary and secondary manifestations of agency and the D.A.D. I
shall then consider the interpretation of Scheffler’s argument given by Ben
See Scheffler (2004), p. 220-224 and Wallace (1996), chaps 1-3.
Claim stated Scheffler (2004) p. 216, 219. Main argument for this: Scheffler (2004), p. 220-224,
227-236.
3 Scheffler (2004), p. 215, p. 216-220, p. 227-236 particularly 236
4 Ibid, p. 219
1
2
3
Scheffler’s “Doing and Allowing”
Bradley and Michael Stocker.5 I shall argue that the text does not support this
interpretation and offer an alternative. I will then discuss the strength of the
argument when given this alternative interpretation, arguing that despite
facing
significant
problems,
the
argument
represents
an
important
contribution to this area of debate.
The Distinction between Primary and Secondary Manifestations of Agency
and the Doing / Allowing Distinction
Scheffler introduces the rather idiosyncratic phrase “primary and secondary
manifestations of agency” to provide “an intuitive characterisation of a
generic contrast”6.
This generic contrast is the idea behind the various
“candidate distinctions” – the distinctions between doing and allowing,
between doing and failing to prevent, between doing and letting happen,
between positive and negative agency etc. Scheffler claims: “In each case, we
may say that the aim is to specify what, for purposes of moral assessment, are
to count as primary manifestations of agency and what are to count as
secondary manifestations.”7
The distinction between primary and secondary manifestations of
agency should thus be understood as the generic form of the D.A.D. Indeed,
Scheffler states that throughout the paper he will speak of “the distinction
between doing and allowing”, “the distinction between doing and failing to
prevent” and “the distinction between primary and secondary manifestations
of agency” interchangeably, using the more common expressions merely as
placeholders without committing himself to “a precise or authoritative
version of the distinction.” 8 Insofar as Scheffler’s argument does require us to
be able to classify particular manifestations of agency as primary or
secondary, he sees this as an intuitive, pre-theoretical classification.
Bradley and Stocker (2005).
Scheffler (2004), p. 216
7 Ibid
8 Scheffler (2004), p. 218
5
6
4
Scheffler’s “Doing and Allowing”
But what is it that we are supposed to be recognising intuitively? The
central idea seems to be that primary manifestations of agency in some sense
involve us more directly and thus say more about us than those that are merely
secondary.9 This idea remains unspecified throughout the paper, in keeping
with Scheffler’s wish to endorse only a commitment to drawing “some
distinction of this kind”10
This vagueness may seem unsatisfactory.
Scheffler endorses no
criterion for distinguishing primary from secondary manifestations of agency,
nor any authoritative account of the nature of this distinction, nor any details
of how the distinction is normatively significant.
Considering that his
distinction is so generic, can we be sure that the arguments he goes on to give
support a recognisable doing/allowing distinction? They may leave open a
position that draws a distinction of some kind among the effects of one’s
conduct, but holds paradigm cases which the D.A.D is supposed to contrast,
for example killing a child and knowingly letting them die, as morally
equivalent.
As I shall discuss later, I believe more work is needed to demonstrate
precisely what sort of distinction the paper supports.
At this stage, it is
unclear to what extent this distinction will resemble the conventional D.A.D.
In fact I am inclined to believe that many claims associated with the doctrine
will be seen to be false. However, if Scheffler has succeeded in showing that
we are unable to regard all the controllable consequences of our conduct as
having equal significance, but instead must distinguish harm (or good) which
is related directly to our agency (in some sense) from other harm we
countenance, this is still a significant achievement.
9
For example, Scheffler speaks of the candidate distinctions as seeking to distinguish
“between cases in which our agency is implicated in a primary way and cases in which it is
implicated only secondarily, if at all.”( Scheffler (2004), p. 216) Later, arguing that bringing
one’s conduct into conformity with norms is a primary manifestation of agency, he claims:
“It requires marshalling the full resources of one’s agency, including one’s capacities for
deliberation, choice and action… [it is] a full fledged expression of one’s agency.” ( Scheffler
(2004), p. 222)
10 Scheffler (2004), p. 216
5
Scheffler’s “Doing and Allowing”
The Structure of Scheffler’s argument
In “”Doing and Allowing” and Doing and Allowing”11 Ben Bradley and
Michael Stocker suggest the following understanding of Scheffler’s argument:
P1: To see oneself as subject to norms of responsibility is to see
oneself as having reason (or a reason) to bring one’s conduct
into conformity with those norms.
P2:
Bringing one’s conduct into conformity with norms of
individual responsibility is something one does rather than
something one allows.
C1: Therefore to see oneself as subject to norms of responsibility
is to see oneself as having reason to do something rather than
merely to allow something.
C2: Therefore to see oneself as subject to norms of responsibility
is to accept (A) that there are morally relevant distinctions
between doing and allowing and (B) in particular that we are
more responsible for doings than for allowings.12
They offer strong criticisms of this argument, arguing that P2 is false and that
neither A nor B of C2 follows from C1. If their interpretation of Scheffler’s
argument is correct, it seems clearly invalid.
However, I do not believe that this is the correct interpretation of
Scheffler’s argument.
Scheffler’s own comments in the paper suggest a
somewhat different interpretation. He states: “In Section IV, … I will present
the core of my case for thinking that such norms must indeed incorporate a
distinction between primary and secondary manifestations of agency.”13 This
is reiterated in Section III, where Scheffler states that in his Section IV he will
begin to defend the assertion: “that the norms to which one views oneself as
subject must incorporate such a distinction, they must, to some extent at least,
Bradley and Stocker (2005)
Bradley and Stocker (2005), p. 800
13 Scheffler (2004), p. 220 (Italics added).
11
12
6
Scheffler’s “Doing and Allowing”
assign us greater responsibility for the primary than for the secondary
manifestations of our agency.”
I think these considerations make it quite clear that Scheffler sees his
Section IV as containing a vital part of his argument. Bradley and Stocker’s
interpretation, which seems to consider only Section II of the paper, cannot be
a fair representation of his argument, for it is substantially incomplete.
Instead the argument must be seen as consisting of two parts. In Part
1, Scheffler hopes to establish that the acceptance of norms of responsibility
commits one to making a distinction between primary and secondary
manifestations of one’s agency.
In Part 2, he argues that the norms of
responsibility must incorporate this distinction, making us more responsible
for primary manifestations of our agency than secondary ones.
I shall now
turn to Part 1 of the argument.
Part 1 of the Argument
It is somewhat difficult to understand how Part 1 of Scheffler’s argument is
intended to work. As I have argued above, there is good reason to think that
he does not see this argument as establishing the full D.A.D, but merely as
showing that we must distinguish in some way between primary and
secondary manifestations of agency. However, it does not seem that there is a
meaningful way of understanding the claim that we must “draw this
distinction” which can truly said to be established by this argument.
Scheffler first explains his notion14 of holding oneself to norms of
individual responsibility, explaining that he understands this to involve
seeing reason to bring one’s conduct into conformity with the norms in
question.15
He then observes that the act of bringing one’s conduct into
conformity with the norms is a primary manifestation of agency. He claims:
“This means that to view oneself as subject to such norms is already to attach
a special importance to, and to see oneself as having a special responsibility
As Scheffler states, his notion relies heavily on the ideas of R.J. Wallace. See Wallace (1996),
Chaps. 1-3.
15 Scheffler (2004), p. 220 -221
14
7
Scheffler’s “Doing and Allowing”
for, what one does.
The distinction between primary and secondary
manifestations of agency is a presupposition of viewing oneself as subject to
norms of responsibility in the first place.”16
Scheffler spends some time responding to the possible objection that
his argument mistakenly assumes that agents recognise higher-order reasons
to bring their actions into conformity with norms, as well as the particular
reasons that apply in specific contexts of action. He first argues that holding
oneself as subject to norms of responsibility does involve an overall resolution
to regulate one’s conduct.17 He then claims that even if this is not so, his
argument still stands, for seeing oneself as subject to norms of responsibility
must at the very least involve recognising, and endeavouring to act upon, the
relevant reasons on a case-by-case basis, and this itself is a primary
manifestation of agency.18
This seems to give us the following general structure of argument:
P’1: To view oneself as subject to norms of responsibility
involves seeing oneself as having reasons to act in conformity
with those norms.
P’2: Acting for a reason, in general, and bringing one’s
behaviour into conformity with norms of responsibility, in
particular, is always a primary manifestation of agency.
C’:
Therefore to view oneself as subject to norms of
responsibility involves drawing a distinction between primary
and secondary manifestations of agency.
P’1 seems acceptable. Various doubts might be raised about the truth of P’2.19
However, even if both P’1 and P’2 are accepted, it is hard to see how C’ is
Ibid, p. 222
Ibid, p. 223
18 Ibid, p. 224
19 See Bradley and Stocker (2005), p. 801-806
16
17
8
Scheffler’s “Doing and Allowing”
supposed to follow. It seems clear that we can use modus ponens to arrive at
the weaker conclusion: ‘To view oneself as subject to norms of responsibility
involves recognising a requirement for a primary manifestation of agency.’
However, C’ does not seem to follow from this, nor does Scheffler seem to
provide an argument supporting the move from P’1 and P’2 to C’.
How the argument fails will depend upon our understanding of
Scheffler’s claim that we must draw a distinction between primary and
secondary manifestations of agency. If all that is involved in the idea of
drawing such a distinction is a tendency to see some manifestations of agency
as primary and others as secondary20, then P’2 does seem to entail some such
distinction. P’2 picks out certain actions as belonging to the class of primary
manifestations of agency – and surely we would only be willing to accept
such a claim as meaningful if we did recognise this class and contrast it with
non-primary, or secondary, manifestations of agency.
However, this makes
the argument circular, for it means that a prior acceptance of the distinction is
necessary to accept P’2 itself.21 In contrast, if “drawing the distinction” is
supposed to involve endorsing any claim about a difference in normative
significance between the two classes, then it simply does not seem to have
been established that we do need to draw such a distinction.
There are various parts of the text that suggest we should understand
Scheffler as believing he has established a distinction with at least some
normative content.22 However, as I argued above, he still sees his argument
as incomplete. We shall thus move on to consider Part 2 of his argument.
Part 2 of Scheffler’s argument.
In Part 2, Scheffler intends to “confront a crucial objection which denies that
the argument of Section II has any bearing at all on the content of such norms
Where this is understood simply as an ability to make a factual distinction between two
classes of manifestations of agency and does not entail any normative commitments.
21 In addition, it does not show that our disposition to draw this distinction comes from the
acceptance of norms. This seems to be an important part of Scheffler’s intention.
22 For example, the quote given above in which he states: “This means that to view oneself as
subject to such norms is already to attach a special importance to, and to see oneself as having
a special responsibility for, what one does.” (Scheffler (2004), p. 222).
20
9
Scheffler’s “Doing and Allowing”
[of responsibility]”23. According to this objection, Scheffler’s argument so far
has established only “a formal distinction between primary and secondary
manifestations of agency”24, but has not shown that we must incorporate such
a distinction into the content of the norms themselves.25 He therefore seeks to
show that it is incoherent to hold oneself as subject to norms of responsibility
without accepting that the content of these norms is sensitive to a distinction
between primary and secondary manifestations of agency.
He does this by considering the position of a person who accepts a
“norm of causal optimality”26 – a standard of behaviour that directs one to
make the best use of the causal opportunities available. This person, he
claims, is committed to “a purely instrumental view of agency” – a viewpoint
according to which “each action is to be assessed solely in terms of its
optimality relative to the other causal opportunities available to the agent.”27
However, Scheffler argues, such a viewpoint is not compatible with the
acceptance of norms of responsibility, for this involves seeing “noninstrumental” reasons for acting – that is reasons based on something other
than the value of the causal opportunity the action would realise.28
This gives us the following basic structure:
P’’1: A purely instrumental view of agency is not compatible with the
acceptance of norms of responsibility.
P’’2: The only alternative to a purely instrumental view of agency is
acceptance of the primary/secondary manifestations of agency distinction.
C’’: Therefore the acceptance of norms of responsibility commits one to
the primary and secondary manifestations of agency distinction.
Scheffler (2004), p. 220
Scheffler (2004), p. 220
25 As I have argued above, it is not clear to me that Scheffler’s previous argument has
established even a formal distinction, if this is seen as a claim with normative content.
However, Scheffler’s response to his consequentialist opponent seems to a large degree to
stand alone, so that it can be assessed without assuming the validity of the previous claim.
26 Scheffler (2004), p. 227
27 Scheffler (2004), p. 231
28 Scheffler (2004), p. 232-234. Scheffler also speaks of “instrumental justification” to refer to
justification based only on the value of consequences and “non-instrumental” justification to
refer to justification based on any other considerations.
23
24
10
Scheffler’s “Doing and Allowing”
This argument seems to be logically valid. Suppose N = There are norms of
responsibility; I = agency should be assessed instrumentally; D = The
primary/secondary manifestations of agency distinction. Then we have: P’’1,
N  not-I and P’’2, Not-I  D. Using modus ponens, this gives us C’’, N  D.
Thus if Scheffler has adequately established P’’1 and P’’2 without
equivocation in the use of terms, he will have established his conclusion.
However, there seems to be some reason to doubt that this is so.
Scheffler seeks to establish P’’1 by arguing that to see oneself and
others as subject to norms involves (a) seeing an imperative to conform to
these norms and (b) seeing reactive attitudes as appropriate if this is not done,
and that neither the imperative to conform nor the reactive attitudes can be
justified instrumentally.
Scheffler gives two reasons that an imperative to conform to norms of
causal optimality could not be justified instrumentally: first, he claims, it
cannot be guaranteed that conforming to such a norm would be causally
optimal29; second, such a derivation would be circular, for one would have to
have already accepted the norm in order to see oneself as having reason to
accept it. Therefore, the acceptance of the imperative must depend on its
independent, rational force – conforming to norms must be justified by noninstrumental reasons.
These arguments, particularly the latter, do seem to show that the
acceptance of norms is incompatible with a purely instrumental viewpoint in
so far as this involves a refusal to recognise any non-instrumental reasons as
normatively significant.
However, it is not clear that Scheffler’s
consequentialist target is committed to such a viewpoint; there seem to be
ways for the consequentialist to accept that the imperative to conform to
There are various examples of cases in which to achieve the best outcome we must stop
trying to achieve the best outcome. See Parfit (1984) particularly p. 23-29, 53-62. This may
mean that consequentialism is self-effacing, which as Parfit argues, does not undermine the
truth of consequentialism as a theory about what the ultimate aim of morality is - but it does
seem to leave Scheffler’s target, the direct consequentialist, in an apparently embarrassing
position.
29
11
Scheffler’s “Doing and Allowing”
norms is non-instrumentally justified, while continuing to hold that the
conduct regulated by the norms themselves is instrumentally justified.
First, the consequentialist might argue that holding oneself to norms of
responsibility is not an action, but merely a matter of belief – and that beliefs
are justified non-instrumentally on the basis of evidence, while actions
themselves are instrumentally justified.
This seems plausible, for feeling
bound to conform to norms seems essentially to involve having a belief about
what one has reason to do. The strength of this response will depend upon
whether Scheffler has successfully established in the first section that holding
oneself to a standard is something we do, although it may seem that he
assumes from the outset that it is an exercise of agency and thus does not
really address this alternative possibility at all.
Second, even if we do grant that conforming to norms of individual
responsibility is an action and an action justified by non-instrumental reasons,
it does not seem to follow that the norms themselves must recognise noninstrumental considerations. After all, if making one’s behaviour conform to
norms is an action, it seems to be an action which is markedly different from
the actions governed by the norms: one might say it is on another level, as the
moves one makes within a game of chess, which are governed by strategic
reasons, are on another level from the ‘move’ of playing the game in the first
place. This is so even if, as Scheffler argues, holding oneself to norms of
responsibility involves a pervasive sensitivity to non-instrumental reasons in
the form of “a standing disposition to treat the fact that an act would violate
the standard as constituting a reason not to perform it.”30
However, when we consider reactive attitudes, Scheffler’s argument
seems more powerful.
The reactive attitudes are governed by a non-
instrumental conception of merit and desert.
The appropriateness of a
reactive attitude does not depend upon the causal optimality of such a
response, but on whether the norms in question have been violated. As
Scheffler argues, if reactive attitudes are merely causally optimal responses to
30
Scheffler (2004), p. 235.
12
Scheffler’s “Doing and Allowing”
particular bits of behaviour then they cease to really be reactive attitudes at
all: “a blast of hostile affect delivered in the hope of achieving some
instrumental advantage is not the same thing as resentment or indignation.”31
The success of this argument turns on the question of whether reactive
attitudes involve an actively hostile response to their subject, so that what is
made appropriate by wrongdoing is not only a judgement but also a change
in behaviour. This would give us an action justified by non-instrumental
reasons. The issue demands a fuller discussion than space allows, but it
seems possible that sanctioning behaviour is required if we are to have
genuine practice of holding people to norms rather than simply ‘grading’
actions. 32
Turn now to P’’2. This premise seems somewhat dubious. Even if the
norms of responsibility must assign the agent’s actions a normative
significance that does not derive from their instrumental efficacy, it is not
clear that this implies acceptance of the primary/secondary manifestations of
agency distinction. The distinction in question involves holding that we have
greater responsibility for primary manifestations of agency in virtue of their
being primary and it is not clear that this follows from seeing some noninstrumental features of our actions as normatively significant.
However, there is something behind what Scheffler says.
Quite
possibly, the recognition that some features of one’s conduct have normative
significance that is independent of their instrumental efficacy is incompatible
with holding all the results of one’s conduct to be equally morally relevant.
Even if this idea does validate a distinction among the consequences of one’s
conduct, there is no guarantee this distinction will align with the traditional
doing/allowing distinction sufficiently to be seen even as a version of the
generic distinction Scheffler wishes to defend. In particular, it may not
Scheffler (2004), p. 233. Although some philosophers (See Smart (1961) p. 291-306) have
argued against this “judgemental” concept of blame, claiming that we should focus merely on
the idea of behaviour-altering sanctions, it seems to me that Scheffler is correct to claim that
an instrumentally justified blame is no blame at all; it is neither true to our actual practices of
responsibility nor a desirable revision of them.
32 See Wallace (1996), p. 69
31
13
Scheffler’s “Doing and Allowing”
validate the prohibition upon harming one person to prevent the greater
harm of others, which Scheffler sees as part of D.A.D.33
I have argued that Scheffler’s argument is best understood as
consisting of two parts, with the latter part including the core of the
discussion.
So understood, Scheffler’s argument is stronger than the
Bradley/Stocker interpretation suggests.
Scheffler’s argument still faces
significant difficulties: it is doubtful whether Scheffler has established some
vital premises and there are also questions about the extent to which
Scheffler’s argument connects with the traditional dispute about the D.A.D.
However, Scheffler’s argument opens up new lines of enquiry, which if
fruitful could transform the shape of this important area of moral thought.
33
See Scheffler (2004), p. 216
14
Scheffler’s “Doing and Allowing”
Bibliography
Bradley, Ben, Stocker Michael, 2005. “”Doing and Allowing” and Doing and
Allowing.” In: Ethics 115 (July 2005): 799-808.
Parfit, Derek, 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford, Clarendon.
Scheffler, Samuel, 2003. “Distributive Justice and Economic Desert.” In: Desert
and Justice, ed. Serena Olsaretti. Oxford, Clarendon: 69-91.
Scheffler, Samuel, 2004. “Doing and Allowing.” In: Ethics 114 (January 2004):
215-239.
Smart, J.J.C., 1961. “Free Will, Praise and Blame”. In: Mind, Vol. 70, No. 279
(Jul. 1961): 291 –306.
Wallace, R. Jay, 1996. Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Mass.: Harvard
University Press.
15