The Background and the Morphological Content
Matjaž Potrč, University of Ljubljana
The background is presented, and then the morphological content. Applications of
morphological content in several areas are briefly discussed. Some differences and
vicinities between concepts of background and morphological content are pointed out. It
is argued that vicinities prevail and so that the morphological content can be treated as
the background.
A. Background.
Background is the landscape of holistic past experience that supports an agent’s
performance. Metaphysics provides one way to reach the background: through the beingin-the-world. The rich background is fully compatible with the being–in-the-world of a
brain in a vat. Background is thus presented in several steps of increasingly wider
environments: starting with local, then moving to global, and then embracing the
transglobal ones.
1. Local background environment.
Background provides testimony about holistic and rich past encounters of cognizer with
the world, it is the world’s echo or supportive trace in cognizer’s experience. Background
mode of giveness is non-occurrent and dispositional. Metaphysics offers one way to enter
into the topics of the background which transgresses its local conception.
What is the background? Here is one example that may come to mind. If you
compete for a job, people will be eager to find out about your background and check it
out. If you wish to employ yourself as a medical doctor, they will look for your past
experiences of dealing with patients, and for you expertise in some specific area that
employers would like you to work in. One of the most important things at issue will be
your background: from your school and scholarly accomplishments (Where did you
study? What were your school grades and marks? What were your eventual achievements
in research related to the area?), to your past employments (Did you already work in a
similarly specialized environment? How similar was that environment to the one you
would work in now? For how long did you work there?), and finally including your
reputation (What do people say about your accomplishments? How do they judge your
reliability? Were there any complaints? The opinion of referees in their recommendation
letters is important at this point.). Finding out what your background is in a certain area
extends through several dimensions according to which your expertise and past
experiences are valued. One passes a judgment about someone’s expertise or background
in a specific area. But also the experts’ own expertise in a certain area consists in his
falling of appropriate judgments, in his ability or disposition to do so.
Checking someone’s background in a certain area is not a simple matter. It
succeeds through several dimensions of involvement. These dimensions point out the
background’s lack of transparency. Background cannot be determined by some
prescribed set of rules in an exceptionless and algorithmically ordered manner. It is just
too wide and rich for that. Rather, the judgment of background expertise is a more typical
way of how to approach it. On many occasions, an expert will not be able to spell out in
an explicit and systematic manner the background that allows him to act as an expert.
1
Many times, he will use narrative form in order to convey the idea. But he will certainly
know how to do things. An expert’s skill is on the side of knowing-how and not so much
necessarily on the side of knowing-that. Sometimes, an expert will judge somebody’s
background by small things that disclose the relation to a larger landscape. The way I
clumsily hold things in my hand will tell a mechanic at a glance that I am not one of his
peers, that the background in that area is practically nonexistent for my case. A cook will
recognize by my small inappropriate gestures that I am not really an expert in the area.
And I will myself immediately recognize that the mentioned cook is not a philosopher:
his tiny remark following my question suffices me to know that.
Experts are thus judged in respect to their background. Despite that this
background gives the basis for an immediate recognition in most cases, there are no rules
really that would determine in an exceptionless manner what the background really is or
how to systematically and flawlessly evaluate it. But despite the absence of such a kind of
systematizing the background proves to be very effective as the guide for us how to
accomplish things.
The background that was considered up till now is related to the expertise. One
becomes an expert through one’s engagement into a specific field, so it seems, and this
succeeds by the restriction posed upon trying to be efficient in all possible directions. If
one is a real good medical doctor, one can be perhaps a good cook as well, but a range of
further areas where the expertise is required will be probably closed for him at some
point. There is a comparatively low limit to the number of fields in one’s expertise. In
this sense we talk about local background where local environments are involved, such as
environments related to the medical practice or to cooking.
There is the testimony of local backgrounds in an expert’s practice. One does not
become an excellent cook in a day or two. Of course, some people are born with lucky
disposition to succeed in a certain area. But usually, a long and repeated period of
practical engagement is nevertheless and additionally needed for someone to become a
good cook. There may have been several trials and errors in the past, and this now
practically prevents further errors to happen at all. A long period of experience has settled
into someone’s cognitive system. And this has led to the presence of dispositional
knowledge by the usage of which one is able to react momentarily and appropriately to a
given situation. She cooks so skillfully and effortlessly. But this would be impossible
without the well settled traces of her past experience supporting her present activities.
A good cook, though, is many times not just characterized by her local
knowledge. She is so good because she really considers her activity to be important for
her life: her cooking engagement is actually her whole world, so to speak. And indeed, a
professional will be so skilled in her environment also because in perfecting her job she
uses experiences from other areas, in a practical inductive manner. The local environment
really does function, so it seems, because of the global environment in which it happens
and in respect to which the agent is not immune at all. A good background in an area
provides the testimony of cognizer’s rich and holistic encounters not just with this
restricted area, but in a wider sense with the whole world.
Background is not explicitly there in the occurrent experience, but it certainly
supports the occurrent experience, in an unmistaken dispositional manner. From a wider
perspective the background is an echo or trace of cognizer’s experience with the world.
2
A look at the background leads us from the local areas of expertise to the global
areas of the whole world figuring as the real thing that actually provides support. But if
the world is involved, we must be dealing with the metaphysical entrance into the topics
of the background.
2. Global background environment
The rich metaphysical background is that of the being-in-the-world. Such a background
enables intentional relations, among other things. Global background environment has
priority over local background environment.
It seems appropriate to call the world the global background environment, as
opposed to the local background environment in some area. It turns out that local
background is embedded into global environment.
The expertise of cooking cannot succeed without an agent collecting over certain
stretch of time background skills and dispositional knowledge that helps her exercising
quite a complex job in an effortless and natural manner. But that specific background
backing up the cooking expertise is actually only functioning if it is sustained by the
entire experience of an agent, if there is the support of her whole experiential world. A
small thought experiment may be helpful here, a form of which will continue to be used
in what follows. Try to imagine that you have an excellent background as a cook, but that
this restricted area is the only background support of your experiences that is in your
power. There is a good chance that you cannot even imagine then how such a restricted
local background as that of cooking would be possible or even effective without the
wider background. This is perhaps a sufficient preliminary proof that helps to realize how
the entire and global experience is actually a precondition for more restricted experiences
and for their backgrounds to get off the ground.
This is also the way in which the rich metaphysical global environment supported
background is recognized: as the holistic situation of being-in-the-world. An agent is
effective because of her engagement into the entire world that she inhabits. Notice that
the concept of being-in-the-world tends itself to be introduced by the area of expertise:
one is a skilful cook, and one is recognized as such in her community – normative
element – that finally leads to one’s appropriating the background of the world she is in.
(Heidegger 1927, Potrč 1993, Dreyfus 1991, Haugeland 1985). Background as being-inthe-world is also recognized as the very precondition of intentional relations (Searle
1983). Here is one way how to understand this. Imagine that you have a thought directed
at the cat, and thus you have an intentional act. Well, your cat directed intentional thought
certainly is different from your dog directed intentional act. But you cannot really have
any of those unless you have many other thoughts and experiences, and so unless you
possess holistic experience of being in the world. This holistic background of worldly
experience does really give you the very possibility of thinking about the cat. Because
you cannot even imagine having your cat thought without the experiential background of
the whole world, this seems to be another proof that global environment is the
precondition of local environment, and that therefore local background depends upon the
global background.
It is not hard to see that there is priority of the global background of being-in-theworld in respect to just local background proper to some specific area of expertise.
3
Global background is then the precondition of local backgrounds. Whereas being-in-theworld really supports and finally enables expertise, the local environment of expertise can
in many ways fail to lead to the full blooded being-in-the-world. Consider a recent pun:
iPhone has many specialized areas to tap on, but where is the touch screen that gets you a
life, or, in our terminology, the background of the world?
It seems to be established by now that being-in-the-world is the environment of
the ultimate background. Local background depends upon it, but it is far from sure that
the opposite direction works as well, according to which global background would
constitutively depend upon a local background or upon a sum of local backgrounds. We
came to the point where global worldly background overrides local background. We
seem to have reached the ultimate destination thereby. For what could be larger than the
world, indeed? The next section will argue against such conclusion, and it will claim that
there is something that is larger then the world.
3. Transglobal background environment
The rich background is fully compatible with being-in-the-world of a brain in a vat.
Compare rich and dynamical perceptual experiences. Transglobal background
environment has priority over global background environment. For the real experiential
background an appropriate functioning of transglobal environment is required. Richness
of the background does not lead away from determinacy of occurrent experiences. To the
contrary, it enables such determinacy. A thought experiment: imagine that contents occur
without the background. This is hard and even impossible to do, and it is in power for
you and as well for your brain in a vat duplicate. The real effective background
encompasses transglobal environment.
We start with the question that concluded the last section: What could be more
encompassing than the world? This seems to be a question without an easy answer, if
there should be an answer to it at all. And yet there is a positive answer that may be
derived from the earlier introduced environment proper to being-in-the- world. Being-inthe-world is actually an experiential category, although it is also a metaphysical category.
But experience is more far reaching than the metaphysical actuality. So one may try with
the thought that the experiential or perhaps evidential world is larger that the actual
metaphysical world, where the actual metaphysical world is understood in externalist
terms. For the experiential world encompasses the actual metaphysical world, as well as
several other possibilities besides to it.
Now, experiential world is compatible with the world of the brain in a vat. Both I
and my envatted replica share the same intentional and qualitative experiences, and
thereby we share the whole experiential world. So, more encompassing than the whole
actual world is the experiential world that I share with my brain in a vat duplicate. In fact,
brain in a vat does have the whole rich world. In respect to the actual metaphysical world
understood in externalist terms, brain in a vat has the environment that is additional to
what may be for us an actual world. And as this was already mentioned, the very
expression being-in-the-world has an experiential basis, for being-in-the-world is the
overall situation involving an experiencer, the Dasein if you will.
I first became attentive at the narrow rich and holistic dimension of experiential
world during my presentation of a theory of perception. Husserl (1973) starts his
4
description with static constellations, gradually adding complexity to it, in order to
advance in the direction of full blown dynamics involving kinesthetic interaction between
perceiver and between her environment. Besides to all of this, there is typical
phenomenological putting of the empirical stuff into parentheses, the bracketing.
Perception, finally, involves the whole complex world. And this being-in-the-world is
compatible with the narrow situation of Husserl’s perceptual twin, of his brain in a vat
duplicate. This one has the whole world as well, namely an expanded narrow experiential
world, with all its richness and dynamics. The rich background involved into perception
is fully compatible with being-in-the-world of a brain in a vat.
Now, our Husserl perceptual duplicate narrow twin has a transglobal
environment, because his environment is richer than just the environment of the
supposedly actual world involving the original perceiving Husserl. Transglobal
background environment has priority over global background environment. In order that
the real experiential background can function at all transglobal environment is a
requirement. Transglobal dimension, well understood, is provided by the skeptical
scenario.
As we started with discussion of background proper to experts, the impression
was that these experts obtained their focusing success by excluding a lot of environment.
This may be true to some extent. But again, there is a lesson now in the offing, according
to which the richness of the background does not lead away from determinacy of
occurrent experiences. To the contrary, it enables such determinacy. (Horgan and Graham
in press) Only if you have the whole rich world, and additionally a rich world of
experiences (transglobal environment with modal potential), you really become able to
get focused at things. The richness of the background, and the richness and dynamics of
transglobal environment supported background leads to determinacy of single
experiences and to their focusing.
A thought experiment of the now known kind may again help our understanding.
Imagine, if you can, that some content does occur without the background. Is it possible
for you, say, to concentrate at the cat, even to represent to yourself a cat, without that
there would exist any background information in your cognitive system about cats
supporting this representation, and without any further background at all? The bet is that
this is hard and even impossible to do. You will find traces and overwhelming support of
the background in each intentional representational focus. This is a proof that the
background is necessary for the very possibility of intentional directedness. And now this
experiential stuff, the real effective background, encompasses transglobal environment. It
is transglobal because it goes over and above the global actual metaphysical world. But in
this transcending of the actual may be the real importance of the background. So
background is then not just the depository of past experiences; it is even more a
dynamical rich projection that enables an agent to perform her tasks.
B. Morphological Content
Morphological content is the kind of cognitive content that is not recognized by the
classical computational models of mind. It came upon the stage with the model of
Dynamical Cognition (Horgan and Tienson 1996, Potrč 1999) and has later begun to be
recognized as an important point to focus in order to appropriately understand several
areas. In this section a quick glance at the morphological content is given, including the
5
circumstances that led the model of Dynamical Cognition to appropriate it. In the next
section, some applications of morphological content are considered. In the last section
then, some vicinities and differences between the background and between the
morphological content are pointed out.
1. Morphological content.
Morphological content is dispositionally entrenched in the weights of a multidimensional cognitive landscape. It came upon the stage with the model of Dynamical
Cognition that was elaborated as a response to the failure of classical computational
model of mind to provide an appropriate treatment of the frame problem. This needs
some clarification.
In the first approach, one may characterize morphological content as something
that is constitutively entrenched into the background of the cognitive system, without that
it would be explicitly available to the cognizer. It is not the content of the pun, but the
background that helps you to get the pun. It is not the meaning of your words, but the
linguistic conditions that color your specific pronunciation. Although you can sometimes
get the grip over your accent, most of the time you don’t, and your intonation will be
there anyway, showing where you came from, geographically, regionally, professionally,
revealing the group of people you mostly frequent and the environment where you find
yourself at the moment. Obviously morphological content has something to do with the
background, with the cognitive background.
2. Dynamical Cognition model of mind came upon the stage as a reply to the question
how to improve/substitute classical computational model of mind so that it will have a
chance to overcome its difficulties in tackling the frame problem.
Morphological content came around in the model of Dynamical Cognition, a
model of mind that is inspired by (but not identical to) connectionist networks. In
difference to the classical computational model of mind that is characterized by discrete
(semantically well delimited) symbols and with tractable computational rule governed
manipulation of these symbols, connectionist computational models rather offer
distributed representations (i.e. representations stretching over a network of neuron-like
nodes) and dynamical learning inspired establishing of relations between these
representations. The information that helps effectuating transitions between total
cognitive states resides “in the weights” of a multi-dimensional virtual semantical
landscape. There is the place for morphological content that both gives material to
representation-building and for the dynamical transitions that happen between these
representations. Dynamical Cognition model – in order to repeat this – is not identical to
any of existing connectionist models, it is just inspired by them. Contrary to these, it tries
to answer to the problems of higher cognition, i.e. belief fixation, which is often criticized
as a weak point of connectionist accounts.
In opposition to connectionist models the classical computational model of mind
exactly tries to deliver an account of representations that builds upon higher cognition
and therefore an account of belief fixation. But as the main proponent of the classical
computational model of mind Fodor continues to stress for some time now, no viable
account of belief fixation is even remotely in sight. The reason is given in his parallel
between belief fixation and scientific confirmation, “the non-demonstrative fixation of
6
belief in science” (Fodor 1983: 104), which both have characteristics of being isotropic
and Quinean. Here are a couple of quotes:
“By saying that confirmation is isotropic, I mean that the facts relevant to the
confirmation of a scientific hypothesis may be drawn from anywhere in the field of
previously established empirical (or, of course, demonstrative) truths. Crudely:
everything that the scientist knows is, in principle, relevant to determining what else he
ought to believe” (Fodor 1983: 105).
“By saying that scientific confirmation is Quinean, I mean that the degree of confirmation
assigned to any given hypothesis is sensitive to properties of the entire belief system: as it
were, the shape of our whole science bears on the epistemic status of each scientific
hypothesis” (Fodor 1983: 107)
“Consider the situation in the philosophy of science, where we can see the issues about
fixation of belief writ large. Here an interesting contrast is between deductive logic – the
history of which is, surely, one of the great success stories of human history – and
confirmation theory which, by fairly general consensus, is a field that mostly does not
exist. My point is that this asymmetry, too, is likely no accident. Deductive logic is a
theory of validity, and validity is a local property of sentences. Roughly, the idea is that
the validity of a sentence is determined given a specification of its logical form, and the
logical form of a sentence is determined given a specification of its vocabulary and
syntax. In this respect, the level of validity contrasts starkly with the level of
confirmation, since the latter is highly sensitive to global properties of belief systems.
The problem in both cases is to get the structure of the entire belief system to bear on
individual occasions of belief fixation. We have, to put it bluntly, no computational
mechanisms that show us how to do this, and we have no idea how such formalisms
might be developed. In this respect, cognitive science hasn’t even started; we are literally
no farther advanced than we were in the darkest days of behaviorism.” (Fodor 1983: 128)
“The failure of artificial intelligence to produce successful simulations of routine
common sense cognitive competence is notorious, not to say scandalous. We still don’t
have the fabled machine that can make breakfast without burning down the house; or the
one that can translate everyday English into everyday Italian; or the one that can
summarize texts; or even the one that can learn anything much except statistical
generalizations. It does seem to me that there’s pattern to the failures. Because of the
context sensitivity of many parameters of quotidian abductive inferences, there is
typically no way to delimit a priori the considerations that may be relevant to assessing
them. In fact, there’s a familiar dilemma. Reliable induction may require, in the limit, that
the whole background of epistemic commitments be somehow brought to bear in
planning and belief fixation. But feasible abduction requires, in practice, that no more
than a small subset of even the relevant background beliefs is actually consulted. How to
make abductive inferences that are both reliable and feasible in what they call in AI the
frame problem? In the general case, it appears that the properties of a representation that
determine its causal-cum-inferential role, though they may be exhaustively syntactic,
needn’t be either local or insensitive to context. As things now stand, Classical
7
architectures know of no reliable way to recognize such properties short of exhaustive
searches of the background of epistemic commitments. I think that’s why our robots
don’t work.” (Fodor 2001: 37-8)
These quotes present wise words from the founder of classical computational
model of mind, the one who established the hypothesis called Language of Thought
(proposing discrete symbols and tractable rule governed computation over them). They
realize that computational model just will not work for such a basic account as that of
belief fixation, for reasons of isotropic and Quinean characteristic of belief system. Such
a system is hopelessly holistic, and because of this it is incapable to account for belief
fixation. But finding out which belief should come at the stage is actually knowing which
belief is relevant for the situation at hand. And question about relevance is plaguing
classical computational model of mind in the form of the so called frame problem: the
problem how to put a frame or how to limit computations in order that the appropriate
belief would come to attention of the cognitive system. This just is not feasible by the
means that are available to the classical computational model of mind. From this point of
view, Dynamical Cognition model of mind came upon the stage as a reply to the question
how to improve/substitute classical computational model of mind so that it will have a
chance to overcome its difficulties in tackling the frame problem. Frame problem consists
in inability to put a frame upon the amount/quality of computation so that the relevance is
obtained.
3. Frame problem targets relevance. Classical model of mind has difficulty with this, in
opposition to human cognizers that mostly haven’t.
Frame problem or problem how to appropriately fix beliefs in a holistic (isotropic
and Quinean) cognitive system targets relevance. General exceptionless rules for
manipulation of symbols just cannot do this in a feasible way in real time and in
sufficiently restricted number of steps. But human cognizers, to the contrary, do not have
any such big problems with belief fixation and thus they mainly attain relevance in an
effortless manner.
4. So a new model is needed with the following desiderata: retain representations and
structure, argue against atomism of representations and against tractability of processes
succeeding over representations.
An appropriate model of mind will thus need to be attentive at the actual
performance of cognizers, in that it will account for the holistic nature of their belief
fixation system. It will have to abandon atomistic representations and tractable processes
succeeding over these, in order to avoid the path that lead to the quandary of the frame
problem about how to achieve appropriate belief fixation. It seems though that one will
still need to retain representations and their structure, a kind of Language of Thought, just
without the features that lead to the frame problem. How to do this?
One may look at levels of description in classicism and in the alternative
Dynamical Cognition framework (following Marr’s proposal). At the level of
hardwiring/wetwiring description of the system, there will not be any really important
differences. At the higher level of description there are occurrent total cognitive states of
the system (beliefs, or representations). Here, the difference will be that classicism will
8
require, as we already announced, tractable processes of transitions over those total
cognitive states, whereas the model of Dynamical Cognition will not require any of these.
In fact, the bulk of action succeeds at the middle level of the cognitive system
description. In classicism, there are tractable algorithmic procedures guiding the
occurrent total cognitive states’ occurrence at the higher cognition descriptive level. They
are themselves not occurrent. In the Dynamical Cognition model of mind, transitions are
effectuated by settling of the cognitive system in the inclines at the multi-dimensional
virtual landscape of information processing. So there are no tractable processes guiding
total cognitive state positioning that would exist at the middle level of cognitive system
description.
5. Mathematical dynamic system description (not by tractable rules).
Middle level of cognitive system description is thus crucial for understanding of the
alternative model of Dynamical Cognition. Transitions do not depend upon algorithmic
procedures, but on a rich multi-dimensional landscape of potential transitions. This
follows mathematical description of potentialities that is characteristic for connectionist
systems. In such a potential space the incoming information will try to settle into inclines
upon the multi-dimensional landscape, thereby following settling “in the weights” of such
information. There succeeds an intertwining kind of both semantic and transition
inducing activity upon such landscape.
6. Relevance in cognizer processing of information comes from the background, from the
morphological content.
Relevance comes easy in such a system, through settling into appropriate position,
through automatically succeeding process. The potential multi dimensional landscape
may be seen as the background. In fact, there is a lot of information available in it,
waiting in a dispositional manner for new inputs and their guidance. The background of
the potential multi-dimensional landscape may be called morphological content.
7. Morphological content and particularist normativity.
It is not hard to see that the model of Dynamical Cognition, and the morphological
content that supports its causal efficiency, is not guided by exceptionless general rules
that would determine total cognitive states’ transitions, as the classical computational
model of mind proposed. Rather, the normativity that falls off the Dynamical Cognition
system is particularist, which means that at most there must be generalities with
ineliminable exceptions or ceteris paribus clauses. This is then a start about how to reply
to the holistic Quinean and isotropic features of belief fixation in cognitive systems.
C. Applications of Morphological Content.
1. Cognition and morphological content can be summarized at this stage, with their role
for several areas.
Now we have a rough idea of the morphological content. It comes as a causally
effective kind of background of the cognitive system, at its middle level of description.
The causal effectivity is exercised in respect to the total cognitive states’ transition at the
higher level of description. But the real action succeeds at the middle level of description,
9
in a holistic multi-dimensional potential mathematically characterized landscape, with the
content residing in the weights upon the potential landscape’s inclines.
Anyway, morphological content seems to be a feature of cognition that is
effective in such areas as that of belief fixation, respecting holistic, Quinean and isotropic
nature of the system.
But as cognition is involved into several things that humans do, morphological
content may well be important for several areas of human engagement. Some of these
will be briefly pointed out or mentioned in what follows.
2. Epistemology: morphological content and justification (an empirical a priori approach,
evidentialism and morphological content).
One important area of human engagement is knowledge. How much do people
know? Do they know anything at all? Well, an answer would be that they have chance to
know if they are justified in the beliefs they hold. So, belief fixation and its nature is
important. If belief fixation succeeds via morphological content (and not by tractable
rules leading over representations), then a different view of knowledge will be available,
as compared to the knowledge that requires fixation at the explicitly occurrent beliefs in
what may be called epistemologist proto-theory.
Once as morphological content is admitted to lead belief fixation, one may try an
empirically informed a priori approach, where one determines by thought experimental
variation which conditions are appropriate to lead to justification of belief. It may turn
out that these conditions are evidentialist (Horgan and Potrč in press) even if one starts
with reliabilist approach and follows its logic.
3. Moral judgment. Morphological content gives appropriate place to general principles:
a new perspective in relation to particularist theses. Generalism and particularism are
compatible by the positive indecision thesis.
Another important area where morphological content has an impact is that of
judgment and specifically that of moral judgment. Judgments succeed by intuition, and
morphological content certainly is more appropriate to account for the basis of intuition
as are classical computational models. Tendencies of belief and judgment forming are
easily accommodated by the recourse to the morphological content.
Although morphological content naturally tends towards particularist normativity,
as was already mentioned, in opposition to general exceptionless rules guided processes,
it also is able to give a new perspective in respect to generalist theses and their
functioning (Horgan and Timmons in press), by way of ineliminable exceptions.
As in several other (mostly thinly characterized) areas where opposite concepts
appear, the dispute between particularism and generalism should stay in positive
indecision.
4. Particularist semantic normativity and morphological content.
An area of morphological content’s link is explanation of the semantics. In this respect,
one can adopt the thesis of particularist semantic normativity (Horgan and Potrč in press
a), where the important point is that of particularist projection and not that of generalist
projection. Appropriateness of such approach may be seen if compared with the behavior
of semantic klutz that fails to grasp relations that we people usually easily do. The basis
10
is that we easily deal with holistic, Quinean and isotropic characterized systems, whereas
klutz tries to hold to his generalist opinions.
5. Particularist epistemic normativity and morphological content.
Because morphological content constitutively builds upon the holism of cognitive system
and of effortless attaining of relevance of belief fixation upon this basis, there is no
wonder that particularist normativity also is forthcoming in pursuing epistemic goals.
This actually joins the point 2. above.
6. Other prospective areas of application for morphological content.
It is not hard to see that morphological content has in similar manner important potential
impact upon other areas related to belief fixation. These several areas merit to be pointed
out and elaborated.
The rationale is that the morphological content comes from Dynamical Cognition
model of mind, and that this model promises to follow the real holistic complexity of
belief fixation on the basis of which we humans function. And several areas of our
engagement should then be accounted for in this manner.
D. Differences and Vicinities between Background and Morphological Content.
1. Differences between background and morphological content. The beginning is that the
background is closer to the metaphysical story, whereas morphological content gets
linked to the story involving cognition. This may be ultimately understood so that the
morphological content forms a sub-area of the background.
As background and morphological content present two different concepts, the first
presumption is that this difference on the side of concepts also involves difference on the
side of what they cover. We will start with the lesson that we have gathered up till now.
Background is related to the world that one is immersed in, in which one acts. It may then
be called the being-in-the-world. And as the world is involved, we have to do with
something metaphysical. On the other hand, there does not seem to exist anything really
metaphysically grounded in a similar sense on the side of the morphological content.
Morphological content is namely a sub-product of an investigation in the nature of
models of mind, and so it has to be primarily of cognitive nature. One may well argue
that cognition is in the world. But it seems that cognition is only a part of the world,
besides to other items persisting in it. So the relation between background and between
morphological content seems to be clear from this side as well: it is subordination or
dependency relation. Cognition depends upon the world, and so morphological content
depends upon the world as well. Morphological content, thus, forms a sub-area of the
background. It is a sub-area of the cognitive in an all-encompassing area of the
metaphysical. This sub-area may be presented in the world in a scattered manner, but this
does not change the above basic relation.
2. The presupposition of this difference supporting the above interpretation is that the
metaphysical takes it over cognition. And the metaphysical is understood as bound to
externalism. So the interpretation of morphological content as a subset of the background
presupposes externalist interpretation of the metaphysical and of the background.
11
The difference between the background and between the morphological content is
that of the metaphysical overwhelming world and the region of cognition that is a part of
the metaphysical constitution of this world. So their relation as presented above is one of
sub-ordination: the cognitive is subordinated in respect to the worldly or to the
metaphysical. So the metaphysical takes it over cognition, it is assigned so to stay in a
primary place.
But just what is the basis for assigning a place of primary importance to the world
as a metaphysical founding place? It is, as it is argued here, the presupposition of
externalism: that there exists an external and metaphysically pervasive world. In relation
to this world, anything cognitive can only be in relation of dependence. Notice that the
cognitive is understood as something internal, and thus as opposed to or subordinated to
externalism, by this fact. It is perhaps not easy to think about cognition being primary,
which will be attempted in what follows. But it is certainly easy to think about the world
as being primary. This is an externalist presupposition that is part of common sense.
Common sense should have its place recognized. That would be ultimately possible even
with the narrow interpretation, but it requires some dialectical skill.
3. An externalist interpretation of the background is not the only one that is possible
however, and chances are that it is wrong. This is demonstrated with the metaphysical
interpretation of background as the being-in-the-world, and with compatibility of beingin-the-world with the situation of the brain in a vat. Just like yourself, your brain in a vat
duplicate has a rich and dynamical world.
An externalist interpretation is not the only that is possible. Background may not
be understood as the external world related only. And in fact, this also seems to be the
case indeed. One may think about the background as something in which cognition is
involved. If one thinks about it, it may well be sensible to think that being-in-the-world is
not really a metaphysical or primarily an externalist dependent feature. The very
expression shows that it is rather a matter of relation of organism (a Dasein normally) to
the world. So it is not as metaphysically substantive then as it seems to be, and it is rather
relative. So an externalist interpretation of the background may turn out to be wrong.
Here is another supportive story in this direction. Being-in-the-world happens to
be not something you are engaged in, but also something where your duplicate the brain
in a vat is engaged in. Brain in a vat has a whole rich and dynamical experiential world –
just like you do – without thereby possessing the external world which you are supposed
to inhabit. Your brain in a vat duplicate still is engaged into, and is a part of being-in-theworld.
4. But if being-in-the-world is compatible with the situation of your brain in a vat
duplicate, then the being-in-the-world metaphysical interpretation is compatible with its
cognitive interpretation. There is no externalist support for being-in-the-world of a brain
in a vat, and so cognition is the only player.
Now, being-in-the-world seems to be fitting to your brain in a vat duplicate
situation, just as it does fir into your situation. But your brain in a vat duplicate, in
opposition to yourself, does not have any external world, as you are supposed to.
Certainly though the brain in a vat has experiential life, so that in a sense we can say that
his cognitive world depends upon his cognition. Actually, brain in a vat’s world is
12
identical to the very rich and complex processes succeeding in his cognition. So being-inthe-world of the brain in a vat is compatible with its cognitive interpretation. As there is
no external support of brain in a vat being-in-the-world situation, cognition stays the only
game.
5. The thesis is that externalism is false for either the background or for the
morphological content. We have seen that background really needs to be interpreted
internally and not externally as we had to expand plausible interpretation of the
background to cover transglobal environment. Thereby, we made background narrow.
Now, we have started with the interpretation of dominant role of externalism as
against cognitive internalist processes, such as these are to be found in the brain in a vat
situation. But this was put under question once as externalism seems to be false not just
for morphological content but also for the background: the interpretation of the
background as being-in-the-world was found to be constitutively dependent upon
relations of experience and thus upon cognitive relations.
Now we can remember our first encounter with the background. We first tried to
explain it with the help of local (expert) environments. But we found out that local
environments of the background really depend upon the global ones (being-in-the-world
was introduced at this stage). And finally we had to extend these environments to
transglobal ones, involving the being-in-the-world of the brain in a vat – if the
background would really need to be plausibly interpreted. But this is exactly the result
that we have reached now in a slightly different manner. So even at the beginning when
we have introduced background it turned out that its interpretation really needs to be
narrow. This is of course opposed to its externalist interpretation.
6. Now, morphological content is best interpreted in narrow manner as well, because it
falls out off the trial to deliver a plausible model of mind.
Now that we have introduced the term ‘narrow’, we can take a look at the
morphological content. We can immediately recognize that it is narrow as well. It is a
product of dealing with the constitution of cognition, and namely with the part of
cognition that is positioned quite remotely from the externalist influences. Perhaps one
can interpret usual intentional contents such as ‘cat’ primarily in an externalist manner.
But this is certainly not the case with the morphological content, which delivers the
distant but relevant echo of the past and of the anticipated experiences.
It should suffice finally to claim that morphological content has a natural narrow
interpretation already by the fact that it is a by-product of the work effectuated upon a
model of mind.
7. So, by their plausible narrow interpretation the background and the morphological
content may be taken as identical. Weaker interpretation: they may be conditionally taken
as identical. Stronger interpretation: they are identical.
By their plausible narrow interpretations – they both actually oppose externalist
approaches – background and morphological content may now be taken as identical.
Recall that the difference between the two hanged upon the presupposition that
the background is naturally interpreted as externalist, whereas this is not the case with the
morphological content. Now we have demonstrated that background is not externalist
13
either, if it is interpreted as being-in-the-world, but this last one is an experiential, and
thus not primarily a metaphysical category.
The weaker interpretation is that the background and morphological content may
be identical. So it would still be possible that background is somehow wider. We do not
think that this is the case, and will give some reasons in a moment, in reply to a possible
objection.
The stronger interpretation is that the background and the morphological content
are identical indeed. But this needs an answer to the worry that the world related matter
of being-in-the-world is not as substantial as it seems, in respect to the morphological
content. This will be addressed as well in the reply to the objection. Let us come quickly
to a couple of other points, supporting the above claim.
8. Vicinities, positive: Why is identity interpretation plausible? Both background and
morphological content are compatible with cognition and with the experiential world.
They are the basic, relevant part of the original immersing of cognizer into the world.
Relevance becomes transparent through narrowness.
We came from the difference between the background and morphological content
to their vicinity. Identity relation certainly makes them close. And they are close because
both of them are compatible with interpretation bringing them in accord with cognition
and with the experiential world. At least it does not sound plausible that morphological
content could have been interpreted externalistically. And we made a case for internalist
interpretation of the background.
Besides to this, both the background and the morphological content present the
basic part of cognizer’s engagement into his (narrow) world, where relevance is provided
in an automatic and reflexive manner. The relevance (remember the frame problem), we
think, becomes transparent through the narrow interpretation.
9. Vicinities, negative: Reasons that background and morphological content are rarely
explicitly thematized is that the usual generalist, atomistic and tractable methods of
explanation exclude them from consideration. An example: proto-theory of epistemic
justification is generalist and not attentive at the background/morphological content
support for justification, despite that this one is crucial for relevance. Particularist
(beautiful, i.e. relevant) patterns are needed, not generalist patterns. One kind of such
approach: positive indecision.
There are also negative vicinities between the background and morphological
content. They are both very rarely explicitly thematized, despite of their pervsasive
presence and despite to the fact that they somehow effortlessly bring the relevance with
them. The reason for this is that the usual forms of explanation rely upon generalist,
atomistic and tractable methods. These methods deal with general rules of presumably
exceptionless form, which first try to pinpoint atomistic contents and then deal with
tractable rules that operate over these. Needless to say that all of this is not compatible
with the nature of the background or of the morphological content. Explicit relevance is
searched through the mentioned means, and these are incompatible with the
morphological background’s effortlessly obtained relevance. Many times generalist
patterns are taken as the only relevant ones. But it turns out that the real relevance resides
in the particular unique patterns. Relevance is not in the repetitive generalist pattern; it
14
resides in the beauty that cannot be subsumed under generalities. The approach to this
matter however stays in a positive indecision, where a combination of generalism and
particularism wins the day, with the dominating influence of the last one.
10. Objection: But the world as the background contains entities, events – which is not
the case for the morphological content. So they cannot be identical. Background is still on
the side of the metaphysics, whereas morphological content (without such entities and
events) is really just a cognitive echo of the world.
Here is a possible objection to the above claim about identity between the
background and morphological content: Whatever the background is, it still has to be
somehow related to the world. But as far as this holds, then the background is
nevertheless on the side of metaphysics for the reason that it involves such matters as
entities and events. But this does not seem to be the case with the morphological content:
this one has nothing to do with the world in a direct manner, perhaps it is just a cognitive
echo of the world, but nothing more substantial (nothing such as in the case of the
background is involved).
11. Answer to the objection: The world as the background of being-in-the-world is not
the real metaphysical externalist or substantialist thing. It is the background, as its name
tells. Our position in the world is given to us with exactly what morphological content
offers. So background and morphological content may be understood as identical.
An answer to the above objection that we propose is as follows. Notice first that
the world involved into the background, namely the being-in-the-world, is not a real
externalist metaphysical thing, and that it is not really externalist, as it is presupposed
once one deals with substantive entities and events. The background, just as its name
says, is the background, indeed. It is the echo of the world itself. Entities and events do
not appear in it as substantial external stuff, but just as an experiential, cognitive echo.
And this is just what morphological content does as well. So the background and the
morphological content may be understood as identical after all.
References
H. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, MIT Press (1991).
J. Fodor, Modularity of Mind, MIT Press (1983).
J. Fodor, Why Mind Doesn’t Work That Way, MIT Press (2001).
A. Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition. Cambridge: Harvard UP (1986).
J. Haugeland, Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea, MIT Press (1985).
M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Max Niemeyer (1927).
D. Henderson and T. Horgan, “Some Ins and Outs of Transglobal Reliabilism,” in S.
Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, in press a.
D. Henderson and T. Horgan, Terry, A Priori Naturalized Epistemology: At the Interface
of Cognitive Science and Conceptual Analysis, in press.
T. Horgan and G. Graham, “Phenomenal Intentionality and Content Determinacy”, in
press.
T. Horgan and U. Kriegel, “Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind”, in
press.
15
T. Horgan and M. Potrč, “Particularist Semantic Normativity,” Acta Analytica 21 (2006),
45-61.
T. Horgan and M. Potrč, “Abundant Truth in an Austere World”, in P. Greenough and M.
Lynch (eds.) Truth and Realism, Oxford (2006), 137-161.
T. Horgan and M. Potrč, Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal
Ontology, MIT Press (2008).
T. Horgan and M. Potrč, “Contextual Semantics and Particularist Normativity,” in M.
Lance, M. Potrč and V. Strahovnik (eds.), Challenging Moral Particularism, Routledge,
in press a.
T. Horgan and M. Potrč, “Transglobal Evidentialism-Reliabilism”, in press.
T. Horgan and J. Tienson, Connectionism and Philosophy of Psychology, MIT Press
(1996).
T. Horgan, J. Tienson, and G. Graham, “Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a
Vat,” in R. Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge, de Gruyter (2004), 297-317.
T. Horgan and M. Timmons, “Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral
Judgment”, in press.
E. Husserl, Ding und Raum, Martinus Nijhoff (1973).
M. Potrč, Dinamična filozofija, ZIFF (2004).
M. Potrč, “From Chinese Room to Dasein in a Vat”, in Čarnijev zbornik, ZIFF (1998),
459-67.
M. Potrč, “Justification Having and Morphological Content,” Acta Analytica 15 (2000),
151-173.
M. Potrč, “Morphological Content” in Potrč, M. (ed.) Connectionism and the Philosophy
of Psychology, Acta Analytica 22 (1999), 133-49.
M. Potrč, Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, Röll (1993).
M. Potrč, “Blobjectivist Monism. Repulsive Monism: One Dynamic BLOB and no
Principles”, in A. Bächli and K. Petrus (eds.) Monism, Ontos (2003), 125-55.
M. Potrč, S. Sajama and V. Strahovnik, “Skeptical Justification”, in press.
J. Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge (1983).
16