Name: ___________________ Class: __________________ Date: _____________
Reliability Type 3: Can Source B be trusted as an indication of Hitler’s foreign
policy aims?
Source B cannot be trusted as an indication of Hitler’s foreign policy aims,
even though Sources A, C and D reinforce this viewpoint. (Direct answer)
Source B says that the Munich Agreement that was signed by Britain and
Germany had effectively resolved the issue of the Sudentenland. This is reinforced
by Source A, where Hitler states that “the Sudentenland is the last problem that must
be solved” and that “it is the last territorial claim which (he has) to make in Europe.”
Thus the implication is that since the issue had been resolved, through the signing of
the Munich Agreement, Hitler would thus stop his expansionary foreign policy.
Source C also assumes that Source B can be trusted as an indication of Hitler’s
foreign policy, and gives credit to Chamberlain for successfully satisfying Hitler’s
aims, and for averting war. Thus Source A and C both reinforce the point that Source
B can be trusted. (Cross-reference to other sources. Can group sources
together e.g. A and C)
Source B also says that the Munich Agreement was an indication of Britain
and Germany’s commitment to assuring “the peace of Europe” through mutual
consultation rather than conflict. This is also reinforced in Source D which says that it
is in the interest of both nations to have good relations with one another, and points
to the signing of “the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as the symbolic desire” of
Britain and Germany “never to go to war with one another again.” Source D can be
taken as a way of confirming the intentions of Britain and Germany, as it illustrates
the concrete efforts taken to build on the good will between the two countries as a
result of the Munich Agreement. (Cross-reference to other sources.)
However, despite the optimistic readings given by all the sources, I know from
my contextual knowledge that Source B cannot be trusted as an indication of Hitler’s
foreign policy as the background information reveals that Hitler had led the
rearmaments programme since 1933 and expanded the military. Moreover, he made
an effort to develop the German Luffewaffe (air-force), which may be revealing of his
intentions to attack land that is further away from German boundaries, as it is not
necessary to build up a massive air force, if Hitler merely wanted to regain
neighbouring lands. Since his actions run counter to his word, therefore, Source B
cannot be trusted. (Cross-reference to contextual knowledge)
Moreover, Hitler’s commitment made in Source B contradicts his previously
stated aims of Lebensraum in the east as well as his desire to dismantle the Treaty of
Versailles. Both aims suggest that Poland was under threat, as the Polish Corridor
had separated Western and Eastern Prussia. Since Hitler made contradictory
statements, he cannot be trusted, and therefore Source B cannot be taken a serious
indication of his foreign policy aims. (Cross-reference to contextual knowledge)
Finally, Hitler had not kept to his previous statements on the matter of the
Sudenten Germans. Initially he had only asked for parts of Sudentenland with a
majority German population. However, prior to the Munich Conference, he had raised
his demands and now wanted the whole of the Sudentenland. This implies that
Hitler’s appetite was insatiable and that he was not contented with the gains that he
had achieved, but always wanted to bargain for more. Therefore Source B cannot be
taken as the final word on Hitler’s foreign policy aims, which my contextual
knowledge shows, was consistently expansionary despite Hitler’s attempts to placate
Britain and France. (Cross-reference to contextual knowledge)
The four sources also cannot be trusted as they all had agendas for
subscribing to the belief that the Munich Agreement can be taken as a strong
indication of Hitler’s foreign policy aims. Firstly, Source A was said by Hitler himself,
and his purpose was to alleviate the fears of the British and French and to make
them more likely to concede Sudentenland to Germany as a means of averting war.
That Sources C and D were published in the British newspapers suggest that these
newspapers, the Daily Express and Daily Sketch were for the policy of Appeasement,
and wanted to garner support for the policy and its advocate, Chamberlain, who was
heralded as a ‘victor’ in Source C. Hence, I have reason to believe that while
Chamberlain may have been serious about the Munich Agreement, Hitler had
entered into it in a deceitful manner, and had no intentions of keeping to his promises,
as seen from the lack of consistency between his actions and words and his
professed aims of destroying the Treaty of Versailles. (Purpose)
Therefore I can conclude that Source B cannot be trusted as an indication of
Hitler’s foreign policy even though all sources reinforce it, as my contextual
knowledge throws Hitler’s trustworthiness into doubt. (Conclusion)