FUNCTIONAL CONSTITUENCIES AND
REPRESENTATION
Professor Ian Scott Department of Political Science, University of Hong Kong
You have asked me to talk about functional
representation. I should say at the outset that I fully
endorse the critical views of the Electoral Reform
Society delegation on this issue. I believe - and I
shall seek to show - that functional constituencies
are inappropriate for Hong Kong now and that they
will result in further damaging what little credibility
are legitimacy the Basic law possesses.
Let me begin in the sombre fields of political
theory. The introduction of functional representation
usually indicates an attempt by an established, but
often shaky, regime to solve the problem of political
instability. Examples of functional representation
include Czarist Russia, the Weimar Republic in
Germany after the First World War and Mussolini's
Italy, none of them regimes particularly
characterized by popular legitimacy and all of them
destined to collapse. The more modern example of
the Slovenia Republic of Yugoslavia, cited in the
Electoral Reform Society's Report, does not inspire
any greater confidence.
The notion of functional representation is to
bring competing interests within the same
institutional forum in order to secure some degree of
compliance with central objectives. Very often it
represents a kind of bargain: the central authority
agrees to give up a portion of its decision-making
power - or at least a consultative voice - in exchange
for the leaders of the major interest groups
exercising social control over their members in the
interests of political stability. It very rarely works.
Interest groups use other means to pursue their
objectives. And leaders of interest groups cannot
usually exercise the degree of social control over
their members which the centre wants. The causes
of social unrest and political stability do not usually
lie in the relationship between the leaders and
followers of interest groups. They are more deeply
imbedded in the society, in the economy, and, most
critically, in the situation which brought on the need
for functional representation in the first place: the
declining legitimacy of the government.
In Hong Kong, the introduction of functional
constituencies was intended to serve two purposes.
The first was to incorporate groups which had not
previously been well represented, such as labour, the
social services and some professions, in the hope
that by providing them with representation in the
Legislative Council, this would defuse the
possibility of external disturbances against the new
political order imposed by the Sino-British
agreement. The second was to legitimize elites
which had already been incorporated informally into
those aspects of the decision-making process which
concerned them. These economic and professional
elites are provided with a haven in the functional
constituencies and are grossly over-represented as a
consequence. Two of my colleagues in the
Department of Political Science at the University of
Hong Kong have calculated that professionals and
managers comprise 11.95 per cent of Hong Kong's
workforce but have 85.7 per cent of functional
constituency seats. The proposed additional
constituencies in 1991 will be in the areas of
engineering,
tourism,
financial
services,
construction and real estates and banks and will
further favourably increase the representation of
professional groups and the business and finance
sector at the expense of other groups in the society.
These functional groupings are not even
representative of the groups in our society, let alone
the population at large. What is even more ludicrous
is that they will provide the 75% of the electors for
the Chief Executive of the Special Administrative
Region, one means by which the Chinese
government through a 'united front' strategy could
directly control the territory after 1997.
There are four principles - and, to my mind,
convincing
charges
against
functional
representation as a system of representation. The
first is that it subverts the position of the
representative in a democratic system. The second is
that it distorts the true preferences of the electorate.
The third is that creates an artificial division
between those who are granted functional
representation and those who are not. And, fourth,
that the mechanisms required to administer fair
elections in functional constituencies are impossibly
difficult to regulate. Let me examine these charges
in turn.
1. Functional representation as a System which
subverts the position of the representative
The position of a representative in a democratic
system has been clear for m my years. In 1734, John
Willis wrote:
'After we are chosen and have taken our seats in
this House, we have no longer any dependence on
our electors, at least in so far as regards our
behaviour here. Their whole power is devolved
upon us, and we are in every question that comes
before this House, to regard only the public good in
general, and to determine according to our own
judgements.'
Edmund Burke, in a more famous speech to the
electors of Bristol in 1791, made the same point and
it has remained a cornerstone of the democratic
process since then. Representatives take into
account the views of their constituents but they are
not bound by them. If their views are sufficiently out
of step with those of the electors, it is assumed that
they will be voted out of office at the next election.
Functional representation, however, at least
raises the possibility that a person elected is
conceived of not as a representative but as a
delegate who is bound by and who in turn exercises
some degree of social control over the functional
electorate. These are potentially conflicting roles.
Mr. McGregor can speak to his own case but the
issues which it raises affect every single functional
constituency. For the representative elected by direct
elections, there is no problem: he or she votes
according to their perception of the public good. For
the delegate from a functional constituency,
however, the moral dilemma is always there: should
sectional interests override the general public good?
2. Functional representation distorts general will
It follows from this argument that any legislature
made up of a mixture of functional delegates and
directly elected representations is unlikely to reflect
a proper mandate from the voters. The weight given
to functional delegates will adversely affect the role
which properly elected legislators can play. In our
own case, this is very serious indeed. The heavy
weighting given to functional constituencies in the
present arrangements was designed to entrench
existing elites. It is becoming clear, to my mind, that
these elites are losing support in the society. Come
September, should the functions constituencies
reflect a traditional and increasingly discredited
power structure and the directly elected members
represent another alternative view, there is no doubt
in my mind where the popular mandate will lie.
What legitimacy, then, will a delegate who is elected
by a few hundred members of a closed club have
when he rises to speak in a chamber which includes
representatives with popular mandates?
3.
Functional
representation
and
representation of functional interests
the
The only academic authority of any standing who
has given support to the notion of functional
representation is G.D.H. Cole who mentioned it in a
book on social theory in 1920. His views are now
discredited but he does make the interesting point
that, if we start from the notion of interest, we
should also accept that an elector may have many
interests. So the slogan becomes not 'one man one
vote' but 'one man, many votes'. This obviously
raises a problem of how in practical terms one
defines an interest. I have an interest in banking
since the banks look after my money. Should not
everyone with a bank account have a vote? The
question of who gets functional representation and
who is entitled to vote for functional representatives
is critical. It has not been determined by popular
assent and in consequence such arrangements enjoy
little popular support.
On a more general basis, of course, there are
always competing, equally legitimate, claims for
functional representation. The Green Paper on the
development of representative government in 1984
argued that "full weight should be given to the
representation of the economic and professional
sectors of Hong Kong society which are essential to
future confidence and prosperity". But it could
equally - perhaps more plausibly - be argued that
Hong Kong's prosperity depends on its workers, its
artisans, labourers and small shopkeepers and
fishermen. Why is full weight not given to their
representation?
4. The mechanisms for administering functional
constituency elections
I do not want to talk at length about the difficulties
of administering functional constituency elections.
The Electoral Reform Society report makes the
point cogently. There are obvious problems with
corruption, manipulation, nominations and the
identification of the electorate with memberships in
particular organizations. The only comment that I
would wish to add is that I am not certain that the
problems can be resolved by cosmetic methods. The
proposals put forward by the Electoral Reform
Society may help. But it is the idea of functional
representation itself which is fundamentally flawed.
In sum, I do not believe that the dinosaur of
functional representation which has, quite
incredibly, been resurrected in Hong Kong will aid
in the solution to the territory's constitutional
problems. To the contrary, I believe that it will
exacerbate them. I realise, of course, that functional
constituencies are enshrined in that outrageous piece
of constitutional nonsense, the Basic Law, but that
does not mean that they will ever be seen to be
legitimate by the population. It would seem to me to
make far greater sense to move towards one of the
few sensible suggestions in the Basic Law which
notes 'the ultimate aim is the election of all members
of the legislative Council by universal suffrage'. If
'ultimate' were replaced by 'immediate', many of the
problems mentioned in the report - and which are
concerning us today - would, I think, rather rapidly
disappear.