MA Philosophy and Social Theory (2006-7)

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MA Philosophy and Social Theory (2006-7)
Co-convenors: Prof Margaret Archer (Sociology) and Prof Michael Luntley (Philosophy)
E-mails: M.S.Archer@warwick.ac.uk; michael.luntley@warwick.ac.uk
Recognised by ESRC as 'S', One ESRC quota award
Seminar meets Mondays, 3.00 - 5.00, S0.10
Aims of the course
The course is intended to give a thorough background in contemporary social
theory and the philosophy of social science. It is genuinely interdisciplinary
and is jointly taught by the Departments of Philosophy and of Sociology.
Teaching and learning proceed by means of weekly seminars, six formal essays and
a dissertation. Students may follow the course on a full-time or a part-time
basis.
Learning Objectives
 To demonstrate an understanding of the major positions in 20th century social
theory and philosophy of the social sciences.
 To appreciate the various relationships between 'theoretical' and 'empirical'
pursuits in sociology.
 To acquire skills in reading carefully and critically difficult texts that
have shaped recent debates in social theory and philosophy of the social
sciences.
 To acquire competence in the formulation and analysis of philosophical
arguments about the social sciences.
 To develop an ability to present, in both oral and written form, materials in
this field to an informed and interested audience.
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Course Structure
Core Course
All students must take the two-term Core Course (‘Philosophy and Social Theory’)
in their first year of study. The exact topics are determined in a class meeting
at the start of each of the first two terms. What follows is a composite of the
last few years, but we expect that students will want to add and subtract
topics, according to their interests. The core course meets each week for two
hours.
Elective Courses
In addition, students must take two further two-term courses or an equivalent
combination of one-term and two-term courses. At least one of these courses must
be offered by the Department of Philosophy and one by the Department of
Sociology. In choosing optional modules, participants are urged to ensure that
they acquire a thorough grounding in both disciplines. In particular, they
should strengthen any deficiencies in their knowledge (e.g. those with a
Philosophy degree should take some Sociology courses and vice versa). The choice
of options is made in consultation with the course convenors. No students are
permitted by the Board of Examiners to prepare a dissertation if they have not
satisfactorily completed course work equivalent to six one-term courses.
Essays
Students are required to write ONE essay of 5,000 words for each one-term course
and TWO essays of 5,000 words for each two-term course. In exceptional
circumstances, permission may be granted for students to submit ONE essay of
10,000 words for a two-term course. A written application must be made in
advance to one of the course convenors for permission to submit a
double-weighted essay. Topics and titles for essays must be agreed in advance
with the course convenors. The Philosophy Department supplies forms on which
agreed topics and word length are recorded. Up to two essays may be proposed as
‘drafts’, subject to resubmission, if approved by the course’s Internal
Examiners.
Dissertations
Students who successfully complete six essays will normally be permitted to
prepare a dissertation. Dissertation topics must be approved by one of the
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Course Convenors. Formal proposals of dissertation topics must be submitted to
one of the Course Convenors by Friday of Week 6 in Term 3. Students should
request supervision for their dissertations from members of academic staff. The
length of dissertations (including Abstract, notes, references or bibliography,
and appendices) must not exceed 10,000 words, unless a written application for
permission to submit a longer dissertation has been received and approved by one
of the Course Convenors.
Student Evaluation
The degree of M.A. is awarded to students who satisfactorily complete all their
essays and their dissertation. The Diploma is available to students who complete
all their essays but do not proceed to write a dissertation. The course uses the
marking conventions of the Philosophy Department. Thus, the pass mark for each
piece of written work is 60%, and a distinction is awarded for work marked at
70% or above. The M.A. Review Board meets in mid-June to assess students’
progress, and the Final Board meets in mid-September. The M.A. with distinction
is awarded to a student who gains a Distinction in four or more of the eight
assessed units (the Dissertation and double-weighted essays count as two units).
All marks are subject to confirmation by the External Examiner.
Staff-student liaison committee (SSLC)
Two meetings are convened toward the end of the first two terms.
Books of general use
Margaret S. Archer, Realist Social Theory
Ted Benton and Ian Craib, Philosophy of Social Science
Martin Hollis, The Philosophy of Social Science
D. Layder, Understanding Social Theory
Michael Luntley, Reason, Truth and Self
P. Manicas, A History and Philosophy of the Social Sciences
M. Martin & L. McIntyre, Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science
Nicos Mouzelis, Sociological Theory: What went wrong?
John Parker et al., Social Theory: A basic toolkit
Andrew Sayer, Realism and Social Science
A. Sica (eds.), What Is Social Theory?
R. Trigg, Understanding Social Science
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OUTLINE FOR TERM ONE
WEEK TWO: Philosophy and Sociology: What Is the Proper Relationship?
Issues for Discussion
(1) Can philosophy 'limit' sociology? Can sociology 'supersede' philosophy?
(2) Can philosophy and sociology be separated? If not, why not?
(3) What is relationship between 'social theory' and the disciplinary purviews
of philosophy and sociology?
Preparatory Readings:
R. Collins, 'Toward a theory of Intellectual change: the social causes of
philosophies', Science, Technology and Human Values
Roy Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism, Ch. 1.
Martin Hollis, The Philosophy of Social Science, Ch. 9, ‘Explaining and Understanding’
R. Trigg, Understanding Social Science, chaps. 1 and 10
Supplementary Readings:
D. Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery
P. Bourdieu, 'An Epistemology for Sociology'.
R. Collins, The Sociology of Philosophies, chap. 15
S. Fuller, 'Prolegomena to a Sociology of Philosophy in the 20th century
English-Speaking World', Philosophy of the Social Sciences
A. Giddens, New Rules of the Sociological Method
M. Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences
P. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science
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WEEK THREE: The Construction of social reality?
Issues for Discussion
1. Although the titles of their books differ only slightly, discuss how this
difference reflects a much deeper difference in orientation between Berger &
Luckmann and Searle.
2. Is Searle's social order real?
3. What is the difference between 'social constructionism' and 'social realism'
Preparatory readings:
P. Berger and T. Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, Introduction and
chap.1
J. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, chaps. 1-2
Supplementary readings:
R. Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism, Ch. 2.
F. Collin, Social Reality
E. Durkheim, Rules of the Sociological Method
S. Fuller, Social Epistemology
M. Gilbert, Social Facts
I. Hacking, The Social Construction of What?
R. Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, chap. 3
S. Turner, The Social Theory of Practices
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WEEK FOUR: Methodological Individualism versus Methodological Collectivism –
has the debate between them been superceded?
Issues for Discussion
1. What does reduction entail? Is it sufficient to argue that it works ‘in principle’?
2. What role did empiricism play in supporting Methodological Individualism?
3. Has the old debate above been superceded by a new one about ‘emergent properties
and emergent powers’?
Preparatory reading:
J. W. N. Watkins, ‘Historical Explanation in the Social Sciences’, in John O’Neill (ed.),
Modes of Individualism and Collectivism.
Maurice Mandelbaum, ‘Societal Facts’ in John O’Neill (ed.), Modes of Individualism and
Collectivism.
Supplementary readings:
See May Brodbeck, Ernest Gellner and L. Goldstein in John O’Neill (ed.), Modes of
Individualism and Collectivism.
Margaret S. Archer, Realist Social Theory, Chs. 1, 2 & 3.
Steven Lukes, ‘Methodological Individualism Reconsidered’, British Journal of Sociology,
19:2, 1968.
Anthony King, ‘Against Structure’ Sociological Review, 47, 1999.
Margaret S. Archer, ‘For Structure’ Sociological Review, 48, 2000.
D. Elder-Vass, ‘Emergence and the Realist Theory of Cause’, Journal of Critical Realism,
4, 2005.
Andrew Sayer, Method in Social Science, 1992.
R.K. Sawyer, ‘Emergence in Sociology’, American Journal of Sociology, 2001
William Wimsatt, ‘Reductionism and its heuristics’, Synthese, 151, 2004.
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WEEK FIVE: Realism and Structuration theories as new approaches to social
ontology and explanation in the social order.
Issues for Discussion:
1. Is social structure an emergent entity with causal powers or is it a ‘virtual reality’?
2. Can and should ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ be transcended?
3. Bhaskar describes himself as ‘under-labouring’ for social science and Giddens
states that he is providing social scientists with a ‘sensitisation device’. How useful
is what they actually deliver to the working analyst of society?
Preparatory Readings:
Roy Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism, Ch. 2 ‘Societies’
Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory
Margaret Archer, ‘Morphogenesis versus Structuration’, British Journal of Sociology,
33, 1982.
Supplementary Readings:
Margaret Archer, Realist Social Theory, Chs. 4 & 5.
Rob Stones, Structuration Theory, 2006.
John Parker et al, Structuration
Ian Craib, Anthony Giddens
David Held and J. B. Thompson (eds.), Social Theory in Modern Societies: Anthony
Giddens and his Critics
J. Clarke, C. Modgil and S. Modgil (eds.), Anthony Giddens: Consensus and Controversy
Margaret S. Archer et al, Critical Realism : Essential Readings
Andrew Collier, Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy Bhaskar’s Philosophy
Nicos Mouzelis, Sociological Theory: what went wrong
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WEEK 6: Relativism and Realism
Issues for Discussion
1. What are relativism and realism theories of?
2. What do relativists and realists dislike the most about each other's views?
3. Can social science be done without taking a principled stance for either
relativism and realism?
Preparatory reading:
A. Collier, An Introduction to Roy Bhaskar's Philosophy, chaps. 1, 5
R. Trigg, Rationality and Science, chaps.1-2
Supplementary readings:
M.Archer, et al. (eds.) Critical Realism: Essential Readings.
D. Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery
Raymond Boudon, The Poverty of Relativism
J. R. Brown, The Rational and the Social
S. Fuller, Philosophy, Rhetoric and the End of Knowledge, chap. 9
M. Hollis and S. Lukes (eds.), Rationality and Relativism
M. Krausz and J. Meiland (eds) Relativism
T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
B. Latour and S. Woolgar, Laboratory Life
J.F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition
H. Putnam, Reason, Truth and History
R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature
B. Wilson (ed.), Rationality
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WEEK SEVEN: The Implications of Economic Models of Rationality for
Social Theory
Issues for Discussion
(1) How are preference and rational choice related? Does the instrumental
conception of rational choice give us reason to care about anything?
(2) How do sociologists try to show that 'rationality' is not a univocal
concept?
(3) Is the economic model of rationality necessarily anti-sociological?
Preparatory Reading
M. Hollis & R. Sugden, "Rationality in Action", Mind (1993)
M. Archer, 'Homo economicus, homo sociologicus, homo sentiens', in M. Archer and
J. Tritter (eds.) Rational Choice Theory: Resisting Colonization
Harry G. Frankfurter, The Importance of what we care about (essay of same title in this
volume of his essays).
Supplementary Reading
Gary Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour
S. Bowles & H. Gintis, "Is Equality Passe? Homo reciprocans and the future of
egalitarian politics", Boston Review (Dec. 1998)
http://bostonreview.mit.edu/BR23.6/contents.html
D. Gauthier, "Maximization Constrained: the Rationality of Cooperation", P.
Moser, Rationality in Action or Morals by Agreement, ch. 6, esp. pp. 158-70
A. Gibbard, "Sociobiology", R. Goodin & P. Pettit, Companion to Contemporary
Political Philosophy
A. Gouldner, 'The Norm of Reciprocity', chaps. 7-9 of For Sociology
D. Parfit, "Prudence, Morality and the Prisoner’s Dilemma", in J. Elster,
Rational Choice
P. Singer, "Reciprocity", Ethics, sec. B.ii
B. Skyrms, Evolution of the Social Contract, esp. chs. 1-3
P. Wagner, 'The bird in hand: rational choice -- the default mode of social
theorizing in M. Archer and J. Tritter, Rational Choice Theory.
B. Williams, "Internal and External Reasons", in his Moral Luck, & P. Moser, ed.
Rationality in Action
S. Williams, 'Is rational choice theory unreasonable? The neglected emotions.'
In M. Archer and J. Tritter, Rational Choice Theory
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WEEK EIGHT: Historicism, Naturalism and Materialism
Issues for Discussion
(1) Are all large-scale social explanations inevitably 'functionalist' or
'teleological'?
(2) Distinguish some senses in which Marxism has and has not 'failed' in its
dual mission to promote and explain radical social change.
(3) How are functional explanations in social science related to evolutionary
explanations in biology? Are there any processes similar to natural selection in
social life?
Preparatory Reading
K. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, chap. 4
J. Elster, "Marxism, Functionalism, and Game Theory: the Case for Methodological
Individualism", Theory and Society (1982), and in A. Callinicos, Marxist Theory.
P. Casal, "On Societal and Global Historical Materialism", in C. Bertram & A.
Chitty, Has History Ended?
Supplementary Reading
G. A. Cohen, History Labour and Freedom, Chs 1 & 5
G. A. Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory of History, pp. 278-296
G. A. Cohen, "Reply to Elster on Marxism, Functionalism and Game Theory", Theory
and Society (1982), and in A. Callinicos, Marxist Theory
J. Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences, Chs VIII, IX & X
A. Levine, E. Sober & E.O. Wright, "Marxism and Methodological Individualism",
New Left Review (1987)
D. Little, Varieties of Social Explanation, Chs 5 & 9
S. Lukes, "Methodological Individualism Reconsidered", in A. Ryan, Philosophy of
Social Explanation (or British Journal of Sociology, 1968)
M. Martin & L. McIntyre, Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science, Parts V &
VI
A. Rosenberg, Philosophy of Social Science, Ch 5
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WEEK NINE: Interpretative Sociology
Issues for Discussion
1. Is ‘understanding’ a proper and alternative role to ‘explaining’ in the social
sciences?
2. Are Hollis and Smith right that the ‘insider’s story’ and the ‘outsider’s’ account will
always ‘spring apart’ – leaving us with ‘two stories’?
3. Has there been any advance on Max Weber’s method of Verstehen for capturing
people’s meanings, intentions, deliberations etc.?
Preparatory Reading
Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations
(last Ch.)
Martin Hollis, The Philosophy of Social Science, Ch. 9, ‘Explaining and Understanding’
Supplementary Reading
K.Appel, Explanation and Understanding
Margaret Archer, Being Human: the problem of Agency, (Conclusion)
Margaret Archer, Structure, Agency and the Internal Conversation
L.Doyal and R.Harris, Empiricism, Explanation and Rationality (Ch 6 & 7)
Clifford Geetz, ‘Thick Descriptions’, in his The Interpretation of Cultures
Nicos Mouzelis, ‘The Subjectivist-Objectivist Divide: Against Transcendence’ Sociology,
34:4, 2000.
William Outhwaite, The Method Called Verstehen
Bryan Wilson (ed.), Rationality
Peter Winch, Idea of a Social Science
WEEK TEN: Individual discussions with students about their works in
progress.
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