FLAVIA ANDREUCCI *
CARLA ANDREUCCI **
PSYCHOANALYSIS, SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY, EPISTEMOLOGY
THE PROBLEM OF THE METHODOLOGICAL DUALISM IN PSYCHOANALYSIS
1) Freudian Psychoanalysis and its Ideal Identity as a Natural Science: from Metapsychology of
Instinctual Drives to the Ego Theory.
During its historical development, psychoanalytic research has never ceased to question itself about its
epistemological fundamentals.
In particular, since Freud's first theoretical formulations, the question has arisen, whether psychoanalysis
was to be considered as a philosophical (humanistic) discipline, or a scientific (naturalistic) one.
As we know, Freud, in a theoretical perspective, always replied univocally to such a question, assigning
psychoanalysis to the field of natural science.
Actually, Freud deeply distrusted philosophical thought which was imputed, by him, to mislead the
human mind in a world of abstract ideas, far from the scientific observation of objective facts.
He even refused to study the systems by philosophers such as A.Schopenhauer and F.Nietzsche, who,
according to him, would have been able to suggest concepts that he intended to achieve exclusively by
empirical research.
Besides, although Freud had a direct knowledge of phenomenological and existential researchers as
F.Brentano and L.Binswanger, he did not consider that an approach to their methods and issues could have
been useful for psychoanalysis.
Thus experimentalism, biologism, physicalism, were assumed by Freud as the epistemological formulas
according to which he used to conceptualize the experiences and facts of his clinical observation.
Out of the two great streams of our contemporary psychology - the psychology of elements and the act
psychology (¹) - Freud undoubtedly followed the first one, both as naturalistic associationistic methodology
and anti-philosophical polemic against the second one.
It should be stressed that Freud did not leave such a methodology even when he was compelled to admit
the essential function of the Ego both in theory and in clinics.
Thus, in Freudian metapsychology, the Ego itself was reduced to a biological function of adjustment to
which a real autonomy could not be recognized, since it had to be conceived as a mere compromise between
the opposite forces of the instincts and the outer world.
Even when, by his theories of narcissism, analysis of melancholia and clinical management of the
transfert, Freud became aware of the reflective function of the Ego as Self (Self observation, Self evaluation,
Self esteem, Self objectivation, Self ideal, Self identity, etc.), he did not however develop a dialectical
methodology about these subjects, but tried to conceptualize them according to a naturalistic-empiricistic
one.
As we know, in his metapsychology Freud systematized his theoretical views on mental functioning.
In this theoretical perspective, he proposed a functionalistic conceptualization of the mental apparatus
according to four points of view: economic, dynamic, topic and structural.
Although, from the structural point of view - based on the three instances of Id, Ego and Superego - an
integrationistic interpretation of this functionalistic perspective would have been possible, Freud preferred a
reductionistic one.
Thus, in the original Freudian metapsychology, the topic and structural points of view are subordinated to
the economic and dynamic ones, so that the adjustment of the whole mental apparatus is regulated according
to the homeostatic (W.B.Cannon) and constancy (T.Fechner) principles. (2)
By introducing H.Hartmann's theory of the biological autonomy of the Ego, it was possible to conceive
the mental apparatus according to a not merely reductionistic pattern of adjustment, as the homeostatic
principle is.
Actually, Hartmann's statement was that the specific structure for environmental adjustment i.e. the
arising of the Ego should not exclusively be considered as a consequence of a menace coming from the outer
world against the impulsive drives, but had also autonomous origins as a spontaneous function operating in a
"conflict-free sphere", including knowledge, language, culture, socialization, etc.
Hartmann's reformulation of Freudian metapsychology was approved by the most representative members
of the A.Ps.A. as L.Rangell, J Arlow, C.Brenner, O.Kernberg, J.E.Gedo, H.Blum and other followers of the
integrationistic functionalistic issues by O.Fenichel, A.Freud, D.Rapaport, so that it was considered as the
"mainstream" of the contemporary psychoanalysis in U.S.A. up to the 1960s.
It should be stressed that, although Hartmann's theory of the Ego allowed the original Freudian
metapsychology to be formulated according to a more integrationistic point of view, it remained nevertheless
founded on a neurobiological basis.
In particular, some psychoanalysts following Hartmann's theory programmed to introduce a cognitivistic
conception of the Ego, in accordance with a neurobiological methodology, into Freudian metapsychology.
Thus, in such a context, many cultural and social behaviours have been explained as functions in some
way autonomous of the Ego, non dependant on instinctual conflicts.
Hartmann's cognitivistic position was however not considered incompatible with Freud's original
metapsychology, according to which libido and instincts are the motivational biological fundaments of both
normal and psychopathological human behavior.
Thus the statement was confirmed that the methodological foundation of psychoanalysis both as theory
and therapy did not need any philosophical issue, having to be linked to naturalistic biological sciences
(more recent ply, eminent psychoanalysts like C.Brenner and J.E.Gedo have supported this epistemological
position).
Nevertheless such a statement was going to result untenable as soon as it became more and more evident,
both in theory and in clinics, that:
a) the Ego could not be conceptualized or treated in a mere reductionistic perspective, as an automatic
biological structure and/or a function of adjustment;
b) the reflective function of the Ego as Self was to be recognized as essential for understanding mental
processes and conducts of human personality, in psychology and psychopathology;
c) the methodology for understanding the reflective I (Self) could not be reduced to naturalistic
fundamentals. (3)
2) The Psychoanalytic Theory og the Ego and its Dialectical Conceptualization, as a Theory of the
Self.
The origins of the psychoanalytic psychology of the Self are to be recognized in Freud's studies on
narcissism, melancholia, Superego, Self ideal, Self identity, etc.
Reflective feelings and concepts like Self-esteem, Self-judgement, Self-punishment, Self-objectivation,
Self-idealization, etc., pointed out the primary reality of the Ego as subject and object of itself, not (to be
considered) reducible to the theory of libido and instinctual drives.
In this perspective, the development of personality and object relations was interpreted by H. Kohut
according to his theory of narcissism and cohesive Self, excluding the metapsychology of libido.
Instincts and libido are also not considered by R.D.Stolorow in his theory of Subjectivity and intersubjectivity, that is inspired by a phenomenological conception of empathy in interpersonal relations.
Thus a signifying epistemological change was introduced into psychoanalysis by the psychology of the
Self and Subjectivity, since its methodical approach to mental experiences complies with the principle of
comprehension, contrasting with the explanatory method of Freudian metapsychology.
Nowadays, however, it should be clear that a dialectical integration is requested for an appropriated
understanding of the reflective Ego (Self) and its related feelings, both in theory and analytic therapy.
In this context we can understand that the relation of psychoanalysis with philosophical issues is anyway
inevitable according to different points of view.
Firstly, in an historical perspective (See Table II) we can verify that Freud's psychoanalytic psychology
has achieved its own theoretical position in a specific sector of western culture, that is, in the area of
naturalistic-empiricistic methodology of reductionistic functionalism.
However, although Freud had achieved the data of his research from psychopathological clinical contexts,
there is no doubt that his observation was founded on a comprehensive (Verstehen) methodology (i.e. an
understanding of the otherness feelings and thoughts in accordance with the observer's analogous intimate
experiences).
This is a methodology that radically differs from the explanatory one (Erklären) where observation is
systematically settled in conformity with an objectualistic extensive dimension, requiring a causalistic
quantifying conceptualization and a priori excluding any interest in the interior experiences of man.
As we know, in his clinical observations and, even more, in his therapeutic practice, Freud refused this
explanatory methodology used in psychiatric clinics and research.
Nevertheless, rather paradoxically, he tried to reduce the data of his comprehensive observation in a
frame of naturalistic conceptualization (the metapsychology of libido and instinctual drives).
Thus, according to Freud, the qualitative experiences of his analytic observation had to be resolved in
quantitative economic formulations in order to set the psychoanalytic research in the field of naturalistic
science.
3) Phylosophy of Science and Dialectical Foundation of Psychoanalysis in Theory and Praxis.
Therefore, we cannot decide about the scientific or philosophical setting of psychoanalytic discipline
without a critical discussion about its methodological (comprehensive or explanatory) fundamentals: that is a
question concerning philosophy of science.
Secondary and consequently, in this methodological perspective, the question arises whether the
structural point of view in Freudian metapsychology could or could not be verifiable as a theory of
personality.
The fact should be considered that an effective theorization of personality could hardly be believable
without a coherent conceptualization of the Ego as autonomous reflective function (Self).
The psychoanalytic theories of the Self (H.Kohut, W.R.D.Fairbairn, E.Jacobson, M.Mahler,
R.D.Stolorow and, in less recent times, R.Waelder) tried to reply to such a question concerning the
foundation of a theory of the personality according to a verifiable methodology.
Once more it should be understood that a problem like the reflective I (Self) and its correlated feelings is
in no way resolvable in a naturalistic perspective and its reductionistic methodology, since it requires a
dialectical conceptualization. (4)
The philosophical issues concerning dialectical methodology cannot be ignored by a research looking for
the foundation of a psychoanalytic theory of human personality and a systematical theory of psychoanalytic
psychotherapy.
______________________________
* Professor of Theoretical Psychology and Psychoanalysis in the Institute for Psychological Sciences and Systematical
Psychotherapy of Genova (Director: G.Giacomo Giacomini). Researcher's Epistemological Statement: Actualistic Dialectics.
** Professor of Systematical Psychopedagogy in the Institute for Psychological Sciences and Systematical Psychotherapy of Genova
(Director: G.G.Giacomini). Researcher's Epistemological Statement: Actualistic Dialectics.
N.B.: The figures in brackets that are linked to an author's name are to be related to the year of the original edition of a work that is
included in the references at the end of this paper
(1) Giacomini G.G. (1980), (2001/b). See also Tables II and I.
(2) Giacomini G.G. (1989).
(3) Giacomini G. G. (2001/a).
(4) Giacomini G.G. (1980), (1987/b), (2001/a).
SUMMARY
Psychoanalytic research cannot ignore epistemological problems in relation with methodological
dualism of Explaining (Erklären) and Comprehending (Verstehen) in psychopathology, theory of
the personality and therapeutic analysis.
These are problems for which theoretical issues in philosophy and philosophy of science are
inevitable.
In particular, the development of the psychoanalytic psychology of the Self, Subjectivity, and
Intersubjectivity nowadays requires a dialectical integration in order to verify the meaning of
conceptualization and methodology of research in theoretical and clinical psychoanalysis.
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