Issue 2 –2002
Online Journal
ARGUMENTATION, INTERPRETATION, RHETORIC
Argumentation: an overview of theoretical approaches and research themes
Frans H. van Eemeren
University of Amsterdam
1 Subject-matter and aims of the study of argumentation
Argumentation is a phenomenon we are confronted with daily. We argue all the time for our
own views and we react continually to oral or written argumentation put forward by others.
Apart from being a verbal activity, argumentation is also a social activity directed at other
people. On top of that, it is a rational activity aimed at defending a standpoint in such a way
that it is acceptable to a reasonable judge.
A person who argues something starts - rightly or wrongly - from the assumption that there
is an explicit or implicit difference of opinion with regard to the acceptability of a certain
standpoint. By putting forward the constellation of propositions which constitutes the
argumentation, the speaker or writer attempts to convince the listener or reader that the
standpoint at issue is acceptable.
Taking these observations as our point of departure, we can describe the subject-matter of
the study of argumentation in the following way:
Argumentation is a verbal, social and rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable
judge of the (in)acceptability of a standpoint by advancing a certain constellation of
propositions which is designed to justify (or refute) the standpoint.
This definition does justice to the 'process-product ambiguity' of the word 'argumentation': it
not only refers to the activity of advancing reasons but also to the shorter or longer text that
results from it. In general the context will make clear which of the two is the intended
meaning.
In publications in speech communication and discourse analysis the term argumentation is
usually used in this (ambiguous) way while in philosophy and logic the use of the term
argument is predominant. The latter term can lead to confusion because it has four different
meanings: (1) reason, in the sense of the German Argument, (2) discussion or exchange of
opinions, (3) quarrel, (4) form of reasoning in the logical sense, consisting of one or more
premises and a conclusion. Although after the appearance of O'Keefe's classical definition
paper of 1977 the difference in meaning between (1), (2) and (3) has been given a great deal
of attention in the argumentation literature in English, it is particularly the confusion of the
meanings (1) and (4) that has been responsible for a great many problems (van Eemeren en
Grootendorst 1992a: 60-62). It is important that the study of argumentation incorporates
both the pragmatic level which is at stake in meaning (1) and the logical level at stake in
meaning (4); but it is at the same time also important to maintain a clear distinction between
these two levels.
The study of argumentation concentrates on the analysis, evaluation and presentation of the
'point of departure' and the 'organisation' of argumentation. The point of departure consists
of all explicit and implicit premises and assumptions that are taken as the starting point in
argumentation. The organisation of the argumentation comprises the way in which the
various reasons are connected with each other and the standpoint at issue to justify or refute
this standpoint. Both in the study of the point of departure and in that of the organisation of
argumentation logical and pragmatic considerations play a part.
On the logical level a whole constellation of verbal, contextual, situational and other
pragmatic factors influencing the course and outcome of the communication process are left
unexamined: the way in which the premises concerned are exactly phrased in ordinary
language use, who is addressing whom, the precise situation in which this happens, all the
things that occurred before, et cetera. Logicians are not generally concerned with
argumentation as it is put forward in natural circumstances by somebody who attempts to
convince someone else of a certain standpoint, but with abstract 'argument forms' or
'patterns of reasoning' in which a conclusion is derived from a particular set of formalized
premises with the help of various sorts of 'logical constants'. To be able to clearly
distinguish between the 'valid' argument forms and the 'invalid' argument forms underlying
specific specimens of reasoning, they leave pragmatic aspects of argumentative reality
outside consideration that are indispensable for developing an adequate theory of
argumentation (van Eemeren et al. 1996: 5-12).
The general aims pursued in the study of argumentation can be summarized as follows:
The study of argumentation aims at determining which soundness criteria a reasonable judge
applies when evaluating the point of departure and the organisation of argumentation and at
making clear how these criteria are to be applied in the analysis, evaluation and presentation
of argumentation.
2 Components of the study of argumentation
In argumentation there is always an explicit or implicit appeal to reasonableness, but this
does, of course, not mean that each argumentation is indeed reasonable. In practice, an
argumentation can be lacking in all kinds of respects. It is the task of argumentation theorists
to determine which soundness criteria should be satisfied in the argumentation for the
argumentation to be called 'reasonable'. Many argumentation theorists are inspired by logic
and they study argumentation for normative purposes. However, there are also
argumentation theorists who have a merely descriptive goal. Especially linguisticallyoriented scholars in textual and discourse analysis are, as a rule, only interested in describing
how, with varying degrees of success, language users make use of argumentation to
convince others.
In current research practice both extremes are represented - with Biro and Siegel (1992) on
the normative side and Willard (1989) on the descriptive side. Most argumentation theorists,
however, take a middle position. Their starting point is that the study of argumentation has a
normative as well as a descriptive dimension. In Argumentation, communication, and
fallacies (1992a), Rob Grootendorst and I propose a - now broadly accepted - integrated
research program. In this program, a theoretical model of acceptable argumentation based on
a philosophical ideal of reasonableness has been developed and by means of empirical
research it is established how argumentative reality is organized and which problems may
occur in it (1992a: 5-6). The normative and the descriptive parts of the research program are
connected with each other through a reconstruction of argumentative reality with the help of
analytic operations from the perspective of the theoretical model of reasonable
argumentation and through the development of methods to improve argumentative practice
methodically (van Eemeren 1986, van Eemeren et al. 1993, 1997). A fully-fledged research
program of this design has a philosophical, a theoretical, an empirical, an analytic and a
practical component.
The philosophical component of the study of argumentation involves reflection on the ideal
of reasonableness underlying the theorizing about argumentation; the outcome of this
reflection is pertinent to the question of when argumentation may be considered sound or
not sound. Toulmin (1976) distinguished between three major conceptions of
reasonableness: (1) the 'geometrical' formal conception which characterizes the logical
approach to argumentation, (2) the 'anthropological' empirical conception, which is
prominent in the rhetorical approach to argumentation, and (3) the 'critical' transcendental
conception, which lies at the heart of the dialectical approach to argumentation. The
differences between these reasonableness conceptions are expressed in argumentation theory
in different views of 'sound argumentation'. According to the geometrical conception sound
argumentation is equal to a valid argument with true premises; according to the
anthropological conception, it amounts to a way of persuading that is successful in a certain
cultural environment; according to the critical conception, it comes down to a constructive
contribution to the resolution of a difference of opinion.
In the theoretical component of the study of argumentation it is, starting from a certain
conception of reasonableness, indicated more precisely what reasonable argumentation
consists of. Which ways of arguing are acceptable to a reasonable judge? Geometrical
logicians will answer this question quite differently from anthropological rhetoricians or
critical dialecticians. The theoretical ideal models will therefore vary in these three cases.
In the empirical component of the study of argumentation descriptions and explanations are
given of the factors and processes involved in producing, interpreting and evaluating
argumentative discourse. As a consequence of the different theoretical angles of approach,
the emphases may be put differently in the various empirical investigations. The geometriclogical approach has only recently led to an interest in empirical research; and the
experiments have so far almost exclusively been restricted to deductive reasoning. The
empirical investigations connected with the anthropological approach have so far been
dominated by so-called 'persuasion' research aimed at determining the effectivity of the
means of persuasion that are brought to bear. In empirical studies starting from the critical
approach it is, among various other things, systematically investigated to what extent
ordinary arguers' argumentative notions and norms agree with the theoretical ones.
In the analytic component of the study of argumentation an attempt is made to create a
bridge between the ideal model of argumentative discourse and argumentative reality. The
central question is how the text or discussion can be reconstructed in such a way that only
those aspects are illuminated that are relevant in the light of the theoretical perspective
which is chosen as the starting point. Depending on the approach that is favoured, the
reconstructions can vary from formalizing the logical elements to the identifying the
persuasive aspects or making explicit the contributions to the resolution of a difference of
opinion.
In the practical component of the study of argumentation the insights gained in the
philosophical, theoretical, empirical and analytic component are being used for developing
methods to improve argumentative practice in a variety of (institutionalized and noninstitutionalized) contexts. In this endeavour it is examined how argumentative practice can
be positively influenced from a certain approach and how the individual skills in
argumentation and the interpretation and evaluation of argumentation can be enhanced.
I shall give a brief overview of some important approaches to the study of argumentation.
Together with other approaches, with a more limited scope or a less developed research
program, these approaches are discussed in more detail in van Eemeren et. al. (1996). Before
discussing the various approaches, it is important to emphasize that all modern approaches
of argumentation developed in the past decades are highly influenced by classical and postclassical rhetoric and dialectic. Classical syllogistic logic (or 'analytics') has not played such
an important role: from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards this logic has
been gradually replaced by modern formal logic concentrating on symbolic reasoning by
means of formally valid derivations rather than argumentative practice.
3 Influential approaches to the study of argumentation
3.1 Toulmin's model of analysis and Perelman's new rhetoric
The study of argumentation, and particularly the teaching of argumentation, has for a long
time been dominated by the theoretical contributions of Toulmin and Perelman (with his
collaborator Olbrechts-Tyteca). Both contributions were published in the fifties and both
intend to offer an alternative for formal logic that should make it possible to make an
adequate analysis of ordinary argumentative discourse. Another commonality is that the
rational procedure of legal reasoning is in both cases taken as the point of departure.
Toulmin's The uses of argument, published in 1958, is mainly known for the model of
argumentation presented in this book. This model represent the 'procedural form' of
argumentation: the various steps that can be distinguished in the defence of a standpoint.
According to Toulmin, the soundness of argumentation is primarily determined by the
degree in which the warrant, which connects the data adduced in the argumentation with the
claim that is defended, is made acceptable by a backing. The following analysis is an
example of a description of argumentation in terms of the Toulmin model (Fig. 1)
The procedural form of argumentation is in Toulmin's view 'field dependent'. This means
that the steps that are taken - and which are represented in the model - are always the same,
irrespective of the kind of subject the argumentation refers to. What kind of backing is
required, however, is dependent on the field to which the question at issue belongs. An
ethical justification, for instance, requires a different kind of backing than a legal
justification. Toulmin concludes from this that the evaluation criteria for determining the
soundness of argumentation are 'field dependent'.
A variety of serious theoretical objections have been raised against Toulmin's views of
argumentation and his model. In addition, in concrete cases the model very often appears
hard to apply. Toulmin's definitions, which combine functional and formal differences, are
such that data and warrants are in practice difficult to distinguish. The distinction between
the two is only really clear in carefully selected examples. And without this distinction the
model is in fact nothing more than a newly-clad reasoning scheme from classical antiquity,
the 'epicheireme'. All the same the model and the connected idea of field-dependent norms
of rationality are still extremely popular.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca provide in La nouvelle rhetorique (1958), which appeared in
an English translation in 1969, an inventory of frequently-used 'argumentation techniques'.
They regard argumentation as sound if this argumentation adduces (more) assent with the
standpoint that is defended among the audience the argumentation is aimed at. Thus the
soundness of argumentation is in the new rhetoric measured against its effect on the target
group. This target group may consist of a 'specific audience', but it can also be the 'universal
audience': the people who are for the speaker or writer the embodiment of 'reasonableness'.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's theory consists most of all in an extensive list of elements
which can serve as point of departure or as argument scheme when constructing the
argumentation that should convince or persuade the audience (see van Eemeren et al. 1996:
ch. 4). With the help of a 'quasi-logical' argument scheme, which resembles a logically valid
argument form in some way, one can, for instance, sometimes achieve the effect that the
public considers the standpoint defended in a reasonable way:
The club is held to maintain certain regulations and therefore its members are also
committed to these regulations.
Another way of justifying a standpoint is the use of an argument scheme such as analogy
that 'structures reality', so that the audience will conclude that the standpoint that is defended
is in a similar way acceptable as a different kind of standpoint which was already accepted
for a long time:
It is clear from the current lack of discipline and the tolerance with respect to immoral
conduct in modern western society that this society is about to come to an end, because the
Roman empire too was near to destruction when people lost their sense of order and
discipline and allowed immoral conduct to take place.
Unfortunately, the descriptions of the various categories distinguished in Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca's catalogue of points of departure and argument schemes are not so clear.
In some cases the various categories also strongly overlap. These and other problems make
it difficult to achieve a unequivocal analysis of argumentation with the help of the
theoretical tools provided by the new rhetoric.
Neither Toulmin's approach nor the new rhetoric has led to the desired results. This is partly
due to the prejudices of these argumentation theorists with regard to logic, which is, without
paying any attention to modern developments, equated with classical syllogistic logic. Both
Toulmin and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca start, without having any qualms about it, from
the assumption that logic has nothing to offer for the analysis and evaluation of
argumentation, whereas in this endeavour certain logical insights are indispensable. Because
both Toulmin and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca concentrate also exclusively on isolated
arguments of reasonings and ignore all pragmatic, contextual and situational aspects, their
approaches are certainly no real alternative to the formal-logical approach of argumentation.
Neither of the two approaches does justice to the fact that argumentation is a specific form
of functional language use which should be treated as such.
Until his death in 1984, Perelman remained involved in the new rhetoric, but he did not
develop any important new theoretical insight after the publication of La nouvelle
rhetorique. His influence is still pretty strong though, in particular in rhetoric and among
lawyers. Unlike Perelman, Toulmin has after the publication of The uses of argument hardly
been active in the study of argumentation. Instead, he directed his attention to topics of a
historical-philosophical nature and problems in the theory of science. At the 1990
conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA) Toulmin, for
once, returned to his argumentation model. He declared that he had come to believe that,
unlike he had earlier argued in The uses of argument, not only justifications and backings
that are used in argumentation are field-dependent, but also the various contextual aspects
and the various forums that are supposed to evaluate the argumentation (1992: 9).
3.2 Informal logic
Out of dissatisfaction with the way in which argumentation was treated in introductory
textbooks in formal logic an approach to argumentation has been propagated in Canada and
the United States from the beginning of the seventies which is known as informal logic
(Johnson and Blair 1980, eds. 1994). The main theoretical sources of inspiration were the
studies by Toulmin and Perelman en Olbrechts-Tyteca . Since 1978 the journal Informal
Logic, edited by Blair and Johnson, has been the speaking voice of the informal-logic
movement. In spite of its name, informal logic is not a new kind of logic, but just an
approach to the normative study of argumentation in ordinary language which remains
closer to the practice of argumentation than formal logic (van Eemeren et al. 1996: ch. 6).
Informal logicians would like to develop norms and procedures for interpreting, assessing
and construing argumentation. The starting point is that argumentation should be sound in a
logical sense (Blair and Johnson 1987). Apart from the fact that it is clear that something
else is meant than that the arguments that are used must be valid in a formal-logical sense, it
is not yet clear what this means. It is certain though that informal logicians are primarily
interested in the relations between premises and conclusions in arguments; it is also certain
that their interest is not restricted to reasoning aimed at convincing.
Blair and Johnson (1997) have indicated what they have in mind when they speak of an
informal logical alternative for the formal criterion of deductive validity. In their view, the
premises of an argument have to meet three criteria: (1) relevance, (2) sufficiency and (3)
acceptability. These criteria are introduced in Johnson and Blair (1977) and they are,
sometimes under different names, adopted by other informal logicians such as Govier
(1985), Damer (1987) and Freeman (1988). In the case of 'relevance' the question is whether
there is an is adequate (substantial) relation between the premises and the conclusion of an
argument; in the case of 'sufficiency' the question is whether the premises provide enough
evidence for the conclusion; in the case of 'acceptability' the question is whether the
premises themselves are true, probable or in some other way trustworthy. None of the three
criteria has been more clearly defined.
Informal logic is not yet a fully-fledged theory of argumentation. It is more an approach to
argumentation which is still in an early programmatic phase. In all kinds of directions
solutions are sought for the various problems. A striking characteristic is that the informal
logicians do not pay much attention to the (linguistic) problems of interpretation and
reconstruction. In line with their logico-philosophical background, they concentrate on the
assessment of arguments.
3.3 Radical argumentativism
Starting at the beginning of the seventies Ducrot and Anscombre have developed in an
number of - almost exclusively French - publications a linguistic approach to language use
and argumentation. Their point of departure is that each utterance contains a dialogue, which
is as a rule implicit. This basic idea is further developed in Ducrot and Anscombre's theory
of 'polyphony' (Anscombre and Ducrot 1986, Van Eemeren et al. 1996: 312-322). Because
Anscombre and Ducrot are of the opinion that every form of language use has an
argumentative aspect, they refer to their 'new linguistics', as Meyer (1986) calls this rather
extreme theoretical position, as radical argumentativism. The starting points are expounded
in three books: Les echelles argumentatives by Ducrot (1980), L'argumentation dans la
langue by Anscombre and Ducrot (1983) and Le dire et le dit by Ducrot (1984).
Ducrot and Anscombre's descriptive approach is, among other things, characterized by a
great interest in words such as 'almost', 'nearly', 'only', 'but'. 'even', 'still', 'because' and 'so',
which can serve as argumentative 'operators' or 'connectors' and give the utterances a certain
argumentative force and argumentative direction. In a certain context, the sentence 'The ring
costs only one hundred euros' can point in the direction of a conclusion such as 'Buy the
ring'; the sentence 'The ring costs no less than one hundred euros' points rather in the
direction of a conclusion such as 'Do not buy the ring'.
According to Ducrot and Anscombre, sentences that express a standpoint always involve an
argumentative relation. This can be clarified with the help of a (not highly sophisticated)
example used by Nolke (1992) in which the presence of the word 'but' suggests two opposite
standpoints in one sentence: 'Paul is rich, but he is married'. On the basis of the first part of
this sentence a woman might conclude that it is a good idea to get to know Paul better; on
the basis of the second part, however, she might conclude that this is perhaps not such a
good idea after all. The fact that these two conclusions point into opposite argumentative
directions is caused by the use of the argumentative connector 'but'. This connector is also
responsible for the fact that the interpretation of the second conclusion wins.
Incidentally, the word 'but' only determines the direction of the conclusion that is suggested
by the sentence, not the content of this conclusion. This content is also dependent on the
context and the situation in which the sentence is uttered. Whatever conclusion may be
drawn in a specific context, the presence of the word 'but' causes in all cases this conclusion
to be the opposite of, and also stronger than, the conclusion that has to be drawn from the
first part. According to Ducrot and Anscombre the opposite standpoints that in a sentence
such as that about Paul are suggested by 'but' select two different 'argumentative principles'
which are on a par with the topoi from classical rhetoric (van Eemeren et al. 1996). In the
context which is assumed in Nolke's example these are 'The more someone has the property
of being rich, the more attractive it is for a woman to get to know him better' and 'The more
someone is tied to another woman, the less attractive it is for a woman to get to know him
better'. In this case the latter topos has a bigger argumentative force than the first, which is
as it were put aside (overruled) by the latter. Thereby the last topos determines the eventual
argumentative direction of the sentence, which leads to an implicit conclusion such as 'It is
no use trying to get to know Paul better'.
3.4 Modern rhetorical approaches
In recent years a powerful revaluation of rhetoric has taken place. The irrational or even
anti-rational image of rhetoric which has come into being during the past centuries has now
to a large part been revised. And the sharp division between rhetoric and dialectic made in
the past appears to require weakening. Several argumentation theorists have become aware
that rhetoric as the study of persuasive techniques is not per se incompatible with
maintaining a critical ideal of reasonableness.
It is remarkable that the rehabilitation of rhetoric in the study of argumentation has started at
about the same time in various countries. A considerable time after the pioneering work by
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, Farrell (1976, 1993), McKerrow (1977) and others in the
United States have defended the rational qualities of rhetoric. Wenzel (1980) too would like
to give rhetoric full credit, but then emphatically in relation with logic and (more in
particular) dialectics. In France Reboul (1988) wanted to give rhetoric a satisfactory position
in the study of argumentation beside dialectics. The rhetorical features of argumentation he
mentions are its being audience-oriented, its presentation in ordinary language, and the
status of the premises and the conclusion as at best being plausible. Reboul regards rhetoric
and dialectic as different disciplines which also display some overlap: rhetoric applies
dialectic to public discussions while dialectic is at the same time a part of rhetoric because
dialectic provides rhetoric with intellectual tools (1990). In Germany Kopperschmidt (1989)
takes a step further: he argues that, viewing things also from a historical perspective,
rhetoric is the central concern of argumentation theorists. The highest reappreciation of
rhetoric comes from the Austrian Kienpointner (1991), who defends the relativistic
rhetorical conception of reasonableness as a fertile instrument for resolving social conflicts.
In the Netherlands Braet (1984) emphasizes the importance of the classical doctrine of status
for modern argumentation theory. He compares its various variants with the stock issues
which are the basis of American 'academic debate'.
Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (1999) aim for an integration of insight from rhetoric into their
pragma-dialectical method for analyzing oral and written argumentative discourse. In their
view, there is a rhetorical goal corresponding with each of the dialectical stages of the
process of resolving a difference of opinion. They think that an argumentative text or
discussion can be reconstructed with more subtlety and can be more fully accounted for if it
is investigated how strategic manoeuvring takes place in each dialectical stage with regard
to the selection from the available 'topical potential' (the possible discussion moves)
available in the discussion stage concerned, the adaptation to the wishes of the audience and
the use of presentational devices such as figures of speech.
3.5 Modern dialectical approaches
To modern dialecticians argumentation is part of a procedure to resolve differences of
opinion concerning the acceptability of standpoints by means of a regulated discussion.
They attempt to formulate 'problem-sound' rules, that is rules that are instrumental in
resolving a difference of opinion. These rules must also be 'conventionally valid' in the sense
that they are intersubjectively acceptable to those who would like to resolve their differences
(Barth and Krabbe 1982: 21-22, van Eemeren et al. 1996: ch. 9). When designing a
procedure for language users who would like to resolve a dispute by means of a critical
dialogue, the 'new dialecticians' make, among other things, use of the ideas propounded by
Crawshay-Williams and Naess and ideas of Lorenzen, Kuno Lorenz and other member of
the Erlangen School (van Eemeren et al. 1996: ch. 3.3, 3.4 and ch. 9.2).
The first initiatives towards a new dialectic are worked out in a formal logical direction by
Barth and Krabbe and - as a sequel to that - in a pragmatic linguistic direction by van
Eemeren and Grootendorst. In From axiom to dialogue Barth and Krabbe (1982) described a
formal-dialectical procedure to determine whether a standpoint can be maintained in the
light of certain starting points or 'concessions'. The name formal dialectics stems from
Hamblin, who had earlier introduced this notion in Fallacies (1970: 253-282). The indication
'formal' refers to the strictly regimented character of the dialogue games developed by Barth
and Krabbe. In this endeavour they made use of insights from the formal dialogue logic of
Lorenzen cum suis. In dialogue logic an argument is presented as a dialogue game between
a 'proponent' and an 'opponent' of a thesis. Together these two parties try to establish
whether the thesis can be defended successfully against critical attacks. In the defence the
proponent can make use of the opponent's 'concessions': propositions the opponent is
prepared to be committed to.
The proponent can try to parry an attack on one of his own propositions by defending it
directly or by undertaking a counterattack on one of the opponent's concessions. The
opponent is obliged to defend a concession that is being attacked. This may lead to a
situation in which he or she can do nothing else than accept a proposition he or she has
attacked earlier on in the dialogue. According to the rules this then results in the proponent
winning the game. The proponent therefore attempts to bring the opponent in this position
by skillfully exploiting his or her concessions. If the proponent succeeds, he or she has
successfully defended the thesis owing to (and given) those concessions (ex concessis) (van
Eemeren et al. 1996: ch. 9).
In Speech acts in argumentative discussions van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984)
developed a theory of argumentation, pragma-dialectics, which connects in various respects
immediately with formal dialectics, but is also different in important ways (van Eemeren et
al. 1996: ch. 10). The agreement is expressed in the term dialectics; the replacement of
formal by pragma (short for 'pragmatic') refers to the differences. The pragmatic elements in
pragma-dialectics are primarily inspired by insights from the work of 'ordinary language
philosophers' such as Austin (1962), Searle (1969, 1979) and Grice (1975); the dialectical
elements are inspired by insights from the work of critical rationalists such as CrawshayWilliams (1957), Popper (1972, 1974) and Barth and Krabbe (1982).
The metatheoretical starting points of pragma-dialectics manifest themselves in four
methodological principles (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984: 7-18, 1992a: 9-11). The
first principle is 'functionalisation': argumentation is conceived as a 'complex' speech act.
The second principle is 'socialisation': argumentation is put into an interactional context. The
third principle is 'externalisation': argumentation is immediately connected with the
commitments created by the performance of this speech act. And the fourth principle is
'dialectification': argumentation is viewed as part of a 'critical discussion' aimed at resolving
a difference of opinion.
An important difference between pragma-dialectics and formal dialectics is that the pragmadialectical rules have the status of necessary conditions for resolving differences of opinion,
whereas the formal-dialectical rules are production rules for generating rational arguments.
Another important difference is that the pragma-dialectical rules apply to the performance of
speech acts in the various stages of the critical discussion conducted to resolve a difference
of opinion, whereas the formal-dialectical rules pertain primarily to the use of logical
constants in making logical deductions. The pragma-dialectical ideal model of a critical
discussion is closer to an ordinary discussion in ordinary language than the formal dialogue
game.
In the pragma-dialectical ideal model of a critical discussion four stages are distinguished:
the confrontation stage, the opening stage, the argumentation stage and the concluding stage
(van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992a: 35). In the confrontation stage a participant in the
discussion - in the role of 'protagonist' - puts forward a standpoint and another participant as 'antagonist' - expresses doubt concerning the acceptability of the standpoint or contradicts
it (in the latter case the situation is already more complicated). In the opening stage, which is
in practice often largely implicit, the point of departure of the discussion is determined. Here
the question becomes what are the common starting points and which rules are being
observed? Then the protagonist advances argumentation in the argumentation stage to
defend his or her standpoint and adds, if necessary, new arguments to answer further critical
reactions. If the arguments that are advanced lead to the acceptance of the standpoint by the
antagonist in the concluding stage, the difference of opinion has been resolved; this is also
the case if the protagonist withdraws the standpoint because of the critical reactions of the
antagonist.
Besides an ideal model of the speech acts that are to be performed in the various stages of a
critical discussion by a protagonist and an antagonist who make an attempt to resolve their
difference of opinion in a reasonable way, the pragma-dialectical discussion procedure also
includes a series of basic rules which together constitute a code of conduct for reasonable
discussants (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1982, 1984, 1992a, 1992c). The problemsoundness of the rules consist in the fact that the maintenance of these rules prevents the
performance of speech acts that are obstructions or impediments to the resolution of a
difference of opinion. Each violation of a pragma-dialectical rule amounts to an incorrect
discussion move. This can happen in each stage of the discussion. The incorrectness
involved generally resembles one or more of the well-known fallacies or a similar offence
against reasonableness (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992a: 102-207, 1992c, 1995a). A
clear example is the violation of the 'freedom rule' that the parties are not allowed to prevent
each other from advancing standpoint or expressing doubt by discrediting the other party in
the way that is known as the fallacy argumentum ad hominem (van Eemeren and
Grootendorst 1992b, 1995b).
4 Specific areas of interest in the study of argumentation
4.1 Reconstructing implicit reasons
The crucial problems of analyzing oral or written argumentative discourse pertain to
'implicit reasons', 'argument schemes' and the 'structure of argumentation'. Before they can
be properly dealt with, it must first be clear exactly which standpoints are being defended
and which reasons are given in their defence. This raises the fundamental question of how
utterances can be identified as standpoints or as argumentation. In pragma-dialectics, both
standpoints and argumentation are defined as (complex) speech acts that are characterized
by the commitments assumed by the speaker or writer when performing a speech act. In
practice, indications of these commitments are often provided by the presentation of the
speech act in a certain context and situation, the reaction given to the speech act and the way
in which the discourse is continued (Houtlosser 1998).
'Implicit reasons' (or unexpressed premises) constitute a central problem in the
reconstruction of argumentation. How can argumentative elements that have not been
expressed explicitly be systematically detected? It was only after 1975 that this problem
really started to catch the attention of modern argumentation theorists. As long as the formal
logical approach was still dominant, it did not play a meaningful role. In logic the starting
point is that arguments have explicit premises and an explicit conclusion, but argumentation
in ordinary language also contains all kinds of implicit elements.
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1981a) argued that the problem can best be approached by
viewing implicit reasons (or unexpressed premises) as 'conversational implicatures' and
using Grice's derivation scheme for making them explicit. It is clear that this approach has
not yet answered all the questions there are. A watertight method for determining
systematically a - let alone the - correct reconstruction of an implicit reason is still not
available. So much is clear that the goal should not be to find out what the speaker or writer
'really had in mind', but to determine (1) to which proposition in the context and situation
concerned the speaker or writer can be held committed which not only (2) makes the
argument underlying the argumentation valid, but also (3) adds something to the explicit
argumentation. Van Eemeren en Grootendorst speak of looking for the 'pragmatic optimum'
(1992a: 64-68, see also van Eemeren et al. 1995). Here is an example:
Shawn loves singing, because he is Irish.
(Irish people love singing)
(pragmatic optimum that constitutes the implicit reason)
Each of the three requirements that are just mentioned has its own problems. In the current
literature on implicit reasons authors are usually mainly concerned with the question
whether 'validity' should be taken exclusively as deductive validity and the question of how
implicit reasons can be distinguished from other implicit elements in argumentative
discourse. Among those who are in favour of 'reconstructive deductivism' are van Eemeren
and Grootendorst (1992a), Thomas (1986), Johnson and Blair (1977) and Groarke (1992);
adversaries are Govier (1997) and Hitchcock (1987). The first one who emphasized the
importance of distinguishing between implicit reasons and, for instance, presuppositions is
Ennis (1982). As a distinguishing feature of implicit reasons he considers their function of
bridging the gap between explicit reasons and conclusions. Gilbert (1991) and Blair (1992)
try to clarify the bridging function of implicit reasons by making use of the theoretical
notions of topos and 'argument scheme'.
4.2 The importance of deductive validity
The role of formal logic is discussed in a more philosophical sense with regard to the criteria
for evaluating the soundness of argumentation. This discussion focuses on the logical
soundness criterion of 'deductive validity'. Deductive validity is the criterion of allowing
formal derivation which means that an argument is valid if and only if it is a substitution
instance of a formally valid argument form which is such that it cannot be the case that true
premises lead to a false conclusion. This is for example the case in the following argument
which is bases on the argument form know as modus ponens:
Argument:
Premise 1: If Peter comes, then Mary comes.
Premise 2: Peter comes.
Conclusion: Mary comes.
Argument form:
Premise 1: p --> q
Premise 2: p
Conclusion: q
Apart from the exceptional logical die-hard, none of the present day argumentation theorists
still thinks that 'deductive validity' deserves to be in a monopoly position. Following
Toulmin and Perelman argumentation theorists have become ever more convinced that the
role of deductive validity is relatively modest, although some logicians still argue that logic
deserves a central position in a general theory of argumentation.
As a model for argumentation in ordinary language formal logic is most fiercely attacked by
the informal logicians. To them, this is as it were at the core of their platform. Criticism
concentrates on the fact that the notion 'deductive validity' would be a norm that is too strict
and therefore inappropriate for evaluating arguments in ordinary language. If this criterion is
maintained without any qualification, almost all argumentation is invalid, if only because
when arguing in ordinary language there are always some elements which remain implicit.
This kind of criticism is most clearly expressed in Govier (1987) Problems in argument
analysis and evaluation. Nowadays some informal logicians take a more differentiated
stance. Johnson, for one, argues that although informal logic offers the best framework for
evaluating argumentation in ordinary language there is also a small role for formal deductive
logic when it comes to evaluating implications and inferences (1992: 157).
A strong defender of the 'deductivism' so despised by Govier is the, again Canadian,
logician Groarke. Groarke argues that all good arguments are deductively valid and that this
conception is a fruitful starting point for analyzing and evaluating arguments in natural
language. Those who reject every formalism and deductivism, according to Groarke, throw
the baby out with the bathwater. He pleads for 'reconstructive deductivism': when making
implicit premises explicit one tries to make the argument deductively valid (1992: 117). For
practical purposes, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1982, 1984, 1992a) advocate the same
policy in dealing with implicit premises because validating an argument in this way provides
the simplest starting point for determining what the suggested relationship between the
explicit reason and the standpoint amounts to. The British logician Fisher has a similar view,
but his view pertains to the detection of the logical form in the structure of argumentation
(1992: 170).
4.3 Distinguishing argument schemes
'Argument schemes' are among the concepts which are studied intensively by argumentation
theorists to create an alternative to the formal logical model and its deductive validity norm.
The point of departure in these studies is that in argumentative discourse, depending on the
argument scheme that is used, various types of argumentation can be distinguished. Each
type of argumentation calls for the answering of specific critical questions to evaluate the
acceptability of the argumentation concerned.
Based on the argument schemes that can be employed in attempting to convince the
interlocutor or reader, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992a) make a distinction between
three main types of argumentation: (1) symptomatic (or 'sign') argumentation, (2)
argumentation by comparison (or 'analogy'), and (3) causal (or 'teleological') argumentation.
By way of illustration I shall present an example of symptomatic argumentation in which the
argument scheme of a sign relation is used (as is indicated by the expression 'is typical of' in
the reconstruction of the implicit reason 1.1'):
symptomatic argumentation:
1 That restaurant must be expensive. [because]
1.1 It seems to have three stars. [and]
1.1' (It is typical of restaurants with three stars that they are expensive.)
argument scheme of a sign relation:
1 For X holds Y
1.1 because: For X holds Z
1.1' and: Z is typical of Y
The argument schemes of argumentation by comparison and causal argumentation are as
follows:
argument scheme of a relation of analogy:
1 For X holds Y
1.1 because: For Z holdsY
1.1' and: Z is similar as X
argument scheme of a teleological relation:
1 For X holds Y
1.1 because: For X holds Z
1.1' and: Z leads toY
With these three main types of argumentation correspond, resulting from the use of the
argument schemes of a sign relation, a relation of analogy or a teleological relation, three
different sets of critical questions. In a critical discussion as envisaged in pragma-dialectics
these are the critical questions the other party in the discussion is supposed to advance. Of
course, each type of argumentation comprises a whole series of subtypes (such as
'pragmatic' argumentation with causal argumentation) that require more and more specific
critical questions. Kienpointner (1992a, 1992b) is an author who made a broad inventory of
argumentation (sub)types and argument schemes distinguished in the literature and by him.
4.4 Determining the structure of argumentation
A central problem in the research concerning the analysis of argumentative discourse is the
determination of the structure of argumentation. The argumentation structure of a text,
speech or discussion is determined by the way in which the reasons that are advanced hang
together and jointly support the standpoint that is defended. An adequate evaluation of the
argumentative discourse cannot take place as long as it is not clear what the argumentation
structure is. What kind of structural relations can be distinguished? Initially this problem
was only dealt with in practical textbooks. Later it also become an important subject in
theoretical publications such as Freeman's (1991) Dialectics and the macrostructure of
arguments and Snoeck Henkemans' (1992) Analysing complex argumentation. The oldest
model for the analysis of the structure of argumentation dates back to Beardsley's (1950)
Practical logic; this model is most popular among informal logicians, such as Thomas
(1986). In Practical reasoning in natural language Thomas (1986) distinguishes four
different structures: (1) 'convergent' argumentation in which two or more reasons support a
standpoint independently, (2) 'divergent' argumentation in which one reason supports two or
more standpoints, (3) 'serial' argumentation in which one reason is itself again supported by
another reason, and (4) 'linked' argumentation in which two or more reasons depend on each
other and support the standpoint only when taken jointly.
In the pragma-dialectical classification of complex argumentation a distinction is made
between (1) 'coordinative' argumentation (with a combined line of defence), (2) 'multiple'
argumentation (with separate lines of defence) and (3) 'subordinative' argumentation (with a
continued line of defence). This classification is explained in van Eemeren and Grootendorst
(1992a) with the help of some examples:
We had to dine out, because there was nothing left at home and all shops were closed.
(coordinative argumentation structure)
It is impossible that you saw my mother last week in Sheringham in Marks and Spencer's ,
because my mother died two years ago and Sheringham does not have a Marks and
Spencer's.
(multiple argumentation structure)
I need not help you painting next week, because next week I do not have any time because I
have to work for an exam then.
(subordinative argumentation structure)
In spite of the differences in terminology, in the descriptions of the various argumentation
structures and in the diagramming, the distinctions that are made in the argumentation
literature are about the same. A problem in all approaches is - put in pragma-dialectical
terms - the distinction between coordinative and multiple argumentation. Snoeck
Henkemans (1992) looks for a solution into the dialogue situation, in which coordinative
argumentation fulfils a different function than multiple argumentation. Another problem is
the representation in the argumentation structure of counterarguments and hypothetical or
suppositional arguments. Freeman (1991) propose a special notational system for these
cases. Snoeck Henkemans (1992) also discusses the location of counterarguments and
refutations of counterarguments in the argumentation structure. Fisher (1989) pays special
attention to the analysis of suppositional argumentation.
4.5 Detecting fallacies
By far the most popular topic in the study of argumentation are the fallacies. Virtually every
normative theory of argumentation includes a treatment of the fallacies. In some sense the
quality of a normative theory of argumentation can even be judged from the degree to which
it makes it possible to provide an adequate analysis of the fallacies. Conversely, it stands to
reason that giving an analysis of notorious fallacies can in turn be conducive to the
examination of the norms of sound argumentation. A major source of problems in the study
of fallacies is the logico-centric definition of a fallacy as an argument which seems valid but
is not valid, which has been for a long time been adhered to in the so-called standard
treatment of the fallacies (van Eemeren et al. 1996: 51-74). In some cases the examples
given to illustrate this definition are already inconsistent with this description. Take for
instance the fallacy of many questions: 'When did you stop beating your wife?' In this
example there is no argument. And, viewed logically, circular reasoning, also known as
petitio principii or begging the question, is not invalid. 'Rome is the capital of Italy,
therefore Rome is the capital of Italy' is a perfectly valid argument. Since Hamblin (1970)
published his book Fallacies there is a general awareness that the standard treatment suffers
from crucial shortcomings.
Starting already in 1972, the Canadian logicians Woods and Walton have continuously
attempted to enhance the level of the study of fallacies (van Eemeren et al. 1996: ch. 8.2).
Until the beginning of the eighties their efforts were in the first place logically-oriented: by
exploring advanced logical systems, such as modal and deontic logic, they hoped to arrive at
a more satisfactory analysis of a number of fallacies. This is the approach they demonstrate,
for instance, in their textbook Argument: The logic of the fallacies (1982) and in Fallacies
(1989), a collection of their joint papers.
Around 1985 a pragmatic turn has been made, particularly by Walton, which resulted in
logic (in)validity no longer being the only norm (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1989). In
Arguer's position (1985), Informal fallacies (1987) and a great number of later books (1995,
1996, 1998, 1999) Walton examines by means of case studies in which contexts and
situations a fallacy is really a fallacy and when a certain move is in fact not a fallacy at all
but a correct discussion move. His conclusion is that there are various types of dialogues,
constituting different types of argumentative contexts. In his opinion, fallacies are incorrect
dialectical shifts from the one type of dialogue to the other (1992). In Commitment and
dialogue this idea is used by Walton and Krabbe (1995) as a point of departure for further
theorizing.
Walton's change of vision marks a trend among argumentation theorists, and led by Walton,
to regard fallacies no longer without exception as incorrect moves. Opposite the 'moderates',
however, who are inclined to take due account of 'mitigating circumstances', are the
'orthodox', who fear that this will lead to an unsystematic ad hoc approach. In their - not yet
highly developed - epistemic approach, Biro and Siegel (1992), for instance, regard fallacies
as failed argumentative attempts to increase our knowledge of the world. The pragmadialecticians van Eemeren and Grootendorst think that any violation of a discussion rule
should be viewed as a fallacy that endangers the resolution of a difference of opinion. On
the basis of the various discussion rules it can be indicated what exactly went wrong (van
Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992a, 1992c, 1995a).
A new and different contribution to the study of fallacies are the experimental empirical
tests regarding the extent to which the norms developed on theoretical grounds are in
agreement with those favoured by ordinary participants in argumentative discourse. Starting
from the pragma-dialectical discussion rules, van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Meuffels
(together with Garssen and others) have started a series of tests that are aimed at achieving
more clarity on this matter. They methodically check whether, and how strongly, different
kinds of violations of the various discussion rules are considered 'wrong' moves by ordinary
judges (1999, with Verburg 1998).
5 The infrastructure of the discipline
The study of argumentation is characterised by its interdisciplinary, or in any case
multidisciplinary, character. Its progress depends on contributions from a great variety of
fields: philosophy, logic, (speech) communication, linguistics, psychology, sociology,
rhetoric, law, etc. Several professional societies promote the study of argumentation. The
most important are the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA) and its
associate the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), the Association for
Informal Logic and Critical Thinking (AILACT), the American National Communication
Association (NCA) and its subdivision the American Forensic Association (AFA).
These - and other societies and academic institutions - regularly organize conferences on
argumentation, which are usually multidisciplinary, and often international. Since 1986
ISSA organizes every four years its general congress in Amsterdam: the "Olympics of
argumentation theory". Furthermore, all kinds of argumentation conferences and colloquia
are held all over the world, such as the conferences organized by OSSA, the Alta
conferences of the American Forensic Association, the Argumentation conference in
Venice, sponsored jointly by Wake Forest University and ISSA, special sessions of the
International Society for the History of Rhetoric, and the regular symposia on special topics
at the University of Amsterdam.
Several journals are exclusively devoted to the study of argumentation. The most prominent
are Argumentation (since1987), Informal Logic (since 1978, after having appeared until
1984 as Informal Logic Newsletter) and Argumentation and Advocacy (since 1988 the
continuation of the Journal of the American Forensic Association, which started in 1954).
The journal Argumentation publishes annually an annotated bibliography of publications on
argumentation. The following scholarly journals also frequently host studies of
argumentation: Communication & Cognition, Communication Monographs, Journal of
Communication, Journal of Philosophy, Journal of Pragmatics, Logique et Analyse,
Philosophy and Rhetoric, Quarterly Journal of Speech.
© Frans H. van Eemeren, 2002
________
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