YUSUFELI
RESETTLEMENT ACTION PLAN
CONCEPTUALIZING THE RESETTLEMENT ISSUE AND
EVALUATING THE ADEQUACY OF THE CURRENT TERMS OF
REFERENCE
AYSE KUDAT
SOCIAL ASSESSMENT
AUGUST 30, 2000
2
Executive Summary
The Yusufeli hydropower project presents a set of unique resettlement challenges.
Many of these are addressed in the current terms of reference (TOR) for the ongoing
resettlement action plan (RAP). Several measures would be needed to upgrade the work
that would result from the current TOR so that the resulting RAP could be compatible
with international standards. To do so would involve relatively modest additional data
collection and the support of a small team of specialists experienced with international
practice.

To ensure that the current RAP is compatible with international
standards the resettlement issue and the “affected populations” could be
defined more broadly to cover: (ı) all the communities of Yusufeli that will be
adversely affected by the inundation of the road and other infrastructure
inundation and (ıı) the unique role of the town of Yusufelı ın the overall
impact area. The current TOR, with respect to its socio-economic surveys,
only includes communities whose houses and/or cultivable lands will be
inundated. Although a larger percentage of the communities will be covered
through headmen interviews, insufficient focus has been devoted to the impact
of the significantly modified road infrastructure on the county as a whole;

To carry out a broader assessment of social costs of the Yusufeli dam,
alternative road infrastructure proposals should be obtained and evaluated.
Similarly, the cost of replacing the road infrastructure and/or building one that
allows only partial connectivity within the settlements forming the county
should be evaluated. The current TOR could be expanded with regard to this;

The present uncertainly with respect to the replacement of the road
infrastructure affects people’s resettlement preferences. Should it not be
possible to develop a concrete final infrastructure plan at this stage, a
contingent analyses with respect to these preferences could be carried out. The
current TOR does not include contingent analysis nor does the current team
have experience in this relatively less well-known methodology; Because the
needed work could be based on a small but carefully selected sample, the
financial and time costs would be minimal. If analytical expertise could be
obtained, the work can be carried out in a short period of time;

Although there are many proposals for the re-construction of the Yusufeli
town, the proposal of the town people to build it in nearby higher elevations is
excluded from the official lists available. All proposed sites, including at least
one suggested by the people of Yusufeli, should be evaluated with respect to
their environmental feasibility, water availability, and social appropriateness.
There is need to launch the relevant preliminary studies without further delay
as their results should be shared with the people. If the people are informed in
a convincing manner that the financial and the environmental costs of rebuilding the entire road infrastructure as well as creating a new town in higher
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elevation from the present town would be prohibitive, a large percentage of
the current resettlement preferences could be modified;

Income restitution is the principle behind the international resettlement
standards and will be an important challenge for the Yusufeli project. There
is insufficient directive within the current TOR to allow a comprehensive
investigation of current income, especially from non-agricultural sources.
Equally important is the lack of specifications in the TOR for programs to
establish future income, especially given the role of transport and gravity
irrigation in current farm operations and of access to pastures for livestock.
Thus, it is difficult to judge whether the consultants will develop well
researched and adequately costed proposals for income restoration. Should the
draft RAP be inadequate with respect to income restitution issues, the work
could be upgraded with support of an economist with relevant experience;

A major gap in the current TOR concerns the comprehensive calculation of
all assets, incomes, infrastructure, public facilities, etc., to be lost (social
costs of the project). Also lacking is the calculation of replacement costs
depending upon alternative scenarios. Measures have already been proposed
to the team working on the current TOR to remedy these gaps (Annex 1). Any
future inadequacy with respect to the output would not be result from data
gaps but from insufficient data analysis. This, too can be remedied by a top
resettlement specialist;

The current TOR can also be strengthened with respect to institutional issues
concerning the resettlement plan design and implementation. Currently, a
large number of public agencies, ranging from DSI, the Ministry of Transport,
the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education, the General Directorate of
Rural Services, and many others, coordinated under the Provincial Governor,
are involved in resettlement implementation. This situation, in the past,
hindered the effective and timely delivery of the required infrastructure and
other resettlement arrangements. There is need to provide guidance
concerning realistic institutional modifications and innovative coordination
arrangements that would allow the effective and efficient implementation of a
RAP. DSI is already reflecting on these issues and could itself complement
the current RAP team to outline workable implementation arrangements in the
RAP;

The current TOR also provide little guidance concerning the need to design a
sustainable participation and information/communication (I/C) action
plan. Rather, several requests have been made to organize participatory
meetings to solicit people’s preferences for the preparation of the RAP.
Although these is a high level of people’s participation in the resettlement
agenda, the TOR is not explicit in the design of a sustainable participation
and I/C strategy. This deficiency too can be remedied through support of a
resettlement specialist with extensive international experience; and
4

The Yusufeli survey instrument, which was based on another dam with very
different resettlement challenges, required substantial modification and pretesting before implementation . The required changes are now in place after
the review this consultant provided (Annex 1).
To remedy the deficiencies will not be difficult if a team of internationally
recognized specialists (one in the following fields: transport/marketing,
quantitative social science/report coordinator and a senior economist) together
with two outstanding data analysts are recruited in addition to the existing
consultants working in the field. Much of any additional data that might be
needed could be obtained by this team at a minimal cost and the new
analysis/write-up could be completed in a short period of time with a good
team.
5
ISSUES PERTAINING TO THE PREPARATION OF THE YUSUFELI
DAM’S RESETTLEMENT ACTION PLAN AS PER INTERNATIONAL
(WORLD BANK) STANDARDS1
1.
The Yusufeli Dam is one part of an integrated river basin development that
can increase Turkey’s current hydroelectric capacity by more than 25% and make a
major contribution to help meet the country’s electricity needs in the future in a
way that is both non-polluting and uses the country’s renewable natural resources.
The construction of the Yusufeli dam will also make a major contribution to the life
of other dams now under construction on the Coruh river. However, there are
substantial resettlement issues that need to be met and can be met if a basin wide
approach is taken to resettlement, a resettlement action strategy (RAS) and a
resettlement action plan (RAP) are prepared, and secure implementation
arrangements are put in place, including a commitment to allocating budgetary
resources in a timely and coordinated approach.
RAS and RAP
2.
This note will focus on the RAS and the RAP based on a four day site visit to
assess (i) whether the RAS is accurately formulated; (ii) whether the terms of
reference (TOR) of the RAP consultants are adequate to meet international
standards; and if not (a) what is missing and what expertise is locally available to
fill the gaps; and (b) how the current consultants could be guided to focus on
priority areas; and (iii) the quality of the resettlement survey instrument that the
consultants will use to collect basic and baseline data.
The survey instrument.
3.
In view of the quick response requested by DSI concerning the survey
instrument, the consultant sent immediately after the site visit an assessment of the
survey instrument which is attached as Annex 1. Basically, the proposed survey
instrument mirrored that used for the Ilisu Dam whose resettlement challenges are
very different from that of Yusufeli. The consultant has made suggestions for
changing the survey instrument and for focusing on areas of concern for Yusufeli. A
revised survey instrument is now being prepared to be pre-tested in Yusufeli to
confirm its effectiveness.
1
Acknowledgement: The preparation of this note is made possible through the support of the
regional office of DSI. The regional director, Mr. Mehmet Kilinc, has generously provided
information and logistic support. His staff traveled long hours to help gather information.
6
The resettlement challenge of Yusufeli: RAS
4.
Although there is an intimate relationships between a RAS and a RAP,
many TORs for RAP lack a strategic framework. The Yusufeli TOR are no
exception in that it lacks a clear strategic objective thats fit the unique situation
of Yusufeli as a community of one town and some 60 villages, each with hamlets
and pastures, all of which are intimately connected to the town for historical,
social, economic and geographic reasons. It might be useful to set the scene for
the Yusufeli resettlement challenge since the priorities to be investigated are not
ones that are common in Turkey and in the world in that:

The most important impact of the Yusufeli Dam reservoir on
the largest number of people – perhaps over 30,000 – may well
deal with the fact that the road transport network, which is now
extensive along the entire main river and its tributaries and
which is critical to the social and economic fabric of the impact
area. A resettlement strategy that acknowledges the central
priority of transport is so unusual that it would need extensive
justification. In this context it is important to note that the
Yusufeli dam does not merely affect the settlements that will be
inundated by the dam reservoir (which would have been typical
for a great majority of dams) but might adversely impact all of
the settlements that consist of the county (ilce) of Yusufeli. The
transport network that will be inundated by the dam poses the
risk of isolating a large number of villages that will not be
inundated but will lose their transport linkage to the rest of the
communities;

The second most important impact of the dam appears to be the
inundation of the productive agricultural land in the immediate
impact area, much of which has been “built” by farm families
through transport of soil from elsewhere and which uses gravity
irrigation for intensive cultivation of mainly vegetables and
fruits with some cereals, especially rice in one area. A
resettlement strategy would therefore have to put priority on
income restoration and, if people remain in the immediate area,
on pump rather than gravity irrigation;

The destruction of housing, usually the most important aspect of
resettlement, may be, in the case of Yusufeli, important, but not
as important for the RAP as a whole, as the transport and
agricultural aspects, the former of which require substantial
investment while the latter may require a refocus on farmer
skills. The situation arises because many households will lose
their transport links and agricultural land which will be
7
inundated but not their homes, which are often built on higher
ground that may be above the reservoir level;

The central role of the town of Yusufeli (ilce merkezi), with a
population of between 5,400 and 9,000 according to different
sources, presents another unique feature of the RAP. It is
essential that the RAP evaluate through a process of social
assessment and stakeholder consultation the role of Yusufeli in
the economic and social fabric of the area and the minimum
requirements from government for the creation of a replacement
that would fulfill the economic and social functions of the
present town. Clearly, without the current transport network,
the future economy of the town will be undermined. Likewise,
without the continued economic support from the town the
villages whose transport links to the town will be lost may
experience income loses;
Because the people of the county appear to “demand” in very strong terms that
their “unity” as a county be maintained, the re-construction of the transport network
and of a new town with all the amenities that the present town may well impose
unusually high resettlement costs to the project. This demand may be impossible to
meet technically and may present high environment costs given the characteristics of
the terrain. The people claim that they would stay in the area if their demands for
“unity” are met; yet, the county has displayed an enormously high outmigration rate
over the past decades despite its “unity”. This has only slowed during the last year
because of the fear of the earth-quake that resulted in large scale damage in towns,
such as Adapazari, where the immigrants from Yusufeli concentrate. The people
believe that the fear of earth-quake, on the one hand, and the enhanced opportunities
for employment that would result from the construction activities associated with a
series of dams under construction in the region would help reduce outmigration from
the Yusufeli county. Thus, rather than the expected high financial costs of
reconstruction of the road infrastructure, the development of the region itself might
create the social and economic opportunities that especially the townsmen of
Yusufeli are seeking.
The nature of the resettlement issue of Yusufeli: loss of social capital resulting
from dam impacts on transport infrastructure.
5.
There is increasing concern with social risks of large scale investments
among the international loan agencies as well as the governmental organizations
responsible for loan guarantees (Export Credit Agencies-ECAs). Civil society is also
better organized to prevent the large social costs of development activities from
being shouldered primarily by a relatively small number of people. The awareness of
risks is especially high in the hydropower sector, yet actions taken to reduce them
continue to be weak around the world and in Turkey.
8
6.
The resettlement activities associated with large-scale projects are usually
under-resourced both financially and in terms of human resources. Thus, the single
most important criterion in making a judgement concerning the appropriateness and
adequacy of a resettlement plan continues to be a realistic assessment of its
costs/implementation potential. Plans can be made to look good on paper and may
even reflect good intentions with regard to their implementation. Yet, institutional
fragmentation, inadequacy of funding, changing government priorities during the
course of the project may all result in the neglect of resettlement activities. Although
the international community requires that resettlement plans be prepared using
World Bank standards, a large number of projects financed by this organization also
lack rigor in their preparation. The World Bank thus continues to cancel its funding
for infrastructure projects when planned resettlement activities are not implemented.
There are indications that ECAs will provide funding for development investments
conditional to their sustained care for social and environmental costs.
7.
The major risks consist of:







Landlessness,
Homelessness,
Marginalization,
Food insecurity,
Increased morbidity,
Loss of common property resources, and
Community disarticulation.
It is rather rare for specialists to be able to identify resettlement situations where the
major risk is community disarticulation. This is a unique feature of the Yusufeli
case and sets it apart from other hydropower projects. In Yusufeli there is a high
“perceived” risk of community disarticulation. This perception has a concrete reality
associated with the loss of the transport network that now defines the Yusufeli
community.
8. Before reviewing the other risks typically associated with dam projects, it may
be helpful to explain what the risk of community disarticulation means in the
concrete case of Yusufeli. What makes Yusufeli unique is its enormous social capital
and the pride its people take in being from Yusufeli (“Yusufelili”)2. One thing that
everyone agrees upon is the presence of enormously high levels of trust in Yusufeli
as the following comments by the people of the town testify:
“No one commits crime.”
“The prison is built to be vacant”.
2
The regional director of DSI explained to the consultant that he was a high school student when he
first heard a radio program about Yusufeli, about the character of the town: honesty and hard work. To date
he has not forgotten it. When the TV was introduced to Turkey and then newly married, he watched
another program on Yusufeli. He and his wife then knew they had to visit the area and they did. Decades
later, ironically, he was appointed to his position in Artvin at a time when the Yusufeli community may be
fragmented.
9
“No store will take the goods they display on the street indoors at
night”.
“No one from Yusufeli would every want to change their birth
certificate to another location in Turkey regardless of how long ago they
might have migrated; being from Yusufeli is the single greatest reference for
honesty that anyone can have”.
“Every employer would feel lucky to have an applicant from Yusufeli”.
“People from Yusufeli would dig into rocks with their hands to rebuild
their community as long as they are not denied the opportunity to do so”.
9.
Thus, it is the risk of loosing social capital, trust, presence of strong social
ties that the people find particularly threatening. This is more so in the town than
in the village communities since the social capital is translated3 into profitable
business in the town. To maintain the county and, more importantly, to expand the
social and economic base of their community, a large number of other villages,
among them a previous county center (ilce merkezi), came forward offering their
settlements to serve as the new center of Yusufeli county. However, in each the
villagers say that “if the center could be built near the current town of Yusufeli, that
would be fine”. Needless to say, the risk of community disarticulation is more
strongly felt within the town of Yusufeli than elsewhere primarily because a large
percentage of the town population makes a living by serving its periphery
10.
Yusufeli is more than the town that serves as the county center: it is a
community of 60 settlements closely connected to one another. Over the years the
connectivity between each of the settlements has improved through transport
infrastructure and the town of Yusufeli came to be the center (ilce merkezi) because
the previous center did not provide the same connectivity as the present center. The
center and periphery is connected both through strong economic ties and through
well-knit social ties. The town itself is composed primarily of migrants from the
periphery, many of whom appear to maintain double residents in the town and in the
village. Should the new Yusufeli center not be established in close proximity to the
present center but a new location is chosen in one of the extreme points of the five
different and otherwise disconnected valleys the town of Yusufeli itself will largely
be fragmented and many of its residents will migrate to areas outside the region once
they receive their compensation payments. Thus, avoiding the risk of community
disarticulation is equated with the rebuilding of the existing transport network that
enables all the villages and the center to maintain a “community”. A similarly strong
sense of county solidarity cannot be found elsewhere in Turkey and has evolved in
the case of Yusufeli over time through improved transport network and migration to
the county from the periphery villages.
3
In this sense also Yusufeli is a textbook case: the central settlement (town) is truly the center of all
settlements that compose the county.
10
11.
Of the remaining risks, the loss of access to common property resources, of
pastures, forests, etc., also appear important with significant income
implications. Marginalization is likely to be a high risk for some of the partially
affected settlements and those that have been left outside the scope of the Terms of
Reference (TOR) now under implementation. Severe health problems and food
insecurity may not be important risks and the present TOR specifically aims at the
establishment of the risk of homelessness and landlessness. Preliminary interviews
suggest that unlike other resettlement situations, both homelessness and landlessness
are perceived as less important. First, a great many people have already migrated
from the region and some have multiple homes. Many also have close relatives
elsewhere in Turkey and a large number continues to make a living from seasonal
labor, working about half the year in western Turkey and returning home the rest of
the time. Secondly, there does not appear to be scarcity of land in the area as
evidenced by some 7 villages coming forward to host a whole town and being able
to show the availability of sufficient land. The villages that will be inundated also
point to the availability of village lands in mezras or pastures and are willing to take
up residence there provided that the transport network will provide them easy access
to other centers.
12.
In conclusion, the risk of loss of social capital or community
disarticulation, loss of access to common property resources as well as
marginalization appear to be high perceived risks of the dam construction. There
risks are not addressed in the TOR under implementation. As such the
resettlement issue of Yusufeli is not adequately addressed. The loss of social
capitalandcommunitydisarticulationhavemajortangible and measurable implications.
For instance, all business in Yusufeli town takes place on the basis of trust; most
customers take goods with a promise to pay and most shop keepers can show their
books with merely a list of expected payments; no legal transactions are needed. The
people note that the breaking up the unity of the county will severely reduce their
incomes from commercial activities and they will, thus, have no reason to stay. The
farmers will likewise be affected in their ability to obtain farm inputs and to market
their goods even though their homes and/or land may not be impacted. The redesign
of the draft surveys and other research instruments might offer a remedy to
this issue. DSI is now working with the Consultants to make the necessary
changes based on this consultant’s comments (Annex 1).
13.
As a consequence of casting the resettlement issue in the typical sense of risk
of inundation of homes and land, the affected populations have also been
somewhat narrowly determined in the current TOR. Given the scope of the
current TOR, this issue might not be fully remedied without additional
resources. The current team, with support from international experts and some local
staff, should be able to fill this gap without incurring excessive expenses.
Current TOR Objectives and Compatibility with the International Standards
14. The international standards for resettlement action increasingly require a
“development” approach. As such the purpose is not merely to compensate the
people for their assets and finding available land and relocating those seeking state
11
support. The internationally accepted World Bank standards minimally require the
following:

Avoiding or minimizing involuntary displacement.

Restoring and improving incomes and living standards.

Allocating resources and sharing benefits.

Moving people in groups.

Promoting participation.

Rebuilding communities.

Protecting customary rights and access to common property resources.

Establishing sound institutional mechanisms for the implementation of the RAP.

Preparing essential instruments to address resettlement issues.
15.
Of the above principles some have been incorporated into the current TOR,
and measures can be taken to ensure that the rest is also done with additional
resources and know-how. The following section provides some proposals to upgrade
the current TOR to international standards. To do so, we shall start with a discussion
of the adequacy of essential instruments incorporated in the TOR. These instruments
consist of:

A baseline income survey.

A detailed resettlement plan.

A relocation timetable corresponding to advances in dam construction.

A distinct budget for resettlement.
16.
A baseline income and socio-economic survey is included in the current
TOR. However, the TOR is insufficiently specific to establish direct and indirect
incomes, and incomes from non-agricultural activities. The first draft of the socioeconomic surveys provided by the Consultants was particularly weak in this regard
and comments were provided (Annex 1) to remedy this situation. Perhaps a more
important deficiency with regard to income estimates relates to the fact that the
examination of the interrelationship of income levels, transport and marketing
networks, and social capital are not requested in the TOR. This be done with a
more experienced, but small, team.
17.
The TOR also asks that a Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) be prepared by the
Consultants. However, insufficient guidance is provided as to how this should be
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done4. In addition, the TOR does not provide an adequate definition of the
“affected populations”. There is an implicit sense that the RAP would basically
deal with the resettlement and income restoration issues of those who seek support
from the state for resettlement. If the RAP concerns itself merely with this group,
it may not be acceptable by international standards. If, on the other hand, the RAP is
to deal with all the people whose land and/or residential areas will be fully or
partially inundated, the TOR provides little hint with regard to the planning of
income restoration problems to be confronted by the people who will ask for cash
compensation for their assets (and this ratio may be higher in Yusufeli than in dams
elsewhere in Turkey. In short, there is little focus, if any, on the RAP on the selfsettlers. This is yet another area of gap that needs to be filled to upgrade the current
RAP to international standards.
18.
As mentioned above, confining the notion of “affected populations” merely
to those whose lands and/or homes will be inundated by the dam reservoir will
likewise not meet international standards. This is because the inundation of the
transport network by the reservoir is likely to cause a dramatic fall in incomes and
living standards for some of the communities of Yusufeli. The determination of
“affected populations” can only be done once the arrangements concerning the
replacement of the transport network are completed; before than neither the
affected populations nor people’s true preferences for resettlement can be
established. 5
19.
There is also need to undertake a legislative review and determine whether
or not the current Turkish laws on expropriation and resettlement would allow a
broader definition of “affected populations” as defined above so that communities
that will lose their transport infrastructure and market connections can ask for
For instance, under D.2 of the TOR it is mentioned that “for the population affected by the dam and based
also on the socio-economic surveys, agricultural and economic investment alternatives, technical
requirements and their financial costs will be research and included in the plan”. D.3 adds that other
alternative income opportunities will be identified. “ By taking advantage of the natural and touristic
characteristics of the region, eco-tourism, hunting, fishing, hand-crafts and other activities will be
investigated and detailed proposals will be made to provide income for those families to be resettled”.
Also, “economic, financial and cost analyses will be carried out to provide the families to be resettled with
advisory services, monitoring and evaluation”. Finally, the TOR mentions that “in the resettlement areas”
and “to ensure that families affected are at least as productive as before and reach a higher standard of
living after the dam is completed, research on employment will be carried out, and studies will be
conducted to provide economic and social rehabilitation, especially to create side income for women.
Special programs will be designed for the youth and the elderly”. No addition guidance is provided as to
how, with what detail and through what types of investigative methods such programs will be designed. An
examination of previous RAPs shows that these consist merely of a similar list of activities without any
feasibility work. For the Birecik dam, for instance, the program suggested consisted of a general list:
poultry, hand-crafts and carpeting, eco-tourism, etc., and none of these has been put in place despite the
fact that the dam construction has now been completed.
5
The implication of which particular definition of affected populations would be used is of critical
importance. If only those who seek government support are provided assistance, there may be as few as
1,000 people to be concerned with. If, on the other hand, the definition includes those who will lose land
and/or housing, the number is about 13,000-15,000 depending upon how the town population is defined. If,
however, the country itself is accepted as the definition of those who are affected, the population that the
RAP is to be concerned with may reach 31,000.
4
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resettlement benefits6. This deficiency can be remedied either by the current
Consultants working on the RAP or be done by the supplementary team to upgrade
the RAP to international standards.
20.
For reasons that should be clear by now, a relocation timetable,
requirement for a RAP of international standards would be difficult to prepare
under the current TOR in a realistic manner; but once the alternative transport
and county center reconstruction costs are estimated and people are consulted,
the preparation of the timetable would not take much time.
21.
The most critical gap in the current TOR is the request for and
guidance on the preparation for a fully costed resettlement action plan. The
relevant costs should include

Expropriation costs

Infrastructure replacement costs, including transport7, water supply, energy,

Resettlement costs 8

Cost of advisory services, job creation programs, skills training programs and
other guidance/services to be provided to all affected populations to ensure that
incomes and living standards are improved or, minimally, restored.

Cost of re-building a county center with schools, municipal buildings, hospitals,
police station, prison, and many other facilities typically available in a town.
Why is the cost of resettlement important for the international community?
22.
The cost of land acquisition and resettlement is an integral part of the overall
cost of dam projects. Yet, most dam projects refer to engineering cost. And the cost
effectiveness of projects or the energy obtained from them is calculated on the basis
In both the villages and in the town of Yusufeli people repeatedly ask this question. “If the unity of
Yusufeli is lost, some villages are marginalized and isolated, there is risk of survival. How can some 20
villages survive if their roads are lost? Where would they go? If the transport network is not going to be
replaced, it is best that Yusufeli country is fully expropriated, the area is declared a disaster area and
converted into a national park”, demand many. Others merely ask whether this would be possible so that
the whole county pack and go away.
7
Alternative transport options, especially in the road sector for resettlement within the general Yusufelı
impact area, is needed quite quickly as it would be an important area to be discussed in a participatory way
with the affected population.
6
8
The resettlement housing/land is provided only to those who seek state support. This is often requested by
landless households and their numbers are likely to be very small in Yusufeli where most families have
assets for which they intend to get cash compensation. These families could obtain cash compensation as
well as receive credit for resettlement housing if they request. However, they are not informed of this
potential that would allow them to resettle in groups of a minimum of 30 households. This resettlement
model, largely inapplicable in other parts of Turkey, promises good results in Yusufeli where land
availability does not appear to be a problem. There is need to pursue this alternative in a timely manner.
14
of the construction costs alone. The resettlement costs are often substantially
underestimated and confined to a portion of the expropriation costs. Because a
specific and comprehensive budget is not available and/or inadequately covered,
international agencies concerned with resettlement issues hesitate to fund dam
projects (or others causing resettlement). Moreover, in most resettlement situations,
multiple actors and agencies are involved, each with a different mandate, set of
priorities and budget. If the contributions that each is to make towards resettlement
are not budgeted for, the overall required action will not take place. Thus, in the case
of Yusufeli, the road infrastructure will have to be partially or totally replaced and
this will have enormous cost implications. If these costs are not included in the total
budget of the dam’s resettlement component and concrete evidence is not provided
that the required investments will be made, the credibility of the RAP will be severely
reduced.
23.
The cost estimates and related gaps in the current TOR can also be
closed by by a competent team of specialists, complemented by an expert familiar
with the budgeting process in the Turkish context as well as with the institutional
histories of the public agencies involved.9
Meeting other international standards for resettlement
24. Minimizing involuntary displacement. Although this is a crucial requirement
for a RAP, the fact that most resettlement plans are prepared subsequent to the
technical plans hinders the interaction of social and technical engineering elements.
This is the case in Yusufeli as well; there is little that can be done to actively
pursue other dam site alternatives taking social and environmental issues into
consideration. However, the people could be more thoroughly informed of the
alternatives considered10.
25.
Restoring/improving incomes. The current TOR incorporates this concern.
As mentioned earlier, this critical issue, may not be treated to international standards
for several reasons: (a) the TOR’s specification of the affected populations is
unsatisfactory; (b) most of the income restitution directives are given only with
regard to those, probably a minority, that might request state support for resettlement;
(c) a comprehensive study of the income profile of the affected households, especially
those in the town, is complex and is made difficult11 given the budgetary constraints
9
This is necessary so that unrealistic expectation are not incorporated in the RAP budget. For instance, the
experts may calculate that the transport infrastructure replacement costs to be $800 million, or, $100
mıllıon per annum to be carried out by the road authority whose total annual budget for the province of
Artvin might have been less than 10 percent of this. Thus, knowledge of budgeting processes of individual
agencies would be important.
10 A large
group of representatives has sought an explanation from the government concerning the
resettlement implications of alternative siting possibilities. Their request has reportedly been responded
to with an official letter which explains that other alternatives were considered and were found to be
highly unsatisfactory from a technical perspective. Yet, there appears to have been no discussion of the
resettlement implications of these alternatives.
11
This could have been possible if the Consultants had several top economists in their team.
15
of the TOR; (d) modeling alternative scenarios for income restoration requires
extensive experience as well as familiarity with likely development outlooks of the
region. The current team is not likely to have the required skills in this regard; (e) a
standard list of activities that might hypothetically restore current incomes is unlikely
to satisfy credit agencies. An additional team of specialist, as defined above, would
be needed to meet this important criterion for an internationally acceptable
RAP.
26.
Allocating resources and sharing benefits. This issue has been excluded
from the current TOR and would require some consideration. This is particularly
so since several proposals have been tabled, including from officials, to allow the
affected populations to share a small percentage of the energy revenues from the dam
for a certain period of time. This can be done by a local energy economist.
27.
Moving people in groups. The TOR doesn’t mention this although existing
legislation says that for those who request state assisted resettlement, this will be done
in groups of at least 30 families, an inflexibility that is unfortunate. Since it appears
that many of those who are fully affected will not choose state assisted resettlement –
although this needs to be verified by the Consultants, moving people in groups may
not, in fact, be a major challenge for the RAP. In any case, the existing team should
be able to deal with this subject without additional input. For those who do choose
state assisted resettlement, early planning for and implementation of specific
resettlement sites will be important, especially so that resettlers are provided with
new homes and sustained income opportunities well before their existing homes and
livelihoods are inundated by the Yusufeli reservoir.
28.
Promoting participation. In other situations around the world, the
establishment of a specific participation strategy and its early implement, including
during preparation of the RAP, has been important in reducing suspicion and
ignorance concerning the costs and benefits of dams, and in shaping resettlement
policies and actions. At present, the TOR essentially confine “participation” to
holding meetings, largely for information purposes, and focus groups. It is clear that
the affected people in Yusufeli wish to have an early opportunity to be: (i) informed
about the current status and future plans of the Yusufeli Dam and of how they will be
affected; (ii) consulted about areas12 of the dam project that affect them – areas that
they broadly define ranging from issues of resettlement to those of employment
possibilities during and after dam construction; and (iii) allowed to participate in the
design of the RAP and in its implementation. There is today a high degree of
suspicion among many people and leaders of Yusufeli about “what is being done to
them”, and it is the view of this consultant that this suspicion derives more from lack
of true communications and information than from the reality of the situation. It is
therefore of great important that the TOR be enhanced using international best
practice to develop a sustainable participation strategy that defines how the
authorities wish to approach the involvement of affected people in the Yusufeli Dam
The use of computer sımulatıon, usıng GIS data and technology readıly avaılable ın Turkey that can be
projected ın vıllage settıngs, has been ınvestıgated by the consultant and could be a powerful tool ın
establıshıng a process of consultatıon and partıcıpatıon wıth affected stakeholder groups.
12
16
process and a participation action plan that will be both a sustained part of the RAP
preparation and of its implementation. This strategy/plan needs to include:

a communications/information program that will be immediate,
sustained, transparent and cover all aspects in which affected people are
interested;

a consultation plan that provides two-way flow of information, both to
the affected people and to the authorities, with independent outside
facilitation to ensure that consultation is effective; and

a participation plan that really does allow affected people to have a say in
how their future is determined with Turkish resettlement laws and
international best practice.
The required work is additional to the current TOR but can be completed by the
above mentioned small expert team.
29. Rebuilding communities. Communities that are affected and those that relocate
need to be rebuilt not just physically but socially and economically. This has been
discussed at length above and is the essence of the concerns of affected people who do
not want to lose the economic and social cohesion of what they call “Yusufeli”. The issue
is not simply to relocate the town of Yusufeli in some convenient site, although this is a
major issue, but of doing resettlement in a way that preserves existing ties. The
consultants need to consult affected people in what options they see and then ask the
consulting engineers to design and cost various alternatives that may demonstrate their
social and economic feasibility.
30. The present view of many affected people is that the authorities have decided on a
number of sites13 within which Yusufeli must make a choice, while many residents and
leaders wish, at a minimum, that other alternatives be investigated. It will be important
for the consultants to be guided by DSI on whether other alternatives can, at this stage, be
investigated since this will frame the debate and the reaction of affected people to the
final RAP, regardless of what it contains.
31. The Consultants may also wish to investigate host communities about the
availability of land and housing sites. In addition, the current Consultant should
investigate the use of Treasury land in higher elevations next to affected areas for
resettlement based on new agricultural models, including the use of pump irrigation,
should transport not be a binding constraint in these areas. It should be possible to carry
out these additional tasks within the existing contractual arrangements for the RAP
preparation.
13
Sites which they identify are associated with the villages of Kilichaya, Ogden, Sarigul, Alanbasi, Cevreli,
Ishani and Demirkent.
17
Institutional arrangements
32. The current TOR has insufficient institutional focus on implementation
arrangements and their budget implications. Currently, a large number of public agencies,
ranging from DSI, the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of
Education, the General Directorate of Rural Services, and many others, coordinated under
the Provincial Governor, are involved in resettlement implementation. This situation, in
the past, hindered the effective and timely delivery of the required infrastructure and
other resettlement arrangements. There is therefore need to provide guidance concerning
realistic institutional arrangements that would allow the implementation of a RAP. The
coordinated approach of GAP should be examined as well as the process in the Turkish
legislature of a proposal on institutional framework for resettlement, including a possible
river basin approach.
18
ANNEX 1
Comments on Survey Instruments Prepared for the Resettlement Plan of Yusufeli Dam
1. The survey instruments submitted by Sahara Muhendislik to DSI have been reviewed.
It is recommended that they be re-drafted and submitted to DSI for approval. As they
now stand they are not appropriate for the specific context of Yusufeli. The consultants
should carry out extensive field work prior to re-drafting the survey instruments. Once
they are re-submitted and approved, they should be pre-tested. The analyses of the pretests together with the original instruments should be submitted to DSI for comments
prior to the implementation of the surveys.
2. The draft research instruments submitted to DSI for approval by Sahara Muhendislik
require substantial additional work to fit the specific realities of the resettlement context
presented by the Yusufeli Dam. The drafts have been taken directly from the survey
instruments used for Ilisu Dam. The Ilisu questionnaires themselves had a large number
of problems resulting from inadequate field work and pre-testing. Replicating the Ilisu
survey in Yusufeli will not only result in the replication of these problems but would also
introduce a large number of new ones. Clearly, the drafts submitted for Yusufeli have not
been prepared by a team that conducted sufficient field work in the area; nor is there any
evidence that they have been pre-tested.
3. In the rest of this memo, a specific list of the issues relevant for the drafts submitted is
provided. However, a new draft should not be based on these comments alone. Rather,
extensive observations should be made in the affected area to prepare survey instruments
appropriate for the resettlement context of Yusufeli. Equally important is collaborate with
the regional director of DSI and other governmental organizations prior to finalizing the
surveys so that their information needs are reflected in the surveys designed to address
the specific problems to be addressed on the Yusufeli context. The suggestions of other
stakeholders, including the town people, the villagers, local government officials and
civil society organizations should likewise be reflected in the new draft to be pre-tested.
The new drafted efforts should aim to address the specific problems of Yusufeli. The
questions raised should be transparently relevant and useful for the preparation of a
resettlement action plan as well as for the ability of DSI to estimate resettlement costs.
4. Some specific comments on the various research instruments submitted are provided
below. Because the draft instruments do not meet the specific context of Yusufeli,
comments on each individual question are not provided. This should not be interpreted to
mean that individual questions excluded from the comments are appropriate.
a.
Focus groups: The type of focus group questions drafted are far too general
to be useful for any planning process. Moreover, many meetings have already been held.
The proposed exclusion of women from the focus groups is also not acceptable. Even if
the consultants hold these meetings to re-draft their research instruments, the proposed
questions are too narrow. If on the other hand, these are proposed to address specific
19
planning issues that emerge from the surveys to be conducted, they should be designed
once these issues are identified.
b. Household identification: It is unclear that the concept of “hane-reisi” is
known or relevant for the people of the region. This should be established. There should
also be a clear and agreed upon decision as to the person with whom interviews will be
held. Interviews with people outside the household should not be carried out. Interviews
with people under a certain age should likewise not be allowed. In the town, “hane no”
instead of street and apartment number has also been proposed as a means of
identification. This needs to be verified as appropriate. In the villages, house numbers
have not been used for identification. Since DSI might send an independent team to
verify that surveys have been carried out correctly, it is important that the consultants (i)
clearly establish the procedures for identification of the affected households; and (ii)
define and communicate to DSI the procedures that the consultants will use for quality
assurance and verification purposes.
c.
Respondent and household characteristics: No systematic effort has been
made in any of the draft instruments to characterize the respondents and the households.
In addition to their gender, age, number of children and education, exposure to external
labor markets, current work patterns, etc, all affect the information received. Similarly,
household composition with respect to gender, age, human resources characteristics need
to be established. The respondent characteristics in the drafts submitted appear to be
based on the assumption that the “head of the household=a man” is the respondent. In
reality an unmarried elder son or daughter might respond. Should this happen, a larger
number of households would appear “childless”.
In this context (q. 7), it is important to note that many people do not understand the
concept of "hane". Therefore, alternative concepts should be tested and reported (e.g.,
“living in this house under one roof”, etc.). Also note that “since when you are living
here” is not a clear question (q.8) as “here could be Yusufeli, the specific village or the
specific house or even the province. Also, if q.8 is relevant, it should clearly be defined
and the number of year of residence should be recorded numerically (such as 10,30,40,
etc.,). As for q.9, it is unclear as to how the responses will be recorded if there are several
school age children of various age and gender. Thus, for all household members
(including those who work outside the community on a seasonal basis) age, gender,
schooling, work and employment patterns, source of income, monthly income
contributions—including in-kind) should be recorded.
d.
Matching respondents, households, communities, and project impacts.
Eventually, the survey instruments will be analyzed within a number of interrelated
contexts. Thus, the consultants should plan to set the individual responses in the context
of their households, communities, and dam impacts. Needless to say this can be done
after the surveys are carried out, but planning for them ahead of time will be useful.
e.
Assets. Assets are the most important elements of the resettlement planning
within the Turkish context. Incomes, on the other hand, are at least equally important in
the international context. However, the draft surveys do not adequately and
20
systematically cover the asset ownership issues. Since the problems are innumerable,
several illustrations are provided. Imagine in q.10 that either an unmarried elder child, the
wife of the primary bread winner or the wife of the “household head” (who could be an
old male) were answering this question and they knew that the house title deed was
registered in the name of the old man. This would result in a “no” answer when the
household members actually own the house that one of them own. Imagine also a
situation whereby (q.11) the house consists of multiple stories, and each story is owned
(with or without a title deed) by one child who regardless of their marital status “eat from
one kitchen”. Would the survey instrument register them as multiple households each
with a separate “owned” house or one household with multiple homes? Each of these
possibilities have very different resettlement entitlement implications.
The questions dealing with the size and the type of the house are likewise
inadequate. Most households are built with mixed building materials. Thus, q. 12 is not
appropriate. All numerical questions, should be recorded numerically not in a pre-coded
manner. Since every home has some sort of a kitchen and a toilet, etc., what one needs to
establish is not merely their presence of absence but their quality. Thus, the survey should
aim to identify housing quality indicators that are locally appropriate and try to guide the
resettlement planning process by providing information that would allow DSI to estimate
the expropriation costs.
The establishment of titles is important. However, in many areas there is no
cadastre and thus no title deeds. Thus, asking ownership questions premised on titles is
misleading because it understates the assets as well as the cadastre problems faced.
Home and asset ownership outside the communities is relatively widespread and
relevant for resettlement planning. However, asset ownership outside villages is covered
merely with one misleading question (q.13) that establishes asset ownership with title
deed in a yes/no form without further details.
Ownership of homes, garden, vineyards, cultivable land, livestock, presence of title
deeds, the registration of these deeds for men, women, individual children, are all
important. Using land size measurements appropriate for the area (as donum is not used
in many parts of Yusufeli) is likewise important. Exact specification of tree and vineyard
ownership, the type, age and productivity of each tree owned is crucial. A precise
definition of the concept of “irrigated” land is likewise important as formal irrigation
supplied by DSI does not exist, but there is extensive informal irrigation. The draft
surveys for both the rural areas and the town is extremely inadequate for a clear
identification of the assets.
f. Incomes. Income restitution is likewise a critical issue, but inadequately covered
in the surveys. Direct wage, salary incomes, in-kind incomes, remittances, agricultural
incomes are not systematically covered. For instance, q.21 asks for annual income
without specifying the year. It pre-codes the answers which will cause loss of
information. It also does not specify the source of income. No family, regardless of how
educated, can answer such a general question. The concept of “others’ work=
baskalarinin isi” is not familiar to the people. Is this to mean agricultural work for other
rural families? “Do you or others from your family work for others for wages? If so, how
21
much do they receive?” The answer will depend on how many work, in what capacities,
when, where, etc., Instead, we would need to know, how many work for wages or
salaries, each for how long or how many months of the year and when did they get paid
last and how much did they get for that month or specified number of days.
Key information concerning access to pastures, mezras, yaylas, etc., are also
missing.
g.
Resettlement preferences. These questions too are more appropriate for Ilisu
than for Yusufeli. Q.28 , Q.29 are repeated. Where people will go, what decisions they
make depend on their current land ownership in “yayla”s and other mahalles (and these
have not been established). These preferences also depend on the new transport network.
Thus, the questions should aim to establish preferences in a concrete context.
i.
Transport infrastructure and marketing. The resettlement issue of Yusufeli
centers around the transport network and other social/administrative/political connectivity
factors of the 60 villages that define the county. These has been no attempt within the
survey to capture the nature of the current interrelationships, why and how important they
are in defining the quality of people’s lives. The establishment of people’s expectations
with regard to the new network is similarly very important.
j.
The town of Yusufeli. This draft suffers from all of the above concerns. In
addition, it is totally inappropriate to capture the income profile of the town where most
people make a living from commercial activities. Multiple asset ownership is widespread,
thus giving the town people ample opportunities to return to their original villages. In
addition, rental house and especially shop occupancy is widespread and extremely
relevant for resettlement. There is a need to fully re-design the Yusufeli town
questionnaire.
k. Headmen surveys. These contain a great deal of information already covered in
the household surveys and are thus not functional. Secondly, they attempt to obtain some
information of infrastructure without any attempt to define the extent and quality of the
infrastructure. Also, they exclude crucial concerns relevant for the transport, marketing
and communications network.
Summary: The draft research instruments are not useful for resettlement
planning purposes and are not relevant for the specific context of Yusufeli. There is a
major risk that the information gathered through these instruments as presently defined
will not produce an appropriate resettlement plan and, therefore, could result in an
extremely negative reaction on the part of the affected people and their political
representatives. In addition to the above comments, any redesign of the instruments needs
to take account of the fact that the Yusufeli situation differs greatly from others in that:

the most important impact of the dam reservoir on the largest number of
people may well deal with the fact that the transport network, which is now
22
extensive and critical to the social and economic livelihood of the area, will
be inundated for almost all affected people.

The second most important impact of the dam reservoir appears to be the
inundation of agricultural land that would need to be replaced using different
agricultural technology, especially for those people who will retain their
houses but not their land following dam construction.

The destruction of housing, usually the most important aspect of resettlement,
may be, in the case of Yusufeli, important, but not as important for the
resettlement plan as a whole as the transport and agricultural aspects.

Since a new town has to be created for the resettlement of the town of
Yusufeli it would be essential to understand through a process of social
assessment, stakeholder consultation and citizen participation what are the
minimum requirements from government for the creation of a replacement
town that would fulfill the economic and social functions of the present town.
The draft research instruments need to be re-designed with these comments taken into
account.
23
ANNEX II:
Mission Notes
Preface
The consultant was asked to visit the Yusufeli Dam impact area by DSI and the
consortium. The consultant wishes to express her appreciation to the regional director of
DSI, Mr. Mehmet Kilinc, who hosted her and provided his staff to accompany her in the
area. The consultant also wishes to thank the regional governor who met with her and
presented his views on the challenges surrounding the Yusufeli Dam. The consultant was
able to visit Yusufeli town on three separate occasions, to see the seven proposed
resettlement sites14, and to have focus groups interviews in villages and hamlets that will
be partially or fully affected by the Yusufeli reservoir and in the town of Yusufeli. The
consultant also wishes to express her thanks to the mayor of Yusufeli, Mr. Yusuf Saglam,
who accompanied her on several of her visits and who arranged a meeting and a luncheon
attended by the local leaders of the six major political parties.
Mission Impression – Overview
The dam site and reservoir area represent a classic hydroelectric generation site:
narrow valleys with high volumes of water descending rapidly between high mountains.
The potential population of about 30,000 that would be affected partially or fully by the
Yusufeli reservoir can be divided into four separate groups:

6-7,000 who live in the Ispir valley15 connected to Yusufeli town by a road
system of about 55 km;

6-7,000 who live in the Barhal valley connected to Yusufeli by a road system
of about 60 km;

6-7,000 who live in the Oltu/Tartum combination of valleys connected to
Yusufeli by a road system of about 65 km; and

6-9,000 people who live in Yusufeli town which is the center connecting the
three valley systems.
In total there appear to be about 31,000 potentially affected people in the three
valleys living in some 60 villages, often with hamlets and in Yusufeli town. The
dispersed nature of the villages and hamlets may derive from the fact that agricultural
land is largely in narrow strips along the river, although there are occasional broader
areas to the southwest.
14
The sites are identified by the association with the following villages: Kilickaya, Ogdem, Sarigol,
Alanbasi, Cevreli, Ishani and Demirkent.
15
There are, in fact, five separate valleys which will be inundated by the reservoir: one to the north towards
Sarigol, one to the west towards Ispir, and three to the east which this report combines into one.
24
Transport
An overpowering impression, reinforced by almost every discussion the consultant
had, concerned the vital role that road transport plays in the social and economic life of
the impact area. One of the three valley systems has no access to other areas other than
through Yusufeli town; for the two other valley systems, Yusufeli town is the nearest
commercial and administrative center. The roads, which have been constructed, often to
paved standards, in all of these valley systems, near the river in most cases, will be
flooded by the reservoir. If people remain in the impact area, replacing the transport
network, either by road or by water, or by a combination, appears to be of the highest
priority and of the greatest concern to the affected population. It will be a challenge for
engineering consultants to provide road transport options built either on the mountain
slopes or higher up so that people are able to remain in the impact area. Without access
to road transport, resettlement within the impact area would be made impossible as would
be the survival of some of the villages. Unit prices to calculate the overall cost of road
transport should be readily available from the road network currently being constructed
around Artvin in similar if not more demanding conditions.
The Economy
The people in the river valleys outside of Yusufeli town land derive their income
largely from agriculture in the river valleys, often in narrow bands of built land next to
the river that is irrigated, largely by gravity systems from upriver, although there is some
pump irrigation. The land has often been built suggesting great innovation and dynamism
on the part of the population. It is repeatedly said that much of the cultivated land is
created by the people physically carrying soil from wherever they could obtain it. There
is also livestock raising based on the use of highland pastures. The farm systems use
intensive methods to cultivate fruits and vegetables with some cereal production. The
fruit and vegetable production requires access to transport since much of it appears to be
sold “as is” rather than processed. There is also some fish-farming and tourism, often
based on weekend travel from neighboring cities.
The economy of Yusufeli town needs to be studied more in-depth, but appears to be
based on its role as an administrative and commercial center for the surrounding river
valley populations. Without the transport network, it is not clear what Yusufeli would
serve economically and therefore it would be greatly diminished, as its predecessor as
county seat, Ogdem, was many years ago.16 The enormous social capital that Yusufeli has
built up is described in the main report. Suffice it to say that the people and political
leaders of Yusufeli feel that the value of their town has not been appreciated so far by the
16
It is ironic that Ogdem , the previous county seat, is proposed as one of the sites for the new Yusufeli
since Ogdem lost its importance with the development of the road system and commercial marketing in the
mid 20th century. Reached by a difficult road with great elevation, Ogdem, a beautiful and tranquil high
altitude village, is a challenge to reach in the summer, and more so in the winter. Today the young have left
Ogdem and most of its fields are untilled. Two people live in Ogdem year around, one of whom was mayor
when it was still the county seat. Ogdem, as an alternative site for Yusufeli, appeals to the
environmentalist and mountain spirits of all of us, but those engaged in modern agriculture and commerce
which resulted, inter alia, from the introduction of the automobile, may feel that Ogdem is more appropriate
for hiking and summer camping.
25
authorities, that their willingness to prepare their own feasibility study for a site in which
they are interested has been ignored, and they believe their political, economic and
human rights have not been respected. The RAP will have to deal with the reality of this
situation which, in international experience, is best done through a genuine and
transparent process of information/communications, consultation and participation.
The importance of Yusufeli and the depth of feeling about its future should not
obscure the fact that many of its citizens appear to have the skills and capital that might
allow them to survive elsewhere. It is also true that some are inquiring about the
possibility of establishing two county centers, not insisting that the unity of the center to
be maintained. Yet others express very strong feelings and intend to take action should
the road network not be replaced and social unity be broken. Even more important,
however, is the concern with the future of the rural villages, which are not wealthy, that
will be fully or partially inundated themselves and will be marginalized if a new transport
network is not built. The resettlement and income restoration of these people is
quantitatively the clear first priority.
Housing
Housing is often the first priority in a resettlement plan. There are indications that it
is the third priority with regard to Yusufeli for two reasons: first, a fair number of
housing in affected communities are built on the hillside and therefore will be spared,
even when agriculture and transport are inundated; and second, the higher priority that
affected people seem to put themselves, although this has to be verified through
systematic surveys and focus groups, on transport and income generation, especially in
agriculture. Even in Yusufeli, housing appears to be less of a concern than community
preservation. The Yusufeli area does, however, contain a clear warning about
resettlement and housing that is not connected to economic reality. Clearly visible from
the road, on a barren hillside along one of the valleys, sits an apartment house constructed
by government to resettle ten families whose homes had been destroyed in a fire. The
apartment house looks attractive from a distance. Closer up, one sees that the area around
the apartment house is largely barren, and the apartment house largely unused. Nine of
the families never moved into this barren place, preferring to remain near their original
homes; the one family that did move in is evidently far from self-sustaining.
There appears to be substantial rental phenomena in the town center. Of the tenants
many are shop owners. The restitution of their income will depend upon the availability
of new rental opportunities in the resettlement site. This is an issue that needs to be more
systematically studied in the socio-economic surveys and included (with associated costs)
in the RAP.
Public Services and Facilities
While it was not possible to take a stock of the public sector services and facilities
in the town and the villages, the town is particularly well equipped with them. To replace
the health facilities, the schools, the office of the county governor, the municipal
buildings, piped water system, the energy network, banks and other credit facilities, large
26
number of buildings that belong to various associations such as the association of traders
will be a gigantic task that needs to start without any delay. To do so will not be easy and
the people are not hopeful that it can be done. They note that everything else takes an
enormously long time to do. In addition, many of the public agencies (with the exception
of the Ministry of Education) may be short of funds to start or complete the work. Most
important of all, none of the relevant cost calculations have been made. And the issue has
not been included in the Terms of Reference RAP effort which has already been
launched.
Integrated River Basin Management for Resettlement
The Coruh river basin is being developed in an integrated manner for dam
development and the achievement of efficient hydroelectric power generation. The
authorities may wish to consider whether resettlement, and non-hydro development
possibilities, should also be seen in an integrated manner. Specifically with regard to
resettlement, the different dam sites and their reservoirs will have similar resettlement
challenges as well as site specific characteristics. However, viewing resettlement in an
integrated manner would have a number of advantages:

Resettlement costs can be spread across more than one dam investment leading to
an evening out of costs and benefits;

Specific resettlement options, such as the role of different transport modes,
agricultural support mechanisms, job creation programs, resettlement sites in both
urban and rural areas, can be viewed in both site specific and basin terms;

Challenging issues, such as information/communications campaigns, participation
and consultation strategies, etc. can be dealt with more effectively and efficiently,
and with more commitment to their actual implementation; and

The costs and benefits for unitary responsibility for resettlement planning and
implementation may well be clarified.