Autonomic and Situational Determinants of the Subjective Experience of Emotion: An
individual difference approach
Alexander Genov
Research Division, State Farm Insurance Companies, Bloomington, IL, USA
(formerly at Clark University, Worcester, MA)
Short Title: Autonomic and Situational Determinants of Emotions
Please address correspondence to:
Alex Genov
Usability Laboratory, Strategic Resources
State Farm Insurance Companies
Three State Farm Plaza
Bloomington, IL 61791-0001
Tel: (309) 766-7746
Fax: (309) 753-1903
E-mail: alex.genov.js1v@statefarm.com
Some hold that autonomic activity is essential to emotions. Others insist that feelings can be
produced if individuals merely believe that their autonomic nervous system has been activated.
Both views are supported by data possibly because people differ in the origins of their emotional
experience. Some identify their emotions from behavioral cues (“personal”) like autonomic
activity, while others from situational cues (“situational”). Individuals were classified into
personal and situational. It was demonstrated that these two types were affected differently by
the combination of actual and believed autonomic activation. When highly aroused and
believing they were highly aroused, personal responders discounted fear, while situational
responders augmented it. Results relate facial expressions, physiological activity, and feelings,
and support Laird’s individual difference caveat.
What kind of an emotion of fear would be left, if the feelings neither of quickened heart-beats nor of shallow
breathing, neither of trembling lips nor of weakened limbs, neither of goose-flesh nor of visceral stirrings,
were present, it is quite impossible to think.
-- William James (1884, pp. 193-4)
Most authorities agree that the autonomic nervous system (ANS) plays some role in
determining the subjective experience of emotion, or the feeling. There is disagreement,
however, on the exact nature of this role. Some hold that the interoception and
interpretation of actual ANS activity is essential to emotional experience (James, 1884;
Schachter, 1964). Others insist that emotional feelings can be produced without ANS
activation if individuals merely believe that their autonomic system has been activated
(Valins, 1966). Both views are supported by extensive empirical literature. The present
paper integrates these two positions within a larger framework, namely an individual
difference theory (Laird, 1974). The premise is that there is evidence for both views
because people differ in the origins of their emotional experience: some behave according
to the first view, others according to the second.
Sympathetic activation is a necessary component of emotional experience and behavior
The view that sympathetic activation is necessary for emotional experience and
behavior was a central component of James’ theory of emotions. Evidence supporting
James’ position on the role of bodily factors in emotions first came from the work of
Marañon (1924) who injected naive subjects with epinephrine and then asked them to
describe their subjective experiences (cited in Cornelius, 1996). Most subjects reported
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experiencing a state like an emotion but devoid of genuine subjective quality. Some,
however, reported experiencing strong feelings such as intense anxiety and sadness. Those
same subjects also reported co-occurring emotional cognitions, e.g. the memory of a
deceased relative. Marañon’s results thus highlighted the role of cognitive processes in
emotional experience. Later on, Schachter (1964) developed this hypothesis incorporating
sympathetic activation (SA) and emotion-related cognitions into the “two-factor” theory of
emotion.
The basic assumption of Schachter’s theory is that emotional states are determined
by the interaction of cognitive factors with a state of undifferentiated SA. To test this
proposition, Schachter & Singer (1962) manipulated subjects’ state of SA, their awareness
of the source of SA, and the context from which explanations about emotional states can be
derived. Results indicated that within the epinephrine-injected (high SA) condition, the
situational context influenced subjects’ emotional states only if they had no adequate
explanation for their state of high SA. This provided support for Schachter’s claim on the
role of cognitions regarding the sources of arousal. Results on the role of arousal itself were
more ambiguous. It was expected that placebo (low SA) subjects would report less intense
emotional experience and would behave less emotionally than all epinephrine-injected
subjects. Contrary to expectations, placebo subjects were consistently more “emotional”
than the epinephrine-injected informed subjects.
Despite, or maybe due to, the slight mismatch between expectations and results,
Schachter’s experiment gave rise to a voluminous body of research evaluating the role of
SA in emotions (for reviews, see Reizensien, 1983; Ross & Olson, 1981). The placebo
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group results stimulated the development of a major paradigm in social-psychological
research on emotion, namely misattribution of sympathetic activation. In the case of the
placebo group, the SA naturally produced by invasive medical procedures, such as
injections, was interpreted to have affected subjects’ emotional state. On that
interpretation, placebo subjects were actually in the same position as the epinephrineinjected ignorant subjects. That is, they were aroused without having an adequate
explanation for the SA. In the epinephrine-injected informed group, on the other hand,
both natural SA and that produced by the epinephrine were presumably “explained away”
as a result of the information about the symptoms, leading to a reduced subjective
experience. This interpretation has been empirically well supported (for review, see Ross
& Olson, 1981).
Another line of research has followed the interpretation of results for Schachter’s
epinephrine-injected condition. It is known as the excitation-transfer paradigm (Zillmann,
1971). According to Zillmann (1971), “if some stimuli produce ... slowly decaying
excitation, this excitation will be carried over into subsequent, and possibly entirely
unrelated experiences. ” Here it is assumed that people do not, or cannot, distinguish the
excitation accompanying different emotions and that the transferred autonomic excitation
may trigger another emotion if the organism moves to a different situation. One way to
produce SA available for transfer is through physical exercise. Such SA has been shown to
affect feelings of anger and aggressive behavior, sexual excitation, helping giving, feelings
of elation, reactions to advertisements, and interpersonal attraction (for review, see
Zillmann, 1996).
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A major assumption of Zillmann’s work is that conscious awareness of the sources
of sympathetic excitation or arousal would prevent arousal transfer. Foster, Witcher,
Campbell, and Green (1998) have questioned this assumption based on results of a metaanalysis on the role of arousal in attraction. Foster et al. claim that arousal has an
“automatic effect on attraction that is independent of factors associated with the attribution
of arousal, such as arousal source ambiguity.” According to them, following the automatic
emotional judgment stage, “individuals may become aware that their attraction to the target
was influenced by their arousal level. Such individuals may adjust their attraction
judgment …” (p. 95). Thus, it may be the case that awareness of the sources of SA do not
completely remove the excitations transfer effects but only reduce them for some people.
In summary, various lines of emotion research provide evidence for the claim that
SA is causally involved in emotional experience and behavior. Research has shown that a
state of elevated diffuse sympathetic activation determines the intensity of emotional
experience. In line with James’ theory, this evidence shows that SA, if not necessary, is at
least sufficient in determining subjective experiences of emotion. Next, we turn to a view,
which downplays the role of actual SA in emotions, stating that it is neither necessary nor
sufficient in determining emotional experience.
SA is not a necessary component of emotional experience and behavior
Virtually dismissing the role of the physiological component of Schachter’s theory,
Valins (1966) suggests that a person need not perceive his or her actual SA in order to
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experience emotion. The mere belief that such SA has occurred, regardless of its
veridicality, is claimed to be sufficient.
To test this proposition, Valins (1966) conducted an experiment in which he
manipulated participants’ belief that their heart rate changed in response to viewing slides
of seminude females and measured their “liking” for the slides. Results showed that
subjects who heard a marked change in what they believed to be their heart rate, found the
photographs they were viewing during the change as more attractive than did subjects in the
control group. This effect was stable over a two-month period.
Parkinson (1985) considers two lines of criticism directed toward Valins’ method.
One deals with possible demand characteristics (Parkinson, 1985; Beck, Gibson, Elliot,
Simmons, Matteson, & McDaniel, 1988). Specifically, by making participants aware of
important aspects of the research question, i.e. the relationship between physiological
reactions and feelings, Valins may have inadvertently led participants to give answers in
accordance with the hypothesis. The second criticism concerns Valins’ theoretical dismissal
of the role of actual SA. This has led Valins (1966; Valins & Ray, 1967) to omit any
measurement of actual physiological indexes such as heart rate (Goldstein, Fink, & Mettee,
1972).
Despite these criticisms, data from false physiological feedback studies suggest that
emotional experience and behavior can be influenced by the mere belief that SA has
occurred, regardless of the actual physiological state of individuals. In fact, the false
autonomic feedback paradigm has been widely used and the basic results have been
replicated repeatedly (Traux, 1984). These results seemingly contradict claims regarding
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the essential role of actual SA in emotions. Resolving this apparent contradiction using an
individual difference approach, is the goal of this investigation.
Individual differences in cue response
The role of individual differences in emotional experience and behavior has been
explored in the past (e.g., Valins, 1967; Fenigstein & Carver, 1978). A research program
that has addressed this issue very systematically is that pursued by Laird and his
collaborators (Laird, 1974; Laird & Crosby, 1974; Laird & Berglas, 1975; Duncan & Laird,
1980; Wixon & Laird, 1980; Bresler & Laird, 1981). The basic premise of Laird’s
research is a self-perception one (Bem, 1972), namely that we have no privileged access to
our internal states but instead are socialized into the labeling them early in life. According
to Bem, “individuals come to ‘know’ their own attitudes, emotions, and other internal states
partially by inferring them from observations of their own overt behavior and/or the
circumstances in which this behavior occurs” (Bem, 1972, p.2). This self-perception
assertion has received substantial empirical support (Bem, 1964, 1965, 1966; Bandler,
Madaras, & Bem, 1968; for a review, see Bem, 1972).
Taking the position that our internal states are generated from the perception of our
behavior and the situation, Laird has identified individual differences in the way people use
these two kinds of information (1974; see Laird & Bresler, 1992 for review). These types
of cues have been called personal and situational, respectively (Laird & Berglas, 1975).
According to Laird’s theory, these two kinds of cues are not rivals. Rather, “it appears that
everyone uses situational cues and that the differences lie entirely in whether people also
use personal cues (Kellerman, Lewis, & Laird, 1989).”
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To examine this hypothesis empirically, Laird has applied the following basic
strategy: in a well-disguised manner, he manipulates a behavior (e.g. a facial muscle
configuration) presumed to express a feeling and then asks subjects to report on their
subjective experience. Previous research has shown repeatedly that, when asked to rate
their emotional feelings after the disguised facial expression manipulation, some people are
influenced by their facial expression (personal cue responders) while others are influenced
by cues from the situation such as the titles of abstract pictures (situational cue responders).
That is, if personal cue responders assume the facial configuration of a frown while looking
at a picture called “Spring,” they will feel more angry than happy. In contrast, if situational
cue responders make a frowning face while looking at the same “happy” picture, they will
feel more happy than angry.
These individual differences have been established most frequently in research on
the effects of facial expressions and postures. In addition, subjects whose feelings are more
affected by their emotional facial expressions, have been shown to exhibit coherent
behavioral patterns that would be predicted by self-perception theory. For example,
individuals more responsive to the facial expression manipulation, are more responsive to
the manipulation of their posture (Duclos et al., 1989), are more empathetically correct in
identifying the emotions of others when they imitate their expressions (Wixon & Laird,
1981), change their attitudes more in the induced compliance procedure (Duncan & Laird,
1977; Rodewalt & Comer, 1979), conform less (Comer, 1975), are more sensitive to pain
and tolerate less of it in the Cold Pressor Test (Genov et al., unpublished manuscript), and
so on.
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A study by Duncan and Laird (1980) examined at the relationship between the
effects of expressive behavior and of SA in a misattribution context. The facial expression
manipulation was used to divide a group of mildly snake-phobic subjects into those more
responsive to personal cues and those more responsive to situational cues. Then,
everybody was given a placebo pill. Half of participants were told that the pill would calm
them and half were told that it would arouse them. Finally, all subjects were asked to
approach and touch a live snake. Results were concordant with the predictions of selfperception theory and with data on individual differences in the use of the two kinds of
cues. Subjects who were responsive to situational cues showed a positive placebo effect:
when they were led to believe the pill would calm them, they reported feeling less fear and
showed less avoidance behavior. When they believed that the pill would arouse them, they
felt more fear and showed more avoidance behavior. For Situational cue responders, taking
a “calming” or an “arousing” pill had defined the situation as calming or arousing and this
perception of the situation translated into emotional feelings and behavior. In contrast,
subjects who were more responsive to personal cues exhibited a reverse placebo effect: if
they were led to believe that the pill would relax them, they felt more afraid. If they
believed that the pill would arouse them, they felt less afraid.
It can be argued that situational cue responders in Duncan and Laird’s (1980) study
were, in essence, showing Valins-type effects because they were acting on the belief that
they were either calm or aroused, irrespective of the veridicality of this belief. Personal cue
responders, on the other hand, exhibited effects similar to those produced by Schachter’s
injection manipulation. That is, they paid attention to their actual level of SA and
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interpreted any changes in it in light of the available cognitive explanation, i.e. expectations
about the effect of the pill.
It should be stressed that in Duncan and Laird’s (1980) study SA was neither
manipulated directly nor measured. Instead, it was assumed that there was naturally
occurring fear-related SA, which could be attributed to a neutral source (the pill). Thus, the
question of whether actual SA affects personal cue responders more remains unanswered.
This was the focus of the present study.
The present experiment
As noted above, Valins’ work on the false autonomic feedback effect has been
criticized on the basis of possible demand characteristics and the lack of measures of actual
SA. The last criticism is especially potent since Valins claims to be evaluating the role of
the actual SA component of Schachter’s two-factor theory.
Schachter and Singer’s (1962) cornerstone study on the role of autonomic and
cognitive activity has also received its dose of scrutiny and criticism. Raising some serious
objections to the original methodology, a study by Mezzacappa, Katkin, and Palmer (1999)
conceptually replicated Schachter and Singer’s epinephrine-ignorant3 condition with
several important modifications. First, Mezzacappa et al. measured SA continuously using
more reliable and valid indexes, i.e. pre-ejection period, heart rate, and skin conductance.
Second, following the recommendations of Plutchik and Ax (1967) and Marshall and
Zimbardo (1979), Mezzacappa et al. used a much stronger SA manipulation – injections of
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epinephrine titrated to subjects’ body weight. Third, the replication included three
emotion-producing conditions: “amusement”, “anger” and “fear”. Fourth, the stimulus
material consisted of film clips whose effectiveness in producing amusement, anger, and
fear has been well documented (Gross & Levenson, 1995). The results of interest indicated
that participants in the epinephrine condition were indeed more autonomically aroused than
control participants and reported stronger feelings of fear. From the three target emotions
(i.e. fear, anger, and amusement), fear may be the most closely related to epinephrineinduced SA. One of the conclusions was that “individual differences in sensitivity to these
effects have yet to be closely examined” (pp.197-8).
The present study incorporated many of the methodological modifications of
Mezzacappa et al. and used an individual difference approach to evaluate the relative role
of SA and the belief of SA in emotions. Many studies have shown that manipulations of
real SA increase emotional feelings. On the other hand, there is evidence that the mere
belief that autonomic changes have taken place can influence subjects’ emotional
experience and behavior. The resolution of this apparent dilemma may come from Laird’s
work on individual differences. It may be the case that while everybody uses situational
cues extensively, some people rely more heavily on personal cues (including SA) in their
emotional behavior. Valins’ feedback manipulation can be seen as substituting in some
ways essentially personal cues (i.e., the interoception of one’s heartbeat) with situational
ones (i.e., the auditory perception of what one believes to be his or her heartbeat). This is
so because in everyday life, auditory perception usually provides information about the
3
Mezzacappa et al. (1999) state that “all subjects were deceived about what symptoms the drug would elicit”
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situation. Thus, in terms of individual differences, Valins’ false feedback manipulation can
be seen as measuring people’s sensitivity to situational cues while Schachter’s epinephrine
injection manipulation measures individuals’ sensitivity to personal cues. In this sense,
both Schachter and Valins may be correct. Since in most of the research groups of subjects
have been compared, the effects of actual SA may have occurred only in part of the group.
Thus, it may simply be the case that the different effects are observed with different people.
The present study was designed to test this hypothesis directly in a factorial experiment.
More specifically, we expected that an increase in actual SA, as indexed by an
increase in heart rate and skin conductance, will lead to an increase in self-reported feelings
of fear for personal cue responders but not for situational cue responders. Personal cue
responders have been shown to be more affected by bodily changes in their emotional
experience (see Laird & Bresler, 1992 for review). We expected that the belief of increased
SA would lead to an increase in self-reported feelings of fear for both situational and
personal cue responders. This is because situational cues, unlike personal or bodily cues,
have been shown to affect both personal and situational cue responders (see Laird &
Bresler, 1992 for review).
Method
Participants
31 male and 39 female (N = 70) Clark University undergraduates and graduate
students 18 to 37 years of age (M = 20.3) volunteered to participate in the study.
(p. 184), not specifying whether they kept subjects ignorant or whether they misinformed them.
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Apparatus and Materials
Disguised Facial Expression Manipulation (DFEM): Materials for the DFEM, used
to classify participants into personal or situational, consisted of four black-and-white
abstract pictures consisting of random patterns of lines. Each picture had a title in the
bottom left hand corner (Betrayal, Rip-off, Spring, and Dancing, respectively). An emotionrating visual analogue scale adapted from Plutchik (1980) was used to quantify the strength
of the two target emotions: happiness and anger. The rest of the emotions featured on the
scale as distracters included: sadness, fear, disgust, anxiety, surprise, and interest. The
assignment of participant to each of the two cue response categories (i.e., “Personal” and
“Situational”) followed the method employed in a number of previous studies (e.g., Duclos
et al, 1989; Flack et al, 1999; Wilcox & Laird, 2000; Duclos & Laird, in press). The
procedure involved a smile trial with two smiles (smile 1 and 2) and a frown trial (with
frown 1 and 2). The “happy” score for frown 1 was subtracted from the “happy” score for
smile 1, and the “angry” score for smile 1 was subtracted from the angry score for frown 1,
and these two differences were added. A positive number was obtained if the person was
happier when smiling and angrier when frowning. This procedure was repeated for the
second pair of smile and frown trial. Participants who had positive scores on both pairs of
trials (i.e., had reported feelings consistent with their facial expressions consistently across
the two pairs of trials) were assigned to the Personal Cue group, while all others were
assigned to Situational Cue group.
Emotional stimuli: A preliminary study (see Appendix 1) was conducted to select and
pre-test the film clips to be used as stimulus material. We could not use previously tested
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material (e.g., Gross & Levenson, 1995) because we needed four film clips that are as
similar as possible to use in a within-subject experiment. Results indicated that the film
clips did not differ from one another in their effect on HR and did not produce a significant
increase in HR. On the other hand, the clips did result in a significant increase in SCL
above baseline but again did not differ from one another in SCL. If SCL is taken as an
index of emotional response (e.g., Dawson, Schell, & Filion, 1990), it can be claimed that
the film clips effectively elicited emotional reactions without significantly changing HR,
which was used as an index of manipulated SA in the main study.
Physical Exercise: A Fitron stationary bicycle was used to induce an increase in HR
and SCL.
Belief of SA: A Matrix MR-700 quartz metronome was used to manipulate
participants’ belief of either high or low SA, as indexed by HR.
Measure of subjective emotional experience: An emotion rating scale similar to the
one used in the DFEM was used to quantify the intensity of 12 emotions felt by participants
while watching the film clips. In addition to the target “scared”, “anxious”, and “tense”,
the emotion labels included: “relaxed”, “angry”,” happy”, “sad”, “depressed”, “upset”,
“confused”, “irritable”, and “sleepy”. In this measure, participants are asked to indicate
how strongly they feel a certain emotion at the moment, by placing a mark on a six-inch
line. Only the end points of the line are labeled as “do not feel at all” and “feel very
strongly” respectively. Scoring consisted of measuring the distance, in quarter inch
increments, from the "Do not feel at all" end of the line to the mark placed by the
participant. The possible response range was 0 to 16. Since the scale was used four times
15
throughout the study (i.e., after each film clip), in order to encourage independent
judgments, four different versions of the scale were prepared in which the order of the
emotion labels varied.
Supplementary Materials: Four scales from the Myers-Briggs (Briggs & Myers,
1976) personality inventory were given to participants at four times during the procedure,
one before each film clip. The scale was introduced in the procedure in order to occupy
participants’ attention during the time needed to reach the best excitation-transfer state.
This has been found to be the period when a person is actually aroused but thinks that he is
not; or does not attribute SA to the exercise (Cantor et al., 1975; Cacioppo et al., 1987).
Participants were also asked an open-ended “body awareness” question twice during the
procedure – before the film clip in each low-SA rest condition. It asked participants how
they felt “right now”. It served the same purpose as the personality scales.
Funnel Questionnaire: At the end, participants were asked to fill out a funnel
questionnaire consisting of increasingly specific questions about their understanding of the
purposes of the experiment. The purpose of the funnel questionnaire was to identify
participants who had become aware of the actual hypothesis of the study.
Physiological measures: Participants were seated in a comfortable, slightly reclined
armchair. Physiological activity was measured using J & J I-330 modules and Unicomp
software from the American Biotech Company. A 486 IBM- compatible computer was
programmed to process physiological data from each participant by averaging them into 10second intervals. Heart rate (HR) was measured using the most common, non-invasive, and
inexpensive method, namely with a photoplethysmograph (Papillo & Shapiro, 1990). The
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photoplethismograph attached to the thumb of the non-dominant hand. The computer
program averaged heartbeats over 10-second intervals. Skin conductance level (SCL) was
recorded using constant voltage (0.166 VDC) passed between two reusable silver-silver
chloride sensors (calibration = +/- 3%; range 0-50 micromohs). The sensors were placed on
the volar surfaces of the medial phalanges of the first and third fingers of the non-dominant
hand. The electrolite used was Signa electrode gel (conductivity not less than 40,000
micromohs; impedance 2.5 ohms or less).
Procedure
1. Overall arrangement and cover story
The basic elements of the procedure were as follows: (1) baseline physiological
readings; (2) the Disguised Facial Expression Manipulation intended to classify participants
into Personal and Situation cue responders; (3) four trials representing all combinations of
high and low actual SA and belief about SA. In each trial participants watched a film clip
and then described the co-occurring feelings; (4) the measurement of feelings of fear in
response to four film clips. Because we needed the participants to be unaware of the true
nature of the experiment, these elements had to be presented as part of a bogus study “on
the effects of various physical and cognitive tasks on brain activity.” The four elements of
the experiment were presented to participants as: (1) baseline physiological readings; (2) a
task measuring the effects of facial muscle activity on memory for abstract pictures; (3) a
task measuring the effect of physical activity and film clips on various physiological
indexes; (4) controlling for the extraneous effects of random changes in mood.
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2. Baseline physiological readings
Decoy EEG electrodes were attached to participants’ foreheads with tape, and actual
photoplethysmograph and skin conductance sensors were placed on the non-dominant
hand. Following the recommendations of Jennings, Berg, Hutcheson, Obrist, Porges, and
Turpin (1981), one-minute baseline HR and SCL measures were taken. It is suitable for the
photoplethysmograph method of HR recording (Jennings et al., 1981) and has been used in
related procedures (Mezzacappa, Katkin, & Palmer, 1999).
3. Disguised Facial Expression Manipulation
Next, participants underwent the DFEM intended to classify them into those more
responsive to personal and those more responsive to situational cues. The task was
introduced to participants as one on the effect of cranial muscle activity on memory for
abstract pictures and EEG activity. First, on a picture from Gray’s anatomy, participants
were shown the facial muscles presumably implicated in the task, namely the ones at the
corner of the mouth and the ones above the eyebrows. Then participants were given the
following instructions: “One thing to keep in mind is that we all have moment-to-moment
random fluctuations in mood that we don’t pay much attention to. To control for any
extraneous effects of such fluctuations, it is important that you notice your mood and report
it after every trial. This will be done using brief emotion rating scales.” The procedure that
followed, included four randomized trials, two of which include “frown” manipulations and
two, “smile” manipulations. During the two frown manipulations, participants are
instructed to pull their eyebrows down and together, and while doing this to clench their
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teeth, holding this configuration for 20 seconds. At the same time, they viewed one or the
other of two abstract pictures entitled “Dancing” and “Spring” (one in each frown trial).
During the two smile manipulations, participants are instructed to open their mouth very
slightly, and to contract the muscles at its corners by drawing them up and back, holding
this configuration for 20 seconds. During these trials, the two abstract pictures were entitled
“Betrayal” and “Rip-off” (one in each smile trial).
The titles of the pictures (which portray highly abstract/nonsense geometrical
forms) were deliberately chosen to clash with the facial expression in each trial. That is,
the meaning of the title (e.g., Spring) is intended to provide a situational cue for a positive
emotion (e.g., happiness). The concurrent facial expression (e.g., a frown), on the other
hand, is intended to provide a personal behavioral cue for a negative emotion (e.g., anger).
After each trial, participants are asked to rate their feelings using the Emotion Rating Scale.
Finally, participants were shown a fifth abstract picture, this time without a title, and were
asked to indicate if they had seen it among the four pictures of the task. This was part of
the cover story.
4. Belief of SA manipulation
During the initial instructions, we told participants the following: “One technical
problem we’ve been having with the equipment is that the video input to the computer
produces a sound artifact in the computer program, so your pulse rate will result in click
from the hard drive. These clicks won’t sound very much like heart rate because the
computer averages the beats, so they’ll sound a bit mechanical. Don’t pay attention to the
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clicks. We have tried to get rid of them but couldn’t figure out how.” These instructions
were part of the cover story designed to convince participants that the metronome clicks
they were going to hear corresponded to their own heart rate.
5. Manipulation of actual SA and the belief of SA
For the purpose of counterbalancing, half of the participants were exposed to
conditions of high and low actual SA in the following order: high-low-high-low. The other
half of the participants were exposed to actual SA in the following order: low-high-lowhigh. These two orders were selected to enable us to use the excitation transfer procedure
in the context of a within-subjects experimental design. That is, each participant was
exposed to two high SA and two low SA conditions in the same experiment.
a. High-low-high-low actual SA order
After the DFEM, participants in the high-low-high-low condition were asked to go
to the exercise bike and to start peddling vigorously. After about a minute, they were asked
to pause briefly and to hold the hand, to which the sensors were attached, as still as
possible. This was done to minimize the movement artifact inherent in the
photoplethysmograph method of heart rate measurement. The experimenter noted
participants’ current pulse rate and if it was at or above 165% of their individual baseline,
asked them to step down, take a seat in the chair and relax. If participants’ heart rate was
less than 165 % of baseline, they were asked to continue peddling for a bit longer. This
increase in HR is based on Cantor et al. (1975) and Cacioppo et al. (1987) who used similar
levels. After participants sat back in the chair, they were asked to fill out the first
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personality scale, which took them on the average of 5 minutes. Next, when participants’
HR went down to 140% of their individual baseline level, or 5 minutes after they stopped
peddling, they were given the following instructions: “The next part of the study involves
viewing a short film clip. The clips in the study have been chosen with respect to some
formal properties, about which I will tell you at the end of the session. Again, to control for
any extraneous effects of random fluctuations in mood, I will ask you to fill out a brief
emotion rating scale at the end of each clip. For that purpose, please pay attention to any
slight changes in your mood.” Next, the experimenter surreptitiously placed a metronome
next to the computer and started it in an unobtrusive way at the exact same time as the
VCR, using a remote control. Half of participants in the high-low-high-low actual SA
condition heard clicks they believed to be their own HR at a “high” 112 beats-per-minute.
The other half heard clicks at a “low” 72 beats-per-minute. At the end of the clip
participants filled out Emotion Rating Scale #1.
Next participants in this condition were asked to fill out the second personality scale
and to answer the open-ended “body awareness” question. When participants’ HR reached
baseline level, or after 9 minutes after ending the exercise, they were shown the second film
clip. During the clip, participants heard either “fast” (112 bpm) or “slow” (72 bpm)
metronome clicks. At the end of the clip, participants filled out Emotion Rating Scale #2.
Next, the above two steps were repeated with a counterbalanced presentation of the
metronome clicks with participants filling out Emotion Rating Scales 3 and 4 at the end of
film clips three and four, respectively.
b. Low-high-low-high actual SA order
21
The only difference in the procedure between conditions a. and b. was that
participants in the low-high-low-high SA condition started the sequence of high and low
SA by watching film clip #1 while their HR was at baseline. After the DFEM, participants
in this condition were asked to fill out the first personality scale and the body awareness
question. Next, they were shown the first film clip and at the same time heard either “fast”
or “slow” metronome clicks. At the end of the clip, participants filled out Emotion Rating
Scale #1. All the instructions and the steps in the procedure were the same as those in
condition a. except for order of presentation. Finally, participants were debriefed.
Experimental Design
The study employed a mixed 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design: (cue response) x actual SA x
believed SA, respectively. The between-subjects (blocking) factors were Cue response
(personal vs. situational) and Order of condition (1, 2, 3, 4). The latter was included to
control for a possible extraneous effect of condition order. The within-subject factors were
actual SA (high vs. low) and the belief of SA (high vs. low). Every participant was
exposed to all four conditions: 1) high actual SA / high believed SA; 2) high actual / low
believed; 3) low actual / high believed; and 4) low actual / low believed, presented in
counterbalanced order. Counterbalancing was done with respect to false feedback (4
sequences: low-low-high-high; low-high-high-low; high-high-low-low; high-low-low-high)
and actual SA (2 sequences: high-low-high-low; low-high-low-high). The resulting
combinations made a total of 4 between-group cells. Each participant saw the four film
clips in the same order: 1, 2, 3, and 4. However, as a result of the counterbalancing
22
described above, each film clip appeared equally frequently in all four possible
combinations of actual SA and the belief of SA.
Results
1. Funnel Questionnaire.
Based on their responses to the funnel questionnaire, 20 participants were excluded
from the self-report analyses because they had indicated awareness of the experimental
hypothesis, namely the effect of SA on emotional experience. A roughly equal number of
personal (N = 9) and situational (N = 11) cue responders were excluded4.
2. Facial expression manipulation
The DFEM resulted in classifying 31 participants in the “Personal cue response”
category, and 39 participants in the “Situational cue response” category. The distribution
of type of cue response is consistent with that found in previous research (e.g., Duclos et
al., 1989; Duncan & Laird, 1980). All the analyses were done with the 22 unaware
Personal cue responders and the 28 unaware Situational cue responders.
3. Manipulation check for actual physiological activation
The experimental design included two high SA conditions in which all participants
were asked to exercise, and two low actual SA conditions in which all participants filled out
4
When the self-report analyses were done with all 70 participants, the pattern of results remained the same.
However, in the latter analyses the level of significance decreased from p <.01 to p < .05 and the effect size
decreased from a large ² of .14 to a medium ² of .06 (Cohen, 1988). The drop in the strength of results after
including the “aware” participants justifies our decision to present results only with the “unaware”
23
questionnaires and rested, presented in counterbalanced order. To check for the
effectiveness of exercise in producing an increase in HR and SCL, these two measures were
averaged over the two exercise conditions, 240 seconds in length each. HR and SCL were
also averaged over the two no-exercise conditions, again 240 seconds in length each. Next,
two paired-samples t tests were performed. Mean HR in the exercise conditions (M =
95.49, SD = 15.69) was significantly higher than mean HR in the no exercise conditions (M
= 87.23, SD = 13.89), t (48) = 8.83, p < .001 (two-tailed). Mean SCL in the exercise
conditions (M = 16.07, SD = 9.36) was significantly higher that mean SCL in the no
exercise conditions (M = 14.33, SD = 8.52), t (48) = 2.73, p < .01 (two-tailed).
4. Subjective experience of fear
The fear score was a composite of the scores for “afraid”, “anxious”, and “tense”.
This technique was used in order to capture the subjective experience of fear/suspense more
fully. Previous research has found that films rated as scary elicited self-reports of
“tenseness” as well as “fear” (Gross & Levenson, 1995; Philippot, 1993). Before
combining these scores into a composite index, a correlational analysis revealed that the
three sets of scores are highly significantly correlated across all four film clips.
Correlations ranged between .43 and .73, all being significant at the .01 level (two-tailed).
An overall 4-way ANOVA was performed to test for main effects of and the
interaction among two between subjects factors, i.e. cue response and film clip order. No
main effects were found for cue response, F (1, 42) = .03, or for film clip order, F (3, 42)=
.31. There was no significant interaction as well.
participants.
24
Film clip order was excluded from the analysis and the effects of the within subjects
factors, i.e. actual SA and believed SA, crossed with type of cue response, were tested
using a 3-way ANOVA. Results show that there were no significant main effects for any of
the three variables. Overall, personal cue responders did not differ from situational cue
responders in their report of fear. In addition, believed SA and actual SA taken separately
did not result in differential fear ratings.
However, there was a highly significant (actual SA) x (believed SA) x (type of cue
response) interaction, F (1, 48) = 7.63, p < .01, ² = .14, observed power = .77.
Graphically, the results are represented in Figure 1. These results indicate that when
participants were highly aroused, high believed SA had a discounting effect for personal
cue responders and a augmenting effect for situational cue responders. In other words,
when personal cue responders were actually highly aroused and heard fast clicks indicating
high SA, they reported less fear than when they heard slower clicks indicating less SA (i. e.,
slower HR). On the other hand, when situational cue responders were actually highly
aroused and heard faster clicks, they reported more fear. This effect was not observed in
the low actual SA condition.
To test for the significance of the effect of believed SA, two mixed 2-way ANOVAs
were performed, one for the high and one for the low actual SA conditions. Type of cue
response was the between-subjects factor and actual SA was the within-subjects factor.
Within the high actual SA condition there was a significant (type of cue response) x
(believed SA) interaction, F (1, 48) = 8.14, p < .01, ² = .15. No significant effects were
found within the low actual SA condition, F (1, 48) = 1.58, p = .21.
25
Discussion
The observed results, characterized by a three-way interaction between actual SA,
believed SA, and cue response, paint a picture more complex than expected. For personal
cue responders, the combination of high actual and low believed SA increased the
experience of fear, but when the high actual SA was combined with the belief of high SA,
there was a marked discounting effect. That is, when personal cue responders’ HR and SCL
were elevated and, at the same time, they heard fast clicks presumably reflecting their
quickened HR, these individuals reported less fear than when they were aroused and heard
slower clicks. In contrast to personal cue responders, the same combination between high
actual and high believed SA led situational cue responders to augment their experience of
fear compared to the low believed SA condition.
An explanation for this pattern of results is provided by Foster et al’s (1998) twostage theory of arousal and attraction, combined with Laird’s emotional cue response
theory. The basic idea of Foster et al.’s model is that initially SA automatically influences
a person’s emotional experience. This influence is independent of the source to which the
person attributes the SA. Subsequently, emotional experience can change based on whether
the person attributes his or her SA to the target stimulus or to a neutral source.
We suggest that the personal cue responders in our study, being more attuned to
their bodily states, used the fast metronome clicks to correctly attribute their high actual SA
to the exercise, i.e. to a neutral source. As a result, they discounted their subjective
26
experience in a fashion predicted by Foster et al. (1998) and Zillmann (1996). According
to Zillmann, “the awareness of residual excitation, ... , prevents transfer effects” (p. 258).
Such an interpretation is consistent with previous research findings. For example,
Nisbett and Schachter (1966) manipulated subjects’ expectation of the severity of electric
shocks and their attribution of the source of the SA naturally produced by electric shocks.
Subjects in the low severity expectation condition, who were led to attribute their SA to a
placebo pill, reported less pain and tolerated more intense electric shocks than subject who
attributed their SA to the shock itself. In effect, these subjects behaved like the personal
cue responders in this experiment who might have attributed their SA to the exercise and
discounted their subjective experience of fear. Personal cue responders in the present
experiment also behaved like the personal cue responders in Duncan and Laird’s (1988)
study. When placed in a fear-producing situation and given a placebo pill, Duncan and
Laird’s personal cue responders exhibited the so-called reverse placebo effect. That is,
when they believed that the pill would calm them they felt more fear. When they believed
that the pill would arouse them, they felt less fear. This latter discounting effect is what we
observed with Personal cue responders in the present study.
In contrast, for situational cue responders in our study the fast clicks provided a
strong situational cue of SA, which may have prevented the discounting effect and even
created an augmenting one. As a result, situational cue responders felt more fear and
exhibited the so-called Valins effect. This is what we had expected based on the results for
Duncan and Laird’s (1980) situational cue responders. When the letter were placed in a
fear-producing situation and given a placebo pill, they exhibited the classic placebo effect.
27
That is, when they believed that the pill would calm them they felt less fear. When they
believed that the pill would arouse them, they felt more fear.
The above results and their interpretation fit our general theory that both personal
and situational cue responders would be influenced by situational cues, and that actual SA
would play an additional role in the personal cue group. What we had not expected was the
discounting effect in the latter group. One way to look at this is to suggest that personal
cue responders integrated information from their bodily reactions and situational
information in generating feelings, an effect demonstrated by numerous arousal
misattribution studies.
We showed that in contrast to personal cue responders, situational cue responders
rely primarily on cues from the environment. Our experiment provided such cues in the
form of fast or slow metronome clicks indicating fast of slow HR. Analysis of variance
showed that when situational cue responders believed they were highly aroused (i.e., heard
faster clicks), they felt more fear, irrespective of their actual level of SA.
In summary, our model of emotional experience presents a promising way of
integrating elements of James’ theory, Schachter’s theory, Valins’ position, and Laird’s
individual difference approach. The model was generally supported with the exception of
the discounting effect observed for personal cue responders. Although unexpected, this
effect is consistent with the theoretical framework.
Implications for Emotion Theory and Everyday Life
Investigators have identified individual variation in the extent to which people can
28
correctly perceive their autonomic reactions (e.g., Katkin, 1985) or the extent to which
there is within-individual correlation between autonomic reactions and self-reported
subjective experience (Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993). The particular
contribution of the present study was to test empirically an important factor which has been
somewhat underinvestigated in the field of emotion research, namely individual differences
in how people’s subjective experiences arise, and what they are about.
This study tested the hypothesis that some individuals’ feelings are more affected by
their bodily reactions (including their actual level of SA) while those of other individuals
may be more affected by situational factors, such as their belief of SA. In our experiment,
individuals were classified into those more affected by bodily cues and those more affected
by situational cues, based on the extent to which their feelings were affected by their facial
expressions of emotion or by cues from the situation. Then it was shown that these two
types of individuals were affected differently by the combination of actual SA and the
belief of SA. There was no difference in the effect of believed SA on participants’ feelings
when participants were not highly aroused. However, when they were highly aroused and
believed they were highly aroused, individuals more responsive to personal cues discounted
their experience of fear. In the same condition, individuals more responsive to situational
cues augmented their experience of fear.
Two important questions related to the individual difference construct tested in the
present study remain to be answered. One concerns the mechanism through which the
emotional experience of personal cue responders is affected. Do personal cue responders
simply produce more bodily cues (e.g., physiological reactions, expressive behavior, etc.)?
29
Are they more sensitive to such cues? Or is it both? Follow-up studies will explore further
any physiological differences between personal and situational cue responders and will
investigate directly the possibility that personal cue responders are better at detecting
changes in their physiology and are more attentive to bodily cues. The second question
concerns situational cue responders’ sensitivity to situational cues. Future studies will look
more closely at the nature of situational cues and the factors affecting their strength and the
mechanisms through which they affect emotional experience and behavior.
The results of the present study relate to everyday life in important ways. Many
medical and psychiatric treatments are directed at changing patients’ SA levels. For
example, to combat anxiety SA levels are controlled by administering beta blockers. One
important implication of our results is that this method would work most effectively only
for individuals responsive to personal or bodily cues. Individuals responsive to situational
cues, on the other hand, would benefit more from placebo treatments. Another use of beta
blockers has been in heart disease treatments. Any possible emotional side effects may be
underestimated because, as our results suggest, they would occur only for personal cue
responders. Finally, our theory has been applied to social problems such as eating
disorders, post-traumatic stress disorders and other mental health issues, such as PMS.
In conclusion, the current project was directed at understanding the nature and
genesis of emotional feelings. Such understanding can be later translated into the practical
arena of emotional and behavioral self-control, behavioral medicine, and clinical practice.
30
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Figure 1
Results for the Subjective Experience of Fear Presented by Level of Believed SA
High Actual Arousal
20
18
16
14
12
Fear Ratings 10
8
6
4
2
0
15.39
11.5
High
14.36
12.57
Personal
Situational
Low
Believed Arousal
Low Actual Arousal
20
18
16
14
12
Fear Ratings 10
8
6
4
2
0
14.68
13.04
13.89
12.64
Personal
Situational
High
Low
Believed Arousal
34
Appendix 1
Six 3-minute clips were edited frame-by-frame from the films Pet Sematary I
(Mary Lambert, Director, 1989) and Pet Sematary II (Mary Lambert, Director, 1992).
The editing involved the selection of meaningful 3-minute-long scenes and the removal
of any startling or especially gory moments.
Six male and four female Clark University undergraduate and graduate student
volunteers watched the film clips and rated several emotional feelings associated with
them on a visual analogue scale adapted from Plutchik (1980). The emotion labels
included “scared”, “anxious”, and “tense”, “angry”, “sad”, “happy”, “confused”,
“depressed”, “irritable”, “relaxed”, “sleepy”, and “upset”. Participants’ physiological
reactions to the film clips were recorded using the apparatus described in the procedure of
the main study.
Each participant watched all six film clips in randomized order. The procedure
involved the following steps. First, participants read and signed the informed consent
form. Next, one-minute SCL and HR baseline readings were recorded. Following that,
participants watched Clip 1. Skin conductance level (SCL) and heart rate (HR) were
recorded for the duration of the clip. Next, participants filled out an Emotion Rating
Scale indicating the intensity with which they experienced several feelings as a result of
watching the film clip. This procedure was repeated for each clip.
Results indicate that none of the six film clips produced a change in HR above
baseline level, F (6, 42) = 1.23, p = .31. In contrast participants’ SCL during the films
clips increased significantly as compared to baseline, F (6, 42) = 6.25, p < .001. Helmert
contrasts revealed that the six clips did not differ from one another in HR or SCL.
We computed a composite score by adding up the scores for “afraid”, “anxious”, and
“tense”. To check for the statistical appropriateness of such a decision, participants’ selfreport of fear, anxiety, and tension were correlated for each film clip. Sixteen5 out of the
total of 18 correlations were substantial and statistically significant, with Pearson r
ranging from .70 to .92. These results indicate that it was appropriate to combine the
scores for “scared”, “anxious”, and “tense” into a composite index, which we called
“fear”.
An initial repeated measures ANOVA revealed that participants reported statistically
comparable levels of fear across all six film clips, F (5, 45) = 1.75, p = .143. A visual
inspection of the means suggested that clips two and three yielded somewhat higher
scores than the other four clips. They were removed from the analysis. A second
ANOVA on the remaining four clips confirmed and strengthened the finding that clips
one, four, five, and six produced the same subjective experience of “fear” in participants,
F (3, 27) = .61, p = .61.
The correlations between self-reports of “scared” and “anxious” for clip 2 was .42, n. s.. The correlations
between self-reports of “scared” and “tense” for clip 5 was .33, n. s..
5
35