SIPRI PROJECT “ADDRESSING FUTURE CHALLENGES TO THE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN
WEAPONS CONVENTION IN CONNECTION WITH SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL
DEVELOPMENTS”
Convergence between Chemistry and the Life Sciences – Points for Consideration
Ralf Trapp
1. Who has said what about the convergence between chemistry and biology / the life
sciences (or more broadly speaking convergence in the life sciences)?

Alexander Kelle, Belfast University Workshop Report 20061
Some key areas of the revolution in the life sciences threaten to expand not only the range of toxic
chemicals that could be misused for malign purposes but also our knowledge of the targets of
potentially harmful biologically active chemical substances in the human body. In decades to
come, this can be expected to shift the “focus of the proliferation problem from the chemical or
biological warfare agent as object of malign manipulation to the physiological target in the
human body as the object of attack.” Given a plethora of research activities over the last decade,
such targets in the nervous, immune and neuro-endocrine immune systems today are much better
understood and thus more susceptible to potential misuse.

US National Academies, NRC, Lemon&Relman Report 20062
Knowledge, materials, and technologies with applications to the life sciences enterprise are
advancing with tremendous speed, making it possible to identify and manipulate features of living
systems in ways never before possible.
Moreover, other fields not traditionally viewed as biotechnologies—such as materials science,
information technology, and nanotechnology—are becoming integrated and synergistic with
traditional biotechnologies in extraordinary ways enabling the development of previously
unimaginable technological applications. It is undeniable that this new knowledge and these
advancing technologies hold enormous potential to improve public health and agriculture,
strengthen national economies, and close the development gap between resource-rich and
resource-poor countries. However, as with all scientific revolutions, there is a potential dark side
to the advancing power and global spread of these and other technologies. For millennia, every
major new technology has been used for hostile purposes, and most experts believe it naive to
think that the extraordinary growth in the life sciences and its associated technologies might not
similarly be exploited for destructive purposes.

John Hart and Ronald Sutherland, OPCW Academic Forum 20073
It is evident that barriers between biology and chemistry are continuing to disappear. This has
implications for both the CWC and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).
Although making more operational the connection in terms of scope of coverage between the two
regimes is not acceptable politically, scientific and technological developments (including in the
chemical industry) may make some degree of linkage in treaty implementation technically
desirable and more politically compelling over time. Such a linkage or overlap also has uncertain
institutional implications.
The pace of change in the life sciences, in particular, is extremely high including, for example, in
the field of agriculture, veterinary sciences and pharmaceuticals. The potential to synthesize a
vast number of chemicals is increasing. The chemical industry is also increasingly versatile in
terms of how it is organized and operated and the ability to produce a wide variety of chemicals
on demand at short notice.
1

Peter Clevestig and John Hart, Working Paper, Polish Academy of Sciences
Workshop Warsaw 20074
When reviewing the research which has awarded scientists the Nobel Prize in the fields of
chemistry and medicine during the last three decades there is an evident increasing overlap of
applications in medicine and life sciences by discoveries in chemistry. Perhaps this can be
explained as an increasing focus on biochemistry for complementing the ever-expanding fields in
biology, where chemical interactions have aided our understandings of the fundamental processes
of life. Such processes are always chemical in nature but have always been put in relation to a
larger picture, specifically in the term of function in relation to structure, and into the contexts of
origin, environment and evolution. However, some research fields in the life sciences have an
increased stake in chemistry, and are in many respects more potent to instigate dual-use concern
than other life science fields.

IUPAC Report for the 2nd CWC Review Conference 20075
Science and technology continue to advance rapidly in areas that directly relate to the scientific
foundations of the CWC. A key feature in this process is that chemistry and biology are
converging, thus reinforcing the importance of the overlap between the prohibitions and
requirements of the CWC and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
Three aspects converge in this regard: the ability to synthesize and test large numbers of new
chemical entities for biological activity; significant advances in the understanding of complex life
processes in a post-genomic area; and the ability to model life processes and develop synthetic
and virtual replicas of living organisms. All this is further amplified by an increasing integration
of chemistry into biology, together with engineering and the information sciences.
The expected benefits from these developments are significant, for example, in areas such as
public health, food production, and pest control. However, there is also an increased potential for
new chemicals with possible CW utility to be discovered by chance or developed by design. The
advances in the life sciences may also lead to new risks in this regard.
While this risk is moderated by the fact that considerable time and effort are still required to turn
a candidate novel agent into an effective weapon, it also emphasizes the need to ensure that the
prohibitions in the CWC and its implementation by States Parties be comprehensive and apply to
all toxic chemicals and their precursors, whether listed in the Schedules or not.

OPCW Scientific Advisory Board report for the 2nd Review Conference 20086
An important trend in the life sciences is the increasing convergence of chemical and biological
systems, which results from an increasing understanding of complex life processes in the postgenomic era, along with the emerging ability to replicate life processes. These advances will
undoubtedly lead to major benefits to humankind in the medical and other sciences, but there is
also a clear potential for abuse. These developments reinforce the overlap between the
Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, as does the increasing number of
toxins and potentially toxic bioregulators being characterised.
New biologically active molecules are being discovered at an unprecedented rate. For example,
parallel synthesis and high-throughput screening are producing data on millions of compounds.
The tools for such techniques are becoming widely available and could be selectively targeted at
toxic molecules. Pharmaceutical and pesticide companies now hold huge databases of biological
data that could be a source of prototypes for new chemical-warfare agents. It should, however, be
noted that most of this data is now being generated through the use of in vitro assays and that
relatively few investigations progress to the study of a compound’s toxicity in vivo. It should also
be noted that the discovery of large numbers of biologically active compounds before highthroughput screening was introduced has had relatively little impact on the development of new
chemical-warfare agents. Moreover, a major offensive programme would be required in order to
convert a new biologically active toxic compound into a chemical weapon.
2
One area in drug research that is causing some concern involves compounds that could be
developed legitimately within the constraints of the Convention as non-lethal agents for lawenforcement purposes. Such compounds clearly have dual-use potential. The accelerated
discovery of drugs has resulted in the identification of many new compounds that act very
selectively on the central nervous system, both regionally and with regard to receptor subtypes. It
remains to be seen what challenge, if any, one or another of these compounds could pose to the
Convention. It should be noted here, too, that although many extremely potent compounds that
act on the central nervous system were discovered in period from the 1950s to the 1970s, only two
types, anticholinergics and opioids, appear to have been developed into chemical warfare agents
or non-lethal agents for use in law-enforcement.

InterAcademy Panel on International Issues et al., International Workshop in
Preparation of the 7th BWC Review Conference (Beijing 2010)7
Life sciences research is an increasingly global enterprise in which rapid advances promise
important contributions to health, food, and energy challenges. However, concerns have also been
raised that some of the tools, techniques, and materials developed to tackle these needs could be
potentially misapplied. The workshop provided an opportunity for the international scientific
community to discuss the implications of recent developments in science and technology that
might be relevant to the development of biological weapons or to detection, diagnostics, or
therapeutics that could affect potential prevention and response to biological attacks.
2. Why and how does this matter for CBW arms control?

Historically, chemical and biological weapons were considered one type of
weaponry. Our understandings or “poison” and “disease” were closely linked.
Proposals for norms that attempted to regulate their (non)use in war addressed
both agent types together (in fact, our scientific understanding would not have
allowed their separation until the beginning of the 20th century).

The partition of the CBW arms control agenda into two, covering separately
chemical weapons and biological weapons, was done for pragmatic reasons at the
end of the 1960ies. It reflected the political realities at the time in terms of what
was achievable with regard to WMD arms control. Also, and despite similarities
and close interactions, it reflected certain differences in the institutional structures
that had evolved in science and technology and in the industries that supported the
military use of chemical and biological agents as weapons.

Since the beginning of the 1970ies, the two regimes have developed in separation
from one another (except for the coverage of toxins which are governed under
both regimes).

Today, the global chemical weapons regime is set out in the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC), with prohibitions on the development, production,
stockpiling, acquisition, transfer and use of toxic chemicals as chemical weapons.
The CWC establishes an international verification regime with declarations and a
variety of verification measures, including routine on-site inspections and
“special” inspections (challenge inspections and investigations of alleged use) to
resolve compliance concerns and provide unequivocal evidence for any breaches
of the treaty. It establishes an international agency to implement these verification
measures and other implementation functions—the OPCW.

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) provides for a similar set
of prohibitions (except that the prohibition on use of biological and toxin weapons
3
is implicit only—it has been formally recognised however by the parties of the
treaty as part of the treaty norms, in a common understanding). At the
international level, however, there is no institutional structure comparable to the
OPCW, and there is no dedicated routine verification system. Compliance
concerns need to be resolved through mechanisms of the United Nations and its
Security Council. Allegations of BW use can also be investigated by the UN
Secretary General under authority given to him/her by the UN General Assembly
in the 1980ies.

Both treaties are firmly anchored in science and technology. Their
implementation requires measures by the States Parties (and in the case of the
CWC by the OPCW) that aim at controlling activities and facilities involved with
relevant materials, equipment and technologies that are of a ‘dual-use’ nature.
Scientific and technological advances often require adaptations of the practical
implementation systems. Such adaptation is essential to ensure the viability and
applicability of the regimes in changing circumstances.

Convergence is one of the drivers for the accelerating pace of advances in the life
sciences. New scientific discoveries and breakthroughs often occur when hitherto
distinct scientific disciplines start interacting and pooling theoretical concepts,
understandings and experimental methods. As a consequence, science
convergence makes unexpected breakthroughs and discoveries more likely (and
their nature less predictable). This can create new risks and challenge existing
implementation practices and understandings.
3. What is the likely impact of the convergence trends on arms control, and specifically
on the BWC?

Convergence in the sciences and technologies underlying the two regimes (CWC,
BWC) may have an impact at different levels. Questions to consider may include:
o With regard to the scope of prohibitions: does the CB conversion create gaps
between the CW and BW regimes (either in terms of legal coverage or with
regard to the practical application of control measures), and if so what is the
remedy?
o What new risk spectrum is emerging as a result of the CB convergence?
o What are effective and appropriate measures to govern and control these
processes and prevent the misuse of new discoveries (by States, by non-State
actors) for hostile purposes?
o Which opportunities will these trends create for the implementation of the two
treaties, for ensuring compliance, and for creating benefits for society in the
form of, for example, new goods, better services, new technologies, increased
trade and economic growths and development?

With regard to the prohibitions stipulated by the CWC and the BWC:
o CB convergence reinforces the overlap between the two regimes (regarding
the prohibition of toxins);
4
o But how far does the concept of “toxins” as applied in the BWC extend to biomolecules such as bioregulators, as well as their synthetic derivatives and
analogues?
o On the part of the CWC, how much bias results from the emphasis that
verification (and some national implementation) systems place on scheduled
chemicals?

CB convergence affects the national implementation of both treaties. Here are
some issues that may need to be analysed specifically in the context of the BWC:
o How does legislation cope with the CB convergence, and (how) can control
lists, review mechanisms and other regulatory and administrative mechanisms
and tools keep up with new developments.
o Should / can the CB convergence be reflected in institutional arrangements at
the national level (e.g., a single authority for CW and BW arms control or
WMD in general, combined or coordinated national control measures, interagency coordination issues, stakeholder outreach and awareness raising
activities).

Under the BWC, there is no international system to verify compliance (there is,
however, the UN Secretary General’s mechanism to investigate alleged CBW
use). Under the CWC, a routine verification system has been established, but this
is largely prioritised around the CWC’s Schedules of Chemicals. Advances in
science and technology that reflect the CB convergence largely happen in what
the CWC calls “Other Chemical Production Facilities” (OCPFs). This verification
system for OCPFs has at least 2 shortcomings with regard to CB convergence: it
lacks focus because the nature of the chemicals manufactures is not revealed in
declarations, and the thresholds for inspection are such that most facilities that
manufacture chemicals of interest in the present context would remain under the
radar screen of verification (not liable for inspection). Several questions then
arise:
o Can and should the CWC routine verification system be adapted to meet the
challenges emanating from CB convergence?
o What are the prospects of creating a verification system under the BWC?
o What other compliance assurance mechanisms are available in case both
answers are negative? Does the absence of international verification under the
BWC matter?

A key aspect of preventing future break-out attempts from the CWC and BWC
regimes, and of averting the acquisition and use of chemical and biological
weapons by terrorists or organised crime, is the strength of the defences against
these weapons. Effective prevention, across-the-board preparedness, robust
response and rapid recovery capacities all have a dissuasive effect on decisions to
opt for the acquisition and use of CB weapons.
5

What, then, is the likely impact of the CB convergence on CB defence?
o Research at the interface of chemistry and biology is likely to bring about new
insights of how diseases work—which could lead to new treatments, and
make available new molecules that could be effective prophylactics and
treatments. In a broader sense, advances in science and technology including
in nanotechnology and biotechnology are expected to enhance capabilities
with regard to detection and identification, physical protection, medical
countermeasures and decontamination.
o The hope is that public health systems will be able to reap benefits from these
new developments. Strong public health systems are an essential defence
against biological (and chemical) warfare.
o In addition, the investments into bio-defence programmes over recent years
(since 9-11 and Amerithrax) aimed to strengthen defences against the use of
biological and toxin agents. These programmes have certainly made use of
new scientific and technological discoveries.

On the positive side, the advances in the life sciences create new opportunities for
enhanced international cooperation:
o Seen by many developing countries as the flip side of BW disarmament, there
are strong expectations that the revolution in the life sciences will lead to
wider and deeper international cooperation, help improve public health
systems and increase international exchanges in biological knowledge,
materials, equipment and technologies.
o Research and development at the interface of chemistry and biology are not
the domain of developed countries. Much of it is basic and applied research,
and spun off from it are practical applications in such areas as medicine, crop
control, plant protection, animal welfare and energy production. These
applications are closely linked to development goals such as improved health,
longer life expectance, the fight against malnourishment and poverty, energy
sufficiency and measures to contain the impact of global warming. Many
countries around the globe are developing these branches of science and
technology, international exchanges are numerous and intensive, trade in
relevant products is expanding and globalisation contributes to the global
distribution and diffusion of these capacities and technologies. Traditional
non-proliferation concepts are increasingly missing the point.
o The goal has to be how to manage expanding exchanges and collaboration in
such a way that the new technologies are exclusively used for beneficial
purposes. Policies that aim at strengthening compliance with the BWC need to
be built around cooperative approaches that combine the promotion of
international cooperation with governance measures to manage the risks.

Finally, the cross-over between chemistry and biology creates challenges and
opportunities with regard to the institutionalization of BW arms control:
o Advances in the life sciences are happening at a fast pace. Perhaps more
importantly, research at the interface of chemistry and biology is likely to lead
6
to surprises and unintended discoveries the direction and timing of which are
hard to predict.
o That calls for a different approach with regard to science and technology
monitoring and assessment: whilst formal reviews (e.g., as part of the
preparation and conduct of review conferences) remain important, they no
longer suffice to guard against sudden changes in the S&T landscape.
Something like an “early-warning system” may be needed. There may be
reason to aim for:
(a) A stronger mandate for the ISU to support such S&T monitoring and to
alert States Parties of developments that may require their action;
(b) A more systematic interaction between the BWC community and the
professional life science community (e.g., through the IAP);
(c) A stronger engagement with the industry, and
(d) More flexible mechanisms to evaluate the impact of new S&T
developments by the States Parties.
4. What should the 7th Review Conference do about it?
This of course is the subject of discussions at the workshop.
Measures that the 7th Review Conference could decide on, and where the EU may wish to
develop common positions and policies, could relate to, for example:

A further strengthening of the institutional support structures for the BWC at the
international level, and in this context a more systematic approach towards
science and technology monitoring and impact assessment;

A further strengthening of governance and compliance mechanisms, including the
development of a stronger relationship of the BWC policy community with the
relevant sectors of industry and the scientific community;

Technical assistance to strengthen national implementation capacity (going
beyond framework legislation and addressing practical needs);

Measures to strengthen governance in the life sciences (e.g., awareness raising,
education, outreach, regulatory mechanisms based on catch-all principles),
combined with measures to promote international cooperation in the field;

Closer cooperation and coordination between the BWC community and the
OPCW.
References
Alexander Kelle “The Changing Scientific and Technological Basis of the CBW Proliferation Problem –
A Workshop Report”, Queen’s University Belfast 2006
2
National Academy of Sciences, “Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences”,
Committee on Advances in Technology and the Prevention of Their Application to Next Generation
Biowarfare Threats, National Research Council Washington DC 2006
1
7
Ronald Sutherland and John Hart “Chemical industry verification under the CWC: scientific and
technological developments and diplomatic practice” Paper presented at the OPCW Academic Forum 1819 September 2007
4
Peter Clevestig and John Hart “Implications of the Convergence of Biology and Chemistry in Arms
Control”, Working Paper submitted to the conference “The Advancement of Science and the Dilemma of
Dual Use: Why we can’t afford to fail”, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw 9-10 November 2007
5
Mahdi Balali-Mood, Pieter S. Steyn, Leiv K. Sydnes, and Ralf Trapp “Impact of scientific developments
on the Chemical Weapons Convention”, IUPAC Technical Report, Pure Appl. Chem., Vol. 80, No. 1, pp.
175–200, 2008.
6
“Report of the Scientific Advisory Board on Developments in Science and Technology for the Second
Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons
Convention (Second Review Conference)”, OPCW Document RC-2/DG.1, Annex, 28 February 2008
7
http://dels.nas.edu/Past-Events/Trends-Science-Technology-Relevant/DELS-BLS-09-06
3
8