______________________________________________
CONTENTS
F
______________________________________________
DECLARATION________________________________________________I
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS________________________________________II
ABSTRACT__________________________________________________ III
INTRODUCTION: FUNCTIONALISM AND EMBODIED, EMBEDDED MIND 1
Functionalism, in a few words ___________________________________________ 2
Embodied Cognition as Undermining Functionalism ______________________ 3
Embodied and Embedded Cognition as Extended Functionalism __________ 6
Where do we go from here? _____________________________________________ 8
CHAPTER 1: FUNCTIONALISM IN DETAIL__________________________ 9
1.1 The Background and the Spirit _______________________________________ 9
1.1.1 Behaviourism __________________________________________________________ 10
1.1.2 Mind-body Identity Theory ________________________________________________ 11
1.1.3 Materialism ____________________________________________________________ 13
1.1.4 Anti-reduction and methodological autonomy _________________________________ 13
1.2 Methods for defining functional roles ________________________________ 14
1.2.1 Turing Machines and Machine tables ________________________________________ 15
1.2.2 Lewis’ Ramsey-sentence method of funtionalization _____________________________ 17
1.3 Commonsense vs. Empirical functionalism __________________________ 18
1.3.1 Commonsense functionalism _______________________________________________ 18
1.3.2 Empirical functionalism __________________________________________________ 19
1.4 The liberalism-chauvinism dilemma _________________________________ 21
1.4.1 The charge of chauvinism _________________________________________________ 21
1.4.2 Functionalism and abstraction _____________________________________________ 24
1.4.3 Functionalism and Multiple Realization ______________________________________ 25
1.5 Functionalism without multiple realization and chauvinism? __________ 28
1.6 Sum up and Conclusions ___________________________________________ 33
CHAPTER 2: THE BODY-DETAIL MODEL: SHAPIRO’S ARGUMENT ____ 36
2.1 Body Matters ______________________________________________________ 38
2.2 The Body’s Role in Perception ______________________________________ 39
2.2.1 A skill-based model of perception ___________________________________________ 42
2.2.2 Sensory substitution and plasticity __________________________________________ 45
2.3 Body Concepts ____________________________________________________ 47
2.3.1 Concepts and Metaphors__________________________________________________ 48
2.3.2 Body and language ______________________________________________________ 48
2.3.3 Individual embodiment vs. social embeddedness _______________________________ 58
2.4 Leaky Minds _______________________________________________________ 60
2.5 Conclusions _______________________________________________________ 64
CHAPTER 3: EXTENDED FUNCTIONALISM _______________________ 70
3.1 Extended computation _____________________________________________ 71
3.1.1 Exploitative Representation _______________________________________________ 72
3.1.2 Wide computationalism ___________________________________________________ 73
3. 2 Ballard et al.: The computational role of vision ______________________ 76
3.3 Dispositional beliefs and extended functionalism ____________________ 78
3.4 Extended Functionalism and the Body_______________________________ 80
3.4.1 Body as a functional notion________________________________________________ 82
3.4.2 The negotiable body _____________________________________________________ 84
3.4.3 Body and Mind – a one-to-one match? _______________________________________ 86
3.5 Status _____________________________________________________________ 87
CONCLUSION _______________________________________________ 94
BIBLIOGRAPHY ______________________________________________ 96
______________________________________________
INTRODUCTION
FUNCTIONALISM AND EMBODIED, EMBEDDED MIND
______________________________________________
In recent years it has become close to orthodoxy in the philosophy of mind to
view the mind and cognition as essentially embodied and embedded. This
view has developed as an opposition to a tendency within cognitive science to
view mind and cognition as a matter of purely internal computation. So far
the focus has been on developing the theses within the embodied and
embedded framework and with less attention being given to how this
framework relates to the views that were prevalent in the immediately
preceding philosophical debates on mind. An exception to this is Lawrence
Shapiro’s book “The Mind Incarnate” (2004). Here Shapiro argues, among
other things, that the embodied, embedded approach undermines a
functionalist program. In contrast and as a response to Shapiro’s argument,
Andy Clark, in his article “Pressing the Flesh” (2006), claims that the
embodied, embedded approach can be seen as a form of extended
functionalism.
My aim in this project will be to explore the logical space between
functionalism and the embodied, embedded approach. In this I will focus on
the question of whether these two positions are compatible or whether the
embodied, embedded approach undermines functionalism, as suggested by
Shapiro. My answer to the latter question is going to be that this is not the
case. However, before we get to this result there is a lot of ground to be
-1-
covered and a few philosophical obstacles that need to be pointed out and
overcome. In the remaining paragraphs of the Introduction I will introduce
the different positions, give an outline of the possible tension between them
and develop and present the central questions of the project.
Functionalism, in a few words
In basic terms functionalism in philosophy of mind is the metaphysical claim
that mental states are individuated in terms of the effect the world has on
them (input), the effect they have on each other (internal interaction) and the
effect that they have on the world (output) (Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson
2007).
To take a simplified and standard example, consider the mental state pain. A
functionalist account could characterise pain as a state that is often caused by
tissue damage, that tends to produce the belief that there is something wrong
with the body and the desire not to be in this state, and in the absence of
stronger desires may cause moaning or even crying. According to
functionalism, a creature that has something that plays this role is in pain.
(Levin, 2004)
What it is that occupies this role is of less importance. The case is similar in
connection with other functional kinds. In this way, what is important about
something being a thermostat is the way, it controls the temperature by
turning heating or cooling apparatus on or off. Such a device might be
constructed in different ways, however if it plays the appropriate role it is a
thermostat. In the same way, what is important about being a left winger on a
hockey team is how this position is coordinated with the rest of the team. It
-2-
seems reasonable to say that what it is to be a left winger does not depend on
whether it is Fernando or Peter that plays this position. Who plays the role
might affect the outcome of the match, of course, but it would not affect the
concept of what a left winger is. In the same way whether a mental state is a
thought, belief, desire etc. depends not on what it is that occupies the
functional role, rather it depends exclusively on its relation to the bigger
system of other mental states, sensory input and behaviour. In this way the
functional identification is neutral to what kinds of states that occupy the role.
As a result, mental states can be realized by many different kinds of states.
This is what is called multiple realization.
Different versions of functionalism have been developed since its first
appearance in the 1960’s. Over time it has become a general approach to
distinguish
between
commonsense
functionalism
and
empirical
functionalism. I will elaborate on this distinction and on functionalism in
general in the first chapter: Functionalism in detail.
Embodied Cognition as Undermining Functionalism
The second chapter will concern Shapiro’s argument that functionalism is
undermined by research within the area of embodied cognition. According to
Shapiro, it is in the spirit of functionalism to characterise mind in a way that
abstracts away from the hardware (the body), on which the mind is
implemented. The result is that the body is neutral in the sense that
“characteristics of bodies make no difference to the kind of mind one
possesses.”(Shapiro (2004) p. 175.) This kind of body neutrality implies that
similar minds can exist in bodies with very distinct properties. However, this
assumption, according to Shapiro, is shown to be false in the light of recent
-3-
research in the area of embodied cognitive science - research that shows that a
creature’s embodiment imposes constraints on what kind of psychological
profile it can have. Shapiro takes his point of departure by distinguishing
between three different lines of research that all, according to Shapiro, show
that characteristics of bodies make a difference to the kind of mind one
possesses.
The first area of research is concerned with the body’s role in perception and
the sense in which characteristics and specific actions of the body play a
significant role in determining the nature of thought. Shapiro gives an
example of this kind of thought concerning auditory perception. According to
Shapiro, our ability to locate a sound source depends on facts about our ears.
One such fact is that we have exactly two ears and not one or more than two.
Another fact is that these ears are placed on both side of a head of a certain
size. One result is that there will be a certain time difference between the
sound received at each ear. To locate the source of a sound the human
auditory system incorporates these facts in its processing. According to
Shapiro, different setups of auditory sensory systems yield different setups of
the processing involved in locating a sound source. Because the body, in this
way, makes a “difference to how an organism hears”, Shapiro suggests, that
the body cannot be neutral to the kind of mind an organism can have (Shapiro
(2004) p. 189).
The second direction that Shapiro refers to within the embedded, embodied
research program concerns the way our concepts and the way in which we
conceive of the world depend on details of our embodiment. The central idea
is that organisms with different kinds of bodies “will conceive the world
differently and will think differently.” (Shapiro (2004) p.183) As an example
Shapiro refers to the work of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson on the role of
-4-
the body in structuring metaphors. The central idea of this work is that the
type of our body plays a significant role in structuring our basic concepts and
that these basic concepts in turn structure more abstract concepts and
metaphors. According to this research, basic concepts like ‘front’, ‘back’, ‘up
and ‘down’ are directly related to the shape and type of our bodies. Shapiro
takes this to support the claim that the content of mental states and thereby
the perspective that one has upon the world is dependent on the type of body
that one has.
The third direction within the embodied cognition research program, which
Shapiro takes to undermine functionalism, is what he calls extended mind.1
The main feature of this view is that the mind and the body are so intimately
tied together that it does not make sense to maintain the division between the
two. Shapiro argues that if we give up this division then, naturally, difference
in bodies will entail differences in mind. (Shapiro (2004) p.183)
The work cited above shows, according to Shapiro, that a difference in body—
even a difference in the fine details of embodiment – makes a difference in
mind. If the body is involved in our psychological processes in this intimate
way, this indicates, according to Shapiro, that it requires a humanlike body to
have humanlike psychological capacities. I will call this line of embodied
approach: the Body-detail model. According to this model, it is not enough to
recognise that the mind is intimately connected to a body; we also have to
specify the characteristics of this body. In the sense that Shapiro takes it as
being in the spirit of functionalism to abstract away from exactly these facts,
the body-detail model of embedded, embodied cognition undermines
functionalism, according to Shapiro.
1
This label originates from Clark and Chalmers (1997). However, Clark and Chalmers intended the
label for the view that the realization of the mind is extended not only to the body, but also to the
physical and social world that surrounds us.
-5-
To get a better understanding of Shapiro’s claim it is useful to notice that
Shapiro uses the term ‘body’ in a slightly different way to which it is
commonly used. Normally when we talk about bodies the term refers to the
entire collection of all body parts such as feet, muscles, entrails etc., including
the brain and central nervous system. Shapiro’s use of the term body is
intended to exclude the brain and the central nervous system (Shapiro (2004)
pp. 70)2. This use of the term body is helpful when we are dealing with
embodied and embedded approaches to mind, because these views take
themselves to be opposing views that take the brain as the sole substrate of
mind. What proponents of embedded, embodied approaches want to
emphasise is exactly how our bodies and environment – as opposed to only
our brain— are intimately linked to cognition. Because of this advantage I will
follow Shapiro’s use of the term ‘body’ throughout this thesis.
Embodied and Embedded Cognition as Extended Functionalism
Contrary to proponents of the Body-detail model, Clark argues that there is a
way in which the embodied approach can be seen as a form of extended
functionalism. This will be the focus of chapter 3. On this line of thought, the
body’s contribution is just a part of a bigger system consisting of body, brain
and environment that as a whole sometimes implements the functional profile
that constitutes mind and cognition. Whereas traditional functionalism
analyses input, output and states internal to the individual, extended
functionalism includes non-biological parts of the environment as what might
be called the 'material realizers' of the mentality-fixing functional roles.
2
Shapiro (2004) treats the question about the relation between mind and body as distinct from the
question of the relation between mind and brain (op.sit. 71)
-6-
One of the examples of such an extended functionalist approach could,
according to Clark (In Press), be the following: in the process of solving some
kinds of accounting problems, an accountant, call her Ada, uses a method of
rapidly scanning columns on one page and copying certain numbers to a
piece of paper and then shifting her attention between the two papers. Using
this strategy, involving external props and the repeated shifting from one
page to the other, the task is cut up into smaller and less demanding tasks. In
this way the workload on Ada’s memory is significantly reduced. Clark
suggests that this process is best analysed in “extended functionalist terms as
a set of problem-solving state transitions whose implementation happens to
involve a distributed combination of biological memory, motor actions,
external symbolic storage and just-in-time perceptual access.” (Clark (In
Press) p.12)
Another embodied approach that, according to Clark, can be interpreted as a
form of extended functionalism is the work of Ballard et al (1997). Their work
is based on experiments in which subjects were given the task of copying a
certain structure of coloured blocks. The subjects were placed in front of a
computer screen with three clearly distinguishable zones: one area containing
the original structure; a reserve area with blocks in different colours that
could be picked up by clicking on the mouse, and an empty area where a
model of the original structure could be built. Ballard et al found that the
subjects solved this problem with the help of repeated rapid saccades to the
original - fixating only on the part of the original necessary for the completion
of the next part of the process: for example, picking up a block with a certain
colour. According to Ballard et al, this suggests that the subjects were only
storing smaller pieces of information about the colour or the position of the
block, taking advantage of the fact that the information could always be
retrieved by fixating on the original. Clark suggests that we should view this
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as an extended functionalist approach because Ballard et al’s theory “analyses
a cognitive task as a sequence of less intelligent sub-tasks, using recognizable
computational and information-processing concepts, but applies those
concepts within a lager organizational whole.” (Clark (in press). p. 11)
By acknowledging the body’s contribution as in this way a part of a bigger
system, extended functionalism leaves room for the possibility that creatures
with different kinds of bodies can share similar minds.
Where do we go from here?
An important task is to investigate how well defined the body-detail model
and the extended functionalist approach are as positions. Further, how
different are they and what is the underlying difference that makes them
come to apparently opposite conclusions about the relations between the
embodied, embedded approaches and functionalism? Is there a possibility
that the two positions could be reconciled? One possibility might be to
formulate functional roles in terms of specific characteristics of the body. That
is, to formulate a functional role so that only creatures with certain bodies and
sensory systems will be able to play that role. This possibility is also
considered by both Clark and Shapiro (Clark (In Press) p.16) (Shapiro (2004)
p. 174). Would this be too much embodiment for the functionalist to admit?
These questions will concerns trough the thesis, however, an obvious first
step on our way to settle the question of the relation between the embodied,
embedded approaches and functionalism is to explore the position of
functionalism in further detail. This will be the task of the following chapter.
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______________________________________________
CHAPTER 1
FUNCTIONALISM IN DETAIL
______________________________________________
In this chapter I will survey a chart of the complex landscape of
functionalism. Firstly, looking into the background and origin of the position
will provide an insight into the intentions behind the position. This will also
provide us with an idea of what ‘the sprit’ of functionalism might be
considered to be. Secondly, I will investigate the notion of functional role and
the models for giving such presented by proponents of functionalism. These
models will provide the background for understanding the difference
between the two dominant versions of functionalism: commonsense
functionalism and empirical functionalism. Finally, I will discuss whether
functionalism in its different versions can avoid the pitfalls of both liberalism
(attributing mental states to systems that do not have them) and chauvinism
(falsely denying mental states to systems that in fact have them)3. A special
focus in this connection will be the relation between functionalism and
multiple realization.
1.1 The Background and the Spirit
In order to get a feeling of what functionalism is and to illuminate what ‘the
spirit of’ functionalism might be, it will be fruitful to look into how and on
3
‘Liberalism’ and ‘chauvinism’ as used by Block 1980.
-9-
what foundations this theory was developed in the 1960’s. One major source
of inspiration available at this time was the first hesitant beginnings of
computer science and its early success. In particular, the distinction between
software and hardware, between function and structure inspired the
distinction between role and occupant found in functionalism. The relation
between software and hardware was viewed as a particularly apt model for
the relation between mind and body. An important source of inspiration from
computer science was the invention by Alan Turing of abstract and theoretical
machines defined by functions characterizing the relations between input,
output and internal states of the machine. I will return to this issue in my
exposition of Hillary Putnam’s early method for defining the functional role
of mental terms. But first let us have a look at the philosophical background
which functionalism can be seen as a reaction to. In this context functionalism
can be seen as having developed out of dissatisfaction with the solutions
provided by the dominating theories of mind at the time: Behaviourism and
The Mind-Body Identity Theory.
1.1.1 Behaviourism
Behaviourism, as a theory of mind, is the thesis that mental states can be
defined in terms of relations between the input of stimuli and the output of
physical behaviour. If, for example, I have a desire to drink a glass of water,
this desire can be defined as having a set of dispositions to act in a certain
way - one of these being the disposition to reach out for the glass, if I get the
opportunity. Notice that this is a simpler approach than the one presented by
functionalism where internal mental states are taken into consideration as
well. According to proponents of functionalism, the problem with
behaviourism is that it seems possible to think of examples where something
has the right kind of behavioural dispositions to the right kind of stimuli, but
without having the right kind of mental state linked with these. Think of a
- 10 -
creature, maybe extraterrestrial, who displays the particular behavioural
dispositions of having pain when receiving stimuli of tissue damage, but who
is only pretending to be in pain – acting as if in pain just to fool us earthlings
(for examples of this sort see Putnam (1963)). Behaviourism would falsely
attribute the mental property of having pain to such an actor. Accordingly,
behaviourism is considered by functionalists and by the general philosophical
community today to be too liberal in its ascription of mental properties to
creatures and systems. In contrast, a functionalist account would not take the
actor to be in pain. The reason being that such a creature would lack the
proper internal relations, for example, it will not tend to believe that there is
something wrong with its body.
1.1.2 Mind-body Identity Theory
In contrast to behaviourism, the mind-body identity theory is considered by
functionalists to be too chauvinistic in its ascription of mental states. The
identity theory claims that in the same way as water is identical to H 2O and
temperature identical to mean molecular kinetic energy, so are mental states
identical to physical states. A very simplified although much used example is
to identify the mental state pain with C-fibre stimulation in the brain.4
Identifying a mental state with a brain state, however, makes the theory
vulnerable to the accusation of being chauvinistic (i.e. falsely denying systems
mental properties). This has the result that only creatures with brains can be
attributed mental states. In this light traditional research within AI, where the
goal is to develop an artificial system with humanlike mental states, seems to
be a non-starter. Further, this chauvinism may not be limited to creatures with
brains but perhaps to humans only. If it is only humans who have C-fibre
stimulation, only humans can feel pain.
4
This is of cause a very simplified identification and the expression C-fibre stimulation is only to be
taken as a stand-in for a more complex brain state.
- 11 -
The challenge for the identity theorist, according to Putnam, is the following:
“He has to specify a physical-chemical state such that any organism
(not just a mammal) is in pain if and only if (a) it posses a brain of a
suitable physical-chemical structure; and (b) its brain is in that
physical-chemical state. This means that the physical-chemical state in
question must be possible of a mammalian brain, a reptilian brain,
mollusc’s brain (octopuses are mollusca, and certainly feel pain), etc.
…. the brain state theorist [the mind-body identity theorist] is not just
saying that pain is a brain state; he is, of course, concerned to maintain
that every psychological state is a brain state. Thus if we can find even
one psychological predicate which can clearly be applied to both a
mammal and an octopus (say ‘hungry’), but whose physical-chemical
‘correlate’ is different in the two cases, the brain state theory has
collapsed. It seems to me overwhelmingly probable that we can do
this.” (Putnam (1967), p.436 (Reprint version))
In addition to the problems of finding a similar state within different species
there seem to be problems identifying certain mental states with particular
kinds of brain states, even within our own species. Research in the field of
neuropsychology has shown that the same psychological process can be
associated with distinct neurological structures. Examples are people who
because of brain damage have developed speech centres in the right
hemisphere (normally situated in the left side) or cases where the auditory
cortex is used to process visual information. (Block and Fodor, (1972) and
Shapiro (2004) p. 28 citing research of von Melchner, Pallas and Sur (2000))
Taking these as different realisations show that mind, or at least some mental
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capacities, can be multiply realised. The mind-body identity theory, according
to functionalists, has a problem accounting for this fact.
Because functionalism can accommodate multiple realization, proponents of
functionalism have argued, it is prima facie preferable to the mind-body
identity theory as a theory about the nature of mental states.
1.1.3 Materialism
What functionalists have in mind when they speak of multiple realization is
that a mental kind can be realized by distinct physical kinds. In this sense,
Functionalism is materialistic in spirit. Materialism is the view that,
fundamentally, all things that exist are 'material' or physical. Arguing that the
kind of states, which are most likely to be able to carry out the functional roles
are physical states, David Lewis (1966) presents his functionalist account as an
argument against dualism. However, strictly speaking, materialism is not
implied by functionalism. In fact, functionalism is compatible with some
kinds of dualism. Again, this is because the functional descriptions involved
are neutral about the nature of the occupier of the role (This neutrality will be
explained further in section 1.2). The only kinds of dualism incompatible with
functionalism are positions like epiphenomenalism and parallelism that deny
causal interactions from the mental to the physical. Properties lacking ability
to affect the physical domain will not be suitable candidates for occupying a
functional role.
1.1.4 Anti-reduction and methodological autonomy
Characterizing the spirit of functionalism it is also important to note that
functionalism has been seen by many as being able to provide a materialistic
account that is non-reductive. The general line of argument is that because
psychological kinds can be realized in diverse physical kinds (multiple
realization) psychological kinds cannot be reduced to physical kinds. This has
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led functionalist like Jerry Fodor (1974) to the conclusion that regularities at
the psychological level, although implemented on a physical level, cannot be
reduced to regularities on this underlying level. In this light, endorsing
functionalism can be seen as a way to ‘save’ the methodological autonomy of
psychology. Accordingly, psychology has its own level of description that is
above the details of neuroanatomy, physiology, chemistry and physics.
Psychology uncovers special laws which cannot be deduced from and thus
not reduced to the laws of physics.
1.1.5 The spirit of functionalism
In the light of the dissatisfaction with the mind-body identity theory and
behaviourism, functionalism can be seen as an attempt to provide a
materialistic and mechanistically inspired account of the mental that promises
the methodological autonomy of psychology and that at the same time avoids
the pitfalls of both liberalism and chauvinism. This seems to sum up the
intentions behind functionalism and thus gives us a picture of what can be
considered to be the spirit of functionalism. Now, we can begin to understand
Shapiro’s claim that it is in the spirit of functionalism to regard the mind as “a
programme that can be characterized in abstraction from the brain/body that
realizes it” (Shapiro (2004) p. 175). Before we discuss whether this is
necessarily a consequence of functionalism I will say a bit more about how we
should understand functionalism and functional roles, and present some
different versions of the position.
1.2 Methods for defining functional roles
Over the years various different versions of functionalism have been
developed. The best way to get an overview of this is to start by looking
at the two main methods for defining mental states in a functionalist way. The
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first method is set in terms of Turing Machines and machine tables. The
second is Lewis’ method for defining terms using Ramsey sentences.
1.2.1 Turing Machines and Machine tables
As noted, functionalism, in its early days was inspired by work within
computer science. Hillary Putnam (1960 and 1967) introduced the idea of
modelling a functional theory of mind over Turing Machines. A Turing
Machine is a purely theoretical and abstract construction defined by two
different functions. Function 1: From input and states to output. Function 2:
From input and states to other states. A machine of this kind can be
characterised in a machine table that, for every possible combination of states
and input, lists the instructions for these functions. These instructions have
form of conditionals of the following kind: If the machine is in state S and
receive input I then it emits output O.
A coke machine is an example of an ordinary machine that can be described
this way:
Coke Machine
50 pence input
1 pound input
S1
S2
Emit no output
Emit a Coke
Go to S2
Go to S1
Emit a Coke
Emit a Coke and 50 pence
Go to S1
Fig: 1 Machine table of coke machine (UK version of example from Block 1980)
This machine table specifies that if the coke machine is in S1 and receives an
input of 50 pence the machine emits no output and goes to state S2. If the
machine, while in S2, receives another 50 pence the machine will emit a coke
and return to state S1 and so on. I will not go through the whole table but I
- 15 -
think that the idea should be clear from these conditionals. One thing to note
is that the system’s response to input depends on its internal state when
receiving the input.
Putnam’s idea was that organisms with mental states can be described
analogues to Turing machines.5 Hence, a mental state is equivalent to a Turing
machine state. In this connection, it is important to notice that the states in a
Turing machine are functionally defined by the way they are connected to
each other in the way that the machine table describes. When we described
the coke machine we did not have to say anything about what materials the
machine was made of, only the relations between the internal states and the
in- and output. Neither did we specify anything about the construction of the
internal state of this machine. What it is to be in these internal states is
specified implicitly in the relations between the states and the production of
output from input as it is shown in the machine table. Any system that has
internal states that interact in this way will have such states as S1 and S2.
Putnam points out that an important feature of this account is that the
physical realization of the sense organs responsible for the various inputs,
and of the motor organs is specified, but that the ‘states’ themselves are
specified only implicitly by the machine table (Putnam (1967)). This has the
feature that the theory says nothing about the nature of the occupier of the
role. The occupier could, in theory, be brain-states, silicon states, physical or
even non-physical states. Like software the mind can be run on many
different kinds of hardware.
5
In his article from 1967 Putnam models his functionalism over Probabilistic Automatons instead of
Turing Machines. In Probabilistic Automatons transitions between states are defined in probabilities
rather than being deterministic.
- 16 -
A problem with Putnam’s model, however, is that a machine state is a state of
the whole system and consequently the model has difficulties accounting for
systems that are in several internal states at the same time. (Levin 2004)
1.2.2 Lewis’ Ramsey-sentence method of funtionalization
Another way to see how functional definitions are supposed to work is
looking at Lewis’ (1972) method for providing functional definitions using
Ramsey sentences. This method has the advantage of being able to account for
systems with several simultaneous internal states. One could say that Lewis’
method defines a system’s mental state all at once. (Levin 2004)
Take the example of defining pain as a mental state. In this case we have a
theory of mental states (an extremely simplified one) where pain is the state
which tends to be caused by tissue damage, causes worry and the emission of
“Ouch“. Worry, in turn, causes brow wrinkling (Example from Block 1980).
If we replace the mental state terms pain and worry with variables (x and y)
and transform the theory into an existentially quantified sentence we get what
is called the Ramsay sentence of the theory.
x, y (x is caused by tissue damage & causes the emission of “Ouch” & causes state
y & y causes brow wrinkling.)
This reads: there are two states x and y such that x is caused by tissue damage
and causes both the emission of “Ouch” and state y, which in turn causes
brow wrinkling.
Now we can define what it is to be in pain and worry in the following way:
- 17 -
Pain
An organism or system S is in pain = there are two states x and y, x is caused by
tissue damage and causes both the emission of “Ouch”, and the state y, and the state
y causes brow wrinkling and S is in state x.
Worry
An organism or system S is worried = there are two states x and y, x is caused by
tissue damage and causes both the emission of “Ouch” and the state y, and the state y
causes brow wrinkling and S is in state y.
Notice that in the above definitions the mental state terms are replaced with
variables, while input and output remain specified. Again this says nothing
about the structure of the involved mental states. Anything with an internal
state that plays these causal roles is worried and in pain.
1.3 Commonsense vs. Empirical functionalism
Having the methods for defining the functional roles in place the next concern
is which kind of theory we should use as the foundation for our definition of
these functional roles. There are two main directions that functionalism has
taken on this question. So-called commonsense functionalists take an a priori
approach, while empirical functionalists hold that we should take a posteriori
empirical psychological theories as our point of departure. In what follows I
will give a more detailed exposition of both these directions.
1.3.1 Commonsense functionalism
According to commonsense functionalists (e.g. Lewis (1972) and Armstrong
(1968)) our guideline for defining the appropriate functional roles for our
mental states is our common knowledge about the relations between
- 18 -
particular input, internal causal interaction and output. This knowledge
provides the background for what could be called a commonsense
psychology. Lewis (1972) suggests that we think of "common-sense
psychology as a term-introducing scientific theory, though one invented
before there was any such institution as professional science." (Lewis (1972).
p. 256) According to Lewis we construe this theory out of our extensive
repertoire of platitudes about mental states — as for example, 'headache is a
kind of pain'— and other platitudes about the causal relations of mental
states, sensory stimuli, and motor responses (Loc cit). We have already seen
pain analysed in such a commonsensical way. It is common knowledge that
pain is caused by tissue damage or damage to the body; it is also general
knowledge that this creates a desire to escape that situation and so on. This is
similar to the way that we define ordinary terms like mousetrap, alarm clock or
ball pen in broad functional terms. A mousetrap is something that has the
functional role of catching mice; an alarm clock has the functional role of
keeping and showing the time and making a loud noise at the right time and
so on. The functional role of an alarm clock gives us the meaning of what it is
to be an alarm clock. If something keeps and shows the time and makes a
loud noise at a certain set time it is an alarm clock. Likewise, an a priori
analysis of pain finds the common sense functional role associated with pain
and this role gives us the meaning of the term ‘pain’.
1.3.2 Empirical functionalism
This variety of functionalism holds that, instead of being guided by
commonsense we should be guided by the findings of the science of empirical
psychology (e.g. Putnam, Fodor). A typical way to express this view is that
mental states are occupants of functional roles and that which functional role
determines which mental states that a subject is in, is a matter for science
(perhaps cognitive psychology or neuroscience) (Braddon-Mitchell and
- 19 -
Jackson (2007)). This yields a different kind of specification of input and
output
than
that
which
is
open
to
commonsense
functionalism.
Commonsense functionalism is restricted to specifying input and output in
terms of what is externally observable and common knowledge (e.g. inputs
that are characterised in terms of objects present close to the subject, and
outputs in terms of bodily movements). In contrast empirical functionalism
can use the knowledge that we acquire via experiments e.g. knowledge of
neural signalling. (Block (1980))
The typical description of empirical functionalism replaces the commonsense
functional role directly with the empirical functional role. However, as
Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2007) points out, it seems that the
commonsense functional role must enter into the picture at some point. This
is because having only the neuroscientific facts about a person would not
suffice to give ordinary people with no knowledge of neuroscience any
knowledge about what that person thinks. They suggest that the
commonsense functional role, instead of having the role of fixing the meaning
of the mental terms, as it has according to commonsense functionalism,
employs the function of fixing the reference of these terms.
Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson distinguish between two general versions
where the commonsense role fixes the reference. In the first, the
commonsense role fixes the nature of the state that plays the role, e.g. on
neurophysiological states. In the second version the commonsense role fixes
another more detailed role that underpins the commonsense role. In this case
“What settles that a subject is in M [a certain mental state] is the internal
functional role which underpins the common sense functional role associated
with M.” (Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2007) P.85) The interesting role for
science becomes to investigate which internal functional roles play the
- 20 -
common sense functional roles. This latter version is the more sensible way to
go, according to Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson. This becomes obvious when
we realize that the first version contradicts the way in which we defined
multiply realization. If the functional role refers directly to the neural state we
end up with chauvinism, similar in kind to that which the mind-body identity
theory has been accused of. However, as we shall see in the next paragraph,
even the more promising versions of empirical functionalism have been
accused of being chauvinistic.
1.4 The liberalism-chauvinism dilemma
Now that we have an overview of what functionalism is and different
versions of it, it is time to ask ourselves how this picture fits with the picture
that we drew of the spirit of functionalism, just a little while ago. Remember
that one of the essential reasons for endorsing functionalism was to avoid the
chauvinism of the mind-body identity theory. We have already seen that
some versions of empirical functionalism seem to have problems avoiding
chauvinism and providing us with the right kind of multiply realization. In
his article “Troubles with Functionalism” Block argues that the dilemma for
functionalism is “that any physical description of inputs and outputs ….yields a
version of functionalism that is inevitably chauvinist or liberal” (Block (1980)
p. 295). Let us take a look at why he thinks that this is the case.
1.4.1 The charge of chauvinism
We’ll start by considering Block’s challenge to commonsense functionalism.
Block observes that commonsense functionalists
“tend to specify inputs and outputs in the manner of
behaviourists: outputs in terms of movements of arms and legs,
- 21 -
sound emitted and the like; inputs in terms of light and sound
falling on the eyes and ears….Such descriptions are blatantly
species-specific. Humans have arms and legs, but snakes do notand whether or not snakes have mentality, one can easily
imagine snakelike creatures that do. Indeed, one can imagine
creatures with all manner of input-output devices, e.g., creatures
that communicate and manipulate by emitting strong magnetic
fields “(Block (1980) p. 294).
On this account Block holds that the general version of commonsense
functionalism leads to a kind of chauvinism: human body chauvinism. In this
sense, Block is suggesting that because the identification of mental states is
limited by the fact that the input and outputs are species-specific, we do not
get the kind of multiple realization the functionalists were originally looking
for.
Turning to the question of empirical functionalism Block’s charge of
chauvinism is a charge of internal organization chauvinism. Remember that
empirical functionalism is concerned with the functional organization of the
internal cognitive mechanisms and processes as are the objectives of empirical
psychology such as input and outputs of the central nervous system
described in neurophysiological terms (Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2007)).
Now, Block invites us to imagine that we meet some Martians and find that in
a commonsense functional way they are very much like us. However, in the
empirical functional way we differ significantly.
“When we get to know Martians, we find them about as
different from us as humans we know. We develop extensive
cultural and commercial intercourse with them. We study each
- 22 -
other's science and philosophy journals, go to each other's
movies, read each other's novels, etc. Then Martian and
Earthian psychologists compare notes, only to find that in
underlying psychology, Martians and Earthians are very
different… Now imagine that what Martian and Earthian
psychologists find when they compare notes is that Martians
and Earthians differ as if they were the end products of
maximally different design choices (compatible with rough
Functional equivalence in adults). Should we reject our
assumption that Martians can enjoy our films, believe their own
apparent scientific results, etc.?…..[T]here may be many ways of
filling in the description of the Martian-human differences in
which it would be reasonable to suppose there simply is no fact
of the matter, or even to suppose that the Martians do not
deserve mental ascriptions. But surely there are many ways of
filling in the description of the Martian-Earthian difference I
sketched on which it would be perfectly clear that even if
Martians behave differently from us on subtle psychological
experiments, they nonetheless think desire enjoy, etc. To
suppose otherwise would be crude human chauvinism.” (Block
(1980) pp. 291-93)
The consequence of identifying mental states on the basis of theories of neural
inputs and outputs as we humans have them seem to be that only creatures
with neurons or with the right kind of neural set up can have mental states
like ours. This is what you might call a neurophysiological chauvinism (term
from Braddon-Mitchel and Jackson (2007)).
- 23 -
1.4.2 Functionalism and abstraction
One way for both commonsense and empirical functionalists to avoid the
charge of chauvinism is to characterise inputs and outputs in more abstract
ways. If, in our example with the coke machine instead of cokes, 50 cent coins
and 1 pound coins, we had characterized these as output 1, Input 1 and Input
2, then every machine that had some inputs and outputs standing in the same
functional relation as that of our coke machine will have the same internal
states as this (Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2007)). In regard to mental
states, any creature or system which had inputs and outputs and similar
internal functional relations would be functionally isomorphic to you and
have the same mental states as you. This would guarantee that systems
without brains or with different bodies are not excluded from the realm of
psychological subjects from the outset. That is, it would ensure the possibility
of the kind of multiple realization with which Putnam and others were
concerned in arguing against the mind-body identity theory. However,
according to Block, the problem with such a characterisation is that it is too
liberal. Block invites us to imagine that we set up all people in China in a
network linked via radio communication that communicates with a body
somewhere in the world. This system is set up in such a way that it is
commonsense functionally equivalent to a human brain and body. Would
such a system have mental states? Commonsense functionalists would have
to say that it has. In the case of empirical functionalism, if someone arranged
the economy of Bolivia in such a way that it had similar relations of internal
states, input and output as a human being, we would have to say that it has
mental states (Block 1980). Block argues that since these would be absurd
assumptions, these versions of functionalism would be untenable. Block holds
that it is our intuition that this kind of system would lack qualitative mental
states. That is, there would not be something “it is like” to be these systems.
- 24 -
However, one might object that what is involved in the example seems to be
outside the reach of our intuitions. It is possible that if we really understood
the complex functional story of the Bolivian economy when organized this
way or the China brain, the thought that it has mental states might not be
absurd. At least it seems reasonable to say that because of our lack in
knowledge of this kind our intuitions in this case can only be very vague.
Bechtel and Mundale (1999) present an alternative option for functionalists to
avoid the pitfall of chauvinism. I will give an exposition of this in a short
while; however there is one thing that we need to shed light on first and that
is the relation between functionalism and multiple realization.
1.4.3 Functionalism and Multiple Realization
Often multiple realization is mentioned in the same breath as functionalism,
and as we have seen multiple realization plays a major role in the general
debate concerning chauvinism versus liberalism. But what exactly is the
logical relation between these two notions? Does functionalism entail multiple
realization? And does multiple realization entail functionalism?
Let us start with the second question. The short answer is: No. It is possible
for something to be multiple realizable even though it is not individuated in
terms of functional role. Standard examples are geometrical kinds like square,
cube, sphere and circle (Mandik (2007)). What makes something a cube is that
it is a hexahedron with six equal squares as faces. This is an intrinsic property.
Something can be a cube without having any causal relations to anything else.
A cube is a geometrical, not a functional kind. Further, cubes can have
different physical properties, be realized in different materials like foam,
stone or wood. It can also have different sizes of squares, be solid or hollow
- 25 -
and have different masses. In this way cube seems to be multiply realizable. If
we had an account on which mental states were individuated in terms of
intrinsic properties, these could still be multiple realized. It may be that
multiple realization of mental states, if true, gives us a good reason to prefer
functionalism to mind-body identity theory, but it does not support
functionalism definitively.
Even more interesting for our current discussion is the second question of
whether we can have functionalism without multiple realization. The idea of
functional kinds being multiple realizable seems to be general. Take for
example the functional kind of mouse trap. Mouse traps come in al sorts of
shapes, materials and make ups. The same seem to be the case with
corkscrew, watch and left winger. Taking mental kinds to be functional kinds
in a similar way, functionalists have argued that mental states like pain or
hunger can likewise be realized in different physical structures e.g. in brain
states in mammals, electronic states in extremely complex (and not yet
developed) computers or in some kind of plasma in extraterrestrial creatures.
However, even though multiple realizability seems to be a property shared by
many functional kinds, this does not necessarily show that all functional
kinds are multiple realizable. According to Shapiro, “adoption of a functional
perspective
toward
the
mind
does
not
entail
that
the mind is multiply realizable.” ((Shapiro 2004), p. 22). This is the case,
according to Shapiro, because it is possible to have a description of a
functional role that applies only, as a matter of necessity, to a single physical
kind. One of his examples involves the drill bit of a machine designed to drill
in extremely hard minerals. Drill bit is an example of an ordinary functional
kind. What is significant to being of the kind drill bit is to have the capacity to
drill a hole when rotated in to a surface. However, Shapiro invites us to
consider that “if diamond are the only substance that in fact are hard enough
- 26 -
to drill through very hard surfaces, then drill bit picks out a physical kind no
less than it refers to a functional kind”(Shapiro (2004) p.21).
Notice, however, that whether or not diamonds, in this case, are the only
substance hard enough for the drilling job is an empirical question. Thus, it
concerns the nomological possibility of drill bit being multiple realizable. This
is distinct from the question of the metaphysical possibility of drill bit being
multiple realizable. Even if diamonds turns out to be the only substance that
can realize the special kind of drill bit in our world and in all the possible
worlds that share our laws of nature, this does not exclude there being other
possible worlds where other physical kinds can do the job as well. The fact
that the functionalist description of the functional role is neutral, at least to
some extent, about the nature of the realization, seem to ensure the
metaphysical possibility of a kind being multiple realizable. However, as we
have seen Shapiro argue, this is not the case when we are concerned with the
nomological possibility. The situation is similar when we consider the
question in relation to mental states.
To sum up: a functionalist approach does entail multiple realization when we
are concerned with the metaphysical possibility; however, this is not the case
when the question comes to the nomological possibility of multiple
realization.
It is the nomological possibility of multiple realization that concerns Bechtel
and Mundale in the article “Multiple Realizability Revisited” (1999) In this
article they develop a suggestion as to how we can have a functionalist
approach that does not involve multiple realization or entail chauvinism.
- 27 -
1.5 Functionalism without multiple realization and chauvinism?
We have now seen that in a certain sense functionalism without multiple
realization is a possibility. As we can formulate a functional role for drill bit
that exclusively can be occupied by diamonds, so we could formulate a
functional role for pain that could only be occupied by humans. However, in
our previous discussion of the liberalism-chauvinism dilemma we saw that
this seemed to steer us straight into chauvinism. In the article “Multiple
Realizability Revisited”, (1999) Bechtel and Mundale suggest, a way forward
for denying multiple realization of mental states, but nevertheless keep a
functionalist approach that has the advantage of not being chauvinistic.
The key feature of this account is their argument discrediting the claim that
mental states are multiple realizable in the way suggested by functionalism.
An exposition of this argument will essentially provide an insight in how they
think that it is possible to reject multiple realization and at the same time
avoid chauvinism.
According to Bechtel and Mundale the prima facie case for multiple
realization stems from a misguided understanding of what a brain state is.
When Putnam advances his argument against the mind-body identity theory
his main claim is that it seems implausible that we would find the same
physical-chemical state in the all different species that share the ability to
have psychological states like pain or hunger (see above quote p. 12). The
conception of a brain state as physical-chemical states has been taken as a
general point of departure for most philosophical discussions of multiple
realization. However, according to Bechtel and Mundale this notion of brain
state is not shared by researchers in the neurosciences. The closest we get to
something that could count as brain states in the neurosciences, are areas of
- 28 -
activity in different parts of the brain. This is a notion of brain state that is
much more abstract and coarse-grained than the one found in the
philosophical arguments. Bechtel and Mundale accuse the philosophers for
failing to note that “the same degree of variability is tolerated by
neuroscientists in identifying types of neural processes that they accept in
identifying psychological types” (Bechtel and Mundale (1999) p. 202)
Bechtel and Mundale point to the fact that it is only on a very abstract level
that humans and octopuses can be considered to share a psychological state
like hunger. In this case, hunger could be characterized as something that is
caused by lack of food, causes discomfort and food-seeking behaviour and so
on. However, if we look at hunger in these different species with the aim of
asserting the individual differences, we see that there are differences in, for
example, what kind of food that is sought, how it is done etc. The usual
practice, in identifying psychological states, involves abstracting away from
such details. On similar lines neuroscientists abstract away from details on
physical and chemical levels.
In fact, neuroscience is more functionalistic than it has traditionally been
thought to be, according to Bechtel and Mundale. They point to the fact that
the neurosciences both in their tools and project rely heavily on
considerations of behaviour and psychological function. This has the result
that it is possible to identify brain states across species and thereby, according
to Bechtel and Mundale, the consequence of making multiple realization less
likely.
To give a simple example of this approach in neuroscience Bechtel and
Mundale refer to Ferrier’s (1886) comparative investigations based on weak
current stimulation of brain areas of, among others, dogs, rats, rabbits and
- 29 -
monkeys. Figure 2 shows the areas on the left hemispheres of monkey (left)
and dog (right) where motor response was educed when stimulated.
Fig. 2
Illustration from Ferrier 1886, reprinted in Bechtel and Mundale 1999
Each number refers to a different kind of motor response e.g. Number 1:
Opposite hind limb is advanced as in walking, Number 5: Extension forward
of the opposite arm (as if reaching or touching something in front)
Although Ferrier’s research is of older date it is illustrative of the approach
that
is
also
present
neurophysiology.
in
Although
today’s
research
contemporary
in
neuroanatomy
research
employs
and
further
developed techniques such as single cell recording, it shares the point of
departure in the assumption that we can compare across species and its
dependence on psychological or behavioural function. When it comes to
research on humans techniques such as position emission tomography (PET)
and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has been developed. Here
the dependence on psychological function is even more evident, because it
relies on the cognitive tasks that the subjects are asked to perform in the
experiments while scanned.
- 30 -
According to Bechtel and Mundale, what we should learn from all this is that
the way we ask questions in the neurosciences is constructed in a way that
makes multiple realization less likely.
“…neuroscientists employ behaviour and psychological function in
setting the context for identity of brain states, with the result that they
identify areas and processes in brains across species, as well as in
different
brains
within
the
same
species.
Not
surprisingly,
psychologists employ similar contexts for identifying psychological
states, resulting in a one-to-one mapping between brain states and
psychological states” (Bechtel and Mundale (1999). p.203)
In short, functional criteria are relevant in identifying both psychological
states and brain states, according to Bechtel and Mundale.
Multiple realization of psychological states is about judging similarity and
difference: firstly, similarity of psychological states and secondly, difference
of physical realizations. The standard arguments for multiple realization have
used a coarse-grained criterion when judging the sameness of psychological
states and a fine-grained criterion when discriminating between brain states.
Bechtel and Mundale’s claim is that if we choose the same grains of analysis
for both psychological and neuroscientific investigations then the plausibility
of multiple realization disappears.
“One can adopt a relatively coarse-grain, equating psychological states
over different individuals or across species. If one employs the same
grain, though, one will equate activities in brain areas across species,
and one-to-one mapping is preserved…Conversely, one can adopt a
very fine-grain, and differentiate psychological states between
- 31 -
individuals, or even in the same individuals over time. If one similarly
adopts a fine-grain in analysing the brain, then one is likely to map
psychological differences onto brain differences, and brain differences
onto psychological differences.” (Bechtel and Mundale (1999) p. 202)
Which level of grain that is appropriate in judging these similarities and
differences depends on the context of inquiry. If, for example, one takes an
evolutionary perspective a coarse-grained analysis would be appropriate.
(Bechtel and Mundale (1999) p. 203) However, according to Bechtel and
Mundale, on neither of these different levels of abstraction is it likely that
psychological states are multiply realized. On the coarse-grained approach
realizations in form of brain states will be similar across species and on the
fine-grained approach we do not share psychological states.
Finally, how does this approach avoid chauvinism? Taking a coarse-grained
approach to both psychological states and brain states makes it possible to
ascribe psychological states to cats, dogs, rat, rabbits and possibly many other
species and not only to humans. But what about computers and
extraterrestrials composed of different types of components? Well, we might
find that these things are alternative realizations, but according to Bechtel and
Mundale, this is not obvious and maybe it is not even likely. Computers that
have psychological abilities are likely to be very different from the computers
that have been invented up till now. Bechtel and Mundale suggest that it at
least seems possible that such computers would have areas that could be
identified as being responsible for processing different sensory inputs or
motor output. According to Bechtel and Mundale, ”this might provide a basis
for a common taxonomy of the physical processing states underlying the
psychological function” (Bechtel and Mundale (1999) p. 204). The situation I
imagine would be similar in the case of extraterrestrials.
- 32 -
At this point one could ask whether this is not exactly what we took as
standard cases of multiple realization? That is, for example, realizations in
silicon-based systems. An alternative way of reading Bechtel and Mundale’s
point about the notion of brain states in the neurosciences is that this notion in
itself is a functional notion that actually permits multiple realization in the
standard terms. So the important issue here is perhaps not, as we first
thought, about whether or not the account discredits the plausibility of
multiple realization. The really important thing to recognize is that
neuroscience is more functionalistic in its outset than first expected and that
the central issue is about choosing level of grain for one’s analysis appropriate
for the context of inquiry.
1.6 Sum up and Conclusions
My aim in this chapter has been to provide the tools for evaluating whether an
embedded and embodied approach is indeed compatible with functionalism.
To sum up, the development of functionalism was connected to dissatisfaction
with the solutions provided by behaviourism and the mind-body identity
theory. Behaviourism was too liberal in its attribution of mental states, whereas
the mind-body identity theory was viewed as chauvinistic. From this we
concluded that what might be thought of as the spirit of functionalism was to
develop a theory that avoided these extremities, and at the same time kept a
materialistic approach. In order to get a better understanding of what is
involved in defining a functional role we looked at two different methods of
functionalization: The machine method and the Ramsey sentence method. Both
methods providing definitions of functional roles that avoid the use of mental
state terms and which are neutral about the physical structure of the mental
- 33 -
states. Using different sources a priori or a posteriori psychology yields different
versions
of
functionalism:
commonsense
functionalism
and
empirical
functionalism respectively. However, both versions have been accused of being
either too liberal or too chauvinistic. In my discussion of the liberalismchauvinism dilemma on the charge of liberalism I argued, with BraddonMitchell and Jackson, that Block’s examples involving the Chinese brain and
the reorganized economy of Bolivia is outside the reach of our intuition and
,accordingly, that it seems to be at least an open question whether or not such a
brain would indeed have mental states. Thus, one way to turn for the
functionalist seems to be towards more abstract characterizations of inputs and
outputs. Another way out of this dilemma, is to recognise the important insight
delivered by Bechtel and Mundale, that the original debate on functionalism
and multiple realization has been cast in different levels of abstraction for
psychological states and brain states –- coarse-grained and fine-grained
respectively. If we are willing to acknowledge that the notion of brain state is
itself a functional notion in the way that Bechtel and Mundale argue, this could
be a way out of the dilemma. Bechtel and Mundale also offer us another
observation worth keeping in mind: which level of grain that is appropriate is
determined by the context of inquiry. Judgements of sameness and difference
are always relative to one’s reasons for wanting to make the comparison in the
first place.
Could we use our newfound distinction between a coarse-grained and finegrained analysis to track down the distinction between commonsense
functionalism and empirical functionalism?
To a first approximation this would seem to be the case in the sense that there
seems be more grounds for a more detailed analysis working from the outset of
scientific psychology than from commonsense psychology. However, it is
- 34 -
worth noticing that even scientific psychological analysis can be more or less
coarse or fine-grained depending on the context of inquiry. Making a coarsegrained analysis as opposed to a fine-grained analysis, in Bechtel and Mundale
use of the terms, is just to focus on the commonalities as oppose to the
differences between individuals. In this light, Bechtel and Mundale classify
characterisations of mental states at the level of scientific informationprocessing psychology as generally coarse-grained. Accordingly, in some cases
the analysis in which an empirical functionalism can take its point of departure
can be characterised as coarse-grained. In this way, it seems coarse-grained
and fine-grained is not a matter of all or nothing, but a continuum. Although,
the distinction does not completely track the distinction between commonsense
and empirical functionalism it will be useful to keep in mind in the following
discussions of the body-detail model and Extended Functionalism and our
further investigations into the relation between embodied cognition and
functionalism.
- 35 -
______________________________________________
CHAPTER 2
THE BODY-DETAIL MODEL: SHAPIRO’S ARGUMENT
______________________________________________
Shapiro argues that research within embodied, embedded cognitive sciences
conflicts with the spirit of functionalism. According to Shapiro, it conflicts
with the body neutral functionalist model of mind that is associated with the
claim that “characteristics of bodies make no difference to the kind of mind
one possesses” (Shapiro (2004) p. 175). In his book “The Mind Incarnate”,
Shapiro depicts these body-neutral views as what he calls naturalistic
versions of Gilbert Ryle’s dogma of the ghost in the machine, which despite
their naturalistic point of departure hold that mind is autonomously residing
in and contained by the brain and the body. In “The Mind Incarnate” these
views are represented by what he calls the seperability thesis (henceforth ST).
ST is construed as the view that the mind is independent of the body in the
sense that the very same mind can exist in many different kinds of bodies
with different properties and that, as a result, the question of understanding
mind can be separated from the question of understanding body. As Shapiro
formulates it, ST views the mind as a “fairly self-contained organ, like a
stomach or a kidney, whose properties and operations can be understood
without having to attend much to the anatomical and physiological properties
of the rest of the body”(Shapiro (2004) preface x). ST is thus the metaphysical
claim that identical minds can exist in different kinds of bodies and the
epistemological claim that we can understand mind without attending to the
- 36 -
facts of the body. As even classical functionalist accounts can allow that
minds cannot be understood without having an understanding of bodies and
the world (the epistemological claim) my focus will be on the metaphysical
claim of ST.
In opposition to ST, Shapiro interprets research in embedded, embodied
cognitive science as supporting what he calls the embodied mind thesis
(henceforth EMT). EMT is the thesis that “minds profoundly reflect the bodies
in which they are contained” (Shapiro (2004). p. 167.) According to this thesis,
a creature with a humanlike mind will have a humanlike body; and a creature
with dolphin mind will have a dolphin body and so on. In fact, EMT claims
“only humanlike bodies will have humanlike minds”. (Shapiro (2004) p. 182
my italics).
The following scenario makes the opposite thesis clear: imagine that we, via
radio, get in contact with some creatures from another solar system. We talk
and interact with them in much the same way as we did with the Martians in
the earlier example from Block. On this basis we assume that they have
something very much like a human mind. As we have only encountered our
new friends over the radio, we have never seen a picture or video of them.
What kind of body would such creatures have? Proponents of ST would say
that we could not know this. As far as we know our new friends could be
spherical and judge distance with the help of sonar. Proponents of EMT on
the other hand would expect these creatures to have a body very much like
the human body (Shapiro (2004) p. 166).
The Human Mind and the Human Body
Before we turn to the research presented by Shapiro in favour of EMT, there
are a few important points worth noting about the notions of the human mind
- 37 -
and body employed by Shapiro. The first is that Shapiro’s argument is
concerned with entire minds and not just states. A human mind in the way
Shapiro uses the term refers to a collection of cognitive capacities such as for
example, memory, perception and use of language (Shapiro (2004) p.69).
Combined with EMT, this means that creatures with dolphin bodies cannot
have humanlike minds, but it does not imply that we cannot share mental
states like for example, hunger or pain. However, whether this is the case
depends, according to EMT, on whether they have body properties that are
sufficiently similar to the relevant properties of human bodies.
To understand the claim of EMT it is also important to be familiar with
Shapiro’s notion of what it means to have a human body. Shapiro states that
when he talks about human bodies he “will usually have in mind facts about
our gross morphology. Human beings walk upright on two legs, have two
forward-facing eyes in their head, and are bilaterally symmetrical. Our ears
are on the sides of our heads, and we have five fingers on each hand”
(Shapiro (2004) p. 71). In this way, EMT states that for a creature to have a
human mind it must share the gross morphology that is generally shared
among human beings.
2.1 Body Matters
Shapiro argues against ST, referring to research in the field of embodied
cognition. Shapiro presents three lines of research that he takes to support
EMT. From the introduction we have already had a taste of what these
involve, but here I will present the issues in further detail.
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A. Perception and thought: the idiosyncratic aspects of the body play
a unique and ineliminable role in perception, such that body form
and structure determines type of mind
B. Conception and content: “The content of the mind – the manner
in which the mind conceptualizes the world – is a function of
body type.” (Shapiro (2004) p.183)
C. The division of mind and body: the mind is realized throughout
the body, making the division between mind and body
impossible to maintain; therefore body type determines type of
mind
I will present these three claims and the research that Shapiro offers in their
support under the following headings: I) The Body’s Role in Perception, II)
Body Concepts and III) Leaky Minds. Along the way I will give some
concerns questioning whether these results suffice to support the strong
claims of A,B,C and EMT.
2.2 The Body’s Role in Perception
According to Shapiro, the body plays a significant and indispensable role in
perception. In the introduction we have already encountered Shapiro’s
example on auditory perception, where the size of the head and the
placement of the ears matters for determining the location of a sound source.
Another example is vision. Shapiro considers our depth perception.
According to Shapiro, our abilities to move our bodies in certain ways and the
particular characteristics of our eyes make an essential difference to our visual
processing.
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Shapiro points to the fact that we human beings have two eyes that are placed
with a certain difference between them. When seeing objects in front of you,
each of your eyes projects slightly different coordinates of these objects to the
respective retinas. From the difference in coordinates your brain then
calculates the relative distance of the objects.
“The squirrel looks closer than the tree, which in turn looks closer than
the fence, because the retinal image of the squirrel appears on the
temple sides of each retinas whereas the image of the fence appears on
the nasal sides of each retina, with the tree’s image nestled between the
two”(Shapiro (2004) p. 187).
According to Shapiro, what is important, in this case, is that the processing of
the brain is fitted to receive the information from exactly two eyes – no more
and no less. In the light of this, visual processing in a spider must be
remarkably different from that of humans (most spiders have eight eyes,
some 6. But there are spiders with no eyes, 4 and up to even 12 eyes).
Accordingly, if we imagine that we could exchange the brain of a spider with
a human brain, the processing done by the human brain would not be apt for
providing depth perception. (Shapiro has an analogy of using a submarine
instruction book for flying an airplane. And as he points out “this will almost
certainly shorten your flight”.) Shapiro takes this to indicate that “Human
vision needs a human body” (Shapiro (2004) p.189).
Shapiro finds additional support for the above statement in work by
Churchland, Ramachandran and Sejnowski (1994) on the issue of parallax. If
you move your head or body in order to take a look around, you will notice
that the things that are closest to you, will appear to move whereas the
background continues to appear stable (This is the phenomenon of parallax).
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These movements, according to Shapiro, are not just an aid to depth
perception but indispensable parts of the visual processing. According to
Shapiro, the picture is similar when we turn to our other perceptual abilities.
Shapiro takes this to show that the body does not merely influence our mental
properties (this would seem to be a trivial observation), but that its
characteristics play an indispensable role in our mental operations:
“..the point I draw from my comments about eyes and ears goes
beyond the obvious claim that perceptual processes are tailored to
body structures. The point is deeper—that psychological processes are
incomplete without the body’s contribution” (Shapiro (2004) p.190)
Shapiro further suggests that
“this means that a description of various perceptual capacities cannot
maintain body neutrality, and it also means that an organism with a
nonhuman
body
will
have
nonhuman
visual
and
auditory
psychologies.” (Shapiro (2004) p. 190)
Does this mean that, for example, people with only one eye or bad eyesight
have non-human visual psychologies? I believe that this is the way we should
interpret the above statement from Shapiro. To call it non-human may be a bit
drastic, but Shapiro’s conclusion seems to imply that people with this kind of
visual embodiment will have a different kind of perceptual psychology than
what is standard among human beings. I think that this is likely to be true,
but the question is what conclusions we should draw from this observation
(more on this later p. 45). Shapiro takes the above research to show that the
body plays such a specific and important role in perception that its
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characteristics determining for our perceptual capacities. The result,
according to Shapiro, supports EMT in the sense that it shows that we cannot
separate mind from body, and that organisms with bodies of a particular type
will have a matching mind.
2.2.1 A skill-based model of perception
According to Shapiro (Forthcoming), we learn a similar lesson from Alva
Noë’s account of perception. According to this view perception constitutively
depends on the body and its relations to the surrounding environment. To be
more precise, perception, according to Noë, occurs when an organism has
implicit knowledge of how movements of its body or body parts will affect
the flow of sensory stimulation that it receives, what Noë calls sensorimotor
contingencies. For example, take my experience of a coffee cup on the table in
front of me. According to the sensorimotor account, this experience is partly
constituted by my implicit knowledge of how the stimulation would change if
I, for example, moved my head to the right and thus looked at the cup from a
different angle. Along the same lines, my experience also depends partially on
my knowledge of how stimuli would change if I were to reach out and grab a
hold of the cup. What is important in this context is that the sensorimotor
contingencies would be different for a creature with a different body.
Accordingly, reaching out for the coffee cup would be associated with a
different set of sensorimotor contingencies for a creature with wings instead
of hands. Because, according to Noë, sensorimotor contingencies are
constitutive of experience, differences in these make differences to what
experience one has. Hence Noë’s conclusion: “only a creature with a body like
ours can have experience like ours” (Shapiro Forthcoming citing Noë p. 19).
To what extent does perception on this account depend on the details of our
embodiment? Noë and O’Regan (2001) have an example of the kind of
characteristics that can make a difference to experience:
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The human eye has a blind spot of 5-7 degrees in its field of vision. This
corresponds to the place where the optic nerve goes through the eyeball and
connects with the brain. The result is that small objects become invisible when
in this field. Usually we do not notice the blind spot and as such it is not a
part of our conscious visual experience. However, according to Noë and
O’Regan, even though we do not experience the blind spot as such, it does
make a difference to the phenomenology of our visual experiences and is part
of what constitutes them. How can this be? According to Noë and O’Regan
the presence of the blind spot produces certain sensorimotor contingencies.
Take the experience of watching a bird flying in the distance. If there was to
be no change in the sensation when the bird enters the blind field, “then the
brain would have to conclude that the object was not being seen, but was
being hallucinated.” (Noë and O’Regan (2001) p. 951) The brain gains
information from the fact that there is a blind spot in the following way:
“Monitoring the way the sensory stimulation from the retina changes
when the eye moves to displace an object in the vicinity of the blind
spot, is, for the brain, another way of gaining information about the
object.” (Noë and O’Regan (2001) p. 951)
Accordingly, experience of watching the bird fly in the distance is, according
to Noë and O’Regan, partly constituted by my implicit knowledge of how the
flow of stimuli is linked with my bodily actions. Now, if we were to imagine a
creature that instead of having one blind spot on each eye had two such blind
spots, this creature would associate the experience of watching a bird in the
distance with other sensorimotor contingencies.
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This illustrates that, according to the sensorimotor account, even differences
in smaller details of one’s body and sensory system will make a difference to
the experience – even such details as the way our retinal image changes when
moving our eyes. The differences that are provided by the differences in
sensorimotor contingences make a difference on a sub-personal level in the
information received and “expected” by the brain. This in turn makes a
difference in the phenomenological character of the experience for example
whether or not I experience watching the bird as a hallucination. According to
the sensorimotor account, every difference in embodiment will make it seem
different to the perceiver. (Noë (2004), Noë and O’Regan (2001))
Further, Noë (2004) rejects the idea that we can, as ST states, separate what
David Marr has termed the algorithmic level of description of cognitive
phenomena from the level of implementation:
“In general it is a mistake to think that we can sharply distinguish
visual processing at the highly abstract level, on the one hand, from
processing at the concrete implementational level, on the other. The
point is not that algorithms are constrained by their implementation,
although that is true. The point, rather, is that the algorithms are
actually, at least in part, formulated in terms of items at the
implementational level. You might actually need to mention hands and
eyes in the algorithms!” (Shapiro (forthcoming) p.15 citing Noë,
original italics and excitement)
The claim that Noë makes in the above paragraph is that the psychological
processing is fitted to body type – hands and eyes and other characteristics of
body are involved in the computational processing. His point is similar to the
one intended by Shapiro with his analogy of using a submarine instruction
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book for navigating a plane. In this way Noë’s account, according to Shapiro,
seems to support the claim of EMT – that human minds require human
bodies. (Shapiro (forthcoming))
2.2.2 Sensory substitution and plasticity
A challenge to Shapiro’s (and Noë and O’Regan’s) analysis above has been
provided by arguments that hold that the human brain is remarkably plastic.
That is, it has an ability to adjust its organization and structure in order to
receive alternative kinds of stimuli—making it possible to substitute parts of
the body with alternative sensory equipment. One of the more known
examples of such sensory substitution requiring that the brain take in
information in a new way is Tactile-vision sensory substitution (TVSS) (see fig.
3):
Figure 3
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The way that TVSS works: An image is selected by a video camera that is usually positioned on
the subject’s forehead. The data from the camera is transmitted via cable to a display unit. The
display unit transduces the video data into a pattern of low-voltage pulse trains, each
corresponding to a pixel in the image. These trains travel via cable to electrode arrays that are
placed on an area of the skin. The electrodes then stimulate the sensors of the skin. An area that
has proved particularly apt for this is the tongue. Source: Bach-y-Rita and Kercel (2003) p. 543
Using this system subjects are able to learn to “make perceptual judgements
using visual means such as perspective, parallax, looming and zooming, and
depth estimates” (Bach-y-Rita and Kercel (2003) p. 543), thus, seemingly
having an ability of gross visual discrimination similar in kind to that of
ordinary vision. Another interesting fact is that after training with the TVSS
for a while, the subjects report perceiving the image out in the world and not
on the skin. These capacities stay unchanged even if we switch from one
motor system (the camera places on the head) to another (for example a hand
held camera). The effect is similar when the electrode array is moved to
different locations on the skin (for example from the tongue to the thigh). This
last fact seems to support the subjects’ reports of not perceiving the image on
the skin, but as out in the world as is also the case in normal vision.
What has been said above gives us reason to argue that just because
characteristics of body are significantly involved in determining perception it
does not entail that it could not have been different, and that alternative
organisations of sensory systems could not have a similar effect– a point
made by Clark:
“[F]rom the fact that (as seems highly likely) our human experience
really does depend in part on many idiosyncratic aspects of our
embodiment, it does not follow that only a creature thus embodied
could have those very experiences. The very most that follows is that,
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for a creature like us, all other things being equal, we would not have
that experience were it not for such–and–such an idiosyncratic fact.”
(Clark (forthcoming) p.7)
This also connects with our considerations about people with disabilities in
their visual systems. People with bad eyesight probably have different
perceptual abilities compared to what is standard among human beings, but
this is only with all other things being equal. However, things are not equal
and people with bad eyesight can wear glasses or contact lenses. Do bodyspecifics really make such a special difference to mind that such aids do not
make a difference in determining mind? I think that what has been said above
gives us reason to doubt the strong claim that characteristics of our sensory
system determine our perceptual experiences in such a way that all
differences in body entail differences in mind.
2.3 Body Concepts
A second area where Shapiro claims to find support for EMT is the role of the
body in structuring our concepts and the way we think about the world -the
content of our thoughts. Here Shapiro draws on the work of both G. Lakoff
and M. Johnson (1980; 1999) and A. Glenberg and M. Kaschak (2000).
Ultimately Shapiro takes this research to show that
“the basic categories an organism develops in order to think about the
world are a function of how its body interacts with the world, and thus
differences in body type will result in differences in how and what an
organism thinks or is capable of thinking” (Shapiro (2004) p. 183).
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2.3.1 Concepts and Metaphors
The central idea of Lakoff and Johnson’s work is that the form and structure
of our body play a significant role in structuring our basic concepts and that
these basic concepts, in turn, structure more abstract concepts and metaphors.
According to this research, basic concepts like ‘front’, ‘back’, ‘up and ‘down’
are directly related to the shape and type of our bodies. The claim is that these
basic concepts are understood through the experience of the world that we
have with a human body. Lakoff and Johnson hold that such concepts would
not make any sense to beings which have bodies with no front or back.
Imagine that all beings on this planet were spherical and able to perceive in
all directions. What would ‘front’ and ‘back’ be for such creatures? According
to Lakoff and Johnson, they would have nothing like our concepts of ‘front’
and ‘back’. (Example by Lakoff and Johnson cited by Shapiro (2004) p. 199)
The basic concepts, in their turn, structure our more abstract concepts. A
much used example is the concepts of happiness and sadness. Happiness is
structured in terms of the basic concept ‘up’ while sadness is structured by the
basic concept ‘down’. Hence for creatures with no concepts of up and down
happiness and sadness would, according to Lakoff and Johnson, be differently
structured. All this, according to Lakoff and Johnson, goes to show that the
content of our psychology, the way in which the mind forms concepts is, at
least partly, determined by body type. And as they conclude: “[T]he peculiar
nature of our bodies shapes our very possibilities for conceptualization and
categorization” (Shapiro (2004) citing Lakoff and Johnson (1999), p. 200).
2.3.2 Body and language
The work of Lakoff and Johnson is not based on experiments and, in order to
support his claim with empirical evidence, Shapiro draws on work of the
psychologists Arthur Glenberg and Michael Kaschak(2000) to show that the
nature of our body is reflected in the way that we conceive the world.
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In order to understand the experiments and findings of Glenberg and
Kaschak it is important to be familiar with the notion of affordance as it has
famously been developed by the psychologist J. J. Gibson. An affordance in
Gibson’s terms is that which is offered to an organism by the features of its
environment. The crucial idea is that what is offered is relative to the
properties of the perceiver - objects offer different things to different
organisms. (Shapiro (2004) p. 203) A ceiling might provide a place for resting
for a fly, but not so for a turtle or a pelican. Likewise, a small stone might be
an object that you can throw, use as a tool or in jewellery for humans, whereas
it might be an obstacle for an ant.
Now let us turn the work of Glenberg and Kaschak and how it is interpreted
by Shapiro. A central experiment in their research involved detecting people’s
ability to understand sentences containing conventional verbs and innovative
denominal verbs in different contexts – contexts that provide affordances and
contexts that do not. Denominal verbs are verbs that are made out of nouns as
for example ‘couch’ in the sentence: “Vera couched in front of the TV”. An
innovative denominal verb could be something like ‘chaired’ in “Rachel
chaired the scientist his mail” where chaired is suppose to refer to the act of
transporting something by the means of a chair (example from Kasckak and
Glenberg (2000)).
Prior to reading the sentence containing the innovative denominal or
conventional verb, the subjects read a text that was designed to set up a
situation where the character of the story had it as a goal to transfer
something (e.g. transfer the mail to the scientist.) See Table 1. Each text had
two versions: an afforded and a non-afforded. The afforded version contained
an object that easily afforded the transfer (e.g. a chair with good wheels). The
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non-afforded version contained the same object, but where some of the
properties had been altered so that it no longer provided easily affordance of
transfer (e.g. a chair missing the wheels). At the end of each text, the critical
sentence would contain an innovative denominal verb (e.g. chaired) or a
conventional verb (e.g. brought). The sentence comprehension was measured
by the time it took the subjects to read this critical sentence.
Table 1: Sample stimuli from Kaschak and Glenberg (2000)
Rachel worked for a scientist in a research firm. As part of her duties, she was
required to bring the scientist’s mail to his office so he could open it after lunch.
On this particular day, Rachel encountered three large boxes among the mail
addressed to the scientist. The boxes were way too big for her to carry.
Affordance manipulating sentence:
In the corner of the room, though, Rachel noticed an office chair with four
good/missing wheels
Critical sentence
Rachel brought/ chaired the scientist his mail.
The result of the experiment showed that the subjects were faster reading the
critical sentence when the context was afforded than when it was nonafforded. Interestingly, the difference in reading time between afforded and
non-afforded versions was larger in the case of innovative denominal verbs
than conventional verbs. The results concerning the innovative denominal
verb are especially interesting because these are the cases where learning of a
new word is involved. Shapiro takes these results to show that language
comprehension involves the knowledge that an organism has about how its
body can interact with its environment. Shapiro concludes: “[A]n ability to
understand sentences seems, at least in many cases, to incorporate an
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organism’s knowledge about how its body might interact with objects in its
environment. Differences in body will, presumably, create differences in ones
ability to understand sentences, and from fact about sentence comprehension
one could predict fact about the body” (Shapiro (2004) p. 212).
Shapiro is carefully trying not to overstate his conclusion, but what does it
mean that differences in body create differences in one’s ability to understand
sentences? And in what sense does ability to understand sentences incorporate
an organism’s knowledge about the interaction possibilities of its body and
environment?
The first thing to note is that the first conclusion seems to rely on the latter: it
is only the case that differences in body can make any differences in ability to
understand sentences if it is the case that the body, in some sense, is involved
in linguistic understanding. Thus, a good place to start our investigation is to
consider how we should interpret the conclusion that the ability to
understand sentences incorporates an organism’s knowledge about the
interaction possibilities of its body and environment. We can start by
recognizing that the word “incorporate” seems to allow at least two different
interpretations of the claim:
Strong: Linguistic understanding requires having knowledge of one’s own
embodiment and possibilities of interaction with a certain environment.
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Weak: Linguistic understanding can use, but does not require having
knowledge of one’s own embodiment and possibilities of interaction with a
certain environment.6
The strong reading advocates the view that linguistic understanding is
constituted by the knowledge one has of the possibility of one’s body’s
interaction with one’s environment. In contrast, the weaker reading suggests
that that the use of this kind of knowledge in understanding is only
contingent.
How should we read Shapiro’s claim? On the one hand Shapiro’s use of the
phrase “at least in many cases” in the original formulation indicates that there
is a possibility of having linguistic understanding without having knowledge
of ones own embodiment. If this is the case then the appropriate reading is the
weaker version. On the other hand, this might not be enough to support the
strong claim of B: “The content of the mind – the manner in which the mind
conceptualizes the world – is a function of body type” (Shapiro (2004) p.183).
Likewise it might not be enough to support EMT, that only creatures with
humanlike bodies can have humanlike minds.
Shapiro (forthcoming)
suggests that “If differences in body type are to suffice for the fracturing of
psychology [that psychology must be species specific] the body must have a
role that is deeper than mere realization” (Shapiro (forthcoming) p. 19). What
Shapiro is aiming at here is that the body must in this case play a constitutive
role. However, in what follows I will follow Weiskopf (Unpublished ms) in
arguing that the weaker claim is the most plausible.
6
This distinction between a strong and a weak reading of the claim is inspired by Weiskopf
(Unpublished) where he considers the possible relations between linguistic understanding and the
process of generating a sensory motor representation of a linguistic described situation.
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The minimal view of understanding
Part of the question, Weiskopf argues, lies in the way in which we interpret
the notion of linguistic understanding. In this connection, Weiskopf presents a
view of linguistic understanding under which it is straightforward that
knowledge of one’s own embodiment is not necessarily involved in the
understanding of sentences. According to what Weiskopf dubs the minimal
view, understanding a sentence (only) requires understanding the truth
condition of this sentence. This involves being able to make certain logical
inferences from the sentence in question. Take the sentence: ”Felix enjoyed
watching the festival shows in August”. Understanding this sentence under
the minimal view involves being able make inferences of the following kind:
Someone enjoyed watching the festival shows in August and Felix watched the
festival shows. Weiskopf’s central claim is that such inferences do not involve
knowledge of affordances let alone knowledge of one’s own embodiment. To
show that this is the case Weiskopf uses the example of the following nonafforded sentence:
“Adam pulled out of his golf bag a ham sandwich and used that to
chisel an inch of ice off his windshield.” (Originally from Glenberg and
Robertson (2000))
In this connection, Weiskopf points out that although a sandwich does not
(usually) afford chiselling off ice of windshields there is a way in which it
seems reasonable to say that the sentence is understandable. From the
sentence we can infer for example that Adam used something to remove the ice
from his windshield. Further, by assuming that the pronoun “that” refers to the
ham sandwich we can infer that the thing that removed the ice was stored in the
golf bag. We can even infer something about the sandwich, namely that the
sandwich is the kind of thing that can chisel ice. Combining this knowledge with
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general knowledge that things that chisel ice have to be hard we can infer that
the sandwich is hard. Neither of these inferences seems to rely on one’s own
embodied encounters with the kind of objects involved. Thus, Weiskopf
suggest it is not obvious that linguistic understanding under this view
requires knowledge of embodiment. This thereby speaks for the weaker
reading. It does not, however, completely cement the case for the weaker
reading, because the notion of understanding that Shapiro has in mind seems
to be more complex than the minimal view.
Understanding as involving sensibility judgements
On the notion of understanding that Shapiro seems to have in mind,
understanding a sentence involves being able to judge whether the sentence is
sensible or not. This view of understanding seems to be present in the
following quote from Shapiro:
“Bodies like ours can push chairs, but cannot swallow them; we can sit
on chairs but cannot balance them on our heads;… All of these facts
about chairs are contingent on facts about human bodies. Likewise the
perspective from which a human being judges the sensibility of a
sentence is one that reflects these facts.” (Shapiro (2004) p. 212)
In this way, it might be argued that judging the sensibility of sentences like
“Rachel chaired the scientist his mail” and “Adam used the sandwich as a
chisel” requires knowledge about facts of the world; about the affordances of
chairs and sandwiches for human beings. This certainly seems to be the result
of the experiments of Glenberg and Kaschak. However, it is a further question
whether knowledge of affordances, in turn, requires knowledge of one’s own
embodiment?
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First of all it seems reasonable to say that Glenberg and Kaschak’s
experiments, in the first instance, show that ability to understand a sentence,
in terms of judging its plausibility, depends not on the reader’s knowledge of
his or her body’s abilities to interact with objects but instead on the
understanding the reader has of how the body of the character in the story
can interact with the environment provided by the text. We assume that the
character in the story, Rachel, is a normal human being and as such she is able
to push a chair. This provides the information that we need in order to
understand the sentence: “She chaired the scientist his mail.” I take it that this
is the point that Shapiro has in mind when he writes:
“If a subject were led to believe that Rachel were two inches tall, or
weighed only five pounds, or had no appendages with which to grasp,
then, quite clearly, the suggestion she chair the scientist his mail would be
no less perplexing than the suggestion that she tennis ball the scientist his
mail, or shingle him his mail, or grass him his mail (Shapiro (2004) p. 212
italics original).
But, if it is the case that our ability to understand the sentence depends on
knowledge of the character’s body, where does knowledge of one’s own body
come into the picture? One might argue that understanding someone else’s
perspective depends on one’s knowledge of how one’s body can interact with
the world. To understand the sentence, “Rachel chaired the scientist his mail”,
I have to know something about what is needed in order to be able to use a
chair as the means for transporting a large box of mail. This knowledge, it
would seem, I have, at least partly, from my own interactions with the world.
In this sense, knowledge of my own body’s possibilities of interaction could
be said to be incorporated in my ability to understand sentences. However,
this is only in a derived sense and further it seems to rely heavily my
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assumption that Rachel is a normal human being. Let us imagine that I
instead had been told that Rachel is alien with superpowers that allow her to
move chairs only using her mind. In this case it still seems reasonable to claim
that I can judge the sensibility of “Rachel chaired the scientist his mail”.
However, it is no longer clear that it matters to any extent whether I myself
have arms or wings, feet or fins. It seems that the knowledge I have of the
affordances involved in this case, is the kind of knowledge that I have about
the world in general – together, of course, with the inferences I can make from
the knowledge of Rachel’s special powers. In contrast, it does not seem to
involve the knowledge I have of the precise details of my own embodiment.
This suggests that comprehension of sentences and thus knowledge of
affordances of the objects involved does not require the knowledge of the
precise details of one’s own embodiment.
Weiskopf (Unpublished) offers an analysis that can help us get a deeper
understanding of why this is the case. Weiskopf suggests that the kind of
arguments supporting the claim that knowledge of one’s own embodiment is
required for knowledge of affordances, make the mistake of conflating “having
information about humans’ physical structure and representing that information
in a particular way (e.g., a way that only a creature with humanlike sensorimotor
capacities could enjoy).” (Weiskopf (Unpublished ms), p. 23)
Weiskopf’s claim is that there has not been enough attention paid to the
difference between psychological content and representational vehicle. The
representational vehicle is the mental particular that caries the content.
Importantly, this content can be carried by a wide range of different kinds of
representational vehicles. To clarify his point Weiskopf draws on Dretske's
analysis of content in terms of information (Dretske (1981)). Information can be
represented in a number of different ways. Weiskopf uses the example that if one
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wants to inform somebody that the cat is sleeping, one has lots of different ways
of doing this: one could, for example, draw a picture of it or write it down, or
signal it, mime it or tell it. It is central to Weiskopf’s claim that from knowing the
information it is not possible to infer anything about the vehicle. Knowing that
you have the information that the cat is sleeping it would not be possible for
anyone to tell whether you had seen it yourself, had been told it or had read
about it.
According to Weiskopf, the picture is similar with information about affordances;
it too can be represented in different ways. Firstly, it can be part of the content of
a perceptual state, as when I immediately perceive the affordance of the chair in
front of me. Secondly it can be part of the content of an informational state (for
example a belief) that is immediately derived from perception. Thinking about a
chair might immediately bring up thoughts about what this object affords, how it
might be used. Thirdly it could be part of the content of informational states that
are not immediately derived from perception, but instead via abductive
reasoning. That is, it could be converted into conceptual content.
The immediate consequence of this is that what Glenberg and Kaschak's
results really shows is that in judging whether a sentence is nonsensical, we
employ states that carry information about affordances, but not that this
information is represented in a way only be available to creatures with a
certain body type.
In fact Weiskopf suggests that in many cases “coming to judge that…
scenarios are or are not sensible might rely on general abductive competence
— the ability to make inferences about real-world situations drawing on
relevant knowledge — rather than any specifically sensorimotor capacities.”
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In this light the weaker reading of the relation between linguistic
understanding and knowledge of one’s own embodiment seems to be the
most plausible.
Now we might ask: is this enough to establish Shapiro’s second claim, that
differences in body create differences in one’s ability to understand sentences
and in this case, what is involved in the notion of difference?
My claim is that because knowledge of one’s own body is often involved only
in a derived way, small differences in one’s body do not create differences in
one’s ability to understand sentences. Only humans can understand language
so it’s difficult to test on other creatures, but what has been said above
suggest that a humanlike body is not required to understand sentences. This
is the case even when it is a question of the understanding involves
appreciating facts about how the world affords itself to human beings. Thus,
sameness of understanding does not seem to require sameness of even gross
bodily structure.
2.3.3 Individual embodiment vs. social embeddedness
In support of this conclusion we can also draw on Harry Collins’
((Forthcoming))work on the relation between the individual, its body and its
language. Collins argues that in the sphere of language the type of body of the
individual has no influence. Instead, what matters is the brain and the social
embeddedness. He argues that the ability to speak a language of a community
fluently can be acquired without the individual being able to take part in the
bodily activities of that community. In Collins’ terms one can have
interactional expertise (fluency) without having contributory expertise (being
able to engage in the bodily activities of the community). The claim is that on
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a test solely based on language someone with maximal interactional expertise
and no interactional expertise will be indistinguishable from someone with
both sorts of expertise. As an example, Collins refers to cases where colour
blind people have passed as colour perceivers (see also Collins et al. 2006).
Following this line of argument Collins endorses what he calls the Minimal
Embodiment Thesis, according to which the precise details of the body of the
individual does not have relevance for the linguistic abilities of this agent.
Another way to state this is that “an individual needs only a minimal body
(ears, mouth, larynx, and maybe something else), to become fluent in the
language of the surrounding society” (Collins et. al (Forthcoming)).
Collins suggests that the language and thoughts available to the surrounding
society may be determined by the typical bodily form of its members (This is
called The Social Embodiment Thesis by Collins). This, however, does not affect
the fact that the precise detail of the individual members’ embodiment does
not determine the language available to that individual. Following this line of
argument Collins agrees with Wittgenstein in saying that ‘if a lion could talk
we would not understand what it said to us’. However, Collins’ claim is that
this is not because of the body shape of that particular lion. Rather it is
because lions typically are brought up in communities of lions. Thus if a
(talking) lion was brought up in a human community we would be able to
understand it (Collins (Forthcoming) p. 5).
Again this is against the strong reading of Shapiro’s claim that differences in
one’s individual body type create differences in language comprehension.
Further, it gives us a new way of reading Lakoff and Johnson’s claim that “the
peculiar
nature
of
our
bodies
shapes
our
very
possibilities
for
conceptualization and categorization” (Shapiro (2004) citing Lakoff and
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Johnson (1999), p. 200). We could interpret this as saying that the typical body
type of our global human community limits the possibilities for
conceptualization and categorization. Thus a community of spherical beings
might not have concepts of FRONT and BACK, but there’s no reason why an
individual spherical being could not have this e.g. if living in a human
community.
What has been said above casts doubt as to whether the research presented in
favour of EMT by Shapiro can support the claim in the required way. Again,
what has been said above is a way of saying that just because body
characteristics can and do play an important and significant part in
determining aspects of our mentality, it does not follow that this is always the
case and that every little difference will make a difference to mind.
2.4 Leaky Minds
As a last argument against ST, Shapiro refers to neurological research
presented by Damasio in “Descartes Error” (1994). This research suggest that
the brain and body are so intimately connected that it is impossible to
distinguish processes that realise mind from bodily processes. This is the case
because there are parts of the brain such as hypothalamus, the brain stem and
the limbic system that are involved in all the neural processes on which
mental phenomena are based, but which are also involved in regulating
bodily functions. Further these parts of the brain are, at least partly, regulated
by the complex chemical activity of the body. Damasio concludes: “Body
regulation, survival and mind are intimately interwoven” (Shapiro (2004) p.
217 citing Damasio (1994) p.123). From this Shapiro draws that mind is
realized in a complex process that spreads throughout the body and is not
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only in the brain as it has been commonly assumed. In this way the
realization of mind leaks out into the body.
How does this apply to the case against ST? According to ST the mind can be
separated from the body and exist in many kinds of bodies. This view,
according to Shapiro, is associated with the view that mind, like a resistor in a
TV, is a “relatively independent and selfcontained” component that only
interacts with the body through well defined interfaces (quote from
Haugeland (1995) cited by Shapiro (2004) p. 212). For the mind to be a
component it does not necessarily require that it can be spatially disconnected
from the rest of the body. Under Haugeland’s interpretation of the notion,
something can be a component without being spatially confined. Whether we
can interpret something as a component of a particular system depends on the
nature of the internal connections between it and the system. An example
could be the Human Resource department in a multinational firm. The
employees of such a department might be stationed in different countries on
different continents. What makes the department a single component,
regardless of the spatial distance between the individual members of staff, is
among other things, the fact that they work with the same problems and have
a high level of interaction and communication between them. For something
to be a component, in this non-spatial sense, it has to have clear boundaries
and interfaces to what surrounds it also.
According to Shapiro, Damasio’s research shows that there are no clear-cut
boundaries and interfaces between what realizes the mind and the rest of the
body. The point is not that we cannot remove the brain from the body and
therefore we cannot separate mind and body: we could imagine that we could
remove the brain and connect it to the body via wires. However, the point is
precisely that if we move the brain in such a way, we have not thereby moved
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the mind, because part of what realizes the mind is the brain and body
combined. Further, the mind is not a component in the sense of a Human
Resource department either, because the processes that realize mind are so
closely connected to the processes of the rest of the body, that it does not
make sense to make this distinction. The result, according to Shapiro is that
mind cannot be separated from the body as ST claims. Further, Shapiro
claims that this supports EMT in the respect that if we cannot separate the
realization of the mind from the body “then of cause differences in bodies will
entail differences in mind” (Shapiro (2004) p. 183)
In the end of his discussion of the issue of this kind of extended realization in
“The Mind Incarnate” Shapiro considers the thought that the realization
could extend beyond the body and into the environment. Shapiro suggests
that in such cases,
“[p]erhaps anything with a humanlike mind must live in a humanlike
natural and social world. Although not conceived in these terms,
research in embodied cognition by people like Clark (1999, 2001),
…and Wilson (2004) promotes such a view” (Shapiro 2004 p. 224).
In the following chapter we shall see a different way of interpreting these
arguments.
First, however, I will accompany Grush (2003) in questioning Damasio’s
neurological findings as evidence that the mind is not a component.. Shapiro
bases his argument on Haugeland's criterion of what makes something a
component. As we saw, according to Haugeland’s criterion, whether
something is a component is dependent on the level of interaction between it
and other 'parts' of the system (Grush dubs this The Bandwidth Criterion).
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Grush questions this criterion, arguing that it is false and that it gains its prima
facie plausibility from a connected but deeper criterion: The Plug Criterion.
According to this criterion something is a component if it can be plugged into
and unplugged from different systems. It is often that these two criteria
correlate, because from a design point of view it is often easiest to place the
plug interfaces at points with low bandwidth interaction. However, according
to Grush, there is no necessary connection between the two and in situations
where they come apart the plug criterion has the upper hand. To show that
this is the case Grush uses the example of the relation between a pilot and her
plane:
“A pilot sits in a cockpit. Her hands in contact with the joystick, minute
forces and resistance it offers are skilfully processed and aid her in
putting the appropriate forces on the stick. The visual scene is complex,
providing a great deal of information in the optic flow concerning the
movement. Even her sensitivity to forces of acceleration and
gravitation are part of this high-bandwidth interaction. In short, let us
agree with Haugeland that this activity is high-bandwidth all the way
through. Is the pilot a component? She can get up, unplug her highbandwidth interfaces from the flight simulator, and if she so chooses
engage instead with a real aircraft through those same interfaces.”
(Grush (2003) p.80)
Grush takes this example to show that even though there is a high bandwidth
interaction between the pilot and the plane we can still consider the pilot as a
component because she can be plugged and unplugged from both the plane
and the flight-simulator. The point to emphasise here is that if, instead of
taking our point of departure as the bandwidth criterion, we take it is the
plug criterion it no longer seems obvious that Damasio’s findings imply that
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the mind is not a component. Whether we in fact can unplug the mind in the
way suggested by the plug criterion is of course a further empirical question.
Additionally, even if it turns out that the processes that realize mind and
those of the rest of the body cannot be distinguished as separate components
we may not necessarily be able to conclude that sameness in of mind must
require sameness of body. Damasio’s results may show that some bits of the
body are bits of the mind too. If that’s so, then differences in those bits of the
body will, in at least one sense, entail differences in mind. However, this does
not show that we need sameness of gross bodily morphology in order to have
sameness of mind.
2.5 Conclusions
Shapiro’s overall claim is that if the research in the area of embodied
cognition and mind is correct then it undermines abstract versions of
functionalism associated with body neutrality— the idea that characteristics
of body make no differences to the kind of mind that one posses. He argues
that research of embodied, embedded cognition and mind shows that
characteristics of embodiment determine the characteristics of the mind. In
this way, his argument is representative of what I have termed the body-detail
model. This reading of the research of this area has the consequence that the
very same kind of mind cannot exist in bodies with different characteristics,
and thus it requires a humanlike body to have a humanlike mind. On this
ground Shapiro also characterises his position as chauvinistic, a label which
further highlights its suggested opposition with the spirit of functionalism.
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The body-detail model and functionalism
At this point it is worth to explore how exactly the position presented by
Shapiro, if correct, would conflict with a functionalistic approach. In
exploring this question it will be helpful to use Bechtel and Mundale’s
distinction between coarse-grained and fine-grained analysis. It seems
obvious that what Shapiro is presenting us with is first of all a fine-grained
analysis of the body. Even though Shapiro talks about gross morphology as
the thing which has to be shared, his primary examples are about details of
placement of ears and eyes. The attention to detail is also evident in the
sensorimotor account. This fine-grained analysis of the body is matched with
at similarly fine-grained analysis on the psychological level. Now, as we have
learned from our exposition of Bechtel and Mundale in chapter 1, judgements
about differences and sameness are always dependent on the context of
inquiry. The appropriateness of grain size is dependent on what one is
interested in investigating. Further, even if differences in brain states match
differences in mind on a detailed level this does not exclude that on a more
abstract level differences in body does not entail differences in mind. There
seems to be no reason why this should be any different when we are
concerned with the relation between body and mind. If this is correct, then it
is not the case that a fine-grained approach in itself undermines the abstract
versions of functionalism. This is only the case if we claim that a fine grain is
the only appropriate grain under which mind should be investigated. Shapiro
claims that if the research of Embodied Cognition surveyed above is correct
then this would show that the fine-grain analysis is the generally appropriate
one. Because body type is constitutive of mind, according to Shapiro’s
analysis of this research, differences at the body detail level will entail
differences at the psychological level. Noë’s claim is that differences in body
necessitates differences in mind and under Shapiro’s reading of for example
Lakoff and Johnson it is in virtue of having a human body that the human
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concepts mean what they do. If this is the case, then according to Shapiro we
have “no choice but to give up hope of generality in favour of species-specific
regularities of the organism over which they range” (Shapiro (Forthcoming) p
.20) – a way of saying that psychology is species-specific.
A fine-grained functionalism?
It is important to note that although arguing that a fine-grained analysis is the
right level of analysis is in conflict with the abstract versions of functionalism,
it is not necessarily conflicting with functionalism as such. In this connection,
Shapiro considers the possibility that his position could be compatible with a
version of functionalism where the “specification of the inputs and outputs
that define mental states are chauvinistic because it restricts attributions of
minds to just those organisms with bodies or brains of a particular sort”
(Shapiro (2004) pp. 174). However, he does not develop this thought in much
detail. As the current project has the overall aim of exploring the logical space
between functionalism and the embodied, embedded approach, it is
nevertheless interesting to investigate this possibility. Can the positions
presented by and Shapiro (2001, 2004), Noë (2004) and Noë and O’Regan
(2001) be read as functionalistic, in a chauvinistic and fine-grained sense?
In Pressing the Flesh Clark suggest a prima facie way of reading these positions
as treating “the body or sensory apparatus as making a unique kind of
functional/computational contribution, one that cannot help but sensitively
impact certain aspects of mind” (op. cit p.16). In the same way that we, in
Chapter 1, considered a way of formulating the functional profile of the kind
drill bit in such a fine-grained way that only diamonds could play the role,
this is a way of formulating the functional profile of the mental in such a way
that only very similar characteristics of embodiment can play this role. In our
distinctions in terms of fine-grained and coarse-grained this would be a
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version of functionalism that applied a fine-grained analysis on both the level
of the definition of the functional role and at the level of realization matching every difference in structure with difference in mental states. This
seem like a plausible interpretation where we keep the insights of
functionalism concerning the way mental states are defined by inputs,
outputs and inner interactions among states and the thought that every
difference in the relevant implementation makes a difference for mind.
However, as we all know (and almost expect, at least in philosophical
contexts) first looks can be deceiving. As Clark (In press) points out: It seems
reasonable to require from a functional account, that it leaves it an open
question whether some role can be fulfilled exclusive by one specific kind of
implementation at least until the matters have been solved empirically. To
make this clear consider again our example of functionally defining the kind
drill bit. In this situation it is not the case that we, prior to empirical
investigation, will be able to say that it must be the case that only diamonds
can fulfil this role. There is, at least in principle the possibility that there are
alternative implementations. Clark (In Press) argues that Noë and Lakoff and
Johnson’s accounts seem to be in conflict even with this fundamental
requirement of functionalism. Clark’s claim is that these accounts seem to
have foreclosed the possibility of alternative realizations. Thus, Clark makes
the following observation about the sensorimotor account:
“By simply identifying experience with implicit knowledge of the full
suit of contingencies defined at the sensorimotor surfaces, the strong
sensorimotor account leaves no room for compensatory downstream
adjustments
to
yield
identical
dissimilarities.” (Clark (In Press) p.21)
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experiences
despite
surface
I take Clark’s overall point to be that we do not, at this time, have the
empirical knowledge to warrant the conclusion that only human bodies or
sensory systems can realize human minds and perception. It would not be in
line with any kind of functionalism to close the possibility when empirical
matters are unsolved. In this way the body-detail model seems to be
incompatible with functionalism on a broader scale than first anticipated.
The above discussion has revealed the deeper opposition between the bodydetail model and functionalism: It lies in the fact that the body-detail model
does not leave room for alternative implementation from the outset. This is
also where most of our critique against the position comes in. The critique is
that there seem to be no warrant on empirical grounds to support the strong
conclusion – in fact it even seems likely that alternative implementations
might be available.
Rejecting the body-detail model
In this chapter I have shown that the research material presented by Shapiro
does not warrant the strong conclusion of the Body-detail model. Although, it
seems reasonable on the basis of the research on perception to conclude that
body does play a very important role in cognition, this does not imply that the
characteristics of body type are indispensable and that nothing can substitute
them. Wearing a pair of glasses can make up for weak eyesight and research
on sensory substitution and brain plasticity gives us reason to believe that
alternative implementations could be made available. This suggests that at
least not every difference in characteristics of body and gross morphology
will result in difference in mind. The situation is similar if we evaluate the
research
presented
on
the
issue
of
language
comprehension
and
conceptualization. Just because knowledge of one’s embodiment can be
involved in language comprehension this does not mean that it is necessarily
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required. In fact we have reasons to believe that in most cases this is not the
way things are. Information of affordances can be carried by informational
states and be the object of abductive reasoning. The fact that we are
embedded in a language using community has the consequence that the
bodily characteristics of the individual are not the determining factor for the
limits of that individual’s language comprehension and conceptualization. On
the third area of the mind leaking into the body our claim was that the
bandwidth criterion did not suffice to tell us if something is a component or
not. That the processes of mind and body are intimately tied does not
necessarily make it the case that the distinction between mind and body
cannot be maintained. The introduction of the plug criterion challenged the
high-bandwidth criterion and Shapiro’s interpretation of Damasio’s research.
Further, even if the realization of mind is leaking to the body this does not
necessarily imply that the very same mind could not have been realized in a
different kind of body.
Rejecting this strong reading of the embodied, embedded mind research
results suffice to reject Shapiro’s claim that research within the area of
embodied, embedded cognition and mind undermines the abstract
functionalistic model of mind. Further, it paves the way for a weaker reading
of this kind of research where we keep the insight that the body plays an
important role in cognition and mind, but which, at the same time, is
compatible with non-chauvinistic versions of functionalism. This will be the
subject of the next chapter where I will present Clark’s interpretation of the
embodied, embedded approach as extended functionalism.
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______________________________________________
CHAPTER 3
EXTENDED FUNCTIONALISM
______________________________________________
In contrast to the body-detail model, Clark (In Press), argues for a way of
understanding the mind as embodied and embedded which is not only
compatible with functionalism but is a way of extending it. He argues that
there is a way of recognising the body as significant for and constitutive of the
mind, that does not entail the conclusion that, in all cases, differences in body
characteristics creates differences in mind. To make his point Clark draws on
arguments, from the research area of embodied and embedded cognition,
which supports the claim that “aspects of the body and world can, at times, be
proper parts of larger mechanisms whose states and overall operating profile
determines our mental states and properties.” (Clark (In Press) p. 4) This is
what Clark and Chalmers (1998) have labelled Extended Mind or what Clark
(In Press) calls The Larger Mechanism Story. According to Clark, these
arguments generally appeal to the computational role in online problemsolving played by processes and events of the body and the environment
(Clark (In Press) pp. 9)
In the introduction of this project, I have already presented a couple of
examples, which Clark takes to exemplify an extended functionalistic
approach. In what follows I will use these and additional examples to go into
further details of the position. My focus will be on illuminating what is
involved in what Clark denotes an extended functionalist approach and how
the examples, presented by Clark, are exemplary of such an approach.
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Subsequently I will investigate how this view contrasts with the body-detail
model and its consequences for the issues of chauvinism and multiple
realization.
3.1 Extended computation
One of the examples, presented by Clark, with which we are already
acquainted, is the example concerning Ada. Ada is the accountant who uses
pen and paper to perform complex accountancy tasks. Using pen and paper
in the way that she does allows her to offload some of the work from her
biological memory to external processes – what have been called minimal
memory strategies.
“Instead of committing complex dependencies to biological memory,
Ada follows trails through the numbers, creating external traces every
time an intermediate result is obtained. These traces are in turn visited
and re-visited on a ‘just in time, need to know’ basis, moving specific
items of information into and out of short term bio-memory.” (Clark
(In press) p. 12)
Clark suggests that this accounting process is best analysed in
“extended functionalist terms as a set of problem-solving state
transitions whose implementation happens to involve a distributed
combination of biological memory, motor actions, external symbolic
storage and just-in-time perceptual access” (Clark (In Press) p. 12).
As a framework for understanding the above example, Clark suggests using
Robert
Wilson's
notions
of
Exploitative
Computationalism.
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Representation
and
Wide
3.1.1 Exploitative Representation
Representation, according to Wilson (2004), is an activity performed by
individuals “extracting and employing information that is used in their
further actions” (Wilson (2004) p. 183). This prepares the grounds for the view
that representing often involves exploiting information that is already directly
available. Wilson calls this Exploitative Representation.
The strategy of exploitative representation is exemplified by the way in which
an odometer keeps track of how many miles a car has driven (Example by
Wilson). An odometer is usually engineered in a way so that it exploits the
fact that each rotation of the wheels is x meters. Thus, for every wheel rotation
the odometer simply record x meters. This exploitative strategy stands in
contrast to another a more complex strategy, which could be to let the
odometer first count the wheel rotations and then calculate the result from the
assumption that each rotation = x meters. In this second strategy the
information would first be encoded and then computed. In contrast the first
strategy, simply exploits the information that is already there (Wilson p.163
also cited by Clark (In press) p.13).
According to Clark, this is the form of computational strategy involved in the
minimal memory strategies employed by Ada when performing the
accountancy task. In Clark’s words “Ada’s biological brain does not create
and maintain persistent encodings of every figure she generates” (Clark (In
Press) p. 13). Instead, it relies, in its computational strategy, on the possibility
of embodied action and the presence of pen and paper to make the
information available when needed.
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3.1.2 Wide computationalism
The notion of exploitative representation prepares the ground for what
Wilson labels Wide Computationalism. The idea is that computational
systems can be widely realised in the sense that parts of its realization are
located outside the head of the individual organism. In this connection,
Wilson distinguishes between entity-bounded realizations and wide
realizations. In the case of entity-bounded realization all the parts of the
realization are located entirely within the individual. In the case of a wide
realization some parts of the realization are not located within the individual.
(This requires that the relevant system S of which the total realisation is a state
extends beyond the individual). The important shift accompanying the idea of
wide realizations is that realizations are within systems (as opposed to in
individuals) and that these systems are located within in a broader
environment (Wilson (2004) pp. 117). Wilson’s position is captured nicely by
the following:
”[W]hy think that the skull constitutes a magic boundary beyond
which true computation ends and mere causation begins? Given that
we are creatures embedded in informationally rich and complex
environments, the computations that occur inside the head are an
important part but are not exhaustive of the correspondent
computational systems. This perspective [(viewing representation as
an active and exploitative process)] opens up the possibility of
exploring computational units that include the brain as well as aspects
of the brain’s beyond-the-head environment.” (Wilson 2004 p. 165)
The difference between the traditional and wide conception of computation is
illustrated by Wilson with an example concerning multiplication. On the
traditional view multiplying 675 with 765, would involve encoding of input
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from world symbols into internal symbols and a subsequent internal
computation of these internal symbols. On this view representation is seen
exclusively as a form of encoding. In contrast, on the wide computationalist
view
multiplication
involves
active
exploitation,
manipulation
and
computation of symbols. Importantly, these symbols can be both internal and
external. In the example above the computation is modelled between the
relevant symbols that constitute the computational system whether they are
in the head or in the world (e.g. on a piece of paper) (Wilson and Clark
(Forthcoming) p. 11-12).
According to Clark, the example involving Ada is an exemplary case to
analyse in wide computational terms. We can analyse Ada’s brain and body
together with the pen and paper as constituting one single wide
computational system. To understand exactly why this is an example of an
extended functionalist approach, we have to take a look at the two key steps
involved in arguing that something is a wide computational system. (1) The
first step is to appeal to a coarse-grained computational/functional role that
supports the ascription of the cognitive state or activity. In the multiplication
example this function is simply transforming the inputs of 675 and 765 to the
output 516375. In the case of Ada it is a more complex accountancy functional
role, but still within the grasp of common knowledge among ordinary human
agents. (2) The second step is to investigate, at a more fine-grained level, what
it is in the particular case that realizes this functional role and then argue that
part
of
this
is
played
by
non-neural
processes
(Clark,
personal
correspondence). In the case of Ada, Clark suggests, that an investigation of
actual flow of processing reveals that the functional role played not only by
processes internal to Ada’s brain, but additionally by parts of the body and
the environment.
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Note that the first step in the analysis above seems to be identical to what we
find in standard commonsense functionalism: What defines the cognitive
process is its commonsense functional profile (a relation between inputs,
inner transitions and outputs). It is on the second step that the insights of the
research in embodied cognition make their entrance. The main intuition is
that if mental states are functionally defined it seems arbitrary to stop looking
for the realization of this coarse-grained functional role at the boundary of the
skull. As we saw Wilson put it “[W]hy think that the skull constitutes a magic
boundary beyond which true computation ends and mere causation begins?”
(Wilson (2004) p. 165). The argument is that the difference between being part
of the brain or not does not in itself make a relevant difference to whether it
plays a computational role or not. Where it gets done does not matter for
identifying what it is that gets done. This view leads the way to what has
become known as the Parity Principle:
“If, as we confront some task, a part of the world that functions as a
process which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in
recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world
is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process.” (Clark and Chalmers,
1998 p. 8)
At this point we begin to see in what sense it is that these arguments, for
extended mind and wide computational systems, are extended functionalists
approaches. The extension simply lies in recognizing that there is nothing in
the functional description that limits the location of the realization to the
boundary of the brain and then arguing that there are in fact cognitive
systems that extends this boundary. The following quote illustrates this point:
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“Just as, for the standard approach, we need not care (within sensible
limits) exactly where within in the brain a given operation is
performed, so too (it might be urged) we should not care whether, in
some extended computational process, a certain operation occurs
inside or outside some particular membrane or metabolic boundary.”
(Clark (In Press) p.17)
In this way, it now seems clear that what Clark has in mind when he uses the
term extended functionalism: Extended functionalism is an argumentative
extension of general commonsense functionalism. Clark argues that this line
of argumentation is also present in other arguments from the research area of
embodied and embedded cognition. Another example suggested by Clark is
Ballard et al’s computational model of vision.
3. 2 Ballard et al.: The computational role of vision
To refresh; Ballad et al’s experiments showed that subjects, when performing
the task of copying a structure of coloured blocks, used a surprisingly high
number of rapid saccades to the original block structure. To Ballard et al this
suggested that people, with each saccade, merely took in the information
needed for the immediately following action. This information could be either
the colour or the position of a block, but not both. This indicated that the
subjects were using fixation as a kind of “deictic pointing” device, marking
locations where specific information was available. To test this hypothesis
Ballard et al. developed further experiments where they, while the subject
was looking else where, changed the colour of some of the still uncopied
blocks in the original. In most cases this change was not noticed by the
subjects and this was taken to confirm the hypothesis that only small bits of
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information, was in use at a certain point. This, in turn indicated that vision
was used as a form of information retrieving or recruitment device. The
subjects were employing a strategy that relied upon the information being
available in the world when needed.
According to Clark two points are especially worth noting about this account:
1.
It shows that visual fixation plays an identifiable computational role
(In the sense that repeated fixation provide the specific information
when needed for guiding action.)
2. The repeated saccades gives the subject an opportunity of minimizing
the requirements allocated to the biological memory7 ( In this way the
world can work like an external storage space for information (Clark
citing Wilson 2004))
Having these key points in mind a parallel of this example and the Ada
example begins to be visible. The best way to capture this parallel is by
illustrating how Ballard et al’s account also tracks Wilson’s notions of
explorative representation and wide computation. According to Ballard et
al.'s theory, eye movement is a sort of pointer that directs our attention in the
world, thus making the world like a store house where we can go and pick
out information when we need it - we recognise this as a form of exploitive
representation in Wilson’s terms. Additionally, according to Ballard et al
bodily actions in the form of fixations plays a computational role and thus in
part constitute the overall cognitive process of copying blocks. In Clark’s
terms: “Bodily actions are thus part of the means by which certain
computational and representational operations are implemented.” (Clark (In
Press) p. 11) In this way the theory recognizes the computational system
7
It is worth noting that at this time we cannot conclude that it is not the case that biological memory
also encodes these details. What is present in the experience is does not necessarily reveal what is
represented in the biological memory or not (Henderson (Forthcoming)).
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carrying out the block copying task as wide in the sense that it extends
beyond the brain of the individual.
Again, this can be interpreted as a functionalist approach according to Clark,
because; “what makes the cognitive process the one that it is is simply its
functional profile (the set of state transitions mediating input and output.)”
(Clark (In Press) p.11) Additionally, it is an extended functionalist approach
because it recognises this functional profile as belonging to “not to the neural
system and its inputs and outputs alone but to the whole embodied system
located in the world.” (Clark (In Press) p.11)
3.3 Dispositional beliefs and extended functionalism
So far all the presented examples have exclusively involved problem solving,
but what about beliefs, desires and so forth? To expand the claim to mind on a
more general term, Clark and Chalmers gives an example of how a
dispositional belief can have an extended realization base.
Compare the following two situations:
Situation 1:
Otto suffers from Alzheimer’s disease and to store important information he
has a notebook which he always caries with him. One day he hears about an
exciting new exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art and decides to go and
see it. He consults his notebook which contains the information that the
museum is on 53rd Street and goes to the museum.
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Situation 2:
Inga, who has a normally functioning memory, has also heard about the
exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art and decides to go see it. She recalls
that the museum is on 53rd Street and goes to the museum.
According to Clark and Chalmers, these two situations are analogous with
respect to belief. In the second situation it seems clear that Inga has the belief
that the museum is on 53rd Street. She goes to 53rd Street because she wants to
see the exhibition and believes that the museum is on 53rd Street.
Additionally, we would also normally acknowledge that Inga had this belief
all along, even at the time before she consulted her memory and the belief
became occurent. According to Clark and Chalmers, the case is the same with
Otto. He also goes to 53rd Street because he believes the museum is at this
address. Otto and his notebook make up a coupled system, where the
notebook has a function that is similar to the function that the biological
memory has for Inga. Thus, it seems reasonable, according to Clark and
Chalmers, to claim that Otto also had this belief prior to consulting his
notebook.
“To say that the beliefs disappear when the notebook is filed away
…[would be] to miss the big picture in just the same way as saying that
Inga's beliefs disappear as soon as she is no longer conscious of them.”
(Clark and Chalmers (1998) p.13)
There may be differences between the case of Inga and Otto, such as the time
it takes to retrieve the information. However, these differences, Clark and
Chalmers argue, are irrelevant to what it is to have a belief. Whether it takes
more or less time to retrieve the information does not change the character of
the belief. Whether Inga has a fast or a slow memory does not change the fact
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that she has the belief that the museum is on 53rd street and so neither should
it do so in the case of Otto. What makes some information a belief, according
to Clark and Chalmers, is the role it plays, that it is there when needed,
available to consciousness, available to guide action and that it is trusted by
the subject (Clark and Chalmers (1998) p. 13).
Again this can be seen as and extended functionalist approach. The first step
of the analysis appeals to commonsense functional roles in identifying the
mental state in this case the dispositional belief. This is a coarse-grained
description where certain differences are abstracted away from, such as for
example the difference in processing time. Again the second step involves
recognizing that Otto’s note book play the same role as Inga’s biological
memory.
We have now seen in what way Clark interprets these arguments for
extended mind as extended functionalist approaches. Our next concern is the
view of the relation between body and mind that such an extended
functionalist approach yields and how this relates and contrasts to the view
on these issues associated with the Body-detail model.
3.4 Extended Functionalism and the Body
A similarity between an extended functionalist approach and the body-detail
model is that the extended functionalist account also argues that there is a
sense in which the body makes an important contribution to mind and that
brain algorithms involve exploiting bodily structures and opportunities. This
is what is shared by the accounts and marks them both as embodied accounts.
Where they come apart is whether this contribution is special in such a way
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that only a body with certain characteristics (the ones that we humans
typically have) can accommodate a humanlike mind (The Body-detail model)
or whether the body is (only) a part of a larger organizational structure which
determines mind (Extended Functionalism). Extended functionalism, in
Clark’s words, depicts the body “as just one element in a kind of equalpartners dance between brain body and world, with the nature of the mind
fixed by the overall balance thus achieved” (Clark (In Press) p. 25)
As a consequence of assigning the body to this more modest position of not
being the sole determinant for mind, it is consistent with extended
functionalist approaches that the very same mind can exist in bodies with
very different properties. As a first example we can take the example of Otto
and Inga from before. They share the same kind of mental state even though
the brain of Otto works differently from that of Inga. This is because there is
something in Otto’s environment that can substitute for having a biological
memory. Illustrating a similar point, but with focus on the whole body and
not just the brain, Clark invites us to consider the example of Adder. Adder is
an intelligent being with a snakelike body. Adder has the advantage of lying
on top of a very advanced touch-screen like environment. By moving its body
in a particular way e.g. by wriggling the tale at a certain speed, Adder is
capable of causing certain external symbols to appear in a certain area of the
screen. At the same time Adder is able to read these external symbols owing
to a kind of Braille. Now picture Adder using this device to do the same
accounting job as we saw Ada do earlier. According to Clark it seems
reasonable to say that the cognitive states that are relevant for carrying out
the accounting are similar in the case of Adder and Ada. The same abstract
functional description of the accounting task can be attributed in the two
situations. It might even be the case that when we investigate the realization
base the two situations exhibit the same labour division between internal and
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external processes. Clark further suggests that we could even imagine another
creature that would be able, by internal computation, to do what Ada and
Adder use hands and touchpad screens for. Taking its point of departure in a
commonsense description the extended functionalist account does not give
into a body detail kind of chauvinism. On this account differences in body do
not entail differences in mind. In fact, according to Clark extended
functionalism leaves even more room for multiple realization than ordinary
(commonsense) functionalism (Clark (In Press) p. 25). The possibility of
realizations being wide in Wilson’s terms opens up for the possibility of a
larger variation in the organization of the complete realization.
3.4.1 Body as a functional notion
As a solution to the tension between extended functionalists accounts and
views that apply the body-detail model, Clark (In Press), in the concluding
remarks, suggests viewing the body itself (at least in scientific contexts) as
something that is defined by a functional role. 8 According to this view, what
counts as the body is whatever plays a certain complex role in a larger,
unified information-processing economy. As a label for this position I first
considered extended, extended functionalism. However, this label has the
unwanted effect of glossing over the fact that the second extension is a
different kind of extension than the first. The first extension as we have seen is
an argumentative extension. The second extension is a question of making the
realization base of the commonsensical functional role functionally identified
as well. Thus a less catchy, but more appropriate label might be: Extended
Body Functionalism.
8
Clark offers this as a solution to the tension between what he calls the Larger Mechanism Story and
the Special Contribution Story. As noted arguments in favour of the Larger Mechanism Story are the
ones that have an extended functionalist approach. Arguments in favour if the Special Contribution
Story are the ones that we have survey under the label of the Body-detail model
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What is the functional role that identifies the body according to Clark?
Answering this question Clark takes his point of departure by observing that
the body is the first point where willed actions meet the world: It is the point
where I turn my thought about having a cup of tea, looking out the window
or climbing Ben Nevis into action. At the same time it is also the point where
we receive sensory inputs and where the flow of sensory inputs change as a
consequence of willed actions. Thus the body has the role of being the
“common and persisting locus of action and sensing". (Clark (In Press) p. 23)
This is connected with our sense of bodily presence and location in the world.
Clark refers to research, on the issue that has become known as telepresence,
which has shown that sense of presence is closely connected to an ability to
interact with the environment. It is the ability to act upon the objects in the
close environment and the fact that such willed sensorimotions results in
certain expected new sensory inputs, that gives one a sense of presence in that
environment. As an example of this, Clark, in his book “Natural Born
Cyborgs”, mentions the experiences reported by people operating the kind of
tele-operating system developed to handle radioactive or other dangerous
materials. Here the operator is able to control a robotic device by wearing
special gloves that transmit movements of the operator’s hands to the robot
and tactile feedback back to the operator. Operators have reported to feel a
shift in the point of view as if they were present in the environment
containing the dangerous materials (Clark (2003 p. 92)). Interesting example
that illustrates this point is the Japanese researcher Hiroshi Ishiguro
experiences with his newly built robot “twin”. The robot looks just like him
and it is even capable of simulating the idiosyncratic characteristics of his
gestures. He can control this robot in real-time and thus via the robot interact
with, for example, a lecture environment kilometres away. Ishiguro controls
the robot from a standard control room containing two screens showing the
view from the robot’s perspective. From here he can control its movements
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and he can speak to the audience via a microphone. In a recent interview he
reports “When I am tele-operating it is interesting what happens. The true
situation is that I’m controlling a robot, but I feel something. It’s as though I
am there. If I look at the robot’s body from this viewpoint, I feel as if the
Robot’s body is my body. If someone walks up and touches the robot face, I
feel something” (Interview by Alun Anderson (July 2007)).
In addition to being the point of sensorimotor confluence the body, according
to Clark, has the further important role of being a “gateway to intelligent
offloading”. This is the role that was especially emphasised by Ballard et al. in
their analysis of fixation. The body gives us a possibility of exploiting the fact
that information can be stored directly in the world. In Clark’s term; "The
body's role in such cases is that of an instrument enabling the emergence of a
new kind of information processing organisation." (Clark (In Press) p. 23)
According to Clark, the body should thus be identified with whatever plays
“the role of being the locus of willed action, the point of sensorimotor
confluence, gateway for intelligent offloading and the stable (though not
permanently fixed) platform whose features and relations can be relied upon
in the computation of certain information-processing solutions.” (Clark (In
Press) p.24) Notice that this is a rather abstract characterization of the
functional role of the body, which abstract away from structural differences
such as chemical and physical differences.
3.4.2 The negotiable body
Viewing body as a functional notion has some interesting implications. In this
light Clark, suggests:
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“ It is merely a contingent (and increasingly negotiable) fact about human
embodiment that the body is both the metabolic centre and the bridge to
sensory presence and intelligent action.” (Clark (In Press) p.23)
Viewing body as a functional notion opens up for the possibility of something
counting as a body without it being “a single persisting body in ordinary 3space”. (Clark (In Press) p.24) This presents new possibilities of having
genuine embodiment that is spatially scattered or genuine embodiment in
virtual or mixed realities. In our example of Adder from before we could
perhaps count the touch screen as being part of Adder’s body. In less
imaginative cases it could be that we would say that a blind person’s cane,
being a point of sensorimotor confluence, would count as a genuine part of
that person’s body. In Clark’s slogan formulation “the body is essential, but
negotiable” (Clark (2003) p. 114).
It is important to notice that on the extended body functionalist account the
body is still important and significant for mind. It recognises the importance
of motions, touch, vision etc. and the ability to interact with an environment.
It rejects the view of mind and cognition as disembodied. Clark sees it as a
resolving the tension between the body-detail model and extended
functionalist approaches in the following way:
“The cognitive importance of the body…. is fully exhausted by its
ability to play a certain functional role in an intelligent organisation.
The distinctiveness and importance of this role is what explains the
intuition that the body makes a special and pervasive cognitive
contribution. But because it [the body] is nothing but a complex
functional role, there is nothing cognitively significant about the bodily
contribution that is not fully captured by reflection upon its several …
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computational and information-processing contributions.” (Clark (In
Press) p. 24)
In this way Clark analyses the position as joining the insight from the Bodydetail model that the body is special and the abstract characterisation of
mental states from extended functionalism.
3.4.3 Body and Mind – a one-to-one match?
The suggestion of viewing body as a functional notion can be seen as an
extension of the technique applied by Bechtel and Mundale that we explored
in our investigations of functionalism. Bechtel and Mundale introduced the
thought that brain states in themselves are rather functional notions defined
in a coarse-grained way. What Clark is suggesting is that the case is similar
when we are concerned with the body. On Bechtel and Mundale’s account
viewing brain states as functional states resulted in a one-to-one mach of
brain states and mental states. Do we get a similar one-to-one match between
body and mind on the extended body functionalist account? If we look back
at our examples of Ada and Adder we see that even though they carry out the
same accountancy task, it would not be right, even under the extended body
approach, to claim that they have the same kind of body. Just because we
count the touchpad as a part of Adder’s body it does not mean that Adder has
hands and feet. The consequence of understanding body as a functional
notion is that in both cases, what it is that counts as the body is determined
by what it is that plays the functional role as laid out above (Clark, personal
communication).
At this point it seems relevant to ask what it is exactly that we gain from
taking the extended body functionalist approach instead of just taking the
extended functionalist approach. Clark suggests it as a resolution of the
tension of a body-detail model and an extended functionalist approach - A
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functionalist way of ascribing a distinctive and important role for the body,
abstracting away from differences on the level of chemistry and physics. I
think that this is an interesting suggestion, and I think that it is important to
recognise that the intuitions behind the body-detail model are something that
a competing position should try to account for. However, as far as the body
already has an essential role under the ordinary extended functionalist
approach an interesting issue for further research might be how it is exactly
that it offers us a reconciliation of the Body-detail model and extended
functionalism. As it stands now, I do not see that extended body
functionalism provides us with an alternative that is sufficiently different
from that provided by extended functionalism to warrant endorsing this
position for our present purpose of rejecting the body-detail model. There
might be other reasons for endorsing the extended body functionalist
approach e.g. to explain the findings involved in tele-presence. However,
endorsing this position might also leave one vulnerable to additional
objections e.g. it might give rise to objections not face by the extended
functionalist approach e.g. that it might be problematic for the position to set
the boundary of the body in distinction from the environment. These issues
are outside the scope of the current project, but would of course be obvious
issues for further research.
3.5 Status
We have now seen that there is a way of acknowledging the importance of
body in mind and cognition that incorporates the insights of good old
fashioned commonsense functionalism. I think that the above reading of the
embodied and embedded approach is on the right track and that it manages
to show how such an approach and functionalism are compatible. In order to
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further compare this approach to the body-detail model and to elucidate
possibilities for further research it is now time to take a step back and gain an
overview of the arguments so far.
Shapiro and Noë suggested that a fine-grained analysis of the body should be
accompanied by a similarly fine-grained analysis of the mental. The
suggestion was, as we have seen, that having certain kinds of mental states
required having a certain kind of body with certain properties. Shapiro
analysed this as conflicting with the spirit of an abstract, body neutral
functionalist approach on account of its chauvinistic consequences. I agreed
with Shapiro that if his interpretation of the embodied research programme
was correct this would indeed be conflicting with the spirit of functionalism,
however, not only with abstract and coarse-grained versions of functionalism,
but with functionalism as such. The conclusion was that it was in conflict with
the spirit of even fine-grained functional approaches. Not because of the
chauvinistic character of the conclusion that it reached, but on account of it
foreclosing the possibility of alternative implementations. In this connection, I
argued that there seem to be good reason to think that such alternatives could
be available.
I argued against the Body-detail model, demonstrating that for each of the
research projects presented by Shapiro the strong reading that one has to have
a humanlike body to have a human mind was not justified. In this light it was
possible to reject Shapiro’s claim that research in embodied and embedded
mind undermines body neutrality and abstract functionalism. This rejection
paved the way for a reading of the research of embodied, embedded mind as
compatible with functionalism. With Clark I suggested a way in which this
might be done. It rests on the observation that some arguments for viewing
mind as embodied and embedded has an extended functionalistic approach.
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These are the arguments in favour of viewing the body as part of a larger
mechanism consisting of brain, body and environment and which overall
operating profile determines our mental states. They have a functionalistic
approach because in these arguments what defines a mental state is a coarsegrained functional role formulated in terms of commonsense psychology. The
extension of the functionalist approach comes from realising that a
functionalist definition of mental states does not in any way require that the
realization of such states is limited to what goes on in the brain. Being part of
a bigger system, the body under the extended functionalist interpretation has
an important, but still more modest role than the one it has under the bodydetail model. This has, as we saw, the consequence that sameness of body is
not required for sameness of mind. In fact, even the possibilities for multiple
realizations are extended under this approach. In this way we escape the
species chauvinism that would be a consequence of the body-detail model.
Whether the extended functionalism should be accompanied by the further
assumption that the body is functionally defined has been left as an open
question to be determined by further research.
The phenomenal feel
Having the arguments fresh in memory, makes us vary of a difference
between the two lines of arguments that we so far have left unnoted. The
examples suggested as support the body-detail model focus on experience
such as, for example, the experiences of hearing a sound, whereas the
extended functionalists, in contrast, focus on cognition.
The experience of the taste of chocolate has a different feel to it than the
experience of the taste of whisky. An ache feels different from an itch. The
arguments presented by the extended functionalist approach all focus on
cognitive states and activities e.g. copying a set of coloured blocks or carrying
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out advanced calculations. Such states and activities do not seem to have a
phenomenal feel to them. Neither does the having of beliefs. It does not feel
different to believe that “the museum is on 53rd street ” than to believe that “it
rains a lot in Scotland”. Having such beliefs might be associated with
experiences that has a certain feel to them, but there is in it self nothing it is
like to have these beliefs. In contrast to the extended functionalist approach
we saw that experiences and the phenomenal feel associated with these
constituted an important issue for Noë.9 Could it be that experiences are
determined by the characteristics of our body whereas cognitive states are
not? Could it be that the body-detail model is true of experience only: that is,
having humanlike experiences with a certain phenomenal quality takes a
humanlike body? Does the extended functionalism ignore the way that
having a certain body shape influence the phenomenal quality of experience?
When considering this question we are of course not concerned with the cases
where experiences are about the body shape. In such cases it is trivially true
that body shape will make a difference to the experience. If type of
phenomenological quality is tied to body type, where as, in contrast, cognitive
processes can be similar even in creatures that have different bodies. This
would imply that the role of the body is unique when it comes to experience,
whilst when it comes to cognition the environment plays a significantly
bigger role.
Consider the difference in the experience of driving a Porsche and a tank.
There is a difference in the way that it feels to shift gears and turn corners in
these different vehicles. My immediate intuition is that there could be a
similar difference between experience of having a snake body and a human
body.
9
The issue of experiences and phenomenal feel does not have the same importance for Shapiro, who in
his conclusions of The Mind Incarnate mentions leaves this an open question.
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A test case for this intuition could be the example of tactile vision substitution
in comparison with ordinary vision. Do people with TVSS really see? Do they
their experiences have the same phenomenological quality as ordinary
seeing?
Noë takes the following approach to this question:
“Tactile vision [is] vision-like because (or to the extent that) there is….
an isomorphism at the sensorimotor level between tactile vision and
normal vision. In tactile vision, movements with respect to the
environment produce changes in stimulation that are similar in pattern
to those encountered during normal vision. The same reservoir of
sensorimotor skill is drawn on in both instances.” (Noë 2004 p. 27).
From the last two sentences in the above quote one get the impression that
Noë equals vision and tactile vision, but here we have to be careful. Note that
the first sentence only states that tactile vision is vision-like. According to Noë
there is an extent to which there are similarities between tactile vision and
normal vision also on a sensorimotor level, however on this level it is also
possible to spot where the isomorphism breaks down. According to Noë the
sensorimotor view places constraints on the degree of similarity that is
required to achieve similarity of experience. Where vision and tactile vision
come apart, according to Noë and the sensorimotor account is the ability
enabled by the systems to subserve patterns of sensorimotor dependencies.
This difference, according to Noë, is due to the differences in the systems: The
vibrator array placed on the skin in the tactile vision system is crude and
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simple compared to the retina involved in normal vision. This, according to
the sensorimotor account, differences in the qualitative aspect of the
experience. I think Noë is correct in noting that the information flow of these
systems does not match the speed and flexibility that normal vision provides.
However, if we refined the TVSS systems with higher level of sensor input.
What then? The question is could it ever be like real vision or would it always
lack that certain kind of feel to it? The question of phenomenal quality has
been a joker in philosophy of mind for decades and especially in relations to
discussions of functionalism. I believe that further research both philosophical
and empirical is needed to answer this question fully. In these investigations,
however, it is important to remember that just establishing that the body does
play an important and distinct role in determining our experiences does not
suffice to establish that no alternative implementations are possible.
All about levels?
When looking away from the question of phenomenal quality, the quote from
Noë above illustrates a point that we came across during the exposition of
Bechtel and Mundale’s views. This point being that a central question here is
about levels of abstraction. Noë rejects the label of chauvinism for the
sensorimotor approach on account of it being able to recognize tactile vision
as a form of vision at a certain level of abstraction e.g. it can recognize that the
same reservoir of sensorimotor skills is drawn on in both instances. According
to the analysis of Bechtel and Mundale, the traditional debates concerning
mental states and functionalism were conducted without much attention
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being paid to the context of inquiry. The arguments presented in the previous
chapters both for the Body-detail model and Extended Functionalism are
highly informed by the most recent developments within science in general
and cognitive science in particular. However, I still believe that what
according to Bechtel and Mundale applies to the traditional debate, could be
said to apply to the current debate as well. Paying more attention to context of
inquiry might reconcile intuitions and positions that at first seem to contradict
each other. On my take the coarse-grained analysis of the extended
functionalist approach is not necessarily exclusive. A fine-grained approach
can also be appropriate at times depending on what you are interested in.
Recognizing this creates room for recognizing and explaining our intuition
that differences in our bodily construction makes a differences to mind. Does
this mean that there is no fact of the matter about whether some alien or
alternative organization ‘really’ implements the same mental states as our
own? This question lies outside the scope of this thesis, but would be an
interesting focus for further research.
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______________________________________________
CONCLUSION
F
______________________________________________
My goal in this project has been to explore the logical space between
functionalism and embodied, embedded approaches to mind. In this
connection my focus has been to evaluate the claim made by Shapiro that
embodied, embedded approaches undermine a functionalist program. What
this project has shown is that we should reject the strong reading of the
embedded, embodied approaches that would yield such a conflict with
functionalism. Although, it seems reasonable on the basis of the research
presented by Shapiro to conclude that the body plays a very important role in
cognition, this does not entail that the characteristics of body type are
indispensable. As stated, wearing a pair of glasses can make up for weak
eyesight and research on sensory substitution and brain plasticity gives us
reason to believe that alternative implementations could be made available.
Our embeddedness in a language using community is a further reason as to
why characteristics of body do not determine type of mind. The rejection of
the body-detail model paved the way for a reading of the embodied,
embedded approach that recognizes that gross bodily states and processes do
play a role in determining mental states, but at the same time reject that they
play a unique and ineliminable role. Under this reading type of mind is not
tied to type of body and embodied, embedded approaches and abstract
commonsense functionalism goes hand in hand. The question of whether
experiences pose special cases has been left to be determined by further
research, but as stated for this asymmetry to be justified it would have to be
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shown not only that the body plays a distinct and important role in
determining our experiences but that it plays a unique and ineliminable role.
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______________________________________________
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