PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE
I. Basics
Meeting time: Tuesday/Thursday 12:40-1:55pm
Meeting place: BEC 202
Professor: E.J. Coffman
E-mail address: ecoffma1@utk.edu
Course website: http://online.utk.edu
Office: 816 McClung Tower
Office Hours: 2-3pm Tuesday/Thursday; 5-6pm Wednesday; by appointment
II. Texts
1. Richard Feldman, Epistemology (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003)
2. Online course packet available at our course’s site at Online@UT (http://online.utk.edu)
▪ Throughout this course, you’ll need to access Online@UT [UT Blackboard [Bb]), as well as
receive e-mail sent to your UT e-mail account. If you need assistance with this stuff, visit the
OIT website (http://oit.utk.edu), or give OIT a call at 974-9900.
III. Course Overview
A. Goals
1. Explore five basic questions in Epistemology, the branch of Philosophy that focuses
on the nature of knowledge and intellectually appropriate (justified) belief
2. Continue honing our critical thinking, reading, writing, and discussion skills
▪ Our course has two main parts, and is organized around five basic questions in Epistemology.
In Part 1, we’ll explore these three questions:
Q1: What does it take for a person to know something to be true? What’s involved in
factual (propositional) knowledge?
Q2: What does it take for a person’s belief to be intellectually appropriate (justified)?
What’s involved in intellectually appropriate (justified) belief?
Q3: Could an intellectually inappropriate (unjustified) belief nevertheless count as
knowledge? Does knowledge require justified belief?
Q1-Q3 aren’t limited to just us human thinkers; rather, they’re very general questions about the
nature or essence of knowledge and justified belief, whose answers apply to any possible
knower/believer. In Part 2 of our course, we’ll explore two questions that focus exclusively on
our intellectual predicament:
Q4: Do we have any knowledge about the “external world”?
Q5: Do we have any justified beliefs about the “external world”?
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▪ We’ll be working to understand and assess the arguments some main historical and
contemporary philosophers have developed in trying to answer these five questions. Here are the
main things we’ll have a better understanding of at the end of this course:
▫ the most influential analysis of knowledge in the history of Epistemology—viz., the
“Justified True Belief” analysis—, as well as the main objection to that analysis;
▫ some main ways in which contemporary philosophers have attempted to refine the
“Justified True Belief” analysis, as well as the main problems with those attempts;
▫ the two main debates about the nature of justified belief: the (i)
“Foundationalism/Coherentism” debate and the (ii) “Evidentialism/Nonevidentialism”
debate;
▫ some main arguments for the conclusion that none of our beliefs about the external
world qualify as knowledge, as well as the main objections to these arguments;
and
▫ some main arguments for the conclusion that none of our beliefs about the external
world are justified, as well as the main objections to these arguments.
B. Methods
1. In class: Interactive lecture; group discussion; 2 essay exams (20% each = 40% of
final grade)
2. Outside class: Reading assignments; 10 Critical Notes (20% of final grade); 1 paper
[10-12 pages] (40% of final grade)
▪ Reading assignments
Our readings come from two sources: (1) the online course packet (available at our course’s Bb
site) and (2) a book by Richard Feldman (Professor of Philosophy, University of Rochester)
called Epistemology. We’ll switch back and forth between the course packet and Feldman’s
book. The course packet contains some of the most important historical and contemporary essays
on our five questions. Feldman’s book will provide helpful explanation, as well as critical
evaluation, of the readings in our course packet. (In a typical lecture, I’ll offer explanations of—
and then raise some initial questions about and/or objections to—what I take to be the main
arguments developed in the assigned readings for that day.)
As usual, you have three main goals when reading assigned material: (1) Identify the main claims
the author is arguing for; (2) Understand how the author argues for those claims; and (3)
Evaluate the author’s arguments. The online course packet includes three of my favorite essays
on these fundamental skills, essays I still find helpful. Please have a look at the three essays
under the heading ‘Preliminaries: Philosophical Terminology and Methods’ in the reading
schedule below.
▪ Critical Notes (10 @ 2% each = 20% of final grade)
This requirement is designed to: (1) help you achieve the three reading goals mentioned above;
(2) help prepare you to contribute to class discussion; and (3) strengthen your ability to clearly
and concisely question and/or object to all sorts of arguments.
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Each Critical Note (CN) you submit will earn a grade of ‘Exemplary’, ‘Satisfactory’, or
‘Unsatisfactory’. A Satisfactory CN will be at least 125—but not more than 250—words; it will
raise either a question about or an objection to something that happens in a particular assigned
reading. An Exemplary CN will fall within the same word limits, and will raise an especially
pressing question about or objection to a central or crucial part of the selected reading. To ensure
that I understand exactly how your question or objection engages the material you’re writing
about, please provide some context by briefly summarizing the part of the reading your question
or objection concerns. Sincere effort will usually suffice for at least a Satisfactory CN. (See the
end of the syllabus for two sample Exemplary CNs.)
Six important rules about CNs:
▫ CNs must be typed.
▫ Each CN must include a word count.
▫ CNs can only be submitted in class.
▫ You can’t submit more than 2 CNs at once.
▫ A CN on a particular reading must be submitted before or during the first class where
we discuss that reading. (So, once we’ve started talking about a particular reading, it’s
too late to submit a CN about it.)
▫ Each of your CNs must engage a different reading. (So, no more than one CN on a
given reading.)
I encourage you to draw on your CNs in class discussion: share your questions with us, try out
your objections on us, and so on.
▪ Essay exams (2 @ 20% each = 40% of final grade)
Each exam will consist of two essay questions drawn from a list of several possible questions.
The possible questions will derive entirely from material covered in class. I’ll distribute a list of
questions several days before each exam. A typical question will ask you to lay out a particular
argument, present a standard objection to that argument, provide a possible reply to that
objection, and (finally) offer your own reasoned verdict about this debate.
▪ Paper (40% of final grade)
I’ll soon distribute a detailed paper assignment that concerns issues raised in Part 1 of our course.
(You may also write on a topic of your own choosing, subject to my approval.) There’s a “rewrite” option on your term paper that works like this. After I return my comments on, and overall
evaluation of, the first draft you submit—which is due by 7am on Friday, November 21st—,
you’ll have the option of submitting a second, revised draft of your paper—which will be due by
7am on Thursday, December 11th. Papers that improve significantly as a result of revisions
may rise 1-2 “grade levels”—e.g., a significantly improved paper that initially earned a B may
rise to a B+ or an A-.
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▪ Discussion
One of my main goals is to help us fruitfully discuss the concepts, theories, and arguments
covered in this course. By participating in class discussion, you can do at least three important
things:
(1) Challenge my understanding and presentation of course material—thereby helping all
of us!—by: questioning my explanations of arguments from assigned readings, or my
evaluations of those arguments, or my views about what’s really important in a given
reading, or …;
(2) Gain a deeper understanding of the material this course covers;
and
(3) Strengthen your ability to participate in all kinds of rational dialogue.
I really hope you take advantage of your opportunity to discuss the ideas we’ll be exploring in
this course. If you do, then in addition to benefiting in all the ways mentioned above, you’ll
position yourself to get bumped into a higher grade category should you end the course on a
“grade borderline”. (I offer this very concrete reward in order to highlight the importance I see in
taking part in classroom discussion.)
I understand that some of us find it easier to participate in class discussion than others. If you’re
especially uncomfortable with the idea of class discussion, please talk to me about that; I may be
able to suggest some relatively painless ways to get into the flow of class discussion. And keep
these things in mind: (1) Nobody here knows everything (including me, as you’ll soon learn!); (2)
Everybody here knows something (and so has something to contribute to discussion); and (3) Any
question or point that occurs to you is almost certainly occurring to someone else at the same time
(“great minds think alike…”).
IV. Key Dates
8/21 (R): First class meeting
10/9-10/10 (R-F): Fall Break
10/14 (T): First essay exam
11/21 (F): Paper due [by 7am]
11/27-11/28 (R-F): Thanksgiving Break
12/2 (T): Last class meeting; all CNs due
12/4 (R): Second essay exam [12:30pm-2:30pm]
12/11 (R): Revised paper due [by 7am; this is optional]
V. Content Outline
Part I: The Nature of Knowledge and Justified Belief
A. The “Justified True Belief” Analysis: A Traditional Theory of Knowledge
1. Explanation
2. The main objection and some defenses
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B. Three Attempts to Fine-Tune the JTB Analysis
1. The “No False Grounds” Condition
2. The “No Defeaters” Condition
3. The “No Essential Dependence on Falsehood” Condition
C. What is Justified Belief?
1. What structure must a set of justified beliefs have?: Foundationalism vs.
Coherentism
2. Does justification require evidence?: Evidentialism vs. Nonevidentialism
D. Does Knowledge Require Justified Belief?
1. The Causal Analysis of Knowledge
2. The Truth-Tracking Analysis of Knowledge
Part II: The Extent of Our Knowledge and Justified Belief
A. Do we know anything about the external world?
1. Some important skeptical arguments
2. Objections
B. Do we have any justified beliefs about the external world?
1. The Problem of Induction
2. The Underdetermination Argument
VI. Tentative Reading Schedule (CP = Course packet; Feldman = Feldman’s Epistemology)
Preliminaries: Philosophical Terminology and Methods
▪ CP: E.J. Coffman, “Finding, Clarifying, and Evaluating Arguments”
▪ CP: Jim Pryor, “Philosophical Terms & Methods”
▪ CP: Jim Pryor, “Guidelines on Reading Philosophy”
Part I: The Nature of Knowledge and Justified Belief
A. The “Justified True Belief” Analysis: A Traditional Theory of Knowledge
1. Explanation
▪ Feldman: Chapter 1
▪ CP: Plato, excerpt from Theaetetus
▪ CP: A.J. Ayer, “Knowing as Having the Right to be Sure”
▪ Feldman: Chapter 2
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2. The main objection and some defenses
▪ CP: Edmund Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”
▪ Feldman: Chapter 3, §§I-II
▪ CP: Oswald Hanfling, “A Gettier Drama”
B. Three Attempts to Fine-Tune the JTB Analysis
1. The “No False Grounds” Condition
▪ CP: Michael Clark, “Knowledge and Grounds”
▪ Feldman: Chapter 3, §III.A
2. The “No Defeaters” Condition
▪ CP: Peter Klein, “A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge”
▪ Feldman: Chapter 3, §III.B
3. The “No Essential Dependence on Falsehood” Condition
▪ Feldman: Chapter 3, §III.D
▪ CP: Ted Warfield, “Knowledge from Falsehood”
C. What is Justified Belief?
1. What structure must a set of justified beliefs have?: Foundationalism vs. Coherentism
a. The “Infinite Regress Argument” for Foundationalism
▪ Feldman: Chapter 4, §II
b. The Main Alternative: Coherentism
▪ CP: Laurence BonJour, excerpt from The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (“A Basic Problem
for Foundationalism”)
▪ Feldman: Chapter 4, §V.C.1
▪ Feldman: Chapter 4, §IV.A-B
▪ CP: Laurence BonJour, excerpt from The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (“The Elements of
Coherentism”)
c. Defending the Infinite Regress Argument: Objections to Coherentism
▪ Feldman, Chapter 4, §IV.C-D
▪ CP: Laurence BonJour, excerpt from The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (“Answers to
Objections”)
▪ CP: Richard Fumerton, “A Critique of Coherentism”
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2. Does justification require evidence?: Evidentialism vs. Nonevidentialism
a. Explanation of Evidentialism
▪ CP: W.K. Clifford, excerpt from “The Ethics of Belief”—just §1, “The Duty of Inquiry”
▪ Feldman: Chapter 4, §I.A-B; §III; §V
▪ CP: Richard Feldman and Earl Conee, “Evidentialism” (§§I-IV)
b. Objections to Evidentialism
▪ CP: William James, “The Will to Believe”
▪ CP: Keith DeRose, “Ought We to Follow Our Evidence?”
▪ CP: Alvin Goldman, “What is Justified Belief?” (§I)
▪ Feldman: Chapter 4, §I.C
c. Two Nonevidentialist Analyses of Justified Belief
i. Reliabilism
▪ CP: Alvin Goldman, “What is Justified Belief?” (§§II-III)
▪ Feldman: Chapter 5, §III
▪ CP: Richard Feldman and Earl Conee, “Evidentialism” (§§V-VI)
ii. Proper Function
▪ CP: Alvin Plantinga, “Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function” (Introduction, §IV)
▪ Feldman: Chapter 5, §IV
D. Does Knowledge Require Justified Belief?: Two Negative Answers
1. The Causal Analysis
▪ CP: Alvin Goldman, “A Causal Theory of Knowing”
▪ Feldman: Chapter 5, §I
2. The Truth-Tracking Analysis
▪ CP: Robert Nozick, excerpt from Philosophical Explanations (“Conditions for Knowledge”)
▪ Feldman: Chapter 5, §II
Part II: The Extent of Our Knowledge and Justified Belief
A. Do we know anything about the external world?
▪ CP: Descartes, excerpt from Meditations on First Philosophy
▪ CP: Peter Unger, “An Argument for Skepticism”
▪ Feldman: Chapter 6, §§I-III
▪ CP: G.E. Moore, “Proof of an External World”
▪ CP: G.E. Moore, “Hume’s Theory Examined”
▪ Feldman: Chapter 6, §§IV-V
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B. Do we have any justified beliefs about the external world?
1. The Problem of Induction
▪ Feldman: Chapter 7, §I.A
▪ CP: David Hume, excerpt from An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
▪ Feldman: Chapter 7, §I.B-E
2. The Underdetermination Argument
▪ Feldman: Chapter 7, §II
▪ CP: John Locke, excerpt from Essay Concerning Human Understanding
▪ CP: Thomas Reid, excerpt from Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (just Chapters 5 &
14)
▪ CP: Michael Huemer, “Direct Realism and the Brain-in-a-Vat Argument”
VII. Appendix: Two Sample Exemplary CNs
A. Sample “Question” CN
One of Coffman’s main aims in this syllabus is to give us a reasonably clear sense of the
questions and issues we’ll explore in this course. Unfortunately, he sometimes slips into using
unfamiliar “specialized” or “technical” terminology. One important place this happens is when
Coffman tries to describe what he calls “the two main debates about the nature of intellectually
justified belief”. Here, he uses the following four terms: ‘Foundationalism’, ‘Coherentism’,
‘Evidentialism’, and ‘Nonevidentialism’. These are not “everyday” or “ordinary” terms: the
typical person on the street certainly won’t know what these terms mean! Rather, these
unfamiliar terms seem to be ones that are defined and used primarily within Epistemology.
Without definitions of those technical terms, many won’t know exactly what kinds of questions
we’ll be discussing in the “What is Justified Belief?” part of the course. So, my question: What
do these four terms mean? (146 words)
B. Sample “Objection” CN
According to Coffman, this course can be thought of as having two main parts, which he tries to
distinguish as follows. In Part 1, he says, we’ll be exploring “abstract, general questions about
the nature of knowledge and justified belief.” In Part 2, he says, “we’ll explore three questions
about our own situation,” questions about the extent or scope of human knowledge and justified
belief. I’m worried that, contrary to what Coffman suggests, there’s not a clear dividing line
between Parts 1 and 2 of this course. Here’s my thought: The only strategy I can think of for
arguing that we lack a particular kind of knowledge or justified belief (the subject matter of Part
2) would employ some general claims about the nature of knowledge and justified belief (the
subject matter of Part 1). It seems, then, that Parts 1 and 2 of this course are much more closely
related than Coffman suggests. (154 words)
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