PHILOSOPHY 300: PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE
I. Basics
Meeting time: Tuesday/Thursday 12:40pm-1:55pm
Meeting place: Claxton Addition 202
Professor: E.J. Coffman
E-mail address: ecoffma1@utk.edu
Course website: http://online.utk.edu
Office: 816 McClung Tower
Office Hours: TBA
II. Texts
1. Richard Feldman, Epistemology (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003)
2. Online course packet available at our course’s site at Online@UT (http://online.utk.edu)
▪ Throughout this course, you’ll need to access Online@UT, as well as receive e-mail sent to your
UT e-mail account.
If you need assistance with this stuff, visit the OIT website
(http://oit.utk.edu), or give OIT a call at 974-9900.
III. Course Overview
A. Two main things we want
1. To explore six fundamental questions in Epistemology, the branch of Philosophy
that focuses on the nature of knowledge and intellectually justified belief
2. To continue honing our critical thinking, reading, writing, and discussion skills
▪ Our course falls into two main parts, and is organized around six fundamental questions in
Epistemology. In Part 1, we’ll explore these three questions:
Q1: What does it take for a person to know that a particular claim (statement,
proposition) is true? What’s involved in factual (propositional) knowledge?
Q2: What does it take for a person to justifiedly believe that a particular claim is true?
What’s involved in intellectually (or, “epistemically”) justified belief?
Q3: Could a person know that something is true without justifiedly believing it? Does
knowledge require justified belief?
Q1-Q3 aren’t focused specifically on our cognitive/intellectual situation. Rather, they’re pretty
abstract, general questions about the nature of knowledge and justified belief, questions about
what’s involved in any being’s knowing or justifiedly believing that something is true. In Part 2
of this course, we’ll explore these three questions about our own predicament:
Q4: How much do we know about our external surroundings (the “external world”)?
Q5: How much do we justifiedly believe about the external world?
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Q6: How much a priori (roughly, “non-empirical”) knowledge and justified belief do we
have?
▪ We’ll be working to understand and assess the arguments some main historical and
contemporary philosophers have developed in trying to answer these six questions. Here are the
main things you’ll have a better understanding of at the end of this course:
▫ the most influential analysis of knowledge in the history of Epistemology—viz., the
“Justified True Belief” analysis—, as well as the main objection to that analysis;
▫ some main ways in which contemporary philosophers have attempted to refine the
“Justified True Belief” analysis, as well as the main problems with those attempts;
▫ the two main debates about the nature of justified belief: the (i)
“Foundationalism/Coherentism” debate and the (ii) “Evidentialism/Nonevidentialism”
debate;
▫ some main arguments for the conclusion that none of our beliefs about the external
world qualify as knowledge, as well as the main objections to these arguments;
▫ some main arguments for the conclusion that none of our beliefs about the external
world are justified, as well as the main objections to these arguments;
and (time permitting)
▫ some main arguments for the conclusion that many (if not most) of our a priori beliefs
neither qualify as knowledge nor are justified.
▪ In addition, at the end of our course, you’ll be better able to find, understand, and evaluate
others’ arguments, as well as present and defend arguments of your own.
B. How we’ll get what we want
1. In class: Interactive lectures; group discussions/activities; 2 essay exams (20% each =
40% of final grade)
2. Outside class: Reading assignments; 10 Critical Notes (20% of final grade); 1 paper
[10-12 pages] (40% of final grade); online discussion
▪ Reading assignments
Our readings will come from two sources: (1) the online course packet (available at our course’s
Online@UT site) and (2) a book by Richard Feldman (Professor of Philosophy, University of
Rochester) entitled Epistemology. Throughout the course, we’ll switch back and forth between
the course packet and Feldman’s book. In the course packet, you’ll find some of the most
important historical and contemporary essays on our six questions. Feldman’s book will provide
helpful explanation, as well as critical evaluation, of the readings in our course packet. In a
typical lecture, I’ll offer explanations of—and then raise some initial questions about and/or
objections to—what I take to be the main arguments developed in the assigned readings for that
day.
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Your three main goals when reading assigned material—whether it comes from the course packet
or Feldman’s book—are to: (1) Identify the main claims the author is arguing for; (2) Understand
how the author argues for those claims; and (3) Determine how strong those arguments are. In
the online course packet, I’ve included three of my favorite essays on these philosophical skills,
essays that I continue to find helpful. To make sure we’re all on more or less the same page when
it comes to approaching course material, please take a careful look at the three essays under the
heading ‘Preliminaries: Philosophical Terminology and Methods’ in the reading schedule below.
Also, you’ll find a variety of helpful material on assigned readings at our course’s online
discussion board—the Problems of Knowledge Discussion Forum. There, I’ll post such things
as (1) my reasons for assigning a given reading; (2) a brief overview of the reading; and (3) some
questions that will help guide you through the reading.
▪ Critical Notes (10 @ 2% each = 20% of final grade)
This requirement serves three important purposes: (1) It’ll help you achieve the three reading
goals mentioned above; (2) It’ll help prepare you to contribute to in-class discussion; and (3) It’ll
strengthen your ability to clearly and concisely express questions about and/or objections to all
kinds of arguments.
Each Critical Note (CN) you submit will earn a grade of ‘Exemplary’, ‘Satisfactory’, or
‘Unsatisfactory’. A Satisfactory CN will be at least 150—but not more than 300—words, and
will raise either (i) a question about or (ii) an objection to something that happens in a particular
assigned reading. An Exemplary CN will fall within the same word limits, and will raise an
especially pressing question about or objection to a central or crucial part of the selected reading.
To ensure that I understand exactly how your question or objection engages the material you’re
writing about, you’ll need to provide some context by briefly summarizing the part of the reading
your question or objection concerns. Sincere effort will usually suffice for at least a Satisfactory
CN. (See the end of the syllabus for a sample Exemplary CN.)
Here are six important rules about CNs:
▫ CNs must be typed.
▫ Each CN must include a word count.
▫ CNs can only be submitted in class.
▫ A CN on a particular reading must be submitted before or during the first class where
we discuss that reading—i.e., once we’ve started talking about a particular reading, it’s
too late to submit a CN about it.
▫ Each CN must take on one of the starred (*) readings in the reading schedule below
(there are many more options than 10, so you’ll have a lot of leeway here).
▫ Each of your CNs must engage a different reading assignment—i.e., no more than one
CN on a given reading assignment.
Finally, I encourage you to draw on your CNs in class discussion: share your questions with us,
try out your objections on us, and so on. “Anonymized” CNs may sometimes be used as
springboards for class discussion.
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▪ Essay exams (2 @ 20% each = 40% of final grade)
Each exam will consist of two essay questions drawn from a list of several possible questions.
The possible questions will derive entirely from material covered in class. I’ll distribute a list of
questions several days before each exam. A typical question will ask you to lay out a particular
argument, present a standard objection to that argument, provide a possible reply to that
objection, and (finally) offer your own reasoned verdict about the relevant debate.
▪ Paper (40% of final grade)
I’ll soon distribute two or three different paper assignments, from which you’ll choose one to
complete. Each assignment will concern issues raised in Part 1 of our course, and will include its
own detailed instructions. Further, each assignment comes with a “re-write” option that works
like this: After I return my comments on, and overall evaluation of, the first draft you submit—
which is due by 5pm on Wednesday, November 21st—, you’ll have the option of submitting a
second, revised draft of your paper—which will be due by 5pm on Friday, December 7th.
Papers that improve significantly as a result of revisions may rise a “grade level”—e.g., a
significantly improved paper that initially earned a C+ may rise to a B; a significantly improved
paper that initially earned a B may rise to a B+.
▪ Discussion
One of my main goals is to help us fruitfully discuss the theories and arguments covered in this
course. By participating in discussion, you can do at least three important things:
(1) Challenge “the Prof”—and thereby help all of us!—by, e.g., questioning my
explanations of arguments from assigned readings, or my evaluations of those arguments;
(2) Gain a deeper understanding of the material this course covers;
and
(3) Strengthen your ability to participate in all kinds of rational dialogue.
I’ll do various things to help foster discussion both inside and outside the classroom. For
example, the reading aids posted online at the Problems of Knowledge Discussion Forum will
help you get a good handle on the main arguments developed in assigned readings so that you can
fruitfully question my and/or others’ explanations and evaluations of those arguments. I’ll often
put condensed lecture notes (in the form of PowerPoint slides) on our course’s website well in
advance of class. Critical Notes will play important roles in sparking class discussion. Finally, I
encourage you to create and/or contribute to discussion threads at Problems of Knowledge
Discussion Forum.
I hope you take advantage of these opportunities to discuss the ideas we’ll be exploring. If you
do, then in addition to benefiting in all the ways mentioned above, you’ll also position yourself to
get bumped into a higher grade category should you end the course on a “grade borderline”. (I
offer this very concrete reward in order to highlight the importance I see in taking part in
classroom and/or online discussion.)
Of course, I understand that some of us find it easier to participate in discussion than others. If
you’re especially uncomfortable with the idea of in-class or online discussion, please talk to me
about that; I may be able to suggest some relatively painless ways to get into the flow of class
discussion. And please do keep three important facts in mind: (1) Nobody here knows everything
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(including me, as you’ll soon learn!); (2) Everybody here knows something, and so has something
to contribute to discussion; and (3) Any question or point that occurs to you in class is almost
certainly occurring to someone else at the same time—knowing that should help you become less
hesitant to ask questions or raise points in class.
IV. Especially Important Dates
8/23 (R): First class meeting
10/11-10/12 (R-F): Fall Break
10/16 (T): First essay exam
11/21 (W): Paper due [by 5pm]
11/22-11/23 (R-F): Thanksgiving Break
12/4 (T): Last class meeting
12/7 (F): Revised paper due [by 5pm; this is optional]
12/11 (T): Second essay exam [12:30pm-2:30pm]
V. Content Outline
Part I: The Nature of Knowledge and Justified Belief
A. The “Justified True Belief” Analysis: A Traditional Theory of Knowledge
1. Explanation
2. The main objection and some defenses
B. Three Attempts to Fine-Tune the JTB Analysis
1. The “No False Grounds” Condition
2. The “No Defeaters” Condition
3. The “No Essential Dependence on Falsehood” Condition
C. What is Justified Belief?
1. What structure must a set of justified beliefs have?: Foundationalism vs.
Coherentism
2. Does justification require evidence?: Evidentialism vs. Nonevidentialism
D. Does Knowledge Require Justified Belief?: Two Negative Answers
1. The Causal Analysis of Knowledge
2. The Truth-Tracking Analysis of Knowledge
Part II: The Extent of Our Knowledge and Justified Belief
A. How much do we know about the external world?
1. Four skeptical arguments
2. Objections
B. How much do we justifiedly believe about the external world?
1. The Problem of Induction
2. The Underdetermination Argument
C. How much a priori knowledge and/or justified belief do we have?
1. The Argument from Verificationism
2. The Argument from Peer Disagreement
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VI. Tentative Reading Schedule (CP = Course packet; * = CN option)
Preliminaries: Philosophical Terminology and Methods
▪ CP: E.J. Coffman, “Finding, Clarifying, and Evaluating Arguments”
▪ CP: Jim Pryor, “Philosophical Terms & Methods”
▪ CP: Jim Pryor, “Guidelines on Reading Philosophy”
Part I: The Nature of Knowledge and Justified Belief
A. The “Justified True Belief” Analysis: A Traditional Theory of Knowledge (Weeks 23)
1. Explanation (*)
▪ Feldman: Chapter 1
▪ CP: Plato, excerpt from Theaetetus
▪ CP: A.J. Ayer, “Knowing as Having the Right to be Sure”
▪ Feldman: Chapter 2
2. The main objection and some defenses (*)
▪ CP: Edmund Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”
▪ Feldman: Chapter 3, §§I-II
▪ CP: Oswald Hanfling, “A Gettier Drama”
B. Three Attempts to Fine-Tune the JTB Analysis (Weeks 3-4)
1. The “No False Grounds” Condition
▪ CP: Michael Clark, “Knowledge and Grounds”
▪ Feldman: Chapter 3, §III.A
2. The “No Defeaters” Condition
▪ Feldman: Chapter 3, §III.B
▪ CP: Peter Klein, excerpt from “Warrant, Proper Function, Reliabilism, and Defeasibility”
3. The “No Essential Dependence on Falsehood” Condition (*)
▪ Feldman: Chapter 3, §III.D
▪ CP: Ted Warfield, “Knowledge from Falsehood”
C. What is Justified Belief? (Weeks 5-8)
1. What structure must a set of justified beliefs have?: Foundationalism vs. Coherentism
a. The “Infinite Regress Argument” for Foundationalism
▪ Feldman: Chapter 4, §II
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b. The Main Alternative: Coherentism (*)
▪ CP: Laurence BonJour, excerpt from The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (“A Basic Problem
for Foundationalism”)
▪ Feldman: Chapter 4, §V.C.1
▪ Feldman: Chapter 4, §IV.A-B
▪ CP: Laurence BonJour, excerpt from The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (“The Elements of
Coherentism”)
c. Defending the Infinite Regress Argument: Objections to Coherentism (*)
▪ Feldman, Chapter 4, §IV.C-D
▪ CP: Laurence BonJour, excerpt from The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (“Answers to
Objections”)
▪ CP: Richard Fumerton, “A Critique of Coherentism”
2. Does justification require evidence?: Evidentialism vs. Nonevidentialism
a. Explanation of Evidentialism (*)
▪ CP: W.K. Clifford, excerpt from “The Ethics of Belief”—just §1, “The Duty of Inquiry”
▪ Feldman: Chapter 4, §I.A-B; §III; §V
▪ CP: Richard Feldman and Earl Conee, “Evidentialism” (§§I-IV)
b. Objections to Evidentialism (*)
▪ CP: William James, “The Will to Believe”
▪ CP: Keith DeRose, “Ought We to Follow Our Evidence?”
▪ CP: Alvin Goldman, “What is Justified Belief?” (§I)
▪ Feldman: Chapter 4, §1.C
c. Two Nonevidentialist Analyses of Justified Belief
i. Reliabilism (*)
▪ CP: Alvin Goldman, “What is Justified Belief?” (§§II-III)
▪ Feldman: Chapter 5, §III
▪ CP: Richard Feldman and Earl Conee, “Evidentialism” (§§V-VI)
ii. Proper Function (*)
▪ CP: Alvin Plantinga, “Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function” (Introduction, §IV)
▪ Feldman: Chapter 5, §IV
D. Does Knowledge Require Justified Belief?: Two Negative Answers (Weeks 9-10)
1. The Causal Analysis (*)
▪ CP: Alvin Goldman, “A Causal Theory of Knowing”
▪ Feldman: Chapter 5, §I
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2. The Truth-Tracking Analysis (*)
▪ CP: Robert Nozick, excerpt from Philosophical Explanations (“Conditions for Knowledge”)
▪ Feldman: Chapter 5, §II
Part II: The Extent of Our Knowledge and Justified Belief
A. How much do we know about the external world?: Four skeptical arguments (Weeks
10-11) [*]
▪ CP: Descartes, excerpt from Meditations on First Philosophy
▪ CP: Peter Unger, “An Argument for Skepticism”
▪ Feldman: Chapter 6, §§I-III
▪ CP: G.E. Moore, “Proof of an External World”
▪ CP: G.E. Moore, “Hume’s Theory Examined”
▪ Feldman: Chapter 6, §§IV-V
B. How much do we justifiedly believe about the external world?: Two skeptical
arguments (Weeks 12-13)
1. The Problem of Induction (*)
▪ Feldman: Chapter 7, §I.A
▪ CP: David Hume, excerpt from An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
▪ Feldman: Chapter 7, §I.B-E
2. The Underdetermination Argument (*)
▪ Feldman: Chapter 7, §II
▪ CP: John Locke, excerpt from Essay Concerning Human Understanding
▪ CP: Thomas Reid, excerpt from Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (just Chapters 5 &
14)
▪ CP: Michael Huemer, “Direct Realism and the Brain-in-a-Vat Argument”
C. How much a priori knowledge and/or justified belief do we have?: Two skeptical
arguments (Weeks 14-15)
1. The Argument from Verificationism (*)
▪ Feldman: Chapter 8
▪ CP: A.J. Ayer, “An Empiricist Critique of A Priori Knowledge”
▪ CP: A.C. Ewing, “In Defense of A Priori Knowledge”
2. The Argument from Peer Disagreement (*)
▪ Feldman: Chapter 9
▪ CP: Thomas Kelly, “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement”
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VII. Appendix: A Sample Exemplary SWPIE
According to Coffman, this course can be thought of as having two main parts, which he tries to
distinguish as follows. In Part 1, he says, we’ll be exploring “abstract, general questions about
the nature of knowledge and justified belief.” In Part 2, he says, “we’ll explore three questions
about our own situation,” questions about the extent or scope of human knowledge and justified
belief. I’m worried that, contrary to what Coffman suggests, there’s not a clear dividing line
between Parts 1 and 2 of this course. Here’s my thought: The only strategy I can think of for
arguing that we lack a particular kind of knowledge or justified belief (the subject matter of Part
2) would employ some general claims about the nature of knowledge and justified belief (the
subject matter of Part 1). It seems, then, that Parts 1 and 2 of this course are much more closely
related than Coffman suggests. (154 words)
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