DOES POLICE PERFORMANCE INCREASE IN IMPORTANCE FOR THE PUBLIC
DURING TIMES OF SECURITY THREATS, AND DO EVALUATIONS OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE DECLINE IN IMPORTANCE?:
FINDINGS FROM A QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF ANTECEDENTS OF
POLICE LEGITIMACY IN ISRAEL*
Tal Jonathan
Institute of Criminology
Faculty of Law
Hebrew University, Israel
David Weisburd
Institute of Criminology
Faculty of Law
Hebrew University, Israel
And
Administration of Justice Department
George Mason University
*This study was supported by the Science and Technology directorate of the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security under Grant Award Numbers N00140510629 and
2008-ST-061-ST0004, made to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism (START, www.start.umd.edu), and by the U.S. National Institute
of Justice under Grant Number Z909601. The views and conclusions contained in this
document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily
representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, START, or the National Institute of Justice.
Abstract
The legitimacy of the police in the eyes of the public in considered one of the most
important goals of policing, and has been found to be associated with numerous
cooperative behaviors. The main antecedent of legitimacy has consistently been found to
be procedural justice, followed by performance evaluations. However, despite recent
terrorism threats and increasing police involvement in homeland security, determinants of
police legitimacy have not been examined under conditions of acute security threats. This
article compares antecedents of police legitimacy in the Israeli town “Sderot”, which has
been the target of repeated missile attacks, to determinants of legitimacy in other
communities in Israel, which have not faced acute security threats in recent years. In
accordance with the literature on the effects of threat, we find that the role of
performance in shaping evaluations of police legitimacy was significantly larger in
Sderot than in our comparison communities. At the same time, the role of procedural
justice was not significantly different, and indeed procedural justice remained the primary
antecedent of legitimacy in both conditions. Implications for theory and practice are
discussed.
2
The legitimacy of the police in the eyes of the public is considered one of the most
important goals of policing in democratic countries (National Research Council, 2004),
and has been found to be associated with numerous cooperative behaviors such as
obeying the law, consenting with police decisions, providing information and
collaborating with the police more generally (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 1990;
2004; Tyler and Huo, 2002; also see review by the National Research Council, 2004).
Given the key place that legitimacy has gained in policing, the antecedents of legitimacy
have also become an important focus of research. One of the main findings of such
studies is that perceptions of procedural justice, which are concerned with the fairness
and appropriateness of police processes, are the single most important factor in
determining evaluations of police legitimacy. Assessments of police performance, while
also significant as an antecedent of legitimacy, have generally been found to play a less
important role (e.g. see Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2001, 2004).
It is not clear, however, if procedural justice and performance would play similar
roles as antecedents of police legitimacy under conditions of acute crisis or threat, such as
terrorism threats. Since the terror attack of 9/11, homeland security has become a
growing responsibility for police forces in numerous countries (Bayley & Weisburd,
2009; International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2005; Weisburd, Jonathan and Perry,
forthcoming). At the same time, the effects of this role on public attitudes towards the
police and on perceptions of police legitimacy are just beginning to be disentangled.
While recent research reveals that terrorism threats may bring about a short-term rise in
public evaluations of the police (Jonathan, 2009), the processes by which perceptions of
police legitimacy are formed under such conditions are unclear. It is reasonable to
3
hypothesize that when faced with acute threats, the public will be more concerned with
end results and less worried about fair processes, and thus the role of performance in
shaping legitimacy would rise, while the importance of procedural justice would decline
(see Sunshine and Tyler, 2003). Moreover, we might expect that under conditions of
threat, the importance of performance would rise above that of procedural justice, and
thus performance assessments would become the primary antecedent of police
legitimacy.
In this study we utilize a unique situation in Israel, which allowed for a natural
experiment examining the determinants of police legitimacy under conditions of severe
security threats among majority communities.1 We use survey data to compare the
importance of performance and procedural justice as antecedents of police legitimacy in
the Israeli town “Sderot”, which has been suffering severe security threats, to antecedents
of legitimacy in other cities and towns in Israel, which have not suffered such intense
threats in recent years.
We begin by reviewing the concept of legitimacy, its significance and its
antecedents. We continue by discussing the responsibility of the police in fighting
terrorism, and the importance of examining the effects of this role on public attitudes
towards the police. We then review the literature on threat and public attitudes, which
suggests that under conditions of terrorism threats performance would become more
important in shaping perceptions of police legitimacy, while the role of procedural justice
would weaken. Our focus then is on our study, the sample selected, and the survey
methods used to collect our data. Using a quasi-experimental design and a multivariate
By “majority communities” we are referring to Jewish adults, not including “Haredim” (Ultra-Orthodox
Jews). As discussed in subsequent sections, Ultra-Orthodox Jews and Israeli Arabs are unique groups,
which may hold different attitudes towards the police, particularly with regard to policing terrorism.
1
4
regression approach to control for possible inequivalence in sample characteristics across
the sites, we compare the importance of assessments of procedural justice and police
performance in Sderot with other Israeli communities, located within five police districts.
Consistent with the literature on the effects of threat, we find that the role of performance
in determining legitimacy was significantly stronger under conditions of severe, acute
security threats. At the same time, we find that procedural justice was not less important
under threat, and indeed remained the primary determinant of legitimacy in both
conditions.
LEGITIMACY AND ITS ANTECEDENTS
Increasing public evaluations of the legitimacy of the police is considered one of the
most important goals of policing in democratic countries (National Research Council,
2004). When discussing police legitimacy, scholars often refer to the belief that the
agency or the rule ought to be obeyed (see Weber, 1968), or to “the belief that the police
are entitled to call upon the public to follow the law and help combat crime, and that
members of the public have an obligation to engage in cooperative behaviors” (Tyler,
2004: 86-87). When people feel the police are legitimate, cooperation with the police and
with the law more generally stems from internal feelings of responsibility and obligation,
which are self-regulated and thus do not depend on sanctions or incentives provided by
the authorities (Tyler, 2004).
Public evaluations of the police as legitimate were found to be associated with
numerous positive outcomes, including compliance with the law and general cooperation
with and acceptance of police authority. Tyler (1990), for example, found among
Chicago residents that evaluations of police legitimacy were a significant determinant of
5
compliance with the law, distinct from and stronger than the expected likelihood of
official sanctions. Sunshine and Tyler (2003) gained similar results in two samples of
New York City residents. Moreover, they found that evaluations of police legitimacy
were associated with willingness to report crimes to the police, provide information, take
part in police-community activities, and empower the police. Recently, Tyler and Fagan
(2008) found using panel data on attitudes of New York City residents, that individuals
who viewed the police as legitimate were more likely to cooperate with the police by
fighting crime in their neighborhoods. Similar conclusions were reached by other
researchers as well (LaFree, 1998; Mastrofski, Snipes and Supina, 1996; Paternoster,
Brame, Bachman, and Sherman, 1997; Sampson and Bartusch, 1998; Tyler and Huo,
2002; Tyler and Wakslak, 2004).
Due to the importance of police legitimacy, it is not surprising that much attention
has been given to its antecedents. Previous studies have consistently demonstrated that
the primary determinant of police legitimacy are evaluations of procedural justice, which
refer to the appropriateness and fairness of the processes by which the police exercise
their authority (National Research Council, 2004; Tyler, 2001, 2004). It is important to
mention, however, that performance evaluations, including, for example, the ability of the
police to catch rule-breakers and accomplishments in fighting crime (Sunshine and Tyler,
2003), were also found to play a significant, though weaker role, than that of procedural
justice (Tyler, 2001, 2004).
Tyler (2001) reviewed four studies examining attitudes of the general public
towards the police and the courts and concluded that considerations of both procedural
justice and performance in fighting crime affect evaluations, while the effects of
6
procedural justice are consistently stronger. For example, telephone interviews carried
out with 1575 Chicago residents revealed that both evaluations of the fairness of police
treatment and views regarding police performance influenced general evaluations of legal
authorities, and together explain 59% of the variance. However, the effect of procedural
justice (beta = 0.49) was stronger that that of performance (beta = 0.28). Similarly, a
survey carried out in 1997 among 346 individuals living in high crime areas in Oakland, 2
revealed that the strongest predictor of overall evaluations of the police was procedural
justice, which explained 26% of the variance, followed by performance evaluations,
which explained 5% of the variance (Tyler, 2001).
More recently, Sunshine and Tyler (2003) analyzed responses to two surveys
carried out in 2001 and 2002 among New York City residents, and contrasted different
judgments about the police that may determine legitimacy. Latent structural equations
revealed that in both surveys, procedural justice was the primary antecedent of legitimacy
(in the first survey beta = 0.74; in the second survey beta = 0.44). Performance
evaluations were the second strongest predictor in the first survey (beta = 0.15), while
distributive fairness (which refers to evaluations about the fairness by which police
services are distributed across people and communities) had the second strongest effect
on legitimacy in the second survey (beta = 0.22).
However, these studies were not carried out under extreme conditions of crisis or
threat which require police intervention, such as intense terrorism threats or attacks.3 As
detailed in subsequent sections, we might expect that under such circumstances the
2
We will return to the issue of crime threats versus terrorism threats and their effects on antecedents of
legitimacy later on in our discussion.
3
While the second survey reported by Sunshine and Tyler (2003) was carried out after the terror attack of
9/11, it was carried out in the summer of 2002, approximately one year after the attack.
7
processes by which perceptions of police legitimacy are formed may change. In the face
of threat, when the public is affected by uncertainty and insecurity, they may be more
concerned with outcomes than with fair processes, and thus the importance of
performance evaluations may rise; the significance of procedural justice may drop; and
thus the relative roles of performance and procedural justice in determining legitimacy
may reverse. However, before turning to a discussion of the effects of threat on public
attitudes and policy choices, we think it is important to elaborate on policing terrorism
more generally and on the importance of examining public attitudes towards the police
within this context.
POLICING TERRORISM AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE POLICE
Since the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, police forces in the United States
as well as in other democratic countries have increased their involvement in
counterterrorism (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; International Association of Chiefs of
Police, 2005; Weisburd, et al., forthcoming). At the same time, policing scholars have
begun to raise questions regarding the consequences that this role may have for police,
particularly with regard to the character of policing and police-community relationships
(Bayley and Weisburd, 2009; Hasisi, Alpert and Flynn, 2009; Lyons, 2002; Mastrofski,
2006; Murray, 2005; Thacher, 2005; Weisburd et al., forthcoming).
It has been argued, for example, that a focus on counter-terrorism may result in
the police emphasizing “high policing” strategies and tactics (Bayley and Weisburd,
2009). This policing style focuses on macro-level problems, utilizes covert methods, and
is generally considered less transparent and accountable, and may thus result in violations
8
of human rights and procedural justice. High policing may also contribute to change in
police priorities and in perceptions of their mission, and result in the police becoming
more control- rather than service-oriented. Such character change may, in turn, hamper
public evaluations of the police and police legitimacy. Public perceptions of the police
may also decline as a result of a zero-sum game of resources, whereby policing terrorism
may come at the expenses of fighting crime and addressing other issues that are troubling
communities at the local level (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; Fishman, 2005; Hasisi et al.,
2009; Weisburd et al., forthcoming). Indeed, Weisburd, Hasisi, Jonathan and Aviv
(forthcoming) recently discovered that higher levels of terrorism threats are associated
with lower levels of clearance rates in Jewish communities in Israel.
At the same time, it has also been argued that police involvement in counter
terrorism may improve evaluations of the police, since the police may be perceived as
addressing the issue that is mostly troubling the public at the time. Additionally, quick
and efficient responses to terrorism may contribute to the image of the police as
professional and successful, and counter-terrorism activities may directly encourage
collaboration between the police and the public (Weisburd et al., forthcoming; see review
by Jonathan, 2009). Indeed, Jonathan (2009) recently found that when faced with severe
terrorism threats, public perceptions of the police in Israel improved. This trend,
however, lasted only for a brief period of time - once terrorism threats began to decline,
evaluations of the Israeli Police in numerous areas including trust, performance and
procedural justice, dropped as well.
It appears, therefore, that police involvement in counter-terrorism, which has
significantly increased in recent years in many Western countries, does influence public
9
perceptions of the police in multi-faceted ways. However, beyond the absolute levels of
trust, procedural justice or performance as measured in surveys, it is not clear how threat
influences the processes by which evaluations of legitimacy are formed. Do the same
factors play a role? Does their relative importance remain consistent, or does the public
value determinants of legitimacy differently under threat conditions? As detailed in the
following section, there are reasons to hypothesize that in the face of crisis or threat, the
importance of performance evaluations in determining legitimacy would rise, while the
role of procedural justice would weaken. In this regard, there is also the question of
whether the significance of performance would rise enough so as to overtake procedural
justice, and become the primary determinant of police legitimacy.
THREAT AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES
Threat, conflict, or acute national crises are known to have numerous effects on
cognitions, emotions, attitudes and behavior. For example, threat was found to trigger
cognitive biases and reliance on cognitive heuristics (Gross and Ní Aoláin, 2006);
contribute to a decision-making process that is dominated by emotion rather than
cognition (Gordon and Arian, 2001); increase prejudice against out-groups (Bettencourt,
Dorr, Charlton and Hume, 2001; Struch and Schwartz, 1989); and contribute to political
intolerance (Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter, 2006; Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus, 1982;
Sullivan, Shamir, Walsh and Roberts, 1985).
Importantly, threats were found to promote action intended to reduce the risk of
physical harm. This tendency was found with regard to natural disasters (Browne and
Hoyt, 2000; Sattler, Kaiser and Hittner, 2000); crime (Ferraro, 1996; Smith and Uchida,
10
1988); and terrorism (Huddy, Feldman, Capelos and Provost, 2002). Thus, it is not
surprising that numerous studies identified a link between terrorism threats and support
for protective government policies, even at the cost of hampering procedural justice.
Friedland and Merari (1985), for example, investigated the impacts of terrorism in Israel
on fear for personal safety and on attitudes towards terrorist groups, counter-terrorism
measures, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict more generally. They found that terrorism
threats were associated with support for harsher counter-terrorism responses. Similar
findings were identified by other researchers in Israel (Arian, 1989; Bar-Tal and Labin,
2001; Gordon and Arian, 2001).
More recently, Huddy, Feldman, Taber and Lahav (2005) examined the effects of
perceptions of threat versus feelings of anxiety concerning terrorism in the United States.
In line with their hypothesis, they found correlations between perceived terrorism threat
and a desire for forceful counter-terrorism measures, both domestic and international,
including, for example, support for national identification cards; government monitoring
of communication; restrictions of civil liberties; US military intervention; and overseas
involvement. Their conclusions are supported by numerous studies carried out in the US
(Davis and Silver, 2004; Herrmann, Tetlock and Visser, 1999; Huddy, Feldman and
Weber, 2007; Jentleson, 1992; Jentleson and Britton, 1998).
Thus, it appears that, among other effects, acute threat or conflict brings about a
desire for action aimed at reducing the threat and the negative emotions associated with
it. In turn, the desire “to do something” about the threatening situation appears to lead to
less concern with human rights and transparent, accountable processes.
11
Returning to procedural justice and performance evaluations as antecedents of
police legitimacy, it appears that while studies have consistently found procedural justice
to be the strongest determinant of legitimacy, and performance assessments to be less
important (National Research Council, 2004; Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2001,
2004), we might expect that under conditions of acute threat, and particularly terrorism,
the role of performance in shaping legitimacy would be enhanced, while the importance
of procedural justice would weaken. Further, it may be assumed that this trend would
result in performance overtaking procedural justice, and becoming the main antecedent of
legitimacy. It is important to mention in this regard that the police are responsible for
handling terrorism at the local level and are first responders to terror attacks (Weisburd et
al., forthcoming), and thus we may assume that these processes will apply to attitudes
towards the police (in addition, perhaps to other government agencies).
Indeed, Sunshine and Tyler (2003) found that while legitimacy influenced
willingness to empower the police both before and after the terror attack of 9/11, after the
attack empowerment was also directly influenced by performance evaluations. Similarly,
Jonathan (2009) recently found that fluctuations in public trust in the Israeli Police
between 1998 and 2007 (a decade which included the high-threat period of the Second
Intifada) appear to reflect performance more than procedural justice evaluations.
In this study we compare the roles of performance and procedural justice in
shaping perceptions of police legitimacy under conditions of acute security threats, to
antecedents of legitimacy under no specific threats. In accordance with the literature, we
hypothesize that (1) when faced with severe and immediate terrorism-related threats, the
role of performance in shaping police legitimacy will be stronger than when there is no
12
acute threat in the background. (2) Under the same conditions, we hypothesize that the
role of procedural justice will weaken. Lastly, (3) we raise the question of whether the
rise in the importance of performance, along with the hypothesized drop in the
significance of procedural justice, will result in performance overtaking procedural
justice and becoming the most important antecedent of legitimacy.
THE STUDY
The aim of our analysis was to compare antecedents of police legitimacy among
individuals living under situations of acute security threats, to the same antecedents
among residents of areas not facing immediate threats. Survey data collected as part of a
larger study examining public attitudes towards the police in Israel4 enabled us to make
such a comparison. This survey was carried out in the districts of 9 police stations in
Israel5, one of which was the town of Sderot.
Sderot is a small city located only 3 kilometers (1.86 miles) from the Gaza Strip. As
a result of its proximity to the Gaza Strip, in addition to being the most densely populated
community in the area, Sderot has been considered the central target for missile attacks
originating from the Gaza Strip, and had thus suffered more rocket threats and attacks
than any other Israeli community - by the end of 2007, Sderot was hit by 803 rockets,
which constitute 45% of rockets hitting inhabited areas (Intelligence and Terrorism
Information Center, 2007). Not surprisingly, studies have revealed high levels of PTSD
The study supported by the Department of Homeland Security’s START Center at the University of
Maryland and the National Institute of Justice seeks to develop a broad understanding of the impacts of
terrorism on policing and public attitudes toward the police.
5
These districts were Afula, Ashkelon, Be’er-Sheva, Natanya, Rosh-Ha’ayin, Sderot, Yarkon, Zion, and
Zvulun. They were chosen for variability on socio-demographic characteristics (crime levels; population
size; proportion of Arabs within the population; and socio-economic levels), as well as on levels of
“classic” terrorism threats.
4
13
and other stress-related symptoms among Sderot residents (Dekel and Nuttman-Shwartz,
2009). More generally, the threat of rocket fire from the Gaza Strip increased
considerably between 2006 and 2008,6 and during the survey period (October 27 December 3, 2008) we witnessed a major peak in rocket threats and attacks.7
While Israeli cities more generally had been the subject of intensive security threats
since the outbreak of the Second Intifada in September 20008, the other eight police
districts where the survey was carried out had not suffered similar security threats during
the survey period, or in the years preceding the survey. First, six of the eight districts
were not located close to the Gaza Strip and thus had not suffered from missile threats or
attacks. The two exceptions were the towns of Ashkelon and Be’er-Sheva, which by the
end of 2008 were included within the range of the rockets (see Intelligence and Terrorism
Information Center, 2009). Although they clearly suffered lower threat levels than Sderot,
due to their ambiguous status they were excluded from the analysis.
Second, with regard to "classic" terrorism threats (such as suicide and other
bombings, shootings and stabbings), the numbers of attacks, deaths and injuries have
substantially declined throughout Israel since 2002, and particularly between 2006 and
2008.9 At the same time, several major terror attacks did take place in Jerusalem in
2008.10 Although threat levels in Jerusalem were low compared to those witnessed in
2002 and 2003, similarly to Ashkelon and Beer-Sheva, the Zion district (which includes
6
While the yearly number of identified rocket hits ranged from 4 to 281 between 2000 and 2005, in 2006
there were 946 hits; in 2007 there were 783 hits; and between January and November 2008 there were 1211
hits (Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2007, 2009)
7
While between July and October, 2008, 1 to 8 rocket hits were identified per month, 125 rocket hits were
identified in November 2008 (see Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2009).
8
See data from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Victims+of+Palestinian+Violence+and+Terrorism+si
nc.htm
9
See cite in footnote 8.
10
See cite in footnote 8.
14
the city of Jerusalem) was excluded from the analysis as well. Individuals residing in the
remaining five districts have not faced acute security threats at the time, and thus
provided a suitable comparison group for Sderot residents.11 These districts, their central
cities and main characteristics are listed in Table 1.
While the comparison districts have not experienced significant security threats
during the period of study, and thus provide a useful comparison for Sderot in Israel, we
recognize that they vary considerably in characteristics (see Table 1). For example, the
yearly average of criminal files per thousand varies in the comparison districts between
53 and 160. In Sderot the level is 106 per thousand residents. Socioeconomic levels also
vary with Sderot close to Afula and Rosh Haayin, reflecting relatively disadvantaged
communities. Additionally, Sderot is the smallest of the police districts we examine in
terms of population size.
At the same time, our five comparison districts include a broad array of Israelis
from 48 different communities and provide a sampling frame of over one million citizens,
covering over 14% of Israeli population. Importantly, the focus of our analysis below is
on how individual perceptions of legitimacy are developed, and in this case we can
control for possible confounding due to the specific weights of different types of people
that are found in Sderot as opposed to the other police districts we study. Thus,
recognizing the possible confounding of individual characteristics in identifying
antecedents of legitimacy, we control for socio-demographic and other personal
characteristics, as well as for district variability in our analyses (see below).
Importantly, we also carried out the analysis including the districts of Ashkelon, Be’er-Sheva, and Zion
(Jerusalem), as well as with each of the districts separately, and reached similar results.
11
15
Table 1 about here
Sampling within the districts
Within the districts, respondents were sampled from all communities so as to
proportionally represent that district. Within each city/town respondents were selected
randomly. It is important to note that in this analysis we focus on majority communities
only. Minorities may hold different attitudes towards the police, and the processes by
which their evaluations are formed may differ, particularly with regard to policing
terrorism and other security threats. Thus, Israeli Arabs as well as Ultra-Orthodox Jews
were not included in the present analysis.12 Accordingly, our final analysis included 2013
individuals from 6 police districts in Israel (between 210 and 405 from each district), out
of which 405 reside in Sderot, our test group, and 1608 reside in five communities in
Israel that have not faced similar security threats at the time. Since respondents with
missing values for any of the variables utilized for the present analysis were excluded,
308 individuals from Sderot and 1103 from our comparison communities were part of the
final regression models.
12
Although evaluations of procedural justice were found to be equally important across ethnic groups
(Sunshine and Tyler, 2004; Tyler, 1994, 2000; Tyler and Huo, 2002), surveys of public attitudes towards
the police consistently reveal that whites hold more positive attitudes toward the police than non-whites
(Bowling, 1999; Brown and Benedict, 2002; Gallagher et al., 2001). Particularly in Israel, Jewish citizens
were found to hold more favorable attitudes towards the police than Arab citizens (Hasisi and Weitzer,
2007). These differences may be particularly strong with regard to policing terrorism (Hasisi et al., 2009;
Henderson, Ortiz, Sugie, and Miller, 2006; Innes, 2006; Thacher, 2005; Weisburd et al., forthcoming), due
to ethnic or national links to the source of the terrorism threat (Weisburd et al., forthcoming), or because
Arab minorities may be treated as the "enemy within" (Hasisi et al., 2009). Ultra-Orthodox Jews may also
be viewed as distinct from the majority community in Israel, particularly with regard to law obedience (see
Yagil and Rattner, 2002).
16
Survey of public attitudes towards the police
The survey questionnaire included 64 questions tapping numerous aspects of
attitudes towards the police and perceptions of policing terrorism in Israel. For most
questions, respondents were asked to rank from 1 to 5 their agreement with statements
(1=Does no agree at all; 5=Agrees completely). Many of the questions as well as the
design of the indexes were based on previous surveys carried out by Tyler & Wakslak
(2004) and Sunshine and Tyler (2003).
Following previous research, our definition of police legitimacy included trust in
the police as well as obligation to obey the law and the police (see Tyler, 2004). Thus,
our dependant variable was operationalized using six statements: “The police are guided
by the public’s well being”; “The police carryout their job well”; “If a relative/friend was
a victim of a crime I would encourage them to turn to the police”; “I have trust in the
Israeli Police”; “I always try to obey the law, even if I find it unfair”; and “The police
should be obeyed, even if we are not pleased with the way they treat citizens”
(Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.70; range: 6-30; Sderot: Mean = 22.05; s.d. = 5.07; Comparison
districts: Mean = 21.40; s.d. = 4.37).
Our first independent variable, procedural justice, was designed in accordance
with past research (Tyler, 2004), and was operationalized using the following statements:
“Officers treat citizens they encounter with respect”; “The police explain their activities
well to the people they encounter”; “The police allow citizens to express their opinion
before making a decision regarding their case”; and “The police treat all citizens equally”
(Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.78; range: 4-20; Sderot: Mean = 11.44; s.d. = 4.32; Comparison
districts: Mean = 10.59; s.d. = 3.76). Our second independent variable, performance,
17
tapped police’s ability to control crime, and was made up of two questions: “The police
efficiently handle crime in my area of residence”; and “Police presence in my area of
residence is adequate” (Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.76; range: 2-10; Sderot: Mean = 5.77; s.d.
= 2.58; Comparison districts: Mean = 5.00; s.d. = 2.41). As mentioned above, numerous
socio-demographic and other factors, as well as past experiences with the police, which
are known from past research to influence attitudes towards the police (see reviews by
Brown and Benedict, 2002; and by Gallagher, Maguire, Mastrofski and Reisig, 2001),
were also measured by our survey and incorporated into our analysis, so as to control for
their confounding effects (see Appendix for more details).
The survey was conducted between October 27 and December 3, 2008, by the
Statistics Counseling Unit at the University of Haifa. It was carried out using a computer
software ("Dvash"), which includes a database of all residents who have a land phone line
("Bezek" or “Hot”), covering approximately 85% of households in Israel (CBS, 200813).
Calls were made between 4 and 8pm. Since respondents had to be at least 18 years old in
order to participate in the study, surveyors asked to speak to the adult in the house. If
there was no answer, the system kept calling the same number 15 more times during the
next 7 to 10 days. If no contact has been made despite these efforts, the system dropped
the household and randomly selected a new number. Out of 801 calls made to Sderot
residents and 3681 calls made in our comparison districts, complete interviews were
obtained from 423 individuals in Sderot and 2144 in the other five districts, resulting in
response rates of 52.8% and 58.25% respectively.
13
See: http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/hodaa_template.html?hodaa=200811082
18
RESULTS
In Table 2 we present the results of our analysis. We use an Ordinary Least
Squares Regression in which the index of police legitimacy is the dependant variable.
Model 1 presents the town of Sderot, while Model 2 portrays our comparison
communities. Both models include the indexes of procedural justice and performance as
our test variables, as well as an index of risk evaluations, past experiences with the police
and numerous socio-demographic and other control variables (See Appendix for more
details). As mentioned above, we have added the particular stations as dummy variables
in order to control for effects at the station level (Natanya station as the reference
category). Both models are statistically significant (p<0.001), and explain a considerable
percentage of the variance in legitimacy evaluations (adjusted R squares of 0.53 and
0.46).14
Table 2 about here
As in other studies, evaluations of procedural justice and police performance are
significant in both models. When comparing the regression coefficients of these two
variables across the two models, we find that the regression coefficient of performance is
much larger in Sderot (b = 0.64; s.e. = 0.10) than in our comparison districts (b = 0.32;
s.e. = 0.05). Utilizing the formula suggested by Paternoster, Brame, Mazerolle and
Piquero (1998),15 we find these differences to be statistically significant (Z=2.7968,
p<0.01, one-tailed test). Thus, confirming our first hypothesis, we find that under
14
Tolerance values for all variables in both models were higher than 0.2, indicating that there were no
multicollinearity problems (see Weisburd and Brit, 2007).
15
Z = b1 – b2 /  (s.e.b12 + s.e.b22)
19
conditions of threat, performance evaluations play a significantly larger role in
determining police legitimacy, than when there is no specific threat in the background.
However, although the regression coefficient for procedural justice is somewhat
smaller in Sderot (b = 0.58; s.e. = 0.06) than in our comparison group (b = 0.64; s.e. =
0.03), using the same formula we find that, contrary to our second hypotheses, these
differences were not statistically significant. Thus, the role of procedural justice in
determining police legitimacy was not significantly lower under conditions of security
threats.
Lastly, when examining the relative roles of procedural justice and performance
within each model, we find that, in line with the literature and contrary to our third
hypothesis, procedural justice remains the strongest antecedent of legitimacy in both
models (beta equals 0.49 in Sderot and 0.54 in the comparison group), followed by
performance evaluations (beta equals 0.32 and 0.17 respectively). Thus, despite the
growing importance of performance under threat, these evaluations did not overtake
procedural justice and did not become the primary antecedent of legitimacy in our
samples.
DISCUSSION
Our findings reveal that in the Israeli town Sderot, which has been facing high
levels of security threats in recent years, the role of performance in shaping police
legitimacy was significantly stronger than in other communities in Israel, which have not
faced such threats at the time. This finding is in line with our first hypothesis, as well as
with the literature on behavior and policy preferences under threat, and is not surprising
20
considering that threat brings about a desire "to do something" in order to diminish the
threat and the negative emotions associated with it (Huddy et al., 2002).
However, contrary to our second hypothesis, we find that the role of procedural
justice in determining legitimacy was not significantly weaker under threat. Moreover,
contrary to our third hypothesis and in congruence with previous studies on antecedents
of legitimacy (see National Research Council, 2004; Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Tyler,
2001, 2004), we found that procedural justice remained the most important antecedent of
legitimacy in both conditions. Thus, although performance evaluations did play a more
significant role in the face of intense security threats, they still remained secondary to
procedural justice in determining legitimacy in our samples.16
The resilience of procedural justice under situations of threat raises intriguing
questions- why is it the case that procedural justice does not decline in importance? The
stable significance of procedural justice appears to contradict common views, as well as
findings from the threat literature, according to which threat was found to elicit political
intolerance (Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter, 2006; Sullivan et al., 1982; Sullivan et al., 1985)
and support for restrictions on civil liberties (Gibson, 1998; Gross and Ní Aoláin, 2006;
Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, and Wood, 1995; Sullivan et al., 1982).
These results may be better understood when examined in the context of previous
studies on police legitimacy in high crime areas, which have consistently demonstrated
the significance of respect, courtesy and procedural justice from the police even in
situations of high crime. For example, Stoutland (2001) analyzed over 50 qualitative
interviews with residents of high-crime neighborhoods in Boston, and identified that
16
It is important to note, however, that in our Sderot sample the difference between the betas was smaller
than in our control districts.
21
despite the high crime conditions, respect from the police was the most salient issue
raised by community members. Interviewees recognized that the police need to enforce
the law, and thus the major issue for them was not the frequency of enforcement activities
but rather the way these activities were carried out.
Similar findings were identified by Carr, Napolitano and Keating (2007), who
studied youth living in high-crime neighborhoods in Philadelphia. These authors
concluded that the narratives of the interviewees concentrated on the fairness of police
processes more than on the outcomes. Lastly, as detailed in the introduction to this
article, Tyler (2001) reports that even in a high-crime area in Oakland, procedural justice
was the primary determinant of evaluations of the police and of decisions concerning
providing the police with additional funding. Performance evaluations, while playing a
role, did not have the same impact on respondents (also see Tyler and Huo, 2002).
These findings are consistent with Tyler’s (2004) assessment of procedural
justice. Tyler explains that when interacting with the police or with government agencies
more generally, people often lack the proficiency to judge whether actions or decisions
made by authorities are reasonable and appropriate. Similarly, they seldom know what
the "correct" outcome should be. Consequentially, the public needs to feel that the
decision makers acted out of true concern for the wellbeing of those involved, and look
for evidence that the process itself was neutral and fair. Tyler further explains that
contact with government agencies carried for the people involved “important messages
concerning their social status, their self worth and their self-respect,” and thus becomes a
key issue, particularly under situations that challenge one’s status and position in the
22
community, such as falling victim to a crime or being suspected of committing one
(Tyler, 2004:95).
In sum, previous analyses of legitimacy in high crime areas, as well as the results
of the present study, suggest that the desire for procedural justice is an enduring, stable,
trait, which does not depend on the security or crime situation. Under conditions of
security threats individuals do value police performance to a greater extent when forming
evaluations of police legitimacy. However, there does not seem to be a zero-sum game
between performance and procedural justice- under threat, while performance increases
in importance, procedural justice does not decline in importance and indeed remains the
primary antecedent of legitimacy, as is the case when there is no security threat in the
background. It could be the case, however, that at a certain level of threat, perhaps under
extreme existential threat, procedural justice may become less important when shaping
perceptions of police legitimacy.
While studies carried out in high crime areas do suggest similarities in the
importance of procedural justice under conditions of crime and security threats,
generalizing our results to situations of high crime warrants further discussion,
particularly since at first glance, there seem to be major differences between terrorism
and crime threats (although dealing with both is part of police mission). Security threats
are often perceived as a threat from the "outside", which under certain conditions brings
about internal cohesion and a general sense of "us" versus "them", which may, in turn,
increase sympathy towards the police and other government agencies among majority
communities (see Coser, 1956; Mueller, 1970; 1973; Simmel, 1955; Stein, 1976). Crime
23
threats, on the other hand, may not be perceived as external and may not elicit such
sympathy.
Additionally, fighting crime is a traditional role for police, and consequently they
may be held accountable if crime levels are high. Terrorism, on the other hand, is often
perceived as the responsibility of numerous government agencies (see Bayley and
Weisburd, 2009), and thus the police may not be held responsible (or at least not solely
responsible) for high terrorism threats. Indeed, recent studies suggest that high levels of
terrorism threats are associated with a short-term rise in public evaluations of the police
(Jonathan, 2009; Shaw and Brannan, 2009), while perceptions of and actual high crime
rates in the local neighborhood were found to be correlated with lower public attitudes
towards the police (Decker, 1985; Flanagan and Vaugn, 1996; Reisig and Parks, 2000;
Sampson and Bartusch, 1998, 1999).
At the same time, there seem to be important similarities between public attitudes
concerning these two types of threats. Similar to the demand to take strong protective
measures in the face of terrorism threats (see Huddy et al., 2005; Friedland and Merari,
1985), there appears to be a relationship between high crime rates, specifically homicide,
and support for "law and order" policies, including the death penalty and harsher
sentences more generally, both in the US (Baumer, Messner and Rosenfeld, 2003;
Rankin, 1979) and in other countries (Stack, Cao and Adamzyck, 2007). Some have even
argued that residents of high-crime areas would support aggressive law enforcement,
even at the expense of civil liberties, as long as this would lead to safer neighborhoods
(Rosenbaum, 1994). At the same time, as detailed above, previous studies consistently
demonstrated the importance of procedural justice in high crime areas, as is the case
24
under situations of security threats. Thus, it appears that the desire to take forceful action
against the threat on the one hand, and the importance of procedural justice on the other,
is consistent for both security and crime threats.
Before turning to the implications of our results, it is importance to consider some
of the limitations of our study. In our analysis we utilized a severe security situation in
Israel, which allowed for a natural experiment. It is not, however, a randomized trial in
which similar individuals are assigned to test and control groups. While our multivariate
regression framework allowed us to control for numerous variables at the individual
level, it could always be the case that a factor not controlled for confounded the results.
Additionally, it may be the case that a factor other than security threats has contributed to
the differences between Sderot and our comparison communities. For example, crime
levels in Sderot are higher than in our comparison districts (see Table 1). However, even
if the threat of crime did influence the results, we do not view this as problematic since,
as discussed above, high crime is another form of threat that seems to have similar effects
on antecedents of legitimacy.
It is also important to keep in mind that our study was carried out in Israel, which
has been suffering from high levels of terrorism and security threats overall. While the
relatively consistent high levels of threat may make the Israeli case somewhat unique,
these circumstances are precisely what makes the investigation of policing terrorism
possible (see Weisburd et al., forthcoming). In this regard, it should also be considered
that four of our six comparison districts (Zion, Natania, Yarkon and Afula) have suffered
high levels of terrorism threats during the Second Palestinian Intifada. Although the
height of the threat was several years prior to our study, and significant differences in the
25
importance of performance were found despite the similarities between the conditions, it
may be that a different comparison group would have revealed significant differences in
the importance of procedural justice as well. For these reasons we encourage future
research to replicate our analysis in other countries, communities, and situations of threat.
Conclusions
Our study raises some important considerations, both theoretical and practical.
First, our findings draw attention to the growing significance of police performance under
threat. While past research has pointed to performance evaluations as the second most
important determinant of police legitimacy, we show that under security threats their
impact significantly rises. Our findings also show, however, that this rise does not take
away from the importance of procedural justice, which did not play a significantly
weaker role under threat. Furthermore, contrary to intuitive views, in our sample
procedural justice remained the primary antecedent of legitimacy even under conditions
of acute security threats. More generally, our analysis draws attention to the importance
of considering the context when examining public opinion and antecedents of attitudes
towards the police.
With regard to police practice, the police may be aware of the growing
importance of performance under threat, and may alter their priorities and strategies
accordingly. Emphasizing end results in the face of high security threats may not only
seem intuitive and natural, but also appears to be supported by the public. At the same
time, it is important to keep in mind that focusing on outcomes and achievements may
come at the expense of transparency, civil liberties and procedural justice, and may thus
26
hamper public attitudes and police legitimacy in the long run (see Bayley and Weisburd,
2009; Hasisi et al., 2009; Lyons, 2002; Mastrofski, 2006; Murray, 2005; Thacher, 2005;
Weisburd et al., forthcoming). Moreover, it is imperative for police decision makers to
consider that even under conditions of high security threats, the public still appears to
value fair, transparent, respectful processes more than they value high performance and
end results when forming evaluations of police legitimacy. In situations of security
threats, there appears to be a growing desire for forceful action and end results, but not at
the expense of high standards of procedural fairness
27
APPENDIX –Control variables
The variable
Description
Attitudes towards the police
Risk index
Operationalized by asking
respondents to state how likely it is,
in their view, to get caught by the
police for each of the following
behaviors [on a scale ranging from
very unlikely (1) to very likely (5)]:
violating a traffic regulation;
breaking and entering; dealing drugs;
and vandalizing public property.
(Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.71)
Experience with the police
Negative encounter Scores of 1 to 3 on a scale of 1 to 5,
with police
rating an encounter with the police
during the year prior to the survey
(“no encounter” as the reference
category).
Positive encounter
Scores of 4 and 5 on a scale of 1 to 5,
with police
rating an encounter with the police
during the year prior to the survey
(“no encounter” as the reference
category).
Crime victim
Victimization during the year prior to
the survey (coded as 0 = no; 1 = yes).
Respondent or
close family
member serving/
served in IP (Israeli
Police)
Volunteered in
Civil Guard*
Coded as 0 = no; 1 = yes.
Coded as 0 = no; 1 = yes.
Socio-demographic characteristics
Sex
Coded as 0 = female; 1 = male
Age
Education
Measured by 8 education levels.
Income
Measured by 5 income levels.
Distribution Sderot
Distribution Comparison
districts
Range: 4-20
Mean = 11.15
s.d. = 4.04
N = 392
Range: 4-20
Mean = 9.71
s.d. = 3.50
N = 1518
Negative
encounter: 15.9%
Positive encounter:
12.7%
No encounter:
71.5%
N = 403
Negative
encounter: 18.2%
Positive encounter:
9.6%
No encounter:
72.2%
N = 1589
No: 90.6%
Yes: 9.4%
N = 404
No: 68.6%
Yes: 31.4%
N = 405
No: 86.8%
Yes: 13.2%
N = 1602
No: 75.0%
Yes: 25.0%
N = 1603
No: 78.0%
Yes: 22.0%
N = 405
No: 78.5%
Yes: 21.5%
N = 1603
Female: 49.4%
Male: 50.6%
N = 405
Mean = 43.49
s.d = 15.03
N = 397
Min. = No
education (1)
Max. = PhD (8)
Median = High
school with
diploma (4)
N = 402
Female: 51.7%
Male: 48.3%
N = 1608
Mean = 45.87
s.d = 15.33
N = 1579
Min. = No
education (1)
Max. = PhD (8)
Median = Nonacademic education
beyond high school
(5)
N = 1601
Min. = Much less
than average (1)
Min. = Much less
than average (1)
28
Single
Divorced/
separated/ singleparent
Widowed
(“Married” as the reference category)
Born in Africa/
Asia
Born in America/
Europe
Born in former
Soviet Union
("Born in Israel" as the reference
category)
New immigrant in
Israel
Defined as 7 years or less since
immigration to Israel, according to a
natural braking point in the
distribution (coded as 0 = no; 1 =
yes).
Max. = Much
above average (5)
Median = A little
less than average
(2)
N = 381
Married or living
with a spouse:
70.2%
Single: 19.3%
Divorced/
separated/ single
parent: 6.0%
Widowed: 4.5%
N = 399
Born in Israel:
54.3%
Born in former
Soviet Union:
21.7%
Born in
Africa/Asia: 18.3%
Born in America/
Europe: 5.7%
N = 405
No = 100.00%
Yes = 0.00%
N = 405
Max. = Much
above average (5)
Median = About
average (3)
N = 1396
Married or living
with a spouse:
68.9%
Single: 17.9%
Divorced/
separated/ single
parent: 8.7%
Widowed: 4.5%
N = 1593
Born in Israel:
69.0%
Born in former
Soviet Union:
11.0%
Born in
Africa/Asia: 10.0%
Born in America/
Europe: 9.7%
N = 1605
No = 99.3%
Yes = 0.7%
N = 1608
* The Civil Guard is a volunteer organization which assists the Israeli Police in numerous policing duties,
and is organized and supported by the police. It has grown out of the special security situation in Israel, and
is considered the largest volunteer organization in the country. For more information see:
http://www.police.gov.il/english/Volunteers/Pages/default.aspx
29
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36
TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1: Police districts
Police district
Communities within the district
Sderot
Sderot
Comparison districts:
Afula
Achsal
Afula
Ahuzat-Barak
Daboria
Gan-Ner
Kfar-Metzer
Kfar-Tavor
Makibla
Naora
Natanya
Aviha’il
Beit-Itzhak
Even-Yehuda
Kfar-Haroe’
Kfar-Vitkin
Kfar-Yona
Rosh-Ha’ayin
Ela’ad
Jaljulia
Kfar-Bara
Kfar-Kasem
Yarkon
Tel Aviv - Jaffa
Zvulun
Avtan
Basmat-Tivo’n
Kiryat-Atta
Kiryat-Byalick
Kiryat-Motzkin
Kiryat-Tivo’n
Nin
Shabli-a-Ganem
Sulam
Taibe-Bae’mek
Tamra
Tzandela
Yoknea’m-Ilit
Yoknea’mMoshava
Michmoret
Natanya
Nordia
Pardesia
Tzoran-Kadima
Tzor-Moshe
Matan
Nirit
Rosh-Ha’ayin
Kiryat-Yam
Nesher
Nofit
Rechasim
Yagor
Population
size1
29,917
Socioeconomic
levels2
4.00
Crime
levels3
106.23
122,370
3.97
54.50
245,053
5.13
88.46
87,644
3.92
52.98
363,400
223,481
8.00
5.77
159.59
66.59
1
Data obtained from the Israeli Police; updated to 2004.
Socio-economic data for communities with the population of 2000 residents or above was obtained from
the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics. The scale was based on various factors such as financial resources;
residence characteristics; education etc. and ranged from 1 to 10 (see: CBS, 2003:
http://www.cbs.gov.il/publications/local_authorities2003/local_authorities_h.htm). The socio-economic
level of the districts was calculated utilizing information at the community level.
3
Yearly averages of criminal files opened per 1000 residents, for the years 2000-2004. Data obtained from
the Israeli Police.
2
37
Table 2: Main findings for Sderot and comparison communities
Variables
Test variables
Procedural Justice index
Performance index
Control variables
Attitudes towards the police
Risk index
Experience with the police
Negative encounter with police
Positive encounter with police
Crime victim
Respondent or close family
member serving/ served in IP
Volunteered in Civil Guard
Socio-demographic characteristics
Sex
Age
Education
Income
Single
Divorced/ separated/ single-parent
Widowed
Born in Africa/ Asia
Born in America/ Europe
Born in former Soviet Union
New immigrant to Israel
Police districts
Zvulun station
Yarkon station
Afula station
Rosh-Ha’ayin station
R2 (Adjusted R2)
N
*
Significant at the 0.05 level
**
Significant at the 0.01 level
***
Significant at the 0.001 level
Model 1- Sderot
B (β)
Model 2- Comparison
communities
B (β)
0.58 (0.49)***
0.64 (0.32)***
0.64 (0.54)***
0.32 (0.17)***
0.01 (0.01)
0.11 (0.08)***
-0.91 (-0.07)
-0.73 (-0.05)
0.26 (0.02)
-0.69 (-0.06)*
0.08 (0.01)
-0.69 (-0.05)*
-0.32 (-0.03)
0.35 (0.04)
-0.18 (-0.01)
0.16 (0.02)
0.78 (0.08)
0.05 (0.13)*
0.39 (0.09)*
-0.03 (-0.01)
-0.12 (-0.01)
-2.20 (-0.09)*
-0.71 (-0.03)
-0.56 (-0.04)
-0.46 (-0.02)
-1.48 (-0.12)**
n/a
-0.21 (-0.02)
0.01 (0.02)
0.19 (0.06)*
0.07 (0.02)
-0.65 (-0.06)*
-0.45 (-0.03)
-1.12 (-0.05)*
-0.45 (-0.03)
-0.12 (-0.01)
-0.79 (-0.06)*
-2.38 (-0.04)
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
0.56 (0.53)
308
-0.73 (-0.07)*
-0.96 (-0.09)***
-0.93 (-0.08)**
-0.65 (-0.05)
0.47 (0.46)
1103
38