Reflective Report
Florian Häubi 0844675
16.04.2020
Rob Compaijen
Introduction
Although Nietzsche is known for his harsh criticism of morality, and especially of Christian morality, one can also find in his texts some positive moral statements. In his paper, Rob
Compaijen states that the characteristic of Nietzsche’s own morality can be best compared to virtue ethics, since Nietzsche, as well as virtue ethics, stresses the importance of a “starken
Charakter”, “Vortrefflichkeit” and “Lebenskraft”. Against this background, Compaijen tries to show that Nietzsche’s notion of “Selbstwerdung” can be seen as a virtue. In the first part of his paper, Compaijen works out Nietzsche’s notion of “Selbstwerdung” by considering the third of the Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen : Schopenhauer als Erzieher .
1 Compaijen sees in
Nietzsche’s call “Become yourself!” the central claim in this text. In the second part,
“Selbstwerdung” is connected with the concept of virtue. Since Nietzsche does not give in any of his writings a definition of virtue, Compaijen proposes to take up the Aristotelian concept of virtue. The suggestion then is to show how and to which extent the characteristics of
Nietzsche’s notion of “Selbstwerdung” correspond to the Aristotelian concept of virtue.
Finally, the Aristotelian “Selbstverwirklichung” and Nietzsches’ “Selbstwerdung” are compared with regard to the realization of a goal.
My paper is divided in three parts. The first chapter will give a summary. Following the structure of Compaijen’s paper, the summary is divided in two sections. The first section will deal with “Selbstwerdung” in SE, and the second section with Compaijen’s reading of
“Selbstwerdung” as a virtue. In the second part of this paper I will summarize some points made during the discussion and in the third part I will give a conclusion.
1. Summary
1.1. Nietzsche’s notion of “Selbstwerdung” in Schopenhauer als Erzieher
Compaijen starts his paper with a detailed reading of the first paragraph of SE. In this first paragraph Nietzsche describes the condition of human beings in his time. According to this description, the human beings have become “bequem”, “träge” and “faul”. Furthermore, they are afraid of accepting their existence as an “Unicum” and live as “Heerdenthiere”. In order to
1 Henceforth: SE
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Reflective Report
Florian Häubi 0844675
16.04.2020 escape from this existence in the mass, Nietzsche’s recommendation is to listen to one’s own conscience which calls out: “[…] sei du selbst! Das bist du alles nicht, was du jetzt thust, meinst, begehrst“ 2 . Here, Nietzsche gives us a task, namely to live according to our own rules and to become the self we are not yet. In order to be able to accomplish such a task, what one really needs is an “Erzieher”. His activity is not to shape or educate one’s own self, rather, the
“Erzieher” has to be seen as a “Befreier”.
3
How do we have to understand that? Nietzsche’s analysis of his own time pointed out that it is “zeitgemäss” not to be a self. Therefore, to become a self is something “unzeitgemässes” and in this sense the educator is a “Befreier”.
He helps us to free ourselves from our time. His education method is to show which contemporary elements prevent us from becoming ourselves. Although Nietzsche mentions a few of these elements, the most important one, according to Compaijen, is striving for a happy life.
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There are three reasons for which striving for happiness prevents us from becoming ourselves.
1.
Since the task of “Selbstwerdung” is difficult and heavy, it is not consistent with pursuing a happy life.
2.
Pursuing a happy life means to achieve a state of well-being and contentment. This is in contrast to “Selbstwerdung”, since it is characterized by process and change.
3.
On one hand, Nietzsche mentions the “Philosoph”, “Künstler” and “Heiliger” and describes them as „Nicht – mehr- Thiere“ and „wahrhafte Menschen“. On the other hand, he writes that pursuing a happy life is an animal-like way of living. It keeps us in an animal state of being and prevents us from realizing a human way of living, and developing the specific human aspects. According to Nietzsche, the development of an authentic human being is the goal of nature. Therefore, “Selbstwerdung” has also to be considered from another perspective, namely the perspective of nature.
Compaijen concludes that, for Nietzsche, “Selbstwerdung” is a process in which, by overcoming its striving for happiness, the self becomes “unzeitgemäss”, i.e. “opposite and incompatible with contemporary times and its standards” 5
, and an authentic human being.
1.2. “Selbstwerdung” and virtue
Since Nietzsche does not give formal criteria for what a virtue is, Compaijen turns to the
Aristotelian concept of virtue. This concept of virtue has three decisive elements: (1) Virtue
2 KSA 1, 338.
3 KSA 1, 341. „[…] deine Erzieher vermögen nichts zu sein als deine Befreier.“
4 Compaijen, p. 5, footnote 27.
5 Compaijen, Summary paper, p.1.
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Reflective Report
Florian Häubi 0844675
16.04.2020 has to do with choices. It is a disposition which arises from choices one makes and it enables to make the right choices. (2) The right choice is determined as the middle between two extremes. (3) This middle is relative, but it is exemplary manifest in the prudent man.
Compaijen now asks: “Kunnen we, gegeven dit schema van de deugd, zelfwording bij
Nietzsche nu beschouwen als een deugd?”
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As regards to (1): „Selbstwerdung“ arises from the choice to listen to one’s conscience and it is a disposition to make the right choices, i.e. to live an authentic life. However, it is not obvious that “Selbstwerdung” can be seen as an attitude, since it has a strong dynamic character. Is “Selbstwerdung” not rather an action than an attitude? In analogy to the virtue of generosity, Compaijen shows that “Selbstwerdung” is indeed an attitude, although this attitude is, in contrast to Aristotle, never manifest as an optimum.
As regards to (2): In order to show that “Selbstwerdung” is the middle between two extremes,
Compaijen takes up Nietzsche’s notion of “Agon”. As “Agon”, the process of
“Selbstwerdung” is a struggle between a self which is absorbed by the mass and a self which is completely singular. In both of these two extremes the “Agon” is absent. Compaijen writes:
“Het zelf dat we moeten worden, vormt een midden tussen ‘massa’ en ‘singulariteit’“ 7
.
As regards to (3): For Aristotle, virtues are exemplary manifest in the prudent man.
Compaijen states that this element is also present in Nietzsche’s concept of “Selbstwerdung”.
Nietzsche’s figure of the “Erzieher” can be seen as an Example which shows how we can become ourselves.
Compaijen concludes that the peculiar characteristics of “Selbstwerdung” correspond to the formal criteria of an Aristotelian concept of virtue. However, there are two elements in
Aristotelian virtue ethics which cannot be found in Nietzsche’s concept of “Selbstwerdung”.
First, the process of “Selbstwerdung” is never complete. Therefore, Aristotle’s notion of an optimum cannot be found in the task of becoming oneself. Second, Aristotle’s virtue ethics is teleological. The goal is to achieve a state of “eudaimonia”. In contrast to this, “Glück” as the goal is completely rejected by Nietzsche. Even more, it has to be rejected since it is a mere hindrance of becoming oneself. Nevertheless, “Selbstwerdung” also aims at a specific goal, namely becoming authentically human. Finally, Compaijen works out a further correspondence between Aristotelian virtue ethics and Nietzsche’s virtue of “Selbstwerdung”.
Both of them call for a realization of “the specifically human aspect(s) of our existence” 8
.
6 Compaijen, p. 10.
7 Compaijen, p. 12.
8 Compaijen, Summary paper, p. 2.
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Reflective Report
Florian Häubi 0844675
16.04.2020
2. Discussion
2.1. The concept of “Glück“ in Schopenhauer als Erzieher
In the discussion it was mentioned that Nietzsche’s concept of “Glück” is not sufficiently worked out in Compaijen’s paper. The paper stresses Nietzsche’s criticism of “Glück” and the striving for happiness as something which has to be overcome. Although such a criticism of
“Glück” is present in SE, Nietzsche seems to distinguish between different conceptions of
“Glück”. Furthermore, one can also find a positive notion of “Glück” in SE, namely by looking closer at Nietzsche’s concept of “Heiterkeit”. Rather than a “Glücksverachter”,
Nietzsche can be seen as a “Glückskritiker”. Another critical point concerns the following argument. The paper argues that only animals strive for happiness. But since human beings are not animals, they should not strive for happiness. This syllogism is not valid. It is not because animals also strive for happiness that humans should not strive for it.
Compaijen admits that he considered the notion of “Glück” in a limited manner and that he valuated “Glück” in a mere negative way. However, in his paper he refers to a quotation which can be found in KSA 1, 373. There, Nietzsche cites Schopenhauer: “Ein glückliches
Leben ist unmöglich: das Höchste, was der Mensch erlangen kann, ist ein heroischer
Lebenslauf
“ 9
. Compaijen does not state that Nietzsche had no positive concept of „Glück“, but that Nietzsche did not consider “Glück” to be neither the goal of his “ethics of
‘selfbecoming’” 10 nor the goal of life.
2.2. “Selbstwerdung” as the middle between two extremes
Another problematic aspect of Compaijen’s paper is the determination of “Selbstwerdung” as the middle between two extremes, i.e. on one hand an existence in the mass and on the other hand a completely singular existence. In particular, three different points were made. First, the
“Agon” of the self which takes place in dealing with the two extremes of mass and singularity is strongly internalized. But how should we understand such a struggle which takes place within the self? Second, Compaijen just mentions the opposition of an existence in the mass and a completely singular existence. However, it seems that there is more than just this opposition. In Nietzsche one also finds a confrontation of singularity and plurality as a chaotic variety of elements within the self. Third, in order to be able to understand adequately the
“Agon”, the single extremes have to be worked out in more detail. What does Nietzsche, for instance, mean with singularity? It seems that also a self as plurality can be designated as a
9 KSA 1, 373.
10 Compaijen, Summary paper, p.2.
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Reflective Report
Florian Häubi 0844675
16.04.2020 singularity. In SE Nietzsche thinks of the human being as a “wunderlich buntes Mancherlei” which is put together “zum Einerlei” 11 .
2.3. What is this “Selbst” in “Selbstwerdung”?
It seems to be problematic to talk about „Selbstwerdung“ without thematizing Nietzsche’s concept of „Selbst“. In the discussion it was mentioned that in SE, Nietzsche’s concept of the
“Selbst” is influenced by Schopenhauer. That is, the self has to be understood as a given core, as something which is already there. Consequently, the process of becoming gets a new dimension. It was suggested that one can distinguish between two concepts of “Selbst” in SE.
On the one hand Nietzsche describes the “Selbst” as something which is given, not educable 12 and comparable to “Granit”. On the other hand, the “Selbst” is a “Gesetzgeber”, creating its very own way of living and formulating its own rules, to which, in turn, it is subjected.
2.4. “Selbstwerdung” in Schopenhauer als Erzieher ?
13
Compaijen writes a few times in his paper „Become yourself!”, i.e. “Werde du selbst!”, and considers “Selbstwerdung” to be the central claim in SE. This is hard to see for three reasons.
First, in the imperative in question, Nietzsche does not use the term “werden”. Instead, the sentence reads as follows: “Sei du selbst!”.
14 It seems that the focus is not on the process of
“werden”, but rather on a specific state of being. Second, Nietzsche does not deal with the concept of “Selbstwerdung”. The task of the self is described by Nietzsche in terms of “selbst sein” 15 , “sich wiederfinden” 16 , “sich finden” 17 and “zu sich kommen” 18 . Finally, Nietzsche values “das Werden” in a negative way. He designates “das Werden” as “lügnerisches
Puppenspiel”, “die eigentliche Zerstreuung” and as “das endlose Spiel der Albernheit”.
Furthermore he writes: „Im Werden ist Alles hohl, betrügerisch, flach und unserer Verachtung würdig“ 19
.
Compaijen answered that he used the concept of „Selbstwerdung“ in a colloquial sense.
According to that, “Selbstwerdung” has to be understood as the transition from our current self – i.e. the self which does not accept its existence as an “Unicum” – to our real and actual
11 KSA 1, 337.
12 KSA 1, 341.
13 This issue was not explicitly discussed in the Nietzsche-Seminar, but I consider it to be important. It gives a serious problem, although it doesn’t undermine Compaijen’s project. Compaijen’s reply was not made during the
Nietzsche-Seminar, but afterwards.
14 KSA 1, 338.
15 Ibid.
16 KSA 1, 340.
17 KSA 1, 341.
18 Ibid.
19 KSA 1, 347.
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Reflective Report
Florian Häubi 0844675
16.04.2020 self. Compaijen’s understanding of “Selbstwerdung” makes no strong claims about the content of “Werden”.
3. Conclusion
Because of the limited amount of pages, the paper cannot fully do justice to the content of SE.
Some important concepts, such as “Glück”, “Selbst”, and the triad of “Künstler”, Philosoph” and “Heiliger”, are not worked out in detail. Furthermore, the paper does not explain nor justify his methodology. For instance, Compaijen does not give any reasons for his choice to compare “Selbstwerdung” with an Aristotelian concept of virtue. Are there not other formal criteria of virtue one can consider? And why is Aristotle more suitable for a comparison with
Nietzsche than other virtue ethicists?
However, the paper gives an interesting commentary of one of the main concepts in SE and it shows how it is possible to make more sense out of Nietzsche’s texts.
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