Two Meanings of Global Citizenship: Modern and Diverse
James Tully, University of Victoria
The Meanings of Global Citizenship Conference
Liu Centre and Trudeau Foundation, UBC, September 9-10, 2005
I. Two contested ways of thinking about global citizenship
1. As Professors Byers and Zacher point out in their Introduction, there is a range of
meanings of the phrase ‘global citizenship’ and disagreement over their relative
importance and appropriate use. This is to be expected. All complex political concepts
with a history are what Wittgenstein called ‘family resemblance’ concepts. That is, they
have a range of different uses and there is not one essential feature common to each
meaning, but, rather, overlapping similarities and dissimilarities among their varied uses
(family resemblances). As a result, their use in particular cases is always open to
contestation and reasoned disagreement. These political concepts and their corresponding
institutions and practices have been fought over historically and each generation inherits
the variegated semantic field of uses handed down to them and continues the struggles
over their meanings, accepting some features while modifying others, in an endless
process of continuity and innovation. ‘Global citizenship’ is no exception and is in fact
the conjunction of two deeply contested concepts.
2. Among the various meanings of global citizenship today I would like to focus
exclusively on two contested types. Many of the most important struggles on the planet
are over these two meanings of global citizenship and the struggles themselves consist in
the exercise of these two practices of global citizenship.
3. These two forms of global citizenship have different names in different literature: low
intensity versus high intensity global citizenship, representative versus participatory, neoliberal versus democratic, restrictive versus non-restrictive, civil versus civic, global
citizenship from above versus citizenship from below, hegemonic versus counterhegemonic, liberal democratic versus agonistic, global versus glocal, modern versus
alternative modernities, hegemonic versus subaltern, and so on. The literature on ‘low
intensity’ versus ‘high intensity’ global citizenship is one of the closest formulations to
the analysis I present here of these two broad clusters of meanings and practices of
citizenship.
4. I will call them ‘modern’ and ‘diverse’. Both are ‘modern’ in the sense of being
exercised over the last 200 years, yet the former is closely identified with the singular
form of citizenship distinctive of the modern West and its global processes of
modernization and citizenization of the non-West, whereas the latter is associated with
the idea of multiple or alternative modernities and modes of citizenship. Similarly, both
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have a place for ‘diversity’, but the latter is closely identified with global struggles for a
multiplicity of forms of citizenship and a multiplicity of practices of governance in which
it is exercised, whereas the former restricts diversity to differences within the singular
form and restricted location of modern global citizenship, on the claim that it is the
universal type of global citizenship for all.
5. The reason why the concept of ‘citizen’ and ‘citizenship’ is indeterminate and has
several meanings, such as modern and diverse citizenship, is that it is defined in relation
to two equally polysemic concepts: the rule of law and constitutionalism on the one side
and democratic participation and popular sovereignty on the other. Each meaning of
citizenship interprets these two broad concepts of the rule of law and democratic
participation in slightly different ways and weights them differently in relation to
citizenship. When citizenship is defined in relation to the rule of law, then it is seen as an
‘opportunity’ concept: a status a person or group has in virtue of being recognized as the
subject of a normative order and the bearer of rights and duties. When it is defined in
relation to democracy, then it is seen as an ‘exercise’ concept: a practice or activity that
citizens engage in within or over a normative order. Different meanings define and
weight these two sides of citizenship differently and explain how they work together
differently. Modern and diverse citizenship share this rich semantic field of nomos (the
rule of law) and demos (democratic participation) but interpret it differently. Because the
two meanings of ‘citizenship’ share this rich semantic field of law and democracy, they
are not simple dichotomies or binary opposites, but overlapping, criss-crossing and
sometimes conflicting in their applications.
6. ‘Modern’ and ‘diverse’ citizenship meanings share the idea that citizens are the
subjects or bearers of rights and duties guaranteed by the rule of law, that is, by some
normative order or what I will call ‘relations of governance’. But, they disagree over the
relevant rights and duties and over the range of normative orders that count as the ‘rule of
law’. Modern citizenship restricts the rule of law to one canonical type of legal or
constitutional order whereas diverse citizenship takes a wide and pluralistic range of
normative orders to be instances of the rule of law.
They also both agree that what differentiates ‘civic’ citizens from ‘civil’ subjects is that
they participate in having a say over the relations of governance to which they are
subjected and by which their conduct and interaction is coordinated and governed. This is
the ‘democratic’ element in citizenship: we the people who are governed by a system of
rules or relationships of governance have a say over them. If the rules to which we are
subject in practices of governance are imposed on us by an internal tyrant, a foreign
imperial power, or a structure of institutions and processes that subjectifies us ‘behind our
backs’, then, by definition, we are passive subjects rather than active citizens. We are
thus ‘unfree’ in the democratic citizen sense and our powers of citizenship – of self-rule,
popular sovereignty, and self-determination – are said to be usurped, dispossessed,
restricted or colonized. Furthermore, if an imposed system is exempt from democratic
transformation by those unfreely subjected to it, and permits only forms of citizenship
within its unalterable basic structure, then it is said to be ‘closed’ rather than ‘open’ (a
constitutional democracy but not a democratic constitution, for example).
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7. When ‘the governed’ act as citizens and demand a say in the practices of governance to
which they are subject, they bring this practice under ‘shared authority’: that is, under the
shared authority of citizens and governors in negotiation. They thereby democratize the
practice of governance. In virtue of participating in such activities, people who were
passive subjects subjectified by governing relationships become active citizens,
transforming the way they are governed and their form of self-consciousness and
conduct, and governing their governors in a reciprocal way. They become ‘free’ in the
civic or citizenship sense. They become good citizens and, reciprocally, the rulers who
are constrained to listen and negotiate, become good governors.
8. Having a say and being a citizen does not entail making the rules or governing directly,
not does it require that the governed and governors are equal, although this is one end of
the spectrum. In the Rousseauian tradition, for example, citizens are free only if they are
the actual authors of the laws from some point outside of the law (the state of nature or
constitutive assembly). Rather, it refers to the multiplicity of ways subjects can have a
say over relationships of power between governors and governed in which they find
themselves. In open systems they do this by challenging the ways they are governed,
entering into negotiations with the powers that be in the various legal, political, cultural,
social, civil institutions, movements and processes available for this, or in ad-hoc
negotiations. They can participate individually or collectively, either directly or through
trusted representatives, in local, national or global institutions, trying to reach agreements
over how to modify or transform the relationships and rules in question, implementing
the reforms, reviewing them, and starting over again.
9. Although both modern and diverse conceptions of global citizenship share this
criterion of having a say over the rules to which the governed are subject, they define it
and its cognate vocabulary in two contrasting and conflicting ways. For diverse global
citizenship, the citizen’s right and responsibility of having a say over the relationships
through which we are governed, and thus submitting it to shared democratic authority,
applies in principle to any practice of governance in any area of life, just in virtue of
being governed, and in diverse ways. For modern global citizenship, it applies to a
restricted subset of practices of governance and in a limited range of ways. From the
perspective of diverse citizenship, therefore, modern global citizenship is one singular
and historically contingent form of citizenship masquerading as universal; whereas, from
the perspective of modern citizenship, diverse citizenship is uncivilized, anti-modern and
illegitimate. The central differences are, therefore, which practices of governance are
open to citizenship and what modes of citizen practice are legitimate.
10. Diverse citizenship is prior to and complementary to modern citizenship in two
senses. Within European states, the rights of participation associated with modern
citizenship were fought and won by subjects who did not originally have these rights or
the right to organize and fight for them. They exercised their diverse citizenship in
centuries of struggles as individuals, workers, women, immigrants, Indigenous peoples,
gays, lesbians, oppressed minorities, environmentalists and so on to gain the democratic
rights that are sometimes institutionalized in modern citizenship. Second, the kind of
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diverse citizen action of calling a relation of power into question and subjecting it to the
shared authority of those subject to it, beyond the boundaries of the most recent formal
institutionalization of modern citizenship, or conversely, the anti-democratic activity of
downsizing the sphere of democratic citizenship, is a permanent feature of the
development of modern citizenship. There is no fixed and universal meaning to modern
citizenship because the exercise of diverse citizenship by the governed constantly
challenges which relations of governance can be brought under shared authority and in
what ways.
Since modern citizenship is paramount today, I will begin with it and its historical
development to a global form of citizenship.
II. The Globalization of Modern Citizenship
1. The defining feature of modern global citizenship is that it takes its singular and
restricted institutionalized form of citizenship as the uniquely civilized, modern and
universal form. It is globalized by means of Western formal and informal imperialism,
and all other forms of citizenship are defined in contrast as uncivilized, less-developed,
pre- or anti-modern, dysfunctional, insurgent, or lawless, and thus illegitimate and illegal.
2. Modern global citizenship can be roughly defined in terms of three features. First, an
individual is a citizen in virtue of a set of rights and duties, of formal equality and
substantive inequality, relative to a formal legal system of ‘civil’ laws that is effectively
enforced by a coercive authority. The precondition of being a citizen in this ‘civil’ sense
is the imposition and effective enforcement of the rule of law from which the status of
citizenship (rights and duties) derive. The imposition of law ‘civilizes’ and thus creates
‘citizens’ and ‘civilization’ in this well-known Roman and Kantian sense. There are two
predominant traditions of interpretation of the requisite set of rights and duties of modern
citizenship at both the nation-state and global level: the liberal-democratic and neo-liberal
wing and the social democracy and cosmopolitan democracy wing.
3. Second, regarding the democratic element of citizenship, citizens have a say in the
making of laws by which they are governed in three ways: the practices and institutions
of elected representative government, the judicial system of courts, and civil society
(freedom of assembly, voluntary associations, social movements, NGOS, free press),
which mediates between the constitutional state and the private capitalist economy. Since
World War II more people have struggled for and won inclusion and a plurality of ways
of participating in these canonical institutions (multiculturalism and multinationalism).
The distinction between private and public constrains the exercise of citizenship in these
three spheres to an island of democracy in a sea of non-democratic practices of
governance in the economic, military and other private spheres. Politics tends to be
defined by contests over the definition of the public and private by the two predominant
traditions of interpretation of these institutions: liberal democratic and social democratic.
4. Third, individual citizens, voluntary organizations, international civil society networks,
and capitalist corporations (as persons) have the cosmopolitan right (ius commercium) to
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travel to and enter into any foreign country in the world, to enter into commercial
relations with the local people or their governments, and to have their ensuing private
property and private contracts coercively enforced under international private law and lex
mercatoria, and by the local government, an imperial power, or an international league of
modern or civilized nations of some kind. Every county has the correlative duty of
hospitality to be open to free trade in this sense, even where there have been centuries of
abuse of the right by imperial powers, and to protect the property and contracts of
foreigners against local democratic control and expropriation. If the local government
fails to uphold its duty of open door free trade, then the ‘wronged’ imperial power (in the
19th century), or the UN, a single state or a coalition of states (in the 20th century), can
intervene militarily to uphold the global cosmopolitan right of free travel and free
commerce and ‘structurally adjust’ the local constitution along modern citizenship lines,
just as states protect the market freedoms of its modern citizens and modern foreign
citizens in their own states.
5. The European imperial powers and the US globalized this form of modern citizenship.
During the 19th century, European imperialism entered a second phase and colonized
85% of the globe. International law was reconfigured around the ‘standard of
civilization’. The European imperial states (and the US after 1895) that had the three
features of modern citizenship (above) defined themselves as ‘civilized’. They defined
the non-European colonies and protectorates in contrast as ‘uncivilized’. The civilized
imperial states were said to have the duty to ‘civilize’ the peoples under their imperial
control. This consisted in the duty of first forcefully ‘opening’ non-European societies to
the ‘civilizing’ effects of free trade dominated by Europe: that is, to gain control of the
resources, labour and markets of the non-European world and to integrate them into
competing imperial economies under their respective ownership. Second, it consisted in
imposing a formal system of colonial laws on the colonies, dominions and protectorates,
‘paramount’ over local, customary law, as a kind of proto-modern citizenship. This
imposed structure of law tended to dispossess the imperialized peoples of their own
systems of law, forms of citizenship, and usurped their democratic control over their own
resources and labour, rendering them subject to an alien system of economic and legal
relationships, while at the same time protecting foreign corporations. Third, a plethora of
voluntary and religious organizations exercised their cosmopolitan rights of global civil
society to enter the colonies and help in the universal project of civilizing the natives, that
is, of preparing them for eventual modern citizenship.
6. While this is a clear case of domination and imposed despotism from the perspective of
diverse citizenship, it is seen as the ‘burden’ of civilizing and modernizing backward or
less-developed peoples, through various ‘stages’ of economic and legal development and
mandate systems, from the universal perspective of modern citizenship. The three
processes (above) worked imperfectly, faced multiple resistances, and produced
unintended effects, contrary to the unilateral theories of civilizational development.
In summary, modern citizenship was globalized in two main ways before and during the
19thc: the replication imperialism of imposing formal colonies around the world; and the
imposition and coercive protection of the cosmopolitan right of open commerce under
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international law for corporations and voluntary civil society organizations (cosmopolitan
imperialism).
7. In the twentieth century, the formal colonies were dismantled. Local political power
was transferred to, or taken back by, westernized capitalist or socialist elites during
decolonization. While the decolonized (but not de-imperialized) peoples dreamed of
diverse forms of citizenship, self-reliance, local democracy, alternative modernities or a
dialogical among diverse civilizations, the westernized elites, trapped in economic,
military, technological and debt dependencies of the persisting imperial relationships,
were constrained to continue what colonialism began: the destruction, overriding or
subordination of local communities, economies and legalities, and the rapid development
of nationalizing subaltern regimes of uniform modern citizenship and civilization
dominated by the economies of the former imperial powers, or face the overwhelming
force of military and financial power.
8. During the same period of decolonization and the Cold War, Western imperialism was
transformed from formal colonial rule to informal, infrastructural governance over
nominally free subaltern states. Informal interactive imperialism is a unique form of
imperialism that is exercised over a world already rendered dependent, unequal and
subject to the hegemony of the former colonial powers by centuries of replication and
cosmopolitan imperialism. It consists in the exercise of various unequal relations of
power (economic, cultural, educational, debt, financial, loans, bribes, aid) over the
nominally free subaltern peoples to constrain them to continue to develop along the lines
of dependent modern global citizenship, all backed up by the threat of military
intervention to protect the commercial and other rights of modern citizenship. Postcolonial subaltern peoples, with all their internal divisions, have a limited yet
indeterminate range of possible actions within this unequal field, from assimilation at one
end through the multiplicity of ways of trying to modify the rules of the field from
within, to outright confrontation at the other. The result is a much more complex and
dynamic system of unequal interaction than during the period of formal colonial rule.
9. After World War II a set of global institutions were established, mainly by the United
States, to govern this global imperial system of modern citizenship, primarily through the
World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization, and,
whenever possible, through the United Nations and voluntary coalitions of the former
imperial powers (the G8). In the same period, the leadership of the system passed from
the competing European imperial powers to the United States, which had a century of
experience with informal imperialism in Latin America, under the Monroe Doctrine and
its corollaries. Woodrow Wilson gave expression to this new phase of western
imperialism and the new form of ‘corporation’ capitalism. It consists in recognizing the
right of self-determination of all peoples, and thus is anti-colonial, and the right of the
United States to intervene in former colonies to ensure they determine themselves in
accordance with openness to free trade under US world hegemony. While proclaiming
self-determination President Wilson invaded China, Haiti, Mexico and the Dominican
Republic to open them to free trade and protect American corporations from local
democracy, and saw no contradiction in so doing.
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10. During the period of decolonization the imperial powers ‘internationalized’ their
former imperial duty to civilize the non-European world and the former colonies
criticized the language of a ‘standard of civilization’ used by the League of Nations. The
rights and institutions of modern global citizenship and the duty to make the world over
in its civilizational image were recast in the post-colonial terms of international rights,
development, modernization, and democratization.
11. Similarly, international law is now said to promote a ‘norm of democracy’, meaning
to recognize only ‘liberal democratic’ countries that have elections, civil society, protect
private property, and are open to capitalist development. Like the 19th century distinction
between civilized and uncivilized states, the states that fail to meet these criteria are not
‘liberal’ or ‘democratic’, but less-developed and thus in need of economic development
and democratization imposed by the Western powers. The interpretation of the norm of
democracy is contested at the global level by the two hegemonic Western traditions of
modernization: the neo-liberal and cosmopolitan democracy wings.
12. Since World War II the means available to govern the conduct of whole countries and
regions informally have increased exponentially. The WB and WTO, local elites, aid
agencies, civil society organizations, non-governmental organizations, the global
marketing of education, and multinational corporations work together in the least
developed countries to break down their ‘pre-modern’ ways and local self-reliance,
integrate them further into the global economy, and build institutions of ‘low intensity
democracy’. Under modernizing imperialism, the colluding civil society organizations
play the role of the old religious societies and residential schools in the period of
civilizational imperialism.
13. The transition to what Manuel Castells called ‘network’ forms of economic, political,
media and military organization in the 1980s increased the range and depth of global
informal control of local ‘self-governing’ nodes and global civil society immensely. The
unilateral proliferation of global juridical regimes such as GATT, the expansion of
TRIPPS and lex Mercatoria, and the neo-liberal revolution have privatized whole areas
of life that were formerly open to modern or diverse forms of democratic citizenship,
placing millions of people under the governance of multinational networked corporations
in which they have no say. And the supranational (or imperial) legal regimes override and
erode modern citizenship at the national level.
14. The turn to global securitization after 9/11/2001 has provided the pretext to restrict
modern global citizenship even further than the neo-liberal revolution had achieved in the
previous decade. The neo-liberal revolution reduced modern citizenship to the first
feature, a narrow reading of the second, and a strengthening of the third; that is, the
coercive enforcement of ‘open door’ imperialism and market freedoms, often to the
repression of the democratic feature, on the grounds that democratic freedoms will
somehow naturally follow market freedoms. This is justified by the revival of Isaiah
Berlin’s infamous Cold War argument that liberal institutions do not require democratic
freedoms. Securitization deepens this trend, outlaws diverse citizenship altogether, and
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intensifies the executive enforcement and incarceration mechanisms of modern
citizenship.
15. Underlying the globalization and enforcement of modern citizenship in its national
and cosmopolitan forms by means of informal imperialism are two military features. The
first is the dependency of subaltern states on the US run global arms market to sustain a
military force capable of protecting the property rights of local and foreign elites against
their own democratic citizens. The second is the capacity of the US military to intervene
immediately anywhere on the planet if any people challenge the imposed regime of
modern citizenship. Governance by intervention (threatened or actual) is based on the
‘full spectrum dominance’ of the United States over the globe by means of 725 military
bases around the world (and over 900 within the US) and the constant patrolling of the
globe by operatives, marines, navy, air force, satellites and the weaponization of space.
The US military has divided the globe into four ‘zones’ governed by four US
Commanders in Chief (CINC) who make up the Joint Chiefs of Staff, like the former
governors general of colonial empires, and equally paramount over the customary laws of
individual states in their respective regions. These imperial military relationships enforce
the modernization model and structure the field of any possible democratic action of
subaltern peoples. As the neo-liberal imperialists put it, ‘the hidden hand of the market
will never work without the hidden fist’ – ‘McDonald’s cannot flourish without
McDonnell Douglas, the designer of the US Air Force F-15’.
16. Once these institutions and technologies of informal imperialism were firmly in place
by the end of the Cold War, the imperial networks could be run somewhat analogously a
large networked multinational corporation, more efficiently than they were run by the old
cumbersome and expensive formal, competing colonial imperial systems of the
nineteenth century (actually more like the old Charter Companies’ imperialism of British
indirect rule). The disanalogy, of course, that the subaltern states, while all unequal,
dependent and formerly colonized (as we have seen), are internally complex and
conflicted, differently situated relative to each other, and are able to exercise a range of
powers available to them within and against the hegemonic relations of global
governance.
17. This whole project of globalizing modern citizenship and governing it by means of
informal imperialism led by the US is laid out not only in the globalization literature of
Fukuyama, Friedman, Ferguson, and Zakari, but also with great clarity in The National
Security Doctrine of the United States of America (2002). Here the imposition of a
regime of restricted modern citizenship by means of military intervention and continuous
military intervention until replication elites are sufficiently socialized is said to open a
country to market freedoms and global civil society; to bring ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’
to oppressed peoples. This is said to be precisely the universal form of free citizenship all
peoples of the world want and which the United States, in virtue of its economic and
military superpower, is uniquely situated to deliver and exercise dominance. The spread
of the types of freedom and low intensity democracy of modern global citizenship is the
prevailing justification of western imperialism today, as we see for example in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
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18. Consequently, in addition to the globalization of modern citizenship by the imperial
development of replication modern states and by means of the global protection of the
cosmopolitan and commercial rights of modern citizens by international law and military
intervention, there is also another kind of citizenship that develops around the global
governors who enforce these two processes of citizenization. This is the less formal
relationship between the governors of the global system and the various elites, subalterns,
collaborators, influence peddlers, arms dealers, opinion moulders and courtiers. It would
be easy to quote the democratic critics of modernization imperialism, but this corruption
of democratic citizenship has caught the attention of the mainstream scholars and
officials as well. Here is how Susan Strange, an international political scientist, describes
the scene:
What is emerging is, therefore, a non-territorial empire with its imperial capital in
Washington DC. If the imperial capitals used to attract courtesans of foreign
provinces, Washington instead attracts ‘lobbies’ and agents of international
companies, representatives of minority groups dispersed throughout the empire and
pressure groups organized at a global scale … As in Rome, citizenship is not
limited to a superior race and the empire contains a mix of citizens with the same
legal and political rights, semi-citizens, and non-citizens, such as the slave
population in Rome … The semi-citizens of the empire are many and are spread
out. … They include many people employed by big transnational firms that operate
in the transnational structure of production that assists, as they all well know, the
global market. This includes the people employed in transnational banking and,
very often, the members of the ‘national’ armed forces, especially those that are
trained, armed by, and dependent on the United States armed forces. It also includes
many scholars in medicine, the natural sciences and the social sciences, as in
business management and economy, who view the American professional
associations and universities as those peers before whose eyes they want to shine
and excel. It also includes the people in the press and the mass media, for whom the
American technology and the examples offered by the United States have shown
the way, changing the established institutions and organizations.
19. How do the promoters and protectors of modern citizenship treat their citizens today?
Here is how Samuel Huntingdon, a conservative realist, describes the form of rule
practiced by the United States government (not unknown to Canadian citizens concerned
about softwood lumber):
To press other countries to adopt American values and practices on issues such as
human rights and democracy; to prevent that third countries acquire military
capacities susceptible of interfering with American military superiority; to have the
American legislation applied to other countries; to qualify third countries with
regard to their adhesion to American standards on human rights, drugs, terrorism,
nuclear and missile proliferation and, now, religious freedom; to apply sanctions
against the countries that do not conform to the American standards on these issues;
to promote the corporate American interests under the slogans of free trade and
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open markets and to shape the politics of the IMF and the World Bank to serve
those same interests … to force other countries to adopt social and economic
policies that benefit the American economic interests, to promote the sale of
American weapons and prevent that other countries do the same … to categorize
certain countries as ‘pariah states’ or criminal states and exclude them from the
global institutions because they refuse to prostrate themselves before the American
wishes.
20. How well do the global leaders of the World Bank and WTO consult the democratic
wishes of those they seek to democratize? As Iris Marion Young, a political theorist,
comments on Globalization and its Discontents by Joseph Stiglitz, former head of the
World Bank:
Joseph Stiglitz argues that the global economic system is now run by a ‘dictatorship
of international finance’. The global finance elites from the US and a few other G8
countries, from the IMF, World Bank and WTO, aligned with private financial and
investment interests, effectively set the major terms of international and capital
movement. Stiglitz acknowledges that these government, international organization,
and business officials believe that they have the general interest of the world’s
people in view. The problems is that their background training, social positions, and
those to whom they are most directly accountable induce them to define this general
interest in particular ways that are biased against the interests of most of the world’s
poor.
21. And, how well does this system promote democratic citizenship and shared authority
in the subaltern states? W.I. Robinson, a Third World area specialist, writes that ‘the
promotion of ‘low intensity democracy’ is aimed not only at mitigating the social and
political tensions produced by elite-based and undemocratic status-quos, but also at
suppressing popular and mass aspirations for more thoroughgoing democratization of
social life in the 21st century international order’.
III. Diverse global citizenship
1. The continuing imperial globalization of modern citizenship in its lowest intensity
form is clearly the paramount pattern of global politics today. Nevertheless, it does not
proceed unopposed as a necessary, inevitable and universal process of development, as its
proponents loudly claim. It is opposed by a multiplicity of global citizenship struggles to
(1) reverse, reform and ‘democratize’ from within the dwindling democratic freedoms of
modern global citizenship (the social democratic agenda and proportional representation
for example); and (2) expand and diversify the practices of democratic citizenship, in
order to bring the anti-democratic relationships of governance of informal imperialism
under the shared authority of the people and peoples who are subjected to them without
their consent. As a result of these struggles, the ‘processes’ of globalization are much
more complex, interactive and indeterminate than the grand theories presume.
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2. From the perspective of diverse global citizenship, the unilateral imposition of modern
global citizenship (or any institutionalized form of citizenship), without the say,
negotiation and shared authority of the individuals and peoples who are subject to it, is
the violation of their democratic freedom - the usurpation and subalternization of their
political, economic, legal and cultural citizenship. Yet, as we have seen, this is precisely
the basic injustice of globalization. Modern citizenship is too restrictive in Western
societies and both imposed and too restricted in its colonizing forms. While it is designed
to get at certain forms of oppression – of the state over the liberal and market freedoms of
the moderns – it is too partial to get at the dominant forms of oppression and exploitation
today. Indeed, as we have seen, it hides these other forms of oppression under the mantra
of uniform modernization, globalization and democratization.
3. The relations of power and knowledge that govern our conduct and interaction as
individuals, groups, classes, peoples and supranational communities in oppressive and
exploitive ways are complex: multiplex, overlapping, criss-crossing and constantly
changing. They are not all conveniently located in the state or the economy, and they are
not controlled by a single class standing above the field of power, as the classic liberal
and Marxists models held. To understand these diverse practices of governance, criticize
them, and bring them under the shared democratic authority of those subject to them in
culturally sensitive ways that do not engender new forms of oppression is an endless
series of contextual tasks of citizenship tailored to the specific forms of unfree practices
of governance by the people who are governed by them. This is the field of diverse
citizenship.
4. The major problem of global citizenship today is the continuation and intensification of
Western imperial rule in a new informal mode outlined in section II: the proliferation of
informal imperial networks of economic, legal, cultural, media, security, and military
relations of power and subjectification that not only bypass the diverse citizenship of the
millions of people who are subject to them, but also manipulate, downsize or disregard
the representative and legal instititutions of modern global citizenship that were
historically designed to bring them under shared representative authority. This is a double
crisis of modern and diverse citizenship.
5. As we have seen, the worst dimension of these processes of de-citizenization is the
situation of the former colonized peoples within the informal relations of imperial
domination and exploitation that govern the field of their possible political and economic
actions. The weak, replication institutions of western modern global citizenship imposed
on them during 500 years of imperialism and the dependent elites who profit from them
remove their political and economic affairs from the popular sovereignty of the people.
These structures in turn are subordinated to a system of international laws and economic
relations over which they have no say but which determine their economic development
to the benefit of the imperial powers and to the detriment and indebtedness of the local
people, usually in the form of resource extraction, single-crop agriculture for export, and
sweat shops. These global relationships in turn are governed by states, global institutions
and multinational corporations over which they have no say.
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6. If they resist and try to bring these relationships under some kind of shared authority
by practices of citizenship, courageous elected leaders are removed or assassinated,
popular movements are repressed by their own elites, or military intervention and
occupation defeats the movements, restructures the constitution, rebuilds the police force,
works with civil society organizations to create a modernizing, export-oriented civil
society, and builds a new global military base nearby. If citizens turn to selfdetermination, the classic tool of collective citizenship, they find that this has already
been integrated into the repertoire of informal imperial rule since the time of formal
decolonization. All this is justified in terms of bringing modern freedoms and
democratization to a rogue or dysfunctional state. As Partha Chatterjee comments,
‘Europe and the Americas, the only true subjects of history, have thought out on our
behalf not only the script of colonial enlightenment and exploitation, but also that of our
anti-colonial resistance and post-colonial misery’.
7. Oxfam concludes that western modernization imperialism is a form of continuous low
intensity warfare against democratic self-reliance. The majority of the world’s population
in the (informally) imperialized states is now more impoverished than under earlier
formal colonial rule, after three successive waves of modernization and democratization
policies since Decolonization. 840 million people are malnourished. 6,000,000 children
under the age of 5 die each year as a consequence of malnutrition. 1.2 billion people live
on less than $1 a day and half the world’s population lives on less than $2 a day. 91 out
of every 1,000 children in the developing world die before 5 years old. 12 million die
annually from lack of water. 1.1 billion people have no access to clean water. 2.4 billion
people live without proper sanitation. 40 million live with AIDS. 113 million children
have no basic education. 1 in 5 does not survive past 40 years of age. There are one
billion non-literate adults, two-thirds are women and 98% live in the developing world.
In the least developed countries, 45% of the children do not attend school. In countries
with literacy rate of less than 55% the per capita income is about $600.
8. In contrast, the wealth of the richest 1% of the world is equal to that of the poorest
57%. The assets of the 200 richest people are worth more than the total income of 41% of
the world’s people. Three families alone have a combined wealth of $135 billion. This
equals the annual income of 600 million people living in the world’s poorest countries.
The richest 20% of the world’s population receive 150 times the wealth of the poorest
20%. In 1960, the share of the global income of the bottom 20% was 2.3%. By 1991, this
had fallen to 1.4%. The richest fifth of the world’s people consume 45% of the world’s
meat and fish; the poorest fifth consume 5%. The richest fifth consume 58% of total
energy, the poorest fifth less than 4%. The richest fifth have 75% of all telephones, the
poorest fifth 1.5%. The richest fifth own 87% of the world’s vehicles, the poorest fifth
less than 1%.
9. Despite the horrendous inequalities of life-situations, the massive powers of inclusion
and assimilation, and the brutal techniques of repression when these fail, subjects
continue to try to act as citizens in a diversity of ways. Let me mention four important
ways.
12
The first is that the imperial globalization of restricted modern citizenship by colonial and
post-colonial means has not been as deep and effective as its defenders and critics have
presupposed. Beneath the veneer of globalization lies another world of legal, political,
cultural, citizen and even economic pluralism that has survived, to varying degrees,
within the interstices of the processes of modernization we have discussed. The entire
imperial world picture of modern state-centred and global citizenship and its technologies
of implementation are not universal and comprehensive in either theory or practice. There
are ‘alternative modernities’, alternative ‘civilizations’, and ‘alternative
cosmopolitanisms’, that are both the imaginaries and the lived experience of millions of
people in the colonized world (as well as in the alternative cultures in the imperial states).
The reason for this remarkable survival of alternative modernities, unknown to the
dominate debate, is that western imperialism has always depended upon the collaboration
of imperialized peoples and, as a result, those who have not been westernized have been
able to keep their forms of legal and political associations and diverse modes of
citizenship alive to some extent, under both colonial and informal imperialism.
The most astonishing example of the survival of diverse citizenship is the survival and
renaissance of 250 million Indigenous peoples who have survived 500 years of genocide,
dispossession, marginalization, assimilation, colonial rule, and the imposition of western
forms of government and economic organization. Consequently, the lived experience of
the present age is very different and more multiplex than the ‘flat world’ and ‘smooth
world’ that is seen through the neo-liberal and neo-Marxist world-pictures of
globalizaton.
10. Second, even where people have been constrained to work within the imposed
institutions of modern citizenship, they have been able think and act differently within
and sometimes against the institutionalized form. The reason for this is that in any system
of rule and subjection, there is always a certain room to maneuver in following the rules
of the game; from the silent non-cooperation in total institutions of modernization like the
army and the residential school, to the hidden scripts and arts of resistance, to some of the
recent struggles of multiculturalism and multinationalism, to the more challenging
exercises of diverse citizenship to radically transform these imposed institutions from the
inside. The latter are exemplified by the non-violent forms of resistance, political and
economic democracy, and self-reliant fair trade versus free trade practiced by Gandhi and
Vandana Shiva.
11. Third, after decolonization and the turn to informal imperialism, millions of the
world’s poor have been forced to migrate from the colonized world to the imperial
centers to find work, and these diasporas are closely controlled and monitored by the
powers-that-be. Despite the immense hardships and forms of discrimination and nonrecognition, they have refused to be servile subjects and have exercised their citizenship
in new and untoward ways, modifying and culturalizing the straightjacket of modern
citizenship in the capital cities and reversing the relations of communication, culture and
community between imperial centre and colonies. This ‘boomerang effect’ or ‘journey
back’ has created deeply diverse cultural communities in the capital cities and new
diasporic supranational communities of immigrants with their home countries. These
13
counter-imperial and counter-national forms of diverse citizenship are bound together by
new kinds of citizen solidarity across similarities and differences that Paul Gilroy calls
‘conviviality’.
12. Fourth, because many of the hegemonic forms of power that undermine citizenship
today take the form of informal networks, a new type of diverse citizenship has
developed in opposition. These ‘counter-hegemonic’ networks of the globalization of
citizenship from below link together local nodes, organized in diverse citizenship ways,
into global networks that have the capacity to act together to bring undemocratic relations
of governance under the shared authority of the governed in various spheres. They think
and act both globally and locally in what is called glocal diverse citizenship. Sometimes
they act to confront undemocratic networks of power directly and force them to negotiate.
Other times they act to bring undemocratic concentrations of power into the
representative institutions and courts of national and global modern citizenship, helping
to reform and strengthen these traditional institutions. The actors involved are often
organized into NGO or CSO (civil society organization) forms of citizenship that directly
counter the CONGOs (coopted NGOs) that work on the hegemonic side of a particular
struggle. Here, the very relations of power that are employed to constrain them to adapt
to a restrictive form of neo-liberal global citizenship turn out to be able to be used to
challenge and modify these relations.
13. These networks of diverse citizens - who see themselves engaging in ‘counterhegemonic’ globalization or globalization from below - take a multiplicity of forms and
bring together a multiplicity of individual and collective actors from any node in the
informal networks that govern our conduct and interaction, from the poorest peasants to
international lawyers, retired business people and democratically-minded technical
experts. There is not a privileged actor, a privileged set of institutions, or a privileged set
of procedures in bringing oppressive networks of power under shared authority, as there
were in earlier forms of citizen resistance to formal colonization. These older forms of
collective citizenship – such as revolutions of decolonization, nation-state building and
the support of international voluntary organizations - have been found to be as
inappropriate to the current situation as the single model of modern citizenship. These
forms of citizenship are specific to the forms of power they address. Again, the reason
this kind of diverse citizenship is possible and appropriate in our times is that there is
always a limited room to maneuver within the informal relations of power; to modify
them from within and even transform them. The diversity of forms can be seen in this
short list of examples: Fair trade (in the interstices of free trade), the Landless Workers
Movement, Food Sovereignty, Porto Allegro participatory democracy, the movements to
democratize the UN, the Land Mines Convention, the International Forum on
Globalization, the environmental movement, and countless others. Even in the highly
structured world of international law, networks of officially unrecognized and uninvited
citizen networks (non-state actors) can make a difference by working to change the
international normative orders from within.
14. The World Social Forum has emerged as the forum for these four types of counterhegemonic diverse citizenship today. It stands in opposition to the World Economic
14
Forum, the forum of hegemonic, neo-liberal citizenship. Representatives from thousands
of alternative modernities, local struggles and glocal networks come to discuss their
different forms of citizenship and learn from each other. This commitment to diverse
citizenship is the ‘first thesis’ of the WSF:
Even as there is biodiversity and it must be defended, there is also ‘demodiversity’,
and it must be defended as well. There is not, therefore, one form of democracy
alone, i.e. liberal representative democracy. There are several other forms, such as
direct, participatory, deliberative, intercultural democracy. But outside the Western
world and culture there are still other forms of democracy which must be valorized.
Take, for example, the autonomous government of the Indigenous communities…as
well as the traditional authorities in Africa or the panchayats in India. The point is
not to accept uncritically any of these forms of democracy, but rather to make
possible their inclusion in the debates about the deepening and radicalization of
democracy.
15. The WSF works in two ways. First, instead of trying to force these diverse forms of
citizenship into a single allegedly universal mould, the role of the forum is to enable
‘translation’ among the diverse actors and their diverse ways of enacting citizenship,
without hierarchy or reduction, so they are always aware of the partiality of their own
perspective and do not try to impose it on others or falsely universalize it, as in the
modern citizenship model. ‘The point is to create, in every movement or NGO, in every
practice or strategy, in every discourse or knowledge, a contact zone that may render it
porous and hence permeable to other NGOs, practices, strategies, discourses, and
knowledges.’ Second, instead of constructing theories of citizenship in ivory towers, the
WSF aims to link academic research more closely to citizen practice on the ground in
networks of reciprocal elucidation between citizen groups and academics. Of course, a
great deal of academic research is moving in this direction and the Trudeau Foundation
supports fellows and scholars engaged in it. The Forum aims to go further and to create a
popular university of social movements (PUSM). The objective is to make knowledge of
alternative globalization (diverse citizenship) as global as globalization itself.
16. The most dangerous immediate threat to global citizenship today, both modern and
diverse, is securitization and militarization of more and more areas of life. This trend
severely restricts modern citizenship and represses diverse citizenship, thereby closing
the door on glocal movements for self-reliant, democratic economic development against
world poverty, and engendering the more extreme anti-democratic and almost mirrorimage ‘terrorist’ networks in response, whereas what is needed is more openness to selfreliant democratic citizenship. But even in these extreme conditions, the average suicide
bombers apparently do not believe in an anti-democratic theology or wish to colonize the
West. They simply want the imperial powers to leave their homeland and their resources,
and these are the only instruments of citizen action left to them. Yet these desperate
actions provide the pretext for more rounds of securitization and further assaults on
democratic citizenship.
15
17. If this brief analysis has some plausibility, then the guarantee of global citizenship is
neither securitization nor the imposition of one form of citizenship, but, as we know from
our own history, the patient and obstinate diverse practices of citizens themselves.
16
Endnotes
The numbers refer to the sections in the text.
I. Two contested ways of thinking about global citizenship
1. See James Tully, ‘Political Philosophy as a Critical Activity’, Stephen White and
Donald Moon, eds., What is Political Theory (2004), 80-102.
3. The concept of low intensity citizenship and democracy was originally developed by
Gills, B., Rocamora, J., Wilson, R., eds. Low Intensity Democracy: Political Power in the
New World Order (1993) and Robinson, W.I., Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US
Intervention, and Hegemony (1996) in their studies of the ‘democratization’ of
Guatemala, Argentina, the Philippines, Chile, Nicaragua and Haiti. It is now widely used
to contrast with ‘high intensity’, or broader and more participatory forms of citizenship.
4. I have discussed these two types of citizenship in more detail in ‘Democracy and
Globalization’, in Ronald Beiner and Wayne Norman, eds., Canadian Political
Philosophy, (2001), 36-62, and ‘The Unfreedom of the Moderns in relation to their ideals
of Constitutionalism and Democracy’, Modern Law Review, 65, 2 (2003), 205-228.
II. The Globalization of Modern Citizenship
4. See Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society (2002) and Martti Koskenniemi,
The Gentle Civiler of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (2001)
for the historical development of this modern national and global system.
5. Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of Civilization in International Society (1984) and
above, note 4. For a comparative analysis of how the European empires and the United
States dispossessed the non-European world of its land by means of different legal
systems, see John C. Weaver, The Great Land Rush and the Making of the Modern
World 1650-1900 (2003). For a review of recent work on the third dimension of the
civilizing project, see Ann Laura Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race
and the Intimate in Colonial Rule (2002). Gong, Keene, and Koskenniemmi all argue that
there have always been two systems of international law: one for the civilized sovereign
states where the norm of non-intervention applies; and another for the relations between
the civilized and uncivilized states, where intervention to protect the third feature of
modern citizenship has always applied. After World War II and the founding of the
United Nations and the global Bretton Woods’ institutions, the terms ‘developed’ and
‘developing’, ‘democratic’ and ‘democratizing’ were substituted for ‘civilized’ and
‘uncivilized’, but the dual system continued. Indeed, the language of ‘civilized’ and
‘uncivilized’ returned to the dominant discourse in the 1990s. For a recent reformulation
of this doctrine, see The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty,
The Responsibility to Protect (2001).
17
6. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer, 98-179. For the role of the mandate systems, see
William Bain, Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the Obligations of Power
(2003).
7. Prasenjit Duara, ed. Decolonization: Perspectives from then and now (2004). For the
military dependency, see Alexander Wendt and Michael Barnett, ‘Dependent State
formation and Third World Militarization’, Review of International Studies, 19 (1993),
321-347. For the debt dependency, see Noreena Hertz, The Debt Threat: How Debt is
Destroying the Developing World (2004).
8. The concept of informal imperialism was introduced by Ronald Robinson, ‘Imperial
Theory and the Question of Imperialism after Empire’, The Journal of Imperial and
Commonwealth History, 12, 2 (January 1984) 42-54, and Wolfgang Mommsen, ‘The End
of Empire and the Continuity of Imperialism’, in Mommsen and Osterhammel, eds.,
Imperialism and after: Continuities and Discontinuities (1986), 333-358. It is now widely
used by scholars of contemporary imperialism. For a recent overview of US informal
imperialism, see Stephen Howe, ‘American Empire: the history and future of an idea’,
OpenDemocracy 12 June 2003, 1-12, www.openDemocracy.net. I have discussed its
distinctive logic in ‘Law, Democracy, and Imperialism’, Annual Law and Society
Lecture, Faculty of Law, University of Edinburgh, March 10-11, 2005 (forthcoming). See
also Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, ‘Retrieving the Imperial: Empire and International
Relations’, Millennium, 31, 1 (2002), 109-127.
9. For the rise of US informal imperialism to global rule through the 20th century, see
Neil Smith, American Empire: Roosevelt’s Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization
(2003) and Andrew Bacevich, American Empire: the Realities and Consequences of U.S.
Diplomacy (2002). Bacevich shows the continuity of US ‘open door’ informal
imperialism from President Wilson to today. For a critical review of the Bretton Woods’
global institutions as instruments of imperial rule today, see Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization
and Its Discontents (2002) and below note 20.
10. Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society, and Smith, American Empire, and note 5
above.
11. This thesis of an international norm of democracy was originally advanced by Anne
Marie Slaughter and Thomas Franck in the early 1990s. See the analysis and criticism of
it from the perspective of diverse citizenship by Susan Marks, The Riddle of all
Constitutions (2000).
12. See the case studies of Ghana and Uganda by Alison Ayers, ‘Demystifying
Democratization: The Global Constitution of Liberal Politics in Africa’, in Third World
Quarterly (forthcoming, Winter 2005), Duncan Green, The Rise and Crisis of Market
Economies in Latin America (2003), and Gills, et al, Low Intensity Democracy.
18
13. For the ‘network revolution’ and its effect on democratic citizenship, see James Tully,
‘Communication Networks, Hegemony, and Communicative Action, Conweb
Constitutional Papers (June 2005),
www.qub.ac.uk/pais/Research/PaperSeries/ConWEBPapers/ . For the proliferation of lex
Mercatoria and supranational legal regimes that restrict global democracy and override
national democracy, see Claire Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority:
Transnational Merchant Law and the Global Political Economy (2003).
14. For the defence of US imperialism in terms of the spread of neo-liberalism detached
from democratic freedom, see Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal
Democracy at Home and Abroad (2003) and William Odom and Robert Dujarric,
America’s Inadvertent Empire (2004). For a critical account of the liberal informal
imperialists, see Rahul Rao, ‘The Empire Writes Back (to Michael Ignatieff),
Millennium, 33, 1 (2004), 145-166, and Jeanne Morefield, Covenants without Swords:
Idealist Liberalism and the Spirit of Empire (2005). For a similar criticism of the
imperialism of the cosmopolitan or social democratic wing of globalization, see Patrick
Bond, ‘Top Down or Bottom Up?’, and Benjamin Barber, ‘Global Governance from
Below’, both in David Held, ed. Debating Globalization (2005), 82-93, 93-106, and
David Held’s reply, Ibid., 141-167.
15. For the global military empire, see Chalmers Johnson, Sorrows of Empire:
Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the Republic (2004). It is outlined in the US military’s
‘Joint Vision 2020’ at www.dtic.mil/jointvision/. The famous quotation that the hidden
hand needs the hidden fist comes from Thomas Friedman, a leading spokesperson for the
new imperialism: The Lexus and the Olive Tree (1999).
16. Bacevich, American Empire.
17. President of the United States, The National Security Strategy of the United States of
America (September 2002), www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. See Johnson, Sorrows of
Empire, for the analysis of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars in this light.
18. Susan Strange, ‘Towards a theory of transnational empire’, in E.O. Czempiel and J.
Roseneau, eds., Global Change and Theoretical Challenge (1989).
19. Samuel Huntingdon, ‘The Lonely Superpower’, Foreign Affairs, 78, 2. Huntingdon’s
thesis that the United States disregards the rules that it imposes on others when it is in
their military and economic interest to do so is supported by Philippe Sands, Lawless
World: America and the Making and Breaking of Global Rules (2005).
20. Iris Marion Young, ‘Modest Reflections on Hegemony and Global Democracy’,
World Congress of Philosophy, Istanbul (2003). Michael Chossudousky, The
Globalization of Poverty and the New World Order (2003) agrees that the World Bank
and World Trade Organization govern the developing world, and argues that the United
States enforces their rules by means of its military dominance.
19
21. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, 6. See also Walden Bello, Dilemmas of Domination:
the Unmaking of the American Empire (2005) for similar conclusions.
III. Diverse global citizenship
4. For a more detailed presentation of this claim, see Tully, ‘Unfreedom of the Moderns’,
above I.4.
6. Partha Chaterjee, The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Post-Colonial Histories
(1993), 5. For a recent overview of this kind of history in Latin America, see Greg
Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America and the Cold War (2004). For a
survey of the informal imperial control of self-determination revolutions during and after
Decolonization, see Duara, Decolonization, and James D. Le Sueur, ed. The
Decolonization Reader (2002). For a recent restatement of Chaterjee’s tragic conclusion,
see David Scott, Conscripts of Modernity: the Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment
(2005).
7. Jeremy Seabrook, The No-Nonsense Guide to World Poverty (2003), 53. All the
statistics come from this volume and they are cited from United Nations publications.
8. Ibid.
9. For a recent world history of legal and political pluralism, see Lauren Benton, Law and
Colonial Cultures 1400-1900 (2001). For the alternative modernities movement, see
Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe (2000) and Dilip P. Gaonkar, ed. Alternative
Modernities (2001). For Indigenous Peoples, see Jeremy Mander and Victoria TauliCorpuz, Paradigm Wars: Indigenous Peoples Resistance to Economic Globalization, a
special report of the International Forum on Globalization and the Committee on
Indigenous Peoples (2004). For a rejoinder to the ‘flat world’ view of the grand theorists
of globalization, see John Gray, ‘The World is Round’, The New York Review of Books,
LII, 13 (August 11, 2005).
10. See Jai Sen and Anand Escobar, eds., Challenging Empires (2004) and Vandana
Shiva, The Living Democracy Movement: Alternatives to the Bankruptcy of
Globalization (2002). For the global contest between ‘free trade’ and ‘self-reliant fair
trade’, see Graham Dunkley, Free Trade: Myth, Realities and Alternatives (2004).
11. Paul Gilroy, After Empire: Melancholia or Convivial Culture? (2005).
12. For an overview of the field, see Louise Amoore, The Global Resistance Reader
(2005).
13. One of the best introductions to this enormous field of diverse glocal citizenship is the
syllabus of Professor Robert Hershey, Faculty of Law, University of Arizona, for Law
697B, ‘Globalization and the Transformation of Culture: A curriculum for social inquiry
and responsibility’. For the social constructivist research on challenging and modifying
20
international norms, see the work of Stephen Toope and Jutta Brunée, and see the case
study by Asher Alkoby, ‘Non-State Actors and the Legitimacy of International
Environmental Law’, Non-State Actors and International Law, 3 (2003), 23-98.
14. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, The World Social Forum: A User’s Guide (2004),
www.ces.uc.pt/bss/documentos/fsm_eng.pdf, accessed July 14, 2005, at 107 for the first
thesis.
15. Sousa Santos, World Social Forum, 122-139 (on translation), and 140-148 (on
Popular University of Social Movements).
16. This is also appears to be Kofi Annan’s view of the immediate threat and the proper
democratic response. See Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations, In
Larger Freedom: towards development, security, and human rights for all (21 March
2005). I also take the title, ‘larger freedom’, to be a diplomatic allusion to the contrast
between low intensity and high intensity democracy. See Johanna Mendelson Forman,
‘In Larger Freedom: Kofi Annan’s challenge’, OpenDemocracy (23 March 2005). For the
empirical research on the motivation of suicide bombers, see Robert Pape, Dying to Win:
the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (2005).
17. See I.10 above.
21