MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
The idea that people can be held responsible or accountable for their actions is central to our
moral thinking. Yet a little reflection on it reveals a number of deep philosophical problems.
Foremost among them is the problem of whether any of us are ever ultimately responsible for
anything, given the extent to which what we do (and who we are) is determined by our
upbringings, environments and genes. More generally, this is the problem of whether our
ordinary ideas about moral responsibility are compatible with a modern, scientific picture of
the world and our place within it. Other problems include whether we can be collectively, as
well as individually, responsible; the relationship between responsibility and associated
notions such as blame, praise, pride, shame and guilt; and the extent to which it is fair to
blame past people for living according to the moral thinking of their day. This module
explores some contemporary research on these questions.
Lectures: The lectures will be held on Tuesdays from 2-3pm in the Spring Term (see the
timetable for locations). The lecturer is Dr. Michael Garnett (m.garnett@bbk.ac.uk).
Seminars: The seminars will be held on Tuesdays from 3-4pm in the Spring Term (see the
timetable for locations). They will be led by the lecturer and by **.
Readings: Every week there is one key reading that is the focus of the seminar discussion.
One of the purposes of the seminar is to help you to understand the reading, so do not worry
if you have not fully understood the reading in advance. Nevertheless, it is essential that you
attempt the seminar reading each week if you are to follow the lecture and to participate in
the seminar discussion. In addition, there is ‘additional reading’ listed that will deepen your
understanding and help you to get the most out of the module. You are especially advised to
cover the additional reading for those topics on which you are planning to write.
Essays (BA): This module is assessed by two essays of a combined total of around 3,000
words. They must be written in response to two of the set questions listed below, except with
permission from the module convenor. For details concerning submission of the essay,
including deadlines, see the BA Handbook.
Prior to this assessed essay, you may also write up to two essays during the course, taken
from the titles below, and receive feedback on them from your seminar leader. These can be
useful practice for your eventual assessed essay. You should submit the first such essay by
the first seminar after reading week, and the second by one week after the last seminar of
term. [Notes: 1) You are always welcome to submit an essay earlier than these dates; 2) the
seminar leader should not be expected to comment on the same essay more than once.]
Essay (MA): This module is assessed by one essay of around 3,500 words. It must be
written in response to one of the set questions listed below, except with permission from the
module convenor. For details concerning submission of the essay, including deadlines, see
the MA Handbook.
Moodle:
Electronic copies of course materials are available through Moodle, at
http://moodle.bbk.ac.uk. You will need your ITS login name and password to enter.
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Week 1. Classical Compatibilism
Seminar Reading:
 Ayer, A. J. ‘Freedom and Necessity’, in his Philosophical Essays (Greenwood Press,
1954). Also in G. Watson (ed.), Free Will (Oxford University Press, 1982).
[http://www.sheffield.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.101522!/file/Ayer-freedom-necessity.pdf]
Further Reading:
 Hobart, R. E. ‘Free Will as Requiring Determination and Inconceivable Without It’, Mind
43/169 (1934). [www.jstor.org/stable/2250169]
 van Inwagen, Peter. ‘The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism’, Philosophical
Studies 27/3 (1975). [www.jstor.org/stable/4318929]
 Aune, Bruce & Lehrer, K. ‘Cans and Ifs: An Exchange’, in G. Watson (ed.), Free Will
(Oxford University Press, 1982). Originally in Analysis 27/6 (1967) & 29/1 (1968).
[www.jstor.org/stable/3326989 & www.jstor.org/stable/3327629]
Essay Question
‘An agent is morally responsible for performing a given act only if he or she could have done
otherwise.’ What does ‘could have’ mean?
Week 2. Frankfurt and his Counterexamples
Seminar reading:
 Harry Frankfurt, ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’ Journal of Philosophy
66 (1969). Also in his The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge University
Press, 1988). [www.jstor.org/stable/2023833]
Further reading:
 Widerker, D. and McKenna, M. ‘Introduction’, Moral Responsibility and Alternative
Possibilities (Ashgate Publishing, 2003).
 Fischer, John Martin. ‘The Frankfurt Cases: The Moral of the Stories’, The Philosophical
Review 119 (2010). Also in his Deep Control: Essays on Free Will and Value (Oxford
University Press, 2012). [Available via Birkbeck elibrary]
 Garnett, Michael. ‘Fischer-Style Compatibilism’, Analysis 73/2 (2013).
Essay Question
‘An agent is morally responsible for performing a given act only if he or she could have done
otherwise.’ Is this true?
Week 3. Agency and Identification
Seminar reading:
 Frankfurt, Harry. G. ‘Freedom of Will and the Concept of the Person’, Journal of
Philosophy 68/1 (1971) [www.jstor.org/stable/2024717]
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Further Reading:
 Frankfurt, Harry. G. ‘On the Faintest Passion’, Proceedings and Addresses of the
American Philosophical Association 66/3 (1992). Also in his Necessity, Volition, and
Love (Cambridge University Press, 1999). [www.jstor.org/stable/3130658]
 Watson, Gary. ‘The Two Faces of Responsibility’, in his Agency and Answerability:
Selected essays (Oxford University Press, 2004). [Available via Birkbeck elibrary.]
 Wolf, Susan. ‘The Real Self View’, Ch. 2 of her Freedom Within Reason (Oxford
University Press, 1990).
Essay Question
‘We are responsible for our conduct because that conduct is ourselves objectified in actions’
(Dewey, quoted in Watson). Discuss.
Week 4. Reason and Responsibility
Seminar reading:
 Watson, Gary. ‘Free Agency’, The Journal of Philosophy 72/8 (1975).
[www.jstor.org/stable/2024703]
Further reading:
 Moran, Richard. ‘Frankfurt on Identification: Ambiguities of Activity in Mental Life’ &
Frankfurt, H. G. ‘Reply to Richard Moran’, both in S. Buss and L. Overton (eds.),
Contours of Agency: Essays on themes from Harry Frankfurt (MIT Press, 2002).
 Wolf, Susan. ‘The Reason View’, Ch. 4 of her Freedom Within Reason (Oxford
University Press, 1990).
 Arpaly, Nomy & Schroeder, Timothy. ‘Praise, Blame and the Whole Self’, Philosophical
Studies 93/2 (1999). [www.jstor.org/stable/4320909]
Essay Question
Is there any sense in which our agency is especially expressed or manifested by our rational
attitudes?
Week 5. The Manipulation Problem
Seminar Reading:
 Kane, Robert. §§2—8 of ‘Ultimate Responsibility’, Ch. 5 of his The Significance of Free
Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press). [Available via Birkbeck elibrary.]
Further Reading:
 Pereboom, Derk. ‘Determinism al dente’, Nous 29/1 (1995). [www.jstor.org/stable/2215725]
 McKenna, Michael. ‘A Hard-Line Reply to Pereboom’s Four-Case Argument’,
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77/1 (2008). [www.jstor.org/stable/40041222]
 Berofsky, Bernard. ‘Global Control and Freedom’, Philosophical Studies 131/2 (2006).
[Available at www.jstor.org/stable/25471814]
Essay Question
How should compatibilists respond to manipulation cases?
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READING WEEK
Week 6. ‘Event-Causal’ Libertarianism
Seminar Reading:
 Kane, Robert. ‘Some Neglected Pathways in the Freewill Labyrinth’, in R. Kane (ed.),
The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (Oxford University Press, 2002).
Further Reading:
 Watson, Gary. ‘Hard Compatibilism and Soft Libertarianism’, Journal of Ethics 3/4
(1999). Also in his Agency and Answerability: Selected essays (Oxford University Press,
2004). [Available at www.jstor.org/stable/25115625 and via Birkbeck elibrary]
 Almeida, M. & Bernstein, M. ‘Lucky Libertarianism’, Philosophical Studies 22/2 (2003).
[Available at www.jstor.org/stable/4321352]
 Haji, Ishtiyaque. ‘Libertarianism and the Luck Objection’, Journal of Ethics 4/4 (2000).
[Available at www.jstor.org/stable/25115656]
Essay Question
Critically assess Robert Kane’s theory of moral responsibility.
Week 7. ‘Agent-Causal’ Libertarianism
Seminar Reading:
 Steward, Helen. ‘The Truth in Compatibilism and the Truth of Libertarianism’,
Philosophical Explorations 12/2 (2009). [http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/10688/1/stewardh1.pdf]
Further Reading:
 Clarke, Randolph. ‘Agent Causation and Event Causation in the Production of Free
Action’, Philosophical Topics 24/2 (1996). [www.jstor.org/stable/43154235]
 Pereboom, Derk. ‘Is Our Conception of Agent Causation Coherent?’, Philosophical
Topics 32 (2004). [www.jstor.org/stable/43154439]
 Garnett, Michael. ‘Freedom and Unpredictability’, Inquiry 56/6 (2013).
[http://philpapers.org/archive/GARFAU.pdf]
Essay Question
What is ‘agent causation’? Is it necessary for moral responsibility?
Week 8. Responsibility and Ignorance
Seminar Reading:
 Fricker, Miranda. ‘The Relativism of Blame and Williams’ Relativism of Distance’,
Aristotelian Supplementary Volume 84/1 (2010).
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Further Reading:
 Rosen, Gideon. ‘Culpability and Ignorance’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
103/3 (2002). [www.jstor.org/stable/4545386]
 Moody-Adams, Michele. ‘Culture, Responsibility, and Affected Ignorance’, Ethics 104/2
(1994). [www.jstor.org/stable/2381578.]
 Holroyd, Jules. ‘Responsibility for Implicit Bias’, Journal of Social Philosophy 43/3
(2012). [http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1932/1/Responsibility_for_BiasA2012.pdf]
Essay Question
When, if ever, is ignorance not an excuse?
Week 9. Individual and Collective Responsibility
Seminar Reading:
 List, Cristian & Pettit, P. ‘Holding Group Agents Responsible’, Ch. 7 of their Group
Agency: The Possibility, Design and Status of Corporate Agents (Oxford University
Press, 2011). [Available via Birkbeck elibrary]
Further Reading:
 Gilbert, Margaret. ‘Who’s to Blame? Collective Moral Responsibility and its Implications
for Group Members’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30/1 (2006). Also in her Joint
Commitment: How We Make the Social World (Oxford University Press, 2013).
[Available via Birkbeck elibrary]
 Feinberg, Joel. ‘Collective Responsibility’, Journal of Philosophy 65/28 (1968).
[www.jstor.org/stable/2024543]
 Silver, David. ‘Collective Responsibility, Corporate Responsibility and Moral Taint’,
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30/1 (2006).
Essay Question
Can a group of agents ever be morally responsible in its own right?
Week 10. Scepticism About Moral Responsibility
Seminar Reading:
 Pereboom, Derk. ‘Free Will, Love and Anger’, Ideas Y Valores 141 (2009).
[www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0120-00622009000300010]
Further Reading:
 Watson, Gary. ‘Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian
Theme’, in his Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays (Oxford University Press,
2004). [Available via Birkbeck elibrary]
 Rosen, Gideon. ‘Skepticism About Moral Responsibility’, Philosophical Perspectives
18/1 (2004).
 Strawson, Galen. ‘The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility’, Philosophical Studies
75/1-2 (1994). [www.jstor.org/stable/4320507]
Essay Question
If moral responsibility is impossible—what then?
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