THE FALL OF THE MIND ARGUMENT AND SOME LESSONS ABOUT FREEDOM
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we’ll diagnose and disarm the so-called Mind argument—typically thought to
constitute the strongest objection to libertarianism, the view that we have free will and that
freedom is incompatible with causal determinism. We start by discussing a prima facie plausible
principle—what we call ‘PRINCIPLE’—that expresses a necessary condition for having a choice
about an event whose causal history includes only events. Next, we argue that whether
PRINCIPLE is true or false, the Mind argument fails in one of two ways. Moreover, each of the
ways in which the Mind argument fails has significant ramifications for the metaphysics of
freedom. Let us briefly highlight one of these forthcoming ramifications: We’ll argue that if
PRINCIPLE is true, then a nonreductive view of action is true. According to a nonreductive view
of action, an agent, S, freely performs an action, A, only if S is nonderivatively causally relevant
to A—i.e., only if A’s causal history strictly and literally includes S, where A’s including mental
events that involve S doesn’t suffice for A’s causal history strictly and literally including S.1
We suspect, then, that some will find in our paper a strong argument for a nonreductive
view of agency. For, as we shall see shortly, PRINCIPLE enjoys much intuitive appeal. Indeed,
near the end of our paper, we defend PRINCIPLE against an alleged counterexample. Of course,
that PRINCIPLE survives the case we consider doesn’t show that it’s true, and here we don’t take
a definitive stand on PRINCIPLE’s truth-value. However, when arguing for her approach to
action, the nonreductivist could do much worse than our argument developed below from
PRINCIPLE to nonreductivism.
Before we begin, it will be helpful to have the following taxonomy of views at our
disposal. Nonreductive libertarianism is the conjunction of a nonreductive view of action and
libertarianism.2 Reductive libertarianism combines libertarianism with a reductive approach to
action—i.e., an approach according to which events alone are strictly and literally included in the
Two points: First, there are different felicitous ways to use the label ‘nonreductive view of action’. We
here use that label in such a way that it applies to views according to which agents are nonderivatively
causally relevant to some of their actions. On our usage, then, the label is equivalent to ‘view of action
that’s not comprehensively reductive’. Second, some philosophers distinguish between nonderivatively or
directly free actions, on the one hand, and indirectly or derivatively free actions, on the other, where the
latter are actions that result in an appropriate way from nonderivatively or directly free actions. The reader
should understand us to be concerned solely with nonderivatively or directly free actions here.
2
Proponents of this view include Roderick Chisholm, “Human Freedom and the Self,” reprinted in Free
Will, ed. Gary Watson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983); Timothy O’Connor, Persons and Causes
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); and Richard Taylor, Action and Purpose (Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966).
1
1
causal history of an event.3 Reductive compatibilism combines a reductive theory of action with
compatibilism, the view that freedom is compatible with causal determinism.4 Finally,
nonreductive compatibilism is the conjunction of a nonreductive view of action and
compatibilism.5
2. PRINCIPLE AND THE MIND ARGUMENT
This section divides into three subsections. In §2.1, we explain PRINCIPLE and the Mind
argument. In §2.2, we argue that if PRINCIPLE is true, then the Mind argument fails in a way
that exclusively benefits nonreductive libertarianism. In §2.3, we argue that if PRINCIPLE is
false, then the Mind argument fails in a way that exclusively benefits reductive libertarianism.
Along the way, we highlight what strike us as some important lessons to be learned about the
metaphysics of human freedom.
2.1 PRINCIPLE AND THE MIND ARGUMENT EXPLAINED
Our project revolves around PRINCIPLE, a prima facie plausible thesis that states a requirement
for having a choice about an event whose causal history includes only other events. Before stating
PRINCIPLE, we offer a concrete example for illustration and initial motivation.
Suppose a rock hurtling through the air strikes and shatters a window. Suppose also that a
bystander, Jack, freely refrains from terminating the rock’s flight toward the window. Clearly, the
window’s shattering (hereafter, ‘the shattering’) has a causal history. That causal history includes
all and only those items that are causally relevant to the shattering. We can distinguish between
two kinds of causal relevance, positive and negative.6 This distinction can be grasped by
considering examples. Events that are positively causally relevant to the shattering include the
rock’s making contact with the window, and the rock’s traveling at a certain velocity and on a
certain trajectory toward the window. Events that are negatively causally relevant to the shattering
include Jack’s freely refraining from snatching the rock mid-trajectory and (perhaps) God’s
3
Proponents of this view include Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1996); and Laura Ekstrom, Free Will: A Philosophical Study (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 2000).
4
Proponents of this view include Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”; and
Gary Watson, “Free Agency”. Both of these papers are reprinted in Free Will, ed. Gary Watson (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1983).
5
Though certainly the least popular of the four views countenanced here, it is not an empty niche. See, e.g.,
Ned Markosian’s “A Compatibilist Version of the Theory of Agent Causation” (Pacific Philosophical
Quarterly 80 [1999]: 257-77) and “Agent Causation as the Solution to All the Compatibilist’s Problems”
(unpublished).
6
We treat these concepts as primitive here, as do others such as Peter van Inwagen when discussing the
Mind Argument in his Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983). See, e.g., p.152.
2
sustaining the rock in existence throughout the duration of its flight toward the window. Now,
suppose finally that another bystander, Jill, has no choice about any event in the shattering’s
causal history, where that causal history strictly and literally includes only events. Given this, it’s
plausible that Jill has no choice about the shattering.
We doubt we are alone in forming the intuition that, in the case just described, Jill has no
choice about the shattering. And when casting about for principled support for this intuition, it is
hard to do better than the following:
PRINCIPLE: Suppose an event, e, is such that only events are causally relevant to it (i.e.,
e’s causal history strictly and literally includes only events). Then an agent, S, has a
choice about e only if S has a choice about some event in e’s causal history.
The rock example confirms PRINCIPLE—as would numerous other similar examples.
Moreover, PRINCIPLE provides a nice explanation of the intuition that Jill has no choice about
the shattering. We thus submit that PRINCIPLE enjoys a significant amount of prima facie
plausibility.
We’ll soon argue that, depending on PRINCIPLE’s truth-value, the Mind argument fails
in a way that has important ramifications for the metaphysics of freedom. Before we do so,
though, we need to complete two preliminary tasks. First, we need to make explicit certain
assumptions in effect throughout the remainder of the paper. Second, we need to lay out the Mind
argument. We do these things in turn.
In the sequel, we assume that at least some human beings have free will, that some
human beings sometimes have a choice about certain events. We also assume that for those
human beings who have free will, there is a first event about which they have a choice. A little
more precisely, we assume that for a human agent, S, who has free will, there is an event, e, such
that S has a choice about e and no choice about any event prior to e. We take it that these
assumptions are held by most parties to the debate about the metaphysics of freedom, and think
them quite uncontroversial.
We’ve intimated that PRINCIPLE bears an interesting relation to the Mind argument; it’s
now time to explain that argument.7 In what follows, we discuss two different formulations of the
Mind argument. We start with an older version due to Peter van Inwagen and then move on to a
more recent version due to Dana Nelkin. Unlike van Inwagen’s version of the Mind argument,
We should note that the label ‘the Mind argument’ is somewhat misleading. There are really different
kinds—and different versions of these respective kinds—of Mind arguments. Van Inwagen (1983, pp. 126150), for example, distinguishes three strands of the Mind argument. In what follows, we discuss what van
Inwagen calls ‘the third strand’. The distinction between these strands noted, we will for stylistic reasons
continue to speak of “the” Mind argument.
7
3
Nelkin’s version has not yet faced decisive criticism in the relevant literature. We thus focus
mainly on Nelkin’s version of the Mind argument in what follows. We start with van Inwagen’s
version because having a good handle on both it and certain subsequent moves in the relevant
literature facilitates comprehension of and appreciation for Nelkin’s more recent, stronger
version.
In An Essay on Free Will (1983), Peter van Inwagen argued, via his Consequence
argument, that freedom and determinism are incompatible. Here is van Inwagen’s initial, informal
statement of the Consequence argument:
If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events
in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is
it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things
(including our present acts) are not up to us.8
After explaining and formalizing the Consequence argument, van Inwagen considered an
argument similar in important respects to the Consequence argument—viz., the Mind argument—
that purports to establish the incompatibility of free will and causal indeterminism. Now, the
question whether the Consequence and Mind arguments stand or fall together is one of
considerable interest that will be discussed below. At this juncture, though, we need only lay out
van Inwagen’s version of the Mind argument.
The Mind argument takes off from the assumption that a given human agent’s actions are
the indeterministic causal consequences of some of that agent’s mental items (e.g., beliefs,
desires, intentions, etc.). Now, consider an agent, S, who acts on some occasion. Let ‘R’ stand for
the action S performs on that occasion, and let ‘DB’ stand for the mental item(s) causally relevant
to R. According to the proponent of the Mind argument, because R is an indeterministic causal
consequence of DB, it is plausible that (i) no one has a choice about DB’s causing R. Moreover,
the argument continues, it is plausible that no one has a choice about S’s having the complement
of mental items he in fact has. In particular, it is plausible that (ii) S has no choice about DB. And
so, the Mind argument’s proponent concludes, if (i) and (ii) are true, then S has no choice about
R. But this line of thought quickly generalizes to show that no one is free with respect to any
indeterministically caused action, and so quickly generalizes to show freedom and indeterminism
to be incompatible.
This informal statement of the Mind argument can be made more precise as follows. Let
us follow van Inwagen by letting ‘Np’ stand for ‘p and no one has, or ever had, any choice about
8
Van Inwagen (1983, p.16).
4
whether p’.9 The heart of van Inwagen’s version of the Mind argument can then be stated as
follows:
(1) N(DB)
(2) N(DB  R)
Therefore,
(3) N(R)
At this point, the following question naturally arises: what licenses the inference from (1) and (2)
to (3)? The answer, according to van Inwagen (1983), is the (by now notorious) inference rule,
Beta:
Beta: {Np & N(p  q)} implies Nq.
As it turns out, Beta underwrites not only van Inwagen’s formalized version of the Mind
argument but also his formalized version of the Consequence argument. Alas, their mutual
dependence on Beta spells trouble for van Inwagen’s versions of the Consequence and the Mind
arguments, since Beta (when conjoined with certain other obvious truths) entails the following
inference principle that is vulnerable to clear counterexample:10
Agglomeration: (Np & Nq) implies N(p & q).
Thus, if van Inwagen’s were the best extant version of the Mind argument, that argument
wouldn’t pose much of a threat to anyone.
But van Inwagen’s version isn’t the best extant version of the Mind argument. There’s a
more recent version of that argument due to Dana Nelkin that doesn’t depend on Beta. A good
way to approach Nelkin’s version of the Mind argument is to take a brief detour through
important recent work on the Consequence and Mind arguments by Alicia Finch and Ted
Warfield (1998). Finch and Warfield show that the following logically weaker inference principle
can take Beta’s place in the Consequence argument (note that ‘□’ here means ‘it is broadly
logically necessary that’):
Beta 2: {Np & □ (p  q)} implies Nq.
Moreover, Finch and Warfield argue that while Beta 2 yields a much improved version of the
Consequence argument, it doesn’t also yield an improved version of the Mind argument. If what
Finch and Warfield claim here is correct, then the discovery of Beta 2 is a boon to those who wish
9
See van Inwagen (1983, pp. 67-8 and note 31, pp. 233-4) for his understanding of having a choice about
whether a proposition is true. Roughly, though, to have a choice about whether p is to be able to act so as to
ensure the falsity of p. See Finch and Warfield (1998, p. 516).
10
See, e.g., McKay and Johnson (1996).
5
to argue for the incompatibility of freedom and determinism, but of no utility whatsoever to those
who wish to argue for the incompatibility of freedom and indeterminism.
Unfortunately for libertarians, Beta 2 does yield a stronger version of the Mind argument.
Dana Nelkin (2001, pp. 112-114) has recently developed an improved version of the Mind
argument that invokes Beta 2 instead of Beta and contains premises that are as plausible as the
premises in van Inwagen’s earlier version of the Mind argument. Here’s the heart of Nelkin’s
improved Mind argument:
(1*) N{DB & (DB  R)}
(2*) □{(DB & (DB  R))  R}
Therefore,
(3) N(R)
(2*) is a tautology, and (3) follows by Beta 2 from (1*) and (2*). Pretty clearly, (1*) is this
argument’s weakest link; rejecting it seems to be the only prima facie viable escape route for
libertarians. As even prominent libertarians concede, though, each of N(DB) and N(DB  R) is
quite plausible,11 and their conjunction seems to constitute a good reason for believing N{DB &
(DB  R)}. Nelkin puts this point nicely:
We have no choice about either DB or (DB  R). Further, we cannot think of anything
one could do to ensure the falsity of the conjunction of DB and (DB  R) itself, while
lacking the ability to falsify the first conjunct and the ability to falsify the second
conjunct. (2001, p. 113)
To be sure, one upshot of the relevant literature is that the general inference principle to which
one may be tempted to appeal in inferring (1*) from N(DB) and N(DBR)—viz.,
Agglomeration—is invalid. However, that Agglomeration is invalid doesn’t entail that it’s
possible for N(DB) and N(DBR) to be true and (1*) false. Moreover, we agree with Nelkin’s
reason for thinking that anyone who accepts N(DB) and N(DB  R) ought to accept (1*) as well.
It’s well worth noting that even if we are mistaken in thinking that Nelkin’s version of the
Mind argument is superior to van Inwagen’s, our main project retains its significance. For our
diagnosis of the Mind argument won’t depend on the invalidity of Beta or any other Beta-like
inference rule. Accordingly, our diagnosis provides the libertarian with an independent reply to
the Mind argument. Our diagnosis also reveals that it’s incorrect to think that whether the
Consequence and Mind arguments stand or fall together turns wholly on whether those arguments
share a valid Beta-like inference rule. We elaborate and defend this last point in the next
subsection, which starts work on our main project—viz., showing that, depending on
11
See, e.g., van Inwagen (1983, pp.146, 149-150); and Finch and Warfield (1998, p.518).
6
PRINCIPLE’s truth-value, the Mind argument fails in a way that has significant ramifications for
the metaphysics of human freedom.12
2.2 WHAT IF PRINCIPLE IS TRUE?
We’ll now argue that if PRINCIPLE is true, then a nonreductive view of action is true, and that
this spells trouble for the Mind argument. Moreover, the trouble that plagues the Mind
argument—given the truth of PRINCIPLE—leaves the strongest extant Consequence argument
intact. In short, we’ll see that if PRINCIPLE is true, then the Mind argument fails, and does so in
a way that exclusively benefits nonreductive libertarianism. To begin, recall PRINCIPLE:
PRINCIPLE: Suppose an event, e, is such that only other events are causally relevant to it
(i.e., is such that its causal history includes only other events). Then an agent, S, has a
choice about e only if S has a choice about some event in e’s causal history.
Suppose, for conditional proof, that PRINCIPLE is true. Suppose, moreover, that e is the first
event about which a human agent, S, has a choice. It follows both that S has a choice about e and
that e has a causal history, H.13 Our argument now proceeds as a dilemma. Either H strictly and
literally includes S or it doesn’t. If the former, then a given agent must herself be nonderivatively
causally relevant to the first event about which she has a choice. Now, suppose the latter. Then
e’s causal history, H, is exhausted by other events. By PRINCIPLE, S has a choice about some
member of H, has a choice about some event causally relevant to e. But this contradicts our
hypothesis that e is the first event about which S has a choice. Thus, H strictly and literally
includes S after all: again, a given agent must herself be nonderivatively causally relevant to the
first event about which she has a choice. In sum, if PRINCIPLE is true, then a given agent must
herself be nonderivatively causally relevant to the first event about which she has a choice:
PRINCIPLE entails a nonreductive view of action.
It should now be clear why the truth of PRINCIPLE spells trouble for the Mind argument.
For as indicated above, the Mind argument takes off from the assumption that all of a given
agent’s actions are the (indeterministic) causal consequences of only other events. Finch and
Warfield make this assumption explicit in their discussion of the Mind argument:
12
Henceforth, unless we say otherwise, the reader should understand us to be concerned with the improved
versions of the Consequence and Mind arguments presented above.
13
Presumably, a human agent has a choice about an event only if that event has a causal history, is such
that some other events are either positively or negatively causally relevant to it. Note that this assumption is
consistent with all the main approaches to the metaphysics of human agency, noncausal views included.
For noncausalists countenance events that are negatively causally relevant to events about which an agent
has a choice. Proponents of noncausalism include Carl Ginet, On Action (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990); and Stewart Goetz, “Libertarian Choice,” Faith and Philosophy 14 (1997): pp.195211.
7
Consider an indeterministic world in which, most importantly, the actions of agents are
indeterministic consequences of agents’ particular sets of beliefs and desires. Let “DB”
represent the particular belief/desire complex of some agent and let “R” represent an
action brought about exclusively by DB. (1998, p. 517)
An assumption of the Mind argument, then, is that the causal history of an agent’s action doesn’t
strictly and literally include the agent but does so, if at all, only by virtue of that agent being
involved in some mental event. Absent this assumption, it’s illegitimate to claim, as the Mind
argument does, that an action such as R is brought about exclusively by DB. In short, the Mind
argument presupposes that a nonreductive view of agency is false. Hence, PRINCIPLE—since it
entails a nonreductive view of agency—entails that an assumption of the Mind argument is false.
Accordingly, if PRINCIPLE is true, then the Mind argument fails.
We also said above that if PRINCIPLE is true, then the Mind argument’s failure is
exclusively beneficial to nonreductive libertarians. Here’s why. No version of the Consequence
argument presupposes a reductive approach to action. Consequently, PRINCIPLE’s entailing a
nonreductive approach to action provides no reason for doubting the cogency of any
Consequence argument. Thus, if PRINCIPLE is true, then the Mind argument fails in a way that
impugns the reductive approach to action while leaving the strongest Consequence arguments
intact.
An important point, alluded to above, about the relation between the Consequence
argument and the Mind argument is now in clear view. Much important recent work on these
arguments seems to assume that if the arguments depend on a common Beta-style inference
principle, then the arguments stand or fall together.14 We can now see that this is false. It’s false
because the Mind argument is burdened by the assumption of a reductive view of action,15 while
the Consequence argument admirably remains neutral between reductive and nonreductive
approaches to human agency.
This subsection’s argument is now complete. Let us briefly sum up our findings. If
PRINCIPLE is true, then a nonreductive approach to human agency is true. But if that’s so, then a
certain assumption, essential to the Mind argument but not the Consequence argument, is false. In
short, if PRINCIPLE is true, then the Mind argument fails in a way exclusively beneficial to
14
See, e.g., Finch and Warfield (1998, pp.519-520) and Nelkin (2001, p.112).
We hasten to add that Finch and Warfield seem to display at least some awareness of this point when
they say,
15
Introducing agent causation into the picture at this point in the discussion would not serve to show
how [N(DB  R)] could be false. Rather, the successful introduction and defense of agent
causation would show that the Mind argument is not relevant to human freedom. (1998, p. 519)
8
nonreductive libertarianism. For if the Mind argument fails in the indicated way, then both
reductive libertarianism and reductive compatibilism are false. And the nonreductive
compatibilist faces the Consequence argument for incompatibilism about freedom and
determinism, without anything like a comparably strong defense of compatibilism.16
2.3 WHAT IF PRINCIPLE IS FALSE?
In this subsection, we argue that if PRINCIPLE is false, then (i) the standard justification for one
of the Mind argument’s premises fails, (ii) the nonreductive approach to action is untenable, and
(iii) the Consequence argument again remains intact. In short, if PRINCIPLE is false, then the
Mind argument fails in a way that benefits only reductive libertarianism.
Suppose, for conditional proof, that PRINCIPLE is false. If PRINCIPLE is false, then it
is possible for an agent, S, to have a choice about an event whose causal history is exhausted by
events none of which is up to S. This has at least three important ramifications for the debate
about the metaphysics of freedom.
First: the standard justification for one of the Mind argument’s premises fails. To see this,
recall premise (1*) of the Mind argument:
(1*) N{DB & (DB  R)}
Obviously, one’s having a choice about either DB or (DB  R) suffices for one’s having a
choice about {DB & (DB  R)}. Thus, if the Mind argument is to succeed, its proponent needs
to show how material in her argument prior to (1*) supports the claim that neither DB nor (DB 
R) is up to S. Fortunately, proponents of the Mind argument have attempted to do this, and we
earlier sketched part of the justification in question. The standard justification for thinking S has
no choice about (DB  R) is the claim that R is an indeterministic causal consequence of DB.
And the following passage from Finch and Warfield—which adverts to a line of thought
originally developed by van Inwagen—expresses the standard justification for thinking that S has
no choice about DB:
As van Inwagen [reference omitted] correctly points out, one could have a choice about
DB only if one had a choice about some earlier state of affairs from which DB followed
[our emphasis], in which case proponents of the Mind argument will simply raise their
worries about this earlier state until we reach an initial state about which the agent in
question has no choice.17
16
For excellent critical treatments of the main arguments for compatibilism, see (e.g.) Ekstrom (2000,
Chapter 3) and Ted Warfield, “Compatibilism and Incompatibilism: Some Arguments,” Oxford Handbook
of Metaphysics, eds. Michael Loux and Dean Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
17
Finch and Warfield (1998, p.518, note 6). The relevant passage from van Inwagen (1983, p.146).
Nelkin’s justification for N(DBR) consists entirely in approvingly quoting Finch and Warfield on this
point. See Nelkin (2001, p.109, note 5).
9
What’s important to notice here is that the italicized portion of the above passage pretty clearly
presupposes PRINCIPLE. Why else should we think that the italicized claim is true except that in
general, one has a choice about an event, e, whose causal history is exhausted by events only if
one has a choice about some other event in e’s causal history? Given our assumption that
PRINCIPLE is false, it follows that the standard justification for (1*) depends on a false
proposition, and so fails.
Moreover, if PRINCIPLE is false, then DB—since it is S’s own desire-belief complex—
is as good a candidate as any for being an event about which S could have a choice even though S
has no choice about any event in that event’s causal history. For that matter, if PRINCIPLE is
false, the event consisting in DB’s causing R also seems as good a candidate as any for being
such an event. After all, R is an action of S’s caused by mental states about which—given the
falsity of PRINCIPLE—S could plausibly have a choice. We conclude that if PRINCIPLE is
false, then so are ‘N(DB)’ and ‘N(DB  R)’, which of course implies that (1*) is false. Upshot:
The falsity of PRINCIPLE not only undermines the standard justification of (1*), but also shows
that premise to be false; in either case, the falsity of PRINCIPLE entails that the Mind argument
fails. That was the first ramification of assuming that PRINCIPLE is false. We continue.
Second: the nonreductive approach to human agency is untenable. We’re willing to grant
the prevailing view that an agent’s being nonderivatively causally relevant to an event is
somewhat mysterious or obscure or opaque in a way that an event’s being so causally relevant is
not. We’re thus willing to grant that a nonreductive view of agency should be embraced only if
there are good reasons to do so. Now, §2.2 showed that if PRINCIPLE is true, then there’s indeed
good reason to embrace a nonreductive view of action. We’re now, however, supposing that
PRINCIPLE is false. We’re thus supposing that it’s possible for an agent, S, to have a choice
about an event, e, where e’s causal history strictly and literally includes only events, even though
S has no choice about any event in e’s causal history. However, if that’s so, then there seems to be
no reason to accept the view that human agents themselves can be nonderivatively causally
relevant to events. We conclude, then, that if PRINCIPLE is false, a nonreductive approach to
human action is untenable.
Third: the Consequence argument remains intact. To see this, notice that PRINCIPLE’s
falsity is consistent with the Consequence argument’s being sound. This is because Beta 2 is
consistent with PRINCIPLE’s denial. Informally, Beta 2 says that “one has no choice about the
logical consequences of those truths one has no choice about.”18 But it’s consistent with this that
18
Finch and Warfield (1998, p.522).
10
one can have a choice about an event whose causal history is exhausted by events none of which
is up to one. To be sure, Beta 2 entails that any such event would have to be an indeterministic
causal consequence of the items in its causal history. Again, though, Beta 2 is clearly consistent
with one’s having a choice about an event whose causal history is exhausted by events none of
which is up to one.
By our lights, then, even if PRINCIPLE were false, the Consequence argument would
remain unscathed. If so, then PRINCIPLE’s falsity is exclusively beneficial to reductive
libertarians. That is, if PRINCIPLE is false, then (i) the Mind argument fails, (ii) a nonreductive
approach to human action is untenable (and so, neither nonreductive compatibilism nor
nonreductive libertarianism is tenable), and (iii) the reductive compatibilist remains faced with
the Consequence argument for incompatibilism about freedom and determinism without anything
like a comparably strong defense of Compatibilism.
This subsection’s argument is now complete. Let us sum up our findings. If PRINCIPLE
is false, three important things follow. One, the standard justification for one of the Mind
argument’s premises fails. Two, the nonreductive approach to action is untenable. And three, the
Consequence argument remains as strong as ever. In short, if PRINCIPLE is false, then (i) the
Mind argument fails, (ii) neither nonreductive libertarianism nor nonreductive compatibilism is
tenable, and (iii) the reductive libertarian retains use of the Consequence argument against the
reductive compatibilist. Only the reductive libertarian benefits if PRINCIPLE is false.
3. CONCLUSION: A BRIEF DEFENSE OF PRINCIPLE
In §2.2, we argued that if PRINCIPLE is true, then so is nonreductive libertarianism. However, as
we argued in §2.3, if PRINCIPLE is false, then nonreductive libertarianism is untenable and
reductive libertarianism is true. Accordingly, a counterexample to PRINCIPLE will suffice to
refute nonreductive libertarianism and shore up reductive libertarianism. Hence, another
interesting point can be seen in light of §2: the intramural dispute between nonreductive and
reductive libertarians turns on PRINCIPLE’s truth-value. Obviously, the inability to provide clear
counterexamples to PRINCIPLE doesn’t prove that it’s true; however, the lack of clear
counterexamples should increase its initial plausibility, thereby strengthening the case for
nonreductive libertarianism. We’ll now conclude by defending PRINCIPLE against an alleged
counterexample. Here it is:19
Suppose at t1, Ridley freely remains seated. At t2, a baseball is shot toward a bottle, where
this is a random occurrence, a matter of “ground-level chance.” Suppose also that if
19
Thanks to [blinded for review] for discussion of this kind of putative counterexample to PRINCIPLE.
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Ridley had at t1 stood, the indicated baseball would not have been shot toward the bottle
at t2. (Suppose this is because Brown would have pressed a button thus disarming the
device that randomly shoots baseballs if Ridley had stood; Ridley and Brown are friends,
and the baseball’s being shot toward the bottle at t2 poses a threat to Ridley if he does not
remain seated t1.) Finally, suppose the baseball shatters the bottle at t3. Now, Ridley has
no choice about any event in the causal history of the bottle’s shattering since the
baseball’s being shot toward the bottle at t2 is a random occurrence. Moreover, there is an
unrealized chain of events that the bottle would have survived, viz., that chain of events
that would have resulted if Ridley had refrained from sitting at t1. Furthermore, Ridley
was able to initiate that chain of events since he was free to stand at t1. And so, Ridley
had a choice about the shattering of the bottle at t3 in spite of the fact that he had no
choice about any event in the causal history of the shattering. Hence, PRINCIPLE is
false.
We dispute our objector’s claim that Ridley had no choice about any event in the causal history of
the bottle’s shattering. As evidence for this claim, our objector offers the stipulated fact that the
baseball’s being shot toward the bottle is a random occurrence. The stipulation, though fine as
stipulations go, fails to support the claim in question. Here’s why.
As the case is described, Ridley is able to initiate an unrealized chain of events by virtue
of being able to stand at t1. In fact, Ridley refrains from standing. Thus, Ridley in fact refrains
from standing but is able to stand. It follows that Ridley freely refrained from standing and so
had a choice about refraining from standing at t1.20 But Ridley’s refraining from standing at t1 is
in the causal history of the bottle’s shattering; though his refraining is not positively causally
relevant to the bottle’s shattering, it is negatively causally relevant to the bottle’s shattering (and
so, is in the shattering’s causal history). For, as the case is described, it is Ridley’s refraining from
standing that directly prevents the initiation of a causal sequence of events that would have
prevented the shattering from occurring. Hence, we do not here have a genuine counterexample to
PRINCIPLE.21 Our tentative conclusion, then, is that the Mind Argument fails in such a way that
nonreductive libertarians are the sole beneficiaries.
20
We here assume the following obvious truth: If S A-s and was able to refrain from A-ing, then S freely
A-s.
21
[Acknowledgements blinded for review.]
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