Knowing Things-in-Themselves:
Bridging the Gap Between Knowledge and Reality
Chienchih Chi (冀劍制)
State University of New York at Buffalo
Abstract
Knowledge is structured through our cognitive frameworks (or cognitive forms). This
seems to mean that we do not directly know reality. What we know about the world is not
necessarily the world-in-itself. In Kant’s words, we can know the real world only by
knowing things-in-themselves, but it is impossible for human beings to possess
knowledge of things-in-themselves because we cannot know things through a God’s-eye
view. Thus, according to Kant, there is a gap between knowledge and reality, or between
epistemology and ontology.
For Kant, if we want to know things-in-themselves, we have to know them
through a God’s-eye view, or, in Nagel’s words, we have to know things-in-themselves
through a view from nowhere. Since we do not (and can never) possess these views to see
things, it is impossible for us to know the ontological world. As long as we believe that
one of these views is necessary for knowing reality, the gap between knowledge and
reality can never be bridged. However, Searle does not agree that we have to apply a
God’s-eye view (or a view from nowhere) to know things-in-themselves. Based on
Searle’s argument, we may find a way to bridge or avoid the gap between knowledge and
reality.
The unbridgeable gap
We do not possess a God’s-eye view or a view from nowhere to see the world. We use the
so-called third-person point of view to understand objective concepts and believe that
these concepts describe things that are supposed to exist in the world objectively and
independently. For example, the computer in front of me may be seen as exactly the same
thing by me and other people from a third-person point of view. In addition, even without
being recognized by any cognitive agent, we believe that those objective entities still exist.
The third-person point of view is supposed to see something objective. When we deal
with things in our daily life, these objective entities or properties may be thought of as
things-in-themselves. This terminology was invented by Kant, but Kant does not believe
that we really possess knowledge of things-in-themselves (Kant 1781; 1965). Thus,
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things-in-themselves may not be a good term for describing entities that are understood
through the third-person point of view.
According to Thomas Nagel’s explanation, the third-person viewpoint is still a
kind of point of view, which is somewhat related to the cognitive agent. Things-inthemselves are not supposed to be known through the third-person point of view, but
rather through a God’s-eye view or a view from nowhere, which seems totally irrelevant
to any cognitive agent (Nagel 1986).
In order to discuss this issue clearly, let’s use absolutely objective to express
properties (of things-in-themselves) that are supposed to be known through a view from
nowhere, but use objective to express properties known through the third-person point of
view. This means that cognitive agents do not use any specific viewpoint to understand
these absolutely objective properties, and through a view from nowhere (or a God’s-eye
view), different cognitive agents (including other animals, aliens, and computer beings)
will see exactly the same things. Thus, if these cognitive agents have concepts about these
properties or things, then these concepts will also be the same.
However, Nagel argues that we can never possess these types of concepts. All
human concepts are more or less subjective and we can never get outside of ourselves
completely to know something absolutely objective. He says,
“The ambition to get outside of ourselves has obvious limits, but it is not always
easy to know where they are or when they have been transgressed. We rightly
think that the pursuit of detachment from our initial standpoint is an indispensable
method of advancing our understanding of the world and of ourselves, increasing
our freedom in thought and action, and becoming better. But since we are who we
are, we can’t get outside of ourselves completely. Whatever we do, we remain
subparts of the world with limited access to the real nature of the rest of it and of
ourselves. There is no way of telling how much of reality lies beyond the reach of
present or future objectivity or any other conceivable form of human
understanding (Nagel 1986, p.6).
For Nagel, we can never possess absolutely objective knowledge because we can’t get
outside of ourselves completely. If we consider the absolutely objective world as the
ontological world (the world of reality), then the epistemological world (the world we
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know or understand) is different from the ontological world. In addition, no matter how
far we can go to see things more objectively, there is no way we will arrive at an
absolutely objective understanding of the world. This also means that we can never know
reality. Thus, there is an unbridgeable gap between our knowledge and reality.
Searle’s view of reality
If the explanation of the Kantian conception of things-in-themselves correctly describes
the ontological world, then the gap is unbridgeable. However, Searle does not believe that
the explanation or definition of things-in-themselves is correct.
Searle does not agree that knowing reality directly as it is in itself requires that it
be known through a view from nowhere or a God’s-eye view (Searle 1998, p.21). Searle
argues that when we see a chair, we directly see the chair in itself – there is nothing
behind it that must be viewed through a God’s-eye view. Searle indicates that we use a
point of view to state facts or things, but we do not use a point of view to invent facts or
things (Searle 1998, p.22). These facts and things that are viewed form a point of view
refer to the ontological world, rather than only our epistemological world. Since Searle
does not believe that there are ontological facts behind the facts that we see from a point
of view, he claims that all we see from a point of view are ontological facts. If we claim
that these facts are simply knowledge, based on Searle’s view, there is no ground for
these facts, which means that we invent facts or things. This is absurd. Thus, Searle
claims that what we see from a point of view are ontological facts.
Searle’s definition of ontology is reasonable and it implies that there is no
absolute objectivity. However, for Kant and Nagel, things-in-themselves are absolutely
objective, and cannot be known through any view. According to this definition of
ontology, there exists a gap between the real world and our knowledge of the world.
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This debate between Kant-Nagel and Searle is not really about how to bridge the
gap originating from Kant’s explanation of things-in-themselves, but about whether there
really is such a gap. According to Searle’s explanation of things-in-themselves, there is
no such gap. Thus, the gap is not really bridged but rather avoided in Searle’s explanation
of things-in-themselves. However, we have reasons to argue that Searle’s explanation is
more plausible. In addition, we can also point out that the conception of absolute
objectivity may originate from a mistaken thought.
Problems with Kant’s things-in-themselves
The conception of absolute objectivity originates from the distinction between
subjectivity and objectivity. Based on this distinction, we are able to imagine that objects
existing in the external world have their own (absolutely objective) properties. However,
we have reasons to believe that the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is
problematic. In addition, we also have reasons to claim that the Kantian definition of
things-in-themselves is bad in some respects.
First of all, suppose there is a property C that belongs to an object O, and C is
absolutely objective. This means that C can never be known through any viewpoint.1
Since any conceivable cognitive mechanism must recognize or understand something
through a cognitive framework, which can be understood as a viewpoint, this fact implies
that no conceivable cognitive mechanism can know what C is. If we believe that God
knows what C is, then we must say that God does not know C through a conceivable
cognitive mechanism. However, we do not have any idea about what kind of knowing
process it (God’s cognitive mechanism) could be. Nor do we have any idea about why we
can be assured that C must exist. In this situation, whether C exists or not is not an
A view from nowhere or a God’s eye view can also be understood as no point of view, which means that
we do not adopt any specific standpoint to view things.
1
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important issue for us to understand the world. This means that we do not have to define
things-in-themselves this way.
Second, if it really happens that the property C exists, since no conceivable
cognitive mechanism can really know it, any knowledge about its existence does not seem
useful. In addition, we know that not all concepts can refer to something real in the world.
Some concepts may be simply produced through a mistaken conceptual framework. If we
have reasons to believe that the idea of absolute objectivity may be one of them, we
should not insist on this kind of definition of the ontological world. Since the problem of
the irreducibility of the mind may imply that the distinction between subjectivity and
objectivity is a mistaken distinction and since the conception of absolute objectivity
originates from the mistaken distinction, we have reasons to believe that absolute
objectivity may be a mistaken concept.2 Thus, we have reasons to claim that the Kantian
definition of things-in-themselves may come from a mistaken thought.
Third, the Kantian conception of things-in-themselves presupposes that there is a
God’s-eye view or a view from nowhere. However, as Searle indicates, if there is really
such a thing as a God’s-eye view or a view from nowhere, there are many things we
cannot see from these views. In Searle’s example, the views cannot see screwdrivers, cars,
bathtubs, etc., because we must see them through a point of view (Searle 1995, p.12).
This means that social reality cannot be seen as reality through these views.
To argue this, Searle distinguishes between intrinsic and observer-relative features
of the world. For Searle, intrinsic features of reality are those that exist independently of
all mental states, and observer-relative features are those that exist relative to the
intentionality of observers, users, etc (Searle 1995, p.9-12). He adds,
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The problem of the irreducibility of the mind is that we cannot use physical concepts to thoroughly
explain the mind. Since we believe that the mental is generated from the physical and the irreducibility
comes from the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity, this irreducibility may indicate that the
distinction is problematic. Nagel (1998) and Searle (1992) both argue that the problem of irreducible mind
originates from the mistaken distinction between subjectivity and objectivity. They suggest that we have to
break the mistaken distinction to solve the problem.
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“It is, for example, an intrinsic feature of the object in front of me that it has a
certain mass and a certain chemical composition. It is made partly of wood, the
cells of which are composed of cellulose fibers, and also partly of metal, which is
itself composed of metal alloy molecules. All these features are intrinsic. But it is
also true to say of the very same object that it is a screwdriver. When I describe it
as a screwdriver, I am specifying a feature of the object that is observer or user
relative. It is a screwdriver only because people use it as (or make it for the
purpose of, or regard it as) a screwdriver” (Searle 1995, p.9-10).
After distinguishing these features, Searle indicates,
“From a God-eye view, from outside the world, all the features of the world would
be intrinsic, including intrinsic relational features such as the feature that people in
our culture regard such and such objects as screwdrivers. God could not see
screwdrivers, cars, bathtubs, etc, because intrinsically speaking there are no such
things” (Searle 1995, p.12).
Without a specific point of view, there are only intrinsic features and we cannot explain
how people use these artifacts and why people need them. Without understanding these
observer-relative features and facts, these artifacts lose their meanings. In addition, if we
do not adopt a point of view, we know nothing of functions. When we say, “The function
of the heart is to pump blood” from “The heart pumps blood,” we are doing something
more than recording these intrinsic facts. We are situating these facts relative to a system
of values that we hold (Searle 1995, p.14-15).
Thus, Searle does not think that it is good to use a God’s-eye view to define
reality; otherwise, we must say that cars do not exist in the world. This is obviously not a
proper result. Thus, the Kantian definition of ontology poorly explains some things in the
world.
Based on these reasons, we can conclude that the Kantian conception of things-inthemselves should be abandoned. Since we have no idea about what a God’s-eye view or
a view from nowhere could be, if we use these views to define ontological reality, then
we simply make a claim that it is impossible for human beings to know reality. In
addition, this definition of ontology will result in a far from acceptable conclusion that no
conceivable cognitive mechanism (or even no possible cognitive mechanism) can know
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what ontological reality is because a cognitive mechanism is a cognitive system that uses
certain ways to detect, explain, and understand facts or things, and this is a point of view
from which to see something. If we adopt a definition of ontology that can only be
viewed from a God’s-eye view or a view from nowhere, then we will fall into this
embarrassing situation. Searle’s definition can avoid this problem.
However, there has to be a reason why Kant, Nagel, and many other philosophers
prefer this explanation of things-in-themselves. I think the reason why many philosophers
like using this definition is probably that it can be a foundation for realism. If we believe
that the world objectively exists, then things-in-themselves are the real nature of objects
that exist in the world. The real nature of objects can only be known through a God’s-eye
view that is supposedly based on no subjective viewpoint. As Putnam indicates, the whole
content of realism lies in the claim that it makes sense to think of a God’s-eye view or
better a view from nowhere (Putnam 1990, p.23).
It seems that if we do not accept the Kantian conception of things-in-themselves,
then we have a problem in accepting realism. However, this is not true. Based on Searle’s
suggestion, we can define realism as the view that “there is a way that things are that is
logically independent of all human representations” (Searle 1995, p.155). But how is it
possible that we can adopt this definition without thinking about (absolutely objective)
things-in-themselves? Searle explains, “Realism does not say how things are but only that
there is a way that they are” (Searle 1995, p.155). We can admit that the world exists
independently without any cognitive agent recognizing it. We do not have to accept that
the real properties of the world are absolutely objective, needing to be known through a
God’s-eye view or no point of view. This means that objects can exist independently but
they have to be known through a point of view. However, this also means that different
viewpoints can view the ontological world differently and they are all ontological
properties. This seems a bad result from Searle’s explanation of things-in-themselves.
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Discussions of Searle’s explanation of reality
Without the Kantian conception of things-in-themselves, we can still accept realism and
the world can still objectively or independently exist. However, there is a problem in
Searle’s definition. If all points of view can see something ontological, how can we
explain illusions? How can we make a mistake in seeing things? Is Searle ready to deny
the existence of illusions and mistaken views of the world?
We may adopt Searle’s explanation or definition of ontology to believe that we
can see reality from a point of view, but we cannot simply claim that all features and facts
viewed from every point of view show ontological reality. Otherwise, illusions and
mistakes are impossible. In addition, some viewpoints may contradict to each other, how
can we accept them all? Furthermore, a viewpoint may apply a conceptual framework to
explain the world, but not all conceptual frameworks can correctly describe the world.
For example, the Newtonian conceptual framework of the physical world is different
from Einstein’s conceptual framework. We can also consider them different points of
view to explain the physical world. However, it is not proper to claim that both of them
correctly describe the ontological world.
In order to properly keep Searle’s explanation of things-in-themselves, it is better
to claim that some points of view or conceptual frameworks may lead us to understand
the ontological world, but some will not. This will explain why we may have illusions
and mistaken views. However, the problem is how we can distinguish these points of
view and conceptual frameworks. My suggestion is that, since Searle seems also to
believe that a complete causal explanation of the world is possible, then all points of view
and conceptual frameworks that are consistent with the complete causal explanation can
be considered a view that can reveal (part of) the ontological reality. Those viewpoints or
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conceptual frameworks that are inconsistent with the complete causal explanation should
be considered mistaken ways to see the world. This will remove the possibility that we
think of illusions or mistaken views of the world as ontological realities because entities
understood through mistaken perceptions will not possess exactly the same causal roles as
the real things.
However, it is still possible that we may see things differently from different
viewpoints that are consistent with the complete causal explanation of the world. I think
we can accept this result. For example, the temperature 50°F can be considered the same
natural phenomenon as the temperature 10°C. We use different viewpoints to see and
explain the same thing in the ontological world.
How to bridge the gap between knowledge and reality?
According to Searle’s explanation of ontology, we deny the Kantian claim that the way to
see ontological realities is through a God’s eye view or, in Nagel’s world, a view from
nowhere. Thus, we can see something ontological through a point of view. Based on this
conclusion, since only cognitive mechanisms possess viewpoints to know things, we can
also infer that if there is no possible cognitive mechanism that can see something X, then
X does not exist. Since one thing has to be seen or understood through a point of view, a
cognitive mechanism can form a point of view to see or understand it. If there is no
possible point of view that is formed by a possible cognitive mechanism to see X, then X
does not possibly exist. If X exists, then at least one viewpoint that is consistent with the
complete causal explanation of the world can be used to reveal X. Thus, a possible
cognitive mechanism that applies the viewpoint can know X. This possible cognitive
mechanism does not necessarily exist now or existed in the past. The possibility of its
existence is enough to give X an ontological status.
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Thus, we assume that if there is a natural phenomenon, then there is a possible
cognitive mechanism that can explain or understand this phenomenon through a point of
view. Thus, if something X is impossible for any possible cognitive mechanism that
adopts a proper viewpoint to explain or to know it, then X is not a natural phenomenon.
This definition denies the possibility that there is something that exists in the ontological
world, but is totally unrecognizable by any possible cognitive mechanism through any
possible viewpoint.
A natural phenomenon plays a causal or functional role in the world.3 We can
create a scientific theory to describe its role or relations with other natural phenomena. If
all causal roles can be explained in a theory, then this theory is the complete causal
explanation of the world. According to Searle’s definition of ontology, if we can create
such a complete causal explanation, we will properly connect epistemology to ontology.
Knowledge obtained from a point of view that is consistent with the complete causal
explanation can be considered a correct description of ontological reality. Thus, once the
complete causal explanation is created, there will be no gap between knowledge and
reality.
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There are some philosophers who do not believe so. They think that some natural phenomena like
phenomenal properties of the mind play no causal role in the world. However, this is not an important issue
here. We can use another view to avoid this debate. Once the properties can be detected, the detector is
already influenced, which has somewhat a kind of functional or causal role in the world. Thus, according to
this level of causal role, all natural phenomena or properties that are detectable play causal or functional
roles. According to the definition of ontology we adopt, there exist no undetectable properties.
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Reference
Kant, Immanuel (1781; 1965). Critique of Pure Reason, Trans. Norman Kemp Smith. New York:
St. Martin’s Press.
Nagel, Thomas (1986). The View from Nowhere, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nagel, Thomas (1998). “Conceiving the Impossible and the Mind-Body Problem,” Philosophy
Vol.73, No.285, pp.337-352.
Putnam, Hilary (1990). Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press.
Searle, John (1992). The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Searle, John (1995). The Construction of Social Reality, New York: The Free Press.
Searle, John (1998). Mind, Language and Society: Philosophy in the Real World, New York:
Basic Books.
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