EU Multi-level Governance Equals Regional Empowerment?
Anna-Lena Hogenauer
PSA Northern Postgraduate Conference, 6 June 2008
Draft – Please do not cite
In the early 1990s, Gary Marks applied the concept of multilevel governance to EU policymaking, arguing that EU policies were subject to a complex system of negotiations of
different levels of government in various arenas. However, while multi-level governance
(MLG) suggests that regions can influence EU policies and, in the process, strengthen their
position vis-à-vis the central state, doubts as to whether strong legislative regions – and in
particular the regions1 of federal states – are really strengthened have grown over the past
years. The aim of this paper is to establish to what extent regions have become
empowered/disempowered by European integration. It will be argued that MLG relies on an
oversimplified model of EU policy-making based on a very specific type of policy and that
the effect of EU policy-making on regional power and authority will vary according to a
regions domestic competences, its wealth and the type of policy-making.
Multi-level Governance as a Theory of the EU as a Political System
In the early 1990s Gary Marks developed the concept of multi-level governance in the context
of EU structural policy. While the concept of MLG is not yet explicitly used in his 1992
chapter on structural policy in the European Community, Marks already addresses the
‘distribution of authority, and decision-making powers across the Community, member states,
and regional governments’, thereby referring to several levels of government (Marks 1992:
192). In his 1993 chapter on ‘Structural Policy and Multilevel Governance in the EC’, Marks
elaborates on the distinction between formal, constitutional powers and everyday politics and
defines the concept of MLG as ‘a system of continuous negotiation among nested
governments at several territorial tiers – supranational, national, regional and local - as the
result of a broad process of institutional creation and decisional reallocation that has pulled
some previously centralised functions of the state up to the supranational level and some
down to the local/regional level’ (Marks 1993: 392). Thus, different levels of government
negotiate on several levels in a process that goes beyond formal relationships to include
informal interaction.
The term ‘region’ can refer to a variety of territorial entities ranging from relatively small sub-state units to
cross-border regions to ‘global’ regions such as West Europe or North America (Loughlin 1997: 154-5). In this
study, the term ‘regions of federal states’ refers to political regions, i.e. territories with regional
governments/administrations. In the case of the federal states it refers to the German and Austrian Länder and
Belgian régions.
1
The two main hypotheses of MLG are that in EU policy-making there will be direct
interaction between sub-national and the supranational actors unmediated by central
governments and that this interaction will undermine the authority of central governments. In
this centrifugal process, some authority will be shifted ‘upwards’ to the European level and
some ‘downwards’ to the sub-national level (Marks 1993: 407). Thus, while MLG
acknowledges that member states remain in the foreseeable future “the most important pieces
of the European puzzle” (Marks, McAdam and Blank 1996: 4; Jeffery 1997: 184), it is closer
to neofunctionalism in that it recognizes that the EU’s supranational bodies, and in particular
the Commission, are capable of exerting independent influence by forming alliances with subnational actors that result in some loss of control on the part of central governments (George
2001: 111-13).
Over time, a more precise set of hypotheses has been developed, especially in relation to the
question of regional influence on EU policy-making. Marks, Haesly and Mbaye (Marks,
Haesly and Mbaye, 2002) argue in a study of sub-national offices in Brussels that an office’s
lobbying activity increases with the funds available, which is in turn linked to the
constitutional competences of the region. Jeffery’s study of the influence of sub-national
authorities in EU policy-making specifies four variables that have an impact on the level of
influence of SNAs both within and across member states. Firstly, a strong constitutional
position allows for more regional influence. Secondly, formal structures of intergovernmental
relations are seen as leading to more influence than informal structures. Thirdly,
administrative adaptation, leadership and coalition-building have an impact on the level of
influence and, finally, legitimacy and social capital (historic background of a SNA, sense of
identity, a well developed civil society, etc.) give greater credibility to sub-national demands
(Jeffery 2000: 14-7).
On the other hand, Bauer (Bauer 2006) argues with regard to the German Länder’s strategy in
the European constitutional debate that “the more resources the particular Land has at its
disposal, the greater seems the likelihood that it opts for the autonomy-orientated position.”
(34). In other words, the wealthier a Land is the more it will strive for a separation of
European and regional competences instead of further Europeanisation of its sphere of
influence. In addition, one of Bauer’s concluding hypotheses is that “[a] sub-national
government is expected to favour a more autonomy-orientated relationship with the European
Union, the more its actual political room for manoeuvre is affected by further European
integration” (35). The ‘actual’ political room for manoeuvre are constitutional competences
and economic resources, as those determine to what extent a region can make full use of those
constitutional competences. Bauer also points out that if a perception of regional
identity/distinctiveness or even a regional party system is involved, this makes the autonomy
option more likely (34). In a similar vein, Jeffery’s recent work on the German Länder shows
that the Länder have come to see European integration as a threat that cannot be reined in by
participation rights and have therefore moved to a strategy of disentanglement of
competences. Jeffery argues that “while regional governments set out 20 years ago with a
transformative project designed to challenge the centrality of the member state in the EU,
legislative regions have in the last few years come to endorse, even buttress the centrality of
the member state” (Jeffery 2007). Thus, while their first strategy was about escaping the
member state and the second about greater participation within it, the third strategy focuses on
the potential of the member state as a barrier against European influence. Legislative regions
are seen as having a distinctive interest in the preservation of “the meaning of regional lawmaking powers in the context of European integration”. Thus, Jeffery argues that the German
regions, with the support of the Belgian and Austrian regions, developed a defensive strategy
during the European constitutional debate with demands for the introduction of the ‘new early
warning system’ for national parliaments and a detailed catalogue of competences. The aim
was to prevent further Europeanization of regional legislative competences and, if possible, to
roll back existing EU powers. A strong member state structure is seen as the best guarantee of
regional autonomy (Jeffery 2005; Große-Hüttemann and Knodt: 596-7).2 Thus, Jeffery argues
that it reflects the Länder’s wish to achieve maximum autonomy within the member state, to
limit the EU’s competences to their current scope and ‘to be left alone’ by the European
Union.
Thus, while the first two articles suggest that the constitutionally strong regions with a long
history will have the greatest influence in EU policy-making amongst European regions,
Bauer’s theory and Jeffery’s analysis of Germany suggest that these same regions will not
support further integration but demand autonomy from the European Union – especially if
they are also economically strong. It does not seem that – from the point of view of
constitutionally strong regions – European integration is a centrifugal process leading to a
distribution of powers both ‘upwards’ and ‘downwards’, but rather a one-way street where
competences move upwards.
An Incomplete Picture – The Empirical Basis of Multi-level Governance
The conflict between the assumption that European integration is part of a centrifugal process
and recent studies that underline the desire of strong regions to limit European integration can
best be explained by looking at the empirical basis of MLG.
At its origin, multi-level governance has been closely linked to empirical findings, albeit in a
specific area of EU policy-making. It has resulted out of Marks’ analysis of EU regional and
structural policy (Marks 1992; Marks 1993) and was initially developed as a concept for EU
policy-making in this field only (George 2004: 107). While it gradually developed into a
general theory of EU policy-making and even European integration, many case studies still
focus on structural policy.
In his study of EU regional policy, Conzelmann has analysed ERDF procedures in North
Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), Nord-Pas de Calais and the North West, three declining industrial
regions receiving Objective 2 aid from 1989 to 1993, to see what difference national politicoinstitutional settings make with regard to the operation of the ‘partnership’ principle
(Conzelmann 1995). In the case of NRW, the Commission was a source of additional funding,
See also Rudolf Hrbek (1999). Hrbek argues that ‘their priority of developing internal channels of participation
– rather than in establishing institutionalised channels of participation and codetermination at the European level,
e.g. in the Committee of Regions – is unmistakable.’
2
but also placed restrictions on the region’s own efforts in the field through its competition
policy. While direct links between NRW and the Commission led to a multilateral pattern of
relationships between supranational, national and regional actors which challenged the
gatekeeper function of the federal government, this did not lead to a noticeable change in
centre-regions power relations. As German structural policy-making relied already on
partnership, the European partnership principle did not lead to noticeable changes in the
relationship between actors (149-50). Ironically, it was in the UK, the least regionalised
country of the three at the time, that the Commission had the biggest impact with its support
for the emergence of the public-private group ‘North West Regional Association’ and its
threat that the region might lose funding in the absence of more internal coherence on a
regional level (p.159-64). While there was no conflict between the regional and central levels
for NRW or Nord-Pas de Calais, the conflictual relations in the UK appeared to be linked to
the generally conflictual relations between the central government and the regional and local
level at the time (165). Thus, overall, in the case of NRW, the enabling and constraining
effect of EU policy-making counterbalanced each other. The absence of conflictual relations
between the national and regional levels limits the applicability of the assumption of MLG
that regions can and will become allies of the Commission in its struggle to gain
independence from the central governments. In addition, European structural policy only
empowered a region in the most centralised case. Bache (2004: 155-6) confirms
Conzelmann’s findings that, in the UK, sub-national involvement in EC structural policymaking was limited and that the central government could still act as a flexible ‘gate-keeper’.
Structural policy was a case of multi-level participation, but not multi-level governance (174).
Tömmel argues with regard to structural policy that the Commission in the most powerful
actor in structural policy and uses this position often to strengthen regions. In addition, “the
more dependent recipient institutions are on external subsidies, the stronger the position of the
Commission” (Tömmel 1998: 59-60). Also in apparent contradiction to Conzelmann,
Anderson finds that the German Länder have been empowered by the Europeanization of
cohesion policy. He points out that especially the eastern Länder have formed ‘a new
territorial constituency in Germany, one that has had the opportunity, the desire, and the
means to avail itself of Commission resources’ (Anderson 1996: 164). In the light of
Tömmel’s (1998) argument, this contradiction might be resolved if one takes into account the
economically extremely weak position of the east German Länder. The enabling effect of the
much needed resources may outweigh the constraining effect of the conditions attached to
them and may have been more important than in the case of NRW. The impact of the degree
of a Land’s dependence on financial support on its attitude towards European integration
clearly emerges from Jeffery’s analysis of two German Länder, Bavaria and Saxony-Anhalt.
It shows that Bavaria, a wealthy and historically rooted Land, would like to limit competences
of European Commission, especially in media policy, agricultural policy and structural policy
and, in particular, see a renationalization/reregionalisation of agricultural and structural
policy. Saxony-Anhalt, by contrast, having a strong interest in Objective 1 of the structural
funds, does not desire to limit the role of the EU (Jeffery 1998).
Finally, with regard to structural policy in Austria, Ficzko’s study reveals that European
structural policy did lead to a considerable strengthening of the regional level compared to
Austrian structural policy pre-accession (Ficzko 2001). While the central government tended
to act like a hegemon and showed little interest in involving the regional level,
Europeanization undermined its position (222-4). The main factors in this process were the
new obligation for multi-annual planning, European financial support, the partnership
principle led to more direct regional engagement with the EU, but also regional mobilisation
from below (229-30).
Overall, it appears that the impact of European structural policy on regions with strong
powers in the field tends to be smaller than on weak regions. It only undermines central
governments where these governments did previously practically monopolise structural
policy-making. By contrast, in the case of regions with important powers in the field, the only
empowering impact stems from the additional financial resources available to the regions,
with the result that the poorer a region is, the more it depends on EU resources and the more it
is in favour of EU involvement. The assumption that there are tensions between the regional
and national levels is not universally true, with the result that regions cannot be expected to
systematically ally themselves with the Commission.
The number of case studies of regional engagement in other EU policy-making areas is very
limited and provides only a patchy picture. Thus, Thielemann’s study of German state aids
showed that Länder-Commission relations can be strained (Thielemann 1999). His analysis of
the dispute about state aid given to Volkswagen by the government of Saxony reveals a bitter
confrontation between the Land and the Commission in which the federal government was
unable to defend the Land. At the centre of the tensions – from a German perspective – were
the Commission’s disregard for the internal allocation of competences in Germany, and its
inconsistent dealings with the special economic situation of the eastern German Länder.
Weatherill (Weatherill 2005) gives a further example of the Commission’s occasional
disregard for domestic structures citing the proceedings against Germany for the incorrect
implementation of harmonising Directive 89/686 on protective equipment for fire-fighters.
Again, the breach was actually caused by the Länder. These studies confirm that the
assumption of a near natural alliance between the regional and the European level does not
apply to all sectors of EU policy-making and hence further confirms the need to rethink and
refine MLG assumptions about the relationship between the regional, national and European
level.
With regard to environmental policy, Streb’s study of Bavaria, Upper Austria and Flanders
shows how the negative integration in state aids has abolished sub-national competencies for
autonomous structural and regional policy. Regions now have to translate their goals into
supranational objectives (Streb 2007: 222-3). He also argues that the Wild Birds Directive and
FFH-Directive illustrate the severe restrictions that strong regions face at the implementation
stage. Thus, in his eyes, European integration leads to a disempowerment of strong regions
that undermines the federal structures of member states.
Overall, looking at the case studies, one notices that the picture is incomplete. First of all,
most case studies focus on structural policy, i.e. a distributive policy that is explicitly built
upon the principle of partnership, while most of the EU’s policies are regulatory. Thus, they
focus on a policy that is more likely to be enabling than the average EU policy. Secondly, by
looking at EU structural policy, authors tend to focus on economically weaker regions. Thus,
the two distinct questions of whether EU funds have an enabling effect on regions or whether
EU structural policy leads to genuine reforms in the distribution of competences are being
conflated. Also, the attitudes of economically strong regions are neglected, which is
problematic in so far as the enabling effect of EU financial support falls away for this type of
region. Thirdly, many of these studies focus on implementation rather than policy-making in
the usual sense. If one is interested in the regions of federal states, this distinction matters, as,
domestically, regions would often have a say in the earlier stages of policy-making and are
thus likely to mobilize during the earlier stages of EU policy-making as well. The question is
therefore: how influential are these regions across all stages of the EU policy-making process?
Fourthly, many studies take – explicitly or implicitly – a ‘top-down’ approach, analyzing the
role of the Commission in mobilizing regions rather than at the ways in which regions
themselves mobilize in EU policy-making. The assumption appears to be that regions are
empowered when they play a role in the implementation/policy-making. The real question is
whether this empowerment really gives them new powers or just allows them to regain
powers on the European level that they already possess in the domestic arena.
As a result, there is need for research on a more diverse set of policy areas and for the
development of more specific hypotheses. In the following three hypotheses will be suggested
for future research.
Who is Empowered by Multi-Level Governance?
H1: The extent to which a region is empowered/disempowered by European integration
depends on its domestic competences. Strong legislative regions will find the channels of
participation in EU policy-making an insufficient compensation for the loss of domestic
powers.
Regions from highly centralized states may find the openness of the European Parliament and
Commission towards lobbying and interest representation by sub-state and non-state actors
enabling. Also, participation in the Committee of Regions, a European advisory body, may
seem attractive. Participation in the implementation of EU policies may strengthen their
position, especially if their financial and administrative resources need to be upgraded for this
purpose. However, strong legislative regions will find the advisory nature of European
channels of regional interest representation and the collective exercise of national channels of
regional interest representation frustrating, in particular in areas where they could previously
co-determine the national policy or even make their own policy. In addition, they do not
benefit from their role of implementers of EU policy, as this is merely an extension of their
domestic powers and as the necessary resources and administrations are already in place.
H2: Economically strong regions will find EU integration less empowering than economically
weak regions.
Economically strong regions do not benefit from the structural funds and can only obtain
limited funding through specific programs. As they have extensive resources at hand, they are
able to steer regional development projects themselves. However, they currently have to work
within the Commission’s guidelines for state aid and within its competition policy.
Economically weak regions, by contrast, may need external funding in order to make full use
of existing competences such as in the area of regional development.
H3: Redistributive areas of EU policy-making will witness greater regional empowerment
than regulatory areas.
First, one could argue that distributive policies differ from regulatory policies in that they
have an inherent potential for an enabling impact on regions by providing resources
(Moravcsik 1994: 53). Second, the partnership principle and the management of funds may
lead to a strengthening of the regional level in relatively centralised states where the regions
hitherto lacked the administrative resources and powers to manage regional projects
(Conzelmann 1995). However, the regions of strongly regionalised or federalised states will
already possess these powers and will generally have already been involved in regional
development prior to the EU structural policy.
The general effect of regulatory policies (the bulk of EU policy), by contrast, can be seen as
rather constraining. In sectors where regions had formerly co-decision powers at the national
level or even exclusive powers, the new European rules restrict their political margin of
manoeuvre in future policy-making at the regional and national level. Where European and
regional policy goals are conflicting, European legislation may effectively force regions to
change their course.
Conclusion
While the strength of multi-level governance lies in its attempt to provide a theory of
European policy-making that reflects the role of both the supranational and the sub-national
levels in addition to the member state governments, it currently relies on over-generalisations
from one particular policy area. In particular, the assumption that European integration is part
of a centrifugal process that distributes power ‘upwards’ to the supranational level and
‘downwards’ to the sub-national level stands in stark contrast with the demands of some
regions for less European integration. In fact, European integration cannot be labelled either
‘empowering’ or ‘disempowering’ for regions. Instead, whether it is one or the other needs to
be assessed on a case-by-case basis. In particular, there is a strong need for further research on
a wider variety of policy areas and for a systematic comparison of the impact of European
integration on the powers of various types of regions.
Bibliography
Anderson J. (1996), “Germany and the Structural Funds: Unification Leads to Bifurcation”, in
L. Hooghe (ed.), Cohesion Policy and European Integration: Building Multi-level
Governance, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Bache I. (2004), “Multi-level Governance and European Union Regional Policy”, in I. Bache
and M. Flinders (eds.), Multi-level Governance, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Bauer M.W. (2006), “The German Länder and the European Constitutional Treaty: Heading
for a Differentiated Theory of Regional Elite Preferences for European Integration”,
Regional and Federal Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 21-41.
Conzelmann T. (1995), “Networking and the Politics of EU Regional Policy”, Regional and
Federal Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 134-173.
Ficzko M. (2001), Regionale Strukturpolitik in Österreich im Zuge des Beitritts zur
Europäischen Union, Dissertation, Berlin, Humboldt Universität.
George S. (2004), “Multi-level Governance and the European Union”, in I. Bache and M.
Flinders (eds.), Multi-level Governance, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Große Hüttemann M. and Knodt M. (2006), “’Diplomatie mit Lokalkolorit’: Die Vertretungen
der deutschen Länder in Brüssel und ihre Aufgaben im EU-Entscheidungsprozess”,
Jahrbuch des Föderalismus, Vol. 7, pp. 595-605.
Hrbek R. (1999), ‘The Effects of EU Integration on German Federalism’, in C. Jeffery (ed),
Recasting German Federalism – The Legacies of Unification, London, Pinter.
Jeffery C. (1997), “Regional Information Offices in Brussels and Multi-level Governance in
the EU: A UK-German Comparison” in C. Jeffery (ed.), The Regional Dimension of
the European Union – Towards a Third Level in Europe?, London, Frank Cass.
Jeffery C. (1998), “Les Länder allemands et l’Europe: intérêts, stratégies et influence dans les
politiques communautaires”, in E. Négrier et B. Jouve (eds.), Que gouvernent les
régions d’Europe?, L’Harmattan, Paris, pp. 55-84.
Jeffery C. (2000), “Subnational Mobilization and European Integration: Does it Make any
Difference?”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 1-23.
Jeffery C. (2005), “Regions and the European Union: Letting them In, and Leaving them
Alone”, in S. Weatherill and U. Bernitz (eds.), The role of Regions and Sub-National
Actors in Europe, Oxford, Hart Publishing.
Jeffery C. (2007), “A Regional Rescue of the Nation-State: Changing Regional Perspectives
on Europe”, EUSA Tenth Biennial International Conference, Montreal.
Loughlin J. (1997), “Representing Regions in Europe: The Committee of the Regions” in
Jeffery C. (ed.), The Regional Dimension of the European Union – Towards a Third
Level in Europe?, London, Frank Cass.
Marks G. (1992), “Structural Policy in the European Community”, in A. Sbragia (ed.), The
Political Consequences of 1992 for the European Community, Washington D.C., The
Brookings Institution.
Marks G. (1993), “Structural Policy and Multilevel Governance in the EU”, in A. Cafruny
and G. Rosenthal (eds.), The State of the European Community, New York, Lynne
Rienner.
Marks G., Haesly R., Mbaye H.A.D. (2002), ‘What Do Subnational Offices Think They Are
Doing in Brussels?’, Regional and Federal Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 1-23.
Marks G., McAdam D. And Blank K. (1996), “European Integration from the 1980s: State
Centric v. Multi-level Governance”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 34, No.
3, pp. 341-78.
Moravcsik A. (1994), “Why the EC Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International
Cooperation”, Centre for European Studies Working Paper 52, Cambridge, MA:
Department of Government, University of Harvard.
Streb H. (2007), Supranational Integration, National Federalism and Subnational States: A
Constitutional Approach to the Impact of European Integratoin on Territorial
Relations in Federal Member States, Thesis for the University of London Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Politics.
Thielemann E.R. (1999), “Institutional limits of a ‘Europe with the Regions’: EC state-aid
control meets German federalism”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 6, No. 3,
pp.399-418.
Tömmel I. (1998) “Transformation of Governance: The European Commission’s Strategy for
Creating a ‘Europe of the Regions”, Regional and Federal Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp.
52-81.
Weatherill S. (2005), “The Challenge of the Regional Dimension in the European Union”, in
S. Weatherill and U. Bernitz (eds.), The role of Regions and Sub-National Actors in
Europe, Oxford, Hart Publishing.