Lunn – Representations of science in primary teachers' practice
Evidence of depth and subtlety in the representations of science in
primary teachers’ practice
Stephen Lunn, the Open University
Paper presented at the European Conference on Educational Research
University of Lisbon, 11-14 September 2002
ABSTRACT
Science is now part of the core curriculum for children aged 5 upwards in many
western countries. Primary (elementary) teachers in England have gained in
confidence and success through teaching it. In the process their views of the nature of
science have developed. These views form part of a 'hidden curriculum', framing the
development of students’ ideas about and orientations towards the subject.
Understanding them is necessary to understanding learners' experiences of it. This
research explored such views through case study and survey methodologies. It
showed the depth and subtlety of teachers' views of science, and analysed them in
terms of six factors, provisionally named scientism, naive empiricism, 'new-age-ism',
constructivism, pragmatism and scepticism. Such an understanding of how science is
actually being represented in classrooms can inform current debates about the place
of the nature of science in the science curriculum.
Introduction
Over the last fifteen years, in much of the developed world, science has become part of the
core curriculum throughout the years of compulsory education. In England and Wales a
broad and detailed curriculum is specified for children aged 5 upwards. At its introduction in
the late 1980s, there was widespread diffidence among primary (elementary) school teachers
in relation to their perceptions of their own competence to teach science (Wragg et al.
1989). Yet over a few years they moved to positions of some confidence and success in
teaching it, despite extensive research pointing out severe gaps in their scientific content
knowledge (Bennett et al., 1992; Kruger et al., 1990). It seems that the act of teaching had
somehow transcended the subject matter and given teachers confidence by another route.
Local, national and international evidence suggests that this confidence was not misplaced,
and that primary teachers in England were and are achieving good and improving results in
their science teaching. In the process their views of the nature of science and the purposes of
teaching it can be expected to have developed.
Locally, for example, the Heads of Science from an LEA's secondary schools emerged not
only impressed, but also surprised and 'rattled', from an encounter with Y6 pupils'
knowledge and understanding of science and science investigation (Gunnell, 1999).
Nationally, the percentage of pupils in England and Wales attaining the 'expected level for
age' or above, in the national year 6 (age 10-11 years) tests, is increasing by nearly 6% a
year, compared with 4.5% for maths and English, despite having started from a higher base
(DfEE 1996a, 1996b, 1997; QCA 1998, 1999, 2000).
Internationally, English primary pupils were found to be amongst the best in the world in
science in the TIMSS international comparisons of attainment in maths and science in
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Lunn – Representations of science in primary teachers' practice
1995/6, though they hovered in mid-table in maths (Harris et al, 1997). Similar results were
found in re-runs of TIMSS in 1998/9 (Ruddock, 2000).
The importance of the teacher in relation to the quality of students' learning, and to the ideas
about and orientations towards a subject that students develop, is well documented. There
are good reasons to believe that teachers' views of the nature of science form part of a
'hidden curriculum' in their science teaching: thus an understanding of them is necessary to
an understanding of learners' experiences of science (Gordon, 1984; Brickhouse, 1991;
Solomon et al, 1996; Uhrmacher, 1997). The research reported here took account of
Koulaidis and Ogborn’s (1995) warning to avoid 'assuming that teachers have one or other
completely consistent view of the nature of science' and aimed to 'construct a collection of
elements ... which can be used to analyse and represent teachers' thinking', and explored
teachers’ views through both case study and survey methodologies.
The survey sample was believed to be unbiased in relation to science background, gender,
and level of comfort with science teaching. The survey data yielded six factors, explaining
82% of the variance in respondents' views of science. These factors were provisionally
named scientism, naive empiricism, 'new-age-ism', constructivism, pragmatism and
scepticism.
The case studies showed the depth and subtlety of some teachers' views of science. The
views expressed by the case study teachers in interview, and those inferred from and made
explicit in their practice, were in most cases consistent with their positions on the factors,
providing support for the validity of the factors.
The distributions of the case study teachers’ responses to survey questions were set against
the frequency distributions for the complete sample and showed that the case study teachers
were typical of the sample and, since the sample was unbiased, of the wider population of
primary teachers. This suggests that the views of the nature of science of this wider
population, and the representations of science communicated in their science teaching, are
also of considerable depth and subtlety.
Current international debates about curriculum reform include the place of the nature of
science in the science curriculum (e.g. Ratcliffe et al, 2001). These debates can be informed
by the kind of analysis presented here. It may be unwise to attempt to specify what should
be taught, in the absence of an understanding of how science is actually being represented in
classrooms. We have to look at suggestions of what ought to be in the context of what is, if
we are to decide whether they represent an improvement.
The following sections:
 give more background on the research methods;
 explicate six 'nature of science' factors extracted from survey data, and their distribution
in the survey sample;
 introduce five case study teachers and show how each is positioned in relation to the six
factors by the survey responses that each of them gave;
 describe the views of science each of the five teachers expressed in interview, and those
made explicit in or inferred from their practice;
 compare the case study teachers' positions in relation to the six factors with their views
derived from interview and observations of practice;
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Lunn – Representations of science in primary teachers' practice
 evaluate the robustness and validity of the six factors;
 discuss the place and nature of science in primary teachers' professional understanding.
Research methods
A pilot project conducted in 1995-96 explored primary teachers' perceptions of the nature of
science and the purposes of primary science education (Lunn, 1996). An initial analysis of
the literature was carried out to identify the main positions on the nature of science that
might be taken, and the main issues on which these positions differed. This involved
reviewing the positions of philosophers, historians and sociologists of science; the research
into the public understanding of science; the research into the views of the nature of science
held by teachers and students; and educationalists' views on the nature of science and
science learning.
This analysis identified the following aspects as important in the characterisation of various
positions:
i]
the different referents of the term 'science';
ii]
the disciplines within science and their inter-relationships;
iii]
relationships between scientific and other disciplines;
iv]
the status of scientific knowledge;
v]
criteria of demarcation;
vi]
scientific method;
vii] the processes of science;
viii] patterns of change in science;
ix]
science in society;
x]
the nature of scientists.
Each of these aspects was broken out into the range of issues that had been abstracted from
the literature: for example at the next level of detail, views of the status of scientific
knowledge could be characterised in terms of positions on:
i]
the confidence with which it can be held;
ii]
whether it has a special status in relation to other forms of knowledge;
iii]
what it is knowledge of;
iv]
the criteria for its acceptance as valid knowledge;
v]
its scope or universality;
vi]
the relationship between discovery and creation in its development.
Analysis of the pilot data suggested that individual teachers' positions could be rich and
complex, and were perhaps dependent on scientific and social context (Lunn & Solomon,
2000). The results of each individual's interview were combined to give a domain mapping
containing only those conceptualisations and distinctions enunciated by teachers in
interview. This formed the basis for the design of the survey instrument and interview
schedules used in the main project.
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Lunn – Representations of science in primary teachers' practice
The research called for both depth, in terms of insights into individual teachers' thinking,
and breadth, in terms of wanting to say something about primary teachers in general: hence
the combination of case study and survey methods in the research design for the main
project. Depth was provided by five case studies of individual primary teachers, purposively
selected, each involving a series of interviews and lesson observations over an eighteenmonth period. Teachers' planning was interrogated using protocol analysis (Ericsson &
Simon, 1993), and biographical and reflective data were collected. The analyses looked at
the views of the nature of science and the personal pedagogic theories of the teachers both as
expressed in interview, and as constructed in the classroom and expressed in their practice.
Breadth was provided by the survey, which also included sections on respondents' science
education and their views on primary science teaching.
A major weakness of quantitative research is the lack of depth with which survey answers
can be probed, leading to doubts about internal validity. In the eyes of many, perhaps
including some policy-makers, a major weakness of qualitative research is its casespecificity – we want to go beyond the cases studied but run into the problem of
generalisation or external validity (Foddy, 1993; LeCompte and Goetz, 1982). Here the
approach taken involved 'intersecting' the case study and survey strands: the case study
teachers completed survey forms, and the rather abstract questions requiring a simple
response in the survey were contextualised and explored in detail in interview, enabling the
internal validity of the survey to be assessed (Brickhouse et al, 2000). Further, it meant that
each of the five case study teachers could be positioned in relation to the wider population of
primary teachers, and thus their typicality could be gauged, in relation to the variables in the
survey. The research methodology is discussed more fully in Lunn (forthcoming).
Six ‘nature of science’ factors
The questionnaire contained 36 questions relating to the nature of science, each taking the
form of a statement (derived from the pilot study as described above) and a five-point level
of agreement scale. Factor analysis, a way of grouping multiple variables into ‘factors’ that
‘explain’ large chunks of variance, was used to compress these data. Six factors emerged,
explaining 82% of the variance (N=61, factor loadings>0.7, p<0.05). These factors were
stable across various combinations of method of extraction, encouraging some confidence in
their validity (Hair et al., 1995). The factors were labelled as follows (percentages show the
proportion of the total variance explained by each factor):
Scientism
19%
Naïve empiricism
17%
New-age-ism
15%
Constructivism
11%
Pragmatism
10%
Scepticism
9%
These labels are shorthand tags: what each means is a set of variable loadings. For example
the scientism factor loaded heavily on the views that:
 applying the scientific method will eventually lead us to the truth (.870)
 there are no mysteries that could not ultimately yield to scientific enquiry (.842)
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Lunn – Representations of science in primary teachers' practice
 science is the only way of finding out about the reality that lies behind the world of
appearances (.794).
Translating the factors and variable loadings into English yields the characterisations of the
factors and tentative interpretive commentaries given in Table (i).
Five case studies
Table (ii) summarises the backgrounds of the case study teachers. Names and identifying
information have been changed to avoid compromising the anonymity of the participants.
Figure 1 shows how the five cases are positioned on the six factors.
Table (iii) summarises analyses of their observed practice in terms of an analysis frame
derived from personal theories of teaching and learning expressed in interview.
Andrew and Linda seemed to have much in common in their personal pedagogies, but had
very different backgrounds in science. Both were very effective teachers of science,
according to colleagues and students. Irene, less experienced in teaching but with a strong
technical background, may have been constrained by the demands of teaching an
examination year in a difficult school. Her pedagogy was strongly connectionist. Keith was
thoroughly disillusioned with teaching and was to leave the profession soon after the project
ended. Howard had been teaching for a long time, and was looking forward to retirement.
The five case study teachers' views of the nature of science
The following sections attempt to give the teachers' views of the nature of science, and the
views of science manifest in their practice. The accounts contain only straight quotes or
close paraphrases of what was said in interview, and said and done in planning sessions and
in interaction with students. Many of the points were reiterated several times in various
forms and contexts.
 Andrew
Andrew sees science as playing a part, alongside other areas of learning, in understanding
and explaining our lives and experiences. It is demarcated by characteristic processes,
focused on the material world, which constitute ‘scientific method’. Scientific method
produces facts and knowledge applicable beyond the context of their discovery, but
provisional - it is not foolproof. Scientific knowledge increases cumulatively: theories can
be ‘renewed and changed’ both in the light of new knowledge and new facts, and as a result
of asking better questions or making better interpretations. Science investigates the reality
behind phenomena, which is not necessarily accessible to the senses. To do so it uses
scientific theories, ways of explaining facts and phenomena, perhaps in terms of models of
the underlying reality. Theories consist of systems of ideas put into a framework. New
theories often require new frameworks, new ways of looking at previous findings and
theories. Different disciplines are of equal standing; the validity of a knowledge claim is
established by the procedures within the discipline, and thus validity is a within-discipline
rather than an across-disciplines quality.
Comparing a scientist’s and a shaman’s knowledge of rain-forest fungi, Andrew began by
arguing that they are equally valid, though reached by different routes for different purposes.
On reflection he decided that the shaman’s beliefs, though based on many generations of
trial and error, are likely to be integrally bound up with rituals and belief systems whose
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Lunn – Representations of science in primary teachers' practice
validity he rejects [the parts of the shaman’s knowledge that he accepts as valid are those
that are compatible with the causal models of a ‘scientific’ world view].
On scientific literacy, he quoted ‘a little learning can be a dangerous thing’ in order to
disagree, saying ‘a little learning is probably better than no learning at all’. The source of
the danger in a little learning is that its possessor is unaware of how little it is: thus a major
goal of education for scientific literacy should be for people to learn enough to understand
how little they know as individuals, and how little science knows as a whole.
He argued that science and morality are intractably connected, science being the engine of
change, informing how we view ourselves and what we are, and leading to potentially
unlimited restructuring of our ‘moral and value framework'.
On the role of science content knowledge in primary teaching, he argued that a good basic
knowledge of a subject is necessary in order to teach it, noting that this is difficult when
teaching nine or ten subjects, and more difficult the older the students are. As a minimum, a
primary teacher should start at GCSE Grade C (GCE 'O' level) standard or above, in each
subject they teach: if they are interested and motivated 'they will take it on from there'.
Outside school Andrew follows science in the media, including reading specialist magazines
like New Scientist, and is interested in astronomy and environmental issues. Discussing a
real-world issue, Andrew argued that as the research had not been done, there was no
definite answer, observing that in relation to this and other issues, 'we often act on evidence
which really doesn’t have much basis in reality, simply because it comes from school
handouts, official headed paper, or is said very convincingly'.
Andrew's practice suggests that science should be conducted in a methodical and orderly
manner. Measurement in standard units, to give quantified results, makes results comparable
and communicable, and avoids inter-observer differences of interpretation. In science we are
concerned to establish evidence that is as reliable and complete as possible: hence the need
to repeat tests, and to test all relevant variables. Having established real differences we can
then look closer to seek explanations for them. If we do not have the ideal equipment for the
tests we want to carry out, we have to think hard, improvise, and get the results somehow,
accepting a degree of inaccuracy if necessary, but 'never cheating': science relies on the
personal integrity of scientists.
There are often several possible explanations for some phenomenon, in which case it is
necessary to think hard about them and how we might investigate them further. All science
involves testing some hypothesis by experiment or observation: scientific conclusions are
'better than random guesses’ as to the way the world really is because they are supported by
empirical evidence, and at any one time represent ‘what we think we can safely say’ about
the material world.
He observes parallels between how children learn science and how scientific knowledge
itself is created. Left to themselves, children will spontaneously investigate, observe, and
form their own conclusions and theories, 'probably half-baked', but produced by collecting
evidence and talking and thinking about it. They thus 'make a rule' that will function as an
hypothesis, which they test and refine using their own, shared or borrowed ideas,
constructing a better, more general rule that may achieve consensus.
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Lunn – Representations of science in primary teachers' practice
 Howard
Howard sees science as a way of looking at the universe, characterised by specificity,
precise measurement, and analysis. It consists of theory, hypotheses, experiments, and
replicable results that cannot easily be misinterpreted. The basis of belief in scientific
knowledge is trust in the methods and integrity of scientists. Science is demarcated by its
procedures, and the absence of an aesthetic element in evaluating its claims, which are not
subject to fashion, cultural values or opinion, and are refutable only by better science: in this
sense, scientific knowledge is always tentative, accepted as the best available at the time.
Knowledge is an accumulation of facts, ideas and theory: theory arises from experimental
conclusions, thus theoretical entities exist in the real world.
On scientific literacy he said, 'Asking why science should matter is like asking ‘Why should
Shakespeare matter?’. For a lot of people it does not. It makes no difference to their lives,
but they are impoverished by not understanding it.'
On the relationship between science and morality, he argued that pure science is specially
privileged in that it is an area where the end of ‘finding out’ can justify means that would not
be acceptable for other ends: 'You can do things that are totally immoral to get to the
conclusion'.
Howard was ambivalent about the role of content knowledge. At times he argued that good
subject knowledge is essential: 'You have to know it in order to teach it, and if you don’t,
you’ve got to get some INSET'. At other times, thinking about his own experiences of it, he
argued that such in-service training ‘isn’t needed.. you don’t have to be a scientist to teach
science’.
Outside school Howard does not seek out science in the media, but is pleased when he
comes across it: 'I think it’s fascinating, but I don’t read scientific journals and I don’t go
out of my way to find scientific stuff and I don’t go to exhibitions'. Discussing a real-world
issue, he provided warrants for his views in terms of his personal beliefs and experience, and
what he had been told by trusted authority.
Howard's practice suggests that he sees scientific knowledge as tentative and susceptible to
radical reconstruction. He is careful to qualify all claims with ‘Scientists think...’, partly to
avoid offending staff, children or parents who have an 'extra or different belief' such as a
Christian fundamentalism: 'Children need to know that it isn't fixed, there are no Truths,
that's the message'. He is very interested in the surface forms of scientific symbolism and
vocabulary, irrespective of their meaning, but implies that the question at the heart of an
investigation does not need to be intrinsically interesting. Science poses and answers
questions, but tells us nothing about why we should be interested in the questions or the
answers.
On occasions, Howard gave a rather cynical impression of scientific practice, for example
implying that it was more important that the recording of practical work contained the
'correct' results and vocabulary than that it represented students' experiences and
understanding.
 Irene
Irene sees science as a process (study of the world) with a purpose (to help us understand it).
It is a situated, human activity characterised by succinctness and purposeful abstraction, and
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Lunn – Representations of science in primary teachers' practice
demarcated by being precise, testable and concerned with facts rather than feelings.
Scientific method involves carrying out an experiment or investigation to find out or verify
something specific, normally with a good idea of what the results will be; gathering and
recording results; and then drawing conclusions. Drawing conclusions is equivalent to
creating, modifying or confirming theory that explains what the results mean. Human
problems, technological and medical needs are the engine of change and progress in science.
Irene is sceptical towards official statements from government and industry, where vested
interests ‘conjure’ an imprimatur of scientific credibility.
On scientific literacy, she argues that non-scientists should have some idea of the scientific
explanations of why the world is as it is, of everyday phenomena like 'night and day, the
seasons, their heartbeat – otherwise you’re just living in a world of cotton wool'.
She sees science and morality as being often in conflict, particularly when commercial
vested interests steer and constrain scientific research. The problem is not the scientists
themselves, who generally have human values, but the industries exploiting their work for
profit, which have only commercial values. She argues that as humans we have a collective
responsibility for what our species does. We have only ourselves to blame if we suffer as a
result of some new technology, but we have a collective responsibility to protect unborn
generations and the natural world, which have no choice in the matter, from such things.
Subject knowledge plays a central role in Irene’s teaching, particularly the background
knowledge that allows the interesting digressions that are her hallmark of good teaching; but
it is not possible to be ‘a specialist in everything’. Thus she does not preclude teaching
without deep background knowledge: the benefits of the ‘single class teacher’ approach at
primary level outweigh any problems of patchy knowledge.
Outside school, Irene is interested in and knows the science of AIDS, and has worked as a
volunteer with AIDS patients. She is an active member of environmental groups. She
follows science in the press and on T.V., reads some popular science books, and is an
enthusiastic follower of the space programme and an avid science fiction reader. In
discussing a real-world issue, Irene used biological knowledge and reasoned in terms of
evolutionary advantage to ground her view in a plausible biological argument.
Irene's practice suggests that science is woven intimately into the fabric of her world,
familiar and accessible. She refers to its purpose as providing explanations for experience:
that some of her explanations have a teleological flavour may reflect a personal pedagogic
theory that such explanations are better understood by young children.
Messages about the nature of science and our relationship with it that come through in her
teaching include the interconnectedness and interdependence of processes and areas of
knowledge within science, of the physical and biological systems of the world, and of our
place in and responsibilities towards them. She makes it clear that doing science, for
example framing and conducting an open-ended investigation, is hard but worthwhile,
compared with the rote learning of scientific ‘facts’, explaining later that science always
offers the possibility of substantive explanation, unlike maths and English, where repeatedly
asking ‘why?’ will lead eventually to an explanation in terms of an arbitrary rule. She points
out that in the practical sphere of experiments, 'science doesn’t always work' as one expects
and hopes, just as following a recipe does not always produce a perfect cake, though usually
scientists will know what is going to happen before they do an experiment. Like children,
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Lunn – Representations of science in primary teachers' practice
scientists make the best progress when they have time to play around, 'but on a much, much
higher level'.
On one occasion Irene gave the impression that she thought it was acceptable for students to
‘idealise’ what they did when they were writing up their work, so that the written report of
an experiment would be strictly speaking untrue in what were considered to be unimportant
details.
 Keith
Keith sees science as the harnessing of rational thought and observation to provide
mechanistic explanations. One general scientific method is common to all science, involving
replicability, verification through testing of predictions, and fairness in research design. The
notion of scientific proof is not problematic in contexts where warrants can be found in
personal experience: but 'at the other end of the scale scientists are prone to try to build a
framework which leads them to extrapolate their ideas into a realm of faith'. Keith cited
Darwinism as an example of this.
Entities like electrons are not ‘real things’, but are elements in theoretical and often
mathematical models encapsulating our best available description or mechanistic
explanation of the phenomenal world - the history of science shows that these theories and
entities change over time and so must be part of our descriptions, not part of the world.
The 'most powerful thing' about science is 'a methodology which has integrity, and informs
and builds up a reliable set of knowledge, explaining what’s already there, and by a
methodical approach helps us to predict what is about to happen.. and when it does happen,
then that I say is an increase in knowledge’. However ‘what science will tell you is limited
to the extent that your world view corresponds to a scientific modernist world view’: science
explains observables rather than underlying reality, and is not in itself adequate to give a full
world view, both because it is unable to offer an account of the mysterious patterns in
mathematics and nature, and because it is constantly evolving. When different forms of
knowledge appear to be in contradiction, 'absolute standards of truth and morality' can be
applied.
On scientific literacy, Keith argues that we should all be concerned with gaining a broad
scientific understanding as part of our worldview, and that this need is as great for those
earning a living in science as for anyone else. Ordinary people are becoming more confident
of their own value systems, and more aware that their values are not necessarily shared by
those pushing new technologies; our ‘post-modern children' do not look at science as ‘the
great hope of the future’, but question both its integrity and what it tells us.
He sees scientific knowledge, being liable to change, as unsuitable as a foundation for moral
values. Faith is a better candidate for an absolute standard because it is irrational, and cannot
be explained, or proven, or disproven. However science is becoming less isolated from
moral concerns. This is not a change in what science is but in how it is perceived. For
example the source of the current unease about GM is people’s feeling that there is
something morally and spiritually wrong with it, something to which its proponents are
morally blind, just as two centuries ago many were morally blind to the evil of the slave
trade.
Keith believes that it is unnecessary for a primary teacher to have extensive science content
knowledge.
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Lunn – Representations of science in primary teachers' practice
Outside school, Keith's interest in science does not take him beyond the broadcast media. He
is indifferent to environmentalism. The main arena in which he encounters science is in
debates around science and religion, with friends in the church.
Keith's comments in class imply a pragmatic view of method: it is not a question of right or
wrong, but whether it leads to a 'sensible result at the end'; and it is not always possible to
plan investigations - often it is a case of trying different things until something works.
Normally the first stage of a scientific investigation is exploratory, involving looking
closely, counting, classifying and mapping. It can be an iterative process. If the first round of
observation leads to unclear or confused classification schema, we can pick out some
promising characteristic and do more observations, focusing on that characteristic. We
should develop a complete and satisfactory description and classification scheme before
moving systematically on to developing functional explanations, but we may have to be
selective, to generalise and to abstract. We have to ignore what we believe to be extraneous
detail in developing our descriptions and classification schemes. In developing explanations
we may use a multiplicity of different modelling techniques for different purposes. We have
to be very careful in our use of language, and sometimes we have to guess, fudge, or make
assumptions, in order to make progress.
 Linda
Linda talks about science in terms of four aspects – content, process, institutional and
pedagogic. Science is characterised by process rather than content, where process includes
‘theoretical scientific reasoning’. Scientific method is pluralistic: there are many methods,
all sharing the common thread of ‘fairness’: fair testing can be applied anywhere, 'even in
English Literature'.
Theories attempt to explain the natural world, and flow from an innate human tendency to
curiosity and model-building, a need to explain, and a refusal to accept that things just
happen to be how they are: they are explanatory models derived from data and imagination.
Scientific knowledge is tentative, and not the only valid knowledge. Progress in science is
real and cumulative, and arises from dialectic between factual and theoretical advance: it is
continuous, with occasional ‘breakthroughs’. Like everyone else, scientists’ world-views are
formed by society, and their world-views colour and inform their scientific thinking: but
scientific change can, in turn, change world-views.
Science, to be of value, has to be independent; but is reliant on funding from government
and industry, who are ‘going to want something back for their funding, so true independence
is really very difficult to find’. The phrase ‘scientifically proven’ immediately invokes the
misinterpretation or misuse of science in the media, marketing, or government propaganda.
Discussing the reality of various theoretical entities, Linda went through a series of
philosophical positions. She began by assuming a naive realist position, that elements in
accepted theories are real: she recognised their constructed nature - ‘they’re all somebody’s
theories, or thoughts or strategies or reasoning and justifying of something’: she questioned
the relationship between theory and reality: she mooted a phenomenalist position: ‘some
people will only have real as something they can touch and feel’: she moved to a solipsistic
position, that reality is personal and private, giving as a warrant the reality of his
hallucinations to a paranoid schizophrenic: and finally settled into a kind of cultural
relativism, citing the reality of spirits and visions for the indigenous people of North
America.
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On scientific literacy she argued that science should matter to non-scientists because it helps
people to understand and evaluate the reasoning behind policy issues, and to be questioning
and sceptical.
On the relationship between science and morality, she argued that religion and established
moral orders 'function to control and maintain the status quo'; whereas 'science emancipates
and frees people' to pursue and create their own understandings and personal moralities.
Linda feels more confident and teaches better when she knows she has sound subject
knowledge, but holds that lack of knowledge can be turned to pedagogic advantage,
explaining that children love it when a teacher says 'I don’t know'.
Outside school Linda follows science in the broadcast and printed media, visiting museums
and attending science-related events with her family. She supports but has never joined
environmental groups, and shares her pupils’ concerns about environmental issues.
Discussing a real-world issue Linda explains how she has systematically gathered her own
'scientific evidence' on which she bases her conclusions and actions, though she admits that
'long-term controlled experiments' would be needed to be sure.
Linda's practice suggests that she sees science as something that can be done anywhere, by
anyone. It starts with looking closely and carefully, and Linda points out how interesting and
unexpected the ubiquitous and taken-for-granted can be when you do so. She believes there
is a personal, quirky element in scientific progress that arises from the uniqueness and
individuality of each scientist, and draws parallels between children’s learning of science
and scientists’ creation of scientific knowledge in their common needs to:
 keep trying lots of different ways to think about or do something;
 build models;
 learn together while retaining autonomy and identity;
 keep questioning; and
 avoid squashing independent ideas.
Solving a scientific problem involves thinking about it from different angles, imagining
what might be, looking hard, trying things out, and changing things systematically. Part of
this is a kind of exploratory play, within which one comes to understand the meaning of the
goal one has been set, and to experience curiosity, frustration, joy, competitiveness,
community, consensus, failure, success, and reflection. Science involves moving through
cycles of open-ended exploration and focused attempts to answer specific questions. It is
open, methodical, shared and replicable, and its usefulness penetrates all corners of ordinary
life. Precedence is important and linked to the thrill of discovery, and scientific success
rewards perseverance. Science demands thinking and doing rather than reading and writing
skills, and a particular kind of creative imagination: if you cannot see what is happening,
you have to use what you can see, know and guess, to help you to imagine what is
happening.
Comparing positions on the nature of science derived from survey, interview and
observation data
The positions of the case study teachers in relation to the six factors were compared with the
views each expressed in interview and those implied or explicit in their practice.
11
Lunn – Representations of science in primary teachers' practice
For each factor, a 'characterisation' had been produced, which someone scoring positively on
the factor could be expected to agree with: see table (i). For example the Naive Empiricism
factor was characterised as:
 Science proceeds by trying things out to see what happens.
 Science is driven by data derived from such observations.
 Progress is represented by the steady accumulation of facts.
For each case study teacher, expectations of their position on such statements were created
in line with that person's score on the factor: so for example Andrew, Irene and Keith, who
all scored highly negatively on Naive Empiricism, would be expected to disagree strongly
with each of these statements. The views of each teacher, as derived from interview and
from practice, were then searched for the expectations in relation to each factor, to establish
which of the following cases held:
 views consistent with expectations
 views inconsistent with expectations
 multiple views expressed, both consistent and inconsistent with expectations
 issues raised by expectations not addressed.
So for example Andrew was expected to disagree strongly with the views taken to
characterise Naive Empiricism above, and was indeed found to do so, in terms of the views
expressed in interview and those that came through in his practice.
Linda, in contrast, was expected to agree strongly with the Naive Empiricism position, and
at times expressed views that suggested that she did: but would always amplify her position
later. For example in interview she argued that science is characterised by process rather
than content, but qualified this by insisting that process includes ‘theoretical scientific
reasoning’, and went on to express a position that is far from naive:
Progress in science is real and cumulative, and arises from a dialectic between factual
and theoretical advance ... Like everyone else, scientists’ world-views are formed by
society, and their world-views colour and inform their scientific thinking: but scientific
change can, in turn, change world-views.
Similarly in practice she implied that science can be done anywhere, by anyone, in relation
to anything, but went on to highlight social aspects and the role of the creative imagination:
Science demands thinking and doing rather than reading and writing skills, and a
particular kind of creative imagination: if you cannot see what is happening, you have to
use what you can see, know and guess, to help you to imagine what is happening.
These were taken to indicate that neither her views expressed in interview nor those derived
from her practice were consistent with expectations based on her score on the Naive
Empiricism factor.
Three cases were noted where a teacher's views from interview or practice did not address
the issues raised by the expectations, and in only one case was it possible to argue that
multiple views had been expressed that were both consistent and inconsistent with the
expectations. This was again Linda, in relation to the Scientism factor. Her negative score on
this factor was consistent with her cultural relativism and her views on the relationships
12
Lunn – Representations of science in primary teachers' practice
between science, society and our evolving world-views. However this seemed inconsistent
with other views, e.g. of the universal applicability of 'fair testing', and of science as
something that 'emancipates and frees people' to pursue and create their own understandings
and personal moralities.
These findings are summarised in table (iv). Andrew's views and practice were consistent
with his factor scores for five of the six factors (10/12), the exception being Constructivism,
where his negative factor score contrasts with views and practice that match the factor
characterisation closely. Howard and Irene matched in 9/12 instances, following identical
patterns, and Keith in 8/12. Linda was the exception, with good matches in only 3/12
instances.
Inconsistencies may be related to participants' approaches to completing the survey form: in
several cases, as well as marking a point on a Likert scale, they added comments suggesting
that their response was to a re-framed question, not the one printed on the form. In varying
degrees, participants also tended in interview to give an 'off the top of the head' response
initially, but to come back with a more considered view later, and it could be that some
survey responses reflected the former rather than the latter. Inconsistencies could also arise
if, though questions were framed in terms of science in general, participants were answering
in terms of an implicit context or setting.
Overall the expectations derived from teachers' scores on the factors were consistent with
their views expressed in interview and in practice around two-thirds of the time: with Linda
excluded from the data, this would be up to 75%.
Of the factors, Naive Empiricism and Scepticism are the most reliable, with good matches
between views, practice and factors scores for 4 of the 5 cases. New-age-ism is the least
reliable, with good matches in 2/5 cases. Scientism was reliably matched with views
expressed in interview but not in practice. For two factors, Constructivism and Pragmatism,
factor scores matched those derived from practice better than those derived from interview.
Evaluation of robustness and validity of the factors
The six nature of science factors emerged from the data, and were not present in any
systematic way in the prior conceptual apparatus underlying the creation of the survey
instrument. The data from the case studies supports their validity to a degree, though there
remain doubts about the completeness of their coverage and in some cases their clarity. In
this sense the analysis represents a first pass at the problem rather than a definitive
conclusion: it does, however, show how a combination of survey and case study methods
could be used to make progress on Koulaidis and Ogborn's (1995, p280) programme of
constructing 'a collection of elements ... which can be used to represent teachers' thinking'
about the nature of science.
The survey questions producing the variables from which the factors were extracted were
derived from conversations between one researcher and seven teachers, and their scope may
have thus been limited by the conceptualisations current in that group at that time. It may be
advisable in any future work in this area to strengthen the coverage of the survey questions,
especially in the psychological and sociological dimensions, perhaps by following the
mapping of a naturalistic approach to the study of science such as Ziman's (2000).
13
Lunn – Representations of science in primary teachers' practice
It will also be noted that the survey questions referred to science in general, and were not
contextualised within specific scientific issues or areas of knowledge. They were based on
views expressed in interview by the teachers involved in the pilot study, most of which were
similarly not contextualised. In the interviews in the main study, the teachers seemed
comfortable in moving between generic and contextualised discussion. When it occurred,
contextualisation was in terms of specific areas of science and specific cultural contexts,
such as the school, the family, or government advice: future work in this area might benefit
from paying attention to both these dimensions of contextualisation.
The factors were stable over various methods of extraction, and significant at p < .05.
However some of the factors could be clearer, and possible anomalies remain – for
example:
 it is not clear whether the pragmatism factor represents a simplistic or a sophisticated
response;
 the similarity between Andrew's and Keith's profiles on the factors contrasts with the
considerable differences in their science teaching practice, though there were fewer
differences in their aspirations;
 the similarity between Howard's and Linda's positive scores on constructivism is difficult
to reconcile with the differences in their views and practice.
Such concerns could be addressed by using the factors to structure a further round of
interviews and observations. Also the factors are derived from a relatively small sample of
61 teachers, and their reliability must be questioned: a larger sample would be advisable in
any future work. Despite these qualifications, it is argued that the factors have a degree of
validity in connection with the views of science implicit in teachers' practice, and offer
interesting insights into the representations of science woven into the framework with which
teachers support students' learning, and the possibility of a structured approach to such
representations.
Discussion
The case studies suggest that primary teachers' views of the nature of science colour the
interpretation of science in their teaching, corresponding with Brickhouse's (1991) findings
in relation to secondary teachers. The wide variation between teachers in the way they
taught science was reflected in a wide variation in the way they conceptualised it. All
emphasised process as characterising or demarcating science, but what they had in mind was
different. Andrew and Linda emphasised the intellectual aspects of process, Howard the
mechanical. Irene, an environmental activist, spun complex webs of connections between
curriculum content, global and local environmental issues, and the children's lives. There
were corresponding variations in values and beliefs, in personal pedagogies, especially
theories of knowledge and learning, and in the science- and education-related life histories
that they brought to the situation. Their theories of learning, for example, varied between
models rooted in two opposed theoretical traditions (Murphy, 1999): that of symbolic
cognition, manifest in Howard's sequential 'clearing up' of curriculum bullet points, and that
of situated cognition, manifest in Andrew's and Linda's emphases on authenticity of task and
development of shared references. This consistency across so many aspects of each
individual's life suggests a deep structural connection, perhaps through identities constructed
in relation to subject matter, as found by Helms amongst secondary science teachers (Helms
14
Lunn – Representations of science in primary teachers' practice
1998). It is interesting to find this in primary teachers who teach across the curriculum,
raising the intriguing question of whether parallel enquiries in relation to other subjects
would reveal integrated or pluralistic professional identities.
The case study teachers' views of science often showed a depth and subtlety that many might
find surprising – for example Alexander et al (1992) argued that 'the class teacher system
makes impossible demands on the subject knowledge of the generalist primary teacher' - but
which are consistent with Pomeroy's (1993) finding that elementary teachers in North
America held views of the nature of science more in line with current thinking (among
philosophers, historians and sociologists of science) than either practising scientists or
secondary science teachers. She attributed this to their greater exposure to constructivist
thinking, and to their lacking the long indoctrination emphasising discipline content and
minimising reflection on process that is experienced by many career science specialists.
Scepticism about the independence of scientific knowledge cited in support of government
policy and commercial interests, and sympathy with environmentalism, were more or less
ubiquitous amongst the sixty-one teachers in the survey. The relationship between the case
study teachers' positions on the various factors; the rich and varied models of science
communicated through their practice; and the typicality of the case study teachers in relation
to the variables in the survey (relating to their life histories, current positions, interest in
science outside school, and aspects of their practice in science teaching, as well as the views
on the nature of science from which the factors were derived) suggests that similarly rich
and varied models of the nature of science may also be widespread in primary classrooms. It
is suggested that this may have contributed to the success of primary science in English
schools in over the last ten years. Very few primary teachers will have themselves been
educated in the nature of science, so the views they express in their practice must be
developed through practice, drawing on many complex components, including their life
experiences, engagement with science outside school, and collegial discourse, as well as the
science curriculum content that they have to teach. These are connected and transformed in
the construction of their professional identities and in the synthesis of their professional
practice and the ideas about and values associated with science that are embedded in it. The
six factors described here may be a step towards understanding the representations of
science in that practice, and hence towards better understanding the learners' experiences of
primary science education.
Pupils' experiences determine how they position themselves towards science, not only in
relation to its cognitive elements, but also to how they feel, the value positions they take up,
and how science is incorporated into each child's 'identity project' (Harré, 1983). Nationally
and internationally, the place and treatment of the nature of science in the science
curriculum is currently the subject of both research and debate. These might benefit from an
understanding of the current curriculum from the learners' perspective, including an
appreciation of the variety, depth and subtlety of the representations of science in primary
teachers' current practice.
Acknowledgements
15
Lunn – Representations of science in primary teachers' practice
I would like to thank the teachers who took part in this research; their schools, colleagues
and pupils; my doctoral supervisor Joan Solomon; colleagues at the Open University and
elsewhere; and my family.
Address for correspondence: Dr. S. A. Lunn, Centre for Curriculum and Teaching Studies,
Faculty of Education and Language Studies, The Open University, Walton Hall, Milton
Keynes MK7 6AA. Email s.a.lunn@open.ac.uk
16
Lunn – Representations of science in primary teachers' practice
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Lunn – Representations of science in primary teachers' practice
Table (i): Characterisations of and commentaries on the six factors.
Factor
Characterisation
Commentary
Scientism
Scientific method will lead to the truth.
There are no mysteries that will not
eventually yield. Science is the only way of
finding out about the reality behind
phenomena.
Uncritical enthusiasm for science and
acceptance of scientific findings as
fact.
Naive empiricism
Science proceeds by trying things out to
‘see what happens’, and is driven by data
derived from such observations. Progress is
represented by the steady accumulation of
facts.
A lay view of science as process
uninformed by theory.
New-age-ism
Progress in science is illusory. It consists in
the development of new ways of talking
about the world that are not intrinsically
better than older ways, just different.
A kind of relativism, which has taken
on board paradigm change, but sees it
as change of linguistic or explanatory
fashion rather than progress.
Constructivism
Science is rooted in attempts to construct
explanations, which originate in discursive
speculation
and
imagination.
The
explanations are of phenomena, which
form part of theory-mediated experience.
Science as joint human sense-making
and disciplined curiosity.
Pragmatism
Truth, coherence, and correspondence with
'reality' are not worth pursuing or are
unattainable: what matters is the usefulness
of science in helping us understand and
influence our experience.
This could represent a frustration with
philosophical nit-picking, or a positive
philosophical position.
Scepticism
Science has no claims to specialness, and is
no more likely to be true than common
sense.
This could represent simple rejection
of the non-commonsensical, or a kind
of pan-epistemological relativism.
Table (ii): The case study teachers
Teacher
Background
Year taught (age)
Type of school
Andrew
Late forties, 25+ years in teaching.
Y5 (9-10 yrs)
Suburban middle
Irene
Late forties, ex-lab. technician. 4-5 years in teaching.
Y6 (10-11)
City middle
Howard
Late forties. 25+ years in teaching
Y3 (7-8) Y5 (9-10)
Suburban primary
Keith
Mid twenties. 3-4 years in teaching.
Y6 (10-11)
City middle
Linda
Late thirties, ex-ceramic artist. 4-5 years in teaching.
Y1 (4-6) Y4 (8-9)
Village primary
19
Lunn – Representations of science in primary teachers' practice
Table (iii): Comparing the observed lessons of the case study teachers
Andrew
Howard
Irene
Keith
Linda
% whole class
discussion
15
88
55
73
32
% group work
85
12
13
2
68
% working as
individuals
-
-
32
25
-
%
practical
work
85
12
13
2
58
Nature of class
discussion
Open-ended
exploration of
pupils' ideas
Closed
questioning to
check
recall
and
set
teacher's
agenda
Open-ended
exploration of
pupils' ideas
Closed
questioning to
check
recall
and
set
teacher's
agenda
Open-ended
exploration of
pupils' ideas:
managing
shared
understandings
Nature
of
connections
Pupil
and
teacheroriginated; to
pupils'
knowledge and
experience but
focussed
within practical
activity
Teacheroriginated; to
items
of
information
Copious pupil
and
teacheroriginated
connections; to
pupils' broader
knowledge and
experience
Mostly
teacheroriginated; to
items
of
information
and to pupils'
knowledge and
experience
Pupil
and
teacheroriginated; to
pupils'
knowledge and
experience,
immediate and
more broadly
Nature
of
practical tasks
Rich context,
authentic, high
autonomy,
purposeful
Context-free,
purposeless,
tightly
constrained
Shared
purpose, tightly
managed
by
teacher
Engaging but
minimal time
allowed
High
autonomy,
authentic,
purposeful
Meta-learning
Connecting
activities
to
learning goals:
reflection on
learning
Focus
on
newly acquired
vocabulary
Clear learning
goals: building
participation
Clear
about
what but not
why: building
participation
Connecting
activities
to
learning goals:
reflection on
learning:
building
participation
Differentiation
By level of
support offered
and nature of
task
By outcome
By level of
support offered
and nature of
task
By nature of
task
By level of
support offered
and nature of
task
Agency,
engagement
Achieved
consistently
-
Achieved
frequently
Achieved
occasionally
Achieved
consistently
20
Lunn – Representations of science in primary teachers' practice
Table (iv): Consistency between expectations based on factor scores and views expressed in interview
and practice, of the case study teachers
Factor
Consistency
with views
expressed in:
Andrew
Howard
Irene
Keith
Linda
%
consistent
over all
cases
Scientism
Interview
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y&N
80
Practice
Y
N
N
N/A
N
20
Naive
empiricism
Interview
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
80
Practice
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
80
New-age-ism
Interview
Y
N
N
Y
N
40
Practice
Y
N
N
Y
N
40
Interview
N
Y
Y
N
Y
60
Practice
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
80
Interview
Y
Y
Y
N/A
N/A
60
Practice
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
80
Interview
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
80
Practice
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
80
Interview
83
83
83
67
17
67
Practice
83
66
66
67
33
63
83
75
75
67
25
65
Constructivism
Pragmatism
Scepticism
%.
consistent
over all factors
% overall
Key: Y = consistent; N = inconsistent; Y&N = both consistent and inconsistent; N/A = not addressed
Figure 1: Profile of each case study teacher in relation to the six factors
3
Linda
2
1
Scientism
Naive empiricism
0
New -age-ism
How ard
Constructivism
-1
Pragmatism
Scepticism
-2
Andrew
Irene
-3
Keith
-4
21