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8
Confidential Information
INTRODUCTION
8.1 In the course of everyday dealings it is common for people to disclose
information to others, with the intention that the information only be used
for particular purposes. Equity will prevent the unauthorised use of
information by recipients in those circumstances and may hold them to
account for any wrongful use. Such claims are generally referred to as
actions for ‘breach of confidence’.
8.2 The disclosure of confidential information can occur in all the myriad
types of relationships that exist in a society: from governmental, through
business and commercial relationships and into private, domestic
relationships. Equity has fashioned a number of broad principles of confidence in response to the need to protect the multifarious forms of
confidential relationship. But the cases all stem from the basic proposition
stated by Lord Greene MR in Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell
Engineering Co Ltd (1948) 65 RPC 203 at 213:
If a defendant is proved to have used confidential information, directly or
indirectly obtained from a plaintiff, without the consent, express or implied,
of the plaintiff, he will be guilty of an infringement of the plaintiff’s rights.
WHAT IS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION?
8.3 Because of the myriad ways obligations of confidence arise it has proven
impossible to provide a strict definition of the phrase ‘confidential
information’: Corrs Pavey Whiting & Byrne v Collector of Customs (Vic)
(1987) 14 FCR 434 at 449–50. The phrase is best viewed as a term that
covers information that is subject to an obligation of confidentiality.
8.4 The better approach is therefore to ask: What sorts of relationships give
rise to obligations of confidence? Confidences arise in three sorts of
relationships: private confidences, confidences relating to government
secrets, and commercial confidences. This chapter will examine these confidential relationships from the perspective of the modern action for breach of
confidence. The doctrine will be examined in terms of its origins and
elements. In most recent times the doctrine has been developed to include
protections for privacy. The extension of the doctrine will also be examined.
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THE ORIGINS OF THE ACTION FOR BREACH OF
CONFIDENCE
8.5 The origins of the obligation of confidence are not easy to pigeonhole.
There are various claims to its parentage. In Morison v Moat (1851) 68 ER
492 at 498, Turner VC said:
Different grounds have indeed been assigned for the exercise of that jurisdiction. In some cases it has been referred to property, in others to contract, and
in others, again, it has been treated as founded upon trust or confidence,
meaning, as I conceive, that the court fastens the obligation on the conscience
of the party, and enforces it against him in the same manner as it enforces
against a party to whom a benefit is given the obligation of performing a
promise on the faith on which the benefit has been conferred; but, upon
whatever ground the jurisdiction is founded, the authorities leave no doubt as
to the exercise of it.
Property origins
8.6 In one respect the action for breach of confidence is property-based.1 In
many cases the information has taken the form of property, such as written
(but unpublished) descriptions of inventions, which may be protected by
copyright. But it is also clear that the exercise of the jurisdiction is not
dependent upon the information being characterised as property (rights in
rem).
8.7 Many trade secrets or processes will be protected by the obligation of
confidence even though they may lack the essential elements of novelty or
inventiveness necessary for registration as a patent or other form of
intellectual property: Krueger Transport Equipment Pty Ltd v Glen Cameron
Storage [2008] FCA 803. For example, in Franklin v Giddins [1978] Qd R
72, the plaintiff was unable to rely on statutory protection of his newly bred
fruit tree as it was not a patentable invention or process, and yet it was
protected by equity’s obligation of confidence.
8.8 Many people may wish to rely on equity instead of statutory registration
schemes because the latter are costly, time consuming or inconvenient, and
the protection that they provide is normally limited to a term of years.2 The
equitable action for breach of confidence suffers from none of these
drawbacks.
8.9 Stuckey has argued that the interest protected in actions of breach of
See Jeremy Birch, ‘Breach of confidence: Dividing the cause of action along
property lines’ (2007) 81 Australian Law Journal 338.
2
R P Meagher, D Heydon & M Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s
Equity: Doctrines and Remedies, 4th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney,
2002, p 1109.
1
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confidence is, in its purest form, a right in personam and hence not property
in either legal or equitable senses.3 This was the approach adopted by Lord
Upjohn in Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46 at 127–8; [1966] 3 All ER
721at 759, where his Lordship said:
The true test is to determine in what circumstances the information has
been acquired. If it has been acquired in such circumstances that it would
be a breach of confidence to disclose it to another then courts of equity
will restrain the recipient from communicating it to another. In such
cases such confidential information is often and for many years has been
described as the property of the donor, the books of authority are full of
such references: knowledge of secret processes, ‘know-how’,
confidential information as to the prospects of a company or of
someone’s intention or the expected results of some horse race based on
stable or other confidential information. But in the end the real truth is
that it is not property in any normal sense but equity will restrain its
transmission to another if in breach of some confidential relationship.
8.10 In OBG Ltd v Allan [2008] 1 AC 1 at 77; [2007] 4 All ER 545 at 611,
Lord Walker (who was in dissent but perhaps not on this point) said that
confidential information cannot be regarded as a form of property. The High
Court has also doubted that property provides a basis for the action:
Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd (No 2) (1984) 156 CLR 414;
56 ALR 193; Brent v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1971) 125 CLR
418.
8.11 However, as noted below, while obligations of confidence operate
personally, confidential information will also be protected in cases where it
lies in the hands of innocent third parties: Butler v Board of Trade [1971] Ch
680; [1970] 3 All ER 593. This suggests that there are dimensions to the
right of confidence that operate against the world (in rem).
8.12 Additionally, trade secrets are often sold in commercial transactions.
Trade secrets can be held by a trustee in bankruptcy: Re Keene (1922) 2 Ch
475. They can be devised by will: Morison v Moat (1851) 68 ER 492. The
fact that one can transfer bundles of rights concerning trade secrets indicates
that they have property characteristics: DPC Estates Pty Ltd v Grey [1974] 1
NSWLR 443 at 460; Smith Kline & French Laboratories (Aust) Ltd v
Secretary, Department of Community Services & Health (1990) 22 FCR 73
at 121–2; 95 ALR 87 at 136. Finally, many of the remedies for breach of
confidence are proprietary in the way that the court can order that
information be delivered up, or that it be held on constructive trust.
8.13 One way to resolve these conflicting positions is to treat the equitable
right of action, and not the information itself, as property: Smith Kline &
J Stuckey, ‘The Equitable Action for Breach of Confidence: Is Information
Property?’ (1981) 9 Sydney Law Review 402.
3
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French Laboratories v Secretary, Department of Community Services and
Health at FCR 121; ALR 136. As Dal Pont and Chalmers4 point out, this
would mean treating the right of action as a mere equity with proprietorial
dimensions. Therefore, if a third party innocently purchased information
subject to a breach of duty, that person would not have acquired property but
instead an equity, which would compete with the original owner’s interest in
a priority dispute.
8.14 Perhaps the best conclusion one can make is that obligations of
confidence are not dependent on the information being property, but they are
certainly strengthened if they have attributes of property. It is also more
likely for commercial secrets to be given property characteristics than
personal confidences. This is primarily because commercial secrets are protected by equity to ensure exclusive enjoyment (an incident of property
rights) while private confidences are enforced to protect the dignity and
standing of individuals in the community (privacy concepts that are nonproprietorial).
Contract origins
8.15 Many obligations of confidence will arise between parties who are in a
contractual relationship. Indeed, many contractual relationships will impose
duties of confidence expressly, and in such cases the extent of those
obligations is determined by the contract: Deta Nominees Pty Ltd v Viscount
Plastic Products Pty Ltd [1979] VR 167 at 190.
8.16 Express covenants are often used restrictively in employment contexts
to prevent use of confidential information after the termination of
employment. While there were earlier doubts, it now appears that an express
clause can extend contractual obligations of confidence beyond what would
be imposed by equity: Wright v Gasweld Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 317.
However, it should be remembered that restrictive clauses are read subject to
the doctrine against restraint of trade (Twenty-First Australia Inc v Shade
[1998] NSWSC 325), so it is unlikely that such a clause would be upheld
should it seek to protect frivolous or trivial information: Wright v Gasweld at
333. Contracts which provide for unqualified prohibitions are less likely to
be upheld, whereas contracts which provide for a process of obtaining
express permission to communicate are less likely to be struck down:
Ministry of Defence v Griffin [2008] EWHC 1542.
8.17 Obligations of confidence can also be implied into contracts: Deta
Nominees v Viscount Plastic Products at 190. When the contractual duty of
confidence is implied it will mirror the equitable duty of confidence.
4
G E Dal Pont & D R C Chalmers, Equity and Trusts in Australia, 4th ed,
Lawbook Co, Sydney, 2007, p 162.
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8.18 However, duties of confidence are not dependent on contractual
relationships. The equitable duty will lie dormant and unaffected by
contractual obligations and may spring into effect should the contractual
obligation fail to eventuate. In Seager v Copydex Ltd [1967] 2 All ER 415,
the plaintiff entered into negotiations with the defendant company, who
sought to market the plaintiff’s patented invention known as the ‘Klent’ grip.
In the course of negotiating a marketing agreement, the plaintiff
unexpectedly told the defendant about a new invention, which he had not yet
patented, called the ‘Invisigrip’. The defendant’s agents told the plaintiff that
they were only interested in marketing the Klent grip. Negotiations
eventually broke down. After that time agents of the defendant sought to
patent a new design that was substantially similar to the Invisigrip. The
plaintiff sought an injunction to prevent the defendant company from
marketing the new grip. The plaintiff also sought damages or an account of
profits in the alternative.
8.19 The defendant company was found to have breached the plaintiff’s
confidence. Lord Denning MR, at 417, found that the jurisdiction of the
court did not depend on any implied contract. Rather, equity would intervene
on the basis that people who have received information in confidence should
not be allowed to take unfair advantage of it. Lord Denning MR also stated
that in cases where part of the information was publicly available (such as
the parts of the design contained in the Klent patent specification), and partly
private (such as the amendments made in the Invisigrip design), the recipient
of the information must be careful to only use that part of the information
which is public.
8.20 Both Salmon and Winn LJJ, at 418–19, agreed with Lord Denning MR.
They also found that the defendant was liable for breaching confidence even
though the defendant’s agents had unconsciously copied the Invisigrip
design. An injunction was refused. Instead, damages were ordered, to be
assessed on the basis of reasonable compensation.
Tort basis
8.21 The characterisation of breach of confidence as a tort was discussed at
3.39. While this characterisation has been around for a long time, in the
United Kingdom the tendency to describe the action as a tort has been
accelerated by the application of the Human Rights Act 1988 (UK). In
Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 at 465; 2 All
ER 995 at 1002-3, Lord Nicholls found that breach of confidence had
changed its nature with the effect that:
The continuing use of the phrase ‘duty of confidence’ and the description of the
information as ‘confidential’ is not altogether comfortable. Information about an
individual’s private life would not, in ordinary usage, be called ‘confidential’. The
more natural description today is that such information is private. The essence of the
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tort is better encapsulated now as misuse of private information.
New Zealand has also expressly recognised a privacy tort: see 8.131. There
remain some doubts in the English and Welsh jurisdictions as to whether the
action has become completely ‘fused’ with common law. Eady J expressed
doubts about tort taking over the action in Mosley v News Group
Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777. In Australia, the action has remained
firmly entrenched in equity. This will be discussed further below.
Human rights origins
8.22 Following on from these tortious developments in England and Wales
and spurred on by the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), some English and
Welsh judges have now characterised breach of confidence as being based in
human rights jurisprudence. In Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers, at
AC 473; All ER 1010, Lord Hoffmann stated that in England the law of
private confidence has moved away from being based on duties of good faith
and has moved to the protection of human autonomy and dignity. In Mosley
v News Group Newspapers Ltd, at [7], Eady J found that the law afforded
protection to information when there was a reasonable expectation of
privacy, primarily because the law is concerned to prevent the violation of a
citizen’s autonomy, dignity and self-esteem. This adaptation of breach of
confidence into the human rights jurisprudence will be discussed at 8.132.
Unjust enrichment
8.23 An alternative basis for the protection of confidential information lies
in unjust enrichment. Professor Gareth Jones has stated that breach of
confidence is a restitutionary claim to make good profits obtained from the
wrongful use of confidential material.5 This argument is strengthened by the
tendency of some judges to calculate equitable damages in a restitutionary
way: Attorney-General v Observer Ltd [1990] 1 AC 109 at 262; [1988] 3 All
ER 545 at 644–5; Minister for Mineral Resources v Newcastle Newspaper
Pty Ltd (1997) 40 IPR 403.
8.24 However, as argued by Richardson, the principle of restitution appears
unable to explain equity’s protection of personal information, which has
little or no commercial value and from which no real account can be made.6
The restitutionary basis of the account of profits remedy is often difficult to
employ and, as a result, relief is more often based on equitable compensation
(what was lost by the plaintiff) rather than unjust enrichment (what was
Gareth Jones, ‘Restitution of Benefits Obtained in Breach of Another’s
Confidence’ (1970) 86 Law Quarterly Review 463.
6
M Richardson, ‘Breach of Confidence, Surreptitiously or Accidentally
Obtained Information and Privacy: Theory Vs Law’ (1994) Melbourne
University Law Review 673.
5
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gained by the defendant).
Equitable origins in conscience
8.25 It is now well established that equity has its own jurisdiction to protect
obligations of confidence which is independent of contract, tort and
property: Commonwealth v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1980) 147 CLR 39 at
50; 32 ALR 485 at 491.
8.26 This jurisdiction appears to have grown out of the earlier line of cases
concerning common law copyright in unpublished manuscripts.
Alternatively, it can be viewed as an expression of equity’s protection of
contractual obligations and good faith: Abernethy v Hutchinson (1825) 47
ER 1313.
8.27 In Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd (No 2) (1984) 156
CLR 414 at 437–8; 56 ALR 193 at 208, Deane J said:
It is unnecessary, for the purposes of the present appeal, to attempt to
define the precise scope of the equitable jurisdiction to grant relief
against an actual or threatened abuse of confidential information not
involving any tort or any breach of some express or implied contractual
provision, some wider fiduciary duty or some copyright or trade mark
right. A general equitable jurisdiction to grant such relief has long been
asserted and should, in my view, now be accepted … Like most heads of
exclusive equitable jurisdiction, its rational basis does not lie in
proprietary right. It lies in the notion of an obligation of conscience
arising from the circumstances in or through which the information was
communicated or obtained. Relief under the jurisdiction is not available,
however, unless it appears that the information in question has ‘the
necessary quality of confidence about it’ (per Lord Greene MR, Saltman
(1948) 65 RPC, at 215) and that it is significant, not necessarily in the
sense of commercially valuable (see Argyll v Argyll [1967] Ch 302 at
329) but in the sense that the preservation of its confidentiality or
secrecy is of substantial concern to the plaintiff.
Therefore the traditional essence of the equitable obligation is
unconscionable conduct: R v Dept of Health; Ex parte Source Informatics
Ltd [2000] 1 All ER 786 at 796; Australian Broadcasting Corporation v
Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199 at 227; 185 ALR 1 at 14.
The notion of unconscionability obviously attaches to situations where the
parties have an established relationship of trust (in the broad sense).
However, as we shall see below, the notion of unconscionability is not
limited to these types of situations. Equity will also view the actions of a
thief or industrial spy as unconscionable, even though they have no prior
relationship with the plaintiff.
THE MODERN DOCTRINE OF BREACH OF CONFIDENCE
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8.28 In Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41 at 47, Megarry J
clearly set out the elements of the modern action as follows:
In my judgment, three elements are normally required if, apart from
contract, a case of breach of confidence is to succeed. First, the
information itself, in the words of Lord Greene MR in the Saltman case
on page 215, must ‘have the necessary quality of confidence about it’.
Secondly, that information must have been imparted in circumstances
importing an obligation of confidence. Thirdly, there must be an
unauthorised use of that information to the detriment of the party
communicating it.
Each of these three elements will be analysed in turn.
INFORMATION THAT HAS A QUALITY OF CONFIDENCE
8.29
The primary and most essential characteristic of confidential
information is that it be information which has not entered the public domain
and become common knowledge: Saltman Engineering Co Ltd v Campbell
Engineering Co at 215. All three types of confidential information are
subject to this requirement. However, each protects different subject matter.
The discussion will firstly centre on the concepts of secrecy and the public
domain and then move to consider the different categories of confidences.
Secrecy and the public domain
8.30
Where information has been published on a non-confidential basis,
it cannot be treated as confidential. For example, in the area of trade secrets,
the publication of a patent can be fatal to a claim of confidence if it can be
shown that there is no ancillary secret surrounding the patent: O Mustad &
Son v S Allcock & Co Ltd [1963] 3 All ER 416; Maggbury Pty Ltd v Hafele
Australia Pty Ltd (2001) 210 CLR 181; 185 ALR 152. Publication of patent
specifications in other jurisdictions may also destroy duties of confidence if
it can be shown that regular reference is made to foreign patent
specifications by people within the jurisdiction: Franchi v Franchi [1967]
RPC 149. However, if the patent specifications do not cover the entirety of
the trade secret, duties of confidence will survive in relation to the
unpublished information: Castrol Australia Pty Ltd v Emtech Associates Pty
Ltd (1980) 33 ALR 31; Seager v Copydex.
8.31
Copyrighted designs may also lose the quality of confidence when
they become shown to the public. In Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth [2008]
EWHC 1878 (Ch), the original prop designer from Star Wars who created
the Stormtrooper helmets and other props had gone into the business of
making helmets and costumes for the public. Lucasfilm Ltd attempted to
stop the prop designer by arguing (amongst other things) that the designs
were confidential but Mann J found that the designs lost their confidential
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nature when the films were released.
8.32
Publication of information subject to a personal confidence will also
destroy any duties of confidentiality. In Lennon v News Group Newspapers
Ltd [1978] FSR 573, John Lennon failed to prevent his former wife from
publishing secrets of their married life, on the basis that he had himself
published information on the topic.
8.33
However, publications that are transitory and unlikely to be
remembered will not destroy duties of confidentiality. For example, a
television broadcast of an informant’s identity did not destroy confidentiality
in G v Day [1982] 1 NSWLR 24. Similarly, a Chinese pop star was
successful in restraining the publication of an embarrassing video tape on the
internet, even after a verbal account of the contents had been published in a
Hong Kong newspaper: Kwok v Thang [1999] NSWSC 1034. In Australian
Football League v Age Company Ltd (2006) 15 VR 419, the names of three
AFL players who had tested positive to drugs were published on an internet
discussion forum. An electronic newspaper article had also named the
players to a limited group of subscribers for about five hours. A further
publication of one of the player’s names had occurred when a phone caller
named the player on the ‘Fox Footy’ television program. Regardless, Kellam
J found that the information had still not yet fully entered the public domain
and remained confidential. A permanent injunction was ordered on the
release of the players’ identities.
8.34
Nor will publications of differing versions of similar information
destroy confidence. The publication of authorised photos of the wedding of
Catherine Zeta-Jones and Michael Douglas by a magazine did not mean that
a rival, unapproved publisher could publish different, unauthorised images in
breach of confidence: OBG Ltd v Allan.
8.35
Publication to a small group of recipients, who understand that the
information is to remain confidential, will not destroy the information’s
quality of confidence. Prince Charles was able to prevent the publication of
his diaries, even though he regularly gave copies of them to a select group of
between 45 and 75 people: Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd
[2008] Ch 57; [2007] 2 All ER 139.
8.36
An issue that arises is whether defendants can rely on their own
breaches of confidence to argue that the information is no longer secretive.
Information will lose its confidentiality when published by a defendant,
particularly if published widely: Attorney-General v Observer, discussed
below at 8.66. This does not mean that the defendant’s breach of obligation
will be without remedy. Rather, it means that remedies for that breach may
be limited to an account of profits or compensation, as injunctive relief may
be futile.
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Personal information
8.37
The jurisdiction to protect personal and private information
developed out of a series of cases which upheld the right of authors and
artists to prevent unauthorised publication of works that they wished to keep
secret: Crowder v Hilton [1902] SALR 82; Millar v Taylor (1769) 98 ER
201; Turner v Robinson (1860) 10 Ir Ch 121. The most famous of these
cases is Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 47 ER 1302; 41 ER 1171. In this
case, Queen Victoria’s consort sought to restrain publication of private
etchings made by himself and the Queen. The Prince had given the etchings
to the Royal printer. An employee was presumed to have sold extra copies to
a third party after which the prints went through a variety of hands until they
landed with the defendant. The defendant sought to display the etchings and
publish a catalogue describing them. The plans to display the etchings were
dropped at trial but the defendant maintained that he had a right to do so if
he wished.
8.38
At trial, the defendant’s right to display the etchings or publish the
catalogue was denied. On appeal Lord Cottenham LC found that the
jurisdiction to prevent unauthorised use was based both in property (in what
the modern reader might regard as copyright in unpublished works) and in
equity’s power to restrain breaches of trust, confidence or contract. As the
etchings had come to Strange via a breach of contract, trust or confidence,
equity could prevent the unauthorised use of the materials. Since the
decision in Prince Albert v Strange, equity has come to protect a variety of
types of personal and private information that has been relayed in
confidence.
Marital relations, sexual preference and activity
8.39
Equity will intervene to protect privacy in a number of situations.
The clearest examples are those cases concerning exposure of the personal
information that arose in marriage or de facto relationships. For example, in
Argyll v Argyll [1967] Ch 302; [1965] 1 All ER 611, the Duchess of Argyll
was able to prevent her ex-husband from publishing intimate details of her
marital behaviour in a Sunday newspaper.
8.40
Equity will also protect the details of a person’s sexual preference
and activity if such details have been communicated in confidence, but outside of marriage. For example, in Stephens v Avery [1988] Ch 449; [1988] 2
All ER 477, the plaintiff succeeded in restraining the defendant from
publishing an account of her affair with another woman (who was later
murdered by the plaintiff’s husband). Browne-Wilkinson VC, at Ch 454; All
ER 481, said that ‘to most people the details of their sexual lives are high on
their list of those matters which they regard as confidential’. In Giller v
Procopets [2008] VSCA 236, the videotaped sexual activities of a couple
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which had been taped after their de facto relationship had come to an end,
were also said to be confidential. Similarly, in Mosley v News Group
Newspapers Ltd, the sado-masochistic activities of a group of S&M
practitioners were found to have been confidential as the group met regularly
and with an understanding that the group’s activities be based on trust and
discretion. Some of the women in the group were paid for their services but
the group members were also friends, and on this basis the relationships in
the group were said to be confidential.
8.41
The courts will look at the depth and length of the relationship.
Communication of the details of casual, transient sexual relationships may
be harder to restrain. In A v B plc [2003] QB 195, an English premier league
footballer was unsuccessful in preventing publication of stories by two
women he had had affairs with. Lord Woolf CJ felt the relationships did not
possess the same requirements of confidentiality as a long-term relationship
such as marriage. Similarly, in Theakston v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd
[2002] EWHC 137 at [60], information pertaining to a television presenter’s
visit to a brothel was not confidential given the fact that the relationship was
a ‘fleeting transaction for money’ (although a photograph of him at the
brothel was held to be confidential). Neither will all the information
imparted in the course of a personal relationship be confidential. In Brown v
Associated Newspapers Ltd [2008] QB 103, the fact that the confidee had
been in a long-term homosexual relationship with the plaintiff (a highranking businessman in a large multinational corporation) did not mean that
all the information imparted in that relationship was confidential. The exlover wished to publish details of the plaintiff’s allegedly improper use of
company resources and the Court of Appeal found that the plaintiff did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to these issues.
Private journals and reminicences
8.42
Journals containing personal thoughts and recollections will also be
protected as confidential. In a modern version of Prince Albert v Strange,
Prince Charles was able to claim breach of confidence over the publication
of extracts from his personal diaries by a former employee. The diaries were
circulated amongst a select group of readers on the understanding that they
not be published. The employee had also been under a contractual obligation
of confidence: Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers.
8.43
In McKennitt v Ash [2008] QB 73, the Court of Appeal upheld a
decision not to allow the publication of parts of a memoir on the grounds
that the memoir contained personal information of a confidential nature. The
memoir had been written by the friend of Loreena McKennitt, a renowned
folk musician, and recounted their friendship of many years. The book
contained a number of personal and private details including facts relating to
McKennitt’s relationship with her fiancé (who died in tragic circumstances),
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her grieving process, her home in Ireland, her record contract and
McKennitt’s state of health. All of these issues were found to have been
confidential.
Medical information
8.44
A person’s medical history will also be the subject of protection,
especially when the disclosure of the patient’s medical condition would
subject the patient to ridicule or embarrassment: X v Y [1988] 2 All ER 648;
W v Edgell [1990] 1 All ER 835. For example, supermodel Naomi Campbell
was able to claim damages for the publication of details of her group therapy
for narcotics addiction and photographs of her attendance at meetings:
Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers. Positive drugs results of three AFL
players were also found to be confidential in Australian Football League v
Age Company Ltd. If medical information has been anonymised there will be
no breach if the information is published: R v Dept of Health; Ex parte
Source Informatics Ltd [2000] 1 All ER 786. The court will judge whether
information has been sufficiently anonymised: Local Authority v Health
Authority (disclosure: restriction on publication) [2004] 1 All ER 480.
Witnesses, informants, suspects and released prisoners
8.45
The identity of witnesses and informants will also be protected by
equity in circumstances where assurances of confidence were given to them,
and they would suffer prejudice from being identified, with no resulting
benefit to the public: G v Day. This is the case even where photographs may
have been shown for a short period in the public domain: Falconer v
Australian Broadcasting Corporation [1992] 1 VR 662. Released prisoners,
who had been convicted of killing a child when they were themselves
children, were also protected by confidence in Venables v News Group
Newspapers Ltd [2001] 1 All ER 908. The protection of confidence was
afforded to them because of the risk of serious injury or death should the
public become aware of their identity and whereabouts. A similar protection
was afforded in Northern Ireland to a convicted killer to prevent publication
of his image, personal details and address, after he had served his sentence:
Callaghan v Independent News and Media Ltd [2009] NIQB 1. On the other
hand, a majority of the New Zealand Supreme Court allowed the publication
of a video in which an accused person (who had been acquitted of the
murder), confessed to killing the victim. While the court dealt with the issue
under the New Zealand privacy tort (see 8.131), the majority stated that
there could be no expectation of confidence if the person was being
interviewed by police and knowingly videotaped: Rogers v TVNZ [2007]
NZSC 91.
Cultural information
8.46
On a wider level, cultural and religious information that is of a
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highly sensitive nature can also be protected by equity. In Foster v
Mountford & Rigby Ltd (1976) 14 ALR 71, Muirhead J injuncted the
publication of a scholarly text on the lives of the Pitjantara People in the
Northern Territory. The information had been imparted to the author in the
greatest of confidences. The author had been accepted into the community
and been given access to the people’s sacred rites and law. The information
had an enormous potential to harm the social fabric of the Aboriginal
community should it have become available to the uninitiated. Given that
damages were inadequate, an injunction was granted. However, if the courts
view the cultural or religious practices as harmful to the public they will not
be afforded protection: Church of Scientology of California v Kaufman
[1973] RPC 635.
Commercial information
8.47
Equity protects a variety of sorts of confidential commercial
information. These are generally referred to as ‘trade secrets’. A distinction
can be made at the outset between trade secrets, which will be vigorously
protected by equity, and other forms of commercial knowledge that are
considered to be too general or obvious to justify protection. Claims that
lack detail or seek to protect information that is common knowledge will
fail: Amway Corporation v Eurway International Ltd [1974] RPC 82.
Additionally, a global claim that fails to particularise the specific pieces of
confidential information will also fail: O’Brien v Komesaroff (1982) 150
CLR 310; 41 ALR 255.
8.48
Information is more likely to be classed as a trade secret when it is
of a detailed nature and acquired with effort: Robb v Green [1895] 2 QB 1.
Additionally, if the information was the product of a special relationship
with the plaintiff’s clients, it is more likely to be protected: Westminster
Chemical New Zealand Ltd v McKinley & Tasman Machinery & Services
Ltd [1973] 1 NZLR 659 at 666.
8.49
In Ansell Rubber Co Pty Ltd v Allied Rubber Industries Pty Ltd
[1967] VR 37 at 50, Gowans J stated:
Some factors to be considered in determining whether given information
is one’s trade secret are: (1) the extent to which the information is known
outside of his business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees
and others involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by
him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the
information to him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or
money expended by him in developing the information; (6) the ease or
difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or
duplicated by others.
8.50
Some specific examples of trade secrets include:
1. Designs for machinery: Ansell Rubber Co v Allied Rubber Industries;
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clothing: Peter Pan Manufacturing Corp v Corsets Silhouette Ltd [1963]
3 All ER 402; film costumes: Lucasfilm v Ainsworth; and tools: Seager v
Copydex.
2. Chemical formulae: Weston v Hemmons (1876) 2 VLR (Eq) 121; the
results of experiments: Smith Kline & French Laboratories v Secretary,
Department of Community Services & Health; and recipes: Crowder v
Hilton.
3. Ideas for entertainment, such as TV shows or exhibitions, which have
been developed to the stage that they could become realised in actuality:
Fraser v Thames Television Ltd [1984] QB 44; Talbot v General
Television Corp Pty Ltd [1980] VR 224; Darvall McCutcheon (a firm) v
HK Frost Holdings P/L (in liq) (2002) 4 VR 570. However, a bare idea
that is obvious and undeveloped will not be protected: De Maudsley v
Palumbo [1996] FSR 447 (an idea for a nightclub).
Trade secret or employee ‘know-how’?
8.51
Difficulties arise in the employment context when employees seek
to leave their jobs and set up businesses in competition with their former
employers. In these cases the courts are guided by the principle that an
employee should be free to use his or her accumulated knowledge, skill and
experience (‘know-how’). By the same token, there is an implied term in
every employment contract that an employee ‘shall honestly and faithfully
serve his master; that he shall not abuse his confidence in matters pertaining
to his service, and that he shall, by all reasonable means in his power, protect
his master’s interests in respect to matters confided to him in the course of
his service’: Robb v Green at 10–11.. These interests must be balanced out:
Manildra Laboratories Pty Ltd v Campbell [2009] NSWSC 987.
8.52
To aid this process of balancing, the courts have adopted a threetiered classification of employment information: Faccenda Chicken Ltd v
Fowler [1985] 1 All ER 724. Information can be classed in the following
categories:
1. trivial information, which is publicly available or so obvious that it
cannot be protected;
2. information that must be treated confidentially until the termination of
employment, whereupon it becomes part of the ex-employee’s collective
skill, knowledge and ability; or
3. highly confidential trade secrets, which will be protected by the courts
even after the termination of employment.
In Faccenda it was said that only the last category could be protected by an
action for breach of confidence. This was rejected in Wright v Gasweld,
where the New South Wales Court of Appeal held that the second category
may also be protected by a valid restraint of trade clause in an employment
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contract.
8.53
The difficulty with using the Faccenda classification can be
illustrated by the example of the employee who, after leaving the employ of
the plaintiff, approaches the plaintiff’s customers. If ex-employees have
done this with the aid of stolen or copied customer lists they will be found to
have breached confidence: AIIB Pty Ltd v Beard [2009] NSWSC 1001 at
[157]; Riteway Express Pty Ltd v Clayton (1987) 10 NSWLR 238; Print
Investments Pty Ltd v Art-vue Printing Ltd (1983) 1 IPR 149; Metrans Pty
Ltd v Courtney-Smith (1983) 8 IR 379; Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd v
Guinle [1979] Ch 227; [1978] 3 All ER 193; Helmore v Smith (No 2) (1886)
35 Ch D 449. Records of dealings with individual clients have also been
classed as confidential: Williams Summers & Co Ltd v Boyce & Kimmond &
Co (1907) 97 LT 505.
8.54
However, if an ex-employee approaches clients in circumstances
where knowledge regarding the clients is public and easily obtainable this
will be treated as trivial information, not to be protected: NP Generations
Pty Ltd v Fenley (2001) 80 SASR 151; TV Shopping Network Ltd v Scutt
(1998) 43 IPR 451. This is of course subject to any valid restraint of trade
clause in the employment contract: Bluescope Steel Ltd v Kelly (2007) 72
IPR 289 at [90].
8.55
To complicate matters further, information taken dishonestly will be
protected by the courts even when it relates to know-how: Halliday &
Nicholas Insurance Brokers Pty Ltd v Corsiatto [2001] NSWCA 188 at
[16]-[17]; Roger Bullivant Ltd v Ellis [1987] FSR 172. Ex-employees are not
entitled to approach customers if they have dishonestly removed or
deliberately memorised lists of the ex-employer’s clients: Wessex Dairies
Ltd v Smith [1935] 2 KB 80. Of course, the idea of ‘dishonest’ or
‘deliberate’ memorisation is an extremely slippery one and hard to
distinguish from the employee’s ordinary memories: SSC&B: Lintass New
Zealand Ltd v Murphy [1986] 2 NZLR 436. Nevertheless, the distinction
between deliberate memorisation and ordinary memories remains the law:
Weldon & Co v Harbinson [2000] NSWSC 272.
8.56
These difficult issues were canvassed by the New South Wales
Court of Appeal in Del Casale v Artedomus (Aust) Pty Limited [2007]
NSWCA 172. The appellants were former employees and directors of the
respondent company (Artedomus). The company had discovered and
sourced a supply of Italian modica stone from the Ragusa region which was
highly sought after. When they left the company the directors agreed that
they would keep confidential any sensitive commercial information they had
obtained from the company for three years. The appellants then established a
competitor which began to import the same stone. Artedomus argued that
the information concerning the source of the stone was a trade secret and the
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appellants’ actions were a breach of confidence. The trial judge agreed,
ordering a permanent injunction on the use of the information about the
source of the supply of the modica stone. On appeal, the New South Wales
Court of Appeal overturned the finding of confidentiality. Following Dean,7
Hodgson JA, at [40], said that the following list would help in determining
whether information was a trade secret:
1. The extent to which the information is known outside the business.
2. The extent to which the trade secret was known by employees and
others involved in the plaintiff’s business.
3. The extent of measures taken to guard the secrecy of the information.
4. The value of the information to the plaintiffs and their competitors.
5. The amount of effort or money expended by the plaintiffs in
developing the information.
6. The ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly
acquired or duplicated by others.
7. Whether it was plainly made known to the employee that the material
was [held] by the employer as confidential.
8. The fact that the usages and practices of the industry support the
assertions of confidentiality.
9. The fact that the employee has been permitted to share the information
only by reason of his or her seniority or high responsibility.
10. That the owner believes these things to be true and that belief is
reasonable.
11. The greater the extent to which the ‘confidential’ material is
habitually handled by an employee, the greater the obligation of the
confidentiality imposed.
12. That the information can be readily identified.
8.57
Hodgson JA found that in cases where it is difficult to separate out
the trade secret from the know-how of the ex-employee, the courts will err in
favour of allowing the employee to use the information. This is particularly
the case when the secret could have been discovered by the defendant using
their know-how and a process of experimentation. Hodgson JA, at [43], said:
[W]here the confidential information is something that is ascertainable
by enquiry or experiment, albeit perhaps substantial enquiry or
experiment, and the know-how which the ex-employee is clearly entitled
to use extends to knowledge of the question which the confidential
information answers, it becomes artificial to treat the confidential
information as severable and distinguishable from that know-how; and in
that kind of case, courts have tended not to grant relief.
7
Robert Dean, The Law of Trade Secrets and Personal Secrets, 2nd ed,
Lawbook Co, Sydney, 2002, p 190.
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Government secrets
8.58
The government is also able to call upon the intervention of equity
to protect information that it believes should be kept secret. However, the
government occupies a special position as a confider and is subject to a
greater deal of scrutiny, given the significant importance of the public’s right
to discuss, review and criticise government action: Commonwealth v John
Fairfax & Sons at CLR 51; ALR 492–3. The government’s confidence will
only be protected when it can be shown to be in the public interest:
Trevorrow v State of South Australia (No 4) (2006) 94 SASR 64.
8.59
This involves the court in a balancing act where the public’s need to
know is weighed against whatever public interests there are in maintaining
secrecy (such as national security): Commonwealth v John Fairfax & Sons
Ltd; Minister for Mineral Resources v Newcastle Newspaper Pty Ltd. The
public interest has been defined as ‘something which is of serious concern
and benefit to the public’: British Steel Corp v Granada Television Ltd
[1981] AC 1096 at 1113; [1981] 1 All ER 417 at 429–30; Attorney-General
(UK) v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 86 at
170. Any restriction on the use of confidential information will be limited to
what is strictly necessary to protect the public interest: Attorney-General
(UK) v Jonathon Cape Ltd [1976] 1 QB 752.
8.60
While there is some authority to the contrary in British Steel Corp v
Granada Television, it appears that in Australia, semi-government
authorities and statutory corporations are treated as being part of the
government for the purposes of the law of breach of confidence, and subject
to the same balancing test of public interest: Esso Resources Ltd v Plowman
(1995) 183 CLR 10 at 32; 128 ALR 391 at 403.
8.61
The most (in)famous cases of a government attempting to protect
confidential information are the Spycatcher cases. In Attorney-General (UK)
v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 30, the second
respondent, Peter Wright, had published details of his life as a spy for the
United Kingdom in a book entitled Spycatcher. The United Kingdom alleged
that the publication of the book was a breach of contract, confidence and
fiduciary duty and sought to restrain its publication.
8.62
At first instance, Attorney-General (UK) v Heinemann Publishers
Australia Pty Ltd (1987) 8 NSWLR 341, Powell J, at 373–4, refused to grant
the injunction on the basis that the book concerned facts and details that
were decades old and hence of little import to the current government of the
United Kingdom. Additionally, much of the information contained in the
book had already been published by others, sometimes with the approval of
the British government.
8.63
The New South Wales Court of Appeal upheld Powell J’s decision:
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Attorney-General (UK) v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (1987) 10
NSWLR 86. Street CJ dissented, by finding that while the application could
be classified as the enforcement of a foreign law, it could be justified on the
grounds that the local sovereign supported the interests of the foreign
sovereign. Kirby P and McHugh JA agreed with Street CJ’s conclusion that
the action was the enforcement of a foreign public law, but found that the
court would not support such an action.
8.64
When commenting on the claim for breach of confidence McHugh
JA, at 191, said:
[R]ules worked out to govern the contractual, property, commercial and
private confidences of citizens are not fully applicable where the plaintiff
is a government or one of its agencies. Private citizens are entitled to
protect or further their own interests, no matter how selfish they are in
doing so. Consequently, the publication of confidential information
which is detrimental to the private interest of a citizen is a legitimate
concern of a Court of Equity. But governments act, or at all events are
constitutionally required to act, in the public interest. Information is
held, received and imparted by governments, their departments and
agencies to further the public interest. Public and not private interest,
therefore, must be the criterion by which equity determines whether it
will protect information which a government or governmental body
claims is confidential.
Kirby P, at 164–5, agreed with the findings of Powell J that the information
had already been placed in the public domain. Moreover, Kirby P found that
the duty alleged by the United Kingdom government was far too wide as it
was not limited in time nor to content. On this point Kirby P, at 163,
observed:
I cannot accept that a person living in Australia would be so imprisoned
by an equitable duty of confidence or by his duty as a fiduciary. Such
duties do not extend so far. They must be reconciled with the freedom to
speak which is such a precious feature of our society ...
8.65
By the time the High Court heard the matter, the book had been
widely published in the United States and Australia. The High Court (Mason
CJ, Wilson, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ) held that
there should be no restraint on publication, given that they had no
jurisdiction to enforce the interests of a foreign state.
8.66
In England, attempts to prevent publication were also unsuccessful.
By the time the matter was decided by the House of Lords the book was
available in Ireland, Canada, Australia and the United States. Parts of the
book had been serialised and reported by English newspapers and the action
concerned injunctions against those newspapers, preventing further publication of the details in Wright’s book: Attorney-General v Observer. The
House found that the worldwide publication of Spycatcher had destroyed
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secrecy so that injunctions would be futile. However, an action for account
of profits was made against one of the newspapers, which had published a
serialised extract prior to the widespread availability.
8.67
Interestingly, members of the House appeared upset that Wright
(who was not a party to the action) was able to avoid liability given that he
was outside the jurisdiction. Lord Goff, at AC 288; All ER 663–4, said:
Certainly, the prospect of Peter Wright, safe in his Australian haven,
reaping further profits from the sale of his book in this country is most
unattractive … If within the jurisdiction of the English court he would be
held liable to account for any profits made by him from his wrongful
disclosure.
8.68
Since Spycatcher there have been cases involving members
of the special forces in the armed services who have been held to
confidences and prevented from publishing their experiences. ‘R’ v
Attorney-General [2003] UKPC 22 concerned a former member of the
SAS who was a member of patrol Bravo Two Zero, which was dropped
into Iraq in the first Gulf War to find and destroy scud missiles. Other
members of that patrol had published accounts of their mission, which
had sold well as books and films. The accounts were not popular with
serving members of the SAS who saw them as being one-sided and
unfair to the patrol member who was killed on the mission. At the request
of the majority of the members of the SAS the Ministry of Defence
required all serving members to sign confidentiality agreements, or leave
the SAS and be returned to their units. The agreement forbade the
disclosure of information relating to the SAS without the approval of the
Ministry of Defence. R signed an agreement but only after being
pressured into doing so. R later left the SAS and returned home to New
Zealand. He went on to write his own account of the Bravo Two Zero
incident and after courting publishers a copy was provided to the
Ministry of Defence. The Minister successfully sought to restrain the
publication on the basis of the agreement. The Privy Council found that
the pressure brought to bear on the soldier was legitimate and hence not
unconscionable nor undue, even though he was not given independent
legal advice: see 10.34.
8.69
The same contract was considered again in Ministry of Defence v
Griffin [2008] EWHC 1542, where this time a former member of the United
Kingdom Special Forces (who had signed the confidentiality agreement
when joining), had made a number of public disclosures regarding his
experiences. The ex-member had not sought the Ministry of Defence’s
approval for these disclosures. Even though the judge believed that the
disclosures were largely anodyne, the judge was prepared to enforce the
contractual provisions requiring that the ex-member seek permission from
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the Ministry. As stated in 8.16, a contractual agreement can expand on the
categories of information that can be considered confidential.
THE DUTY OR OBLIGATION OF CONFIDENCE
8.70
Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) is the leading case on the question
of whether there exists a duty of confidence. In this case, the plaintiff entered
into negotiations with the defendant regarding a joint venture to manufacture
a moped that had been designed by the plaintiff. During the course of
negotiations access had been granted to the designs of the plaintiff. After the
negotiations broke down the defendant began to manufacture mopeds that
incorporated some of the design elements of the plaintiff. The plaintiff
sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the manufacture and sale of the
moped.
8.71
Megarry J set down the three necessary elements of the modern
action for breach of confidence. In particular, Megarry J, at 48, said that the
question of whether information had been communicated under an obligation
of confidence was objective:
[I]f the circumstances are such that any reasonable man standing in the
shoes of the recipient of the information would have realized that upon
reasonable grounds the information was being given to him in
confidence, then this should suffice to impose upon him the equitable
obligation of confidence.
On the balance of convenience the injunction was not granted although
undertakings were accepted by Megarry J that a notional royalty should be
accounted for per sale should the plaintiff succeed at trial.
8.72 Megarry J’s objective test has been accepted on numerous occasions:
Mense v Milenkovic [1973] VR 784; Castrol Australia v Emtech Associates;
Telstra Corp Ltd v First Netcom Pty Ltd (1997) 148 ALR 202 at 208.
Meagher, Heydon and Leeming8 have questioned whether reasonableness is
an appropriate standard for equity to impose given that equity may require a
person to conduct their affairs according to higher standards than those of
the general populace. In Deta Nominees v Viscount Plastic Products, at 191,
Fullagar J proposed that the test should be referenced to whether an equity
lawyer would recognise the information as the plaintiff’s property. However,
later in the judgment, Fullagar J stated that the relevant question was
whether a person of ordinary intelligence, in all the circumstances of the
case, including (1) the relationship of the parties; (2) the nature of the
information; and (3) the circumstances of the communication, would
recognise that the information was imparted in confidence. It should
R P Meagher, D Heydon & M Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s
Equity: Doctrines and Remedies, 4th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney,
2002, pp 1112–3.
8
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therefore be accepted that an objective, ‘reasonableness’ test is appropriate
for determining whether communication was confidential.
Types of situations importing an obligation of confidence
8.73
Duties of confidence will be readily imported in situations where
the confider has expressly stated that the proposed communication is to be
confidential: Attorney-General (UK) v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty
Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 86 at 189–90; Stephens v Avery at Ch 456; All ER
482.
8.74
In other situations, confidentiality will be inferred from the relationship between the parties, for example, where the parties are married or in
a de facto relationship, or close friends: Argyll v Argyll [1967] Ch 302;
[1965] 1 All ER 611; Giller v Procopets. Duties of confidence are also
commonly found in fiduciary relationships (Boardman v Phipps), or where
the parties are engaged in a joint enterprise: Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) at
48. Professional relationships such as those between solicitors and clients,
priests and devotees and doctors and patients can also be ones of confidence,
primarily because of their fiduciary dimensions.
8.75
It is also clear that the relationship between an employer and
employee is one that can generate such obligations. However, much will turn
on the type of duties of employment and it should not be assumed that all
relationships of employment import duties of confidence: Hivac Ltd v Park
Royal Scientific Instruments Ltd [1946] Ch 169; 1 All ER 350; Hitchcock v
TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (No 2) [2000] NSWCA 82. As discussed above,
even in circumstances where a duty of confidence is established, the
employee will generally only be bound to preserve trade secrets rather than
general know-how.
Unsolicited and accidental communications
8.76 In some circumstances a confider will volunteer information without
warning the confidee that the information is confidential. A difficult
question then arises as to whether the circumstances of the receipt were
confidential because it may be unfair to force duties of confidence on
unsuspecting parties. In Fractionated Cane Technology Pty Ltd v Ruiz-Avila
(1987) 8 IPR 502, the defendants were not held to have received information
in confidence when they (along with others) attended a test-run of the
defendants’ machine which proceeded to produce unexpected results. Given
there was no prior agreement about confidentiality and since the results had
surprised everyone, the court refused to find that the circumstances attracted
duties of confidence.
8.77 However, much turns on the objective assessment of the
circumstances. For example, in Seager v Copydex, even though the plaintiff
unexpectedly volunteered information about the Invisigrip, the
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circumstances of the negotiations (which occurred over a period of a year)
were treated as confidential.
8.78
Accidental disclosures may also impart a duty of confidence, if it is
clear that the information has a confidential quality and has been mistakenly
imparted: Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers (No 2) [1988] 2 All ER
620 at 658–59. In Trevorrow v State of South Australia, documents
including legal advice had been provided accidentally to the plaintiff by the
Office of State Records. The plaintiff was suing the State of South Australia
for damage he suffered during his upbringing as an Aboriginal state ward
and his solicitors had accessed historical records concerning the decision to
make him a ward. Legal documents were accidentally disclosed which
discussed the legality of the Aboriginal Protection Board’s exercise of
power. These documents were arguably privileged and certainly had a
confidential quality. Nevertheless, the Full Court of the South Australian
Supreme Court found that the circumstances had not been imparted in
circumstances where a reasonable person would have thought the documents
were confidential. The Crown had a policy of making the documents
available and there was nothing in the circumstances which would have
made a reasonable person aware that the information was to be kept
confidential.
Misappropriation of information
8.79 A difficulty arises when the information has not been acquired in
confidential circumstances, for example, when it has been stolen via an act
of industrial espionage. Technically one could argue that such information
cannot be protected because it has not been communicated in circumstances
importing duties of confidence.
8.80 Such an argument was rejected in Franklin v Giddins where the
defendant stole cuttings of a new strain of nectarine developed by the
plaintiff. Dunn J, at 79–80, said:
I find myself quite unable to accept that a thief who steals a trade secret,
knowing it to be a trade secret, with the intention of using it in
commercial competition with its owner, to the detriment of the latter,
and so uses it, is less unconscionable than a traitorous servant. The thief
is unconscionable because he plans to use and does use his own wrong
conduct to better his position in competition with the owner, and also to
place himself in a better position than that of a person who deals
consensually with the owner.
8.81
Older authority supports Dunn J’s view. In Exchange Telegraph Co
Ltd v Central News Ltd [1897] 2 Ch 48 at 54, an injunction was granted preventing the defendant from ‘surreptitiously obtaining or copying from sheets
of letterpress, tapes or other documents’. In Crowder v Hilton the defendant
was liable for stealing the plaintiff’s recipe book and publishing the recipes.
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Other early cases protected unpublished manuscripts or artistic works that
had been reproduced without permission: Millar v Taylor (1769) 98 ER 201;
Turner v Robinson (1860) 10 Ir Ch 121; Prince Albert v Strange. Newer
authority also accepts the principle. In Australian Broadcasting Corp v
Lenah Game Meats, the majority accepted that equity would protect personal
information collected surreptitiously.
Eavesdroppers
8.82
But what of intermeddling third parties who receive information via
eavesdropping or legal forms of espionage? In Malone v Metropolitan
Police Commissioner [1979] Ch 344 at 376, Megarry V-C said that those
who communicate confidential information to others accept the risks of third
parties being able to overhear that communication. As a result, telephone
conversations that had been tapped by the police were not the subject of confidence because ‘the speaker is taking such risks of being overheard as are
inherent in the system’. According to Megarry V-C, the question of whether
there is an obligation of confidence depends on the method of
communication.
8.83
But as Meagher, Heydon and Leeming9 point out, this focus on the
risks of eavesdropping is misplaced. The focus of investigation should be
whether the actions of the defendant are unconscionable. Eavesdroppers will
be bound if they intercept information in circumstances where it is clearly
not meant for them, regardless of the ease with which eavesdropping may be
committed. The later case of Francome v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd
[1984] 2 All ER 408, appears to support this approach. In this case illegal
phone tapping was said to be a breach of confidence, even though the risks
of illegal phone tapping would appear to be as high (or low) as legal tapping
by authorities.
Liability for the actions of agents and employees
8.84
It appears that the actions of agents and employees can be imputed
to their principals and employers respectively: Seager v Copydex. Such a
finding was made in Coulthard v South Australia (1995) 63 SASR 531 at
535, where King CJ made the following observation:
It is to be expected that equity would follow the law in such
circumstances and that the common law doctrine of the vicarious
liability in tort of an employer for the acts of employees in the course of
their employment would apply in equity to breaches of confidence. It is
to be expected that equity would act upon the conscience of the
R P Meagher, D Heydon & M Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s
Equity: – Doctrines and Remedies, 4th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney,
2002, p 1119.
9
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Extract from Principles of Australian Equity and Trusts by Radan & Stewart
employer by requiring the employer to accept responsibility for the
employee’s breach of confidence.
Third parties
8.85
What action can be taken against third parties who come into
possession of confidential information? As is made clear by early
authorities, equity will not hesitate to act against third parties who receive
information knowing that it was the subject of a breach of obligation: Prince
Albert v Strange. In Wheatley v Bell [1982] 2 NSWLR 544 at 555, Helsham
CJ in Eq said that an injunction can be obtained against any third party who
knowingly obtained the confidential information in breach of confidence or
in any other fraudulent manner.
8.86
All that is necessary for liability is that the third party have actual or
constructive notice of the breach: Ansell Rubber Co Pty Ltd v Allied Rubber
Industries Pty Ltd at 45–6. Some have suggested that the defence of a bona
fide purchaser without notice should apply to an innocent purchaser of
confidential information who later becomes aware of the breach. However,
this was rejected by Helsham CJ in Eq in Wheatley v Bell, because his
Honour found that confidential information was not property, and hence, not
subject to the rule. However, his Honour did mention the possibility of the
third party raising the defence of change of position.
8.87 The problem with the view of Helsham CJ is that it ignores the
obvious fact that sometimes the information will be property. Evans has
suggested that an alternative way to understand the position of third parties
in receipt of confidential information is to treat them as coming under the
second limb of Barnes v Addy (1874) 9 LR Ch App 244: see Chapter 18.10
Under this principle strangers who participate with knowledge in a breach of
trust are treated as constructive trustees of the property. However, this
principle requires notice (Consul Development Pty Ltd v DPC Estates Pty
Ltd (1975) 132 CLR 373), and would therefore appear to be more restrictive
than the current approach to third parties in receipt of confidential
information. Moreover in Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say Dee Pty Ltd
(2007) CLR; 236 ALR 209, the High Court refused to employ the second
limb of Barnes v Addy in a case where it was alleged that a fiduciary had
misapplied confidential information. The claim failed for a number of
reasons, one of which was that the information was publicly availble and
therefore not confidential. But the majority found, at CLR 143-4; ALR 246,
that even if the information had been confidential it did not have
charactertistics of property that would have enabled the rule in Barnes v
10
M Evans, Equity and Trusts, 2nd ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney, 2009,
p 174..
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Addy to apply.
BREACH OF THE DUTY OF CONFIDENCE
Establishing a breach
8.88 Once a plaintiff has established a duty of confidence owed by the
defendant, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s actions were in
breach of that duty. Gurry11 has argued that this question can be asked by
examining the purpose of the confider in communicating the information to
the defendant:
The test which has found widespread acceptance is whether or not the
information was disclosed for a limited purpose. If the information was
disclosed for a limited purpose, the confidence crystallises around that
limited purpose. The confidant will be bound by an obligation the
content of which is not to use or disclose the information for any purpose
other than the limited one for which the information was imparted.
8.89
However, Australia’s Federal Court rejected the blanket imposition
of this test in Smith Kline & French Laboratories (Australia) Ltd v
Secretary, Department of Community Services & Health (1991) 28 FCR 291;
(1991) 99 ALR 679. In this case the plaintiff, a drugs company, had supplied
detailed information relating to the performance of one of its drugs to the
government, for the purpose of extending its patent. Another drug company
opposed the extension of the patent and sought approval to market a generic
version of the drug. The plaintiff sought an injunction to prevent the
government from using the information it supplied to assess the competitor’s
application. Both at trial before Gummow J ((1990) 22 FCR 73) and on
appeal the application failed. The Full Court, at FCR 303; ALR 691, found
that, while the information was confidential, there was no breach of duty.
The confider’s purpose test was not appropriate in cases where each party’s
interest was different and known to be so. Rather, the question of breach
should be answered by seeing whether unfair advantage had been taken of
the information. It was said, at FCR 304; ALR 692:
Whether one adopts the ‘reasonable man’ test suggested by Megarry J or
some other, there can be no breach of the equitable obligation unless the
court concludes that a confidence reposed has been abused, that
unconscientious use has been made of the information.
In the circumstances it was reasonable for the plaintiff to expect the
government to use the information in the interests of public health. This had
wider implications than the confider’s purpose of extending the patent. The
test of breach therefore entails an ‘enquiry into the extent and limits of the
11
INSERT REFERENCE TO GURRY AT p 118. Pls complete
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obligation of confidentiality that may be imposed on an individual in regard
to particular pieces of confidential information in his or her possession’:
National Roads and Motorists’ Association Ltd v Geeson (2001) 40 ACSR 1
at 6.
8.90 The test of breach in Smith Kline & French Laboratories was adopted
by the English Court of Appeal in R v Department of Health; Ex parte
Source Informatics Ltd [2000] 1 All ER 786. In this case drug prescriptions
were provided by patients to pharmacists for the sole purpose of allowing
the pharmacists to dispense drugs. The pharmacists wished to supply their
prescription records to a company so it could conduct research into
prescription practices. All information that identified patients was to be
removed. The government department refused to give its permission to the
pharmacists on the grounds that it would be a breach of confidence.
8.91
The Court of Appeal found that the pharmacists would not
breach confidence if they supplied anonymised information, even though
this went beyond the confider’s purpose in supplying the information. The
confider’s purpose was said to be irrelevant when the information was
anonymous.
Detriment
8.92
It is an open question as to whether or not there is a requirement of
detriment in the action for breach of confidence. In Smith Kline & French
Laboratories v Secretary, Department of Community Services & Health
(1990) 22 FCR 73 at 112; 95 ALR 87 at 126, Gummow J said:
The basis of the equitable jurisdiction to protect obligations of
confidence lies, as the present case illustrates, in an obligation of
conscience arising from the circumstances in or through which the
information, the subject of the obligation, was communicated or
obtained: Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd (No 2) (1984)
156 CLR 414 at 438; 56 ALR 193 at 209. The obligation of conscience
is to respect the confidence, not merely to refrain from causing detriment
to the plaintiff. The plaintiff comes to equity to vindicate his right to
observance of the obligation, not necessarily to recover loss or to restrain
infliction of apprehended loss. To look into a related field, when has
equity said that the only breaches of trust to be restrained are those that
would prove detrimental to the beneficiaries?
8.93
This view was supported in Hitchcock v TCN Channel Nine Pty
Ltd (No 2) at [29]; NRMA Ltd v Gleeson (2001) 40 ACSR 1 and NP
Generations Pty Ltd v Feneley (2001) 80 SASR 151.
8.94
In England a similar attitude was adopted in Attorney-General v
Observer, where four members of the House of Lords stated that financial or
economic detriment was not a necessary feature. Lord Keith, at AC 256; All
ER 640, said:
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I would think it a sufficient detriment to the confider that information
given in confidence is to be disclosed to persons to whom he would
prefer not to know of it, even though the disclosure would not be
harmful in any positive way.
8.95
However, in Commonwealth v John Fairfax & Sons, Mason J
concluded that detriment was an essential ingredient. However, it may be
that his Honour’s requirement for detriment is set at a low level. His Honour,
at CLR 51; ALR 492, said:
It may be a sufficient detriment to the citizen that disclosure of
information relating to his affairs will expose his actions to public
discussion and criticism.
His Honour was adamant, on the other hand, that the government must show
more than mere embarrassment for it to be successful in claiming breach of
confidence, given the importance of freedom of speech.
DEFENCES
The Public Interest Defence
8.96
The impact of public interest on the government’s ability to protect
confidential information has already been discussed above: see 8.58 . A
defence is available to private citizens whereby a breach of confidence can
be excused if it can be proven to be in the public interest. Early authorities
established that there was no confidence in an ‘iniquity’: Gartside v Outram
(1856) LJ Ch 113 at 114; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Kumar
(2009) 253 ALR 219 at [26]. This early concept of iniquity included
criminal and fraudulent conduct but was later expanded to include
misconduct which ought to be disclosed in the public interest: Initial
Services Ltd v Putterill [1968] 1 QB 396; [1967] 3 All ER 145.
8.97
Relatively trivial matters in which a claimant may have acted below
a recognised standard of behaviour will not automatically trigger the defence
as normally a high degree of misbehaviour must be demonstrated:
McKennitt v Ash [2005] EWHC 3003 at [97]; upheld on appeal McKennitt v
Ash [2008] QB 73.
8.98
While there was some authority to the contrary (Allied Mills
Industries Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1981) 34 ALR 105), a
recognised public interest will not automatically trump the public interest in
preserving private confidences: A v Hayden (1984) 156 CLR 532; 56 ALR
82. Instead, it is a process whereby the respective public interests in keeping
the confidence and making the information public are weighed and
compared. In Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers [2008] Ch 57 at
124-5;All ER 156 , Lord Phillips CJ said:
…the test to be applied when considering whether it is necessary to
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restrict freedom of expression in order to prevent disclosure of
information received in confidence is not simply whether the
information is a matter of public interest but whether, in all the
circumstances, it is in the public interest that the duty of confidence
should be breached. The court will need to consider whether, having
regard to the circumstances, it is legitimate for the owner of the
information to seek to keep it confidential or whether it is in the public
interest that the information be made public.
8.99
While this statement was made in the context of the privacy
developments in England and Wales, it still appears to be a correct statement
on the balancing process that needs to be undertaken in equity.
Dangers to individuals or the public
8.100 The defence can be used by private citizens to expose dangers to
public safety or health: Church of Scientology of California v Kaufman. For
example, in W v Edgell [1990] 1 All ER 835, a doctor was employed to
provide a psychiatric assessment of an inpatient who had killed five people.
The report was originally sought to secure the patient’s release but the
findings in the report were so adverse that the application for release was not
pursued. At the doctor’s direction a copy of his report was forwarded to the
Secretary for State. In assessing whether this breach of confidence was
excusable, the Court of Appeal found that the public interest in disclosing
the report to the authorities outweighed the public interest in the patient’s
confidentiality, given the serious concerns for the safety of the public.
8.101 Similarly, in Hubbard v Vosper [1972] 2 QB 84; [1972] 1 All ER
1023, Lord Denning MR stated (at an interlocutory stage) that the
publication of a book on Scientology by an ex-member of that religion could
be justified via a public interest in exposing the secrets of Scientology,
which was at the time viewed by some as a dangerous practice.
The public interest and the administration of justice
8.102 The public interest in the administration of justice can also justify a
breach of confidence, although the extent to which such a defence is
available in Australia is open to question. In Lion Laboratories Ltd v Evans
[1985] QB 526; [1984] 2 All ER 417, employees of the manufacturer of
breath testers were not liable for leaking information which questioned the
accuracy of the breath testers. This was because the breath testers were used
to convict people of driving offences and as such there was a public interest
in making sure the tests were accurate. In Campbell v Tameside
Metropolitan Borough Council [1982] QB 1065; [1982] 2 All ER 791, a
teacher brought an action in negligence against an education authority after
she was beaten by a student. In pursuance of her claim she sought access to
the authority’s psychological assessment records to prove that the authority
had been aware of the student’s mental instability. The Court of Appeal
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found that the public interest in allowing the teacher to properly litigate her
claim was of enough weight to override the authority’s duty of confidence to
the student. However, this approach has not always found favour in
Australia: AG Australia Holdings Ltd v Burton (2002) 58 NSWLR 464. In
Richards v Kadian [2005] NSWCA 328, the New South Wales Court of
Appeal refused to follow this line of thought. The child plaintiff had brought
proceedings against his doctor, alleging that the doctor had been negligent in
failing to diagnose a congenital heart condition. In preparing a defence to the
claim, the doctor sought to interview the child’s treating specialists. Access
had been granted to the specialists’ records but the plaintiff refused to give
the specialist permission to be interviewed. It was argued by the defendant
doctor that the obligations of confidence had been waived by the plaintiff
when the action had commenced. The court found that in order for
confidence to have been waived, there had to be an identifiable public
interest which went beyond the effects on the private rights of the parties. As
no other public interests were affected by the confidentiality apart from
those of the parties, the court refused to find that the obligations of
confidence had been waived.
Public interest and sexual activity
8.1023 Breaches of confidence in relation to sexual conduct might also be
justified in the public interest. In Stephens v Avery, at Ch 453–4; All ER
480–1, Brown-Wilkinson V-C said that the courts would not enforce a duty
of confidence relating to matters which had a gross immoral tendency,
although his Lordship stated that it may be too difficult to apply this
principle in modern times, as (some might argue!) there is no generally
accepted code of sexual morality. These issues again came to the fore in
Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd, where the plaintiff (the President of
Federation Internationale de l’Automobile) belonged to a group of practising
sado-masochists who acted out prison roles, including the wearing of
uniforms, dominating behaviour and the shaving of the plaintiff’s bottom.
The defendant newspaper convinced a member of the group to covertly film
its activities. The newspaper argued that the breach of confidence was
justified because the sexual role play was ‘Nazi’-themed. Eady J accepted
that if there had been such activity it may have been in the public interest for
it to have been reported; however, after reviewing the evidence the judge
found that the group activities were not inspired by Nazism or intended to
deride the Holocaust. Moreover, the judge refused to find that publication
was justified on the basis that the activity was adulterous and depraved.
Eady J, at [127], said:
[I]t is not for the state or for the media to expose sexual conduct which
does not involve any significant breach of the criminal law. That is so
whether the motive for such intrusion is merely prurience or a moral
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crusade. It is not for journalists to undermine human rights, or for judges
to refuse to enforce them, merely on grounds of taste or moral
disapproval. Everyone is naturally entitled to espouse moral or religious
beliefs to the effect that certain types of sexual behaviour are wrong or
demeaning to those participating. That does not mean that they are
entitled to hound those who practise them or to detract from their right to
live life as they choose.
Public figures and the Woodward defence
8.104 In Woodward v Hutchins [1977] 2 All ER 751, a number of pop
stars, including Tom Jones and Engelbert Humperdinck, attempted to
prevent their former public relations agent from publishing ‘tell all’ stories
about their sexual encounters. Lord Denning MR found that, as the pop stars
had created favourable but false images of their private lives, there was a
public interest in the truth being told. More recently, it has been said in A v
B plc [2003] QB 195 that public figures who court public attention about an
issue will have less ground to object if the public have an understandable
and legitimate interest in being told the information. To illustrate, in
Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers, there was no confidence preventing
the press from publicising Naomi Campbell’s narcotics addiction, given her
continued public statements that she had not taken drugs (although the
details of her treatment were confidential). However, the converse is also
true. In McKennitt v Ash, , the folk singer’s aversion to publicity and
concern with privacy was a factor in finding against any defence based on
Woodward.
8.105 Australian courts have retreated from Lord Denning MR’s farreaching position on public interest. It has been said in Australia that a
public interest must be more weighty and precise than a broad public interest
in the truth being told: Castrol Australia v Emtech Associates; Bacich v
Australian Broadcasting Corp (1992) 29 NSWLR 1; NRMA v Yates [1999]
NSWSC 701. This line of cases shows that there is a difference between the
concept of the public interest and what the public may be interested in:
Sullivan v Sclanders (2000) 77 SASR 419; Australian Football League v
Age Company Ltd at 440; Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl [2007] 1
AC 359 at 408; [2006] 4 All ER 1279 at 1321.
Public interest or clean hands?
8.106 In Corrs Pavey Whiting & Byrne v Collector of Customs (Vic)
(1987) 14 FCR 434 at 445–52, Gummow J went so far as to doubt whether
the public interest defence was truly a defence at all and believed it was
better understood as an expression of equitable principles based on
conscience, such as clean hands or iniquity. This approach was adopted in
Sullivan v Sclanders (2000) 77 SASR 419, and commented on favourably in
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AG Australia Holdings Ltd v Burton (2002) 58 NSWLR 464. It was also
adopted in Australian Football League v Age Company Ltd at 436 where
Kellam J stated that the defence required that:
(a) The proposed disclosure will in fact disclose the existence of or the
real likelihood of the existence of an inquity that is a crime, civil wrong
or serious misdeed of public importance;
(b) that the iniquity is of a character of public importance in the sense
that what is to be disclosed affects the community as a whole, or affects
the public welfare; and
(c) that the person who is seeking to protect the confidence is doing so in
order to prevent disclosure to a third party with a real and direct interest
in redressing the alleged crime, wrong or misdeed.
Change of position
8.107 The defence of change of position is a defence to an action for
unjust enrichment. The defence is generally made available to innocent third
parties who mistakenly receive money and act to their detriment, for
example by making substantial investments with it: David Securities Pty Ltd
v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 175 CLR 353; 109 ALR 57;
Gertsch v Atsas [1999] NSWSC 898; K and S Corporation Ltd v Sportingbet
Australia Pty Ltd [2003] SASC 96. In such circumstances the defendant is
not held liable to account for money expended.
8.108 Some commentators have suggested that the defence should also be
available to innocent third parties who receive confidential information.12 As
yet there is no Australian authority that is directly on point, although
theoretically the defence should be available, particularly in cases where the
plaintiff seeks restitutionary relief.
Forced disclosure
8.109 A confidee may be forced to disclose information by legal compulsion. For example, public health statutes often require the mandatory
reporting of infectious diseases, and often provide for the disclosure of
infected persons’ names and addresses, for example, under s 18 of the Public
Health Act 1991 (NSW). In such cases the defendant is not liable for breach
of confidence.
8.110 Similarly, courts may order that confidential documents be provided
in the discovery process: Campbell v Tameside Metropolitan Borough
Council. This will often involve the court in the balancing of the public
interests: D v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children
[1978] AC 171; [1977] 1 All ER 589.
12
M Evans, Equity and Trusts, 2nd ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney, 2009,
[5.42].
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8.111
Quasi-judicial bodies may also have powers to call on documents.
In Royal Women’s Hospital v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria
(2006) 15 VR 22, a hospital refused to supply health records to the Medical
Practitioners Board of Victoria. The Board had sought the records as part of
an investigation, sparked by Senator Julian McGauran, into a late-term
abortion that had been performed in the hospital. The abortion had been
performed as the child had been diagnosed with dwarfism and the pregnant
woman had threatened self-harm should an abortion not be performed. The
Senator alleged that the child had been misdiagnosed and made a complaint
to the Medical Board. The main thrust of the hospital’s argument was that
there was a public interest immunity which protected it from the Board’s
power of investigation. Public interest immunity is normally claimed by
government officials and members of the executive to keep sensitive
governmental information secret. The Victorian Court of Appeal found that
the hospital had no right to claim such an immunity and that the Board’s
powers of investigation could not be resisted. The doctors were later cleared
of misconduct by the Board.13
Delay
8.112 The general equitable defence of delay or laches is available to
actions for breach of confidence: Attorney-General (UK) v Heinemann
Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (1988) 10 NSWLR 86.
Clean hands
8.113 It can be argued in some cases that relief should not be granted
because of the way in which the confider has conducted himself or herself
and the means chosen to protect the information: Hubbard v Vosper. For
example, in Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd, the newpapers were
free to contradict Campbell’s claim that she had never used drugs (but not by
publishing details and photographs of her attendance at therapy meetings).
As with all cases concerning the clean hands doctrine, the improper
behaviour must be shown to be directly related to the relief sought: Talbot v
General Television Corp Pty Ltd at 240.
REMEDIES
Injunctions
8.114 The primary remedy for breach of confidence is an injunction. It
should be noted that if the breach of duty stems from a purely equitable duty
of confidence it could be argued that the injunction would stem from
C Stewart, ‘Victorian Doctors Cleared of Late Term Abortion’ (2007) 4
Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 4.
13
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equity’s exclusive jurisdiction and hence there need be no reference to the
adequacy of damages.
8.115 However, in Foster v Mountford & Rigby, the fact that the potential
injury to the Aboriginal community was not possible to compensate was
used to justify an injunction. Similarly, compensation may be more equitable
in situations where the breach was committed innocently: Seager v Copydex.
8.116 Subject to what will be said below about the springboard doctrine,
injunctions will not be granted in cases where the information has moved
into the public domain: Attorney-General v Observer. Nor will an injunction
be successful. In such cases, an account of profits or compensation may still
be ordered.
The springboard doctrine
8.117 It has been said that a confidee must not be in a better position for
having breached a commercial confidence by getting a ‘head start’ on
competitors: Seager v Copydex at 417. Equity will prevent a defaulting
confidee from being able to use information even after it has entered the
public domain. This idea is known as the ‘springboard’ doctrine: Austal
Ships Pty Ltd v Incat Australia Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 368; Dart Industries Inc
v David Bryar & Associates Pty Ltd (1997) 38 IPR 389.
8.118 Roxburgh J introduced the concept of a ‘springboard’ when he said
in Terrapin Limited v Builders’ Supply Co (Hayes) Ltd [1967] RPC 375 at
391:
As I understand it, the essence of this branch of the law, whatever the
origin of it may be, is that a person who has obtained information in
confidence is not allowed to use it as a spring-board for activities
detrimental to the person who made the confidential communication, and
spring-board it remains even when all the features have been published
or can be ascertained by actual inspection by any member of the public.
8.119 The facts of Terrapin concerned the manufacture of a prefabricated structure. The structure had been put on the market and was thus
susceptible to reverse engineering. However, the defendants breached confidence by using the designs of the plaintiff, and by doing so got a head start
on other competitors in the field. To counter this unfair advantage the court
ordered that the defendant be placed under a special disability, in the form of
an injunction preventing it from entering the market, which lasted until the
information had fully reached the public domain.
Delivery-Up
8.120 The court can order a defendant to deliver up property in the
defendant’s possession which has been created, compiled or manufactured
as a result of a breach of confidence: Blockbuster Australia Pty Ltd v Karioi
Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 1089; Ansell Rubber Co v Allied Rubber Industries.
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Equitable compensation and equitable damages
8.121 A competent court can order compensation either under the
traditional jurisdiction of equity or under Lord Cairn’s Act: see Chapter 26.
Whether the order is for compensation or damages, the calculation will be on
a compensatory basis. In commercial confidences, it will be easier to
calculate compensation and damages based on the damages to business
interests, but in private confidences, it has proven difficult to work out
whether compensation can be provided, in the absence of the plaintiff
suffering some recognisable psychiatric injury.
8.122 Exemplary damages are not available because they are punitive:
Harris v Digital Pulse Pty Ltd (2003) 56 NSWLR 298: see 26.27–26.34.
However, aggravated damages, which relate to damage to the plaintiff’s
dignity, have been found to be available: Giller v Procopets; see 26.35.
There is some dispute in the United Kingdom about the availability of
aggravated and exemplary damages. Naomi Campbell was able to get
general damages and aggravated damages (modest though they were) in
Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers. In Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3)
[2003] 3 All ER 996, the judge thought himself able to order aggravated and
exemplary damages but declined to do so. But in Mosley v News Group
Newspapers, Eady J found that there was not yet sufficient authority to
suggest that exemplary damages were available. Perhaps this is a result of
the fusion of equitable and human rights principles which is currently under
way in the United Kingdom: see 8.134.
8.123 These issues concerning general compensation and damages,
aggravated damages and exemplary damages were discussed in Giller v
Procopets, a case where the defendant had shown (or attempted to show)
photographs and video of the plaintiff having sex, to the plaintiff’s family,
friends and co-workers. The trial judge found that while the plaintiff had
been greatly distressed by the defendant’s actions, she was not suffering any
recognised psychiatric condition which could be compensated for. On
appeal, all the three judges found that damages for mental distress could be
ordered in the traditional jurisdiction of equity and under Lord Cairn’s Act,
even in cases where the plaintiff had not suffered recognised psychiatric
injury. The main argument was that damages should be available, as it
would be strange for equity to offer injunctive relief but then fail to offer a
remedy to the plaintiff in cases when an injunction would be too late to stop
the damage. Again, all three judges agreed that aggravated damages should
be available to compensate for the manner in which the confidence had been
abused. Aggravated damages were said to be compensatory and not punitive
in nature.
Account of profits
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8.124 As an alternative to equitable compensation, the defendant may be
made to account for the profits made from a breach of duty: Peter Pan
Manufacturing Corp v Corsets Silhouette Ltd [1963] 3 All ER 402.
8.125 Account of profits can be a difficult remedy to provide, especially
given the problems of isolating the relevant profits from a defendant’s
income stream. An allowance can be awarded to the defendant for their time,
effort and skill but the onus for establishing the allowance falls on the
defendant: Bluescope Steel Ltd v Kelly (2007) 72 IPR 289 at 326; Harris v
Digital Pulse Pty Ltd (2003) 56 NSWLR 298 at 384.
8.126 It now appears that an account of profits can be ordered for a breach
of confidence which is purely contractual and which has not resulted in
damage. In Attorney-General v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268; [2000] 4 All ER
385, the defendant was a convicted double agent who had escaped to Russia
in the 1960s. He published a memoir of his adventures long after the events
in the memoir had entered the public domain. However, this was considered
to be a breach of his contractual duties not to disclose government secrets.
The House of Lords found that the defendant’s profits from publication
could be claimed by the Crown, even though the equitable duty of
confidence had ceased. Moreover, there was no actual damage suffered by
the Crown given that the information was already public. Nevertheless, a
majority found that an account could be ordered because of the exceptional
circumstances of the case. Lord Nicholls, at AC 285; All ER 397, said:
If confidential information is wrongfully divulged in breach of a nondisclosure agreement, it would be nothing short of sophistry to say that
an account of profits may be ordered in respect of the equitable wrong
but not in respect of the breach of contract which governs the
relationship between the parties.
Constructive trusts
8.127 Constructive trusts are available as a remedy for breach of
confidence: LAC Minerals Ltd v International Corona Resources Ltd (1989)
61 DLR (4th) 14. The remedy will be most clearly available when the
confidential information is property. This is because the imposition of a trust
requires that there is property to be held on trust: see Chapter 21.
8.128 However, the Supreme Court of Canada has recently held that a
constructive trust can be imposed for breach of confidence, regardless of
whether the information has taken a proprietorial form: Cadbury Schweppes
Inc v FBI Foods (1999) 167 DLR (4th) 577. The decision can perhaps be
explained by the distinction which Gummow J made in Smith Kline &
French Laboratories v Secretary, Department of Community Services &
Health. As discussed above, at 8.13, his Honour stated that in cases where
the information is not property, the equity which arises from breach may
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itself be considered as property.
THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVACY RIGHTS
The traditional approach to privacy protection
8.129 The early decisions on breach of confidence gave rise to the
American common law right of privacy.14 However, in Australian
jurisprudence it has been said that there is no common law right to privacy:
Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor (1937) 58
CLR 479; Cruise v Southdown Press Pty Ltd (1993) 26 IPR 125; Australian
Consolidated Press Ltd v Ettingshausen (1995) 38 NSWLR 404.
8.130 Generally speaking, privacy ‘rights’ can only be enforced when
they have been incidentally affected by the commission of some other tort.
Nuisance has been used as a basis in England and in Australia:
Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] 3 All ER 669; but see Hunter v Canary Wharf
Ltd [1997] AC 655; [1997] 2 All ER 426; Raciti v Hughes (1995) 7 BPR
14,837. Alternatively, trespass to land has also been used to prevent the
broadcasting of videotaped images: Lincoln Hunt Australia Pty Ltd v
Willesee (1986) 4 NSWLR 457; TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Inning (2002)
54 NSWLR 333. However, an injunction will not issue unless it can be
shown that damages, including exemplary damages, will be insufficient to
compensate the plaintiff.
8.131 The limitations of this approach lay in the requirement that the
claimant have an interest in the land upon which the interference occurred.
This was illustrated in Kaye v Robertson (1991) FSR 62. The plaintiff, a
television personality, was seriously injured and convalescing in a closed
hospital ward when he was photographed by the defendant. The plaintiff
sought to restrain the publication of a photograph because of its
embarrassing nature. However, the plaintiff was unable to prove an
actionable trespass to the person (the flash of the camera was not a battery),
nor a trespass to land (the plaintiff had no proprietary interest in the hospital
ward, only a licence to occupy). As such, his claim of privacy failed.
Developments in New Zealand
8.132 While New Zealand has a Bill of Rights, there is no specific
protection of privacy contained within it: Lange v Atkinson [2000] 3 NZLR
385. New Zealand courts have therefore looked to developing a tort of
privacy to fill in the gap left by the common law: Bradley v Wingnut Films
14
Ricketson & Richardson (1998) at 482 Pls complete
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[1993] 1 NZLR 415; P v D [2000] NZLR 591. The tort has many elements
which have been borrowed from breach of confidence, but the main
requirement is that there be a disclosure of private facts which is highly
objectionable to a reasonable person. In Hosking v Runting [2004] NZCA
34, the publication of photographs of children of a television celebrity, taken
when they were in a public space, was not said to be offensive. Interestingly,
this test is taken from Gleeson CJ’s judgment in Australian Broadcasting
Corp v Lenah Game Meats: see below.
8.133 In Rogers v TVNZ [2007] NZSC 91, a majority of the New Zealand
Supreme Court allowed the publication of a video where an accused person,
who had been acquitted of killing a woman, confessed to her murder. The
video had been excluded from the evidence at the trial and had been released
by the police to the media. Blanchard, Tipping and McGrath JJ held that
there could be no reasonable expectation of privacy when a person was
being interviewed by police and knowingly videotaped.
Developments in the United Kingdom
8.134 English and Welsh courts have also looked to expanding the
protection of privacy interests. However, they have decided not to depart
from the old rule that there is no general action for breach of privacy:
Wainwright v Home Office [2002] QB 1334; [2003] 3 All ER 943. Instead,
they have combined the law of confidential information with the human
rights jurisprudence of the European Union, under the Human Rights Act
1998 (UK). The two relevant articles to cases of breach of confidence are
Article 8 (the right to respect for private and family life) and Article 10 (the
right to freedom of expression).
8.135 In Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2001] QB 967; [2001] 2 All ER 289,
Catherine Zeta-Jones and Michael Douglas and the publisher of the
magazine OK! sought to injunct publication of photographs which had been
taken at their wedding without their approval. The couple had entered into a
contract with OK! magazine for the publication of wedding photographs (for
a considerable sum after a bidding war with Hello! magazine). All guests
were made aware that photography was forbidden and that OK! had the
rights to images. Staff were made to sign confidentiality agreements. In spite
of these precautions and very tight security, a freelance photographer had
managed to take photographs and supply them to the rival publisher of
Hello! magazine. The initial issue before the Court of Appeal of England
and Wales was whether an injunction should be granted to prevent Hello!
from publishing the unauthorised photographs.
8.136 At trial, an injunction was granted, but the decision was quickly
overturned by the Court of Appeal. It was found that the balance of
convenience lay against the granting of an injunction. This was primarily
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because the Douglas/Zeta-Jones family had traded their rights as
commodities, and, as such, damages would be an adequate remedy for any
proved breach, as well as for any breach of the rights of OK!. In so finding
the Court of Appeal emphasised the role that breach of confidence could
play in protecting rights to privacy, especially given the requirement of the
Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) to bring English law into line with the law of
the European Union. The doctrine of confidential information was said to be
available to protect the right to respect for private life, under Article 8 of the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950.
In discussing the role of confidential information in protecting privacy,
Sedley LJ, at QB 1001; All ER 320, said:
The law no longer needs to construct an artificial relationship of
confidentiality between the intruder and victim: it can recognise privacy
itself as a legal principle drawn from the fundamental value of personal
autonomy.
8.137 OK! magazine managed to publish its wedding images some hours
prior to Hello! magazine and the matter went back to trial. After an
unsuccessful attempt to strike out the defence in Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No
2)[2003] 1 All ER 1087, the matter went to trial in Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No
3) [2003] 3 All ER 996. Douglas and Zeta-Jones were successful in gaining
modest damages under breach of confidence of £14,600: Douglas v Hello!
Ltd (No 6) [2004] EMLR 13. The photographs were treated as akin to trade
secrets, given their commercial value. The fact that the defendants had acted
surreptitiously to obtain the photographs meant that they had acted
unconscionably, with resulting detriment to the married couple.
Interestingly, Lindsay J stated that aggravated and exemplary damages could
be awarded but he declined to do so. OK! were also successful in gaining
damages for breach of confidence. Lindsay J found the images to be
confidential, that Hello! had acted unconscionably by purchasing
photographs that they knew had been taken in breach of confidence, and that
OK! magazine had suffered a detriment of over £1,000,000.
8.138 The trial decision was appealed: Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2006]
QB 125; [2005] 4 All ER 128. The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of
breach of confidence for the Douglases but overturned the decision to award
damages to OK! magazine, finding that no obligation of confidence arose in
the magazine’s favour. It was said that any confidence owed to OK! only
related to the authorised images taken by the magazine.
8.139 This decision was then appealed by OK! magazine as one of the
three cases decided in OBG Ltd v Allan. This appeal fused a number of
appeals on questions of unfair competition. The majority of the House of
Lords (Lord Hoffmann, Baroness Hale and Lord Brown) restored the trial
judge’s finding in favour of OK!. Lord Hoffmann could find no legal or
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policy reason for denying the rights of OK! as they had paid consideration
for the right to exclusive images from the Douglases who were in control of
their wedding images. Lord Hoffmann found that the security arrangements
at the wedding were not only for the benefit of the Douglases but also for
OK! magazine in respect of any photographic images taken, not just the
authorised ones. Both Baroness Hale and Lord Brown agreed with Lord
Hoffmann. Lord Brown also found that OK!’s rights related to the
prevention of publication of the unauthorised photographs rather than
limiting those rights to the authorised ones.
8.140 In dissent, Lord Nicholls disputed that the information contained in
the unauthorised photographs was in any way substantially different from
the authorised ones. His Lordship found that the publication by OK! of its
own images was enough then to destroy the confidence in the approved
photographs. Lord Walker argued that there was nothing confidential about
the images. His Lordship found, at AC 83; All ER 616, that the law did not
allow people to complain about being photographed, unless the photograph
was either embarrassing, had been procured through the misuse of official
powers or was a trade secret. His Lordship doubted that the images were a
trade secret and said that the fact that security was in place could not
automatically invest the images with the quality of confidence.
8.141 Since the Douglas litigation, the doctrine of breach of confidence
has continued to push into the privacy realm. Some have seen the use of
Article 8 as splitting the doctrine of confidence into two arms: a traditional
arm which is regulated under the old principles, and a new arm which is
characterised primarily as a privacy tort, which is dictated by a balancing
exercise between Article 8 and 10 interests: McKennitt v Ash. The starting
point for this tort is to inquire whether the claimant had a reasonable
expectation of privacy which should be protected by Article 8. This is in turn
answered by asking whether the disclosure of information would offend a
reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities, when placed in the same position
as the claimant: Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers. A number of factors
are relevant to this inquiry including ‘the attributes of the claimant, the
nature of the activity in which the claimant was engaged, the place at which
it was happening, the nature and purpose of the intrusion, the absence of
consent and whether it was known or could be inferred, the effect on the
claimant and the circumstances in which and the purposes for which the
information came into the hands of the publisher’: Murray v Big Pictures
[2008] EWHC Civ 446 at [36].
8.142 To illustrate, Sir Elton John failed to injunct the publication of a
photograph of him walking down the street because the photograph
contained no embarrassing information: Sir Elton John v Associated
Newspapers [2006] EWHC 1611. But in Murray v Big Pictures, J K
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Rowling (acting on her infant son’s behalf) successfully sued a provider of
photographic images for providing photos of her son to the media. The
photos were of the son in a pram with his family walking down the street.
Given the child’s age, he was not upset or distressed by the publication of
the image but his mother nevertheless brought the action on his behalf to
provide some privacy. The trial judge struck out the action. He refused to
find that the photographs were private as they had been taken in the street
and did not reveal any information which would have caused
embarrassment. However, the Court of Appeal overturned that finding. Sir
Anthony Clarke MR, giving the judgment of the court, found that the child
had a reasonable expectation of privacy to be able to go to a café with his
parents, as this was part of his recreation time, and photography during that
time was intrusive. The matter was remitted for retrial.
8.143 If the information can be classed as protected by Article 8 then the
court must move to consider whether the Article 8 interests are outweighed
by Article 10: McKennitt v Ash. In that context the defences of public
interest may be considered and a test of proportionality must be applied:
Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers at Ch 79; All ER 156.
8.144 Given that the UK courts have moved so far into integrating the
European human rights into their doctrine, it could be argued that the
English cases are now of decreasing relevance to Australian conditions.
Caution should be exercised in reliance on these decisions, but it should also
be said that the differences are not as great as some would make out. First,
the traditional doctrine and categories still apply in the United Kingdom, and
resort may not need to be had to the articles for the resolution of commercial
confidences: OBG Ltd v Allan. Second, English judges have tended to
overemphasise the difference between the new ‘tort’ approach and the
traditional doctrine. It is claimed that the tort approach is radically different
because it allows judges to enforce confidences in circumstances where
there is no pre-existing relationship giving rise to an enforceable duty of
confidence: Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd at [7]. But as we have
seen above, this was possible under the traditional doctrine: Franklin v
Giddins. Equity does not require a pre-existing relationship before imposing
a duty of confidence. What is needed is a form of unconscionable conduct.
Finally, as more Australian jurisdictions adopt human rights legislation akin
to the UK model, there may well be reconvergence between Australian and
English approaches.
Australian approaches to privacy protection
8.145 Privacy rights are created under statutory schemes in Australia, such
as under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). However, these schemes generally
relate to access and control of personal records rather than protection of
wider privacy interests. Additionally, Australian jurisdictions (apart from the
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Australian Capital Territory and Victoria) lack domestic protection of human
rights: Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) s 12. These factors may have led to
one thinking that Australian courts would be slow to follow the
jurisprudence currently developing in England and New Zealand.
8.146 Initially, it was said that equity may restrain the publication of
photographs even when they have been taken in public spaces
surreptitiously, if they are embarrassing or offensive: Bathurst City Council
v Saban (1985) 2 NSWLR 704 at 708; Hellewell v Chief Constable of
Derbyshire [1995] 4 All ER 473 at 476. Hodgson CJ in Eq adopted this
principle in Kwok v Thang. This case concerned the contents of a video tape
taken of the plaintiff in a passionate encounter with one of the defendants.
The plaintiff was a Chinese pop star and had come to Australia on tour.
While on tour he was befriended by the defendants. The defendants had
filmed the encounter in a hotel room as a way of extorting money from the
plaintiff. An account of the contents of the tape had been published in a
Hong Kong newspaper. The plaintiff sought an injunction to prevent further
publication. Hodgson CJ in Eq found that the balance of convenience
required that the defendants be restrained from publishing the contents of the
video tape. The prior publication in Hong Kong was transitory and unlikely
to be remembered and hence did not destroy confidentiality. There was a
serious question to be tried as to whether the defendants had breached
confidence given that they had only been friends for a short period of time.
Hodgson CJ in Eq stated that one need not have a longstanding friendship
before equity would find an obligation of confidence.
8.147 In Donnelly v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Limited (1998)
45 NSWLR 570, Hodgson CJ in Eq restrained the publication of a video
taken of the plaintiff in his underpants during a legal search of his house.
The plaintiff was convicted of the charges relating to the search. The tape
was not used in the prosecution and police had given the tape to a television
station. This was considered by Hodgson CJ in Eq to be an abuse of police
power, which triggered the plaintiff’s right to equitable relief. The risk of
public humiliation could not be overcome by the availability of exemplary
damages. Hence an injunction was ordered even though there was no
trespass.
8.148The above cases all illustrate that if the defendant is directly
responsible for some unconscionable act leading to publication they can be
restrained either via an action for breach of confidence or through some
inherent equitable jurisdiction. However, as shown in Donnelly v
Amalgamated Television Services, equity will also be able to take action
against third parties who were not responsible for the recording of the
information but who seek to publish it in the knowledge that it was recorded
unconscionably.
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8.149 This extension of the equitable jurisdiction was discussed in
Australian Broadcasting Corp v Lenah Game Meats. A majority of the High
Court refused to restrain the publication of video footage by the ABC which
had been taken of the slaughtering processes employed by the plaintiff when
butchering possum meat. The film had been recorded by hidden cameras that
had been placed by animal liberationists inside the plaintiff’s building. It was
assumed that the liberationists had trespassed when placing the cameras in
the building. The footage was then supplied to the broadcaster who aired it
after the plaintiff’s original attempts to bring an injunction failed. The
plaintiff sought an injunction to prevent further broadcasts of the footage.
8.150 The primary issue was whether the broadcaster could be restrained via
an injunction, given that it had not committed an actionable wrong in
obtaining the footage. A claim was made that further publication would be
unconscionable (because the broadcaster knew that the footage had been
obtained via a trespass) and unconscionability on its own would allow for an
injunction.
8.151 However, a majority of the High Court (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron,
Gummow, Hayne and Kirby JJ; Callinan J in dissent) disagreed. In doing so
they gave the most detailed consideration to date in Australia of the use of
equity to protect privacy. The main issue related to whether the tape
contained confidential or private information. Gleeson CJ supported the
general principle that equity could act to restrain publication of photographic
material surreptitiously obtained. However, the act recorded must be of a
‘private’ nature before equity should intervene because only then would it be
unconscionable to publish the footage. The issue of what was ‘private’ was
therefore central. His Honour, at CLR 226; ALR 13, said:
There is no bright line which can be drawn between what is private and
what is not. Use of the term ‘public’ is often a convenient method of
contrast, but there is a large area in between what is necessarily public
and what is necessarily private. An activity is not private simply because
it is not done in public. It does not suffice to make an act private that,
because it occurs on private property, it has such measure of protection
from the public gaze as the characteristics of the property, the nature of
the activity, the locality, and the disposition of the property owner
combine to afford. Certain kinds of information about a person, such as
information relating to health, personal relationships, or finances, may be
easy to identify as private; as may certain kinds of activity, which a
reasonable person, applying contemporary standards of morals and
behaviour, would understand to be meant to be unobserved. The
requirement that disclosure or observation of information or conduct
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities
is in many circumstances a useful practical test of what is private …
Applying this test, Gleeson CJ, at CLR 227; ALR 13-14, found that the
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footage was not of a private act:
The problem for the respondent is that the activities secretly observed
and filmed were not relevantly private. Of course, the premises on
which those activities took place were private in a proprietorial sense.
And, by virtue of its proprietary right to exclusive possession of the
premises, the respondent had the capacity (subject to the possibility of
trespass or other surveillance) to grant or refuse permission to anyone
who wanted to observe, and record, its operations. The same can be said
of any landowner, but it does not make everything that the owner does
on the land a private act. Nor does an act become private simply
because the owner of land would prefer that it were unobserved. The
reasons for such preference might be personal, or financial. They might
be good or bad. An owner of land does not have to justify refusal of
entry to a member of the public, or of the press. The right to choose who
may enter, and who will be excluded, is an aspect of ownership. It may
mean that a person who enters without permission is a trespasser; but
that does not mean that every activity observed by the trespasser is
private.
8.152 Gleeson CJ’s finding that the footage was not private meant it was not
unconscionable for the ABC to publish the footage. Gleeson CJ said that his
decision would have been different had the ABC been the trespasser. In such
a case he said he would follow the line of authority, beginning with Lincoln
Hunt Australia Pty Ltd v Willesee, to find the actions of the trespasser as
unconscionable. Gleeson CJ also opined that had the footage been of a
private nature, such as the footage in Donnelly, it would have been
unconscionable for the ABC to televise it.
8.153 Gummow and Hayne JJ dealt with the claim that the respondent
company had a right to privacy. Their Honours believed that Victoria Park
Racing & Recreation Grounds Co v Taylor was no longer a bar to the
creation of a new tort of privacy, but they cautioned that a preferable course
would be to adapt recognised forms of action to meet new situations and
circumstances. They accepted the analysis of Sedley LJ in Douglas v Hello!
Ltd that privacy was based on the fundamental value of personal autonomy.
As such, Gummow and Hayne JJ queried whether any generalised tort of
privacy should be available to corporations. Their Honours felt that the
company had not sufficiently made out a cause of action and, as such, an
injunction could not be granted. Gaudron J agreed with their reasons.
8.154 Kirby J disagreed with the views of Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ
on the ability of the court to grant an injunction but he nevertheless agreed
that an injunction should not be granted. Kirby J believed that equity did
have the power to prevent the media from broadcasting improperly obtained
information even when the media was not directly involved in the improper
activities. His Honour also believed that a tort of privacy might be
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developed, but thought that the question did not need to be decided in the
extant case. Nevertheless, Kirby J still refused to agree to an injunction
because he thought that it would improperly interfere with the implied
freedom of political communication, described in Lange v Australian
Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520. The discussion of animal
welfare was a legitimate matter of governmental and political concern and
should not be prevented by an injunction.
8.155Callinan J (in dissent) found that the ABC’s use of the footage was a
breach of confidence and that equity should intervene, given the clear
violation of the company’s right of possession over the land. His Honour
was also prepared to go the next step and recognise a tort of privacy and he
believed that the implied constitutional right of political communication was
not implicated in the case. Given these findings, he believed the injunction
should be upheld.
8.156Lenah Game Meats may have opened the door to privacy-based claims
but the Australian courts have generally been reticent to rush in.15 The
District Court of Queensland has accepted a tort in Grosse v Purvis [2003]
QDC 151, but the Victorian Full Court and the Federal Court have so far
declined to create a tort of privacy: Giller v Procopets; Kalaba v
Commonwealth [2004] FCA 763.
8.157 To that extent, the doctrine of confidential information remains the
main source of protection for privacy in Australia. Gleeson CJ’s
requirements, first, that information be private and, second, that disclosure
be highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities, now
appear to be the key requirements. The fact that the information has been
obtained via trespass is a factor to consider, but it is not determinative of the
issue of breach of privacy, nor of unconscionability: Pillay T/As West Corp
Mortgage Market v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 983.
Mark Johnston, ‘Should Australia Force the Square Peg of Privacy into the
Round Hole of Confidence or Look to a New Tort?’ (2007) 12 Media and Arts
Law Review 44.
15