THE MORAL MAJORITY AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT
INTRODUCTION
The Moral Majority is an interesting case as a social movement. Although it was an
organization advocating for social change, and had a form of leadership and a constituency, it
presents challenges to the typical model of a social movement. For example, a well defined
stratification system within the movement was non-existent, and leadership tended to be regional as
well as national in nature. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it was very difficult to establish
who members really were. Were they individuals who tuned in to watch Jerry Falwell on
television, those who responded to pleas for money, those placed on the Moral Majority's mailing
list, or those who, when polled, admitted to agreeing with various positions of the Moral Majority?
This ambiguity is partially due to the media's penchant for using the terms "the New Christian
Right" and "Moral Majority" synonymously.
Nevertheless, scholars have treated Moral Majority as a social movement (Liebman, 1983;
Simpson, 1983; Snowball, 1991). In reviewing the literature, it becomes very apparent that scholars
have had a difficult time agreeing upon the level of support for the Moral Majority within the
country (Simpson, 1983; Buell & Sigelman, 1985; Wilcox, 1989). In fact, much of the literature I
discovered attempted to address this issue.
I did not find much in the way of social movement literature on the Moral Majority that
dealt specifically with the three dynamics discussed in class. Thus, I have chosen to read the
articles and book chapters in the context of these dynamics, using the events to explain how each of
the dynamics interacted with one another over the life course of the movement. Therefore, this
essay will proceed in the following manner: I will present five sections, each corresponding to a
particular aspect of the movement. I explain how the dynamics of organization, ideology, and
environment interact with one another in particular reference to the specific aspect of the movement
covered in that section. Finally, a brief discussion will follow to tie up any loose ends.
THE EMERGENCE OF MORAL MAJORITY
The political and religious ideologies collectively termed "the New Christian Right"
provided the context for the emergence of Moral Majority. Researchers have suggested that the
Christian Right arose in opposition to perceived liberal trends in society such as the legalization of
abortion, the purging of religion in public schools, and general moral decay (Liebman and
Wuthnow, 1983; Bromley and Shupe, 1984; Wilcox, 1989; Moen, 1994). This particular religious
movement in turn, produced a number of organizations. The National Christian Action Coalition,
the Religious Roundtable, Christian Voice, and Moral Majority were organized to address and
correct these and other perceived problems within society.
The Moral Majority Inc. was established in June of 1979 by a group of Baptist pastors
around the country (Georgianna 1989). As Liebman (1983) points out, it was a movement of
mega-churches from the very beginning. Each one pastored a church with a congregation well over
6,000.
Ideology and environment played a very important role in the emergence of Moral Majority.
The preexisting networks established by pastors were crucial. The original "triad" of founding
members consisting of Jerry Falwell, Greg Dixon, and Timothy La Haye knew one another well
before 1979. Bob Billings, the first executive director, continued to work with his own
organization "Christian Voice," after his appointment. He later helped to establish networks
between Moral Majority and the secular New Right when he served as religious adviser to the
Reagan campaign, eventually becoming an assistant in Reagan's department of education.
Charles Stanley, a pastor of a large Southern Baptist Church, and D. James Kennedy, a
Presbyterian minister in Florida were added to Moral Majority's board shortly after its creation. This
allowed the organization to increase its appeal to those outside independent fundamentalist Baptist
groups. Both Stanley and Kennedy pastored large church's and were known outside their respective
states.
Obviously, the immediate political environment coupled with the network structure of these
pastors provided fertile ground for the creation of Moral Majority. Each one of these Christian
leaders felt that America was on a moral downward spiral that needed to be reversed. Falwell
(1981) himself suggests that he had waited "for years" for a Christian leader to emerge and lead
America back to morality. He reports that Tim La Haye and Greg Dixon "urged" him to put
together a political organization after sensing a "crisis" and realizing that no one else would
mobilize others to "lead the way out of the wilderness" (Falwell, 1981: 187).
Falwell and Moral Majority leaders felt they were merely articulating the concerns of others.
Many felt that the government was threatening their lifestyles with the legalization of abortion, the
threat of the Equal Rights Amendment, and the rising sentiment toward homosexual rights, etc.
The immediate political environment was ripe for a group like the Moral Majority to offer
alternative political solutions based upon shared religious doctrines.
The preexistent networks were the backbone for the building process. While the
environment was conducive for the emergence of Moral Majority, it was not enough. If it had been,
one would expect that Moral Majority would have formed long ago as the issues perceived as
threats by fundamentalists were not new. Conversely, networks were also not enough. As I have
already pointed out, Dixon, Falwell, and La Haye knew one another well before 1979. Rather, it
seems that the pre-established networks and the perception of an impending crisis worked together
to bring Falwell and the others to a decision to act when they did. Once a decision for action was
made, the Moral Majority was able to move very quickly because of these friendships.
Eventually, organizational features interacted with the religious environment, forming new
coalitions based upon these networks. For example, some of the organizations within the New
Christian Right were loosely linked through Moral Majority. Billings for example, used the same
mailing list as Moral Majority for his organization "Christian Voice." Moral Majority, Christian
Voice, and other religious and political organizations could now share resources to recruit and
mobilize members.
Falwell was able to recruit and mobilize members using his church as well as television and
radio broadcasts. Falwell pastored a congregation of over 11,000 members at Thomas Road Baptist
Church in Virginia. Meanwhile, his "Old Time Gospel Hour," constructed around the 11:00
Sunday service at Thomas Hill was broadcast weekly on over 350 television stations nationwide.
Over 300 radio stations nationwide broadcasted both the Old Time Gospel Hour and the Daily
Moral Majority Commentary (Crawford, 1980). Finally, the organizational newsletter "Moral
Majority Report" reached over 840,000 homes with an estimated readership of three million
(Liebman, 1983).
The Old Time Gospel Hour raised $35 million during fiscal year 1979, and in 1980
contributions from combined fundraising activity approached $1 million a week (Liebman, 1983).
Obviously this would be a staggering amount for an organization that was only a year old. But
Falwell and company already had a "built in" pool sympathetic for Moral Majority recruitment and
mobilization.
While Falwell was attempting to recruit those in his own church and audiences by way of
radio and television, La Haye and Dixon (who pastored the 8,000 member Indianapolis Baptist
Temple) were able to appeal to their large audiences. La Haye was a nationally well known author
of at least sixteen books selling more than 300,000 copies a year (Liebman, 1983). Meanwhile,
Stanley and Kennedy were strategic ties to other potential recruitment and mobilization pools.
Stanley, a well-respected Southern Baptist pastor of a large church in Atlanta helped to reach other
Southern Baptists; the largest denomination in the United States. Kennedy, a respected
Presbyterian minister was chosen as the liaison to this and other like minded denominations. By
choosing a diverse, yet highly networked leadership, Moral Majority was able to reach others that
normally would have ignored them. Meanwhile, the fact that others outside the independent Baptist
circle sat on the board of Moral Majority lent credibility to the organization.
Many diverse groups heard Moral Majority's message between Falwell's own media blitz
and the other board member's audiences. Consequently, this has presented problems for researchers
who tried to define Moral Majority's membership (see Yinger and Cutler, 1984). The organization
claimed a membership of over four million Americans (a figure that climbed to 6.5 million), and
over 72,000 ministers, priests, and rabbis (Covert, 1981; Falwell, 1981; Georgianna, 1989).
Meanwhile, conservative estimates set Moral Majority's membership at around 400,000- 50,000
(Liebman, 1983; Buell & Sigelman, 1985).
There is no question that Moral Majority's message reached a large audience, yet it is
unwise to suggest that everyone that agreed doctrinally supported the Moral Majority. Some
evangelicals and fundamentalist may have agreed that America was troubled morally, but disagreed
in Moral Majority as a political solution. Others may have agreed on some Moral Majority
positions while disagreeing with others. Financial statements, if available, would be of little help
because it has been suspected that Falwell has redistributed funds from his other ministries to Moral
Majority coffers. These funds could then be used to sustain the enormous amount needed for the
mass mailings, television and radio broadcasts, etc., used to reach potential members.
The organizational aspects of the Moral Majority allowed Falwell to exploit, maintain, and
eventually broaden existing networks between Moral Majority leaders, members, and potential
recruits. By redirecting funds, or using previously existing platforms (like his church) Falwell was
able to reach a sympathetic audience to Moral Majority's platform. The networks that emerged out
of the larger political and religious environment enabled Falwell to recruit men like Kennedy and
Stanley, who in turn, could lend credibility to Moral Majority while addressing their preexisting
networks that existed outside Falwell's immediate influence. These networks in turn, presented
Falwell and Moral Majority with potential resources such as members and money.
These were important for Moral Majority to gain national credibility so that the organization
could begin to grow into a full fledged movement. But to do so, Moral Majority had to go beyond
building a base constituency, they had to reframe their agenda to make it resonate with potential
members. Thus new issues and goals had to be added to existing ones.
MORAL MAJORITY'S GOALS
While the environment interacting with ideology and organization provided a source for the
emergence of Moral Majority, it also assisted the expansion of the movement's agenda. As Moore
and Whitt (1986) point out, Moral Majority was originally a single issue movement addressing
government interference with Christian private schools. Falwell wasted little time in expanding his
agenda to include such thing as the opposition toward legalized abortion, homosexual rights, illegal
drugs, pornography, and the Equal Rights Amendment. Meanwhile, he advocated support for the
nation of Israel, a strong national defense, and prayer in public schools (Falwell, 1981; Kuter, 1982;
Moore & Whitt, 1986; Georgianna, 1989).
Falwell appealed to the ideological fundamentalist religious beliefs of his audiences to take
up the movement's cause. He also pointed out the problems with the current political environment
by suggesting that the government was openly hostile to fundamentalist ideology. He argued that
the government would continue to infringe upon the civil liberties of fundamentalists unless it was
held back. By appealing to fundamentalist's ideologies and reframing the political environment as a
"fight for religious liberty," Falwell hoped that he could galvanize support and secure more
resources for the movement.
Moral Majority worked aggressively to mobilize a grassroots constituency. Within two
years they had chapters in all 50 states, numerous local affiliates, and an active Washington office
that spent over $6 million dollars in fiscal 1981 (Georgianna, 1989). Much of this money went to
the movement's media campaign (Liebman, 1983). Moral Majority used its "Moral Majority
Report," along with its extensive mailing list to mobilize its constituents to action. The movement
called on members for anything from sending in money, writing congressmen and other state
officials, and mobilizing local affiliates. Snowball (1991), suggests that the Moral Majority Reports
devoted as much space to mobilization as it did to the ten next most important issues combined.
These articles often instructed members in the structure and content of letter writing.
Falwell's job was undoubtedly made easier by the pre- mobilization accomplished by
previous groups within the New Christian Right movement. These other organizations allowed
Moral Majority ready access to mobilized constituents. Moral Majority appealed to these
constituents on the basis of common ideology and the weak political and religious structure of the
Christian Right. Although there were groups that had already mobilized a portion of the
constituents, they were relatively small with few resources or initial direction. Moral Majority
offered constituents direct ties to an organization that boasted not one, but a number of
well-recognized leaders. This also gave potential recruits an impression of strong leadership and
organization. Falwell also had access to an enormous mail list from his television and radio
broadcasts that could be used to recruit, mobilize, and raise money. The visibility of Falwell also
helped Moral Majority. A December 1980 Gallup poll reported that 40% of its sample had heard of
Moral Majority. In May of 1981 a similar poll conducted by the Washington Post and ABC
reported that this figure raised to 49% (Liebman, 1983).
Thus Falwell had ready access to three groups, (1) his own audience, (2) those already
mobilized by other groups within the Christian Right, and (3) other's outside of Christian
fundamentalism. Moral Majority used a strategy of frame extension to recruit and mobilize others
from this last group. The movement attempted to appeal to conservative religious ideologies
congruent with their own, again using the same rhetoric of the possibility of lost religious liberties.
Jews, Catholics, and Pentecostals were all targeted initially, and yet as we shall see later on, Moral
Majority was largely ineffective in recruiting from these populations.
Falwell had hoped to use Moral Majority to reach individuals from these three targeted
groups by appealing to mutually shared goals based upon common conservative ideologies. The
political and religious environment was ripe as fundamentalists continued to fear for their religious
liberties, and groups within the Christian Right mobilized constituents. Falwell and the Moral
Majority were largely successful in recruiting fundamentalists from the first two target groups (1)
other organizations and (2) Falwell audiences. Much of this success was due in part to the
organizational structure of Moral Majority, a feature we need to explore more fully.
MORAL MAJORITY'S STRUCTURE
Falwell claimed that Moral Majority was not a political party or a religious organization
(Falwell, 1981). Georgianna (1989) however, points out that he was "responsible for numerous
operations" such as Thomas Road Baptist Church, Old Time Gospel Hour, Liberty University, and
Moral Majority, and that these multiple roles fed upon one another.
Falwell's organizational role of the charismatic leader helped in his ability to mobilize
various individuals from these areas using ideological rhetoric. For example, Falwell was an
authority figure, a pastor. Many in his congregation and amongst his followers regarded him as one
of God's special leaders called apart for a significant leadership role. Many were willing to follow
Falwell based on their belief that Falwell was a biblical authority to be respected and obeyed.
Falwell was able to use his various roles to reach a large portion of individuals, promoting religious
ideology as a basis for political reform. Not surprisingly, Wilcox (1989) and Tamney and Johnson
(1983, 1984) found that the largest supporters of Moral Majority were evangelicals with
conservative views on social and foreign policy issues, sympathetic with the political right, and
unsympathetic toward the left. Thus most of Falwell's constituency was recruited and mobilized
based upon their preexisting networks and religious and ideological orientations.
The interaction between ideology and organization is further expressed in the churches that
were often used as regional and state Moral Majority basis. Liebman has suggested that "Moral
Majority's genius lay in linking with a national network of conservative clergymen" (1983: 61).
This network was the Baptist Bible Fellowships, 2,500 independent fundamentalist Baptist
churches that emphasized the autonomy of the local church and strong authority of the pastor as
leader of the congregation. Many of the pastors of these church's met in seminary and Bible
colleges, especially Jerry Falwell's Liberty University and Baptist Bible College in Missouri.
These churches proved excellent for Moral Majority for several reasons. First, they shared a
common entrepreneurial attitude for church planting and growth with Moral Majority leaders.
Baptist Bible Fellowship pastors were expected to infiltrate communities and build churches on the
basis of converts they made. Churches were built from the ground up based upon networks of
converts that the pastor established within the community. These pastors were skilled at motivating
individuals; they had to be if they were going to build and maintain a fellowship. Obviously these
skills were useful for Moral Majority leaders who required regional leaders to recruit and mobilize
on a local and regional level.
Another attractive feature of Baptist Bible Fellowship churches was their relative autonomy
as opposed to national conventions ruled by hierarchical leadership structures like the Southern
Baptist Convention. It was up to each Baptist Bible Fellowship pastor to lead his congregation as
he saw fit. The idea was that (1) the individual pastor had earned that right since he was
responsible for building his church, and (2) it was in the best interest of each congregation to be
autonomous so that they could adapt and respond quickly and easily to the immediate environment.
The pastors largely relied on charisma to recruit and maintain members. They held all authority
and decision making privileges within the fellowship, and the congregation was expected to respect
the pastor's leadership.
Finally, the ideology and structure of the Baptist Bible Fellowship made them conducive for
Moral Majority's goals, much like the churches in the South were conducive for the Civil Rights
movement. Baptist Bible Fellowships provided Moral Majority with localized bases from which
the national leadership could draw resources. This included localized leaders to represent Moral
Majority and help them recruit and mobilize new members. Baptist Bible Fellowship leaders also
fed Moral Majority information on local and regional politics. Finally, more members through
Baptist Bible Fellowship churches meant more money for Moral Majority. Studies have indicated
that almost half of all the state chapter leaders were Baptist pastors (Liebman, 1983). Wilcox
(1994) suggested that more than half of Moral Majority membership in Ohio was drawn from
Baptist Bible Fellowships, and Georgianna (1989) suggested that around 75% of the Indiana Moral
Majority were drawn from Baptist Bible Fellowships.
While Baptist Bible Fellowships provided considerable resources for Moral Majority, they
were insufficient for sustaining the movement alone. This interaction between the organization and
the environment is crucial because the organization is unable to sustain itself without reference to
its immediate environment. While the environment of Baptist Bible Fellowship churches aided the
movement, Moral Majority was also forced to appeal to another segment of its environment
through direct mailings, television, and radio. The funds from all of these activities together were
crucial for sustaining Moral Majority. Thus an intricate web of interaction between ideological,
organizational, and environmental dynamics recruited, mobilized, and sustained the movement. Its
influence could now be choreographed on a national and local level because of the relationship
between national leaders and Baptist Bible Fellowship pastors. But how influential was the Moral
Majority? We now consider this question.
MORAL MAJORITY'S INFLUENCE
The influence of the Moral Majority is difficult to perceive. Some have suggested that the
Moral Majority found little support amongst most Americans (Simpson, 1984; Buell & Sigelman,
1985; Moore & Whitt, 1986). While this is undoubtedly true, it seems logical to suggest that the
movement was influential in that the media often used Moral Majority as a synonymous term for
the Christian Right. Furthermore, scholars have devoted considerable attention to determine the
degree of support for Moral Majority. The movement obviously did not have the support that its
leaders often claimed, yet it seems that it was influential to some degree, otherwise we would not
expect the level and intensity of attacks it received from countermovments and the media.
Movement leaders suggested that Moral Majority had been effective in, as well as
responsible for many issues including: (1) blocking passage of the Equal Rights Amendment, (2)
defeating liberal Iowa Senator Dick Clark, and (3) placing Ronald Reagan in the White house
(Crawford, 1980; Moore & Whitt, 1986). Many defeated politicians agreed, although it is
impossible to tell whether they actually believed this themselves or if they (1) wanted a scapegoat
as an explanation for their failure, (2) felt they could mobilize voters for the next election, or (3) a
little of both. Nevertheless, many conservatives were elected as a result of shifting political trends.
The level of influence Moral Majority had is debatable and probably unknowable.
Nonetheless, the political and cultural environment provided some level of success for Moral
Majority. Wilcox suggests that the Christian Right and Moral Majority were successful in that
while they failed to achieve their overall goals, they benefitted from resources lent by the secular
New Right and the Republican party to "facilitate political conversion of white evangelical
Christians to Republican politics" (1994: 249). Wilcox seems to be suggesting that while the Moral
Majority eventually disintegrated, its members have realigned themselves in coalitions with
Republican politicians, putting themselves into a position to exert more influence in the future. The
Moral Majority ultimately came to an end as a result of its failure to form broad based coalitions
such as these, an issue that we now turn to.
MORAL MAJORITY'S DEMISE
Georgianna said that "a recent report indicates that Falwell has had to cut off his toll free
line to save 7.2 million. This may spell out financial difficulties" (1989: 27). In January of 1986,
Falwell folded Moral Majority (Moore & Whitt, 1986).
Many reasons have been offered up for the movement's failure. Falwell blamed it on the
immediate environment by claiming that the media had distorted its goals and positions (Moore &
Whitt, 1986). Wilcox (1994) on the other hand, suggests a combination of organizational and
ideological reasons. First, he points out that it was no longer profitable to raise money through
direct mail. In 1984, Moral Majority raised $11.1 million dollars through the mail. This figure
dropped to somewhere around $3 million in 1988, well below the $10 million Georgianna (1989)
suggested Falwell needed to keep the organization buoyant.
Wilcox offers three main reasons why funds dropped during this period. First, the
continued success of Republican candidates convinced constituents that money was no longer
needed. Moral Majority supporters felt that the dangerous liberal policies would subside now that
conservatives were in office. Second, the market was becoming saturated with other organizations
competing for funds. New groups and coalitions began to form and grow. Specialty groups
supporting pro-life and pro-family causes began to appeal to individuals based upon singular issues,
eventually drawing away those who may have agreed with Moral Majority on some issues, but
disagreeing on others. Finally, 1988 was a scandalous year for televangelists. Jim Bakker was
exposed as having had sexual relations with a former PTL secretary, and was eventually tried on tax
fraud charges. Jimmy Swaggert was caught in the company of a prostitute, fueling charges that his
behavior had been an ongoing activity. All of these events must have disillusioned some followers
and angered many others. Some simply did not want to be associated in any way with
televangelists after the scandals received wide spread attention in the media.
But lack of money was not the only reason for Moral Majority's demise. Wilcox also cites
ideological and organizational problems that occurred within Moral Majority and Baptist Bible
Fellowship ranks. One organizational problem was that the Baptist Bible Fellowship pastors that
the movement had begun to rely on so heavily simply could not balance their pastoral
responsibilities, church building activities, and Moral Majority duties. As I mentioned earlier, the
organizational structure for Baptist Bible Fellowship was such that the pastor shouldered much of
the leadership, planning, and church planting responsibilities. More time was needed on the part of
the pastors to maintain their churches when these fellowships began to grow.
Another problem with Baptist Bible Fellowship was an ideological one, namely that those
within the Baptist Bible Fellowship were intolerant towards others outside their denomination.
Snowball (1991) lists this doctrine of separation as one of the major barriers to movement
mobilization. In Wilcox's study of the Ohio Moral Majority, he reports that one county chairman, a
Methodist minister, was unable to mobilize members of any of the Baptist Bible Fellowship
churches in his county because they felt that the ideological differences between themselves and
others were too great. Wilcox also reported that this minister had the only Catholics in the entire
state organization.
In the end, environmental, ideological, and organizational aspects crippled Moral Majority
as a social movement. While Falwell reconstituted Moral Majority as the Liberty Foundation (see
Haden & Shupe, 1988), these factors proved to be insurmountable. As Wilcox (1994) suggests,
Moral Majority did not fail because of shifting public sentiments, but because of the above
environmental, ideological, and organizational factors that influenced one another.
CONCLUSION
The Moral Majority as a movement contributed heavily to Christian politics. The
immediate religious, political, and cultural environment created an atmosphere conducive for rapid
recruitment and mobilization by the organization. By relying on preexisting networks inside and
outside the leadership structure, Moral Majority was able to galvanize support rather quickly.
Charismatic leaders like Falwell and Baptist Bible Fellowship pastors evoked deep
responses from fundamentalists by reframing the immediate environment in terms of one that
needed immediate revitalization. The environment had to be "won back" from the amoral forces
that continued to encroach upon moral territory. Single issues that are symbolic of a lost world to
be recaptured, coalesced into political action because they resonated with large numbers of people
(Heinz, 1983). Moral Majority recast the political situation as a struggle to recover a traditional
way of life. This symbolic production and dissemination was indispensable for the movement.
Obviously then, Moral Majority's ideology and the immediate environment interacted with
and affected movement organization. Charismatic leadership played a central role in mobilizing
constituents at the national and local levels. Decisions to align Moral Majority with Baptist Bible
Fellowship were calculated decisions based upon the immediate needs of the organization as well
as the ideological congruence between the two. Shared beliefs and frame extension allowed Moral
Majority to co-opt these churches for immediate gains.
While the movement ultimately failed due to reasons already specified, its influence
continues to be felt. Some groups have learned from Moral Majority's success and failures. Pat
Robertson's Christian Coalition seems to be one of these. The Christian Coalition has deliberately
avoided the mistakes of the Moral Majority by attempting to construct and mobilize a truly
ecumenical movement (Wilcox, 1994). It is uncertain at this time how successful the Christian
Coalition will be, but it has already shown its political capabilities. Ultimately, organizations like
Moral Majority and the Christian Coalition have to learn to walk a precarious path, balancing
elements within the dynamics to sustain themselves. The truly successful ones seem to be those
that strike this balance without losing their identity in the process.
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