1
Towards a Perceptual Basis for Self-Knowledge / Arnon Cahen
1. Introduction:
Skepticism with respect to a certain kind of self-knowledge was popularized through the writings of David Hume. Hume argued that, pace Descartes, we can never have any substantial knowledge about the nature of the self. Rather, when we search for the self that is to be the bearer of mental properties, all that we find are the mental properties themselves; nowhere can we find a persisting self. Hume took this epistemological datum as reason for the metaphysical claim that the self has no substantial reality; rather, he argued, the self just is a bundle of mental properties.
1
With various disanalogies, it seems a similar observation drove Wittgenstein’s claims in his
Tractatus . Metaphorically speaking, Wittgenstein argued that “…from nothing in the field of sight can it be concluded that it is seen from an eye.” 2 That is, in experiencing the world, we are never acquainted with the self undergoing the experience; the self is not an object as apples and oranges that we encounter in the world. Furthermore, it is not merely that the self isn’t
an encountered object – it is unencounterable. These are powerful arguments against the possibility of having a certain kind of acquaintance with the self, and as a result, they
1 Famously, Hume argued that “when I enter most intimately into what I call myself , I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but perception.” The conclusion he draws from such observation is that, since nothing but the perceptions are observed and in them there is no self to be found, the self can be nothing over and above the bundle of successive perceptions that one in fact observes. Hume, D., A
Treatise of Human Nature
, bk. I, pt. IV, sect. vi (‘Of Personal Identity’) This is in contrast to
Descartes’ substance-attribute metaphysics in the Meditations , according to which thoughts, broadly construed, are properties, ways of being, of a thinking substance.
2 Wittgenstein, L., 1921. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. ( London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1955) 5.633. The Metaphor is drawn out most clearly by Pears, who understands Wittgenstein as implying that “…no ego appears in the field of consciousness just as no eye appears in the visual field.”(Pears, D., 1987.
The False Prison, Vol. 1 & 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press) p. 156)

2 constitute skepticism about the possibility of a certain kind of a-posteriori selfknowledge.
In the latter part of the 20 th
century this skepticism has been challenged by noting that the self participates essentially , though implicitly, in the representational contents of perception. Thus, several philosophers have argued for the possibility of forming a substantial notion of the self by pointing to the presence of self-specifying information in perception.
3 Bermúdez, for example, argues that the source of all self-awareness is traceable to perception. The way the world is perceptually represented involves information about the self that can supply a basis for primitive self-awareness as a nonconceptual point of view.
4
If this is the case, then we have a way out of Humean and
Wittgensteinean skepticism. Though we are never perceptually acquainted with the self, our experience of the world can form a basis for genuine self-knowledge since the self is essentially implicit in the contents of perception.
The claim that the self is implicit in the contents of perception has been widely cited in epistemology, not only for the sake of securing us self-knowledge, but also in a host of related projects. Among others, it has been called upon for the sake of securing us
3 The expression ‘self-specifying information’ is Gibson’s. See Gibson, J. J. (1979). The
Ecological Approach to Visual Perception . (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin). I am thinking in particular of Evans, and with some variation of Shoemaker, Cassam, and Bermúdez, to name a few. See Evans, G. (1982). The Varieties of Reference . (New York: Oxford UP); Shoemaker, S.
(1968). Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. In Cassam, Q. (Ed.) Self-knowledge .
(New York:
Oxford UP 1994); Cassam, Q. (1994). Introduction. In Cassam, Q. (Ed.) Self-knowledge .
(New
York: Oxford UP); Bermúdez, J. L. (1995). Ecological Perception and the Notion of a
Nonconceptual Point of View. In Bermúdez, J. L., Marcel, A., and Eilan, N. (Eds.) The Body and the Self (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press); Bermúdez, J. L. (1998). The Paradox of Self-
Consciousness . (Cambridge MA: MIT Press).
4 Bermúdez, The Paradox of Self-Consciousness .

3 knowledge of an objective, mind-independent world,
5
for describing the distinctive perspectivalness of the contents of conscious perception, 6 and in explaining the possibility of judgments that are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun.
7
5 A suggestion put forth by Evans ( The Varieties of Reference ), as well as Bermúdez ( The
Paradox of Self-Consciousness ), is that it is precisely the systematic presence of the self in all of perception that explains our capacity to think of the world as separate from its being observed.
See also Bermúdez (‘Ecological Perception and the Notion of a Nonconceptual Point of View’) who argues from the presence of such self-specifying information in perception to the notion of the self as a nonconceptual point of view which allows the separation of the self from the world.
One of the ways Bermúdez proposes such a capacity for thinking of the world as objective and mind-independent is secured is the fact that perception invariably informs us not only of our environment but simultaneously about many of our physical properties as well. He says, “[o]n the ecological understanding of perception, a form of sensitivity to self-specifying information is built into the very structure of perception from the earliest stages of infancy in such a way that, as
Gibson famously put it, all perception involves coperception of the self and the environment.”(Ibid., p. 153)
6 Noë, for example, argues that the perspectival aspect that is an essential feature of conscious perception is accounted for by the perception of perspectival properties, relational properties involving reference to the point of view of the observer . Thus, the point of view of the observer must enter into the content of perception so as to explain features of conscious perception (Noë,
A., 2004. Action in Perception.
(Cambridge MA: MIT Press)). Eilan, too, argues that for a representation to be conscious is for it to be from a subject’s point of view. A representation is from a point of view when the contents of that representation are in part essentially perspectival.
“[T]he distinctive feature of conscious perceptions is that whatever other contents they have, their contents will always include a layer of such essentially perspectival contents…”(Eilan, N., 1995.
‘Consciousness and the Self.’ In Bermúdez, L. J., Marcel, A., and Eilan, N., (Eds.) The Body and the Self (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press) p. 354) Indeed, “[t]he consciousness of conscious perceptions consists in such essential perspectivalness.”(Ibid., p. 344) Perceptual representations are essentially perspectival, and hence potentially conscious when, among other things,
“… intrinsic to a specification of their contents is that the subject is a merely implicit relatum .”(Ibid., p. 345, my italics). Van Gulick also makes several similar claims in Van Gulick,
R., (1993). ‘Understanding the Phenomenal Mind: Are We All Just Armadillos?’ In Davis, M. and Humphreys, G. W., (Eds.). Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays.
(Oxford: Blackwell), Van Gulick, R., (2000). ‘Inward and Upward: Reflection, Introspection and
Self-Awareness.’ Philosophical Topics 28: 275-305, and Van Gulick, R., 2004. ‘Higher-Order
Global States HOGS: An Alternative Higher-Order Model of Consciousness.’ In Gennaro, R.,
(Ed.) Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness.
(Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins
Publishing Co.)
7 Somewhat rephrasing Shoemaker’s definition, judgments that are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun are judgments of the form ‘I am a
’ where it is impossible that one knows that someone is a but makes the mistake of judging ‘I am a
’ because s/he mistakenly thinks that ‘I’ refers to the someone who is a.
(Shoemaker, ‘Self-Reference and

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In this paper, I will not be overly concerned with the details of these various projects. My aim is more general. What is sorely missing from the abovementioned epistemological projects is: a) an analysis of what the appeal to an implicit self in the contents of perception amounts to, and b) an account of how perception could involve contents in which the self is implicit in this way. Therefore, my aim is twofold: a) in section 2, I analyze how we should understand the claim that the self is implicit in perception such that it can achieve the goals set before it – mainly, to provide a genuine rebuttal of
Humean/Wittgensteinean skepticism, and b) in section 3 I argue, by appeal to John
Perry’s notion within the philosophy of language of the unarticulated constituent, that perception has the resources to incorporate this notion of the implicitness of the self and can, therefore, constitute a source for genuine self-knowledge.
2. The Implicitness of the Self in Perception
Minimally, saying that the self is implicit in perception just means that in perceiving the world, though we never find the self as an object among others ( a la Hume and
Wittgenstein), the way that we experience the objects and properties that we do carries information about the self that is enjoying the perception. In other words, saying that the self is implicit in perception is minimally to say that perception affords us self-specifying information. Furthermore, the distinctive way that we experience our environment can be explained by appeal to those properties of the self that the self-specifying information informs us of. Hence, we can appeal to this distinctive way in which the world is
Self-Awareness’, p. 82). In the service of this latter goal, Bermúdez argues that these judgments
“[gain] their immunity to error through misidentification [as] a function of the distinctive way in which the self is represented in the contents of perception.” Bermúdez, J. L., (2003). ‘The
Elusiveness Thesis, Immunity to Error through Misidentification, and Privileged Access.’ In
Gertler, B. (Ed.) Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge . (Ashgate Press,
Epistemology and Mind series). p. 226.

5 perceptually represented in the service of the epistemological projects mentioned above.
It will, therefore, be the aim of this section to get clearer on the sense in which the self is implicit in our perception of the world, or equivalently, the sense in which there is selfspecifying information to be found in perception. To do so I explore two accounts according to which the self can be said to be implicit in perception. The first is the inferential account , which I will argue cannot serve as a basis for self-knowledge. The second is the constitutive account , which I will suggest is appropriate for the purposes discussed above.
2.1 The inferential account
Often we say such things as ‘smoke implies fire’, ‘the orientation of the needle in a gas gauge implies the level of gas in the tank’ and ‘any event implies its causal history’.
Though somewhat awkward, there is a sense in which it is legitimate to say that fire is implicit in smoke, and that the level of gas is implicit in the orientation of the needle, and the causal history of an event is implicit in that event. In such cases we infer what is said to be implicit from what is ‘given’, where this inference is based on properties of what is thus ‘given’ in conjunction with causal or probabilistic knowledge that we possess of the world. This is so since the former event (smoke/ needle orientation) carries information about the latter event (fire/ level of gas). Indeed, this is the case whenever a given event
(and I use this term broadly) carries information about a different event.
8
Thus given that we have knowledge of the relation between the level of gas in the tank and the behavior
8 I use the term ‘event’ to cover all cases in which some object comes to possess a property – nothing in the following hangs on this choice of terminology. For a thorough discussion of the notion of carrying information see Dretske, F. (1981). Knowledge and the Flow of Information.
(Cambridge MA: MIT press).

6 of he needle, our perceiving the needle point to ‘E’ allows us to infer that the gas tank is empty.
Properties of the self, too, can be implicit in this way in perception. An awareness of our possessing certain properties can be inferred from the contents of our perceptions taken at face value in conjunction with certain other worldly knowledge. For example, I might one morning wake up with a pounding headache and be aware of my keys still in the keyhole on the wrong side of the door. While the contents of my perception are the keys and their relation to the door etc., I may quite easily infer, on the basis of certain causal knowledge that I posses, that I got home yesterday a bit too drunk. My having the properties I had yesterday causally determined the contents of my current perceptions, and as they generally do so in a reliable and dependable way, I can infer from the contents of my experiences not only properties of my former self (that is, come to form the belief that I was drunk), but also, with some additional inferences, properties of my current self (for example, that I am dehydrated). Thus, in being perceptually aware of the keys and the door, I become doxastically aware of properties of my self.
This way of understanding how the self is implicit in perception will not do, however, as a basis for self-knowledge that could answer the dilemmas for which an appeal to the implicit self has been made. First, as an inferential account, the self-ascriptions that it gives rise to depend on the availability of additional ‘connecting’ beliefs that would relate the way the world is represented to the probable causes of its being so represented, among which will figure certain properties of the self. However, the availability of such connecting beliefs to the subject presupposes self-knowledge of a form that Hume and
Wittgenstein would deny, e.g., knowledge that I am careless when drunk , where the first

7 person pronoun refers to that which is undergoing the current perception. However, to possess such knowledge presupposes exactly the acquaintance with the self that is under criticism.
Furthermore, the inherent defeasibility of these self-ascriptions, make them inappropriate as a basis for knowledge . Surely, there are many other possible causes that could bring about the world’s being as it is perceptually represented, e.g. a malicious friend who decides to play a trick on me. That is, in such cases, perception carries self -specifying information only contingently , only insofar as the environment being the way it is happens to involve the self in its causal history, as such, it cannot be a basis for selfknowledge . Relatedly, the plausibility of the various epistemological projects described above depends on a constitutive relation between self-specifying information and the way that the world is perceptually represented. It is something about the way in which the environment is represented that informs us of the self, with no need of inference on our part.
2.2 The constitutive account
To develop a proper understanding of how the self can be implicit in the contents of perception it is instructive to think about a paradigm example, utilized in the context of the epistemological projects mentioned, in which the self is considered implicit in perception.
In perceiving a tree, say, it is the tree and certain of its properties that are represented.
However, the claim is that the way that the tree is represented reflects certain properties of the self that is doing the representing.
9
In particular, the tree is represented as being at a particular distance and orientation relative to the perceiver’s position in space. This is
9 Indeed, it is the nature of this ‘reflection’ relation that is our goal to uncover.

8 but one of infinitely many properties of the same type (‘being at distance x from y’) that the tree has. However, it is the location of the observer that partially determines which of these properties the tree will be represented in perception as having.
According to the previous understanding of ‘implicit’, it is merely the fact that properties of the experiencing self partially determine the contents of the representation that legislates the claim that these properties of the self are implicit in perception. There’s a causal dependence between states of our selves (in this case, our location in space) and the way particular contents are represented in perception, and it is in virtue of this causal dependence that perception carries information about the self. But, as argued above, understanding the sense of ‘implicit’ in terms of mere causal dependency is not sufficient.
What is needed is both that the self is implicit in the contents of perception, and that the availability of information about the self does not require inference.
10
These conditions are satisfied once we hold that the relational property, the location and orientation of the tree relative to the observer , is itself part of the content of perception. If this is the case, then in being aware of the tree as being at a certain distance one is ipso facto aware of one’s own location relative to the tree. Crucially, the information about the subject’s location relative to the tree is available to her as part of the contents of her perception , without any need of inference.
If this is the case, it is no longer appropriate to say that the self is altogether implicit in perception. Rather, since the relational property the subject is aware of when experiencing the tree is part of the explicit content represented, and an awareness of this
10 The latter condition would exclude such cases as discussed above, where the information about the self is available to the subject only through the application of causal or formal inferences involving the contents of perception and certain connecting beliefs.

9 property just is an awareness of a property of one’s self, it follows (by transitivity of identity) that the latter too is explicitly represented. This is so since the self-specifying information that is made available in perceiving the tree’s relative distance just is the property of the self which it is meant to inform us of. Thus, to be aware of this particular property of the self, there is trivially no need for inference on the basis of the contents of perception, taken at face value, and various connecting beliefs. Still, there is an important sense in which the self is implicit, in that clearly only one of the relata necessary for specifying the relational property one is aware of is explicitly represented in perception – in this case, the tree. The other component, the self, remains implicit in perception.
3. The Implicit Representation of the Self and Unarticulated Constituents
If such essentially self-involving relational properties are constitutive of the content of perception, it is clear how perception can be a basis for discharging the skepticism with which this paper began. However, whether perception has the resources to represent such essentially self-involving relational properties is highly contentious. It is the aim of this section to argue that perception does have such resources.
While the appeal to the perception of relational properties is not a very controversial claim, the sort of relational properties I appeal to are more problematic. I claim that relational properties are part of the content of perception even though one of their relata is not represented. This fact underlies the sense in which, though properties of the self are explicitly represented in perception, the self remains implicit. How can a relational property be part of the content of experience when one of the relata is not part of that experience? Surely, it makes some sense to say that part of the content of my perception is that the ashtray is to the left of the computer. But, had the computer not been part of

10 the content of my experience, could that relational property of the ashtray be represented?
I think the answer is clearly negative. So how is this story supposed to work in the case of perception of relational properties in which one of the relata, the absent relatum, is the self?
The clearest way of handling this objection is to consider Perry’s notion of an unarticulated constituent.
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An unarticulated constituent is a constituent of a proposition that has no corresponding expression in the utterance that expresses the proposition.
Perry’s original example is the utterance ‘It is raining’. As he says, “[i]n this case, I say that the place is an unarticulated constituent of the proposition expressed by the utterance. It is a constituent, because, since rain occurs at a time in a place, there is no truth-evaluable proposition unless a place is supplied. It is unarticulated, because there is no morpheme that designates that place.” 12 Indeed, for the expression to have any content at all we must supply it with the unarticulated constituent. What is interesting in this case is that the content of the utterance contains an n -ary relation, though in the expressed, explicit, features of the utterance we find only an n-1 -ary predication. As a result, one of the constituents of the content that the utterance in fact expresses remains unarticulated, i.e., implicit. While the relation in question is the raining at a particular place and time, only the time is actually articulated in the utterance, the place is left unarticulated, it is implicit in the particular expression of this proposition. Though the utterance involves an unarticulated constituent we can understand what the utterance expresses, the proposition
11 See, Perry, J., (1993). The Problem of the Essential Indexical and Other Essays , (New York:
Oxford UP). The discussion that follows is mainly from Perry, J., 1998. ‘Indexicals, Contexts, and Unarticulated Constituents’, In Aliseda A., et al. (Eds.),
Computing Natural Language ,
(Stanford: CSLI Publications) pp. 1–11.
12 Perry, ‘Indexicals, Contexts, and Unarticulated Constituents’, p. 8.

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‘it is raining here’. Furthermore, it is only when supplementing the utterance with the unarticulated constituent that it expresses a proposition and is truth-evaluable; in this case, the utterance will be true iff it is raining at the place of utterance.
The analogy to our question – how can a relational property be part of the content of experience when one of the relata is not part of that experience? – amounts to a question about the possibility of perceptually representing states of affairs involving n -ary relational properties with vehicles that contain only n-1 -ary constituents. In the propositional case, for an utterance of ‘it is raining’ to be truth-evaluable, for it to express a proposition, we must mention an unarticulated constituent as part of its content, since the proposition it expresses, is not evident from the syntactic constituents of the utterance themselves (and their manner of composition). Similarly, for our experience to be evaluable, for it to have correctness conditions, that is, for it to have a particular content, we must include the self as a constituent of that content, though it is not represented as an object in the experience. Rather, what we find in experience is only the tree represented at a certain location, and representing such a location involves representing it in relation to some frame of reference or other.
Thus, in representing the tree’s location I represent it as being in front , for example, but though what the tree is in front of is not part of the experience it must be included in specifying the correctness conditions for the experience. Just as we can represent the fact that it is raining here by uttering ‘it is raining’, so we can perceptually represent the relation the tree bears to our selves by perceptually representing it as being in front.
‘Being in front’, like ‘is raining’, is an n-1 -ary constituent of a vehicle which represents an n -ary relation. In both cases, we can legitimately say that there is an

12 implicit/unarticulated constituent, since it participates as part of the content for there to be correctness conditions for the experience, and truth conditions for the propositional case, and yet there is no corollary of that constituent in features of the vehicle representing such contents.
This point can be brought out further by reflecting on Perry’s discussion of occasions in which we should expect to find utterances involving unarticulated constituents. Our utterances contain such constituents when it is obvious what they are from context. One such example is especially interesting. Consider, he says, “[a]n agent that never needs to have information about how the world looks except from its own perspective. It will treat n -ary relations involving itself as n-1 ary relations, and treat properties of itself as propositions, for example, Bird in front! rather than Bird in front of me .”
13
In this example, since the person is never in a position to receive information from others, making the required constituent ‘of me’ explicit is redundant.
14
If the person receives information that the bird is in front, there is no question regarding who it is in front of.
Though this example is intended as an illustration of how the availability of context influences the appearance of sentences involving unarticulated constituents, it can be borrowed for our purposes as well. By transposing the example to the perceptual domain, we no longer need to limit the example to the odd agent described above – the same situation is applicable to us all. As perceivers, we invariably cannot receive perceptual information about how the world looks but from our own perspective. We are never in a position to receive perceptual information about the bird being in front that is not also
13 Perry, ‘Indexicals, Contexts, and Unarticulated Constituents’, p. 9.
14 It is required for the proposition to be truth-evaluable, but redundant with respect to the subjects understanding of the proposition expressed.

13 information that the bird is in front of us . Thus the perceptual representation already has in it, as it were, the context in which the perception is being had as an unarticulated constituent. In such a case, it can represent an n -ary relational property (‘the bird being in front of me’) though in having the perception I am made aware only of the bird being in front.
Interestingly, in arguing against the postulation of mental indexicals to explain how perception can be relevant for action, 15 Millikan gives a similar argument for the unarticulated self in perception.
16
The similarity to the account brought here is striking and so it is worth quoting her position at some length. She argues that -
“…when I see or otherwise perceive the spatial relation of an object to myself, often I need not perceive any portion of myself in order to act with regard to it. For example, to walk towards the church at the end of the square, I need not perceive my legs or any other part of myself. And yet, I have said, my spatial relations to other things are an important part of what is represented in perception. How can this be?
Once again, bee dances (Of course! What else!) are the key. What a bee dance shows is the direction, relative to hive and sun, in which there is nectar. But there are no variables in the bee dance that show the hive, or the sun, or that it is nectar that is being represented. For example, there is no aspect of the bee dance that, if varied or replaced, would show the relation of nectar to hive and moon, or the relation of danger to hive and sun. Similarly, the visual percept shows the spatial disposition of other objects relative to where I am, but there is no variable in it that might be replaced to show the spatial
15 In the way that, for example, Perry does (e.g., in ‘The Problem of the Essential Indexical’).
16 Millikan, R., 2001.‘The Myth of the Mental Indexical’. In Brook, A., and DeVidi, R., (eds.)
Self-Reference and Self-Awareness , Advances in Consciousness Research Volume 11,
(Amsterdam: John Benjamins).

14 dispositions of these objects relative to any other spatial point of view. I can imagine and
I can conceive from spatial points of view I do not currently occupy, but I cannot perceive from other points of view. That is of the nature of perceptual representation, designed, in the first instance, to guide action. ... Hence they have no need explicitly to represent me.
… But, once again, this inarticulateness in how the self is represented has nothing to do with indexicality.”(my italics) 17
Millikan argues that though spatial relations can be perceptually represented, the self remains unarticulated in such representations since the having of such perceptions cannot be from any other point of view. Perceiving the church at the end of the square is already perceiving it in relation to one’s self, though the self need not be explicitly represented, since in having such a perception there cannot be variability with respect of the perspective from which it is had nor with respect of who it is that could direct their action in response to such perception. There is a built in context in perception that guarantees that the perception is one had by me and so is a perception relative to the point of view which I inhabit.
18
4. Summary
17 Ibid. p. 175.
18 Notice that though Perry is one of the targets of Millikan’s argument, in his discussion of unarticulated constituents, as it is described above, there is no appeal to indexicals. Indeed, he attempts to argue from the same considerations driving Millikan that there are cases of purely unarticulated constituents, meaning that there are no hidden indexicals involved. In the example of the agent who receives information about how the world appears only from his own perspective there is no need for a hidden indexical, since simply receiving such information guarantees that it is information in relation to his own perspective; there is no possibility of variability with respect of the perspective and hence no involvement of a hidden indexical whose reference would vary with context.

15
In conclusion, I have argued that perception does represent properties that essentially involve the self as an implicit relata. This is so, since the correctness conditions of perception are given by reference to certain relational properties the environment bears to the perceiver. Furthermore, the self’s being implicit in the content of perception can be understood as being an unarticulated constituent of the content of perception. If this is the case, it seems that skepticism about the possibility of having knowledge about the nature of the self on a-posteriori grounds can be discharged. The way we are aware of the world through perception involves an essential, though implicit, reference to the self having the perceptual experience. As such, knowledge of the nature of the self having the experience can be based on the experience itself, even if as Hume and Wittgenstein insist, the self is not an object that one can find within the world.
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 Bermúdez, J. L., 1998.
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
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
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
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
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16

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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