Political, legal and economic problems in European integration
PO333
Lecture Notes Term 1
Lecture 1 Introduction: Themes in European Integration
EU between a standard international organisation and a state.
Described in a variety of different ways.
To understand EU’s role in international relations, necessary to start off by looking at what
type of animal the EU is.
Basic trajectory:
Initiated in 1950s through specific areas of cooperation: coal and steel, atomic energy,
common market.
Then: piecemeal proposals and developments. But by 1970s: integration had stagnated.
Single market programme renewed integration in the late 1980s.
Led to Maastricht: range of institutional deepening and EMU.
Basic template for 1990s. Incremental additions in all areas, nearly all spheres have some
element of European cooperation.
New Amsterdam treaty, 1998. Nothing dramatic. JHA, foreign policy, economic cooperation
to accompany EMU.
Then: convention. Big institutional debate replayed. Crucial moment for EU. Preparing itself
for enlargement, will effect its very essence, what type of political entity it seeks to become.
So: need to start from origins to understand what has driven and held back this process.
During the course we will follow the historical, chronological development of European
integration, so you get an idea of general process of change and deepening of cooperation
between European states.
But we will look at this development in a way that allows us to explore more conceptual
themes.
Overview.
To flag up some of the main arguments that each of the lectures will formulate:Origins and early years:
Started in very technical, mundane areas of cooperation; early optimism that this would soon
spread to full political union and a European federal state.
Genius; but soon hit obstacles. Dynamics that were supposed to drive the EU inexorably
forward were not working. By 1970s if anything going backwards.
Why? Essential argument here: architects of the EC after WWII had underestimated the
forces of political and economic nationalism; how political controversial even technical issues
could be; and how sensitive European integration would be to wider international events.
Relaunching.
Surprise then that integration re-energised, put back on tracks in late 1980s by single market
programme, a collection of technical, unexciting trade measures.
Why did this succeed? Mixture: international environment effecting European
competitiveness so badly that states had to react together; neo-liberal convergence; but also
effect of surreptitious building up of cooperation over previous years.
Key argument also: the ‘1992’ programme meant different things to different people: UK –
end in itself, even today UK sees single European market has being by far main bedrock of
EU’s purpose; others – also supported a European; for others it was merely a means to open
the door for more political integration.
Maastricht. 1992.
Mythologised as the really significant moment. EC became the EU, a Treaty on European
Union, seemed to herald real political union; EMU, new JHA, CFSP etc.
Only a few years before the EU was moribund, now extending cooperation into massively
important new areas. Why the change? Financial globalisation; end of Cold War; internal
momentum.
But big argument here: Maastricht over stretched the EU; we will look at problems after, EU
suddenly became unpopular and how EU issues filtered more and more into national political
debate – and assess long term implication of this change in relation between national politics
and the EU.
Euro.
Sets us up nicely to look at the Euro.
Rocky road to introducing Euro; and mixed record – much to do with tension between having
a supranational, federally-managed currency in a political context that not fully Europeanised.
Euro a success, but still really important questions left unanswered in terms of future
development of Euro and wider economic cooperation in EU.
Towards European constitution.
Because elites had got ahead of population, a big convention was called over 2002-03, to
draw up a European convention that could bring EU closer to the people.
Here argument will be that the Constitutional treaty agreed by governments earlier this year
fails to do that. Makes EU more complicated, less intimidating for its citizens. Heralded as a
great success; certainly will help embed many rights; but could be storing up future trouble.
Leading on to: democratic deficit.
Big problem for EU: decline in democratic accountability over policy-making as competences
move from nation states to the European level.
We will see how interpretations of this problem differ and make the argument that a strategy
for closing the EU’s democratic deficit need to include several strands.
Much focus on EP; important but itself limited. Problem is not just weakness of European
institutions; real European level democracy requires development of a European demos, a
European wide population that defines itself in terms of a European identity and organises
itself politically on a European basis.
By no means certain this happening yet.
Last issue: new area of judicial and police cooperation.
Big growth area since 9/11.
Good and bad points. Shows cooperation developing quickly in a sphere where it could make
a real concrete difference. But, concerns over this new cooperation restricting basic rights
within the EU.
Also argument to be made here is that even with such an urgent need in this sphere of
counter-terrorist cooperation national governments have still shown themselves to be jealous
of their own autonomy and in some areas reluctant to engage in a truly concerted European
effort against international crime.
Themes:1. How to describe the EU; when we compare it to a) standard international organisation; b)
nation state.
Clearly somewhere in between, but where along the spectrum?
Exactly what features that look more like a standard international organisation (like UN); and
which features beginning to look more like those of nation state?
2. Process of integration: underlying inexorable momentum, or government controlled
process that starts and stops according to fluctuating national interest calculations? Are we
nearing the end of the road or on verge of federal state finally?
Who is really in control of the process of integration?
Governments; Brussels (and who is Brussels?); business groups; citizens, interacting across
borders.
3. Material national interests or broader issues of identity?
Policies in different areas driven by concrete identifiable interests – or is something of wider
significance going on? Is EU about something more qualitative, something less tangible, to do
with identity? Or is all this just waffle to mask material power interests?
4. How well has EU responded to changes in the international context?
Especially vis-à-vis US?
Looking at global changes: how do we situate EU in broader context?
Lecture 2 The Origins and Early Years of European Integration
Perhaps difficult for us to realise today the urgency with which the architects of the EU in the
aftermath of WWII were driven by the fear of another war – now we perhaps take this for
granted and are more concerned about the precise economic costs and benefits of the EU, but
in the 40s and 50s it was really a matter of war and peace.
This is what produced a strong federalist movement after the war.
Federalism associated with idealism, born in inter war period, with roots as far back as Kant.
Fundamental challenge to realism, to the balance of power of the 19th century that had ended
so disastrously.
To transcend this, and the bitter historical rivalries in Europe, an act of constitutional
reconciliation was needed.
Top down approach. Led by enlightened elites.
Associated with groups like the European Movement, or politicians such as Churchill,
Spinelli.
Restructuring of the international system. To end the Westphalian system based on the nation
state, that presumed peace would result from balance of power dynamics.
It clearly didn’t.
So, needed new supranational control and authority, a reproducing of the nation state at the
international level.
Would produces stability by combining two things.
A supranational authority would prevents conflict and regulates activity to the mutual benefit
of the states within the federation. To ensure control and efficiency.
Especially crucial: centralised control over the means of violence.
A constitution would lock in peace and constrains the natural rivalries of nation states, as
politics, diplomacy on a more informal level had provided inadequate.
Second, keeping some responsibilities at a more local level would ensure a connection to the
people and more legitimacy and less bureaucracy.
Key thing is that ultimate sovereignty would be transferred to the European level.
Distinguished it from a confederation: sovereignty remains with national governments who
voluntarily decide to pool parcels of sovereignty in some areas.
The most prominent reference point.
BUT: it was eventually NOT the federalist ideology that drove European integration.
Lots of federalists meetings and plans.
Key moment was when plans for a European Defence Community, around for a number of
years after WWII, were rejected by the French parliament in 1954 – UK had already said it
was not interested.
This was to be a very direct and immediate way of Europe gaining control over German
armed forces and prevent German nationalistic rearmament.
But just too controversial, too federalist.
High politics and security was clearly to be pursued in looser fashion and with the US,
through NATO, created in 1949.
Rather: key was way in which processes below the level of governments were harnessed to
drive integration forward.
Functionalist approach to relations between states.
Very influential strain of thinking after the War.
Origins of interdependence and regime theory.
Critical of idealists. Had to look at what was actually happening and build a strategy for
international peace for this.
Here there was good news. Because of modern technological change it was becoming feasible
and necessary to organise economic activities at a level beyond the nation state, in order to
increase efficiency.
Crucially, this related very much to citizens real concrete needs, not grand constitutional
designs which would have little to do with their daily lives.
Needed then to organise activities politically on a functional basis.
Each function would be organised in accordance with its own most efficient level of
organisation.
Technocratic vision of governance, that has become very, very influential – eg WTO, IMF.
Again, this would ensure cross cutting linkages between states, upon which real human
welfare depended, and thus peace would be guaranteed.
Neo functionalists sought to build on this earlier work and apply its lessons to the specific
events unfolding within Europe.
Functionalism was very much not about a single overarching regional political arrangements,
but a form of world governance dominated by different levels of organisation each managing
a specific function – trade, finance, transport.
Neo functionalists sought to elaborate a strategy for bringing about the political integration of
Europe.
Very specific to the way that the EU developed.
Focused on underlying processes, but also with a stated aim of channelling these towards a
supranational institutional form of integration.
This was philosophy followed by those who set up the EC – Monnet, Schuman.
No good trying to impose a European superstate in one go. Too controversial. Plan for a
common defence policy was rejected.
Needed to start with very technical, uncontroversial areas.
So: integration actually started in coal and steel.
ECSC 1951.
Rather dull. Technocratic. Low politics.
But profound political significance.
If Germany and France locked their coal and steel production together, this would restrain
them from being able to power and build up their armies to fight each other. They would be
dependent on each in the most basic area of economic production.
The key notion was then that of spill over.
Once one economic sector was supranationalised, there would be pressure for groups in other
areas for their sectors to be integrated.
The benefits of integration would be seen. Working with the grain of increasing economic
interdependence.
Very pluralist concept of national politics: key role assigned to interest groups lobbying
governments for certain outcomes.
People would gradually shift their loyalties to the European centre and concentrate their
lobbying strategies here. Interests would begin to depend on the management of different
sectors by the supranational authorities in particular sectors.
Technical inconsistencies would be set up: once you had a Europeanised steel industry, for
the full benefits of this to be realised you would need an integrated transport system – and so
on from sector to sector, until you got a self-sustaining momentum this would eventually spill
over from these areas of low politics to the more controversial areas of high politics.
Governments would gradually be trapped, as interest groups pressed them for more and more
integration.
And indeed, the ECSC was followed in 1957 by the Rome treaty commitment to integration
in agriculture and for a customs union. Also atomic energy – Euratom.
Again rather dry areas.
And focus on setting up the institutional structure, that would persist in the decades to come: a
supranational Commission playing executive role of bringing forward proposals; offset by a
Council of Ministers, representing member states – an arrangement that would spark tensions
that, despite all the development since then, continue to dominate EU politics even now.
Key deal between France and Germany.
France to support and assist Germany’s insertion back into the international fold; in return
Germany would share its industrial might with France and help pay for French agriculture.
Governments would cede competence in what they though were relatively technical areas but
soon be caught up in a powerful dynamics for more integration.
Expectations were key. Once a dynamic was established, groups would judge more
integration to be likely, organise themselves on a European basis and seek to protect their
interests through the way that incipient European policies were designed, and thus you would
have a self-fulfilling prophecy.
But in reality: integration stagnated in the 1970s.
Management of some sectors was clearly not an apolitical technocratic exercise.
Even in ECSC: this absolutely central building-block; most centralised area of cooperation
with a High Authority supposed to plan production and distribution on a rational panEuropean basis. But, in practice even here national governments were reluctant to let go.
Nothing like a European coal and steel industry developed.
Despite all the lofty declarations, France and Germany continued in practice to resist losing
control and sought to support and preserve their own national industry against each other.
Customs barriers were removed; but other barriers were not, and the planned move to a
common market failed to materialise.
Rather than thinking that Europeanisation would guarantee a mutually benefit outcome,
producer groups were, in the recession of the 1970s, concerned to out-compete their European
rivals by hanging on to their national privileges – subsidies and protectionist barriers.
Nationalism seemed more prevalent in the 1970s than in the 1950s, and the spirit of
integration seemed, if anything, to be going backwards.
De Gaulle’s influence felt here – strong defender of French sovereignty, and even at this early
stage in the 1960s he was trying to rein back power from the EC; he pushed a plan (Fouchet
Plan) for a looser Europe of the nation states – very much like UK plans over last two
decades.
IN 1965 de G famously withdrew French reps from the Council of Ministers, bringing EC to a
halt, until the following year winning agreement on a reinforced prevision for the national
veto (known as Lux compromise).
Debates in 1960s dominated by UK’s repeated and belated attempts to gain entry into EC,
blocked by de Gaulle.
Many of neo-functionalism’s original architects themselves began to question the theory, as
the expected momentum failed to emerge.
Another example:
Proposal for monetary union first put forward by ministers in 1969.
But this was just as the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates was collapsing, and in
the 1970s governments prioritised national emergency economic measures in the fact of the
oil crisis and world recession: competitive devaluations.
Some states argued that you needed full economic union – coordination of all economic
policies, tax harmonisation – and a good dose of political union before it made sense to
introduce a single currency. This top-down philosophy prevailed in the 1970s and into the
1980s, holding back monetary union.
These the days of top-down statist demand management. Keynesianism proved more resistant
to European monetary integration than the neo-liberal monetarism that developed in the late
1980s and 1990s.
A loose system of European exchange rate cooperation was carried on in the 1970s, but
without firm commitment from member states.
1979: ERM established.
National currencies could fluctuate 2.25 per cent either side of a central parity. (Some 6 per
cent bands).
But governments simply changed their parities each time circumstances became difficult.
At same time, even in these dark hours, where integration and cooperation had stagnated,
optimists did not entirely despair.
The high politics of European cooperation had hit bumpy times.
But, since WWII communications and interactions of all kinds had increased spectacularly,
and continued to deepen.
This locking populations into a feeling a common community, of shared values.
This the guarantee of peace.
This the really notable change in European international relations since WWII.
Habits and identities changing.
Inconceivable to most that European nations could return to conflict.
This had produced a security community – the key concept.
1970s and early 1980s saw a lot of summits between heads of government producing
statements of intent to get European integration back on track; vacuous and completely at
odds with strong priority given to national interests. But did create a collection of
commitments that could be referred back to later on – in some sense trapped governments to
live up to their rhetoric.
Plus: 1979 saw direct elections to the EP; still a weak body and did not make immediate
difference. But again this new demo legitimacy of the EP would come into play later on.
It was these trends that, according to many, laid the basis for the relaunching of the EU – the
period of rapidly deepening integration that occurred from the late 1980s and throughout the
1990s – that we will look at in the next lecture.
So this period strange: failures, stagnation, bitter acrimony; but all of the elements that later
triggered a reinvigoration of the EU in fact did have their roots back in initiatives introduced
at this time.
Lecture 5 The Single Market and the Relaunching of Europe
After the period in which European integration stalled, in 1985 the SEA was signed and the
integration was relaunched.
The centre-piece of this relaunching was the agreement to finalise the EU’s single internal
market by 1992.
The period after the SEA, in the late 1980s, saw intense activity that lead to the signing of the
Treaty on Political Union at Maastricht in December 1991. Maastricht agreed a number of
new commitments, including CFSP and EMU.
In the space of 6 or 7 years the EU appeared to have gone from a sclerotic, atrophied
organisation into a club committed to monetary and political union.
What was behind this new momentum?
What has kept it going?
What were its implications?
Single Market:
Switch to negative as opposed to positive integration: not new competences at European
level; just removal of barriers at national level.
Proved more palatable – and influenced whole flavour and nature of integration.
Dropped attempt to centralise common standards and regulations; rather, principle would be
one of mutual recognition of national standards – states would no longer be able to use pretext
of saying ‘our rules and regulations for trading or setting up businesses are simply different
therefore you exporters or investors from other EU states can’t come into to compete in our
domestic market’.
So: instead of a statist, regulation-oriented, interventionist economic policy at European level;
simply removing governments’ ability to frustrate integrated trade and investment by
technical measures at national level.
Collection of 300 technical measures reducing barriers to trade between European states.
NTBs, which had proliferated during 1970s.
With a fixed deadline to focus minds.
Curiously this set of technical trade measures succeeded like nothing before it in galvanising
the European conscience, as Europe 1992 (the date set for the completion of the single
market) was the label, the banner that appeared everywhere and dominated debate in this
period.
Ostensibly about deregulation, but it was gradually found that to regulate the new European
market you needed to hand over quite extensive new powers to the European Commission,
empowering the latter considerably.
Philosophy was to cut transaction costs by cutting barriers to trade.
Government subsidies to prop up inefficient national industries would no longer be allowed.
Increased competition would drive down process across Europe. And equalise price levels –
massive differences in prices still a major impediment to economic interdependence.
Economies of scale would drive down costs and enable EU to compete with huge US market.
Apparent victory for a neo-liberal Europe.
Presented in UK as move towards Thatcherite Europe.
But many countries saw single market merely as a first step towards more supranational
integration in more interventionist and more redistributive economic policies.
So, on the back of the single market the French pushed to increase elements of a proactive
European industrial policy; increased commitments to EU funded R and D, for instance.
And regional and social cohesion funds were soon created, to channel funds to the EU’s
poorest economies – Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland - the quid pro quo for the weaker
economies signing up to the free market, where many predicated their own companies, their
own indigenous industrial base would be decimated by competition from companies from the
rich and powerful states like Germany.
So, real differences persisted over basic questions of economic ideology.
For the UK, the single market was end in itself; for most other states, merely an initial step on
the way to other forms of cooperation.
What drove the single market?
The debate between realist and neofunctionalist explanations has dominated the
analysis of European integration.
The relatively limited progress of integration up to the mid-1980s seemed to vindicate the
realist argument that national governments would remain essentially in control.
Governments would cede limited competences where necessary to further national policy
goals, but successfully resisting the transfer of any significant parcels of sovereignty.
Cross-border linkages between interest groups and societal enthusiasm for integration had
remained limited.
Co-ordination even in technocratic ‘low politics’ spheres had become controversial, rather
than setting up a nice smooth glidepath to deeper integration.
Neofunctionalists themselves conceded that they had been too deterministic in suggesting that
the ‘spillover’ of integration from one sphere to another would be virtually automatic.
The revival of European integration in the 1980s, primarily through the single
market programme, engendered renewed theoretical debate.
Some analysts focused on the convergence of national governments’ policy preferences
which preceded agreement on the SEA.
This the realist interpretation.
Member States faced a common challenge in the shape of the growing American and
Japanese dominance of the increasingly globalized economy. Governments together
realized the failure of the protectionist and interventionist policies of the 1970s.
EU’s share of world exports had dropped from 42% 1972 to 35% 1983.
Its trade deficit tripled between start of 1980s and end of the decade.
Losing out to US and Japan in hi-tech sectors; to NICs in low cost standardised production.
Agreement among national elites that the injection of competition and
deregulation was necessary.
So governments remained the pivotal actors.
After the period of ‘Eurosclerosis’ national elites had now come to the conclusion that a
greater degree of market integration was essential for the furtherance of national objectives.
European regional identity and integration a counter to deepening globalisation.
Other commentators: governmental decisions to embark on the ‘1992’ programme built on an
already developing momentum of cooperation.
Not cause, more effect.
Some revindication of neo-functionalism.
Single market was built on piecemeal and unnoticed advances made even during the dark
days of the 1970s, such as the incrementally expanding impact of the rulings of the ECJ.
Notion of the bicycle rider.
Actually despite all the problems and tensions it was realised by the early 1980s that you
couldn’t go backwards, and that if the EU was to recapture its international competitiveness it
had to go forward by deepening the measures that already existed, rather than unravelling
everything. Interests and perceptions had already begun to change.
Single market as unintended spillover from previous initiatives:- EMS since 1979,
- ECJ ruling (the Cassis de Dijon case) that standards must be mutually recognised
across states – governments could no longer refer to different standards used in
production processes to block goods from other European countries
- companies involved in technological co-operation under various Rand D
programmes.
- Influence of transnational groupings, such as the Roundtable of
Industrialists – influential lobbying
- new dynamic leadership of the Delors Commission, pushed governments towards
accepting the concept of a fully integrated single
market.
- extensive network of committees and consultation unique to the institutional structure
of the Community – not simply a standard free trade deal.
Ongoing sustainability underlying the process of integration.
This more akin to the neofunctionalist logic – some said the notion of a self-sustaining
dynamic had at last kicked in.
Notions you will see referred to as transgovernmentalism or transnationalism.
What is really unique in the EU is the depth of interaction between different decision making
forums.
Hundreds every day.
This held to influence outlook of actors.
Related to institutionalist theories of IR. Institutions effect outcomes.
Ministers meet their counterparts from other EU states more often than their domestic cabinet
colleagues.
Breeds loyalty and shared outlooks.
Difference between different policy areas (say, between finance ministers and foreign
ministers) can be greater than between member states.
Link to constructivism later on.
One of most influential IR breakthroughs in recent years.
Contrast to pure rationalism.
Formation of identities condition ways that interests are perceived: why states perceived
themselves to have the interests that they pursue.
Again this has been applied to the EU.
All a similar group of approaches. Many differences but a common core that looks at the way
in which interaction across borders sets up a new structure of international politics.
Not simply one unified black box state against another.
Complex cross cutting patterns of interaction.
All these alternative explanations to realist-intergovernmentalism suggest: internal, selfsustaining momentum.
That dynamics were already supranational. Had begun to slip out of governments’ control.
That EU already an entity sustained by a fundamentally different type of politics.
Realists countered that all these ideas fail to explain exactly how increased interaction
actually changes interests and identities.
Could argue exactly the opposite: the more we travel, the more we come into contact with
other Europeans, the more we hang onto our local differences as a way of preserving our
identity.
Insisted that governments were still in the lead: our identities are fashioned by governments,
the media etc, rather than us fashioning identities that governments are then obliged to
respond to.
So, they saw Single Market as reflecting a fortuitous coinciding of support for market
liberalisation – the only thing you could get the UK signed up to in this period – and
predicated that things would remain at that.
They were proved wrong.
No sooner had the single market programme got going than European governments began
serious talk of creating an economic and monetary union.
A momentum of dynamism was indeed sustained.
Was single market and its accompanying dynamics a success?
Well, still slow progress and limitations to liberalisation.
Limited especially in service sectors: telecommunications, gas and electricity utilities – the
big public monopolies that governments still fiercely defended.
State aid levels have fallen but not been eliminated – big states still push Commission into
allowing many exceptions to allow them to prop up inefficient industries in declining areas or
to strengthen big European MNCs against US companies.
Big public procurement contracts still go mainly to national companies – but some have
began to go genuinely on efficiency grounds – for example, UK recently awarded some big
defence contracts to French firms, quite controversial. But still not balanced: some states have
opened up on this, others still impossible to penetrate, with contracts awarded through
contacts and political favours.
Other technical and legal barriers remained to full market integration: things like need for a
common company law, or banking code – cross-border cooperation and investment in the
banking sector was slow to take off..
Rates of implementation of single market rules has differed significantly between member
states – Commission and ECJ have used their teeth, but has been a long, painstaking and
bitter process often.
Commission and some governments have complained that some states have disingenuously
introduced new barriers that are labelled as health, safety or environmental requirements but
in fact spurious and designed as means of protection, new ways of keeping out competition
from other European markets – these forms of regulations offering loopholes from the singe
market programme.
Seen in renewed attempts in 2000, Lisbon strategy.
Commitments made in Lisbon to deepen the internal market, especially relating to financial
services.
Pushed forward by Blair and Aznar: concerned with French and German dominance diverting
attention from competitiveness issues to more interventionist approaches on employment and
social policy.
As aid, ‘1992’ did not actually complete the single market; barriers remained; since then, an
ongoing, painstaking process, that now rarely hits the headlines, to do away with remaining
trade barriers.
Common UK position: should finish this before talking of grandiose schemes for political
union; those most enthusiastic for deeper integration tend to be the ones who still have not
implemented huge swathes of the internal market programme.
So Blair and Aznar pushed this new initiative to complete and extend the single market and to
promote innovation and competitiveness.
But slow progress so far.
New targets and benchmarks have been set, by some states still resisting.
Interestingly, on this it is the UK in alliance with the Commission that have been pushing
most strongly – something to remember when you hear Euro-sceptics complaining that
Commission is always out to get the UK and support France and Germany. It is true that
France and Germany have pushed the Commission into accepting some big parcels of state
aid to ailing national champions in France and Germany: but overall, the Commission has
used the single market programme to take these more protectionist countries to court and help
open up markets for the more free trading states .
On this the UK has not so much been intervened against as it as used Brussels institutions as a
means of pursuing its own national interest in prizing open European markets.
So overall mixed signals and varying interpretations.
When single market was agreed many influential reports predicated the ‘costs of non-Europe’,
the burden on growth due to barriers between different states; estimates varied, but
proponents argued that by removing distortions to free trade across Europe the single market
programme would add 2-4% to EU GDP per year.
Many doubt this has happened.
Indeed, just as the single market was coming on stream in the 1990s, European economies
slipped into one of the deepest recessions since the 1970s.
Over then years on, Europe has still lagged behind the dynamism of the US economy, in
terms of growth, job creation and expansion in high tech industries – this significant as so
move of the thrust behind ‘1992’ was to catch up with the US, using the power and rigour of a
large internal market like that of the US to drive efficiency and competition.
Mixed readings from this: UK would argue this because single market, competition has not
gone far enough; French would argue it shows need for Europe to build onto the single
market more active employment and growth policies.
So, economically – jury still out.
Paradoxically, for an agenda that was presented in UK as being a refreshingly pragmatic
approach in the EU – focused just on concrete issue of free trade – it is probably the case that
the main impact of the single market programme was political.
Turned out to be launch-pad for what was the most intense period of activity in the EU’s
history in the years that followed.
Will look at this in next lecture: how single market led onto the Maastricht treaty in 1991, a
treaty on European Union, that contained what is still the most dramatic leap forward in
integration.
Lecture 6 Maastricht and Beyond
Maastricht, TEU:
New 3 pillar structure: EC plus new intergovernmental pillars - bringing in ad hoc
cooperation on foreign policy to create CFSP; and enshrining new pillar on JHA.
Together this created the EU.
New cooperation on infrastructure and industrial policy, education, health.
Existing cooperation ratcheted up: social cohesion funds to poorer parts of the EU; social
chapter (UK opted out).
Notion of European citizenship, with certain rights applying across national borders.
At same time, enshrined principle of subsidiarity – nation of power being exercised as close
to the people as possible; so could be sold by more sceptical governments as a move to return
power away from Brussels – but not really fleshed out in any detail.
For the UK this meant taking powers back to the nation state; in states like Germany and
Spain strong regional governments used this concept to push for more powers to be devolved
to the region level – their vision was to cut nation state out of the equation almost (too small
to act alone on big issues; too big to be efficient on delivering services to local populations).
And at Maastricht, a new regional policy was developed.
So, some debate: was it step towards a more supranational federal super-state? Or was it a
triumph for intergovernmentalism, for new pragmatic form of cooperation, controlled by
governments and not the Brussels institutions?
For first time: concept of formal opt outs: UK opted out of social chapter and EMU,
Denmark later won series of similar opt-out (especially on defence) – so many pointed to
beginning of end for one-size-fits-all model and move to flexible integration.
Lot of talk at this stage of variable geometry: idea of a common core based around original 6
members, moving ahead with deeper commitments; and then a 2nd ring of existing members
who would pick and choose; and then a 3rd ring of future new members.
In a sense, people could read into the TEU what suited their own purposes. Indeed, deliberate
ambiguity was key to getting Maastricht agreed.
Integrationists had certainly pushed for more.
They wanted foreign policy and JHA to be brought into the EC proper and subjected to the
integrated policy-making processes of the Brussels institutions.
Significantly, France – seen as swing state between Germany and the UK – had wavered
between opinions, but Mitterrand ultimately rejected the federalist option.
EMU:Historic commitment to a single currency – still the biggest, most significant area of EU states
joining together.
ERM had gradually settled down. By early 1990s governments were showing themselves
willing to make difficult adjustments – raising interest rates and cutting back borrowing in
times of slow growth – in order to maintain European exchange rate cooperation.
All depended upon the international stability and reputation of the DM as Europe’s strongest
currency.
In essence, the system was predicated on the aim of other states hitching themselves to the
coattails of the DM; states hoped that by tying themselves to the DM, the DM’s credibility
would rub off on their own currencies.
As the system embedded itself down and appeared to be succeeding, France and Germany
took the lead in forwarding plans for building on 10 years experience of the ERM and moving
towards full monetary union.
Basically a 3 stage model was designed:
1st stage – early 1990s – closer economic and monetary cooperation; and free movement of
capital
2nd stage – late 1990s – convergence of economic and monetary indicators
3rd stage – single currency.
This was the path agreed at Maastricht in December 1991.
Most notably, it was agreed that to make the single currency work a rigorous process of
convergence between member states economic and monetary policies would first have to take
place.
It was on this issue that most political debate centred.
A series of convergence criteria were agreed, that would dominate European economic policy
for the rest of the 1990s.
Before moving to a single currency, member states were obliged to:
- reduce budget deficits to no more than 3 per cent of GDP; so cut back on public
spending
- bring their accumulated public debt below 60 per cent of GDP; that is pay back
some of the debts run up in previous years
- keep their currencies in the ERM at the same parity for 2 years
- bring down inflation to within 1.5 per cent of the average of the three lowest rate
of inflation;
- bring down interest rates to within 2 per cent of three best performers.
Real pressure here: agreed that if a majority of states had achieved these by 1997 they could
move ahead to EMU; so for fist time, real risk of being left behind!
Seemed remarkable to many that such a momentous decision had been agreed by elites,
without engendering any great public debate amongst European publics.
Exception was UK.
Triggered debates in the UK over the costs and benefits of monetary integration.
Opponents on both left and right
- for the right: one of final bastions of national sovereignty
- for the left: a bankers’ Europe, increasingly distant from social concerns and
more and more of a constraint on stimulating growth and redistribution strategies.
Many economists pointed out that EU not an optimal currency area. Need single labour
market to underpin monetary union. But people don’t move from one country to another to
help equalise market conditions in different parts of the EU. In an area with a single currency,
people will move from depressed to over-heating areas and conditions will be equalised. This
is not going to happen across EU.
Maybe, said proponents, but EMU not a fixed end-state, rather a process, a means essentially
of driving such convergence, reform and deeper flexibility and integration between European
economies. If EMU could push a liberalisation of labour markets many saw this as potentially
its biggest benefit – labour market rigidity seen by many to be Europe’s main weakness
relative to the US.
These debates continued, but the political decisions had already been taken by most
governments.
This raised the question: why this drive to EMU at this moment?
Financial globalization
Expansion in cross-border capital flows; much de facto economic sovereignty already lost.
When international speculators and markets moved against a currency the volumes of money
were now so big that individually governments couldn’t possibly deploy the resources to prop
up their currencies.
By 1992 $300bn was being traded every day on London’s stock exchange; the Bank of
England’s total reserves were under $50bn.
If markets moved against a currency, central banks would traditionally prop up the currency
by buying it up (increasing demand, decreasing supply, thus propping up value of currency).
With cross-border financial flows having almost doubled just over the late 1980s, central
banks simply weren’t able to do this any more.
Exchange rates simply couldn’t be managed on a national basis any more.
Monetary coordination a means of confronting the power of the markets – a way of giving
government back some effective control over their economic policy. Much harder for
speculators to take on a single Euro currency than individual national currencies.
If Bundesbank put up rates, this could trigger such a large movement of funds out of £ into
DM, that the Bank of England would not have any hope of offsetting, so would in effect have
to follow DM any way – by pushing up interest rates, even if UK in a slump and actually
needed lower interest rates.
Monetary sovereignty was by now formal, not de facto – some argued. Sharing monetary
sovereignty was all gain, no cost.
EMU an inevitable reaction as government preferences reacted to the constraints of
globalisation.
Normal political explanation: end of Cold War. This strengthened Germany’s determination
to anchor itself into Western Europe, to convince other states it was committed to the EU, as a
quid pro quo for winning their support for German unification.
France, conversely, saw EMU as a means through which it could gain political purchase over
Germany’s strongest attribute: its strong currency and impeccable anti-inflationary credibility.
All part of the same French logic that had kicked off the start of European integration: the
interest to France in tying Germany down to a European venture that would jointly manage
and control German strength.
(It was as part of this deal that France agreed to the strict convergence criteria insisted upon
by Germany)
This the realist, high politics account.
But not the only explanation.
Plans had already been moved forward during the 1980s, before the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Monetary officials had been cooperating together for a decade.
Pointed towards socialisation: had reached more common understandings on the need for
strict anti-inflationary rigour and how to go about deepening monetary cooperation.
Not so much that Germany had imposed a strict monetarist vision on France and others as
quid pro quo for a political deal; rather than monetary and finance communities across Europe
had converged in a more positive sense around a belief in the need for integration as a means
of strengthening anti-inflationary rigour.
So, according to this angle, all the interesting movement was taking place below the
governmental level.
Linked to this: a vindication of neo-functionalism
Single market had set up new pressures that drove governments into agreeing monetary
union. Private sector began to realise it was difficult to benefit fully from a single market
when you had constant exchange rate fluctuations and competitive devaluations.
Result of the momentum created by the SEA.
Globalization could not in itself explain why the commitment to EMU was made in 1991.
Neofunctionalism provided the key, pointing out how the SEA had laid the foundations for
EMU successfully to move forward.
In addition, a more assertive Commission played a significant role in getting EMU skilfully
back onto the agenda and navigating the difficult tactical considerations of gaining consensus
between member states on tricky detailed matters.
Key really is that all were happening.
Big historical shifts occasion by the end of the Cold War; these dovetail with a long gradual
process of underlying cooperation at the more mundane technocratic level; talk of EMU
follows on from recent developments in other functional areas, in this case the single market;
and at the same time, institutions in Brussels are beginning to be more active as policy
entrepreneurs.
This is a combination that is seen in many different policy areas.
Lecture 7 The Euro
Saw in last lecture the variety of factors responsible for both the single market and the single
currency commitment in the early 1990s, and how these synthesised different explanations of
the integration process.
EMU also brought in another new factor: the domestic politicisation of European issues. Due
to the single currency commitments agreed at Maastricht, the following years saw the EU
seep into the domestic politics of member states to a greater extent than ever before.
No sooner had heads of government returned from Maastricht than turmoil hit the ERM.
Suddenly, with Germany running up huge deficits to cover the costs of integrating Eastern
Europe, the DM did not look quite as capable of providing the role of strong anchor currency.
The Bundesbank consequently pushed up interest rates to shore up the DM just as the UK
(that had only joined the ERM in 1991), Italy and other states were going into recession and
needing lower interest rates.
Triggered massive crisis in UK.
Pound forced from the ERM, and this fed into ratification process for Maastricht, that dragged
on for many months and almost brought down the Major government.
The Danish no vote (in the referendum on Maastricht) sowed further doubts in the markets.
The markets began betting heavily that the ERM would not survive.
A classic Euro-fiddle was concocted: the ERM bands were simply widened to 15 per cent.
Allowed governments to keep to the letter of the Maastricht agreements; but in substance
undermined the whole notion of gradually tightening monetary cooperation laying the
grounds for a smoother transition to the Euro.
Germans were not offered a referendum, but all polls suggested a large majority of Germans
opposed giving up the tried and tested DM – Germany’s strongest national post-War symbol for a possibly weaker currency.
These events after Maastricht can be seen as having a major impact on analytical explanation
of European integration.
Both intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism neglected to give
significant attention to the influence of domestic political considerations.
Realist explanations: governments deciding on what constituted the national interest
autonomously from societal pressures.
Neofunctionalism: cross-border linkages between sectoral interest groups, in favour of further
integration. Not a notion of broader public or party political debate at the national level, and
with very opposed range of views. Neo-func a technocratic vision, not integration as a highly
politicised process.
Domestic politics also at this time making an entry into broader IR theories.
Many of these theories had also downplayed the influence of domestic political debate on int
relations.
Int structure was, rather, seen as key: liberals saw the key structure as interdependence;
structural realists saw the key structure as rivalry between states; writings on international
hegemony saw the key structure as being US dominance.
So differences over what aspects of int structure most influential; but all schools agreed that
structure more important than the influence coming bottom-up on governments from national
political debate.
Theorists began to question this; arguing that variations in governments policies owed much
to differences in the structure of their domestic policy-making processes.
One of the most influential articles on the EU of the 1990s incorporated these concerns Moravcsik’s ‘liberal intergovernmental’ framework.
Key feature is relationship between state and society in shaping national preferences.
Against ‘black box’ notion of the state.
Key is variety of national political engagement: across states, issues, time periods. instead
interpreting
Winners and losers: so differing views; which of these predominates will depend on national
political processes – some of these will give more weight to business, others to unions; some
will give weight to parliament, in others broader civil society protest counts for more.
All this seemed increasingly pertinent after Maastricht.
In initial phases, when the EMU timetable was drawn up, no real domestic engagement.
Driven by opaque nexus of politicians, national and
Commission officials and central bank governors.
Even business sector not at this stage active, either for or against.
After Maastricht, domestic actors came out against the sacrifices needed to meet the
Maastricht convergence timetable.
New emergence of anti-EU sentiment which took political elites by surprise.
Street demonstrations against convergence reforms in Paris in December 1995; French
government backed off from implementing many of its proposals.
In Spain and Italy opposition from key trades unions to EMU delayed reforms.
In Germany, the opposition Social Democratic party for the first time spoke out against the
sacrifices of convergence; this helping it along the road to assuming power from the CDU in
1998.
Gerhard Schröder - at this time a regional governor – rose to popularity by arguing that
priority be given to German jobs at the expense, if necessary, of delaying the EMU timetable.
Similarly, in Italy, Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia, in opposition, rose to power by opposing
government plans to raise taxes in order to meet the Maastricht criteria.
In Spain, the centre-right Partido Popular fought its way to election
victory in 1996 in large part because of the populist line it adopted against the
Socialist government’s Maastricht-driven austerity programme.
In France, the same ‘jobs-before-EMU’ line won Jacques Chirac a large part of his support in
the run-up to the 1995 presidential elections.
In all these case, thanks to EMU the EU (for so long a largely technocratic issue, or a matter
for political elites concern with grad international geo-politics) was suddenly playing a major
role in the outcome of national elections.
In Germany, many regional governments (the influential Länder) resisted convergence related
reforms.
So did powerful Catalonian and Basque governments in Spain.
And in Italy the Northern League used its presence to undermine the government’s proposed
Euro-tax.
EMU also for the first time opened major divisions within parties.
Between Massimo D’Alema and Romano Prodi in the ruling centre left coalition in Italy.
In Spain, between prime minister Felipe González and the more traditionalist wing of the
Socialist Party,
In France, after the Socialist victory in 1997 between prime minister Lionel Jospin and a large
segment of his party. Also in the Gaullist party.
Tensions in Germany within both the CDU and SPD.
Slits also opened up amongst business groups.
Many business had pressed for the ERM to be relaxed. came about in part because of pressure
from business for greater priority
Public opinion polls showed majorities unwilling to pay higher taxes in order to
meet the EMU criteria.
In France 49% voted against Maastricht in their 1993 referendum, citing convergence
concerns as main reason.
Still a bit muddled.
Focused on sacrifices of convergence, not what this meant longer term for EMU membership.
No clear left-right divide. Actors still developed national agendas.
Internal divisions appeared, but overall still influence of embedded national perspectives.
More focus on the immediate national interest rather than distinct ideological choices about a
European economic policy.
But: of unparalleled signficance.
This debate unleashed across Europe showed that the relationship between publics, elites and
the EU would never be the same again.
Further debate followed:
The Stability Pact, agreed 1997.
Pushed by Germany: fines for states exceeding the budget ceilings, to continue after the
introduction of the Euro and thus provide ongoing financial discipline.
Seemed a bit counter-intuitive to many people: to take more money away from governments
already struggling with rising deficits.
But significant in seeming to set strict financial parameters for broader economic and fiscal
policies that would govern the nature of economic management after the Euro was
introduced.
Differences arose over how restrictive such rules should be.
Germany eventually bowed to pressure from France and others to accept less restrictive and
automatic rules.
France and others now really wanting tax harmonisation. To stop states undercutting each
other and forcing tax rates down: concern that under EMU, tax competition would replace
exchange rate competition – endangering the European model of social welfare
Low taxation economies – Ireland, Luxembourg and the UK – argued
that globally competitive tax regimes were needed to keep investment in the EU.
At root, divisions emerge over whether EMU is about embracing globalization
as a benign guarantor of financially responsible government; or about confronting the
pernicious effects of globalisation.
These major differences were not resolved when EMU agreed – kept ambiguous to get
agreement. EMU was not end of the debate on these issues, but the beginning.
Not clear that governments had really learnt from the ERM crisis and the divisive politics of
convergence; seemed to push ahead again on new initiatives.
Implications:
- governments lost ability to say ‘We must reform for the sake of Europe’;
- became ‘We must reform for ourselves, despite Europe’
doubts over traditional method of agreeing a grand commitment without filling in details,
hoping to set up cooperation that will resolve more difficult differences further down the
road – might make it worse simply delaying difficult choices; public feeling they are
being bounced.
- long time frames: things had changed so much in between Maastricht and end of
1990s: Maastricht was about EMU as means of tying in Germany; that didn’t really look
like the big problem by the end of the decade.
But of course the single currency did go ahead.
Due to the difficulties in meeting the convergence criteria, the requisite majority of states
were not ready in 1997, the earliest date foreseen.
So, we had seen the desperate politics of the ERM crisis and then at this stage predictions that
weaker states would never meet the convergence criteria, and whole project seemed in doubt.
European seemed to have set such rigid economic hurdles that the political logic behind EMU
was being put at risk.
But then – helped a bit by renewed growth, some reform efforts, and some flexible
interpretations of the convergence criteria - it was decided relatively smoothly in 1998 that 11
states were in a position to fix their exchange rates on 1 Jan 1999; the UK, Sweden and
Denmark had excluded themselves; only Greece judged not to have met the criteria – and it
was let in only a couple of years later.
After this, euros notes began to be used for internal transactions, but national currencies
retained. These were then withdrawn on 1 Jan 2002, and the Euro become introduced for
daily use.
Only UK, Den and Sweden did not adopt the euro. (Swedes and Danes have both voted
against in referendums).
Single interest rate, set by the ECB.
ECB also determines the money supply for the Eurozone.
Record so far?
ECB has been strongly anti-inflationary in its monetary policy.
Need to establish credibility with financial markets.
Euro initially slid against the $, but has for some time now been strong and rising against the
$.
This one of main criticisms: ECB has been so fiercely independent, and so intent on
demonstrating rigour to the financial markets, that it has been insensitive to member states
economic difficulties.
For a period after 2001, observers argued that recession many parts of the Eurozone called for
a more relaxed monetary policy than the ECB was willing to countenance.
Consequently, one of the major issues that has emerged since the introduction of the Euro
relates to the problems of holding the ECB democratically accountable.
Less transparent than Bank of England, that has a formal inflation target set by government
and publishes its reasoning for its decisions on interest rates; ECB more opaque, more
cautious about revealing its logic, and has a more interpretive inflation target (1-2%).
This brings us back to a central concern: we have a supranational, federal central bank, but
this is not embedded within a federal political system with commensurate systems of political
control. This mismatch has at some points appeared to be developing into a major issue since
the creation of the single currency.
(Interestingly, in Ireland and initially in Spain this worked the other way: very strong growth
and over heating economies required more of a tightening of monetary policy – and these
states found it very difficult to find national levers and instruments to cool their economies).
Some of these concerns do appear to have permeated the ECB: over the last year policy has
relaxed a little, and in fact the inflation target has been missed. So ECB argues that unfair to
say it has been too rigid and been responsible for squeezing growth out of the Eurozone –
argue that unfair to blame the ECB and the Euro for problems in fact caused by the fall out
from 9/11, Iraq, rising oil process.
Fair points – but, critics reply, it is still the case that the UK economy has continued to do
rather better.
Towards coordination of broader economic policies?
Not that much.
On the one hand, talk of tighter tax harmonisation in the Constitution; and economic ministers
of the Euro members have developed regular consultation on macro-economic policy – this is
the system of ‘economic government’ that the French in particular have pushed for to give a
slight Keynesian twist to the ECB’s monetarism.
But, these moves still limited.
Indeed, the big issue in recent years has been that the Stability Pact has been increasingly
breached. So, increasing divergence.
And who have been the guilty parties: France and Germany, the two states supposedly most
committed to driving forward deeper economic integration, and in Germany’s case the state
most insistent on the issue of financial prudence for so many years.
And the response sheds interesting light on the underlying dynamics of integration: France
and Germany have not been penalised heavily and have basically ignored warnings from
other states and the Commission for several years. It seems that the power of the big member
states acting in their own immediate self-interest can still prevail over rules-based
cooperation, however well embedded those rules appear to be in a formal sense.
Ironically, it appears that it has been some of the so-called weaker EU states (that everyone
thought would destabilise EMU) who have implemented reforms so as to be able to survive
under the Euro; and France and Germany that have still prevaricated on implementing
difficult domestic reforms in order to stabilise the management of monetary policy at the
European level.
This may not be good for Europe over the long term: if all states start to interpret the rules
flexibly, chaos will result. Comes back to the tension between having a European monetary
policy but national fiscal policies. As a national government you have an incentive to borrow
heavily and run up large debts nationally to fund your social programmes because the costs
you would normally pay in higher interest rates is now dispersed through Europe – if others
are borrowing less, the rise in interest rate will be small. You get other states essentially to
each bear a bit of the cost of your own profligacy. But if everyone does this, no overall fiscal
supranationalism to control the situation. Classical prisoners’ dilemma.
Also effect of slow progress on completion of single market: some say this means EMU still
rests of fragile foundations. Still big split between member states on principle of how far to
take market liberalisation (often seen as Anglo-saxon market orientation, that has won some
supporters amongst continental parties v. more typical European style social model and statist
regulation) : curious to have situation of a single currency resting on such marked conceptual
divergence.
Internationally, not yet a rival to $.
But, many countries – Brazil, China, Iraq(!) – did start to hold more of their reserves in Euros
rather than $.
Promises to increase EU’s influence and power over international finance.
But also brings responsibilities and problems.
Often see this with $: fact that so much of the world wants to hold $ is what has enabled US
governments to cover domestic deficits; with so many $ sloshing around the world economy,
also difficult to control inflation. EU could begin to experience some of these problems.
In managing these international financial issues, EU still needs to develop a common front.
Despite having a single currency, Euro governments have fought to retain separate national
positions in bodies such as the IMF – and have often voted in very different ways in these
international financial institutions. This is now on the agenda – lots of talk of a single
European representative internationally: so a big issue to watch in the future.
The UK?
Set its famous economic tests, a reworking of the convergence criteria that are in fact very
imprecise (is the UK economy converging with Eurozone; will membership be good for jobs,
for the City)
So: this will be overwhelmingly political.
Decided last year that most of the tests had not been meet.
Not even a firm date or commitment for a referendum: while UK economy continues to do
relatively well against the Eurozone, looks unlikely.
Indeed, period after Maastricht was a tumultuous decade, in which the for many the memory
of the ERM crisis in 1992 still fresh, when £ forced out of ERM and the high interest rates
needed to keep £ in for some months fostered a UK recession – in which many people lost
their houses etc.
On the one hand, case for Euro harder to win against this background.
On the other hand, may seem less threatening is a few years, if economic fortunes turn, and
people in UK can see that Euro doesn’t make French any less French, and hasn’t led to
political superstate.
Lecture 8 Towards a European Constitution
The three pillars have become a little more blurred and slightly modified.
Amsterdam treaty, 1997
Notion that Maastricht had created a new conveyor-belt of momentum towards political union
was given substance by its commitment to set up another IGC as early as 1996.
So, when most member states were barely passed the stage of ratifying Maastricht, and
undergoing the controversial and painful process of EMU convergence, negotiations for
another big treaty began.
For some, Maastricht had already hit problems because it was not ambitious enough and had
enshrined tensions between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism.
The caution of the 2 new intergovernmental pillars was seen as already holding the EU back.
For others it was the opposite: the growing controversy over EU matters, the Danish No vote,
the narrow margin of victory for the Yes vote in the French referendum, growing Euroscepticism – all these indicated that political elites had over-stretched themselves at
Maastricht.
Elites now seemed far ahead of their publics in pushing integration a curious change for much
of the EC’s history it was said to be elites holding back the growing European spirit and
conscience of their populations.
So, the phrase that political leaders started using at this point suggested the need to ‘bring the
Union closer to the people’ – each leader having his own idea of exactly what this meant.
For France and others it meant pushing a new employment chapter, a Jobs summit, new social
provisions; for the UK it meant removing EU bureaucracy and red tape and freeing up the
market for workers and businesses, not adding more regulations and social costs).
Also at this stage, in 1995, you had Sweden, Austria and Finland joining; and the EU
beginning to make its commitments to take in CEECs. This began to focus minds on how
reform would be necessary to cope with a far larger Union.
Again, this began to magnify differences: integrationists said the prospect of a larger Union
required deeper integration to be put in place, more majority voting so that individual states
could not block everything etc; minimalist states said, no, exactly the opposite, the widening
of the EU requires a fundamental different model, far more flexibility.
From the point of view of Eastern European states who had just recovered their national
independence from the yoke of Russian rule they would hardly what to give that up
immediately to the alternative master of Brussels; from the point of existing member states, if
it has been hard to create a European demos, spirit, conscience amongst existing Western
European states how much harder would it be to generate this in a Europe that might stretch
from Dublin to Istanbul, from Andalusia to the Baltic.
In the end the Amsterdam treaty was fairly modest.
Certainly did not engender the same kind of reaction or profile that Maastricht had done.
(If Labour had not won the UK election just before the summit, it might not even have been
agreed).
Some extension of majority voting, on fairly uncontroversial areas.
EP’s powers lightly increased.
Some JHA activity was brought into the community pillar: so modest increase in
supranationalism over intergovernmentalism.
New provision that many saw as most significant at the time was a clause allowing for a
group of member states to move ahead of others to develop new areas of cooperation. It
looked like this might free up the more integrationist states and finally lead to a variable
speed EU.
But this has not in practice been used.
In reality, the more ambitious member states have been reluctant to break an overall spirit of
consensus and the unity of the EU. Moreover, the laggards could still veto them from moving
ahead in the last instance.
Many in UK said that for may years other governments had been hiding behind the UK, using
Britain as a scapegoat for the slow pace of integration; gaining credit for being impeccably
European, blaming the UK for every disagreement; but that when they gained the formal
constitutional provision to move ahead on their own they were actually reluctant to do so.
(This is a general observation that has been made since Labour took office: as the UK became
more of a normal member and was suddenly not the main state blocking every single
proposal, this brought out more the differences between other states and forced them to think
a bit harder about the limits to their own integrationism).
Schengen area – allowing for removal of border controls – was strengthened and brought into
the community pillar – but the UK again opted out, arguing that as an island it made more
sense for it to impose controls at its borders, but then be more relaxed over internal controls
(Ireland argued the same); continental states argued their borders were porous now anyway
and that security was best done on people already inside the country; hence the acceptance of
identity cards, which the UK then still rejected.
This was an issue cited by advocates of flexibility: here there were genuine reasons for
different models applying to different states. And should thus be allowed for.
Modest increase in citizen’s rights to information on the EU and redress in things like
consumer protection. But no major success in convincing people that Amsterdam was about
really creating a ‘people’s Europe’.
It seemed to be just another treaty sown up by elites, with little public awareness, just making
the Union even more complex and difficult to understand for the individual citizen.
One last interesting development in the Amsterdam treaty was the introduction of a new
suspension clause – where states breached fundamental values of EU they could be
suspended; this is what was used against Austria when Haider’s far right party won
governmental office.
(Each of these treaties: developments in foreign and security policy that we will cover next
term)
As said, one stated purpose of having another treaty was to reform the EU’s institutions to
prepare for enlargement. In fact, the one issue Amsterdam didn’t even touch was this issue of
institutional reform.
So, again no sooner has the ink dried on the Amsterdam treaty – the 3rd big EU treaty in just
over a decade – than another round of negotiations were convened to prepare for another
treaty.
By 2000 enlargement looked imminent and inevitable, so change could no longer be put off.
So negotiations lead to a treaty finally signed at Nice in December 2000.
Took negotiations into some very arcane issues on precise institutional make up of the EU.
Pretty dry stuff, but it took EU negotiations closer the brink of failure than any other treaty.
Indeed, even though – after much acrimonious delay leaders did reach agreement – the new
treaty did really resolve many crucial issues.
Main issues:
Needed to take away large states second Commissioner (otherwise simply too many
Commissioners), to have one Commissioner per state – still too many but the smaller states
refused to give up their national representative (- interesting of course that Commissioners
still seen as national reps, when that is categorically what they are supposed not to be).
This just now coming in: Mandelson alone replacing UK’s 2 commissioners.
In return, big member states insisted that needed change to the current bias of voting weights
in favour of smaller states.
More qmv to make sure enlargement didn’t bring the whole policy-making process to a halt;
with 30 members, at least one would always be likely to have a particular problem with a
proposal and block agreement.
QMV was extended again;
But not applied to the really difficult areas, rather more procedural issues, not those where
states actually likely to use a veto!
Moreover, move towards idea of a double majority. Added requirement that a vote have
support not only from the qualified majority (calculated according to different weights for
each state) but also a straight majority of member states and from states accounting for a
majority of the EU’s population.
Can be seen: far from making decisions easier ahead of enlargement, makes the process more
unwieldy, more confusing to citizens.
On towards a European constitution?
This proved one of the most exhausting and drawn out negotiations, subject even more than
previous occasions to horse trading, back room deals and late night marathon sessions
between leaders. Indeed, such a chaotic mess that most agreed this process of constant treaty
revisions and huge intergovernmental negotiations had to stop – this was the origin of the idea
of devising a semi-permanent European constitution, that has dominated debate over the last 2
or 3 years.
The Irish then rejected the Nice treaty – much to do with new defence policy, but broader
concerns too. Decision simply to hold the referendum again, after a few modest changes
relating to Ireland’s neutrality, simply compounded the impression that European integration
was still pushed forward by elites steamrolling over hesitant publics: you lose a referendum,
just hold it again until the people vote how they are supposed to vote!
All these considerations fed into decision to establish a Convention on the Future of Europe at
the beginning of 2002.
Unlike the closed process of elite negotiation that had preceded other treaty negotiations, the
Convention broadened out representation – not only from governments but also other parties,
plus MEPs and Commissioners.
Inherent differences right from the start.
States like Germany – probably the strongest advocate of the constitution - very legalistic
tradition, a constitution a natural and benign enshrining of rights and the powers of regions.
For the UK, with no formal constitution itself and a common law tradition the whole notion of
a constitution rather scary and alien.
UK didn’t know quite what to make of it: was the constitution indeed just a ‘tidying up
exercise’ - as the government insisted – grouping together in a single document all the
competences already exercised by the EU? Or was it something more sinister? Nobody
seemed sure.
Many pragmatic realists argued that a constitution could play a vital role in stopping the
apparently never-ending slide of powers towards Brussels. This often forwarded as the main
worry about Europe: a given proposal might look quite reasonable but most start you off on a
slippery slope towards more and more centralisation. Powers only ever seemed to flow from
the nation state to the EU; there was never any way of getting them back where people
thought they were not working at the European level – CAP the best example.
A constitution, it was argued by the pragmatists, would be able to stipulate once and for all
what powers the EU did have and which it did not have, which powers would stay with the
nation state. This would increase the legitimacy of specific policy cooperation. UK ministers
might then be able to say convincingly to the electorate: ‘support membership of the single
currency because it makes sense economically and it is not part of a slippery slope towards a
federal superstate’.
And not just the UK versus the rest: indeed one of the most notable divisions in the
convention was between big and small states. Feeling that the 3 (4) big states wanted to
strengthen the Council and increase their own power over smaller states – seeing this as votal
to respond firmly and more dynamically to the changed international circumstances of post9/11.
Small states rather saw legitimacy as about strengthening the Commission to protect their
citizens from a perceived heavy-handed dominance of the big member states – the source, it
was argued, of scepticism on smaller states.
Main features:- new president of the Council, that is representing member states, this to replace the
system of 6 monthly rotating presidencies, which were confusing and undermined
credibility with foreign interlocutors.
- Elected head of Commission, pushed by Germany, to give the Commission greater
accountability
- In fact, returned to these arcane institutional issues, that Nice had not really tied up:
commitment to put a cap on the size of the Commission after next enlargement and
form an inner core Commissioners.
- And slightly simpler voting system proposed: majority of states, accounting for at
least 60 per cent of EU population.
- Qmv to become the norm, but with exceptions that applied to most of the difficult
areas – foreign and defence policy, JHA, tax
- Key way of closing democratic deficit was to give national parliaments a greater role
and coordination with MEPs; to help strengthen national parliamentary scrutiny of
EU legislation, rather than massive new powers to the EP to do this.
First attempt in Rome last year failed. Berlusconi’s eccentric chairmanship didn’t help.
Then negotiations in December 2003 collapsed dramatically. Salutory: normal for EU
negotiations to go down to the wire, as leaders play brinkmanship, holding back acquiescence
simply to gain concessions at the very last minute; however, desperate difference were at
these big set piece theatres of negotiations, agreement was always pulled out of the fire at the
final moment – with stories of Chirac apprehending Blair in dark corridors at 4am to sow up a
deal for Europe’s future, and the like.
But this time the brinkmanship went beyond the point of rescue and leaders returned home
spitting blood at each other.
Many predicated that some kind of final showdown had been reached, as all the ambiguities
of states’ different visions that lay behind the EU finally exploded.
But, no.
A few months later leaders had another go and this time got agreement.
Thanks to fortuitous change in Spain’s government: Atlanticist PP to more pro-European
PSOE.
Big obstacle had been Spain and Poland: they had negotiated at Nice a weighting on votes
that favoured medium sized states – and meant that a medium size state like Poland or Spain
got almost as many votes as the biggest member states, and could not easily be outvoted by
the big states.
Thus didn’t like the draft constitution’s proposed to change this, to make reaching decisions
easier. Spain at this time under increasingly Eurosceptical PP government; and Poland as
largest of candidates keen to show it was no push over.
Hence, again, contrary to the whole rationale of the proposed constitution, most time and
effort of the Convention and subsequent governmental negotiations was on these concerns
over voting weights and triple majorities etc – far from the issues concerning real people.
Get Economist’s critique.
Finally agreed this summer.
But still has to be ratified. Number of states will hold referendums; most interestingly, UK
and France – in both governments had adamantly insisted there was no case to hold
referendum on the constitution!
Must be real probability that voters in at least one country will reject the constitution.
So where do we stand after this long process – long stagnation, then single market,
Maastricht, single currency, and now an agreed constitution?
Have we reached the threshold of a true federal political union?
The very language of the EU having its own constitution is state-like.
But hardly looks like the document drawn up by the Founding Fathers at Philadelphia as basis
of US’s constitution.
Compare the language.
Hardly likely to enter the European psyche and stir passions as the US constitution does.
And most famously (or infamously) references to ‘federalism’ were dropped; as was idea of
renaming the EU as the United States of Europe – this to keep the UK representatives from
scuppering the whole exercise.
Actually the constitution doesn’t move far on what normally considered the trappings of
statehood – monopoly of organised violence.
Still no single European plebiscite for a single leadership figure – governments will select the
new Council president; the Commission president will not be voted by the European
electorate but by the EP from a list drawn up by governments.
And for those concerned about the perpetual drift of ever deeper integration it is not clear that
the Constitution has really drawn a line in the sand and set the limits of the EU in any kind of
permanent way.
In short, not clear that the Constitution has really done what it set out to do.
Hasn’t really engaged people; indeed the discussions were more complex and impenetrable
than ever before!
Declared aim to make European more relevant looked slightly farcical as endless discussions
on voting weights in the Council took place as Iraq burned and the terrorist threat reached
Europe in horrendous fashion on 11 March in Madrid.
Lecture 9 EU Institutions and the Democratic Deficit
All the debates and crises over the succession of new treaties have increasingly centred on
concerns over the EU’s democratic legitimacy.
Increasingly evident that the EU suffers from a widening democratic deficit.
Policy competences have been transferred from the nation-state to Brussels, rendering
obsolete national mechanisms of democratic accountability, without these being replaced by
equivalent process of democratic control at the European level.
As the EU has gained powers it has become increasingly intrusive of our everyday lives. It is
no longer something we can simply let diplomats and leaders negotiate as a matter of grand
international strategy. The EU is in many areas the bread and butter of issues effecting our
daily lives. And yet, this intrusion has not been accompanied by effective means of input into
these new areas of Europeanised policy-making.
Has special relevance to the EU but also part of a broader trend emanating from globalisation.
Democracy has been hollowed out at the national level; but no international or European level
democracy has emerged to replace this.
Generally said to be two elements of concern, two strands to the democratic deficit.
One relates to the formal institutional processes of EU policy-making.
These have developed in a way that fails to provide strong democratic control over policy
outputs. Limited means for citizens to influence policy through representative bodies.
A second strand relates to the absence of a European demos.
Argued that a prerequisite to democracy is the existence of a unified community, a common
feeling of identity, a common civic spirit. Many doubt that this exists in the EU, even after 50
years of cooperation.
Let us look first at the concerns over the EU’s institutional configuration.
Three way institutional split:
- Commission, quasi executive that formulates and introduces policy proposals
- Council, member states reps
- EP
For many the main issue is the continuing weakness of the EP over the other 2 bodies.
This would seem to be the obvious democratic body positioned to assume the powers lost by
national parliaments and to hold EU executive power to account.
Yet, no secret of course, that the EP widely seen to have remained weak and ineffective.
EP has gradually increased its role in EU policy-making.
Procedures of codecision – rather technical, explained in all texts, but basically requires EP to
give its assent to many new legislation in many areas of policy.
And these areas – where codecision applies – have been gradually widened.
And has used new powers to scrutinise the Commission in an increasingly muscular fashion –
most dramatically in 1999 when after a corruption scandal involving a number of
Commissioners the EP insisted on the resignation of the whole Commission.
Probably true to say that the EP has gained greater powers to hold the Commission to account
than to hold the Council to account.
But on Commission too there are growing problems: many comment on the ‘policy making
style’ of the Commission being very technocratic; as a body lacking its own democratic
constituency the Commission in some sense very open about courting input into its policymaking. But tends to build policy networks around so-called ‘insider’ interest groups. Quite
technical measures, devised almost in collaboration with interest groups in that area
(electricity producers for utilities directives; env groups for env directives etc etc). So what
has emerged is a collection of separate expert policy communities – epistemic communities,
sharing similar perspectives. This dominating policy-making style of the EU rather than open
competitive debate.
More generally, you will all know the often asserted problems with the EP.
Especially the pitifully low level of people voting in Euro elections (less than in Big Brother,
seems to a favourite comparison of the media), undermining MEPs’ claims to democratic
legitimacy.
How many know who their MEP is?
So, EP still focus of many ideas for democratising the EU.
Most common idea – now a possibility under the draft constitution – is for parliament to vote
in commission president – as national parliaments essentially do with national leaders.
Moreover, not just a problem of the EP.
For some states – the UK, and to some extent, France – way of recovering democratic control
over EU policy-making (and closing the democratic deficit) is to being national parliaments
back into the equation.
National parliaments have played a weak role in scrutinising EU legislation. Much of what
comes out of Brussels of course shrouded in mystery for the public; national politicians
should be providing the filter between EU proposals and national populations. But they
haven’t really done so in an effective way.
National leaders often complain about being constrained by the EU; but in fact the EU has
helped leaders themselves escape from national parliamentary scrutiny. EU gives them
greater autonomy over national parliaments in many matters; it is common for leaders to
come back from EU negotiations saying that such and such a decision was unavoidable as
‘my hands were tied’ from preventing this measure at the EU level
(Of course they very cleverly do the reverse when they are in Brussels, saying ‘we would love
to agree to such and such, but my hands our tied by my own backbenchers – for those who
have studied IR theory, this is the double-edged diplomacy of Putnam’s famous article).
This is hot topic in the constitution: the UK pushed to get included new provisions to giving
national parliaments more formal role in the EU policy-making process – for example,
through being brought into consultation forums with MEPs looking a proposed new
legislation.
But did not agree on the idea of a new second chamber in EP made up of national MPs
(?check).
Interestingly, different interpretations of QMV on this score.
For integrationists the limited use of qmv has been a primary source of the EU failure to win
popular legitimacy, to the extent that it holds decisions up ad leads to perception that EU is
inefficient in agreeing new ideas.
Others say, no: it is increasing use of qmv that has been the problem; citizens of one country
see their government being out-voted on important issues and there is nothing they can do
about it.
This particularly acute in debate over defence. One side: one of main reasons citizens don’t
value the EU is the EU’s weakness vis-à-vis the US on issues of international security, often
single states have prevented more credible EU interventions. Other side: prospect of sending
national troops under an EU mission decided by qmv when the national government has voted
against would be unthinkable – asking soldiers to die when their own government has no
ultimate control over a mission.
This reveals a fundamental difference still over what the democratic deficit actually is: for
inter-governmentalists, sceptics the democratic deficit lies not so much in the EP’s lack of
control over Commission and Council, but the Council declining ability to control the
unelected Commission.
They see democratic legitimacy still residing in the nation state, in the democratic institutions
of the nation state – arguing that it these institutions that consequently need to have greater
influence in European policy-making.
In fact, a key feature of the EU is the variety of its policy making procedures.
Key point: lots of different styles of policy-making across different policy areas.
No single policy-making style.
When you hear someone passing stark dramatic judgement – that power has been lost to
‘Brussels’; or conversely that the centre of gravity in policy-making still rests too heavily
with national governments – these are simplifications.
Distinction often made between low and high politics, as we have seen. This reflected in
different policy-making dynamics.
In some areas, the Community method – where competence supranationalised; in other areas
governments in control and national parliaments strongly engaged.
Result? Nature of the democratic problem can differ between policy areas.
That is a flavour of debates over balance between institutions and how this should be
reformed to strengthen European democracy.
But as aid, EU’s problem goes beyond these institutional issues.
You can devise a perfect institutional set up, allowing for perfect democratic oversight of the
EU; but if you don’t have an active, interested, engaged demos, organised on a European
basis, this won’t amount to much.
Question remains of who EU institutions are to be accountable to?
You need a fairly unified European populace bound together by common identities, broadly
similar definitions of what basic interests and values are.
Decisions have to be accountable, but also legitimate in a normative sense.
This the bedrock of democracy.
You and I argue about policy choices, ideology. But there is some commonality, some
presumption of belonging to a common community – which means that if I have my chance
to access policy-making circles to influence debate but then lose the argument, I still
recognise the essential legitimacy of the decision taken.
This the notion of a ‘general will’ that people like Rousseau saw as being crucial to the liberal
republic.
Many doubt this exists.
Thus, however powerful the EP citizens will still approach and lobby it as a forum for
arbitrating between diverse and clashing national interests and identities – not something
sufficing for a more democratic EU.
And if you doubt that it can exist at all, your solution to the democratic deficit will naturally
lie in reinforcing the role of national representative bodies – the only ones, according to
sceptics, resting on this foundation of shared community, values and legitimacy.
But others are more optimistic that it is in this domain of values and shared identity that the
real potential for European democracy land for legitimising the EU lies.
Application to the EU of deliberative democracy theories.
EU offers potential for different forms of public space to debate policy choices and values.
has
Democracy less about formal institutions. More about citizens being able actively to shape the
fundamental values of the integration project.
EU offers prospect of new international civil forums to help build consensual norms that
transcend instrumentalist bargaining.
Focus on social and human rights indicate areas where the EU has developed beyond powerinterest dynamics.
Very important: linkage between internal and external aspects of democratic legitimacy.
Support for spread of common normative values internationally see as tied to the EU’s own
incipient identity.
Common argument that EU focuses on rights and values externally as this flows from its own
internal rationale.
But also that best prospect of strengthening legitimacy of EU internally is to be found in these
value-driven external policies.
Many analysts have come to posit a pre-eminence of ideational dynamics as key to the EU’s
distinctiveness as an international actor.
Emergence of common ideational content to the EU’s international presence.
Traditional pictures of rationalist bargaining between national interests fail to capture the
accumulation of a more normative, values-driven foreign policy profile.
Often argued that concepts such as democracy, civil society and rights-based political culture,
born in Europe and key to understanding what is peculiarly European
Constitutive of the EU’s most fundamental essence.
EU level international identity adds a common ‘principled’ dimension to Europeans’
multifaceted identities
EU as a ‘normative model’.
Especially seen in Eastern enlargement; about retaining the EU’s essential identity
Aim to strengthen the EU’s own democratic legitimacy became entwined with East European
candidates’ consolidation of their still fragile democracies.
Kosovo – few interests; about identity.
Likewise with stress on humanitarian assistance.
More of a key to closing the gap in legitimacy than things like single market, involving
winners and losers.
Also seen in development of European Security and Defence Policy.
Defining our most essential security in terms of Europe seen as part of remoulding citizens’
identities.
About giving more of a collective conscience to international actions.
EU governments have insisted that European citizens are more likely to support costly and
risky interventions carried out as EU operations, in defence of European values, than in the
case of NATO-labelled operations.
Especially the case with Germany.
And about correcting what most damages the EU in the eyes of its citizens: as one EU
minister put it: having to wait for the Americans to intervene (referring in particular to the
Balkans).
Eurobarmoter polls have regularly shown that even in the most sceptical member states, this
one of the functions that Europeans most want from the EU: independence from the US in the
field of defence and security.
Military dimension can no longer be seen as being purely about territorial defence; rather
about proactive external projection in the name of certain values.
Lecture 10 Judicial and Police Cooperation
Dynamism since 9/11; both new commitments to police and security cooperation, and
harmonization of criminal law to deal with terrorist suspects and international crime in a more
watertight fashion – these problems that have thrived on gaps and disconnects between
different national systems.
Many of these new police and judicial proposals had been around for some years, but new
political will after 9/11 – this indicative of wider trends in EU: often ideas around for along
time but don’t get going until some event propels them forward (EMU was same).
In early 1990s aimed at fears over international crime from CEECs; then adapted for antiterrorism.
Classic spill over: free movement, market integration breeds easier crime etc, so needs
Europeanisation in internal security issues.
Then again added to by international events and changes beyond EU borders – so again the
twin dynamics coming together to propel a new agenda forward.
Started in earnest in 1992 TEU third pillar.
Initial moves in response to terrorism of 1970s; Trevi Group of interior and justice ministers,
outside EC proper, more ad hoc and limited, really about dialogue and exchange of
information.
Formalised and made more systematic in TEU.
Third pillar initially labeled as JHA, and included a lot of measures on visas and asylum that
in the Amsterdam Treaty were moved to first pillar (under control of EU institutions) – so
what remained in intergovernmental pillar was more coherent and narrow focus on police and
judicial matters, and thus renamed ‘Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters’.
Mainly intergovernmental, but with some role for Commission and EP.
Meantime in 1995 agreement on creating a European Police Office, Europol; although delays
kept it from becoming operational until 1999.
Slow progress.
So, big summit on internal security at Tampere in Finland in 1999: this is what really got this
significant new sphere of EU cooperation going.
Lots of new proposals.
Police Chiefs Task Force
Harmonisation of criminal law.
A new prosecuting organisation, Eurojust,– idea of bringing together main judicial
organizations in each state to facilitate better cooperation on judicial measures against
international crime.
European Police College
Common arrest warrant – bit like single market determined that standards in one part of EU
would have to be recognised everywhere else in EU; conditions for arrest of a suspect in one
part of EU would apply elsewhere (rather than having debates over whether someone should
be extradited, which often let suspects slip through the net). So, negative integration again –
accompanied by cautious positive integration in form of harmonized common procedures of
criminal law.
All with benchmarks and timetables, again mimicking the single market – and reflecting fact
that ideas had been around but no momentum pushing them through to being implemented.
Nice treaty also applied the new reinforced cooperation mechanisms to internal security,
making it possible for a groups of states to deepen cooperation in this sphere without being
subject to a veto from other states.
All good intent. But nothing much happened. On 9/11 most of these proposals had not been
fully implemented.
After 9/11:Measures to stem the funding of terrorists.
An expanded definition of terrorism
More police and judicial cooperation
Operationalisation and beefing up of the Police Chiefs Task Force
Increased powers and a significantly increased budget for Europol
New teams of anti-terrorist experts
Eurojust finally created February 2002
A new Common Arrest Warrant, providing for direct apprehension to replace a leaky system
of extradition
Agreement over a new border police and a new external borders agency
An expansion of the legal scope to strengthen border policing where instability in a country
threatened to provoke increased migration.
Much of this focus on police, judicial and anti-terrorist cooperation has been extended into
external agreements as well.
Addition of a new justice and home affairs partnership with Arab states.
Counter-terrorist cooperation was for the first time formally part of the ministerial meetings
between EU and Arab states.
A lot more funding than for human rights (supposedly other part of post 9/11 agenda).
Indeed one effect of this area of cooperation has been over restrictions on civil rights within
the EU.
New conditions set for third countries’ counter-terrorist measures: anti-terrorism clauses into
new agreements with Algeria, Lebanon and the GCC – obliging these states to buy into the
new police and judicial cooperation developing within the EU.
EU also tightened up and expanded its list of terrorist organizations – those organizations that
would be banned within the EU.
For long time no cooperation in this.
Indeed, were big differences: France strict on dissidents from Arab regimes coming in; UK
very lenient – London became centre for groups opposed to Middle Eastern regimes.
Acrimony between UK and France.
US complained too.
In 2002 cooperation did tighten up on this: PKK and the National Resistance Council of Iran,
at the behest of the Turkish and Iranian governments, respectively.
This new EU activity was a natural extension of new policing and judicial powers at national
level.
UK government introduced a tougher anti-terrorism law, which required a derogation from
article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights; also set up a new terrorism threat
assessment unit.
(About 600 people have been arrested under this, mainly North African citizens; but only a
handful actually charged and found guilty).
Most other states – similar measures.
This an area where EU cooperation made sense: as states reacted in similar ways to 9/11; and
with European coordination making sense to prevent suspects slipping between the nets
between different states.
EU’s counter-terrorism unit was beefed up.
Common country threat assessments drawn up
New programme of technical assistance to for anti-terrorist cooperation
New initiatives on terrorist financing.
In October 2003, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK launched a new ‘European
security zone’ for the Mediterranean, with the agreement of North African governments to
help patrol road, air and sea transport.
PSC (managing new ESDP) talked about new cooperation to match growing concept of
‘homeland security’ in the US.
New commitments after Madrid bombings.
A lot of the new measures introduce after 9/11 had not been implemented.
It was a shock to realize that the people apprehended by Spanish authorities were known to
other member states’ security and intelligence services, but that information had simply not
been pooled.
Poor implementation of common arrest warrant, for example. (5 states not transposed into
national law even by mid 2004; others slow on actual implementation).
Same poor implementation on common definition of terrorism – so still variation on
approaches of different national courts, some more lenient.
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (2000, with 2001 protocol) – to
provide for cross-boarder cooperation on surveillance of suspects, interception, monitoring of
bank accounts etc. Again limited implementation – this type of cooperation and assistance
between security forces just not happening in practice.
Also still incomplete implementation of a similar 2002 Decision on money laundering, aimed
at tackling the financing of terrorist organizations.
Same thing with 2002 and 2003 agreements to allow Commission inspections regarding
aviation and maritime security – idea here to bring states with weaker security coverage of
airports and ports up to standard European procedures.
Two states still had not even established agreed national contact points (coordinating officers
for cooperation on police and judicial cooperation for combating terrorism and international
crime).
So, after Madrid, renewed political commitment to speed up and actually implement all the
measures of EU cooperation agreed after 2001.
And new measures.
New Counter-terrorist tsar/ coordinator. Gijs de Vries.
Plus, importantly, new Commission proposal for cross-broader hot pursuit; idea to allow
police force pursuing suspects in one state to operate across into another state where trail
leads them into that state. Significant, jurisdictions of each set of security forces almost
becoming Europeanised, overlapping with each other.
Quite an implication for sovereignty.
Seen as necessary to prevent suspects just slipping across national borders and evading
capture because different national police forces blocking each other from operating outside
their own national boundaries.
Lot of new proposals under new proposals for better exchange of information:- European register on convictions
- European database of suspects under each state’s new post 9/11 anti-terrorist
legislation, shared between states
- Increased transparency on bank accounts, so that banks obliged to reveal names of
account holders
- Better dissemination and monitoring of EU list of terrorist organizations: this still not
operational enough to ensure assets of all members of these actually being frozen.
All to be coordinated through a new clearing-house mechanism for pooling information,
involving both Europol and Eurojust, and indeed national intelligence services.
(Recognised that Europol’s Terrorism Task Force had not benefited from full information or
cooperation from member states.)
And idea of making the Task Force of EU Police Chiefs more operationally relevant – so far
this limited to fairly generally and generic discussions on approaches towards police
cooperation.
Really needed. But still national jealousies preventing full cooperation and transparency
between states.
Significantly, a lot of speculation and talk about a possible EU CIA came no where near being
agreed; very much, national forces in charge, just sharing information and cooperating better
between themselves.
Critics say this not enough; need something far more systematic – to plug gaps and loopholes
that exist between the police and judicial coverage operated by each individual state.
A European style of policing as not really emerged; still real differences in national policing
doctrines – French gendarmarie style very different from English bobby on the beat.
Europol doesn’t do policing itself; can provide information but relies on national forces
actually to make arrests. (Although since 2002 Europol officers can at least participate in
investigation teams set up between different European police forces).
Some see European Police College has leading towards a convergence of policing styles,
around a common framework for training; also a range of other programmes supporting
exchanges and secondments between different police forces. But any significant convergence
a long way off yet.
Europol still complains that it doesn’t get full information from national authorities; so still
imperfect coordination, where a suspect has been monitored in one state and then moves to
another – of course, authorities cooperate on this, but still imperfect overall coordination of
such exchanges on a really systematic by a European supranational body.
The list of crimes to which the common arrest warrant would apply had to be narrowed, after
a range of debates – including rumours that Berlusconi had insisted on a whole raft of
financial crimes being excluded for which other EU states might arrest him. Italy did agree to
a list of 32 crimes, but still focused on a group of major international crimes.
In EU, still rather more of a civil liberties brake on more intrusive police and judicial
instruments.
This seen in talks over judicial cooperation with US, where EU resisted US hard line
measures and insisted in certain protection of civil liberties.
This especially an issue on data protection (ability of authorities to access personal
information).
For example, proposals for security forces being able to access more info on airline
passengers – limited compared to new provisions introduced by the US; indeed subject of a
fierce disagreement between US and EU, latter refusing to agree to transatlantic cooperation
on the basis of more intrusive US measures for checking up on passengers’ background.
Agreement reached in summer 2003 on EU-US cooperation.
Europol and FBI working together better.
But still tensions in approach – tensions on these technical legal issues in the judicial
cooperation pillar reflecting overarching differences across the Atlantic on the ‘war against
terrorism’.