PROCLUS’ THEOLOGY OF PLATO
[Extracted from Thos. Taylor’s Translation]
(1) Biographical. Of the Sitters in the Academical Chair of the Neoplatonists who followed
the Master Plotinus, undoubtedly the venerable Proclus was the most original thinker as well as the
ablest systematizer of the Teachings of Plato.
He was well called, by way of eminence, “The Platonic Successor.”
He was born at Constantinople, 8th February, 410 A.D., of a Lycian family, and died 17th
April, 485 A.D.
His teacher was Syrianus, of whom he always spoke with great reverence and gratitude.
In these days, when the need for systematic training is perhaps becoming more than ever
universally recognized, there should be a goodly field of disciples to whom Proclus particularly
appeals. And this in spite of the fact that according to some critics he is considered too methodical.
But, in justice, this criticism is usually accompanied by the deepest admiration for the perfect order
and the finished logic which characterize his style. Moreover, as soon as the student becomes
accustomed to Proclus’ somewhat uncommon composition, he begins to discover in it unsuspected
charms, wondrous profundities, and marvellous flashes of Truth, couched in the very simplest of
words. He is also impressed by the fact that Proclus, like Plato, never loses touch with the Primal
and Universal Principle even when discussing the most multiplex and particularized aspects of it,
nor does he leave the track of direct deduction, but builds up his conclusions, step by step, leaving
nothing to supposition.
Students of Plotinus will find that Proclus is complementary to him in a wonderful manner.
Plotinus is the religious-philosophical mystic, par excellence.
Proclus is the philosophical theologian and metaphysician, for it has been affirmed with
truth, that he set the philosophical and dialectical methods of the Schoolmen, and of all Christian
Mystical Science.
He was an acute mathematician, too, as an examination of his “Commentaries on Euclid”
will evince.
There is little doubt that he thoroughly mastered the Philosophy of Plato, and, after passing
it through the splendour of his own illuminating Intellect, re-presented the Platonic Teachings for
the benefit of all subsequent ages.
“The Theology of Plato,”—of which this series of articles will comprise a selection of
choice passages with occasional comments—is a monumental work, of which the indefatigable
English Platonist, Thos. Taylor, has left us an English Translation which preserves the spirit and
style of the original, although, perhaps, it may not be perfect from a purely philological point of
view.
In this work Proclus unfolds the Platonic doctrine of the Supreme God and of all the
Sublime Hierarchies of Beings (i.e., The Gods) who eternally proceed from Him, manifest His
Ineffable Nature, express His unfathomable Mystery, and interpret His Infinite Will; and rule over,
preserve, and perpetually perfect the entire cosmos.
(2) Introductory. I. “I am of opinion,” says Proclus, “that the whole philosophy of Plato
was at first unfolded into light through the beneficent will of Superior Natures, exhibiting the
intellect (Comment 1,—see below) concealed in them, and the truth subsisting together with beings,
to Souls conversant with generation (so far as it is lawful fro them to participate of such
supernatural and mighty Good). And again, after having received its perfection, returning, as it
were, into itself, it became unapparent to many who professed to philosophize, but once more
advancing into light it became again effable to all who earnestly desired to engage in the
investigation of true being. But I particularly think that the mystic doctrine respecting divine
concerns, which is purely established on a sacred foundation, and which perpetually subsists with
the Gods Themselves, became thence apparent to such as are capable of enjoying it for a time
through one man (namely Plato), whom I should not err in calling the primary leader and hierophant
of those true Mysteries, into which Souls, separated from terrestrial places, are initiated, and of
those entire and stable visions, which those participate in who genuinely embrace a happy and
blessed life. But this philosophy shone forth at first from him so venerably and arcanely, as if
established in sacred temples, and within their adyta, and being unknown to many who have entered
these holy places, in certain orderly periods of time, proceeded as much as was possible for it into
light, through certain true priests, and who embraced a life corresponding to the tradition of such
mystic concerns.
II. These interpreters of the epopteia (or mystical spectacles) of Plato, who have unfolded to
us all-sacred narrations of divine concerns, and who were allotted a nature similar to their leader, I
should determine to be the Egyptian Plotinus and those who received the theory from him, I mean
Amelius and Porphyry, together with those in the third place who were produced like virile statues
from these, namely, Iamblichus and Theodorus, and any others, who after these, following this
divine choir, have energized about the doctrines of Plato with a divinely-inspired mind. From these
Syrianus, who, after the Gods, has been our Leader to everything beautiful and good, receiving in
an undefiled manner the most genuine and pure light of truth in the bosom of his Soul, made us a
partaker of all the rest of Plato’s philosophy, communicating to us that arcane information which he
had received from those more ancient than himself, and caused us, in conjunction with him, to be
divinely enthusiastic about the mystic truth of divine concerns.
To this man, therefore, if we should undertake to return thanks adequate to the benefits
which we have received from him, the whole of time would not be sufficient because they are
eternal benefits.
III. But it is necessary, not only that we should have received from others the transcendent
good of the Platonic Philosophy, but that we should leave to posterity monuments of those blessed
spectacles of which we have been spectators, and emulators to the utmost of our ability, under a
leader the most perfect of the present time, and who arrived at the summit of philosophy; perhaps
we shall act properly in invoking the Gods, that They will enkindle the light of truth in our Soul,
and, in supplicating the attendants and ministers of Better Natures to direct our Intellect, and lead it
to the all-perfect divine, and elevated end of the Platonic Theology. For I think that everywhere he
who participates in the least degree of intelligence, will begin his understandings from the
Comment 1.—Intellect. In Proclus, “Intellect” is the equivalent of the Greek “Nous.” Its connotation is not
what is modernly understood by intellect. It is the principle above Soul, and therefore might be translated as Spirit or
Spiritual mind.
Gods, and especially in explications respecting the Gods; for we can no otherwise be able to
understand a Divine Nature than by being perfected through the light of the Gods; nor divulge it to
others unless governed by Them, and exempt from multiform opinions, and the variety which
subsists in words, preserving at the same time the interpretation of divine names. Therefore,
knowing this, and complying with the exhortation of the Platonic Timaeus, we in the first place
establish the Gods as Leaders of the Doctrine respecting Themselves. But may they, in
consequence of hearing our prayers, be propitious to us, and benignantly approaching, guide the
Intellect of our Soul, and lead it about the Vesta of Plato (Comment 2), and to the arduous
sublimities of this speculation; where, when arrived, we shall receive all the truth concerning Them,
inquiring about Them of others, and, at the same time, as far as we are able, exploring Them
ourselves.”—Book I, Ch. 1.
(3) The ONE and the Many. “The most proper beginning of the thesis proposed by us is
that from which we may be able to discover the First Cause of all beings.
“For being impelled from this in a becoming manner, and having our conceptions purified
respecting it, we shall with greater facility be able to distinguish other things.” (Comment 3.)
“If many things have a subsistence, each of the many is something or a certain One. But if
each of them is nothing, or not even one thing, neither is it possible for the many to exist; for the
many are many so far as each individual of the multitude exists. If, therefore, the many alone have
a subsistence, and the One in no respect is, neither will the many exist. For things which are in no
respect one have not any existence whatever.
“There is no number of beings if the One in no respect is; but all things and each thing will
not be one. For the principle of number, the monad is one, and every number itself is one.”
(Comment 4.)
“But if the One, which is The One Itself, alone has a subsistence, and there is nothing else,
there will be among all things neither a whole, nor that which has parts. For everything which has
parts is many, and every whole has parts. But the One is in no respect the many.
“All things, however, are, and are generated what they are, through the One. And together
with the One, indeed, every being is preserved; but separated from the One it proceeds to the
corruption of itself.
Comment 2.—Vesta of Plato. Vesta is the Goddess of the immutable centre and heart of all things; to be led to
the Vesta of Plato, therefore, is to approach the innermost significance of his Philosophy.
Comment 3.—The Platonic Conception of the Supreme God is one of the most profound and exalted to be
found in any system of thought; hence, in proportion as we are able to apprehend it, so our conceptions of the natures
that proceed from God are correspondingly elevated. And since these natures, which immediately proceed from Him,
are most like unto God, they are appropriately denominated “The Gods,” by the Platonists. Such conceptions, however,
are not in any sense idolatrous, or pagan, nor do they detract from the glory of the One Supreme, but rather enhance It,
because as we shall learn from Proclus, “all the Gods are God.”
Comment 4.—The Monad. In divine natures, the Monad is that which contains a multiplicity of unities, distinct
and yet at the same time, profoundly united—and which produces a multitude intimately allied to itself. It is a
particular wholeness, a plural-unity, which is one and yet comprehends and produces all numbers. There could be no
Orders or particular causal chains if the Monad remained in itself unprolific.
“From these things therefore it is necessary that the many should participate of the One, that
the One should be unmingled with multitude, and that nothing should be better than the One, but
that this should also be the cause of being to the many.” (Comment 5.)—Book II, Ch. 1.
“For that which is deprived of the One is nothing. Hence the One is prior to essence.”—
Book II, Ch. 2.
(4) The Principle of all things. “But if that which is first is something which is not essence,
it is absurd to assert that it is subordinate to essence. For the Principle of all things is that which has
the greatest power and the most absolute authority, and is most sufficient to itself, and is not that
which is most ignoble and indigent of the many. And, in short, it is necessary that no secondary
nature should be better than the Principle.
“But the Principle is invariably principle (Comment 6), and other things proceed from it. If,
however, that which is not essence is better than all essence, it will either be participated by it, or it
will be entirely imparticipable. If, however, essence participates of the Principle, of what will it be
the principle? And how will it be the principle of all beings? For it is necessary that the Principle
of beings should be no one of beings; since if it were any one of them, it is necessarily not the
principle of all beings. But everything which is participated by another thing is said to be that by
which it is participated and in which it primarily is.
“The Principle, however, is separate, and belongs in a greater degree to itself than to other
things. Besides, everything which is participated proceeds from another more excellent cause; since
that which is imparticipable is better than that which is participable. (Comment 7.) It is not
possible, however, to conceive anything better than that which is most excellent, and which we call
the Principle. For it is not lawful to assert that things secondary to the Principle, and which proceed
from it, are in any respect better than their principle. The Cause, therefore, of all beings is above all
essence, is separate from every essence, and is neither essence, nor has essence as an addition to its
nature. For such an addition as this is a diminution of simplicity, and of that which is one.”—Book
II, Ch. 2.
“That the One, therefore, is the Principle of all things, and the First Cause, and that all other
things are posterior to the One, is, I think, evident from what has been said.”—ibid., Ch. 4.
Comment 5.—Cause of Being. The first thing conceivable to the human mind is that which has being or
essence; for that which is without, or beyond, being, cannot be conceived. Hence the cause of being, or of “be-ness,” is
that initial act of causation which can be attributed to the First Cause of all, Who, of necessity, is beyond being or
essence.
Comment 6.—Principle. The Principle of any thing is its beginning, origin, arche, head, or idea;—e.g., the
principle of being, or be-ness, is that according to which all beings are produced, are able to subsist or exist, and by
which they participate in essence. And similarly with the principles of life, intelligence, and anything else. The Monad
is the principle of numbers; but the ONE is the Principle of principles,—or rather, Principle itself.
Comment 7.—The Imparticipable is that which is not consubsistent with a subordinate nature. It has the
relation of a Monad; being exempt from subordinate nature. It has the relation of a Monad; being exempt from
participants and yet producing things which may be participants. Thus imparticipable Intellect is the intellect which is
not consubsistent with Soul, but is exempt from it; and imparticipable Soul is the Soul which is not consubsistent with
body,—and so in other things.—(T. Taylor).
(5) The One and the Good. “The mode of demonstration pertaining to the One is twofold.
For Plato delivers to us two names of the Ineffable Cause. In the ‘Republic,’ indeed, he calls it ‘The
Good,’ and demonstrates it to be the fountain of the Truth which unites intellects and intelligibles
(Comment 8). But in the ‘Parmenides’ he denominates such a principle as this ‘The One,’ and
shows that it gives subsistence to the divine unities.
“Again, therefore, of these names, the One is the principle of the progression of the whole of
things, but the Good of their conversion. For because all things derived their subsistence and
proceed from the First Principle, on this account referring the One to it, we demonstrate that it is the
cause of all multitude and every progression. For whence is multitude unfolded into light except
from the One? But, again, because the progressions from it are naturally converted to it, and desire
the ineffable and incomprehensible hyparxis (Comment 9) we denominate it the Good. For what
else is that which converts all things, and which is extended to all beings as the object of desire, but
the Good? For all other things subsist distributedly, and are to some beings honourable, but to
others not. And every thing which in any respect whatever is said to have a subsistence, aspires
after some things and avoids others. But the Good is the common object of desire to all beings, and
all things according to their nature verge and are extended to this. The tendency, however, of
desiring natures is everywhere to the appropriate object of desire.
“The Good, therefore, converts; but the One gives subsistence to all secondary natures. Let
not, however, any one suppose that the Ineffable can on this account be named, or that the cause of
all union is doubled. For here, indeed, we transfer to it names, looking to that which is posterior to
it, and to the progressions from it, or the circular conversions to it. Because, indeed, multitude
subsists from it, we ascribe to it the appellation of the One; but because all things, even as far as to
things that have the most obscure existence, are converted to it, we denominate it The Good.
“We endeavour, therefore, to know the unknown nature of the First Principle through the
things which proceed from, and are converted to it; and we also attempt through the same means to
give names to that which is ineffable.
“This Principle, however, is neither known by beings, nor is effable by any one of all things;
but being exempt from all knowledge, and all language, and subsisting as incomprehensible, it
produces from itself, according to one cause, all knowledge, everything that is known, all words,
and whatever can be comprehended by speech. But its unical nature, which transcends all division,
shines forth to the view triadically in the natures that posterior to it. For all things abide in, proceed
from, and are converted to the One. For, at one and the same time they are united to it, are
dependent on its union, which is exempt from the whole of things, and desire the participation of
it.”—Book II, Ch. 6.
Comment 8.—Intelligibles and Intellects. In the Platonic sense Intelligible natures are such as possess real
permanent being, and therefore are truly knowable or intelligible;—things which do not possess real being, but subsist
in a continual condition of change, are not truly knowable.
Intellects perceive Intelligibles by becoming united with them.
Comment 9.—Hyparxis. The hyparxis is the first principle or the foundation of a thing. It is the essential root
and the innermost nature of a thing, as well as that characteristic essence or summit of any nature through which it is
what it is. In the Gods it is analogous to the unity and deity of their natures.
(6) The Two Modes of Ascent. “We also define two modes of ascent to the First (Comment
10), conjoining that mode which is through analogy with the appellation of the Good, but that which
is through negations with the appellation of the One; which Plato, also indicating, in the ‘Republic’
calls the first ‘The Good,’ and at the same time makes a regression to it through analogy; but in the
‘Parmenides’ establishing it as The One Itself, he unfolds the transcendency of it which is exempt
from beings through negative conclusions. According to both these modes, therefore, the First
Principle transcends all gnostic powers and is entirely exempt from definition, but all other things
afford us the cause of knowledge and of appellation. And the First Principle, indeed, unically
(Comment 11) gives subsistence to all the unions and hyparxes of secondary natures; but the things
posterior to this Cause participate of it in a divided manner. These also become multiplied by
abiding, proceeding, and returning; but The One is at once perfectly exempt from all the prolific
progressions, convertive powers, and uniform hypostases in beings.”—Ibid.
(7) The First Principle and the Gods. “This, therefore, is the one truth concerning the First
Principle, and which possesses one reason remarkably conformable to the Platonic hypothesis,
namely, that this Principle subsists prior to the whole orders in the Gods, that it gives subsistence to
the boniform essence of the Gods, that it is the fountain of superessential Goodness, and that all
things posterior to it, being extended towards it, are filled with Good, are united to it, and after an
ineffable manner, subsist uniformly about it. For its unical nature is not unprolific, but it is by so
much the more generative of other things which have a subsistence. Nor does its fecundity tend to
multitude and division; but it abides with undefiled purity, concealed in inaccessible places. For in
the natures also which are posterior to it we everywhere see that which is perfect desires to
generate, and that which is full hastens to impart to other things its plenitude. In a much greater
degree, therefore, it is necessary that the nature which contain in one, all perfections, and which is
not a certain good, but Good itself, and super-full (if it be lawful so to speak) should be generative
of the whole of things, and give subsistence to them; producing all things by being exempt from all
things, and by being imparticipable, similarly generating the first and the last of beings.
“The Good is the most final of all ends, and the centre of all desirable natures. All desirable
natures, indeed, impart an end to secondary beings; but that which pre-subsists, uncircumscribed by
all things, is the First Good.”—Book II, Ch. 7.
(8) The Apprehension of the Gods. “All who have ever touched upon Theology have called
the first and the most self-sufficient principles of things, ‘Gods,’ and have said that the theological
science is conversant about these.
Comment 10.—The Two Modes of Ascent are called “Via Affirmativa” and “Via Negativa,” respectively. The
“Affirmative Way” is pursued by regarding God as Himself the superplenitude of every conceivable virtue and power;
but the “Negative Way” is followed by denying that God can possibly be any of the things which He produces, but that
He must be entirely exempt form them and infinitely transcend them all. Therefore, when, by negation, we have
separated Him, in our consciousness, from every conceivable attribute; He remains the Absolute, Incomprehensible,
mysteriously “Unknowing” and Unknowable ONE. We cannot even say the ONE exists; hence Plato’s paradox: “If the
ONE is, It is not.”
Comment 11.—Unical. That which is characterized by unity.
“And some, indeed, have (erroneously) considered a corporeal essence as that alone which
has any existence, and have placed in a secondary rank, with respect to essence, all the genera of
incorporeal natures, considering the principles of things as having a corporeal form, and evincing
that the habit in us by which we know these, is corporeal. (Comment 12.)
“The divine narration, however, of Plato despises all corporeal natures in the consideration
of these principles. Because, indeed, everything divisible and endued with interval, is naturally
unable either to produce or preserve itself, but possesses its being, energy, and passivity through
Soul, and the motions which Soul contains.
“But Plato demonstrates that the psychical essence (i.e., the essence pertaining to Soul, see
Comment 13) is more ancient than bodies, and is suspended from an Intellectual (Spiritual)
hypostasis. He shows that Intellect is the father and cause of bodies and Souls, and that all things
both subsist and energize about it, which are allotted a life conversant with transitions and
evolutions.
Plato, however, proceeds to another principle entirely exempt from Intellect, more
incorporeal and ineffable, and from which all things, even though you should speak of such as are
last, have necessarily a subsistence. For all things are not naturally disposed to participate of Soul;
nor are all things able to enjoy Intellect; but it is necessary that the Principle of all things should be
participated by all things. Plato having divinely discovered this First Principle of wholes, which is
more excellent than Intellect, and is concealed in inaccessible recesses; and having exhibited these
three causes and monads, (Comment 14) denominated them as incorporeal and above bodies,
produces from these monads their proper numbers; one multitude being indeed unific, but the
second intellectual, and the third psychical. For every monad is the leader of a multitude coordinate with itself.
“But as Plato connects bodies with Souls, so likewise he connects Souls with Intellects, and
these again with the unities of beings. But he converts all things to one imparticipable Unity. And
having run back as far as to this Unity, he considers himself as having obtained the highest end of
the theory of wholes; and that this is the truth respecting the Gods, which is conversant with the
unities of beings, and which delivers their progressions and peculiarities, the contact of beings with
them, and the orders of forms which are suspended from these unical hypostases.
“But he teaches us that the theory respecting Intellect, and the forms and the genera
revolving about Intellect, are posterior to the science which is conversant with the Gods themselves.
Likewise, that the intellectual theory apprehends intelligibles, and the forms which are capable of
being known by the Soul through the projecting energy of Intellect (Comment 15); but that the
theological science, transcending this, is conversant with arcane and ineffable hyparxes, and
pursues their separation from each other, and
Comment 12.—Incorporeal Natures. Since the Gods are God, they are necessarily infinitely superior to all
ideas of body or corporeality; hence they can never be apprehended by corporeal faculties.
Comment 13.—Psychical is here used in its original and best sense; it has nothing whatever to do with what is
nowadays known as “Psychism” and “the Psychic”, which refer to the astral world and not to the Soul itself.
Comment 14.—The ONE, Intellect, and Soul. These Principles, considered as Monads, contain and produce an
infinite number of unities, intellects, and souls.
Comment 15.—Intellectual Projection. The projecting energy of Intellect is intuitive perception, an immediate
darting forth, as it were, to its proper object, the Intelligible.
their unfolding into light from one cause of all; whence, I am of opinion, that the intellectual
peculiarity of the Soul is capable of apprehending intellectual forms, and the difference which
subsists in them, but that the summit, the flower of Intellect and hyparxis, is conjoined with the
unities of beings, and through these, with the occult union of all the divine unities. (Comment 16.)
For as we contain many gnostic powers, through these alone we are capable of being conjoined with
and of participating in this occult union. For the Genus of the Gods cannot be apprehended by
sense, because it is exempt from all bodies; nor by opinion and dianoia (Comment 17), for these are
divisible and come into contact with multiform concerns; nor by intelligence in conjunction with
reason, for knowledge of this kind belongs to true beings; but the hyparxis of the Gods rides on
beings, and is defined according to the union itself of wholes.”
(9) The Soul’s Ascent to the Gods. It remains, therefore, if it be admitted that a divine
nature can in any respect be known that it must be apprehended by the hyparxis of the Soul. For we
say that everywhere things similar can be known by the similar; namely, the sensible by sense, the
doxastic (Comment 18) by opinion, the dianoetic by dianoia, and the intelligible by Intellect. So
that the most unical nature must be known by the ONE, and the Ineffable by that which is ineffable.
“Indeed, Socrates in the First Alcibiades rightly observes that the Soul, entering into herself,
will behold all other things and Deity itself. For, verging to her own hyparxis and to the centre of
all life, laying aside multitude and the variety of the all-manifold powers which she contains, she
ascends to the highest watch-tower of being.
The Soul, then, when looking to things posterior to herself, beholds the shadows and images
of beings, but when she converts herself to herself, she evolves her own essence and the reasons
which she contains.* And at first indeed she, as it were, beholds herself alone; but when she
penetrates more profoundly into the knowledge of herself, she finds in herself both Intellect and the
orders of beings. When, however, she proceeds into her interior recesses and into the adytum, as it
were, of the Soul, she perceives with her eye closed the Genus of the Gods, and the Unities of
beings. For all things are in us psychically, and through this we are naturally capable of knowing
all things, by exciting the powers and the images (ideas) of wholes which we contain.
And this is the best employment of our energy, to be extended to a divine nature itself,
having our powers at rest, to revolve harmoniously round it, to excite all the multitude of the Soul to
this union, and laying aside all such things as are posterior to the ONE, to become seated and
conjoined with that which is ineffable and beyond all things. For it is lawful for the Soul to ascend
till she terminates her flight in the Principle of things; but arriving thither, beholding the place
which is there, descending thence, and directing her course through beings, likewise evolving the
multitude of forms, and apprehending intellectually how each is suspended from its proper
unity, then we may
Comment 16.—Occult. This term is employed in its literal sense, meaning “hidden.” It is applied to that which
is above, or hidden from, intellectual perception, and has nothing to do with “occultism”.
Comment
17.—
Dianoia. This is the discursive energy of reason; it is the power of the Soul which reasons scientifically, or
dialectically, deriving the principles of its reasoning from Intellect.
Comment 18.—Doxastic; from doxa, opinion. This is the lowers of the gnostic powers of the rational soul. It
knows that a thing is, but not why it is; i.e., it is ignorant of the cause.
* (It is interesting to note that this passage is identical with the very foundation of Oriental Raja Yoga).
consider her as possessing the most perfect science of divine natures, perceiving in a uniform
manner the progressions of the Gods into beings, and the distinctions of beings about the Gods.
“Such then, according to Plato’s decision, is our theologist; and his theology is a science of
this kind, which unfolds the hyparxis itself of the Gods, separates their unknown and unical light
from the peculiarity of their participants, and announces it to such as are worthy of this energy,
which is both blessed and comprehends all things at once.”—Book I, Ch. 3.
PROCLUS’ THEOLOGY OF PLATO
[Extracted from Thos. Taylor’s Translation.]
THE GOODNESS OF THE GODS
(1) The Power of the Gods. “Three things are asserted by Plato in the “Laws”:—(1) that
there are Gods; (2) that Their Providence extends to all things; and (3) that they administer all
things according to Justice, and suffer no perversion from inferior natures.
For what can be of a more leading nature than the hyparxis of the Gods (Comment 1) or than
boniform Providence, or immutable and undeviating Power, through which They produce
secondary natures uniformly, convert them to Themselves, and preserve Themselves in an undefiled
manner? The Gods, indeed, govern all things but suffer nothing from subordinate natures, nor are
changed with the variety of the things to which Their Providence extends.
Of all beings, however, it is necessary that some should move only; but that others should be
moved only; and that the natures subsisting between these should both move and be moved. And
with respect to these last, it is requisite, either that they should move others, being themselves in
turn moved by others, or that they should be self-motive.
These four hypotheses, likewise, are necessarily placed in an orderly series, one after
another; (a) that which is moved only,— depending on other primary causes; (b) that which moves
others and is at the same time moved; (c) that which is self-motive, and which is beyond that which
both moves and is moved, beginning from itself and through its own motion imparting the
representation of being moved to other things; and (d) that which is immoveable, preceding
whatever participates in either producing or passive motion. (Comment 2).
Comment 1.—The Hyparxis of the Gods is “analogous to the unity and deity of Their natures.” It is that which
makes Them what They are.
Comment 2.—The Four Hypotheses of Motion.—From these Proclus then proceeds to demonstrate how the
ultimate cause of all motion (and therefore also of life and activity of every kind) originates in the Power of the Gods,
which is all-pervading—from the first to the last of things. He shows that in so far as secondary natures are able to
participate in this Power of the Gods so they preserve their own peculiar characteristics and are able to energize
according to their particular natures; but in so far as they depart from the Power of the Gods, so they suffer a privation
of life and essence.
The series of arguments used by Proclus may be summarized as follows:—
I. The activities of Self-motive Natures must be according to Time, because the Eternal is beyond motion.
Therefore the Self-motive is secondary to, and dependent upon, the Eternal which is immoveable.
II. If all things should stand still, there could be no further motion unless the Self-motive continued to subsist,
because the Immoveable does not itself impart motion. Hence, the things moved,—i.e., the alter-motive, depend upon
the Self-motive which begins from itself.
III. Bodies or corporeal natures are not adapted to move themselves, hence depend upon the Self-motive. The
Soul, which imparts motion to the body, is self-motive. The Intellect, upon which the Soul depends, is immoveable,
and gives to the Soul its perpetual permanency and sameness of subsistence. The Intellect, being Eternal, is deific and
subsists in union with real beings or Divine Unities. Hence, when the Soul energizes according to Intellect it is
conjoined to the Gods.
Therefore it necessarily follows that the body is able to move because of the Soul; the Soul is able to impart
motion because of Intellect; Intellect is able to impart sameness to the Soul because of the Divine Unities; and thus, the
Ultimate and Final Causes of all these Powers (and others analogous to them) reside in the Gods.
For that which is corporeal, being alter-motive, derives from Soul the representation of selfmotive power and through it is an animal. But Soul, being self-motive, participates of a life
according to Intellect, and energizing according to time, possesses a never-ceasing energy and an
ever-vigilant life from its proximity to Intellect. And Intellect, possessing its life in Eternity, always
subsisting essentially in energy, and fixing all its stable intellection at once in Intellect, is entirely
deific, through the Cause prior to itself.
All things, therefore, as we have previously said, are suspended from the ONE through
Intellect and Soul as media. And Intellect, indeed, has the form of unity; but Soul has the form of
Intellect; and the Body of the world is vital (through Soul). But everything is conjoined with that
which is prior to itself. And of the natures posterior to these, one in a more proximate but the other
in a more remote degree, enjoys that which is divine. And divinity, indeed, is prior to Intellect,
being primarily carried in an intellectual nature; but Intellect is most divine, as being deified prior to
other things; and Soul is divine, so far as it acquires an intellectual medium. But the Body, which
participates of a Soul of this kind, is also itself divine; for the illumination of divine Light pervades
supernally as far as to the last dependencies, yet the body is not simply divine, but the Soul, by
looking at Intellect, and living from itself, is primarily divine (Comment 3).
These is one corporeal-formed Wholeness of the Universe and many others under this
depending on it; there is one Soul of the universe, and after this, other Souls together with it
disposing in an orderly manner the whole parts of the universe; there is one Intellect, and an
intellectual number under this participated by Souls; there is one God Who connectedly contains at
once all Mundane and Supermundane Divine Natures and a multitude of other Gods, Who distribute
intellectual essences (Comment4).—Book I., Ch. 13.
The Gods, therefore, are really the causes of all motion; some of them being essential and
vital according to a self-motive, self-vital, and self-energetic power; but others of them being
intellectual and exciting by Their very being all secondary natures to the perfection of life. And
others, again, are unical or characterized by unity, deifying by participation all the whole genera of
themselves according to a primary, all-perfect, and unknown power of energy. But others, again,
supply motion to secondary natures according to place or quality, and are essentially the cause of
motion to Themselves. For everything which is the cause of essence to other things is by much
greater priority in possession of its own proper energies and perfection.
Comment 3.—The All-pervading Gods.—This shows that nothing is destitute of the Gods, but that in so far as
different natures are adapted to participate in the Power of the Gods so in that degree they are divine. The body is least
adapted, but Intellect most, while the Soul subsists midway between them. “The body is not simply divine” because it
has no real subsistence without Soul; but the Soul is self-subsistent and when converted to its Principle—Intellect—it
acquires an intellectual medium through which “it is primarily divine.”
Comment 4.—Processions from Deity. Just as all the Genera of the Gods are processions from One First GOD,
so all Intellectual Numbers proceed from One Intellect; all Souls from One Over-Soul; and all corporeal wholes are
progressions of the One Corporeal-formed Universal Wholeness which is the manifested Cosmos.
Motion, Being, and Life proceed from a unical hyparxis (Comment 5) which connectedly
contains Intellect and Soul which is the source of total Good, and which proceeds as far as the last
of things. For of Life, indeed, not all the parts of the world are capable of participating; but of the
ONE all things participate, even as far as to Matter itself, both wholes and parts, things which
subsist according to Nature and the contraries to these; and there is not anything which is deprived
of a cause of this kind, nor can anything ever participate of Being if it is deprived of the ONE.—
Book I, Ch. 14.
(2) The Providence of the Gods. If, therefore, the Gods produce all things and contain all
things in the unknown comprehensions of Themselves, how is it possible that there should not be a
providence of all things in these comprehensions, pervading supernally as far as to the most partial
natures? For it is everywhere fit that offspring should enjoy the providential care of their causes.
All things, therefore, are partakers of the providence of their preceding causes;—being
purified by the Psychical Gods (Comment 6); participating of sameness and a stable condition of
forms from the Intellectual Gods; but receiving into themselves the presence of union, of measure,
and of the distribution of Good, from the First Gods (Comment 7).
For the very being of the Gods is defined by the Good, and in this They have Their
subsistence. But to provide for things of a dependent nature is to confer on them a certain good.
How, therefore, can we deprive the Gods of Providence without depriving them of Goodness? And
how, if we subvert Their Goodness, is it possible that we should not also ignorantly subvert their
hyparxis, which we established by former demonstrations?
Hence it is necessary to admit, as a thing consequent to the very being of the Gods, that
They are Good according to every excellence. And again, it is consequent to this, that They do not
withdraw Themselves from a providential attention to secondary natures; and that there is with
Them the most excellent knowledge, unpolluted power, and unenvying and exuberant will. From
which it follows that They provide for the whole of things and omit nothing which is requisite to the
supply of Good.
Let it not be thought, however, that the providence of the Gods about secondary natures is
such that it is either a busy or laborious one, for Their blessedness is not to be defiled by difficulty
of administration; since even the life of good men is accompanied with facility and is void of
molestation and pain. But all labours and molestation arise from the impediments of matter. If,
therefore, it be requisite to define the mode of the Providence of the Gods, it must be admitted that
it is spontaneous, unpolluted, immaterial, and ineffable.
For the Gods do not govern all things
either by investigating
Comment 5.—Unical Hyparxis, or in other words, the root one-ness through which all things are connected to,
and able to participate in, the ONE.
Comment 6.—The Psychical Gods, that is the Choir of Gods Who rule over the World of the Soul, called also
the Supermundane World, animated by the Vivific Divinities.
Comment 7.—The Six Choirs of Gods,—according to Proclus the names of these are:—
The Intelligible Gods.
The Intelligible-Intellectual Gods.
The Intellectual Gods.
The Supermundane Gods.
The Liberated Gods.
The Mundane Gods.
what is fit, or by exploring the good of everything by ambiguous reasonings, or by looking
externally and following the effects as men do in the providence which they exert on their own
affairs.
But the Gods, pre-assuming in Themselves the measures of the whole of things, and
producing the essence of everything from Themselves, and also, looking to Themselves, They lead
and perfect all things in a silent path, by Their very being, and fill them with Good (Comment 8).
Neither, likewise, do They produce in a manner similar to Nature,—energizing only by
Their very being, unaccompanied by deliberate choice. Nor do They energize in a manner similar
to partial Souls (Comment 9) in conjunction with will and deprived of production according to
essence.
But They contract both these into one union, and They will such things as They are able to
effect by Their very being; while, by Their very essence, They are capable of, and produce, all
things, containing the cause of production in Their unenvying and exuberant Will.
So that, if indeed the communication of Good by the Gods is according to nature,
Providence also must be according to nature; and these things are accomplished by the Gods with
facility and by their very being alone.
That, however, which is especially the illustrious prerogative of the Platonic Theology I
should say is this, that according to it, neither is the exempt essence of the Gods converted to
secondary natures through a providential care of things subordinate, nor is Their providential
presence with things diminished through Their transcending the whole of things with undefiled
purity. But it assigns Them as separate subsistence, being unmingled with every subordinate
nature, and yet being extended to all things, caring for and adorning Their progeny. For the manner
in which They pervade all things is not corporeal, as is that of light through the air; nor is it
divisible about bodies as in Nature; nor converted to subordinate natures as that of a partial Soul;
but it is separate from body, without conversion to it, and is immaterial, unmingled, unrestrained,
uniform, primary, and exempt.—Book I, Ch. 14.
(3) The Justice of the Gods. The third problem we are to survey is the unpervertible in the
Gods, Who perform all things according to Justice, and Who do not in the smallest degree subvert
its boundary, or its undeviating rectitude, in Their providential attention to all other things and in
the mutations of human affairs.
I think, therefore, it is apparent that everywhere that which governs according to nature, and
pays all possible attention to the felicity of the governed, after this manner becomes the Leader of
that which it governs, and directs it to that which is best.
If, therefore, we grant that the Gods are the Leaders of the whole of things, and that They
possess every virtue, how is it possible that They should neglect the felicity of the objects of Their
providential care? Or, how can They be inferior to other leaders in the providence of subordinate
natures; since the Gods, indeed, always look to that which is better, and establish this as the end of
all Their government?
Comment 8.—The Silent Path of the Gods. The truth of this sublime passage is to realized the more we
contemplate the Infinite Grace of GOD and the Goodness of His Hosts of Great Gods.
Comment 9.—The Partial Soul according to Proclus, is the Soul limited by bondage to generation and inferior
natures, and thus unable to energize its integrality.
And universally, whether you are willing or not to call the Gods Leaders, or Rulers, or
Guardians, or Fathers, a Divine Nature will appear to be in want of no one of such names. For all
things that are venerable and honourable subsist in Them primarily.—Book I, Ch. 15.
That which has the hyparxis of itself and the whole of its essence defined in the Good and
which by its very being produces all things, must necessarily be productive of every good, but of no
evil. For if there was anything primarily Good which is not God, perhaps some one might say that
divinity is indeed a cause of good but that it does not impart to beings every good. If, however, not
only every God is Good, but that which is primarily boniform and beneficent is God, then it is
perfectly necessary that Divinity should be the cause of Good, and of all such Goods as proceed into
secondary descents, as far as to the last of things.
For as the power which is the cause of life gives subsistence to all life; as the power which is
the cause of knowledge, produces all knowledge; as the power which is the cause of beauty,
produces everything beautiful; and as every primary cause produces all similars from itself and
binds to itself the one hypostasis of things which subsist according to one form, so, after the same
manner, the First and most principal Good and uniform Hyparxis, establishes simultaneously in and
about Itself, the Causes and Comprehensions of all Goods. For all Goods are from thence
produced, perfected, and preserved; and the one series and order of universal Good depends on that
Fountain. Through the same cause of hyparxis, therefore, the Gods are the suppliers of all Good,
but of no evil. For that which is primarily Good gives subsistence to every good from Itself, and is
not the cause of an allotment contrary to itself; since that which is productive of life is not he cause
of the privation of life; and that which is the source of beauty is exempt from the nature of that
which is void of beauty and is deformed. Hence, of that which primarily constitutes Good, it is not
lawful to assert that it is the cause of contrary progeny.
The Divine Cause of Good is established eternally in itself, extending to all secondary
natures an unenvying and exuberant participation of Good. Of its participants, however, some
preserve the participation with incorruptible purity, receiving their proper Good in undefiled
bosoms and thus, through an abundance of power, possess inevitably an allotment of Good adapted
to them.
But although those natures which are arranged in the last of the whole of things enjoy,
according to their, nature, the Goodness of the Gods (for it is not possible that things entirely
destitute of Good could either have any being or subsistence), yet, receiving an efflux of this kind,
they neither preserve the Gift, which pervades them, pure and unmingled, nor do they retain their
own proper Good stably, but, becoming partial and material, they exhibit to Order, the privation of
Order; to Reason, irrationality; and to Virtue the contrary of it, vice (Comment 10).
Comment 10.—Evil. Proclus has much to say concerning the non-existence of Evil, which is defined as the
privation of Good. Evil is self-destructive. Things only subsist in so far as they contain some good; hence, Evil, as an
ultimate and real principle, is non-existent; yet, from the human standpoint, “Evil” certainly needs transmutation, or
rearrangement, before man can recognize it as Good.
But with respect to the natures which rank as wholes, each of these is exempt from a
perversion of this kind, the things more perfect in them always having dominion according to
nature. For the universe is always happy, and always consists of perfect parts, which subsist
according to Nature (Comment 11).
Divinity, therefore, as we have said, is the Cause of Good; but the shadowy subsistence of
evil does not subsist from power, but from the imbecility of natures which receive the Illuminations
of the Gods. Nor is evil in wholes, but in partial natures, nor yet in all these (Comment 12). For the
first of partial natures and partial intellectual genera are eternally boniform. But the media among
these, and which energize according to Time, connecting the participation of the Good with
temporal mutation and motion, are incapable of preserving the Gift of the Gods immoveable,
uniform, and simple; obscuring, by the variety, the simplicity of this Gift; by their multiform its
uniform nature; and by their commixture its purity and incorruptibility.
All things, however, are converted as much as possible to the Goodness of the Gods. And
wholes, indeed, remain in their proper boundaries and also the perfect and beneficent genera of
beings; but more partial and imperfect natures are adorned and arranged in a becoming manner;
become subservient to the completion of wholes; are called upward to the beautiful; are changed;
and in every way enjoy the participation of the Good, as far as this can be accomplished by them.
For there cannot be a greater Good to each of these than what the Gods impart according
to measures to Their progeny; but all things, each separately and all in common, receive such a
portion of Good as it is possible for them to participate. But if some things are filled with greater
and others with less Good, the power of the recipient and the measures of the distribution must be
assigned as the cause of this. For different things are adapted to different beings according to their
nature. But the Gods always extend Good in the same manner as the sun always emits light; for
different things receive this light differently and yet to the greatest extent of which they are capable.
For all things are led according to the Justice of the Gods, and Good is not absent from anything,
but is present to all according to an appropriate boundary of participation.
And as Plato truly says: “All things are in a Good condition and are arranged by the
Gods.”—Book I, Ch. 17.
Comment 11.—“The Universe is always happy.” This reminds us of Plotinus when he affirms that: “The
World is worthy of its Author,—complete, beautiful, and harmonious. Those who find fault with it, make the mistake
of considering it in part.”—En. III. 2-3. This truth cannot be over-emphasized. It is a joy-giving truth, for in the
contemplation of the grandeur and magnificence of the Works of the Gods in the Great Cosmos, man must necessarily
draw near to Them in consciousness.
Comment 12.—Partial Natures are particular Natures. Thus; “Every partial or particular intellect participates
of the Primal Unity which is above intellect, both through the universal Intellect and through the partial unity which is
co-ordinate with it. And every partial Soul participates of universal Intellect through universal Soul and through a
partial Intellect. And every partial nature of Body participates of universal Soul through universal Nature and a partial
Soul.”—(Proposition cix,).
THE THEOLOGY OF PLATO
FROM PROCLUS
III.—THE BEAUTY OF THE GODS*
(1) The Immutability of the Gods. All the things demonstrated, so far, depend upon three
common conceptions of a divine nature, namely, on conceptions concerning Its Goodness, Its
Immutability, and its Truth.
For the first and ineffable Fountain of Good is with the Gods, from all Eternity, which is
itself the cause of a Power that has an invariable sameness of subsistence, and of the first Intellect,
which is real being, and the Truth which is in real beings.—Book I., Ch. 16.
Let us survey the Immutability and Simplicity of the Gods; what the nature of each is, and
how both of them are adapted to the hyparxis of the Gods, according to the narration of Plato.
The Gods are exempt from the whole of things; but, filling them with Good, They are
Themselves perfectly Good, each according to his own proper order possessing that which is most
excellent, and the entire Race of Gods being at once allotted a predominance according to an
exuberance of Good.
But if the First Cause is most excellent, that which is posterior to the First is not so; for that
which is produced is inferior to that by which it is produced (Comment 1).
But it is necessary in the Gods to preserve the order of causes unconfused, and to define
separably their progressions; for with the unfolding into light of things secondary from those which
are first, that which is most excellent must also be surveyed in each of the Gods. Because each of
the Gods, in his own characteristic peculiarity, is primarily and perfectly Good.
For example, one is allotted this transcendency and is most excellent as possessing a
prophetic power; another as demiurgic; and another as perfecter of works.
Moreover, in the Republic, Socrates very properly observes, when speaking of the Gods,
that each of them is most beautiful and most excellent, and for ever retains a simplicity of
subsistence in his own form. For each of the Gods being allotted that which is first and which is the
summit in his own particular Series, does not depart from his own proper Order, but contains the
blessedness and felicity of his own proper power. Neither does he exchange his order for an
inferior one, for it is not lawful for that which possesses all virtue to be changed into an inferior
condition. Nor does he pass into a better order; for where can there be anything better than that
which is most excellent?
Comment 1.—But inasmuch as the Gods are God, i.e., They are His Manifested Progressions, They are not
inferior to Him in essence, although, as His Differentiated Activities, They are secondary to Him.
* The Articles of this Series in previous Issues were: I.—The First Principle and the Gods; II.—The Goodness
of the Gods.
It is necessary, therefore, that every Divine Nature should be established immutably, abiding
in its own accustomed manner. Hence, from these premises, the self-sufficiency, the undefiled
purity, and the invariable sameness of subsistence of the Gods, is apparent. For if they are not
changed to an more excellent condition of being, as possessing that which is best in their own
nature, they are sufficient to themselves and are not in want of any good.
And if they are not at any time changed into an inferior condition, they remain undefiled,
established in their own trancendencies. And, again, if they guard the perfection of themselves
immutably, they subsist always with invariable sameness.
We shall next consider, therefore, what is the self-sufficiency of the Gods, what is their
immutability, and what their sameness of subsistence (Comment 2).
I. The world is said to be self-sufficient, because its subsistence is perfect, proceeding from
principles that are perfect; because it is a whole, coming from perfect wholes; and because it is
filled with an appropriate good from its generating Father. But a perfection and self-sufficiency of
this kind is partible and is said to consist of many things coalescing in one, and to be filled from
separate causes according to participation.
The order of divine Souls also is said to be self-sufficient, as being full of appropriate
virtues and as always preserving the measure of its own blessedness without indigence. But here
likewise the self-sufficiency is in want of powers, for these Souls have not their intellections
directed to the same Intelligibles, but they energize according to Time and obtain the complete
perfection of their contemplation in whole periods of time. The self-sufficiency, therefore, of
Divine Souls, and the whole perfection of their life, is not at once present (Comment 3).
Again, the Intellectual World is said to be self-sufficient, as having its whole Good
established in Eternity, comprehending at once its whole blessedness and being indigent of nothing,
because all life and all intelligence are present with it, and nothing is deficient, nor does it desire
anything as absent. But Intellect is, indeed, sufficient to itself in its own Order, yet it falls short of
the self-sufficiency of the Gods, because, although every Intellect is boniform, yet it is not
Goodness itself nor primarily Good, but each of the Gods is a unity, hyparxis, and goodness.
The nature of the hyparxis of each divine unity determines its progression of Goodness; for
one divinity is a perfective Goodness, another is a Goodness connective of the whole of things; and
another is a collective Goodness. But, nevertheless, each is simply a Goodness sufficient to itself.
Or, it may be said, that each is a Goodness possessing the self-sufficient and the all-perfect, but not
according to participation or illumination, but by being that very thing which it is.
For Intellect is self-sufficient to itself by participation; the Soul is self-sufficient according
to a similitude to a divine nature. But the Gods themselves are self-sufficient through and by
themselves, filling themselves, or rather, subsisting eternally as the plenitudes of all Good.
Comment 2.—In order to emphasize the completeness of these three attributes in the Gods, Proclus proceeds to
consider what degree of self-sufficiency, immutability, and sameness of subsistence is possessed by the World, by the
Soul, and by Intellect, or the Intellectual (Spiritual) World, in comparison with that in the Gods.
Comment 3.—Real self-sufficiency cannot be possessed by any nature which has its activity in Time, because
it is perpetually in a process of becoming. But the eternal for ever is, and always possesses its fullest possible being: it
neither becomes more nor less.
II. With respect to the Immutability of the Gods: of what kind is it?
Is it such as that of a naturally circulating body? For the celestial bodies are, in a certain
respect, immutable, and not adapted to receive anything from inferior natures, nor to be affected by
the mutation arising from generation, and the disorder which occurs in the sublunary regions. Their
immutability is great and venerable, but it is inferior to that of the Gods. For every body possesses
both its being and its perpetual sameness from other precedaneous causes.
Neither is the impassive and the immutable in the Gods such as the immutability of Souls;
for Souls communicate in a certain respect with bodies and are the media of an impartible essence,
and of an essence divided about bodies.
Nor, again, is the immutability of intellectual essences equivalent to that of the Gods; for
Intellect is, indeed, immutable, impassive, and unmingled with secondary natures, but only on
account of its union with the Gods. And in so far as Intellect is uniform it is immutable, but so far
as it is manifold it has something which is more excellent and something which is subordinate, in
itself.
But the Gods, alone, having established their unions according to this transcendency of
being, are immutable dominations, are primary, and are impassive. For there is nothing in them
which is not hyparxis and one. The unities of the Gods unite all multitudes; they deify everything
which participates of them, receive nothing from their participants, and do not diminish their own
proper union because of the participation. Hence, also, the Gods being everywhere, are similarly
exempt from all things, contain all things, and are vanquished by none.
III. In the third place, the universe is said to subsist in a state of invariable sameness, so far
as it is allotted an order in itself which is always preserved indissoluble; but, at the same time, it
possesses a corporeal form and therefore is not destitute of mutation.
The order of the Soul, likewise, is rightly said to have an essence perpetually established in
sameness; for it is entirely impassive in its essence, but it has its energies extended into time, and at
different times it understands different Intelligibles.
Intellect is said both to subsist and to understand with invariable and perpetual sameness,
establishing, at once, in Eternity, its essence, powers, and energies. However, through the multitude
of its intellections, and through the variety of intelligible species and genera, there is not only a
sameness but also a difference of subsistence in Intellect (Comment 4).
Hence a perpetual sameness of subsistence is primarily in the Gods alone, and is especially
inherent in them.
The Gods, therefore, possess in themselves the causes of an eternally invariable sameness of
subsistence, and guard with immutable sameness their own proper hyparxis.—Book I., Ch. 19.
Comment 4.—For, “every Intellect being a plenitude of forms, one Intellect contains more universal, but
another more partial forms; and the superior Intellect contains more universally the things which those posterior to them
contain more partially. But the inferior Intellects contain more partially the things which those that are prior to them
more universally.”—Proposition CLXXVII, “Proclus’ Metaphysical Elements.”
(2) The Simplicity of the Gods. In the next place let us consider what power the Simplicity
of the Gods possesses; for, Socrates observes, a Divine Nature does not admit of that which is
various and multiform and which appears different at different times, but the uniform and the
simple are to be referred to Divinity. Each of the Gods, therefore, remains simply in his own form.
What then shall we conclude concerning this simplicity? It is not such as may be defined as
one in number. Nor is it such as that simplicity which is in many things according to an arranged
species or genus; for these, indeed, are more simple than the individuals in which they are inherent,
but are replete with variety, communicating with Matter and receiving the diversities of material
natures.
Nor is it such as the form of Nature; for Nature is divided about bodies, verges to corporeal
masses, emits many powers about the composition which is subject to it; and, indeed, although
more simple than bodies, has an essence mingled with their variety.
Nor is it such as the simplicity of the Soul; for the Soul, subsisting as a medium between an
impartible essence and an essence which is divided about bodies, communicates with both
extremes, and by reason of that is multiform in its nature when conjoined with things subordinate,
but its head is established on high, and according to this it is allied to Intellect and participates in the
Divine.
Nor, again, is the Simplicity of the Gods such as that of Intellect. For every Intellect,
although impartible and uniform, yet, at the same time, possesses multitude and progression; by
which it is evident that it has a habitude to secondary natures, to itself, and about itself. Intellect is
also in itself, and is not only uniform, but also multiform, and, as it is said, a one-manyness.
But the Gods have their hyparxis defined in one Simplicity alone, being exempt from all
multitude and transcending all division and interval, or habitude to secondary natures, and all
composition. They are, indeed, in inaccessible places, extended above the whole of things, and
eternally abiding beyond all beings; but the illuminations proceeding from them to secondary
natures, being mingled in many places with the participants, which are composite and various, are
received according to the peculiarity of each.
But it is necessary that the nature of that Principle which generates things that are multiform
should be simple and should precede what is generated in the same manner as the uniform and
single precedes the multiform and many.
If, therefore, the Gods are the cause of all composition, and produce from themselves the
variety of beings, it is certainly necessary that the unity of their nature, which is generative of the
whole of things, should have its subsistence in perfect simplicity. For as incorporeal causes precede
bodies; as immoveable causes precede things that are moved; and as impartible causes precede all
partible natures; so, after the same manner, uniform intellectual powers precede multiform natures,
unmingled powers precede things that are mingled together, and simple powers precede things of a
variegated nature.—Book I., Ch. 19.
(3) The Love of the Gods. In the next place let us consider the Beautiful; what it is, and
how it primarily subsists in the Gods. It is rightly said to be boniform beauty, intelligible beauty,
and to be more ancient than intellectual beauty; to be Beauty itself, and the cause of beauty to all
beings.
The Beauty of the Gods is separate from the beauty which is apparent in corporeal masses;
from the symmetry which is in these; from the elegance of Soul; and from Intellectual splendour. It
subsists in the Intelligible Place of Survey, proceeds from thence to all the Choirs of the Gods,
illuminates their super-essential unities, and all the essences suspended from these unities.
As, therefore, through the first Goodness, all the Gods are boniform; and through Intelligible
Wisdom They have an ineffable knowledge established above Intellect, thus also, through the
Summit of Beauty, everything Divine is lovely.
For from thence all the Gods derive beauty, and, being filled with it, They fill the natures
posterior to themselves, inspiring them with love for the divine, and pouring supernally on all things
the divine effluxion of beauty.
Such, therefore, is Divine Beauty, the supplier of divine hilarity, familiarity, and friendship.
Through this the very Gods are united to and rejoice in each other, in their communications and in
their mutual replenishings.
Plato delivers three indications of this Beauty:—in the Banquet, indeed, denominating it the
“Delicate”; for the Perfect and that which is most blessed accedes to the Beautiful through the
participation of Goodness. He says, in that dialogue: “That which is truly beautiful is delicate,
perfect, and most blessed.” One of the indications of the Beautiful, therefore, is the Delicate. But
another indication may be assumed from the Phaedrus, namely, the “Splendid”; for attributing this
to the Beautiful, Plato says: “It was then we were permitted to behold the Splendid Beauty shining
upon us”; adding afterwards “Beauty alone has this allotment, to be most splendid and most
lovely.”
Another indication of Beauty is that it is the “Object of Love.” In many other places Plato
shows that the Inspiration of Love is conversant with the Beautiful, defining and suspending love
from the Monad of Beauty (Comment 5).
Because Beauty converts and moves all things to itself, causes them to energize
enthusiastically, and recalls them through love, it is the Object of Love, being the leader of the
whole amatory series, exciting all things to itself through desire and wonder.
Again, because it extends to secondary natures, plenitudes from itself, in conjunction with
joy and divine felicity, enflaming and elevating all things, and pouring on them illuminations from
on high, it is the Delicate.
And because it bounds this triad of indications, and covers as with a veil the ineffable union
of the Gods, bathes, as it were, in the light of forms, causes Intelligible Light to shine forth, and
announces the occult nature of Goodness, it is denominated the Splendid, lucid and manifest.
The Goodness of the Gods is supreme and most united; their Wisdom is parturient with
Intelligible Light and the prototypes; but their Beauty is established in the highest archetypes, is the
luminous precursor of Divine Light, and is the more splendid and more lively to contemplate and to
embrace than every luciferous essence, and when it is approached it inspires divine awe and
wonder.
As a result of these three indications of the Beauty of the Gods it follows that the natures
which are filled with their effects should necessarily be converted to and conjoined with each of the
three through kindred media. For different things are filled by this triad through different media,
and different powers are converted to different perfections of the Gods. Abut, as Plato frequently
asserts, it is manifest that the cause which congregates all secondary nature to Divine Beauty,
which familiarizes them with it, is the cause of their being filled with it and of their derivation from
thence, is nothing else than Love, which eternally unites all according to the Supernal Beauty of the
Gods.—Book I., Ch. 24.
Comment 5.—The Beauty of the Gods is that which “delights the Soul.” As the Delicate it delights the Soul’s
spiritual taste; as the Splendid, it delights the Soul’s spiritual vision; and as the Lovely it delights the Soul’s spiritual
touch, even as the touch of the lover thrills the being of the loved one.
THE THEOLOGY OF PLATO
FROM PROCLUS
IV. THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE GODS.*
(1) The Truth of the Gods. The next consideration is that concerning the Truth which is in
the Gods, and the fact that a Divine Nature is without error, and is neither the cause of deception
nor ignorance in man or in any other being.
The Truth of the Gods is exempt from that truth which consists in words, for so far as this
truth is composite, it is in a certain respect mingled with its contrary (Comment 1).
The Truth of the Gods also is exempt from the Truth of the Soul, whether the latter is
surveyed in opinions or in sciences, so far as it is in a certain respect divisible and is not in real
being itself, but is assimilated to, and co-harmonized with reality; and so far as it requires processes
for its perfection, it falls short of that Truth, which is eternally stable, immutable, and of a primary
characteristic (Comment 2).
The Truth of the Gods likewise is exempt from the Truth of Intellect, because, although this
subsists according to essence (that is essentially) and is said to be, and is, in real being through the
power of sameness, yet again, through difference, it is separated from the essence of the Gods, and
preserves its own peculiar hypostasis (Comment 3).
The Truth of the Gods consists in their indivisible union and all-perfect communion; and
through this, their ineffable knowledge surpasses all other knowledge; indeed, all secondary species
of knowledge depends upon them for an appropriate perfection. This Divine Knowledge
comprehends all beings, and all knowable things, according to an ineffable union. And through this
the Gods know all things at once,—wholes and parts, being and non-being, things eternal and things
temporal; not after the same manner as Intellect, which knows parts by universals, and non-being by
being; but they know all things immediately, in general and in particular, necessary and contingent,
even to an infinity of contingencies.
The Truth of the Gods, and the mode of their knowledge concerning all things that have a
subsistence in any respect whatsoever, is quite ineffable and incomprehensible to the projected
energies of the human Intellect; this mode is known to the Gods themselves alone (Comment 4).
Comment 1.—Divine Truth is essentially unitive and infinite, but when expressed by words it is multiplex and
finite. All errors are partitive truths taken out of their proper relation with Integral Truth. Finite words cannot represent
infinite truths; hence, in this sense, they are mingled with error.
Comment 2.—The Dianoetic Mind, whereby the Soul surveys Truth, whether in science, philosophy, or
otherwise, in so far as it proceeds through successive stages of reasoning processes, is not stable, but is perpetually
passing on to more and more comprehensive conceptions.
Comment 3.—Intellect, in the Proclian sense, is that which knows Truth by Spiritual Intuition both in its
sameness and in its difference, or, in other words, both in its universal and its particular aspects; but it knows the latter
through the former.
Comment 4.—It is possible for the finite to attain to an ever increasing (continued on next page)
* The previous articles of this Series were:—I. The First Principle and the Gods; II. The Goodness of the Gods;
and III. The Beauty of the Gods.
The excellence of Intellect is to be admired, and its knowledge of all things, of individuals,
of things supra-natural, and of intellectual paradigms; but infinitely more admirable is the
knowledge of the Gods. For Intellect itself is produced by them (Comment 5).
All things depend upon the Gods alone; and real Truth is with Them, Who know all things
unically. On this account by supernal inspiration the Gods teach all beings who are able to receive
Their illuminations. For since They Themselves are transcendently exempt from all beings—
whether eternal or temporal in nature—They possess a transcendent knowledge of each and all
things, according to one united truth.
If there is any error in what Plato describes as “divine inspirations or revelations,” this does
not originate in the Gods, but is a consequence of the disposition of the recipients, of the nature of
the vehicles, or the places, or the times, of the revelations (Comment 6). For all these contribute to
a participation of divine knowledge, and when they are appropriately co-adapted to the Gods, they
receive a pure illumination of the Truth which is established in Them. But when they are separated
from the Gods through inaptitude, and become discordant, then they obscure the divine Truth which
proceeds from Them. The Gods are always the suppliers of Truth, and those natures who are
illuminated by Them, are necessarily their lawful participants. But the Eye of the Soul is not at first
strong enough to behold the full radiance of Truth.
Plato also celebrates this Truth, which subsists primarily in the Gods, as the Leader to Them
of every Good, and likewise of every Good to men. For even as the Truth which is in Soul conjoins
it to Intellect (Spirit), and as Intellectual (spiritual) Truth conducts all the intellectual or spiritual
Orders to the ONE; thus also, the Truth of the Gods unites the Divine Unities to the Fountain of all
Good, with which, being conjoined, They are filled with all boniform Power. For everywhere the
hyparxis of Truth has a cause which is collective of multitude into unity (Comment 7); and for this
reason the Light proceeding from the Good, which conjoins Intellect with the Intelligible, is
denominated Truth, by Plato. This characteristic property, therefore, which unites and binds
together the natures that fill, and the natures that are filled, according to all the Orders of the Gods,
must originate supernally and proceed as far as the last of things.—Book I., Ch. 20.
Comment 4.—(Cont.)
knowledge of the nature of the Infinite, but it is impossible for the finite to become the Infinite; hence the mode by
which the Infinite operates is for ever incomprehensible. In like manner, the Soul may realize more and more the
nature of the Truth of the Gods—Who are Infinite—but the mode by which they know all things simultaneously in all
their possible and imaginable aspects, is necessarily beyond the Soul’s highest attainments.
Comment 5.—Intellectual Paradigms are subjective and spiritual Ideas or universal principles; they constitute
the highest mode of comprehending truth. But the Gods contain the One Idea which is Absolute Truth Itself. In them
the Knower—Intellect—and the Known—the Intelligible are one. Therefore, Intellect is said to be produced by them.
Comment 6.—According to Plato, there are four kinds of divine Inspiration or Revelation, any one of which
may be the means of uniting the Soul with the Gods, namely:— the Inspiration of Love; of Prophecy or Knowledge; of
Theurgy or Sacred Telestic Concerns; and of Music or harmony in its widest significance.
Comment 7.—The Hyparxis of Truth is the very principle of Truth Itself, by which Truth is what it is. By the
application of this principle, partitive expressions of truth are brought into their right relationships with Integral and
Universal Truth.
(2) The Wisdom of the Gods. But again, Truth is certainly the Leader to, and that which
establishes beings in, divine Wisdom; with which Intellect being filled, possesses a knowledge of
real being, and by which Soul, through participation, energizes intellectually.
For the full participation of true Wisdom is effected through Divine Truth, since this
everywhere illuminates intellective natures and conjoins them with the objects of intellection, even
also, as Truth is that which primarily unites Intellect with the Intelligible.—Book I., Ch. 24.
Wisdom is allotted a second order, being the Intelligence of the Gods, or rather the hyparxis
of Their Intelligence (Comment 8). For Intelligence, indeed, is intellectual knowledge which is
united to the object of knowledge and the intelligible union of the Gods.
Plato especially surveys this in the triad of the Beautiful, the Wise, and the Good, affirming
that Wisdom is the plenitude of that which is known, and that it neither seeks, nor investigates, but
possesses the Intelligible. Hence the Gods do not philosophize, nor desire to become Wise, for they
are eternally Wise. Therefore, that which philosophizes is imperfect and indigent of Truth; but that
which is divinely Wise is full and not indigent, having eternally everything present to it, and
therefore having no unfulfilled desires. But Divine Plenitude and Goodness are pursued by the
philosopher. In the Republic, Plato considers Wisdom as that which is generative of Truth and of
Intellect; to the Soul, indeed, the ascent to divine Plenitude is accomplished through Knowledge,
but to Gods, Intellect is present because of the fullness of their Knowledge. For the progressions of
the Gods do not proceed as from an imperfect nature to the perfect, but as from a self-perfect
hyparxis, power proceeds which is prolific of inferior natures.
In the Theaetetus, Plato indicates that Wisdom is perfective of things imperfect, and that it
calls forth the latent and concealed intelligence in the Soul (Comment 9).
It is evident, therefore, that Wisdom is triadic; it is the fullness of being and of truth; it is
generative of intellectual truth; and it is perfective of intellectual natures that are in energy.
Hence, in like manner, the Wisdom of the Gods is indeed full of divine Goodness; it
generates divine Truth; and it perfects all things posterior to itself.—Book I., Ch. 23.
(3) The Faith of the Gods. But what is it that unites the Soul to the GOOD?
What is it that causes a cessation of all-various energy and motion?
What is it that establishes all divine natures in the first and ineffable Unity of Goodness?
And how does it come to pass that every nature when established in that which is prior to
itself, according to the Good which is in it, again establishes things posterior to itself according to
the same cause?
It is, in short, the Faith of the Gods, which ineffably unites all the genera of the Gods, and of
Angels, and of happy Souls to the GOOD.
Comment 8.—If Truth is that which is primarily knowable, then Wisdom may be considered as that which is
the primary power of knowing, hence it is here called the Intelligence of the Gods. But in another sense, Wisdom is
before Truth, since it knows that which is knowable; thus Plato speaks of Wisdom as generative of Truth.
Comment 9.—A Philosopher, therefore, who pursues Truth for the sake of Truth and as a means of
purification, is truly a lover of wisdom, as the name denotes.
For it is necessary to approach the Good, neither gnostically, nor imperfectly, but by giving
ourselves up to the Divine Light, closing the eyes of the Soul, and after this manner, becoming
established in the unknown and occult Unity of Real Being (Comment 10).
For such a kind of Faith as this is more ancient than the gnostic energy, not only in the Soul,
but with the Gods themselves, since according to this Faith all the Gods are united, and all their
powers and progressions are uniformly collected about one centre.
If, however, it be requisite to give a definition of this faith, let it not be supposed that it is
such a kind as that which is concerned with the wandering about sensible natures, for this falls short
of knowledge and much more of the truth of real being.
But the Faith of the Gods surpasses all knowledge, and, according to the highest union,
conjoins secondary natures with those that are primary.
Neither is this faith of a similar species with the belief in common conceptions, for these are
accepted prior to all reasoning; and the knowledge of them is divisible, therefore by no means
equivalent to divine union. Neither should it be affirmed that the energy of Intellect is the same as
the Faith of the Gods. For intellectual energy is multiform, and is separated from the objects of
intellection through difference; and, in short, it is intellectual activity about the Intelligible. But it is
necessary that Divine Faith, by its very nature, should be uniform and quiescent, being perfectly
established in the haven of Goodness. For neither is anything else among beings so credible and
stable, and so exempt from all ambiguity, divisible apprehension, and motion, as the GOOD. For
through this, Intellect embraces another union more ancient than intellectual energy, and, in like
manner, Soul considers the variety and splendour of intellectual forms as noting in comparison with
that transcendency of the GOOD by which it surpasses the whole of things.
This Faith, in fact, dismisses intellectual perception, running back, as it were, to its own
hyparxis; but it always pursues, tends to, and aspires after the GOOD, hastening to embosom It, and
to give itself to This alone, among all things, without hesitation.
All things, indeed, possess, innately, this one inflexible and ineffable tendency to the
GOOD, which is the one sure Goal of all beings (Comment 11).
This, also, is especially the object of belief to all beings, and, because of the union it effects
with the divine, it is denominated Faith by theologists; and not by them only, but likewise by Plato,
who proclaims, in the Laws, the alliance of this Faith with Truth and Love. He asserts that the lover
of falsehood is not to be believed, and that he who is not to be believed is void of friendship and
love. Hence, it follows that the lover of Truth is worthy of belief, and he who is worthy of belief is
well adapted to friendship and love. From these things, by analogy, divine Truth, Faith, and Love
may be surveyed, and by a reasoning process, their stable communion with each other may be
comprehended. Plato
Comment 10.—At first it may appear rather singular to speak of Faith as an attribute of the Gods, but inasmuch
as God is giving Himself unceasingly to His Creatures, through His Eternal Emanations—the Gods—and since Faith is
that attribute which gives without question or consideration of recompense, for this reason Faith may be predicated of
Deity; and in so far as man energizes according to this divine Faith, he follows, or imitates, the divine mode of activity
instead of the human. Faith, for Proclus, is an ineffable state which opens the Soul directly to beatific vision.
Comment 11.—For, without exception, all things perpetually and without ceasing, pursue that which is good
according to their own prevailing tendencies and conceptions, even although the species of goodness, which is good to
them, is relatively evil in comparison with the Absolute GOOD.
also affirms that the virtue of Fidelity conciliates all disagreements. Hence, Faith is the cause of
union, communion, and quietude or repose.
And if there is such a power as this in the Soul, it is by a much greater priority in the Gods
Themselves. For as Plato speaks of a certain divine temperance, justice, and wisdom, how is it
possible that Faith, which connectedly comprehends the whole order of virtues, should not also
subsist with the Gods?
Briefly, there are three things which replenish Divine Natures and which are the sources of
plenitude to all the superior choirs of Being, namely, Goodness, Wisdom, and Beauty. And, again,
there are three things, secondary to the above, but pervading all the divine orders, which collect
together the Natures that are filled, and these are Faith, Truth, and Love (Comment 12).
All things are redeemed through these and are conjoined with their primary principles;
some, indeed, through the inspiration of Love; others through divine philosophy; and others through
theurgic power, which is more excellent than all human wisdom, and which comprehends prophetic
Good, the purifying power of perfect Good, and summarily, all such things as are the effects of
divine possession.—Book I., Ch. 25.
Comment 12.—In his commentaries on the Alcibiades I, Proclus says: “Faith gives all things a solid foundation
in the Good. Truth reveals knowledge in all real existences. Love leads all things to the nature of the Beautiful.”