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Australian Journal of Psychology Vol. 41, No.2, 1989 pp, 131-133
On the Relevance of Philosophy
to Psychological Research:
Fashions Versus Fundamentals
John J, Furedy University of
Toronto
Throughout his paper, and especially in the concluding paragraph, Dr Slezak
communicates quite dearly that he found little to admire in my paper (Furedy, 1988).
and he may well be right to imply that I have not kept up with the details of the latest
fashions in cognitive science. My concern, however, is with more fundamental issues. In
this brief reply, I discuss three distinctions that should clarify important differences in our
concerns.
Psychological Research Versus Psychology
The title of my article referred to "psychological research", whereas his title refers to
"psychology" The difference is important. The former refers to enquiry that relies
predominantly on controlled observation to resolve disputes. These observations are usually
based on experiments that manipulate independent variables, but can also be based on nonexperimental methods, as long as those methods use control for the variables under study.
Psychology, more broadly conceived, includes areas where the enquiry is less empirically
oriented. Psychoanalysis, spate of cognitive psychology, and much of cognitive science may
all involve observations, but these observations are not viewed as critical in the resolution of
disputes concerning rival theoretical positions.
Testing Theories Versus Making Metaphors/ Models: Scientific Procedures Versus
Sectarian Apologetics
The "computational or information processing approach" has, in Dr Slezak's own words,
"become the dominant orthodoxy (italics added) among philosophers in recent times" (p. 127).
Fodor, who is one of the workers said to provide "rigorous, technically informed articulation"
is approvingly described as "the Pope of MIT High Church Computationalism" (p. 127, italics
added]. The theological flavour of these sorts of comments is obvious.
Similarly, the cited passage from Johnson-Laird (p. 128) smacks of arguing from authority.
Based on passages such as those in Revelation, some theologians have argued that Christ is
both the alpha and the omega, and Johnson-Laird tells us that the computer is the “last
metaphor”. But last, second-last, or whatever
The preparation of this reply was supported in part by a grant by the National Sciences and Engineering
Council of Canada. I am indebted to G, B, Biederman, M. Feak, and Christine Furedy for comments.
Requests for reprints should be sent to John J Furedy, Department of Psychology. University of
Toronto, Toronto. Ontario. Canada M5S l A 1 .
Australian Journal of Psychology Vol. 41, No.2, 1989 pp, 131-133
132
JJ. Furedy
the ordinal position, the point remains that the computational position is a metaphor,
analogy, or model, rather than a genuine, testable theory. Note also that the same passage
argues for the computational "thesis' on the grounds that "no one has yet succeeded in
refuting" it. However, just as among psychoanalysts, the Freudian thesis had considerable
"status" but little testability, so it appears for the computational “thesis”.
The distinction, in the end. is whether one is interested in actually measuring cognitive
processes, and hence in also differentiating them from other psychological processes (e.g..
Furedy. 1989a, 1989b, 1989c; Furedy & Riley, 1987, 1989; Furedy, Shulhan, & Randall,
1989; Michell, 1988), or whether the interest is only in modelling these processes in such a
way that they are, by definition, said to be the "last metaphor for the mind". These arc
quite different interests, and in my view, the latter approach does not, in the long run,
contribute to psychological research, just because "it is not specific enough to serve as a
genuine hypothesis" (Furedy, 1988. p. 77).
Differing Conceptions of Philosophy
The philosophy that I suggested was relevant for "research and professional psychologists"
(Furedy, 1988. p. 7I) is the 250 decades of reflection on fundamental issues. This contrasts
with the two-decades view said by Dr Slezak to "have been incorporated into the practice
of philosophers" (p.123). This view is grounded on quotations from philosophers who
report that "in the mid-seventies I discovered that my patience with most mainstream
philosophy had run out" (p. 124), and Dr Slezak also asserts that "with the wisdom of
hindsight, philosophers now look with self-deprecating scorn at their own former
concerns" (p. 124), But in addition to these "development in the discipline during the past
twenty years or so" being rather brief relative to the 2.500 years or so that philosophy has
been around, it is also not the case that all philosophers are convinced that this particular
"revolution" is soundly based. For example, to take a writer whom I cited in Furedy (1988.
p. 74). Heil (1981) has argued in Mind that cognitive psychology of the sort espoused by
Fodor (1975) rests on a mistake, and Heil, as far as I know, has not had his philosophical
licence revoked.
Philosophy, more broadly conceived, deals with reflections an fundamental issues, and
those reflections are relevant for "research and professional psychologists" because both
the conduct and evaluation of research is influenced by one's (examined or unexamined)
position on these issues, i have more recently provided an autobiographical illustration of
how such philosophical concerns, and the adoption of some conclusions espoused by
Anderson, can influence a particular research programme (Furedy, 1989c), Another more
thorough illustration for the implications of Andersonian realism for current cognitive
research has been provided by Michel I (1988), while Baker (1986) has provided a
philosopher's perspective on the influence of Anderson's philosophical thinking. Finally, a
reviewer of Baker's book has suggested that "Anderson's philosophy, especially in its
critical aspects, remains a stimulating and expansive body of thought, with clear
contemporary import in its censure of those idealist and relativist theses which seem to be
enjoying another of their periodic resurgences" (McLaughlin, 1989, p. 95). So the fact that
in Slezak and Albury's (1988) book. "Anderson's philosophical concerns are nowhere to be
seen" (p. 10) is of relevance only to those who believe that it is more important to have an
impact on the thinking of some current psychologists and philosophers, than to propose
ideas which, in the long run are sound.
Australian Journal of Psychology Vol. 41, No.2, 1989 pp, 131-133
133
JJ. Furedy
In my view, then, provided one keeps the above sorts of distinctions in mind, it
seems that at least I two points are clear. First, philosophical considerations need to be
taken up "if we wish the research enterprise to be genuinely progressive and
cumulative from an epistemological point of view" (Furedy, 1988, p. 76). Second,
despite its low citation count in the current literature, Andersonian, "Australian"
(Baker, 1986) or "direct" (Michell, 1988) realism does have something of interest to
say to psychological researchers, to those researchers, that is, who are more concerned
with progress in understanding the principles of behaviour than with being at the
cutting edge of current cognitive fashions.
References
Baker, A. J. (1986}. Australian realism: The systematic philosophy of John Anderson.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fodor, J. (1975). The language of thought. Sew York: Crowell.
Furedy, J. J. (1988), On the relevance of philosophy for psychological research: A
preliminary analysis of some influences of Andersonian realism. Australian Journal of
Psychology, 40, 71-77.
Furedy, J. J. (1989a). Arguments for and proposed tests of a revised S-R contiguity
reinforcement theory of human Pavlovian autonomic conditioning: Some contracognitive claims. Biological Psychology, 27, 137-152.
Furedy, J. J. (1989b). Towards evidentially based, non-circular explanations of human
Pavlovian autonomic conditioning as a genuine phenomenon: A realist perspective,
Biological Psychology. 27. 191-194.
Furedy, J. J. (I989c). On the relevance of philosophy for psychological research: Some
autobiographical speculations concerning the influence of Andersonian realism.
Australian Psychologist, 24. 93-100.
Furedy, J. J.. & Riley, D. M. (1989). Human Pavlovian autonomic conditioning and
the cognitive paradigm. In G. Davey (Ed.), Cognitive processes and Pavlov tan
conditioning in humans (pp. 1-25). New York; Wiley.
Furedy, J. J., & Riley, D. M. 11989). Propositional and response processes as
distinguishable and equally important aspects of conditioning: Some clarifications.
Biological Psychology, in press.
Furedy, J. J., Shulhan, D. & Randall, D.C. (1989) Human Pavlovian HR decelerative
conditioning with negative till as US: A review of some S-R, stimulus-substitution
evidence. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 7, 19-23,
Heil, J, (1981). Does cognitive psychology rest on a mistake? Mind, 90. 321-342.
McLaughlin, R, (1989). [Review of A. J. Baker, Australian realism: The systematic
philosophy of John Anderson] Australian Journal of Philosophy, 67. 93-95.
Michel], J. (1988), Maze's direct realism and the character of cognition. Australian
Journal of Psychology, 40, 227-250,
Slezak, P. The relevance of philosophy to psychology: Response to J, Furedy.
Australian Journal of Psychology, 41, 122-130.
Slezak, P., & Albury, W. R, (Eds.), (1988). Computers, brains and minds: Essays in
cognitive science. Dordrecht: Reidel/Kluwer.
Received 3 April 1989.
Australian Journal of Psychology Vol. 41, No, 2, 1989 pp. 131-133