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LEXSTAT 18 U.S.C. 1503
UNITED STATES CODE SERVICE
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TITLE 18. CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PART I. CRIMES
CHAPTER 73. OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
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18 USCS § 1503
§ 1503. Influencing or injuring officer or juror generally
(a) Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavors to influence,
intimidate, or impede any grand or petit juror, or officer in or of any court of the United States, or officer who may be
serving at any examination or other proceeding before any United States magistrate judge or other committing magistrate, in the discharge of his duty, or injures any such grand or petit juror in his person or property on account of any
verdict or indictment assented to by him, or on account of his being or having been such juror, or injures any such officer, magistrate judge, or other committing magistrate in his person or property on account of the performance of his
official duties, or corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs,
or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). If the offense under this section occurs in connection with a trial of a criminal case, and the act
in violation of this section involves the threat of physical force or physical force, the maximum term of imprisonment
which may be imposed for the offense shall be the higher of that otherwise provided by law or the maximum term that
could have been imposed for any offense charged in such case.
(b) The punishment for an offense under this section is-(1) in the case of a killing, the punishment provided in sections 1111 and 1112 [18 USCS §§ 1111 and 1112];
(2) in the case of an attempted killing, or a case in which the offense was committed against a petit juror and in
which a class A or B felony was charged, imprisonment for not more than 20 years, a fine under this title, or both; and
(3) in any other case, imprisonment for not more than 10 years, a fine under this title, or both.
HISTORY:
(June 25, 1948, ch 645, § 1, 62 Stat. 769; Oct. 12, 1982, P.L. 97-291, § 4(c), 96 Stat. 1253; Sept. 13, 1994, P.L.
103-322, Title VI, § 60016, Title XXXIII, § 330016(1)(K), 108 Stat. 1974, 2147; Oct. 1, 1996, P.L. 104-214, § 1(3),
110 Stat. 3017.)
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
Prior law and revision:
Based on title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 241 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 135, 35 Stat. 1113; June 8, 1945, ch. 178, § 1, 59
Stat. 234).
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18 USCS § 1503
The phrase "other committing magistrate" was substituted for "officer acting as such commissioner" in order to clarify meaning.
Minor changes were made in phraseology.
Amendments:
1982. Act Oct. 12, 1982 (effective upon enactment, as provided by § 9(a) of such Act, which appears as 18 USCS §
1512 note), in the section heading, substituted "or juror" for ", juror or witness"; and in the text, substituted "grand" for
"witness, in any court of the United States or before any United States commissioner or other committing magistrate, or
any grand" and deleted "injures any party or witness in his person or property on account of his attending or having attended such court or examination before such officer, commissioner, or other committing magistrate, or on account of
his testifying or having testified to any matter pending therein, or" following "discharge of his duty, or".
1994. Act Sept. 13, 1994 designated the existing provisions as subsec. (a) and, in such subsection as so designated, substituted "punished as provided in subsection (b)." for "fined not more than $ 5,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both." and substituted "magistrate judge" for "commissioner" in two places; and added subsec. (b).
Such Act further purported to substitute "under this title" for "not more than $ 5,000"; however, because of prior
amendments, the amendment could not be executed.
1996. Act Oct. 1, 1996, in subsec. (a), added the sentence beginning "If the offense under this section occurs . . .".
NOTES:
Related Statutes & Rules:
Sentencing Guidelines for the United States Courts, 18 USCS Appx § 2J1.2.
Bribery of officers, jurors, or witnesses, 18 USCS § 201.
Influencing juror or witness as criminal contempt, 18 USCS § 401.
Wire or oral communications, authorization for interception, 18 USCS § 2516.
Corrupt or forcible interference with administration of Internal Revenue laws, 26 USCS § 7212.
This section is referred to in 18 USCS §§ 201, 1039, 1512, 1961, 2516, 3142; 29 USCS § 1111.
Research Guide:
Federal Procedure:
25 Moore's Federal Practice (Matthew Bender 3d ed.), ch 618, Place of Prosecution and Trial § 618.04.
8A Fed Proc L Ed, Criminal Procedure §§ 22:60, 250, 492.
9B Fed Proc L Ed, Criminal Procedure § 22:1811.
10A Fed Proc L Ed, Discovery and Depositions § 26:657.
20A Fed Proc L Ed, Internal Revenue § 48:1594.
33A Fed Proc L Ed, Trial §§ 77:221-223.
33A Fed Proc L Ed, Witnesses §§ 80:354, 357, 367-369.
Am Jur:
8A Am Jur 2d, Bail and Recognizance § 62.
12 Am Jur 2d, Bribery § 2.
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18 USCS § 1503
31A Am Jur 2d, Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 120.
35A Am Jur 2d, Federal Tax Enforcement § 1215.
38 Am Jur 2d, Grand Jury § 32.
58 Am Jur 2d, Obstructing Justice §§ 1, 5, 7, 9-15, 17-19, 28, 34, 40, 75, 88.
60A Am Jur 2d, Pensions and Retirement Funds § 420.
Forms:
16 Bender's Federal Practice Forms, Form CrR14:13, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
17 Bender's Federal Practice Forms, Form CrR46:2, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
11 Am Jur Pl & Pr Forms (Rev ed), Federal Criminal Procedure §§ 32, 33.
Criminal Law and Practice:
2 Criminal Constitutional Law (Matthew Bender), ch 6, Grand Jury Procedures § 6.03.
1 Criminal Defense Techniques (Matthew Bender), ch 1, Bail Reform Act of 1984 § 1.03.
3 Criminal Defense Techniques (Matthew Bender), ch 56, Defense of a Securities Case §§ 56.02, 56.06.
1 Business Crime (Matthew Bender), ch 3, Trial Preparation; Problems of Investigation and Representation P 3.04.
Bankruptcy:
1 Collier on Bankruptcy (Matthew Bender 15th ed. rev), ch 7, Bankruptcy Crimes PP 7.07A, 7.08.
Immigration:
8 Immigration Law and Procedure (rev. ed.), ch 111, Civil Liabilities and Criminal Offenses § 111.08.
Corporate and Business Law:
5 Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation, 2nd Edition (Matthew Bender), ch 92, Full-Scale Investigations by the Department of Justice § 92.06.
1 Antitrust Counseling and Litigation Techniques (Matthew Bender), ch 3, Information Management and Document
Control § 3.07.
5 Antitrust Counseling and Litigation Techniques (Matthew Bender), ch 53, Responding to a Grand Jury Investigation §§ 53.03, 53.04.
5 Antitrust Counseling and Litigation Techniques (Matthew Bender), ch 54, Responding to a Subpoena Duces Tecum § 54.02.
5 Antitrust Counseling and Litigation Techniques (Matthew Bender), ch 56, Counseling the Antitrust Grand Jury
Witness § 56.04.
6 Securities Law Techniques (Matthew Bender), ch 88, Securities Enforcement Investigations § 88.03.
Federal Taxation:
5 Rabkin & Johnson, Federal, Income, Gift and Estate Taxation (Matthew Bender), ch 88, Criminal Penalties and
Procedures § 88.01.
Annotations:
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18 USCS § 1503
Corrupt or Forcible Interference with Administration of Internal Revenue Laws Under 26 U.S.C.A. § 7212(a) [26
USCS § 7212(a)]. 26 ALR Fed 2d 229.
Construction and application of 18 USCS § 1503 making it a federal offense to endeavor to influence, intimidate,
impede, or injure witness, juror, or officer in federal court, or to obstruct the due administration of justice. 20 ALR Fed
731.
Meaning of term "corruptly" for purposes of 18 USCS § 1503 making it a federal offense to corruptly endeavor to
influence, intimidate, impede, or injure witness, juror, or officer in federal court, or to obstruct the due administration of
justice. 62 ALR Fed 303.
Venue of prosecution for unlawfully influencing, intimidating, or impeding a federal officer, witness, or juror, under
18 USCS § 1503. 64 ALR Fed 678.
Defenses to State Obstruction of Justice Charge Relating to Interfering with Criminal Investigation or Judicial Proceeding. 87 ALR5th 597.
Texts:
3 Benedict on Admiralty, Marine Oil Pollution § 114.
1A Environmental Law Practice Guide (Matthew Bender), ch 6B, Document Retention Issues in Environmental Law
§ 6B.13.
2A Environmental Law Practice Guide (Matthew Bender), ch 12C, Criminal Enforcement § 12C.04.
Law Review Articles:
Grindler; Jones. Please Step Away from the Shredder and the "Delete" Key: §§ 80 and 1102 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act. 41 Am Crim L Rev 67, Winter 2004.
Sanchirico. Detection Avoidance. 81 NYU L Rev 1331, October 2006.
Interpretive Notes and Decisions:
I.IN GENERAL 1. Generally 2. Constitutionality 3. Purpose 4. Nature of crime 5. Construction 6. Relationship with
other federal laws 7.--18 USCS § 401 8.--18 USCS § 1512 9. Relationship with state laws 10. Civil liability 11. Collateral disciplinary proceedings
II.ELEMENTS OF CRIME
A.In General 12. Generally 13. "Corrupt" or "corruptly" 14.--Payment of money; bribery 15. Court of United
States 16.--Military court 17.--Territorial court 18. Endeavor 19.--Materiality of success 20. Proceedings covered
21.--Civil actions 22.--Grand jury 23. Pendency of proceedings 24.--Grand jury 25. Influence, obstruct, or impede due
administration of justice 26. Injure 27. Intent 28. Knowledge 29. Threat or force
B.Persons Who May Be Influenced or Injured 30. Court officers 31.--Police officers 32. Grand jurors 33. Petit
jurors 34. Parties 35. Witnesses
III.PARTICULAR ACTS AS CONSTITUTING OFFENSE
A.Influencing, Intimidating, Impeding or Injuring Particular Persons
1.Court Officers 36. Improperly using influence to reduce sentence 37. Public criticism 38. Miscellaneous
2.Jurors 39. Endeavoring to affect deliberations or decisions 40. Miscellaneous
3.Parties 41. Preventing party from appearing at proceedings 42. Preventing party from getting facts 43. Miscellaneous
4.Witnesses 44. Inducing witness to give false, evasive, or incomplete testimony 45.--Injury or threats of injury 46.
Inducing Fifth Amendment invocation 47. Preventing or inducing witness or potential witness from testifying 48. Miscellaneous
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18 USCS § 1503
5.Intermediaries 49. Asking intermediary to influence juror 50. Asking intermediary to influence witness 51.
Miscellaneous
B.Other Particular Acts By Accused 52. Concealment of information 53. Correspondence during proceedings 54.
Destruction or diversion of evidence 55. Falsifying or altering documents 56. False testimony 57. Obtaining or disclosing secret grand jury documents 58. Reprisal 59. Miscellaneous
IV.INCLUDED AND RELATED CRIMES 60. Attempt 61. Conspiracy
V.DEFENSES 62. Double jeopardy 63. Entrapment 64. Immunity 65. Impossibility of success 66. Statute of limitations 67. Miscellaneous
VI.PROCEDURE, PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT
A.In General 68. Jurisdiction 69. Venue 70. Joinder of parties
B.Indictment or Information
1.In General 71. Generally 72. Bill of particulars 73. Joinder and severance of counts 74. Duplicity and multiplicity 75. Surplusage
2.Necessity and Sufficiency of Particular Allegations 76. Conspiracy 77. Corrupt act 78. Details of conduct 79.
Federal action or proceeding influenced 80. Intent, knowledge, or motive 81. Obstructive element 82. Miscellaneous
C.Trial
1.In General 83. Witnesses 84. Remarks or inquiries of judge 85. Remarks of prosecutor 86. Questions of fact or
law
2.Instructions 87. Corruptly 88. Knowledge or intent 89. Miscellaneous
D.Evidence
1.Admissibility 90. Circumstantial evidence 91. Expert testimony 92. Pending indictments 93. Photographs 94.
Prior convictions 95. Prior conduct 96. Recordings 97. Statements and declarations 98. Miscellaneous
2.Sufficiency 99. Generally 100. Endeavor to influence, intimidate, or impede 101.--Success of endeavor 102. Intent or knowledge 103. Miscellaneous
3.Other Matters 104. Burden and standard of proof 105. Presumptions and inferences 106. Variance between indictment and proof
E.Post-trial Matters 107. Verdict 108. Sentencing and punishment 109. New trial 110. Appeal and review
I.IN GENERAL 1. Generally
18 USCS § 1503 makes unlawful any act, committed corruptly, in endeavor to impede or obstruct due administration of justice, and proper criterion to apply to acts is their reasonable tendency to obstruct honest and fair administration of justice. Courtney v United States (1968, CA9 Cal) 390 F2d 521, cert den (1968) 393 US 857, 21 L Ed 2d 126,
89 S Ct 98, reh den (1968) 393 US 992, 21 L Ed 2d 457, 89 S Ct 440.
Although specific provisions of 18 USCS § 1503 relate to tampering, by corruption, threats, or force, with sources
of evidence extrinsic to actor, final all-embracive language proscribes all conduct which corruptly influences, obstructs,
or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, due administration of justice. United States v Cohn (1971,
CA2 NY) 452 F2d 881, cert den (1972) 405 US 975, 31 L Ed 2d 249, 92 S Ct 1196.
18 USCS § 1503 is divided into two parts: (1) its specific language, which forbids influencing, intimidation, or impeding of any witness, juror, or court official, and (2) its concluding omnibus clause, which punishes influencing, obstruction, or impeding of due administration of justice. United States v Howard (1978, CA5 La) 569 F2d 1331, cert
den (1978) 439 US 834, 58 L Ed 2d 130, 99 S Ct 116.
18 USCS § 1503 is criminal statute that does not provide for private cause of action. Forsyth v Humana, Inc. (1997,
CA9 Nev) 114 F3d 1467, 97 CDOS 3865, 97 Daily Journal DAR 6578, 1997-1 CCH Trade Cases P 71818, cert den
(1997) 522 US 996, 118 S Ct 559, 139 L Ed 2d 401, 21 EBC 2376 and affd (1999) 525 US 299, 119 S Ct 710, 142 L Ed
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2d 753, 99 CDOS 516, 99 Daily Journal DAR 585, 22 EBC 2201, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 9631, 1999 Colo J C
A R 379 and (criticized in Flanagan v Allstate Ins. Co. (2007, ND Ill) 2007 US Dist LEXIS 39638).
Court will not issue contempt citation with injunction or protective order to prevent alleged violation of 18 USCS §
1503. Kuang Hung Hu v Morgan (1975, ED NC) 405 F Supp 547.
2. Constitutionality
18 USCS § 1503 is not unconstitutionally vague. United States v Marionneaux (1975, CA5 La) 514 F2d 1244 (ovrld in part as stated in United States v Watson (1989, CA11 Fla) 866 F2d 381) and (ovrld in part on other grounds as
stated in United States v Scrushy (2006, MD Ala) 237 FRD 464).
Given absence of any First Amendment considerations, defendants who were indicted for attempting to sell transcripts of secret grand jury testimony to persons under investigation for suspected violations of federal banking laws,
could not challenge 18 USCS § 1503 as unconstitutionally vague on its face; since omnibus clause of 18 USCS § 1503
clearly proclaims that all obstructions of justice are prohibited, § 1503 gives fair notice of offending conduct in this
case, which is all that constitution requires. United States v Howard (1978, CA5 La) 569 F2d 1331, cert den (1978)
439 US 834, 58 L Ed 2d 130, 99 S Ct 116.
18 USCS § 1503 gives fair notice that it outlaws giving of false testimony before grand jury. United States v Griffin (1979, CA5 Fla) 589 F2d 200, cert den (1979) 444 US 825, 62 L Ed 2d 32, 100 S Ct 48.
Conviction for impeding federal investigation in violation of 18 USCS § 1503 does not violate Fifth Amendment
rights when evidence at trial discloses that defendant has not simply refused to answer federal agent's questions but has
affirmatively conspired and acted to misinform agent. United States v Hawkins (1985, CA11 Fla) 765 F2d 1482, cert
den (1986) 474 US 1103, 88 L Ed 2d 921, 106 S Ct 886.
Obstruction of justice statute (18 USCS § 1503) applies to scheme to transmit secret grand jury information exclusively to suspected grand jury targets and such application is neither overbroad under First Amendment nor void for
vagueness under Fifth Amendment. United States v Jeter (1985, CA6 Ky) 775 F2d 670, cert den (1986) 475 US 1142,
90 L Ed 2d 341, 106 S Ct 1796.
Term "corrupt" in 18 USCS § 1503 was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to juror who divulged secret grand
jury information, where based on his own statements and information provided to him as grand juror, jury could conclude he knew his actions were unlawful. United States v Brenson (1997, CA11 Fla) 104 F3d 1267, 10 FLW Fed C 675,
reh, en banc, den (1997, CA11) 113 F3d 1253 and cert den (1997) 522 US 884, 139 L Ed 2d 148, 118 S Ct 214.
By incorporating word "corruptly," 18 USCS § 1503 does not thereby suffer from unconstitutional vagueness.
United States v Mitchell (1974, DC Dist Col) 397 F Supp 166, affd, en banc (1976, App DC) 181 US App DC 254, 559
F2d 31, 1 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1203, cert den (1977) 431 US 933, 53 L Ed 2d 250, 97 S Ct 2641, reh den (1977) 433 US
916, 53 L Ed 2d 1103, 97 S Ct 2992.
Count of indictment against defendants, individual and corporation, alleging violation of omnibus clause of 18
USCS § 1503 did not require dismissal because statute was not unconstitutionally vague; it did not matter that statute
did not prohibit alleged conduct, i.e., destruction of documents, employed by individual to obstruct justice; it was not
means employed that statute prohibited, but corrupt purpose that motivated conduct. United States v Triumph Capital
Group, Inc. (2003, DC Conn) 260 F Supp 2d 470.
3. Purpose
Purpose of Congress in enacting predecessor to 18 USCS § 152 was not to charge witnesses with duty or liability,
but to protect them and administration of justice from corrupt threatening and intimidating acts by third persons. Smith
v United States (1921, CA8 Ark) 274 F 351.
Predecessor to 18 USCS § 152 was designed to protect witnesses, and protection is extended to time between appearances as witness as well as when actually appearing as witness. Kloss v United States (1935, CA8 Ark) 77 F2d
462.
Predecessor to 18 USCS § 1503 was designed to protect witnesses in federal courts and to prevent miscarriage of
justice by corrupt methods. Broadbent v United States (1945, CA10 Utah) 149 F2d 580; Catrino v United States
(1949, CA9 Mont) 176 F2d 884; United States v Cohen (1962, DC Conn) 202 F Supp 587.
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Last clause of 18 USCS § 1503 is broad catch-all phrase and is all embracive and designed to meet any corrupt
conduct in endeavor to obstruct or interfere with due administration of justice. Falk v United States (1966, CA9 Cal)
370 F2d 472, cert den (1967) 387 US 926, 18 L Ed 2d 982, 87 S Ct 2044 and (superseded by statute as stated in United
States v Simpkins (1986, NMCMR) 22 MJ 924).
18 USCS § 1503 is designed, in same fashion as 18 USCS § 401, to meet any corrupt conduct in endeavor to obstruct or interfere with due administration of justice, and is not merely intended to prohibit conduct directed against participants in judicial proceedings. United States v Walasek (1975, CA3 Pa) 527 F2d 676.
Purpose of 18 USCS § 1503 is to protect not only procedures of criminal system but also its goal to achieve justice;
it is designed to protect witnesses in federal courts and also to prevent miscarriage of justice. United States v Griffin
(1979, CA5 Fla) 589 F2d 200, cert den (1979) 444 US 825, 62 L Ed 2d 32, 100 S Ct 48.
Purpose of 18 USCS § 1503 is to protect individuals who assist in federal investigation or judicial proceeding.
United States v Cuesta (1979, CA5 Fla) 597 F2d 903, cert den (1979) 444 US 964, 62 L Ed 2d 377, 100 S Ct 451, 100 S
Ct 452.
Purpose of 18 USCS § 1503 is to protect participants in federal judicial proceedings and to prevent interference by
corrupt methods with administration of justice. United States v Chandler (1979, CA5 Ga) 604 F2d 972, reh den (1979,
CA5 Ga) 608 F2d 524 and cert dismd (1980) 444 US 1104, 63 L Ed 2d 317, 100 S Ct 1074.
Purpose of 18 USCS § 1503 is to render illegal all interference with judicial functions of United States, and final
clause of statute was added in order to cover those means of interference which draftsmen were not prescient enough to
enumerate. United States v Bonanno (1959, DC NY) 177 F Supp 106, revd on other grounds (1960, CA2 NY) 285 F2d
408.
4. Nature of crime
18 USCS § 1503 is contempt of court statute. United States v Campbell (1972, WD Pa) 350 F Supp 213.
Obstructing justice is offense indictable at common law, as well as by federal statute, as provided by 18 USCS §
1503, and has also been recognized as military offense. United States v Daminger (1960) 30 CMR 826.
Conviction of charge of wilfully, unlawfully, and knowingly conspiring to commit bribery and of charge of bribery
of juror is conviction involving moral turpitude. In re Barron (1971) 155 W Va 98, 181 SE2d 273.
5. Construction
Under rule of ejusdem generis, general words which follow specific words in enumeration of prohibited acts in 18
USCS § 1503 must be construed to embrace only acts similar in nature to those acts enumerated by preceding specific
words. Haili v United States (1958, CA9 Hawaii) 260 F2d 744 (criticized in United States v Novak (2000, CA8 Mo)
217 F3d 566).
18 USCS § 1503 is criminal statute and as such must be strictly construed. United States v Essex (1969, CA6
Tenn) 407 F2d 214; United States v Ryan (1971, CA9 Cal) 455 F2d 728, 20 ALR Fed 719; United States v Scoratow
(1956, DC Pa) 137 F Supp 620.
Since final clause of 18 USCS § 1503 must be strictly construed, manner in which it may be violated "would ordinarily seem to be limited to intimidating actions," as evidenced by earlier specific clauses. United States v Metcalf
(1970, CA9 Wash) 435 F2d 754.
Final clause of 18 USCS § 1503 should be construed to include acts occurring in absence of any personal contact
with juror, witness, or official, and could not be limited to "intimidating actions." United States v Howard (1978, CA5
La) 569 F2d 1331, cert den (1978) 439 US 834, 58 L Ed 2d 130, 99 S Ct 116.
Ejusdem genris cannot be used to restrict second, or omnibus clause, of 18 USCS § 1503, to type of acts prohibited
by first clause. United States v London (1983, CA11 Ga) 714 F2d 1558, 71 ALR Fed 914.
While there are two distinct clauses in 18 USCS § 1503, first, protecting participants in specific judicial proceeding,
and second, preventing miscarriage of justice by corrupt methods in pending federal case, statute must be strictly construed, and under doctrine of ejusdem generis, general words which follow specific words in enumeration of prohibited
acts in section here involved must be construed to embrace only acts similar in nature to those acts enumerated by preceding specific words. United States v Knife (1974, DC SD) 371 F Supp 1345.
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Omnibus clause of 18 USCS § 1503 must be read to proscribe conduct that impedes administration of justice beyond those acts specifically enumerated in first portion of statute. United States v Caron (1982, ED Va) 551 F Supp
662, affd without op (1983, CA4 Va) 722 F2d 739, cert den (1984) 465 US 1103, 80 L Ed 2d 132, 104 S Ct 1602.
6. Relationship with other federal laws
Uttering false statements to FBI agent who might or might not testify before grand jury does not constitute obstruction of justice under 18 USCS § 1503, where it has not been shown that agent acted as arm of grand jury, grand jury had
summoned testimony of agent, or accused knew that his false statements would be provided to grand jury. United States
v Aguilar (1995) 515 US 593, 132 L Ed 2d 520, 115 S Ct 2357, 95 CDOS 4719, 95 Daily Journal DAR 8113, 9 FLW
Fed S 217 (criticized in United States v Watt (1995, DC Dist Col) 911 F Supp 538) and on remand, remanded (1996,
CA9) 80 F3d 329, 96 CDOS 520, 96 Daily Journal DAR 849 (criticized in United States v Ebert (1999, CA4 NC) 1999
US App LEXIS 8453) and (criticized in Boehner v McDermott (1998, DC Dist Col) 1998 US Dist LEXIS 11509).
Offense of endeavoring to procure false testimony under 18 USCS § 1503 differs from offense of subornation of
perjury under 18 USCS § 1622 in that latter crime requires actual procurement of perjury; thus it is not improper to convict defendant of both crimes upon same transaction. Catrino v United States (1949, CA9 Mont) 176 F2d 884.
In general, 18 USCS § 1505 serves purpose in administrative field similar to that of 18 USCS §§ 1503, 1504 in judicial field. Taran v United States (1959, CA8 Minn) 266 F2d 561.
18 USCS § 1503 and 18 USCS § 201 prescribe different conduct and describe 2 separate offenses, separately indictable and separately punishable. United States v De Alesandro (1966, CA2 NY) 361 F2d 694, cert den (1966) 385
US 842, 17 L Ed 2d 74, 87 S Ct 94.
While defendant may have been guilty of contempt or some other federal crime, such facts did not necessarily support 18 USCS § 1503 conviction. United States v Ryan (1971, CA9 Cal) 455 F2d 728, 20 ALR Fed 719.
Indictment under 18 USCS § 1503 for endeavoring to obstruct justice, which is based upon attempt to induce rendering of false testimony, need not satisfy specificity requirements imposed for § 1623 violation. United States v
Friedland (1981, CA3 NJ) 660 F2d 919, 9 Fed Rules Evid Serv 21, cert den (1982) 456 US 989, 73 L Ed 2d 1283, 102 S
Ct 2268.
18 USCS §§ 1501, 1503 are separate criminal offenses. United States v Schaffner (1985, CA6 Ky) 771 F2d 149, 18
Fed Rules Evid Serv 1136.
Obstruction of justice under 18 USCS § 1503 and perjury under 18 USCS § 1623 are separate offenses for which
consecutive sentences may be imposed upon conviction arising out of same act or transaction. United States v Langella (1985, CA2 NY) 776 F2d 1078, cert den (1986) 475 US 1019, 89 L Ed 2d 320, 106 S Ct 1207.
Failure to provide court with documents in compliance with summons and court order was violation of 18 USCS §
1505, since it would have been violation of 18 USCS § 1503, for statutes are similar in language, and cases interpreting
§ 1503 are relevant to construction of § 1505. United States v Laurins (1988, CA9 Cal) 857 F2d 529, 89-1 USTC P
9250, 26 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1346, 63 AFTR 2d 767, cert den (1989) 492 US 906, 109 S Ct 3215, 106 L Ed 2d 565.
Defendant was properly charged with corrupt persuasion of grand jury witness under omnibus clause of 18 USCS §
l503, even though 18 USCS § l5l2 specifically addresses witnesses, since existence of more narrowly tailored statute
does not necessarily prevent prosecution under broader statute, so long as defendant is not punished under both statutes
for same conduct. United States v Kenny (1992, CA4 Va) 973 F2d 339.
Although "corruptly" in 18 USCS § 1505 may be too vague to provide constitutionally adequate notice that it prohibits lying to Congress, anyone who intentionally lies to grand jury is on notice that he may be corruptly obstructing
grand jury's investigation in violation of 18 USCS §§ 1503, 1623, since settings in which two provisions apply are vastly different. United States v Russo (1997, App DC) 322 US App DC 388, 104 F3d 431, 46 Fed Rules Evid Serv 456.
Although 18 USCS § 1621 and 18 USCS § 1503 overlap to some extent, overlap is not valid reason to bar prosecution under either. United States v Cohen (1962, DC Conn) 202 F Supp 587.
Prior to enactment of 18 USCS § 1510 it was not crime to obstruct criminal investigation or inquiry before the initiation of proceedings within scope of § 1503 or 1505; § 1510 was intended to reinforce and expand existing statutory
structure by applying criminal sanctions to interference with criminal investigative process and in relation to §§ 1503
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18 USCS § 1503
and 1505, by their explicit terms, statutes are applicable to different governmental activities as well as separate chronological periods. United States v Mitchell (1973, SD NY) 372 F Supp 1239, app dismd (1973, CA2 NY) 485 F2d 1290.
Defendant's multiplicity argument, challenging charges of obstruction of Grand Jury's investigation in violation of
18 USCS § 1503, and withholding subpoenaed document in violation of 18 USCS § 1512(c)(1), failed as Government
adequately distinguished two counts in abstract; obstruction statutes that were referenced in two counts each incorporated elements that were not present in other. United States v Butler (2004, SD NY) 351 F Supp 2d 121.
Where government contractor claimed company, its subsidiaries, and employees engaged in misconduct, specifically that competitors' employees improperly obtained and used its proprietary and confidential information to gain advantage in securing governmental contracts, which enabled competitors to gain advantage in market to provide government satellite launch services, under facts as alleged, both employees knew that there was ongoing judicial proceeding
and this was not case where alleged wrongdoers merely uttered false statements to investigating agent who might or
might not have testified before grand jury; it was company that filed false deposition testimony and affidavit in related
litigation; these facts were sufficient to support inference that defendants intended to obstruct justice in that litigation
and, thus, predicate act based on these facts was sufficiently pled under Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Lockheed Martin Corp. v Boeing Co. (2005, MD Fla) 357 F Supp 2d 1350, 18 FLW Fed D 381 (criticized in
James Cape & Sons Co. v PCC Constr. Co. (2005, ED Wis) 2005-2 CCH Trade Cases P 74982).
7.--18 USCS § 401
Where, following jury trial defendant was found guilty of violation of 18 USCS § 1503 by willfully and by means
of threats endeavoring to influence, intimidate and impede witness in discharge of her duty in pending criminal case,
defendant's contention that he was not subject to prosecution under 18 USCS § 1503 because conduct alleged in indictment occurred in presence of court and, therefore, was punishable, if at all, only as contempt of court under 18 USCS §
401(1), was not tenable, because misbehavior falling within literal ambit of both sections is punishable under either, and
government is generally entitled to proceed under either of two applicable criminal statutes. United States v Harris
(1977, CA7 Ind) 558 F2d 366.
18 USCS § 401 authorizes summary punishment for contempt, while 18 USCS § 1503 requires indictment and trial;
Congress confined § 401 to courtroom misconduct in order to curb judicial abuse of contempt power, but nonetheless,
two statutes often overlap; conduct expressly covered by § 1503 may occur in view of court, and there is no reason to
require summary contempt proceedings when government wishes to proceed by indictment. United States v Howard
(1978, CA5 La) 569 F2d 1331, cert den (1978) 439 US 834, 58 L Ed 2d 130, 99 S Ct 116.
18 USCS § 1503 was enacted as counterpart to 18 USCS § 401, whose reach is limited to conduct occurring in
presence of court; as such, § 1503 allows punishment of actions taken with specific intent to impede administration of
justice. United States v Simmons (1979, CA3 Pa) 591 F2d 206.
Although 18 USCS §§ 1503 and 401 often overlap, summary contempt proceedings need not be pursued pursuant to
§ 401 where government proceeds by indictment under § 1503. United States v Jones (1981, CA5 Ga) 663 F2d 567, 9
Fed Rules Evid Serv 750.
Charging defendant with contempt of court in violation of 18 USCS § 401(3) and obstruction of justice in violation
of 18 USCS § 1503 was not multiplicitous because obstruction charge required proof of additional element or elements
that were not part of criminal contempt charge; however, there was need for careful consideration of definition of "corruptly" in § 1503 charge that would apply at trial, which in this case might require court to forego use of
knowledge-of-consequences principle. United States v Jackson (2002, ND Ill) 204 F Supp 2d 1126.
8.--18 USCS § 1512
Conviction for intimidation and harassment of witnesses is improper under 18 USCS § 1503; prosecution should be
made under Victim and Witness Protection Act (18 USCS § 1512). United States v Hernandez (1984, CA2 NY) 730
F2d 895 (criticized in United States v Rovetuso (1985, CA7 Ill) 768 F2d 809, 18 Fed Rules Evid Serv 809) and (criticized in United States v Tackett (1997, CA6 Ky) 113 F3d 603, 1997 FED App 157P) and (criticized in United States v
Tomeny (1998, CA11 Fla) 144 F3d 749, 11 FLW Fed C 1513).
18 USCS § 1503 is applicable to obstruction of administration of justice by attempts to influence witnesses notwithstanding enactment of 18 USCS § 1512 and 1982 amendment to § 1503 deleting references to witnesses, since residual clause in § 1503 prohibiting anyone from obstructing or attempting to obstruct "due administration of justice"
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18 USCS § 1503
was not deleted; convictions under both § 1503 and § 1512 arising from alleged conduct with respect to potential witness are not multiplicious. United States v Wesley (1984, CA5 La) 748 F2d 962, cert den (1985) 471 US 1130, 86 L Ed
2d 281, 105 S Ct 2664.
Issue of whether charges involving harassment and intimidation by force can be prosecuted only under 18 USCS §
1512 and not under 18 USCS § 1503 is close question for purposes of determining release on bail pending appeal under
18 USCS § 3143. United States v Powell (1985, CA8) 761 F2d 1227, 79 ALR Fed 649.
Although attempt to persuade witness to lie in order to mislead government might amount to obstruction of justice
in violation of 18 USCS § 1503, it is not within ambit of § 1512. United States v King (1985, CA2 NY) 762 F2d 232,
cert den (1986) 475 US 1018, 89 L Ed 2d 316, 106 S Ct 1203.
Witness tampering may still be charged under 18 USCS § 1503, as well as under 18 USCS § 1512. United States v
Rovetuso (1985, CA7 Ill) 768 F2d 809, 18 Fed Rules Evid Serv 809, cert den (1986) 474 US 1076, 88 L Ed 2d 809, 106
S Ct 838 and cert den (1986) 476 US 1106, 90 L Ed 2d 360, 106 S Ct 1951.
Witness tampering is punishable under 18 USCS § 1503 despite fact that all references to witnesses have been deleted from § 1503 and that 18 USCS § 1512 specifically provides increased protection to witnesses; however, §§ 1503
and 1512 are not coextensive. United States v Risken (1986, CA8 Iowa) 788 F2d 1361, cert den (1986) 479 US 923, 93
L Ed 2d 302, 107 S Ct 329.
Defendant was properly charged with corrupt persuasion of grand jury witness under omnibus clause of 18 USCS §
l503, even though 18 USCS § l5l2 specifically addresses witnesses, since existence of more narrowly tailored statute
does not necessarily prevent prosecution under broader statute, so long as defendant is not punished under both statutes
for same conduct. United States v Kenny (1992, CA4 Va) 973 F2d 339.
Unlike 18 USCS § 1503, presence of investigation or judicial proceedings is immaterial under 18 USCS § 1512, so
long as there is evidence that defendant believed that person might furnish information to federal officials and that he
killed or attempted to kill that person in order to prevent such disclosure. United States v Edwards (1994, CA7 Ill) 36
F3d 639.
Witness tampering may still be charged under 18 USCS § 1503, despite enactment and subsequent amendment of
Victim Witness Protection Act and 18 USCS § 1512. United States v Maloney (1995, CA7 Ill) 71 F3d 645, reh, en banc,
den (1996, CA7 Ill) 1996 US App LEXIS 4533 and cert den (1996) 519 US 927, 136 L Ed 2d 214, 117 S Ct 295.
Government may prosecute defendant's attempt to influence individual's anticipated testimony before grand jury
under omnibus clause of 18 USCS § 1503, even though 18 USCS § 1512 specifically penalized witness tampering, since
§ 1512 did not repeal omnibus clause by implication. United States v Tackett (1997, CA6 Ky) 113 F3d 603, 1997 FED
App 157P, reh, en banc, den (1997, CA6) 1997 US App LEXIS 16497 and cert den (1998) 522 US 1089, 139 L Ed 2d
868, 118 S Ct 879, subsequent app (1999, CA6 Ky) 193 F3d 880, 1999 FED App 363P.
Omnibus clause of 18 USCS § 1503 continued to prohibit witness tampering even after 1988 amendment to 18
USCS § 1512. United States v Ladum (1998, CA9 Or) 141 F3d 1328, 98 CDOS 2851, 98 Daily Journal DAR 3937, 98-1
USTC P 50345, 81 AFTR 2d 1576, cert den (1998) 525 US 898, 119 S Ct 225, 142 L Ed 2d 185 and cert den (1998) 525
US 1021, 119 S Ct 549, 142 L Ed 2d 457.
In enacting 18 USCS § 1512 Congress implicitly removed witness tampering from scope of 18 USCS § 1503.
United States v Bruno (2004, CA2 NY) 383 F3d 65.
18 USCS § 1503 did not embrace witness tampering where although 18 USCS § 1503 was amended to remove any
explicit reference to witnesses, its omnibus "due administration of justice" clause continued to cover witness tampering
and it was improbable that, in 1982, Congress meant to adopt, in 18 USCS § 1512, specific ban against forcible intimidation while impliedly narrowing, in 18 USCS § 1503, omnibus clause so as to decriminalize corrupt but non-forcible
interference with witnesses. United States v LeMoure (2007, CA1 Mass) 474 F3d 37.
Charges of witness tampering may be brought under 18 USCS § 1503 even though 18 USCS § 1512 was enacted
specifically to protect witnesses, because residual clause in § 1503 covers acts which are not covered by narrow provisions of § 1512; however, defendants may renew motion at close of government's case since proof may show violation
of § 1512. United States v Montgomery (1987, SD NY) 675 F Supp 164, affd (1988, CA2 NY) 860 F2d 15, 26 Fed
Rules Evid Serv 1129, cert den (1989) 488 US 1033, 109 S Ct 846, 102 L Ed 2d 978 and (criticized in United States v
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18 USCS § 1503
Lugo (2003, SD Tex) 289 F Supp 2d 790) and (criticized in People v Davis (2005) 36 Cal 4th 510, 31 Cal Rptr 3d 96,
115 P3d 417, 2005 CDOS 6393, 2005 Daily Journal DAR 8733).
9. Relationship with state laws
Although employee of Arkansas State Game and Fish Commission has no right to tenure and is subject to discharge
with or without cause at will or whim of commission, without notice or hearing, he charges violation of his First
Amendment rights when he alleges he was discharged because he testified in criminal proceeding in federal court,
which rights are protected by 18 USCS § 1503 and proceedings against individual commissioners will not be dismissed.
Miller v Hulsey (1972, ED Ark) 347 F Supp 192.
10. Civil liability
Since 18 USCS § 1503 was passed in public interest, employer's violation of employees' rights under employment
contract would not constitute tort against them unless violation thereof amounted to tort at common law. Odell v Humble Oil & Refining Co. (1953, CA10 NM) 201 F2d 123, 22 CCH LC P 67350, cert den (1953) 345 US 941, 73 S Ct 833,
97 L Ed 1367.
Civil liability, incident to criminal violation of 18 USCS § 1503 by jury tampering, does not exist under Federal
Tort Claims Act (28 USCS § 1346(b)), 42 USCS § 1985(b), or case law. Jones v United States (1976, CA8 Ark) 536
F2d 269, cert den (1977) 429 US 1039, 50 L Ed 2d 750, 97 S Ct 735 and (criticized in Sheets v Butera (2003, DC Neb)
2003 US Dist LEXIS 1582).
18 USCS § 1503 was enacted for protection of public and created no cause of action in favor of individual who
claims to be damaged by its violation. Mainelli v Providence Journal Co. (1962, DC RI) 207 F Supp 453, affd in part
and vacated in part (1962, CA1 RI) 312 F2d 3.
Civil liability, incident to criminal violation of 18 USCS § 1503, does not exist under Federal Tort Claims Act [28
USCS § 1346(b)], 42 USCS § 1985(b), or Bivens Doctrine [403 US 388, 29 L Ed 2d 619, 91 S Ct 1999 (1971)]. Jones v
United States (1975, ED Ark) 401 F Supp 168, affd (1976, CA8 Ark) 536 F2d 269, cert den (1977) 429 US 1039, 50 L
Ed 2d 750, 97 S Ct 735 and (criticized in Sheets v Butera (2003, DC Neb) 2003 US Dist LEXIS 1582).
Civil liability, incident to criminal violation of 18 USCS § 1503, does not exist under Federal Tort Claims Act [28
USCS § 1346(b)], 42 USCS § 1985(b), or Bivens Doctrine [403 US 388, 29 L Ed 2d 619, 91 S Ct 1999 (1971)]. Jones v
United States (1975, ED Ark) 401 F Supp 168, affd (1976, CA8 Ark) 536 F2d 269, cert den (1977) 429 US 1039, 50 L
Ed 2d 750, 97 S Ct 735 and (criticized in Sheets v Butera (2003, DC Neb) 2003 US Dist LEXIS 1582).
18 USCS § 1503 does not create civil cause of action. Burch v Snider (1978, DC Md) 461 F Supp 598.
18 USCS § 1503 does not create private claim for relief. Harberson v Hilton Hotels Corp. (1985, DC Colo) 616 F
Supp 864.
Individual has no standing under 18 USCS §§ 4 and 1503 to challenge conviction and subsequent execution for espionage of couple which "put A-bomb in hands of Russians" 40 years ago, where complaint charges judge who presided
over espionage trial with obstruction of justice, because plaintiff may not bring civil suit under these criminal statutes in
qui tam. United States ex rel. Farmer v Kaufman (1990, SD NY) 750 F Supp 106.
Civil action for embracery against expert witness is dismissed, even if witness caused mistrial in patent action by
contacting and attempting to influence jurors, because no private action for jury tampering exists under 18 USCS §
1503. OMI Holdings v Howell (1994, DC Kan) 864 F Supp 1046, affd (1997, CA10 Kan) 1997 US App LEXIS 2475.
11. Collateral disciplinary proceedings
For purposes of disbarment proceedings conviction of attorney for violating 18 USCS § 1503 by attempting to induce witness to testify falsely under oath in judicial proceeding is conviction involving moral turpitude. United States
v Friedland (1980, DC NJ) 502 F Supp 611, affd without op (1981, CA3 NJ) 672 F2d 905.
Conviction for endeavoring to obstruct justice and for perjury before grand jury warrants 2 year suspension from
practice of law imposed in state disciplinary proceeding. Louisiana State Bar Asso. v Vesich (1985, La) 476 So 2d 811.
For purposes of disciplining of attorney, crime is one involving "moral turpitude" if act denounced by statute offends generally accepted moral code of mankind; offense of violation of 18 USCS § 1503 is inherently offense involv-
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18 USCS § 1503
ing moral turpitude and any conviction thereof requires disbarment of District of Columbia attorney. In re Colson
(1979, Dist Col App) 412 A2d 1160.
Conviction for endeavoring to obstruct justice and for perjury before grand jury warrants 2 year suspension from
practice of law imposed in state disciplinary proceeding. Louisiana State Bar Asso. v Vesich (1985, La) 476 So 2d 811.
Attorney who pleaded guilty to crime of conspiracy in violation of 18 USCS §§ 371, 1343 and 2314, and conspiring
to obstruct justice in violation of 18 USCS § 1503, would be disbarred under subdivision 2 of § 90 of New York Judiciary Law. In re Glass (1977, 1st Dept) 59 App Div 2d 248, 399 NYS2d 6.
II.ELEMENTS OF CRIME
A.In General 12. Generally
Under 18 USCS § 1503, conduct is punishable where accused acts with intent to obstruct justice, and in manner that
is likely to obstruct justice, but is foiled in some way; if accused with requisite intent lies to subpoenaed witness who is
ultimately not called to testify, or who testifies but does not transmit accused's version of story, accused has endeavored
to obstruct justice and may be found guilty of violating § 1503. United States v Aguilar (1995) 515 US 593, 132 L Ed 2d
520, 115 S Ct 2357, 95 CDOS 4719, 95 Daily Journal DAR 8113, 9 FLW Fed S 217 (criticized in United States v Watt
(1995, DC Dist Col) 911 F Supp 538) and on remand, remanded (1996, CA9) 80 F3d 329, 96 CDOS 520, 96 Daily
Journal DAR 849 (criticized in United States v Ebert (1999, CA4 NC) 1999 US App LEXIS 8453) and (criticized in
Boehner v McDermott (1998, DC Dist Col) 1998 US Dist LEXIS 11509).
18 USCS § 1503(a) serves as catch-all provision that prohibits any endeavor to impede administration of justice that
is not prohibited by other, more specific provisions, and if alien's crime falls within § 1503(a), it constitutes "aggravated
felony" for deportation purposes under 8 USCS § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); to constitute offense under 18 USCS § 1503(a): (1)
there must be nexus between alien's conduct and judicial proceedings; (2) alien's conduct must have relation in time,
causation, or logic with judicial proceedings and must have natural and probable effect of interfering with due administration of justice; (3) alien must have had specific intent to do some act or acts which tend to influence, obstruct, or
impede due administration of justice; (4) alien's motivation is irrelevant under § 1503(a); and (5) where alien unquestionably intended to undertake act, with full knowledge that it would impede due administration of justice, that is all law
requires in order to show specific intent to influence, obstruct, or impede due administration of justice. Alwan v Ashcroft
(2004, CA5) 388 F3d 507 (criticized in Marquez-Marquez v Gonzales (2006, CA5) 455 F3d 548) and (criticized in,
questioned in Puentes Fernandez v Keisler (2007, CA4) 502 F3d 337).
Federal convict now being pursued by state in civil RICO action may not relitigate elements of crimes he pleaded
guilty to, including facts that he (1) lied to federal investigators, and (2) attempted to obstruct justice thereby, because
convict conceded these points by admitting violation of 18 USCS § 1503. West Virginia v Moore (1995, SD W Va) 897
F Supp 276.
Shareholder claimed corporate director perjured himself by misrepresenting to court in related salvage action that
corporation would not sell artifacts when, in fact, he intended to sell artifacts, that allegedly false statements made in
court were intended to obstruct or actually did obstruct justice by attempting to influence due administration of justice,
that "false" periodic reports were filed with court and that defendants failed to file required information with Securities
Exchange Commission; accordingly, shareholder sufficiently alleged predicate acts of obstruction of justice under
Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. D'Addario v Geller (2003, ED Va) 264 F Supp 2d 367, subsequent app, remanded (2005, CA4 Va) 129 Fed Appx 1, magistrate's recommendation (2005, ED Va) 2005 US Dist
LEXIS 37065.
13. "Corrupt" or "corruptly"
Where petitioner auditing firm was charged with witness tampering under 18 USCS § 1512(b)(2)(A), (B) (amended), and district court, over firm's objection, altered pattern jury instruction used under 18 USCS § 1503 and instructed
jury to convict if it found firm intended to "subvert, undermine, or impede" governmental factfinding by suggesting to
its employees that they enforce document retention policy, conviction was overturned because changes were significant
in that no longer was any type of "dishonesty" necessary to finding of guilt, and it was enough under such instruction
for firm to have simply "impeded" government's factfinding ability. Arthur Andersen LLP v United States (2005) 544
US 696, 125 S Ct 2129, 161 L Ed 2d 1008, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 93266, 18 FLW Fed S 324.
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18 USCS § 1503
As used in predecessor of 18 USCS § 1503, it is as "corrupt" to persuade public officer by lies as by bribes. United
States v Polakoff (1941, CA2 NY) 121 F2d 333, cert den (1941) 314 US 626, 86 L Ed 503, 62 S Ct 107.
Any endeavor to influence witness or to impede and obstruct justice falls within connotation of "corrupt" as used in
predecessor to 18 USCS § 1503. Broadbent v United States (1945, CA10 Utah) 149 F2d 580.
"Corruptly" as used in 18 USCS § 241, predecessor of 18 USCS § 1503, means for improper motive, and motive
may be either desire to aid someone else or hope of pecuniary reward or benefit. Martin v United States (1948, CA4
Va) 166 F2d 76.
Word "corrupt" in 18 USCS § 1503 means for evil or wicked purpose. United States v Ryan (1971, CA9 Cal) 455
F2d 728, 20 ALR Fed 719.
"Corruptly," under 18 USCS § 1503, requires proof of more than mere failure to produce documents and requires
some affirmative conduct, such as destruction, concealment, or removal of documents. United States v Weiss (1974,
CA2 NY) 491 F2d 460, cert den (1974) 419 US 833, 42 L Ed 2d 59, 95 S Ct 58.
Defendant's endeavoring to induce witness to deny making of loan, to pass it off on another lender, or to plead Fifth
Amendment for purpose of protecting original lender, with knowledge that loan had in fact been made and extortionate
interest paid, was "corrupt" under 18 USCS § 1503. United States v Cioffi (1974, CA2 NY) 493 F2d 1111, cert den
(1974) 419 US 917, 42 L Ed 2d 155, 95 S Ct 195.
Term "corruptly" as used in 18 USCS § 1503 means for improper motive or evil or wicked purpose. United States
v Haas (1978, CA5 Ala) 583 F2d 216, reh den (1978, CA5 Ala) 588 F2d 829 and cert den (1979) 440 US 981, 60 L Ed
2d 240, 99 S Ct 1788.
Term "corruptly" within meaning of 18 USCS § 1503 does not superimpose special and additional element of offense such as desire to undermine moral character of juror; evil purpose in sense of fiendish motive is not necessary
element of violation of § 1503. United States v Ogle (1979, CA10 Colo) 613 F2d 233, cert den (1980) 449 US 825, 66
L Ed 2d 28, 101 S Ct 87, reh den (1980) 449 US 1026, 66 L Ed 2d 487, 101 S Ct 594.
"Corruptly" as used in 18 USCS § 1503 means that act must be done with purpose of obstructing justice. United
States v Rasheed (1981, CA9 Cal) 663 F2d 843, 9 Fed Rules Evid Serv 360, 62 ALR Fed 284, cert den (1982) 454 US
1157, 71 L Ed 2d 315, 102 S Ct 1031.
Criminal defendant who gives false name to magistrate at trial acts corruptly in violation of 18 USCS § 1503.
United States v Plascencia-Orozco (1985, CA9 Cal) 768 F2d 1074.
Individual may be said to have "corruptly" impeded due administration of justice under 18 USCS § 1503 merely by
refusing to testify before grand jury, although fear of reprisal in narrow range of circumstances can negate intent.
United States v Banks (1991, CA11 Ala) 942 F2d 1576, vacated on other grounds, remanded (1993, CA11 Ala) 988 F2d
1106, 7 FLW Fed C 241.
Because defendant had corrupt intent to impede judicial proceedings by directing grand jury witness to fabricate
information, defendant's conviction for obstruction of justice under 18 USCS § 1503 was affirmed; there was logical
relationship between defendant's knowing conduct of directing union member to fabricate information to grand jury
regarding union's criminal activities and effect it would have in hiding information from grand jury. United States v
Macari (2006, CA7 Ill) 453 F3d 926, 179 BNA LRRM 3281, 153 CCH LC P 10694, cert den (2006, US) 127 S Ct 688,
166 L Ed 2d 518.
"Corruptly" as used in 18 USCS § 1503 means having evil or improper purpose or intent. United States v Haldeman (1976, App DC) 181 US App DC 254, 559 F2d 31, 1 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1203, cert den (1977) 431 US 933, 53 L
Ed 2d 250, 97 S Ct 2641, reh den (1977) 433 US 916, 53 L Ed 2d 1103, 97 S Ct 2992.
Any endeavor to influence witness or to impede and obstruct justice falls within connotation of word "corruptly" as
used in 18 USCS § 1503. United States v Cohen (1962, DC Conn) 202 F Supp 587.
Within context of indictment charging violation of 18 USCS § 1503, use of words "corruptly endeavors" charges
defendants with committing intentional and knowing act, in view of fact that word "corruptly" has been held to mean
with "an improper motive." United States v Zolli (1970, DC NY) 51 FRD 522.
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18 USCS § 1503
Contention that word "corruptly", contained in 18 USCS § 1503, means any endeavor to influence jurist cannot be
literally accepted since probation officers, attorneys, and defendants are all invited to address pleas concerning sentence
to sentencing judge, and this cannot be construed as corruptly endeavoring to influence sentencing judge; where, however, submission to sentencing judge relies substantially upon relationship to judge--e.g., friendship or past or present
associations, such submission would constitute corrupt endeavor within meaning of § 1503; defendant who sought to
have attorney make oral approach to judge on basis of such relationship could be convicted of violation of § 1503.
United States v Fasolino (1978, WD NY) 449 F Supp 586, affd (1978, CA2 NY) 586 F2d 939.
Grand juror is guilty of endeavoring to obstruct justice in violation of 18 USCS § 1503, where juror told former
friend and roommate he was target of grand jury investigation and gave some details of investigation, because even if
juror's action was attempt to help one-time friend get off drugs, it also was attempt to interfere with government investigation and amounted to "corrupt endeavor" to obstruct due administration of justice. United States v Peasley (1990,
DC Me) 741 F Supp 18.
Former Interior Secretary was properly charged under 18 USCS § 1503 for concealment before grand jury, despite
his argument that use of term "corruptly" in omnibus clause of § 1503 indicates Congress's intent to limit applicability
of clause to coercive acts of transitive nature, or conduct that is actively intended to corrupt another, because case law in
D.C. Circuit reflects nontransitive reading of omnibus clause of § 1503, and government may charge defendant under
omnibus clause for making false statements before grand jury while under oath if making of such statements obstructs
due administration of justice. United States v Watt (1995, DC Dist Col) 911 F Supp 538.
14.--Payment of money; bribery
As used in predecessor to 18 USCS § 1503, any endeavor to impede and obstruct due administration of justice was
corrupt, and it was not necessary that such effort should be accompanied by payment or promises of payment of money.
Bosselman v United States (1917, CA2 NY) 239 F 82.
That United States was not party to civil cause in which juror was improperly influenced made no difference in
prosecution under predecessor to 18 USCS § 1503. Sneed v United States (1924, CA5 Tex) 298 F 911, 37 ALR 772,
cert den (1924) 265 US 590, 68 L Ed 1195, 44 S Ct 635.
If person, for payment of price, conspires to induce another to withhold information from officers charged with
administration of law in order to impede and obstruct administration of justice, action is corruptly done within meaning
of 18 USCS § 1503. Zamloch v United States (1952, CA9 Cal) 193 F2d 889, cert den (1952) 343 US 934, 96 L Ed
1342, 72 S Ct 770.
Defendant's conduct was "corrupt" within meaning of 18 USCS § 1503 where he sold his services and in return for
payment of money attempted to influence person encompassed by § 1503. United States v Kahaner (1963, CA2 NY)
317 F2d 459, cert den (1963) 375 US 835, 11 L Ed 2d 65, 84 S Ct 62, reh den (1964) 375 US 982, 11 L Ed 2d 429, 84 S
Ct 478 and cert den (1963) 375 US 836, 11 L Ed 2d 65, 84 S Ct 73 and cert den (1963) 375 US 836, 11 L Ed 2d 65, 84 S
Ct 74, reh den (1963) 375 US 926, 11 L Ed 2d 169, 84 S Ct 263.
That portion of 18 USCS § 1503 proscribing any corrupt endeavor to influence juror in discharge of duties does not
require for its violation offer or promise of thing of value. United States v De Alesandro (1966, CA2 NY) 361 F2d 694,
cert den (1966) 385 US 842, 17 L Ed 2d 74, 87 S Ct 94.
Noncoercive but corrupt attempt to influence, e.g., by bribery, is within conduct proscribed by 18 USCS § 1503.
United States v Walasek (1975, CA3 Pa) 527 F2d 676.
Non-coercive but corrupt attempt to influence as through bribery is within proscribed conduct of 18 USCS § 1503.
United States v Nicosia (1980, CA7 Ind) 638 F2d 970, cert den (1981) 452 US 961, 69 L Ed 2d 972, 101 S Ct 3110.
15. Court of United States
Threat in violation of 18 USCS § 1503 must relate to possible testimony of witness in pending federal proceeding,
since statute specifies "any court of the United States." United States v Baker (1974, CA6 Ky) 494 F2d 1262.
Superior Court of District of Columbia is not court of United States within meaning of 18 USCS § 1503. United
States v Regina (1980, DC Md) 504 F Supp 629.
16.--Military court
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18 USCS § 1503
In action where accused was charged under Article 134 of Uniform Code of Military Justice with violating 18
USCS § 1503 by committing assault and battery on account of victim's having testified as witness in court martial proceedings, specification alleged offense under Clause (1) or (2) of Article 134 of Uniform Code of Military Justice instead of 18 USCS § 1503 regardless of whether military court is "court of the United States" within meaning of 18
USCS § 1503. United States v Long (1952) 6 CMR 60.
If summary court-martial is not court within meaning of 18 USCS § 1503, it is department or agency within meaning of 18 USCS § 1505. United States v Daminger (1960) 30 CMR 826.
17.--Territorial court
District Court of Virgin Islands is territorial court and not court of United States for purposes of 18 USCS § 1503.
United States v George (1980, CA3 VI) 625 F2d 1081.
18. Endeavor
Experimental approaches to corrupt juror were "endeavor" under predecessor to 18 USCS § 1503. United States v
Russell (1921) 255 US 138, 65 L Ed 553, 41 S Ct 260.
Term "endeavor," as used in 18 USCS § 1503, describes any effort or essay to do or accomplish evil purpose that
section was enacted to prevent. Osborn v United States (1966) 385 US 323, 17 L Ed 2d 394, 87 S Ct 429, reh den
(1967) 386 US 938, 17 L Ed 2d 813, 87 S Ct 951.
In order for "endeavor" to come within ambit of 18 USCS § 1503, defendant's acts must have been brought to bear
upon some person who had legal authority to do, or not to do, some act which would or could affect final outcome of
trial. Ethridge v United States (1958, CA9 Wash) 258 F2d 234.
Violation of 18 USCS § 1503 does not require offer or promise of thing of value. United States v De Alesandro
(1966, CA2 NY) 361 F2d 694, cert den (1966) 385 US 842, 17 L Ed 2d 74, 87 S Ct 94.
"Endeavor" under 18 USCS § 1503 is any effort or any act, however contrived, to obstruct, impede, or interfere
with witness, and any such endeavor is "corrupt." United States v Cioffi (1974, CA2 NY) 493 F2d 1111, cert den (1974)
419 US 917, 42 L Ed 2d 155, 95 S Ct 195.
Evidence that defendant and another, who was also indicted in one of indictments pending against defendant, had
several times discussed killing witness, and that co-indictee, by then turned government informant, at his last meeting
with defendant handed over to defendant expense money to locate witness, showed sufficient "endeavor" within meaning of 18 USCS § 1503, notwithstanding that federal agent arrested defendant as soon as he was handed expense money
and prior to doing anything to witness. United States v Mitchell (1975, CA6 Tenn) 514 F2d 758, cert den (1975) 423
US 847, 46 L Ed 2d 68, 96 S Ct 86.
"Endeavor" within meaning of 18 USCS § 1503 connotes somewhat lower threshold of purposeful activity than
"attempt". United States v Lazzerini (1979, CA1 Mass) 611 F2d 940.
Defendant may endeavor to influence witness within meaning of 18 USCS § 1503 without explicitly offering bribe
for specific testimony since "endeavor" connotes lower threshold of purposeful activity than "attempt". United States v
Tedesco (1980, CA1 Mass) 635 F2d 902, cert den (1981) 452 US 962, 69 L Ed 2d 974, 101 S Ct 3112.
Use of term "endeavor" in 18 USCS § 1503 and its predecessor have been interpreted as embodying concept less
technical than that normally associated with "attempt"; court has construed word "endeavor" as describing any effort or
essay to accomplish equal purpose that § 1503 was enacted to prevent. United States v Barton (1981, CA2 NY) 647
F2d 224, cert den (1981) 454 US 857, 70 L Ed 2d 152, 102 S Ct 307 and (criticized in United States v DeFries (1997,
App DC) 327 US App DC 181, 129 F3d 1293, 156 BNA LRRM 2999).
18 USCS § 1503 proscribes endeavors to obstruct and actual obstruction is not element of proof. United States v
Rasheed (1981, CA9 Cal) 663 F2d 843, 9 Fed Rules Evid Serv 360, 62 ALR Fed 284, cert den (1982) 454 US 1157, 71
L Ed 2d 315, 102 S Ct 1031.
By use of term "endeavor" Congress purged from statute technicalities associated with distinguishing between
preparation for attempt and attempt itself, and "endeavor" does not require proof that would support charge of attempt.
United States v Buffalano (1984, CA2 NY) 727 F2d 50.
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18 USCS § 1503
Attempt by attorney to obtain money from his client so attorney could fix case is endeavor to obstruct justice justifying conviction for violation of 18 USCS § 1503. United States v Silverman (1984, CA11 Fla) 745 F2d 1386, 16 Fed
Rules Evid Serv 1316.
Defendant who obtained written false statement from witness but did not actually use it in court or deliver it to
court officer did attempt to obstruct justice in context of 18 USCS § 1503, since obstruction of justice was foreseeable..
United States v Fields (1988, CA11 Fla) 838 F2d 1571, reh den, en banc (1988, CA11 Fla) 845 F2d 1032.
As used in 18 USCS § 1503, term "endeavors" connotes systematic or lasting effort. United States v Zolli (1970,
DC NY) 51 FRD 522.
While 18 USCS § 1503 uses broad term "endeavor" to define offense, there must be some overt act directed toward
some person whose action or failure to act could affect outcome of case. United States v Campbell (1972, WD Pa) 350
F Supp 213.
Fact that false declaration was withdrawn before anything was done by court with respect to motion for protective
order did not preclude defendant's prosecution for endeavoring to obstruct justice under 18 USCS § 1503. United States
v Savoy (1998, DC Md) 38 F Supp 2d 406.
18 USCS § 1503 includes "endeavors" to influence or obstruct administration of justice; punishable endeavor need
only be some overt act directed toward some person whose action or failure to act could affect outcome of case.
Commonwealth v Trolene (1979) 263 Pa Super 263, 397 A2d 1200.
19.--Materiality of success
That government informer with whom defendant-attorney arranged to bribe member of jury never in fact approached juror and had no intention of so doing did not render defendant's endeavor to bribe juror so impossible of accomplishment as to keep his conduct from being violation of 18 USCS § 1503. Osborn v United States (1966) 385 US
323, 17 L Ed 2d 394, 87 S Ct 429, reh den (1967) 386 US 938, 17 L Ed 2d 813, 87 S Ct 951.
Mere endeavor without success to corrupt juror was offense. Thomas v United States (1926, CA8 Ark) 15 F2d
958.
Success of endeavor aggravated offense under predecessor to 18 USCS § 1503. Bedell v United States (1935, CA8
Iowa) 78 F2d 358, cert den (1935) 296 US 628, 80 L Ed 447, 56 S Ct 151.
Success is not essential to crime under predecessor to 18 USCS § 1503. Craig v United States (1936, CA9 Cal) 81
F2d 816, reh den (1936, CA9) 83 F2d 450 and cert dismd (1936) 298 US 637, 80 L Ed 1371, 56 S Ct 670 and cert den
(1936) 298 US 690, 80 L Ed 1408, 56 S Ct 959 and reh den (1936) 299 US 620, 81 L Ed 457, 57 S Ct 6; United States v
Knohl (1967, CA2 NY) 379 F2d 427, cert den (1967) 389 US 973, 19 L Ed 2d 465, 88 S Ct 472 and (superseded by statute as stated in United States v Gerhart (1976, CA8 Iowa) 538 F2d 807, 1 Fed Rules Evid Serv 286).
Activity of hiring intermediary to do act which would intimidate witness constitutes corrupt endeavor to obstruct
justice, in violation of 18 USCS § 1503, notwithstanding fact that intermediary never carried out plan. Knight v United
States (1962, CA5 Ga) 310 F2d 305.
Offense of corruptly endeavoring to influence, intimidate, or impede witness, in violation of 18 USCS § 1503, may
be proved despite fact that witness was not ultimately influenced, intimidated, or impeded. Overton v United States
(1968, CA5 Tex) 403 F2d 444.
One "endeavors" to obstruct justice, in violation of 18 USCS § 1503, when he hires intermediary to murder prospective government witness, despite fact that intermediary never did, and never intended to, make attempt on witness'
life. United States v Missler (1969, CA4 Md) 414 F2d 1293, cert den (1970) 397 US 913, 25 L Ed 2d 93, 90 S Ct 912.
18 USCS § 1503 calls only for "endeavor", similar to criminal solicitation statute and does not require proof that
would support charge of attempt; it was no defense that putative intermediary declined to approach judge or that endeavor was unsuccessful. United States v Fasolino (1978, CA2 NY) 586 F2d 939.
Defendant could be convicted under 18 USCS § 1503 even though facts presented attempt to obtain money by deception from attorney by representation that defendant had juror under his control. United States v Neiswender (1979,
CA4 Md) 590 F2d 1269, cert den (1979) 441 US 963, 60 L Ed 2d 1068, 99 S Ct 2410.
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18 USCS § 1503
Success of defendant's attempt to influence jurors is not essential to violation of 18 USCS § 1503. United States v
Jackson (1979, CA8 Ark) 607 F2d 1219, cert den (1980) 444 US 1080, 62 L Ed 2d 763, 100 S Ct 1032.
One may violate 18 USCS § 1503 by endeavoring to obstruct justice without actually succeeding in that endeavor.
United States v Shoup (1979, CA3 Pa) 608 F2d 950.
Success is not prerequisite to conviction for violation of 18 USCS § 1503 since all that is necessary to be proven is
that defendant "endeavored" to obstruct justice. United States v McCarty (1979, CA8 SD) 611 F2d 220, cert den
(1980) 445 US 930, 63 L Ed 2d 764, 100 S Ct 1319.
In prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1503, success in influencing witness is not in itself determining factor,
since statute requires only proof of endeavor. United States v Baker (1979, CA4 NC) 611 F2d 964.
Failure of individuals to surrender correspondence called for by subpoena as part of grand jury investigation into
life of deceased narcotics fugitive obstructed justice in violation 18 USCS § 1503, even though letters had little, if any,
investigatory value, since 18 USCS § 1503 carries no materiality element. United States v Ruggiero (1991, CA2 NY)
934 F2d 440, 33 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1516 (ovrld in part on other grounds as stated in United States v Urso (2006, ED
NY) 2006 US Dist LEXIS 13147).
Obstruction of justice is crime of attempt, as well as basis for enhanced punishment, in which success is not element; therefore, whether or not lie actually affects outcome of trial is "immaterial." United States v Buckley (1999, CA7
Ill) 192 F3d 708, cert den (2000) 529 US 1137, 146 L Ed 2d 969, 120 S Ct 2021, subsequent app (2001, CA7 Ill) 251
F3d 668.
Effort to get third person to influence jury, who declined to do so, was not misbehavior that was effective to obstruct, or impede justice, or hinder its administration. United States v Carroll (1906, DC Mont) 147 F 947.
It is immaterial to charge of corruptly endeavoring to obstruct due administration of justice by seeking to pervert
truth in pending case, in violation of 18 USCS § 1503, that person whom defendant corruptly sought to influence was
not, and did not intend to be, witness in case. United States v Mannarino (1956, DC Pa) 149 F Supp 351.
18 USCS § 1503 defining obstruction of justice refers to "endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any witness," and does not require that any such "endeavor" prove successful. In re Carr (1977, ND Ohio) 436 F Supp 493.
Conviction of violation of 18 USCS § 1503 is valid, where materiality is not element of § 1503, even if false statements made by defendant in recusal affidavit did not affect government's case in chief, because his actions did not have
to be successful to be punishable under § 1503, and they clearly had natural and probable effect of interfering with due
administration of justice. United States v Rankin (1998, ED Pa) 1 F Supp 2d 445, affd without op (1999, CA3 Pa) 185
F3d 863.
If unlawful act done with reference to particular cause pending or contemplated to be brought before United States
court did not obstruct administration of justice therein, no offense was committed, although evil intent of unlawful act
may have militated against administration of justice in some other cause. Shackelford v Commonwealth (1919) 185 Ky
51, 214 SW 788.
20. Proceedings covered
Investigation being conducted by United States attorney, who had brought in one conviction on charge, to ascertain
identity of other principals in offense, was protected by 18 USCS § 1503 from concealment of information. Zamloch v
United States (1952, CA9 Cal) 193 F2d 889, cert den (1952) 343 US 934, 96 L Ed 1342, 72 S Ct 770.
Falsehoods given before nonjudicial inquiries are not encompassed within 18 USCS § 1503. United States v
Bufalino (1960, CA2 NY) 285 F2d 408.
Prerequisite for conviction under 18 USCS § 1503 is pendency at time of alleged obstruction of some sort of judicial proceeding that qualifies as "administration of justice"; obstruction of investigation that is being conducted by governmental agency or instrumentality does not constitute § 1503 violation because such agencies or instrumentalities are
not judicial arms of government "administering justice". United States v Simmons (1979, CA3 Pa) 591 F2d 206.
Omnibus clause, which refers to interference with "due administration of justice," cannot be construed to proscribe
conduct which takes place wholly outside context of ongoing judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding; therefore, defend-
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18 USCS § 1503
ant's conduct of interfering with execution of search warrant could not result in conviction under 18 USCS § 1503.
United States v Brown (1982, CA9 Cal) 688 F2d 596.
Defendant could not be convicted of violating 18 USCS § 1503 for intentionally interfering with wiretap, since
wiretap was element of federal investigation and not pending judicial proceeding. United States v Davis (1999, CA3 NJ)
183 F3d 231, 52 Fed Rules Evid Serv 732, amd (1999, CA3 NJ) 197 F3d 662 and (criticized in United States v Arthur
Andersen LLP (2002, SD Tex) 2002 US Dist LEXIS 26870).
Application of 18 USCS § 1503 is restricted to obstruction of justice in judicial proceedings, and was not applicable
to alleged activities of defendant in obstructing investigation by Federal Bureau of Investigation. United States v
Scoratow (1956, DC Pa) 137 F Supp 620.
"Due administration of justice" must be construed so as not to include acts of interference with witnesses in investigation being conducted by FBI or similar investigatory, as opposed to judicial, arm of government. United States v
Scoratow (1956, DC Pa) 137 F Supp 620.
Obstruction of justice charges under 18 USCS § 1503 must be dismissed against defendants where defendants informed codefendant that he was being investigated by Bureau of Narcotics, since on date alleged obstruction of justice
occurred, no charges had been brought against codefendant and grand jury had not been apprised of drug investigation,
and therefore there was no pending judicial proceeding; obstruction of government agency's investigation is insufficient
to trigger 18 USCS § 1503. United States v Ellis (1987, SD Miss) 652 F Supp 1451.
Where plaintiff aviation company, which alleged that it was induced into entering into fixed based operations contract on false misrepresentations by defendants, town, its airport commission, and members of commission, asserted that
obstruction of justice was alleged predicate act for its Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim, and
that defendants filed false reports with federal and state agencies to improperly obtain funds, although obstruction of
justice was racketeering activity under 18 USCS § 1961(1)(B), term referred to interferences with court proceedings as
set forth in 18 USCS § 1503, and because nothing in allegations suggested that any defendant engaged in interference
with any court proceeding, claim failed. Barry Aviation, Inc. v Land O'Lakes Mun. Airport Comm'n (2005, WD Wis)
366 F Supp 2d 792.
Specification alleging that accused obstructed justice by endeavoring to influence or intimidate person who was to
give statement to Office of Special Investigations agent during such agent's investigation does not allege offense of obstructing justice either in military law or under 18 USCS, since OSI investigation is law enforcement procedure rather
than judicial-type proceeding such as is contemplated by paragraphs 32(b) and 33(a) of Manual for Courts-Martial and
18 USCS § 1503 and 18 USCS § 1505. United States v Daminger (1960) 30 CMR 826.
21.--Civil actions
18 USCS § 1503 is broad enough to cover attempted corruption of prospective witness in civil action in Federal
District Court. Roberts v United States (1956, CA9 Cal) 239 F2d 467.
22.--Grand jury
18 USCS § 1503 protects integrity of entire judicial process, that is, grand jury proceedings as well as trials. United States v Grunewald (1956, CA2 NY) 233 F2d 556, 56-1 USTC P 9452, 56-2 USTC P 9647, 49 AFTR 1270, revd on
other grounds (1957) 353 US 391, 77 S Ct 963, 1 L Ed 2d 931, 57-1 USTC P 9693, 51 AFTR 20, 62 ALR2d 1344.
Grand jury investigation is criminal proceeding with respect to 18 USCS § 1503. United States v Howard (1978,
CA5 La) 569 F2d 1331, cert den (1978) 439 US 834, 58 L Ed 2d 130, 99 S Ct 116.
Corrupt advice under 18 USCS § 1503 was required to be related investigation by grand jury, not F.B.I. United
States v Fayer (1978, CA2 NY) 573 F2d 741, cert den (1978) 439 US 831, 58 L Ed 2d 125, 99 S Ct 108.
Under certain circumstances, obstruction of United States Attorney's inquiry is equivalent to impairment of federal
grand jury's investigation; this is true in situation where investigation by Attorney and by grand jury were conducted
jointly and impediment to one of them would affect other's inquiry. United States v Shoup (1979, CA3 Pa) 608 F2d
950.
Prerequisite to any violation of 18 USCS § 1503 is existence of pending judicial proceeding known to violator and
grand jury investigation is such proceeding; issuance of subpoena by grand jury is not necessary to trigger application of
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18 USCS § 1503
§ 1503. United States v Vesich (1984, CA5 La) 724 F2d 451, 14 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1518, reh den (1984, CA5 La)
726 F2d 168 and (superseded by statute as stated in United States v Gonzalez (1991, CA2 NY) 922 F2d 1044).
"Due administration of justice," as used in 18 USCS § 1503, includes official inquiry undertaken by lawfully constituted agency such as grand jury. United States v Solow (1956, DC NY) 138 F Supp 812 (superseded by statute as
stated in United States v Simpkins (1986, NMCMR) 22 MJ 924).
"Administration of justice" clause of 18 USCS § 1503 is all embracing and while statute may not apply to correctional or investigatory arms of government, obstruction of grand jury functions is within purview of statute. United
States v Cohen (1962, DC Conn) 202 F Supp 587.
18 USCS § 1503 requires that there be obstruction of judicial proceeding, such as grand jury investigation. United
States v Hubbard (1979, DC Dist Col) 474 F Supp 64, 4 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1076.
23. Pendency of proceedings
18 USCS § 1503 is not applicable at least until complaint has been filed with United States commissioners (magistrate), and thus does not apply to threats made against potential witness when threats concern only what witness might
tell investigating authorities, not what he might testify about in judicial proceedings; defendant who removed automobile purchased by another with money stolen from bank by such other did not obstruct justice by attempting to remove
evidence in violation of 18 USCS § 1503 where no proceeding was pending at time of removal so as to establish status
of automobile as evidence and where evidence could not support inference that defendant might know or suspect that
automobile would become evidence. United States v Metcalf (1970, CA9 Wash) 435 F2d 754.
18 USCS § 1503 has no application where defendant, under investigation by IRS, ordered alteration of some business records which later were subpoenaed by grand jury, but where there was no proceeding pending at time he gave
order. United States v Ryan (1971, CA9 Cal) 455 F2d 728, 20 ALR Fed 719.
Requisite for violation of 18 USCS § 1503 is that judicial proceeding be pending so that conduct of accused may
impede its due administration; although at time of defendant's alleged obstructive conduct, prosecution had progressed
to point where adverse jury verdict had been returned, proceeding was still pending since appeal was pending and District Court had retained authority with respect to defendant's custody, and furthermore, defendant could have filed motion for new trial despite pendency of appeal. United States v Johnson (1979, CA4 NC) 605 F2d 729, cert den (1980)
444 US 1020, 62 L Ed 2d 652, 100 S Ct 677.
Judicial proceeding was pending at time defendant made false statements to probation officer where, even assuming
that no complaint had actually been filed, defendant had been in custody and had signed consent form agreeing to waive
her right to trial and sentencing before district court judge before interview occurred. United States v Gonzalez-Mares
(1985, CA9 Cal) 752 F2d 1485, cert den (1985) 473 US 913, 87 L Ed 2d 663, 105 S Ct 3540.
United States attorney was engaged in "discharge of his duty" in meaning of 18 USCS § 1503 when defendant forcibly assaulted him, where he was returning to courthouse after case against defendant was no longer pending in sense
that sentencing had occurred, since attorney was still responsible for representing government in case of appeal or motion to reduce sentence. United States v Fernandez (1988, CA11 Fla) 837 F2d 1031, cert den (1988) 488 US 838, 102
L Ed 2d 78, 109 S Ct 102.
Assuming, arguendo, that omnibus clause of 18 USCS § 1503 requires that misconduct occur during pending judicial proceeding, defendant's misconduct which occurred during term of supervised release satisfied statute, since it took
place well within one-year period contemplated by Rule 35(b). United States v Novak (2000, CA8 Mo) 217 F3d 566,
cert den (2000) 531 US 1043, 148 L Ed 2d 546, 121 S Ct 640.
Because FBI investigated to provide evidence to grand jury regarding union's criminal activities to coerce theatre
companies into entering contracts with union, investigation was pending judicial proceeding to support defendant's conviction for obstruction of justice in violation of 18 USCS § 1503; as defendant also had corrupt intent to impede judicial
proceedings by directing grand jury witness to fabricate information, defendant's conviction was affirmed. United States
v Macari (2006, CA7 Ill) 453 F3d 926, 179 BNA LRRM 3281, 153 CCH LC P 10694, cert den (2006, US) 127 S Ct 688,
166 L Ed 2d 518.
Count charging defendant with obstruction of justice in violation of 18 USCS § 1503 is not defective notwithstanding that there was no action pending against defendant at time he sent threatening communications, since portion of §
1503 defendant is charged with violating (i.e., attempt "to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of jus-
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18 USCS § 1503
tice") is not by its terms confined to situations in which action is pending. United States v Blohm (1984, SD NY) 585 F
Supp 1112.
Prosecution under 18 USCS § 1503 contemplates pending criminal proceedings of some sort. United States v
Ridgeway (1982, ACMR) 13 MJ 742.
To constitute offense of obstructing justice under 18 USCS § 1503, act must be in relation to proceeding pending in
federal courts, and such proceeding is not pending until complaint has been filed. United States v Daminger (1960) 30
CMR 826.
24.--Grand jury
In determining when to activate sanctions of 18 USCS § 1503, no rigid rule as to when grand jury proceeding is
"pending" can be established; no necessary minimum set of circumstances can be articulated, as remedy is to inquire in
each case whether subpoena is issued in furtherance of actual grand jury investigation. United States v Walasek (1975,
CA3 Pa) 527 F2d 676.
Investigation by law enforcement agency ripens into pending grand jury investigation for purposes of 18 USCS §
1503 when officials of such agency apply for, and cause to be issued, subpoenas to testify before sitting grand jury; for
purposes of determining pendency issue, grand jury is not required to be cognizant of subpoena or otherwise involved in
investigation. United States v Simmons (1979, CA3 Pa) 591 F2d 206.
One can conspire to obstruct anticipated-but as yet uncommenced-grand jury proceeding. United States v Messerlian (1987, CA3 NJ) 832 F2d 778, cert den (1988) 485 US 988, 99 L Ed 2d 501, 108 S Ct 1291.
Issuance of grand jury subpoenas during sitting of grand jury was insufficient to establish pending grand jury investigation, since subpoenas were issued without meaningful judicial oversight, on standard forms signed by deputy clerk,
and not every investigation in which grand jury subpoenas are used ripens into pending grand jury investigation; it was
reversible error for judge to unreasonably limit inquiry into whether subpoenas were issued to secure presently contemplated presentation of evidence before grand jury. United States v Nelson (1988, CA3 NJ) 852 F2d 706, cert den
(1988) 488 US 909, 102 L Ed 2d 250, 109 S Ct 262.
For purposes of obstruction of justice under 18 USCS § 1503, grand jury investigation constitutes judicial proceeding. United States v Duran (1994, CA9 Cal) 41 F3d 540, 94 CDOS 9107, 94 Daily Journal DAR 16943.
In order to prove that judicial proceeding is pending, government must show that not only does grand jury exist in
district and that subpoenas have issued, but that grand jury has some relationship to investigation obstructed. United
States v Davis (1999, CA3 NJ) 183 F3d 231, 52 Fed Rules Evid Serv 732, amd (1999, CA3 NJ) 197 F3d 662 and (criticized in United States v Arthur Andersen LLP (2002, SD Tex) 2002 US Dist LEXIS 26870).
District court abused its discretion in quashing grand jury subpoena, where it failed to justify its decision under
Rule 17(c) requiring that evidence sought could not be obtained by other means or to determine whether government
had submitted sufficient evidence of crime or fraud to waive attorney-client privilege. In re Grand Jury Proceeding
Impounded (2001, CA3 NJ) 241 F3d 308.
Defendant could be convicted of obstructing justice for interfering with grand jury even though jury was sitting
beyond its term. Shimon v United States (1965, App DC) 122 US App DC 152, 352 F2d 449.
In prosecution for obstruction of justice in violation of 18 USCS § 1503, where federal grand jury was duly impaneled, and it issued subpoenas to telephone company officials to produce toll call records charged to defendants, and to
defendant to bring with him certain documents, there was more than sufficient evidence to establish pendency of judicial proceeding within meaning of statute. United States v Simmons (1978, ED Pa) 444 F Supp 500, 2 Fed Rules Evid
Serv 927, affd (1979, CA3 Pa) 591 F2d 206.
Request for in camera review of government's materials will be entertained, where defendant asserts that at time of
his alleged attempt to obstruct justice there was no ongoing grand jury proceeding within meaning of 18 USCS § 1503,
because government acknowledges ongoing proceeding is prerequisite to its charge and represents that grand jury proceeding did exist at pertinent time. United States v Hammad (1987, ED NY) 678 F Supp 397, revd on other grounds,
(1988, CA2 NY) 846 F2d 854, reh den (1988, CA2 NY) 855 F2d 36 and corrected on other grounds, (1988, CA2 NY)
858 F2d 834.
25. Influence, obstruct, or impede due administration of justice
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18 USCS § 1503
"Administration of justice" means performance of acts or duties required by law in discharge of that duty; one may
obstruct justice by merely failing to aid, but to obstruct administration of justice requires something more than nonaction. Rosner v United States (1926, CA2 NY) 10 F2d 675.
18 USCS § 1503 proscribes only that which produces or which is capable of producing effect that prevents justice
from being duly administered. Cole v United States (1964, CA9 Cal) 329 F2d 437, cert den (1964) 377 US 954, 12 L
Ed 2d 497, 84 S Ct 1630.
"Due administration of justice" clause of 18 USCS § 1503 must be read to embrace only acts similar in nature to
those mentioned in earlier specific clauses, and perjury alone does not constitute offense under § 1503. United States v
Essex (1969, CA6 Tenn) 407 F2d 214.
Whatever can be accomplished through intimidating or influencing witness, juror, or court official is labeled by 18
USCS § 1503 as obstruction of justice, for reason that each of these actors has certain duties imposed by law, and interference with his performance of these duties necessarily disrupts processes of criminal justice system; interference can
occur despite absence of any personal contact with juror, witness, or official. United States v Howard (1978, CA5 La)
569 F2d 1331, cert den (1978) 439 US 834, 58 L Ed 2d 130, 99 S Ct 116.
Solicitation of intermediary to importune judge to impose lenient sentence is endeavor made "to influence" judge or
due administration of justice. United States v Fasolino (1978, CA2 NY) 586 F2d 939.
Destruction or concealment of documents can fall within prohibition of 18 USCS § 1503. United States v Rasheed
(1981, CA9 Cal) 663 F2d 843, 9 Fed Rules Evid Serv 360, 62 ALR Fed 284, cert den (1982) 454 US 1157, 71 L Ed 2d
315, 102 S Ct 1031.
Defendant's alleged conduct in hiding witness from authorities to prevent his testimony at criminal trial falls within
residual omnibus clause of 18 USCS § 1503 prohibiting endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede due administration
of justice; in enacting 18 USCS § 1512 and removing from § 1503 all references to witnesses, Congress did not intend
to redress all forms of witness tampering under § 1512, leaving § 1503 to remedy only tampering with court officers and
jurors. United States v Lester (1984, CA9 Cal) 749 F2d 1288, 17 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1213 (superseded by statute as
stated in United States v Masterpol (1991, CA2) 940 F2d 760) and (superseded by statute as stated in United States v
Aguilar (1994, CA9 Cal) 21 F3d 1475, 94 CDOS 2697, 94 Daily Journal DAR 5199).
18 USCS § 1503 applies to cases in which witness asks defendant to aid him in attempt to avoid testifying as well
as to cases in which defendant improperly induces witness not to testify, and it does not require showing that defendants
actually impeded justice since statutory focus is on endeavor. United States v Washington Water Power Co. (1986,
CA9 Wash) 793 F2d 1079.
In order to secure conviction for obstruction of justice, government must prove something more than commission
of perjury, since otherwise, every perjury violation would be obstruction of justice, and it is most unlikely that Congress
intended such result. United States v Rankin (1989, CA3 Pa) 870 F2d 109, cert den (1989) 493 US 840, 107 L Ed 2d
86, 110 S Ct 126, subsequent app (1989, CA3 Pa) 893 F2d 1332, subsequent app (1991, CA3 Pa) 937 F2d 600.
In prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1503 by committing perjury before grand jury, it was not necessary to
prove that grand jury's investigation was actually impeded in some way beyond merely being denied evidence that
could have been obtained had defendants answered truthfully, since short flat denials of knowledge had effect of closing
off entirely avenues of inquiry being pursued. United States v Williams (1989, CA5 Tex) 874 F2d 968, reh den, en
banc (1989, CA5 Tex) 878 F2d 1435.
Bankruptcy judge who received series of disruptive mailings from farmer whose efforts to obtain bankruptcy protection failed was engaged in discharge of his duties, even though he had recused himself from defendant's case, since
he was still involved in adjudicating bankruptcy cases. United States v Fulbright (1997, CA9 Mont) 105 F3d 443, 97
CDOS 480, 97 Daily Journal DAR 783, cert den (1997) 520 US 1236, 137 L Ed 2d 1041, 117 S Ct 1836.
Given evidence presented by government that defendant's testimony was false, and jury's apparent acceptance of
that evidence, defendant's perjurious testimony had effect of closing off entirely avenue of inquiry being pursued; consequently, defendant's testimony was corruptly attempting to influence administration of justice in violation of 18 USCS
§ 1503. United States v Brown (2006, CA5 Tex) 459 F3d 509, reh den, reh, en banc, den (Oct 18, 2006) and cert den
(2007, US) 127 S Ct 2249, 167 L Ed 2d 1089.
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18 USCS § 1503
18 USCS § 1503 is contempt statute and before court may punish for contempt there must be present element of
obstruction of court in performance of its duty. United States v Campbell (1972, WD Pa) 350 F Supp 213.
Indictment which charges defendant with violating 18 USCS § 1503 by seeking to obtain, by payments of cash,
certain government materials, including minutes of grand jury proceedings and draft of contemplated indictment relating to charges then pending against defendant in earlier matter, alleges activity within purview of "due administration of
justice" clause of § 1503. United States v Rosner (1972, SD NY) 352 F Supp 915.
Where defendant allegedly made unauthorized disclosures of classified information about ambassador's wife's affiliation with Central Intelligence Agency to journalists and allegedly made false statements to federal agents and grand
jury, defendant's motion to compel discovery was granted as to, inter alia, documentation of discussions defendant had
with government officials or reports regarding ambassador or wife, but motion was denied as to documents concerning
ambassador and wife. United States v Libby (2006, DC Dist Col) 432 F Supp 2d 81.
Administration of justice protected from being obstructed or impeded consisted of action of courts, through their
officers and other direct instrumentality, essential to free and full consideration and determination of matter, and enforcement of their orders and decisions. United States v Seeley (1844, CCSDNY) 27 F Cas 1010, No 16248a.
26. Injure
Forcing witness out of business is injury to witness in his person or property for 18 USCS § 1503 purposes. United
States v Campanale (1975, CA9 Cal) 518 F2d 352, 77 CCH LC P 10948, cert den (1976) 423 US 1050, 96 S Ct 777, 46
L Ed 2d 638, 77 CCH LC P 11163, 78 CCH LC P 11180, reh den (1976) 424 US 950, 96 S Ct 1422, 47 L Ed 2d 356.
27. Intent
Specific intent to have violated predecessor to 18 USCS § 1503 must exist to justify conviction, but doctrine allowing transfer of intent in regard to crimes flowing from general malevolence has no applicability to this offense; if unintended wrong was not nature and probable consequence of intended wrongful act, artificial character cannot be ascribed
to it as basis of guilty intent. Pettibone v United States (1893) 148 US 197, 37 L Ed 419, 13 S Ct 542.
Defendant who approached man convicted for income tax evasion and told him that for certain sum of money defendant would see to it that man got probation did not thereby violate 18 USCS § 1503 where defendant had no intention
of actually attempting to influence any court officials in this regard, intending only to "shakedown" man. Ethridge v
United States (1958, CA9 Wash) 258 F2d 234.
In order for assault to constitute offense under 18 USCS § 1503, it must be made with knowledge on part of defendants of victim's past conduct or expected conduct in connection with federal narcotics charge then pending and either for purpose of punishing him for past conduct in relation thereto or intimidating him in connection with his expected conduct in relation to charge. Ferina v United States (1962, CA8 Mo) 302 F2d 95, cert den (1962) 371 US 819,
9 L Ed 2d 59, 83 S Ct 35.
Defendant's knowing and willful alteration of documents which IRS had arranged to have subpoenaed by grand jury did not violate 18 USCS § 1503 where prosecution had failed to show that defendant had specific intent to obstruct
justice. United States v Ryan (1971, CA9 Cal) 455 F2d 728, 20 ALR Fed 719.
Where evidence showed that defendants arranged meeting, took active role in fabricating story about ownership of
two horses, and knew that federal grand jury was investigating ownership of horses, inasmuch as evidence established
motives for defendants to concoct cover story, jury could properly infer that defendants' object was to obstruct grand
jury proceedings in violation of 18 USCS § 1503, notwithstanding that defendants contended that story was fabricated
for purpose of presenting to state racing commission and not to federal grand jury. United States v Turcotte (1975,
CA2 NY) 515 F2d 145, cert den (1975) 423 US 1032, 46 L Ed 2d 406, 96 S Ct 564.
Finding of specific intent to interfere with witness in pending judicial proceeding is essential element of offense of
obstructing justice, and this specific intent may be established by circumstantial evidence. United States v White (1977,
CA10 Okla) 557 F2d 233.
Violations of 18 USCS §§ 1503 and 1510 both require proof of specific intent to obstruct justice. United States v
Carleo (1978, CA10 Colo) 576 F2d 846, cert den (1978) 439 US 850, 58 L Ed 2d 152, 99 S Ct 153.
Intent is necessary elements of offense under 18 USCS § 1503. United States v Haas (1978, CA5 Ala) 583 F2d
216, reh den (1978, CA5 Ala) 588 F2d 829 and cert den (1979) 440 US 981, 60 L Ed 2d 240, 99 S Ct 1788.
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18 USCS § 1503
Specific intent to impede administration of justice is essential element of violation of 18 USCS § 1503. United
States v Johnson (1978, CA5 Tex) 585 F2d 119.
In prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1503, defendant need only have knowledge or notice that success of his
fraud would have likely resulted in obstruction of justice; since when defendant intentionally seeks to corrupt, foreseeable consequence of which is to obstruct justice, he has violated 18 USCS § 1503, defendant who intentionally undertook
act or intended to effectuate arrangement with reasonably foreseeable consequence of obstructing justice violates § 1503
even if his hope was that judicial machinery would not be seriously impaired. United States v Neiswender (1979, CA4
Md) 590 F2d 1269, cert den (1979) 441 US 963, 60 L Ed 2d 1068, 99 S Ct 2410.
18 USCS § 1503 allows punishment of actions taken with specific intent to impede administration of justice; so
long as defendant has such specific intent, he may not circumvent court's contempt power by pressing empty technicalities. United States v Simmons (1979, CA3 Pa) 591 F2d 206.
Specific intent to impede administration of justice is essential element of 18 USCS § 1503 violation, which government must establish beyond reasonable doubt. United States v Sun Myung Moon (1983, CA2 NY) 718 F2d 1210,
83-2 USTC P 9581, 14 Fed Rules Evid Serv 133, 52 AFTR 2d 6026, cert den (1984) 466 US 971, 104 S Ct 2344, 80 L
Ed 2d 818 and (criticized in United States v Sonego (2005, CAAF) 61 MJ 1, 2005 CAAF LEXIS 363).
Actual contact or even intent to contact person having authority to effect result need not be shown to prove 18
USCS § 1503 violation; intent may be inferred from proof that defendant had knowledge or notice that his corrupt actions would obstruct justice than actually being administered. United States v Buffalano (1984, CA2 NY) 727 F2d 50.
Specific intent to impede grand jury investigation is essential element of 18 USCS § 1503 violation, however, that
intent may be inferred by jury from all surrounding facts and circumstances. United States v Petzold (1986, CA11 Fla)
788 F2d 1478.
Specific intent to obstruct or impede administration of justice under 18 USCS § 1503 is not required so long as defendant had knowledge or notice that success in scheme to defraud would have had natural and probable consequences
resulting in direct interference with administration of justice, where defendants who solicited $ 50,000 for sentence reduction and encouraged client to drop appeal of his conviction argued that they never intended to attempt to accomplish
sentence reduction for client. United States v Machi (1987, CA7 Wis) 811 F2d 991, 22 Fed Rules Evid Serv 795.
Defendant's conviction on charges of grand jury and agency obstruction, 18 USCS §§ 1503, 1505, was vacated because jury instructions on these counts relieved jury of having to make findings of wrongful intent, corrupt intent, and
nexus requirement, in assessing criminal liability. United States v Quattrone (2006, CA2 NY) 441 F3d 153.
Defendant's conviction on charges of grand jury and agency obstruction was vacated because jury instructions on
these counts relieved jury of having to make findings of wrongful intent, corrupt intent, and nexus requirement, in assessing criminal liability. United States v Quattrone (2006, CA2 NY) 441 F3d 153.
To complete crime of obstructing due administration of justice in violation of 18 USCS § 1503 it is not necessary to
have intent to influence jury; only intent involved in crime of obstructing justice is intent to do forbidden act. Caldwell
v United States (1954, App DC) 95 US App DC 35, 218 F2d 370, cert den (1955) 349 US 930, 99 L Ed 1260, 75 S Ct
773, reh den (1955) 349 US 969, 99 L Ed 1290, 75 S Ct 880.
28. Knowledge
Knowledge or notice that justice was being administered by court was necessary on part of defendant in order to
sufficiently charge him with obstructing administration of justice in such court. Pettibone v United States (1893) 148
US 197, 37 L Ed 419, 13 S Ct 542.
Reasonably founded belief of defendant that person attempted to be influenced was witness was sufficient to make
requisite scienter, where he was in fact witness. Broadbent v United States (1945, CA10 Utah) 149 F2d 580.
In order for assault to constitute offense under 18 USCS § 1503, it must be made with knowledge on part of defendants of victim's past conduct or expected conduct in connection with federal narcotics charge then pending and either for purpose of punishing him for past conduct in relation thereto or intimidating him in connection with his expected conduct in relation to charge. Ferina v United States (1962, CA8 Mo) 302 F2d 95, cert den (1962) 371 US 819,
9 L Ed 2d 59, 83 S Ct 35.
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18 USCS § 1503
Knowledge is necessary element of offense under 18 USCS § 1503. United States v Haas (1978, CA5 Ala) 583
F2d 216, reh den (1978, CA5 Ala) 588 F2d 829 and cert den (1979) 440 US 981, 60 L Ed 2d 240, 99 S Ct 1788.
Knowledge of federal nature of proceeding allegedly obstructed in violation of 18 USCS § 1503 is not element of
offense. United States v Ardito (1986, CA2 Conn) 782 F2d 358, cert den (1986) 475 US 1141, 90 L Ed 2d 338, 106 S
Ct 1792 and cert den (1986) 476 US 1160, 90 L Ed 2d 723, 106 S Ct 2281.
Neither 18 USCS § 752 nor § 1503 requires government to prove that individuals planning escape were aware of
federal status of their intended escape target. United States v Aragon (1993, CA4 SC) 983 F2d 1306, 38 Fed Rules
Evid Serv 103, amd (1993, CA4 SC) slip op.
In case where defendants, executives of two corporations, allegedly temporarily "parked" equity interest in three
power-generating barges owned by one corporation with other corporation by using sale Government claimed was
sham, although defendant claimed that his testimony was not actually false, as he never denied knowledge of some
"understanding" or "comfort" between two corporations as to buyback; rather, he merely denied knowledge of "promise" of such side-deal, this distinction and spin placed on selective and hyper-technical word choice provided no refuge
from jury's verdict of guilty to charges of perjury before Grand Jury in violation of 18 USCS §§ 1623 and 3551, and
obstruction of Grand Jury investigation in violation of 18 USCS §§ 1503 and 3551. United States v Brown (2006, CA5
Tex) 459 F3d 509, reh den, reh, en banc, den (Oct 18, 2006) and cert den (2007, US) 127 S Ct 2249, 167 L Ed 2d 1089.
Defendant was not entitled to judgment of acquittal on charge of violating 18 USCS § 1503 where defendant deleted several documents from his computer for which there was no outstanding subpoena; however, there was evidence
that defendant knew that documents would eventually be requested based on his discussions with former prosecutor.
United States v Triumph Capital Group, Inc. (2008, CA2 Conn) 544 F3d 149.
Defendant having no notice or knowledge that person was witness did not violate predecessor to 18 USCS § 1503.
United States v Kee (1889, DC SC) 39 F 603.
Proper test of violation of 18 USCS § 1503 is whether defendant had knowledge, notice, or information that person
he endeavored to intimidate or interfere with was or intended to be witness in pending matter. United States v Solow
(1956, DC NY) 138 F Supp 812 (superseded by statute as stated in United States v Simpkins (1986, NMCMR) 22 MJ
924).
In order to complete offense of destroying "evidence" under 18 USCS § 1503, it is not necessary to show that defendant knew that documents he destroyed were "material" to subject of pending grand jury inquiry which he was
charged with obstructing, but only that they bore reasonable relation to inquiry. United States v Siegel (1957, DC NY)
152 F Supp 370.
Knowledge that person whom defendant sought to intimidate was government witness is necessary element under
18 USCS § 1503 charge. United States v Bufalino (1981, SD NY) 518 F Supp 1190.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Defendant's sentence for conspiracy to distribute cocaine, cocaine distribution, and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of school, in violation of 21 USCS §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 860, was
properly enhanced under USSG § 3C1.1 when defendant sought and threatened to kill witness he thought was cooperating with police after police executed search warrants on defendant's properties; defendant knew that he was under investigation within meaning of 18 USCS § 1503, and his conduct rose to level of obstructing justice. United States v
Rinick (2007, CA3 Pa) 219 Fed Appx 238, cert den (2007, US) 127 S Ct 3027, 168 L Ed 2d 742.
29. Threat or force
Attempt to secure possession of automobile which had been purchased with money obtained in bank robbery could
not be prosecuted under 18 USCS § 1503 since defendant did not use threats or force to obtain automobile. United
States v Metcalf (1970, CA9 Wash) 435 F2d 754.
There is no requirement that there be proof of direct threats or actual use of violence for 18 USCS § 1503 to have
been violated; where there were continual references to witness' wife, against background of defendant's earlier statement of what he would do if interest was not paid, threat was enough to justify jury's belief that witness was physically
afraid. United States v Cioffi (1974, CA2 NY) 493 F2d 1111, cert den (1974) 419 US 917, 42 L Ed 2d 155, 95 S Ct 195.
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18 USCS § 1503
18 USCS § 1503 should not be limited merely to "intimidating actions." United States v Howard (1978, CA5 La)
569 F2d 1331, cert den (1978) 439 US 834, 58 L Ed 2d 130, 99 S Ct 116.
Threats or force need not be used in order for violation of 18 USCS § 1503 to occur. United States v Ogle (1979,
CA10 Colo) 613 F2d 233, cert den (1980) 449 US 825, 66 L Ed 2d 28, 101 S Ct 87, reh den (1980) 449 US 1026, 66 L
Ed 2d 487, 101 S Ct 594.
Use of word "corruptly" in 18 USCS § 1503 is clear indication that not every violation of § 1503 involves threats or
intimidation. United States v Rasheed (1981, CA9 Cal) 663 F2d 843, 9 Fed Rules Evid Serv 360, 62 ALR Fed 284, cert
den (1982) 454 US 1157, 71 L Ed 2d 315, 102 S Ct 1031.
B.Persons Who May Be Influenced or Injured 30. Court officers
Prosecuting attorney preparing recommendation for judge of federal courts with regard to sentence to be imposed in
particular case is "officer" acting in discharge of his duty within meaning of § 135 of Criminal Code, predecessor of 18
USCS § 1503, since influencing attorney could influence judge himself. United States v Polakoff (1940, CA2 NY) 112
F2d 888, 134 ALR 607, cert den (1940) 311 US 653, 85 L Ed 418, 61 S Ct 41.
United States district court judge is officer in or of any court of United States within meaning of that language as
used in 18 USCS § 1503. United States v Margoles (1961, CA7 Wis) 294 F2d 371, cert den (1961) 368 US 930, 7 L Ed
2d 193, 82 S Ct 367.
Trustee in bankruptcy is conventional court officer protected by court-officer prong of 18 USCS § 1503. United
States v Crispo (2002, CA2 NY) 306 F3d 71, 49 CBC2d 376.
31.--Police officers
It was improper to offer juror any valuable thing or consideration to obtain verdict, or prevent one's being found, or
to influence his opinion or action in any particular. Charge to Grand Jury (1869, DC Or) 1 Deady 657, 30 F Cas 986,
No 18251.
Indictment charging that defendant corruptly did endeavor to influence, obstruct and impede due administration of
justice in United States District Court in that defendant, knowing that Chief of Police, Mission, South Dakota, had arrested party, threatened physical injury to said police chief unless party was released from jail, did not commit violation
under 18 USCS § 1503 because first assumption that police chief was officer of court whose daily work would always
be assumed to be in discharge of duty was incorrect since local police officer's only federal duty in case was to make
arrest on behalf of federal officers and whose duty did and had ended after he gave up custody of prisoner; at time he
was threatened, police chief had already turned over custody, had no remaining duties concerning party, and could not
possibly have released prisoner as demanded by defendant; therefore, defendant could not have obstructed justice even
had he wanted to do so. United States v Knife (1974, DC SD) 371 F Supp 1345.
32. Grand jurors
There may be indictment for obstructing justice under 18 USCS § 1503, for corruptly interfering with grand juror,
even though no oath had been administered to juror at time of interference. United States v Solow (1956, DC NY) 138
F Supp 812 (superseded by statute as stated in United States v Simpkins (1986, NMCMR) 22 MJ 924).
33. Petit jurors
Corrupt endeavor was within meaning of predecessor of 18 USCS § 1503, despite fact that petit juror had not yet
been selected or sworn, where defendant knew that person he endeavored to influence corruptly was juror. United
States v Russell (1921) 255 US 138, 65 L Ed 553, 41 S Ct 260.
Surety on recognizance who induced principal not to voluntarily appear was properly prosecuted. Astwood v
United States (1924, CA8 Mo) 1 F2d 639.
Predecessor to 18 USCS § 1503 included endeavoring to influence, intimidate, or impede petit juror. Bedell v
United States (1935, CA8 Iowa) 78 F2d 358, cert den (1935) 296 US 628, 80 L Ed 447, 56 S Ct 151.
Prospective members of petit jury are protected by 18 USCS § 1503. Calvaresi v United States (1954, CA10 Colo)
216 F2d 891, revd on other grounds (1955) 348 US 961, 99 L Ed 749, 75 S Ct 522.
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18 USCS § 1503
Prospective juror who had been selected as member of jury panel expected to try national labor leader on criminal
charges in United States District Court was "juror" within meaning of 18 USCS § 1503. United States v Osborn (1969,
CA6 Tenn) 415 F2d 1021, cert den (1970) 396 US 1015, 24 L Ed 2d 506, 90 S Ct 567.
Veniremen who were members of panel from which petit juror was to be selected came within class of persons
protected by 18 USCS § 1503. United States v Jackson (1979, CA8 Ark) 607 F2d 1219, cert den (1980) 444 US 1080,
62 L Ed 2d 763, 100 S Ct 1032.
It was improper to offer juror any valuable thing or consideration to obtain verdict, or prevent one's being found, or
to influence his opinion or action in any particular. Charge to Grand Jury (1869, DC Or) 1 Deady 657, 30 F Cas 986,
No 18251.
34. Parties
Predecessor of 18 USCS § 1503, was broad enough to cover any act, committed corruptly, in endeavor to impede or
obstruct due administration of justice, and therefore persuading codefendant to absent himself from trial in order to improperly secure postponement violates statute. Samples v United States (1941, CA5 Ala) 121 F2d 263, cert den (1941)
314 US 662, 86 L Ed 530, 62 S Ct 129.
35. Witnesses
Witness called before grand jury was witness in court of United States. Davey v United States (1913, CA7 Ind)
208 F 237, cert den (1913) 231 US 747, 58 L Ed 464, 34 S Ct 320; United States v Marionneaux (1975, CA5 La) 514
F2d 1244 (ovrld in part on other grounds as stated in United States v Watson (1989, CA11 Fla) 866 F2d 381) and (ovrld
in part on other grounds as stated in United States v Scrushy (2006, MD Ala) 237 FRD 464); United States v Campanale
(1975, CA9 Cal) 518 F2d 352, 77 CCH LC P 10948, cert den (1976) 423 US 1050, 96 S Ct 777, 46 L Ed 2d 638, 77
CCH LC P 11163, 78 CCH LC P 11180, reh den (1976) 424 US 950, 96 S Ct 1422, 47 L Ed 2d 356.
It was not necessary that witness should have been subpoenaed to be protected. Smith v United States (1921, CA8
Ark) 274 F 351; Samples v United States (1941, CA5 Ala) 121 F2d 263, cert den (1941) 314 US 662, 86 L Ed 530, 62 S
Ct 129; Roberts v United States (1956, CA9 Cal) 239 F2d 467; Cotton v United States (1969, CA10 Kan) 409 F2d
1049, cert den (1970) 396 US 1016, 24 L Ed 2d 507, 90 S Ct 577.
Witness before grand jury, when no particular case was then being investigated, could have been influenced witness. Etie v United States (1932, CA5 Tex) 55 F2d 114.
Codefendant with accused in conspiracy trial was not "witness" within meaning of word as used in § 135 of Criminal Code, predecessor of 18 USCS § 1503, at least unless accused had reason to believe that codefendant was going to
waive immunity and testify. Walker v United States (1938, CA8 Mo) 93 F2d 792.
Person who had not been requested to testify and who had no desire, intent, or expectation of testifying, was not
witness within 18 USCS § 1503. Berra v United States (1955, CA8 Mo) 221 F2d 590, 55-1 USTC P 9382, 47 AFTR
698, affd (1956) 351 US 131, 76 S Ct 685, 100 L Ed 1013, 56-1 USTC P 9480, 49 AFTR 187 and (superseded by statute
as stated in Sansone v United States (1965) 380 US 343, 85 S Ct 1004, 13 L Ed 2d 882, 65-1 USTC P 9307, 15 AFTR 2d
611).
Anyone who knows or is supposed to know material facts and who is expected to testify about them or be called on
to testify is "witness" within meaning of 18 USCS § 1503. United States v Grunewald (1956, CA2 NY) 233 F2d 556,
56-1 USTC P 9452, 56-2 USTC P 9647, 49 AFTR 1270, revd on other grounds (1957) 353 US 391, 77 S Ct 963, 1 L Ed
2d 931, 57-1 USTC P 9693, 51 AFTR 20, 62 ALR2d 1344.
One endeavors to obstruct due administration of justice, in violation of 18 USCS § 1503, by endeavoring to influence persons he believes to be prospective witnesses, regardless of whether those persons intend to, or actually do, testify. Falk v United States (1966, CA9 Cal) 370 F2d 472, cert den (1967) 387 US 926, 18 L Ed 2d 982, 87 S Ct 2044
and (superseded by statute as stated in United States v Simpkins (1986, NMCMR) 22 MJ 924).
Under 18 USCS § 1503, "witness" is one who knows or is supposed to know material facts and is expected to testify to them, or to be called on to testify as witness. Hunt v United States (1968, CA5 Tex) 400 F2d 306, cert den (1969)
393 US 1021, 21 L Ed 2d 566, 89 S Ct 629.
Within meaning of 18 USCS § 1503, witness is one who knows, or is suppose to know, material facts and is expected to testify to them or to be called as witness to so testify; where person gives information about offense for which
Page 27
18 USCS § 1503
defendants' brother is indicted, and defendants confront her with her actions, threaten her, and forcefully assault her,
conviction under this section is proper. United States v Griffin (1972, CA10 Kan) 463 F2d 177, cert den (1972) 409 US
988, 34 L Ed 2d 254, 93 S Ct 344.
18 USCS § 1503 clearly protects witnesses before grand juries. United States v Campanale (1975, CA9 Cal) 518
F2d 352, 77 CCH LC P 10948, cert den (1976) 423 US 1050, 96 S Ct 777, 46 L Ed 2d 638, 77 CCH LC P 11163, 78
CCH LC P 11180, reh den (1976) 424 US 950, 96 S Ct 1422, 47 L Ed 2d 356.
Purpose of 18 USCS § 1503 requires that connotation of "witness" be determined with view to substance, rather
than form; thus, person may be witness within protection of § 1503 even though he is not under formal subpoena or is
expected to testify in proceedings not yet convened; thus, chief prosecution witness retains his status as "witness" while
case is pending on direct appeal. United States v Chandler (1979, CA5 Ga) 604 F2d 972, reh den (1979, CA5 Ga) 608
F2d 524 and cert dismd (1980) 444 US 1104, 63 L Ed 2d 317, 100 S Ct 1074.
Person testifying at trial retains status as "witness" during time case is on direct appeal. United States v Chandler
(1979, CA5 Ga) 604 F2d 972, reh den (1979, CA5 Ga) 608 F2d 524 and cert dismd (1980) 444 US 1104, 63 L Ed 2d
317, 100 S Ct 1074.
Solicitation of false testimony from prospective witness may provide basis for conviction under obstruction of justice provision of 18 USCS § 1503. United States v Friedland (1981, CA3 NJ) 660 F2d 919, 9 Fed Rules Evid Serv 21,
cert den (1982) 456 US 989, 73 L Ed 2d 1283, 102 S Ct 2268.
Person need not always intend or expect to testify in order to be "witness" within meaning of 18 USCS § 1503.
United States v Berardi (1982, CA7 Ill) 675 F2d 894.
Under 18 USCS § 1503, witness retained status of witness while case in which he testified is on appeal or while
motion for new trial is pending in subject case. United States v Patton (1983, CA6 Tenn) 721 F2d 159.
For purposes of 18 USCS § 1503, likelihood that putative witness would testify in future is essential factor in evaluating individual's status as witness. United States v Vesich (1984, CA5 La) 724 F2d 451, 14 Fed Rules Evid Serv
1518, reh den (1984, CA5 La) 726 F2d 168 and (superseded by statute as stated in United States v Gonzalez (1991, CA2
NY) 922 F2d 1044).
18 USCS § 1503 is applicable to obstruction of administration of justice by attempts to influence witnesses notwithstanding enactment of 18 USCS § 1512 and 1982 amendment to § 1503 deleting references to witnesses, since residual clause in § 1503 prohibiting anyone from obstructing or attempting to obstruct "due administration of justice"
was not deleted; convictions under both § 1503 and § 1512 arising from alleged conduct with respect to potential witness are not multiplicious. United States v Wesley (1984, CA5 La) 748 F2d 962, cert den (1985) 471 US 1130, 86 L Ed
2d 281, 105 S Ct 2664.
Witness who appeared before grand jury was "witness" within meaning of 18 USCS § 1503 even though he had already appeared before grand jury and refused to testify and was unlikely to be recalled at time defendant attempted to
hire another to kill him, where, although witness had asserted Fifth Amendment privilege, he knew or was supposed to
know material facts about matters under investigation by grand jury and could have been recalled to appear, since person's status as witness continues even when judicial proceedings have already occurred as long as there is possibility
that person will testify or be called upon to testify in future. United States v Risken (1986, CA8 Iowa) 788 F2d 1361,
cert den (1986) 479 US 923, 93 L Ed 2d 302, 107 S Ct 329.
Conviction for witness tampering in violation of 18 USCS § 1503 was proper, where bank chairman advised bank
teller to keep quiet during investigation of his activities since it was reasonable for jury to find that he thought that teller
was or would be grand jury witness at time of their conversation. United States v Shannon (1988, CA8 Mo) 836 F2d
1125, 24 Fed Rules Evid Serv 816, reh den (1988, CA8 Mo) 1988 US App LEXIS 18914 and cert den (1988) 486 US
1058, 100 L Ed 2d 930, 108 S Ct 2830.
Excused witness' status paralleled that of witness between initial and subsequent appearances; one called as trial
witness retains that character throughout duration of trial for purposes of 18 USCS § 1503. United States v Jackson
(1975, App DC) 168 US App DC 198, 513 F2d 456.
Person for whom subpoena had issued to appear before United States commissioner was witness. United States v
Bittinger (1876, WD Mo) 24 F Cas 1149, No 14598.
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18 USCS § 1503
"Witness" falls under protection of 18 USCS § 1503 before, during, or after trial at which he testifies. United
States v Verra (1962, SD NY) 203 F Supp 87.
Although word "witness" has been eliminated from 18 USCS § 1503, perceived potentiality of individual as witness
is relevant to charges under § 1503. United States v Osticco (1984, MD Pa) 580 F Supp 484, 15 Fed Rules Evid Serv
511, affd without op (1984, CA3 Pa) 738 F2d 424 and affd without op (1984, CA3 Pa) 738 F2d 426, cert den (1985)
469 US 1158, 83 L Ed 2d 919, 105 S Ct 904.
III.PARTICULAR ACTS AS CONSTITUTING OFFENSE
A.Influencing, Intimidating, Impeding or Injuring Particular Persons
1.Court Officers 36. Improperly using influence to reduce sentence
Where defendant was attempting to influence assistant district attorney in charge of case to recommend reduced
sentence therein and to bring it before certain judge who would reduce it still more following his custom with respect to
prosecutors' recommendations and giving supposedly disinterested reasons for his attempts while actually he was acting
in expectation of financial gain, such attempts were corrupt because they were fraud. United States v Polakoff (1941,
CA2 NY) 121 F2d 333, cert den (1941) 314 US 626, 86 L Ed 503, 62 S Ct 107.
Defendants conspired to obstruct due administration of justice in violation of 18 USCS § 1503 where, for money
paid to them to use their influence in bankruptcy matter, defendant acting United States attorney exercised discreet influence on office of United States attorney, and where defendant state court justice consulted with judge sitting in
bankruptcy case, endeavoring to influence him regarding severity of sentence. United States v Kahaner (1963, CA2
NY) 317 F2d 459, cert den (1963) 375 US 835, 11 L Ed 2d 65, 84 S Ct 62, reh den (1964) 375 US 982, 11 L Ed 2d 429,
84 S Ct 478 and cert den (1963) 375 US 836, 11 L Ed 2d 65, 84 S Ct 73 and cert den (1963) 375 US 836, 11 L Ed 2d 65,
84 S Ct 74, reh den (1963) 375 US 926, 11 L Ed 2d 169, 84 S Ct 263.
Criminal defense attorney's alleged conduct in knowingly making false representations to prosecutor as part of
scheme to induce prosecutor to file postjudgment motion under 18 USCS § 1503 to reduce sentence of defendant convicted of narcotics trafficking and murder would constitute obstruction of justice, even though convicted defendant had
been sentenced, where there still were "pending proceedings" in which convicted defendant could file postjudgment
motion to reduce his sentence. United States v Baum (1999, SD NY) 32 F Supp 2d 642.
37. Public criticism
Newspaper criticism of district attorney saying that while stay in given case was not required in law it was moral
liability upon district attorney was not 18 USCS § 1503 violation. Mainelli v Providence Journal Co. (1962, CA1 RI)
312 F2d 3.
Newspaper criticism tending to embarrass judge in case pending before him constituted obstruction of administration of justice. United States v Toledo Newspaper Co. (1915, DC Ohio) 220 F 458, affd (1916, CA6 Ohio) 237 F 986,
affd (1918) 247 US 402, 38 S Ct 560, 62 L Ed 1186 (ovrld in part on other grounds by Nye v United States (1941) 313
US 33, 61 S Ct 810, 85 L Ed 1172) and (Overruled as stated in United States v Rangolan (2006, CA2 NY) 464 F3d 321).
38. Miscellaneous
Defendant who endeavored to bribe federal judge for corrupt purpose endeavored to obstruct justice in violation of
18 USCS § 1503. United States v Margoles (1961, CA7 Wis) 294 F2d 371, cert den (1961) 368 US 930, 7 L Ed 2d 193,
82 S Ct 367.
Defendant who threatened officer of federal court with regard to pending matter by pointing pistol at him, corruptly
endeavored to influence, intimidate, or impede officer, in violation of 18 USCS § 1503. Hodgdon v United States
(1966, CA8 Minn) 365 F2d 679, cert den (1967) 385 US 1029, 17 L Ed 2d 676, 87 S Ct 759.
Charge of obstruction of justice against defendant is not dismissed, where defendant sent bogus letter to federal
District Court requesting leniency for himself, which letter allegedly bore forged endorsement of his employer, because
even if letter did not influence judge, endeavor to obstruct justice is shown if letter had natural and probable effect of
impeding justice. United States v Collis (1995, ED Mich) 875 F Supp 398.
Unpublished Opinions
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18 USCS § 1503
Unpublished: Where defendant gave false information about his assets to pretrial services officer who made bond
recommendation to court, evidence was sufficient to support conviction for obstruction of justice because bail proceeding was part of administration of justice within meaning of 18 USCS § 1503; false information about one's income and
assets submitted in course of bail investigation had probable effect on outcome of bail proceeding. United States v
DeAngelis (2006, CA11 Fla) 206 Fed Appx 873, 98 AFTR 2d 7555, subsequent app (2006, CA11 Fla) 2007-1 USTC P
50292, 98 AFTR 2d 7878, cert den (2007, US) 128 S Ct 232, 169 L Ed 2d 175 and cert den (2007, US) 127 S Ct 1845,
167 L Ed 2d 339.
Unpublished: Issuance of bench warrant was natural consequence of individual's failure to appear for enforcement
hearing; therefore, university, lawyers, law firm and judge's actions in obtaining award of attorneys' fees, setting enforcement hearing, failing to inform court of individual's financial status, seeking bench warrant, and making settlement
offer could not support 42 USCS § 1985(2) deterrence claim or claim for obstruction of justice under 18 USCS § 1503.
Raiser v Kono (2007, CA10 Utah) 245 Fed Appx 732.
2.Jurors 39. Endeavoring to affect deliberations or decisions
Parties to civil suit violated predecessor to 18 USCS § 1503 by paying for drinks and lodging of juror. Sneed v
United States (1924, CA5 Tex) 298 F 911, 37 ALR 772, cert den (1924) 265 US 590, 68 L Ed 1195, 44 S Ct 635.
Solicitation of juror in pending criminal prosecution to vote not guilty as to one defendant because attorney for such
defendant was great friend of solicitor was endeavor to influence juror within use of that word in 18 USCS § 1503.
Kong v United States (1954, CA9 Hawaii) 216 F2d 665.
No violation of 18 USCS § 1503 occurred where defendant approached juror who was member of panel called for
forthcoming case and conversed with juror about matter not being tried, but 18 USCS § 1503 offense occurred where
defendant, at bidding of one who was accused in previous case, twice contacted member of jury panel called in that previous case and offered her money if she would "sit on the jury." Calvaresi v United States (1954, CA10 Colo) 216 F2d
891, revd on other grounds (1955) 348 US 961, 99 L Ed 749, 75 S Ct 522.
Evidence was sufficient for conviction for endeavoring to influence, intimidate, and impede jurors in discharge of
their duties, in violation of 18 USCS § 1503, where one defendant, through intermediaries, contacted acquaintances,
friends, or relatives of 2 of jurors and one venireman who was sitting at trial of national labor leader involving alleged
violations of Taft-Hartley Act, and one intermediary induced neighbor of one of jurors to offer juror $ 10,000 to influence his vote, attempted to bribe son and daughter of another juror for purpose of influencing their father, and promised
benefits to husband of third juror if he would influence his wife's vote. United States v Hoffa (1965, CA6) 349 F2d 20,
affd (1966) 385 US 293, 17 L Ed 2d 374, 87 S Ct 408, reh den (1967) 386 US 940, 386 US 951, 17 L Ed 2d 880, 87 S Ct
970, 87 S Ct 971.
Defendant violated 18 USCS § 1503 where defendant, who had been friends for some years with juror who was
serving at trial of national labor leader for alleged Taft-Hartley violation, informed juror that juror had chance to make $
10,000. United States v Medlin (1965, CA6 Tenn) 353 F2d 789, cert den (1966) 384 US 973, 16 L Ed 2d 683, 86 S Ct
1860, reh den (1966) 385 US 889, 17 L Ed 2d 123, 87 S Ct 14.
Evidence was sufficient to support conviction under 18 USCS § 1503 where defendant met juror serving in narcotics conspiracy case in which acquaintance of defendant was on trial and attempted to influence him by speaking of unfairness of machinery of justice against accused persons, expressing belief that defendant in narcotics case had been
wrongfully accused, and implying that $ 5,000 would be paid to juror if "at the right time" he would "remember who
your friends were." United States v De Alesandro (1966, CA2 NY) 361 F2d 694, cert den (1966) 385 US 842, 17 L Ed
2d 74, 87 S Ct 94.
Defendant corruptly endeavored to impede due administration of justice by giving money to petit juror to influence
juror's action in pending case in violation of 18 USCS § 1503 where defendant, through intermediary, gave juror $ 500
with intent to influence juror's decision in defendant's earlier trial. United States v Panczko (1970, CA7 Ill) 429 F2d
683, cert den (1970) 400 US 946, 27 L Ed 2d 252, 91 S Ct 253.
Convictions must be vacated and remanded for hearing on whether defendants were prejudiced by jury misconduct,
where allegations that individual approached defendant two days before closing arguments offering assistance in obtaining favorable verdict provided credible evidence of jury tampering. United States v Corrado (2000, CA6 Mich) 227
F3d 528, 2000 FED App 280P (criticized in United States v Vanmeter (2002, CA10 Okla) 278 F3d 1156) and (criticized
in State v Benenati (2002, App) 203 Ariz 235, 52 P3d 804, 381 Ariz Adv Rep 3).
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18 USCS § 1503
40. Miscellaneous
It was obstruction of justice for parties, during progress of criminal prosecution, to employ detective to shadow jurors. Sinclair v United States (1929) 279 US 749, 73 L Ed 938, 49 S Ct 471, 63 ALR 1258.
Defendants who questioned grand juror about who was being investigated, met with him thereafter to discuss investigation, and asked him to keep them informed of further developments, were guilty of violating 18 USCS § 1503,
even though grand juror made initial contact with them on his own initiative. United States v Saget (1993, CA11 Ga)
991 F2d 702, 37 Fed Rules Evid Serv 643, 7 FLW Fed C 346, cert den (1993) 510 US 950, 126 L Ed 2d 344, 114 S Ct
396.
Actions constitute violation of 18 USCS § 1503, irrespective of any good faith belief he may have had, where defendant actively participates in criminal scheme to obstruct justice by having juror write false letter alleging juror misconduct which never occurred. United States v Dozier (1982, MD La) 543 F Supp 880.
3.Parties 41. Preventing party from appearing at proceedings
Predecessor of 18 USCS § 1503, was broad enough to cover any act, committed corruptly, in endeavor to impede or
obstruct due administration of justice, and therefore persuading codefendant to absent himself from trial in order to improperly secure postponement violates statute. Samples v United States (1941, CA5 Ala) 121 F2d 263, cert den (1941)
314 US 662, 86 L Ed 530, 62 S Ct 129.
Accused obstructed justice in violation of predecessor of 18 USCS § 1503 where accused conspired with one of 22
defendants to falsely arrange to have emergency medical operation performed on that defendant, so as to obtain mistrial
as to that defendant. United States v Minkoff (1943, CA2 NY) 137 F2d 402.
42. Preventing party from getting facts
Violation of predecessor to 18 USCS § 1503 may consist of preventing litigant from learning facts which he might
otherwise learn since this prevents him from deciding for himself whether or not to make use of such facts. Wilder v
United States (1906, CA4 W Va) 143 F 433, cert den (1907) 204 US 674, 51 L Ed 674, 27 S Ct 787.
43. Miscellaneous
Defendant who plied plaintiff in civil action with liquor, thereby obtaining from plaintiff letters to court and to
plaintiff's attorney requesting that action be dismissed, obstructed justice by causing false and fraudulently obtained
letter to be filed with court, thereby causing delay and expense to court, in violation of predecessor to 18 USCS § 1503.
Nye v United States (1943, CA4 NC) 137 F2d 73, cert den (1943) 320 US 755, 88 L Ed 449, 64 S Ct 62.
4.Witnesses 44. Inducing witness to give false, evasive, or incomplete testimony
Conspiracy to corruptly endeavor to influence, intimidate, and impede witness, and to corruptly endeavor to impede
and obstruct justice, in violation of 18 USCS § 241, predecessor of 18 USCS § 1503, was established by evidence that,
inter alia, defendant's coconspirator, defendant in prior trial, had attempted to bribe that one with whom he had been
arrested for that earlier crime, to induce other to take blame for that crime and testify that no other parties were involved. Samples v United States (1941, CA5 Ala) 121 F2d 263, cert den (1941) 314 US 662, 86 L Ed 530, 62 S Ct 129.
Defendant violated 18 USCS § 241, predecessor of 18 USCS § 1503, where, during defendant's trial for selling alcohol to 16-year-old Indian ward of federal government, he induced witness to falsely testify that he had witnessed sale
of liquor and that sale was made to unknown Mexican rather than to Indian ward in question. Catrino v United States
(1949, CA9 Mont) 176 F2d 884.
Defendants violated 18 USCS § 1503 where they accepted money from one who was accused of crime in return for
promising to alter testimony of one of defendants and that of another person, both of whom were material witnesses in
pending case. Anderson v United States (1954, CA6 Ky) 215 F2d 84, cert den (1954) 348 US 888, 99 L Ed 698, 75 S Ct
208, reh den (1955) 348 US 922, 99 L Ed 723, 75 S Ct 291.
Defendant, charged in criminal information with several violations of Federal Fair Labor Standards Act, endeavored to influence, intimidate, or impede witnesses and to influence, obstruct, or impede due administration of justice, in
violation of 18 USCS § 1503, where defendant prepared and obtained signed statements from several persons involved
in charges without allowing them to read statements and without explaining statements to witnesses. Smith v United
States (1956, CA5 Fla) 234 F2d 385, 30 CCH LC P 69990.
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18 USCS § 1503
Attorney violates 18 USCS § 1503 by having his client-witness knowingly testify falsely and contrary to oath on
material subjects. United States v Root (1966, CA9 Cal) 366 F2d 377, cert den (1967) 386 US 912, 17 L Ed 2d 784, 87
S Ct 861.
Defendant violated 18 USCS § 1503 where he persuaded old friend who was witness to explain her possession of
certain stolen United States Treasury bearer bills by saying that they had been given to her by particular acquaintance
who had recently died. United States v Knohl (1967, CA2 NY) 379 F2d 427, cert den (1967) 389 US 973, 19 L Ed 2d
465, 88 S Ct 472 and (superseded by statute as stated in United States v Gerhart (1976, CA8 Iowa) 538 F2d 807, 1 Fed
Rules Evid Serv 286).
Defendants corruptly endeavored to influence prospective witness in pending federal judicial matter, in violation of
18 USCS § 1503, where they approached particular witness and made false representations to him with purpose of endeavoring to influence him to testify falsely. United States v Friedman (1971, CA9 Cal) 445 F2d 1076, cert den (1971)
404 US 958, 30 L Ed 2d 275, 92 S Ct 326.
Defendant corruptly endeavored to induce witness to give false testimony in violation of 18 USCS § 1503 where
defendant contacted witness who had been subpoenaed to testify before grand jury investigating loan-shark activities,
and instructed witness to tell grand jury nothing about loans and to testify, if asked where he borrowed money, that he
had borrowed it from cash register at witness' place of employment. United States v De Luzio (1972, CA10 Colo) 454
F2d 711, cert den (1972) 407 US 922, 32 L Ed 2d 808, 92 S Ct 2467.
Perjurous witness can bring about miscarriage of justice envisioned by 18 USCS § 1503; witness' testimony is
"evasive" when he deliberately conceals knowledge and "false" when he blocks flow of truthful information. United
States v Griffin (1979, CA5 Fla) 589 F2d 200, cert den (1979) 444 US 825, 62 L Ed 2d 32, 100 S Ct 48.
Defendant's conversation with grand jury witness in February of 1982 is attempt to influence witness during period
of grand jury, since grand jury's term ran from December of 1981 through July of 1982; defendant's statement to witness
that defendant had committed no crimes and that witness would be indicted if witness told grand jury that defendant
actually had committed crimes is clear attempt to influence grand jury testimony. United States v McComb (1984, CA7
Ind) 744 F2d 555.
18 USCS § 1503 is broad enough to cover such proscribed acts as witness tampering under omnibus clause, which
was left intact by 1982 amendment; 18 USCS § 1512 is not only vehicle for prosecution for witness tampering. United
States v Moody (1992, CA11 Ga) 977 F2d 1425, 6 FLW Fed C 1353, cert den (1993) 507 US 1052, 123 L Ed 2d 653,
113 S Ct 1948, subsequent app (1996, CA11 Ga) 102 F3d 554.
Defendant corruptly endeavored to influence, obstruct, or impede due administration of justice, in violation of 18
USCS § 1503, where defendant endeavored to pervert truth in certain case then being tried, by paying $ 150 to individual whom he believed was witness in that trial, it not being necessary, in order to prove crime of obstructing due administration of justice, that status of bribe's recipient as witness be established. United States v Mannarino (1956, DC Pa)
149 F Supp 351.
45.--Injury or threats of injury
Defendant obstructed justice in violation of 18 USCS § 1503 where he used threats of violence to induce girl to help
defendant establish alibi. Doan v United States (1953, CA9 Cal) 202 F2d 674.
Defendant violated 18 USCS § 1503 where, inter alia, defendant induced employee, who was witness in labor proceeding against defendant, to sign false affidavit by threatening employee with discharge. Smith v United States (1956,
CA5 Fla) 234 F2d 385, 30 CCH LC P 69990.
Defendant violated 18 USCS § 1503 by shooting witness who was giving testimony. Ferina v United States (1962,
CA8 Mo) 302 F2d 95, cert den (1962) 371 US 819, 9 L Ed 2d 59, 83 S Ct 35.
Defendant violated 18 USCS § 1503 by, inter alia, inducing witness by threats to testify falsely. United States v
Knohl (1967, CA2 NY) 379 F2d 427, cert den (1967) 389 US 973, 19 L Ed 2d 465, 88 S Ct 472 and (superseded by statute as stated in United States v Gerhart (1976, CA8 Iowa) 538 F2d 807, 1 Fed Rules Evid Serv 286).
Defendant who threatened life of witness testifying before grand jury investigating defendant's alleged racketeering
activities, demanding that witness "stop talking to the Feds," endeavored to intimidate witness under 18 USCS § 1503.
United States v Bradwell (1968, CA2 Conn) 388 F2d 619, cert den (1968) 393 US 867, 21 L Ed 2d 135, 89 S Ct 152.
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18 USCS § 1503
Defendant, in violation of 18 USCS § 1503, corruptly endeavored to impede and influence one who had been and
was to be witness in connection with testimony she had given and was to give before federal grand jury investigating
possible violations by defendant of Mann Act where defendant, inter alia, threatened to notify her family of her prostitution activities. Courtney v United States (1968, CA9 Cal) 390 F2d 521, cert den (1968) 393 US 857, 21 L Ed 2d 126,
89 S Ct 98, reh den (1968) 393 US 992, 21 L Ed 2d 457, 89 S Ct 440.
Attorney conspired to obstruct administration of justice in violation of 18 USCS § 1503 where informer, who had
been primary source of evidence to be used against 2 defendants in narcotics action, was beaten severely at direction of
those defendants' attorney in order to induce him to sign statement despite fact that intermediary never actually made
attempt on partner's life. Hunt v United States (1968, CA5 Tex) 400 F2d 306, cert den (1969) 393 US 1021, 21 L Ed 2d
566, 89 S Ct 629; United States v Missler (1969, CA4 Md) 414 F2d 1293, cert den (1970) 397 US 913, 25 L Ed 2d 93,
90 S Ct 912.
Defendant did not use threats to influence testimony of prospective witness in violation of 18 USCS § 1503 where
threats he made did not relate in any way to witness' possible testimony in proceeding pending before United States
magistrate. United States v Metcalf (1970, CA9 Wash) 435 F2d 754.
46. Inducing Fifth Amendment invocation
Defendant endeavored to influence witnesses, in violation of 18 USCS § 1503, where defendant knew witnesses
were expected to testify before grand jury and where he influenced witnesses to plead Fifth Amendment privilege.
United States v Grunewald (1956, CA2 NY) 233 F2d 556, 56-1 USTC P 9452, 56-2 USTC P 9647, 49 AFTR 1270, revd
on other grounds (1957) 353 US 391, 77 S Ct 963, 1 L Ed 2d 931, 57-1 USTC P 9693, 51 AFTR 20, 62 ALR2d 1344;
Cole v United States (1964, CA9 Cal) 329 F2d 437, cert den (1964) 377 US 954, 12 L Ed 2d 497, 84 S Ct 1630.
While witness violates no law by claiming Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in grand jury proceeding, one who bribes, threatens, or coerces witness to claim it or advises with corrupt motive witness to take it, can
and does obstruct or influence administration of justice. United States v Cioffi (1974, CA2 NY) 493 F2d 1111, cert den
(1974) 419 US 917, 42 L Ed 2d 155, 95 S Ct 195.
There was sufficient circumstantial evidence for jury to infer that defense attorney did intend to participate in conspiracy to obstruct justice under 18 USCS §§ 371, 108 and 1503, where defendant urged client to take Fifth Amendment
in grand jury investigation, knowing that client had immunity, in order to shield another individual, and as result of
which client served prison term, despite his argument that he acted with client's consent, and that his actions themselves
were legal. United States v Cintolo (1987, CA1 Mass) 818 F2d 980, cert den (1987) 484 US 913, 98 L Ed 2d 216, 108
S Ct 259.
47. Preventing or inducing witness or potential witness from testifying
Testimony that defendant sent another out of country to keep him from getting grand jury subpoena showed defendant obstructed and impeded administration of justice. Heinze v United States (1910, CA2 NY) 181 F 322.
Defendant corruptly endeavored to influence, intimidate, and impede witness, and corruptly endeavor to impede
and obstruct justice in violation of predecessor of 18 USCS § 1503, where defendant falsely told prospective witness in
trial pending against coconspirator that witness' own pending criminal case had been thrown out, or that it would be
"fixed," so long as witness did not appear at trial of coconspirator. Samples v United States (1941, CA5 Ala) 121 F2d
263, cert den (1941) 314 US 662, 86 L Ed 530, 62 S Ct 129.
Defendants conspired to obstruct justice in violation of 18 USCS § 1503 where, inter alia, they offered bribes to
witness to induce him not to testify at pending proceeding. United States v Kahn (1966, CA2 NY) 366 F2d 259, cert
den (1966) 385 US 948, 17 L Ed 2d 226, 87 S Ct 321 and cert den (1966) 385 US 948, 17 L Ed 2d 226, 87 S Ct 324, reh
den (1966) 385 US 984, 17 L Ed 2d 445, 87 S Ct 502 and cert den (1966) 385 US 948, 17 L Ed 2d 226, 87 S Ct 324, reh
den (1966) 385 US 984, 17 L Ed 2d 445, 87 S Ct 503.
Obstructing due administration of justice in violation of 18 USCS § 1503 was established by testimony that witness
had been induced by threats and demands made by defendant to secrete herself so as to prevent her attendance as witness for prosecution in earlier criminal case in which defendant had been accused of counterfeiting. Parsons v United
States (1967, CA10 Colo) 386 F2d 837, cert den (1968) 391 US 969, 20 L Ed 2d 882, 88 S Ct 2041.
Defendant who quarreled with his partner in alleged hijacking and who after his arrest for hijacking, fearing that his
partner would testify against him, hired another person to cause murder of or serious injury to partner to prevent his
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18 USCS § 1503
appearance, corruptly endeavored to obstruct due administration of justice in violation of 18 USCS § 1503, favorable to
defendants, even though judicial proceeding pending was preliminary hearing prior to grand jury investigation, and informer, though subpoenaed to testify at preliminary hearing, had not been called there as witness. Hunt v United States
(1968, CA5 Tex) 400 F2d 306, cert den (1969) 393 US 1021, 21 L Ed 2d 566, 89 S Ct 629.
Conspiracy to intimidate witness in federal prosecution and substantive offense of intimidating witness in violation
of 18 USCS § 1503 were established where witness, who was being detained in jail, informed FBI he had engaged in
robbery, which was under investigation, with defendant's brother; defendant approached witness' wife and told her to
tell her husband not to testify against defendant's brother and that witness should know he would not be able to walk
streets safely if he did testify and witness informed authorities he would not testify because he feared for safety of himself and family. Overton v United States (1968, CA5 Tex) 403 F2d 444.
Person who prevents or endeavors to prevent witness under subpoena from testifying before federal grand jury obstructs or endeavors to obstruct due administration of justice in violation of 18 USCS § 1503. United States v Marionneaux (1975, CA5 La) 514 F2d 1244 (ovrld in part on other grounds as stated in United States v Watson (1989, CA11
Fla) 866 F2d 381) and (ovrld in part on other grounds as stated in United States v Scrushy (2006, MD Ala) 237 FRD
464).
Testimony from witnesses, including trial judge, that defendant had shaken fist at defendant and said "You better
not" as she was on witness stand supported conviction under 18 USCS § 1503 for influencing witness in federal proceeding. United States v Harris (1977, CA7 Ind) 558 F2d 366.
In prosecution for obstructing justice in violation of 18 USCS § 1503, although defendant did not actually employ
word "kill" in presence of undercover agent posing as "free-lance hit-man," but in response to inquiry as to whether
defendant wanted eyewitness to offense for which defendant was awaiting trial to be killed, defendant nodded his head
affirmatively, whether defendant actually desired or intended witness be killed is peripheral to offense charged, where
government presented substantial evidence, endorsed by jury, that defendant endeavored to obstruct justice by in some
manner preventing witness from testifying. United States v Brinklow (1977, CA10 Colo) 560 F2d 1008.
If proven, it would constitute violation of 18 USCS § 1503 where defendant knew that party was to be witness and
knowingly hid or helped to hide such party in order that he would not be subpoenaed and would not testify at trial of
defendant's client. United States v Schaffner (1983, CA6 Ky) 715 F2d 1099.
Bribing witness to absent himself from court was contempt of court as well as offense under predecessor to 18
USCS § 1503. In re Brule (1895, DC Nev) 71 F 943.
48. Miscellaneous
Mere request that witness make statement contradicting other testimony was not obstructing administration of justice. Harrington v United States (1920, CA8 Iowa) 267 F 97.
Defendant corruptly endeavored to influence, obstruct, or impede due administration of justice in violation of 18
USCS § 1503 where defendant allegedly contacted witness, and attempted to persuade him to destroy records pertaining
to defendant's alleged kickback activities. Berra v United States (1955, CA8 Mo) 221 F2d 590, 55-1 USTC P 9382, 47
AFTR 698, affd (1956) 351 US 131, 76 S Ct 685, 100 L Ed 1013, 56-1 USTC P 9480, 49 AFTR 187 and (superseded by
statute as stated in Sansone v United States (1965) 380 US 343, 85 S Ct 1004, 13 L Ed 2d 882, 65-1 USTC P 9307, 15
AFTR 2d 611).
5.Intermediaries 49. Asking intermediary to influence juror
Hiring intermediary to offer bribe to prospective juror was corrupt "endeavor" within purview of 18 USCS § 1503,
notwithstanding fact that intermediary was secretly working with government and therefore had no intention of actually
approaching juror, and although no bribe was ever offered to any juror. Osborn v United States (1966) 385 US 323, 17
L Ed 2d 394, 87 S Ct 429, reh den (1967) 386 US 938, 17 L Ed 2d 813, 87 S Ct 951.
Evidence that defendant approached another party, told that party that he wished to see juror then serving at trial to
see if juror would "hang" jury, and asked that party to contact juror and see if juror would see defendant, whereupon
party did so contact juror, was sufficient to justify conviction for endeavoring to influence juror in violation of 18 USCS
§ 1503. Hicks v United States (1949, CA4 Va) 173 F2d 570, cert den (1949) 337 US 945, 93 L Ed 1748, 69 S Ct 1501.
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18 USCS § 1503
Telling third party to offer bribe to potential juror is corrupt endeavor to influence, even though third party had no
intention to ever make approach. United States v Osborn (1965, CA6 Tenn) 350 F2d 497, affd (1966) 385 US 323, 17
L Ed 2d 394, 87 S Ct 429, reh den (1967) 386 US 938, 17 L Ed 2d 813, 87 S Ct 951.
Defendant who approached man with offer of money if he could "tamper" with 2 jurors and get them to vote for
acquittal violated 18 USCS § 1503. United States v Bell (1965, CA6 Tenn) 351 F2d 868, cert den (1966) 383 US 947,
16 L Ed 2d 210, 86 S Ct 1200 and (superseded by statute as stated in United States v Scisney (1989, CA6 Ky) 885 F2d
325, 28 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1127).
Defendant who offered sum of money to man to talk with jurors impaneled in particular criminal case to which defendant was not party, and to ascertain jurors' feelings regarding that particular case, obstructed due administration of
justice in violation of 18 USCS § 1503. Caldwell v United States (1954, App DC) 95 US App DC 35, 218 F2d 370, cert
den (1955) 349 US 930, 99 L Ed 1260, 75 S Ct 773, reh den (1955) 349 US 969, 99 L Ed 1290, 75 S Ct 880.
Defendants endeavored to influence juror in violation of 18 USCS § 1503 where defendants induced one person to
enlist aid of second person to contact juror then serving in trial of civil action, and to inform juror that plaintiff in civil
action was good man and needed help. United States v Torquato (1970, WD Pa) 316 F Supp 846.
50. Asking intermediary to influence witness
Defendant who, inter alia, asked intermediary, to whom he offered money, to keep person who intended to testify at
pending trial from so testifying conspired to corruptly endeavor to influence, intimidate, and impede witness and to
corruptly endeavor to impede and obstruct justice, in violation of predecessor of 18 USCS § 1503. Samples v United
States (1941, CA5 Ala) 121 F2d 263, cert den (1941) 314 US 662, 86 L Ed 530, 62 S Ct 129.
Defendant who, being under charges of selling illegal alcohol, hired intermediary to influence, intimidate, and impede one who was to be witness against him by "planting" illegal alcohol on premises of witness' drinking establishment, corruptly endeavored to impede due administration of justice in violation of 18 USCS § 1503, notwithstanding
fact that intermediary never carried out plan. Knight v United States (1962, CA5 Ga) 310 F2d 305.
Defendants conspired to obstruct justice in violation of 18 USCS § 371 and endeavored to influence witness in violation of 18 USCS § 1503 where during previous trial of one of defendants for abortion, material witness for government was approached by intermediary who apparently offered gifts to witness if she would not testify at abortion trial,
intermediary had acted at direction of defendants, and witness subsequently requested to be excused as witness in return
for gifts. Laughlin v United States (1967, App DC) 128 US App DC 27, 385 F2d 287, cert den (1968) 390 US 1003, 20
L Ed 2d 103, 88 S Ct 1245.
51. Miscellaneous
Defendant did not violate 18 USCS § 1503 by his action in contacting one who had been convicted on income tax
evasion and suggesting that for money he could and would make arrangements with proper authorities to see other person would receive probation, where he received no money and did nothing further. Ethridge v United States (1958,
CA9 Wash) 258 F2d 234.
Corrupt endeavor to impede witness' appearance, within meaning of 18 USCS § 1503, was established where defendant hired intermediary to make attempt on life of prospective witness but where such attempt was never made.
United States v Missler (1969, CA4 Md) 414 F2d 1293, cert den (1970) 397 US 913, 25 L Ed 2d 93, 90 S Ct 912.
B.Other Particular Acts By Accused 52. Concealment of information
When defendant conceals information that is relevant and germane to grand jury's functions, conviction under 18
USCS § 1503 for obstructing justice will be sustained. United States v Cohn (1971, CA2 NY) 452 F2d 881, cert den
(1972) 405 US 975, 31 L Ed 2d 249, 92 S Ct 1196.
Defendant who attempted to conceal documents by removing them from company office and placing them in his
garage in noncompliance with grand jury's subpoena is guilty of obstruction of justice, since endeavor to conceal, if not
outright concealment, is all that is necessary to obstruct justice under 18 USCS § 1503; fact that date of compliance with
subpoena had been temporarily extended modified but did not nullify defendant's obligation to comply fully, accurately
and promptly. United States v Lench (1986, CA9 Cal) 806 F2d 1443, 1986-2 CCH Trade Cases P 67393.
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18 USCS § 1503
Providing grand jury with disguised and misleading handwriting exemplars, and counseling grand jury witnesses to
give false testimony, is criminal conduct contemplated by 18 USCS § 1503. United States v Beatty (1984, ED NY) 587
F Supp 1325.
RICO counterclaimant inadequately alleges obstruction of justice under 18 USCS § 1503 as predicate offense,
where assertion is merely that party to disputed contract withheld from discovery in civil case documents relevant to
contract, because § 1503 has not been interpreted to apply to civil discovery dispute where there has been no court order
or subpoena requiring production of documents. Richmark Corp. v Timber Falling Consultants, Inc. (1990, DC Or)
730 F Supp 1525.
53. Correspondence during proceedings
One who sent letter to grand jury which showed upon its face intention that it was to be considered with respect to
pending case, could not say that he did not attempt to influence grand jury thereby, as attempt to influence was inherent
in act of sending such letter. Duke v United States (1937, CA4 Va) 90 F2d 840, 112 ALR 317, cert den (1937) 302 US
685, 58 S Ct 33, 82 L Ed 528, reh den (1937) 302 US 649, 58 S Ct 135, 82 L Ed 503 and reh den (1937) 302 US 650, 58
S Ct 261, 82 L Ed 504 and reh den (1937) 302 US 785, 58 S Ct 135, 82 L Ed 600.
Letters written by defendant and delivered to judge while equity cause was pending in his court were of nature
tending directly to obstruct administration of justice so that defendant was guilty of contempt of court. United States v
Huff (1913, DC Ga) 206 F 700.
Act of state superintendent of insurance in writing letters to insurance companies protesting their dealings with
claimant in regard to death claim, at that time pending in federal court, was not act in presence of court, or so near
thereto as to obstruct administration of justice. Hillmon v Mutual L. Ins. Co. (1897, CCD Kan) 79 F 749.
54. Destruction or diversion of evidence
Evidence that defendants attempted to conceal union documents which they had been subpoenaed to produce, and
that they gave false testimony as to missing documents, was sufficient to support jury's conviction for obstructing justice in violation of 18 USCS § 1503. United States v Curcio (1960, CA2 NY) 279 F2d 681, 60-2 USTC P 9514, 6 AFTR
2d 5021, cert den (1960) 364 US 824, 81 S Ct 59, 5 L Ed 2d 52.
Whatever limits may be placed upon scope of 18 USCS § 1503 by a ejusdem generis rule, other rules of statutory
construction, or vagueness doctrine of constitutional law, those limits do not preclude conviction, otherwise within ordinary meaning of statutory language, for deliberately destroying documents sought by subpoena returnable before sitting grand jury. United States v Walasek (1975, CA3 Pa) 527 F2d 676.
18 USCS § 1503 may be basis for prosecuting person who alters or destroys corporate records with knowledge that
records are being sought by grand jury investigating company's activities. United States v Faudman (1981, CA6 Mich)
640 F2d 20.
Proscription of 18 USCS § 1503 is not limited to impeding or threatening conduct but extends to destruction of
documents subpoenaed by grand jury and therefore warning target of valid search warrant in order to prevent discovery
and seizure of quantity of contraband is within scope of § 1503. United States v Brown (1982, CA9 Cal) 688 F2d 596.
Individual who had not been served with subpena duces tecum for production of certain letters before grand jury,
but who allegedly had reason to believe that he would be called to be witness and to produce letters ordered, could be
prosecuted for having corruptly obstructed and endeavored to obstruct and impede due administration of justice because
of his destruction of letters. United States v Solow (1956, DC NY) 138 F Supp 812 (superseded by statute as stated in
United States v Simpkins (1986, NMCMR) 22 MJ 924).
Where defendants destroyed memoranda which had been subpoenaed for production before federal grand jury and
replaced them with substitute memoranda for purpose of representing substitutes to grand jury as originals, which misrepresentation was actually made eventually, this was offense of obstructing justice in violation of 18 USCS § 1503.
United States v Siegel (1957, DC NY) 152 F Supp 370.
Person who knows that federal grand jury is investigating certain possible violations of federal law, and who has
reason to believe that certain incriminating document is likely to come to grand jury's attention, and who intentionally
causes destruction of that document in order to prevent it from falling into hands of grand jury, may properly be convicted of obstruction of justice under 18 USCS § 1503; what must be shown by government is that federal grand jury
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was duly empanelled and engaged in administration of justice and that defendant corruptly sought to impede grand jury's efforts; fact that defendant "reached" document before grand jury subpoenaed it does not preclude conviction for
obstructing justice. United States v Fineman (1977, ED Pa) 434 F Supp 189.
Allegation in search warrant that defendant had attempted to destroy evidence subject to subpoena duces tecum
states violation of 18 USCS § 1503. In re Motion to Quash Grand Jury Subpoenas (1984, SD W Va) 593 F Supp 184,
app dismd (1985, CA4 W Va) 766 F2d 870.
Obstruction of justice charge against police officer who allegedly kept some packets of seized cocaine fails under
18 USCS § 1503, where no state or federal prosecution, including grand jury investigation, was pending at time of alleged retention, notwithstanding officer's reason to believe that judicial proceedings were imminent. United States v
Smith (1990, DC Dist Col) 729 F Supp 1380.
Indictment count charging 2 former corporate officials with violating 18 USCS § 1503 by withholding and destroying documents requested in discovery for racial employment discrimination class action against corporation will not be
dismissed, where case goes beyond civil discovery abuse remediable through civil sanctions, because officials are
charged with seeking to impair pending court proceeding through intentional destruction of documents sought in, and
highly relevant to, that proceeding. United States v Lundwall (1998, SD NY) 1 F Supp 2d 249.
Although government proved that defendant had read newspaper articles that made him aware that grand jury was
investigating investment company he worked for, it did not prove that defendant ever had possession of any of firm's
incriminating documents that might be material to grand jury investigation; thus, government did not prove that defendant acted or endeavored to act corruptly with intent to obstruct or to impede grand jury proceeding with respect to
destruction of documents for purposes of establishing violation of 18 USCS § 1954. United States v Kirkland (2004, DC
Or) 330 F Supp 2d 1151.
Defendant was convicted of obstructing justice under 18 USCS § 1503 where government proved that defendant
had read newspaper articles that made him aware that grand jury was investigating investment company he worked for,
defendant had burned some of company's office documents that were kept at his home, defendant lied to investigators
when he told them that he had returned all of firm's documents in his possession back to firm's office, and defendant
intended to misdirect agents and grand jury. United States v Kirkland (2004, DC Or) 330 F Supp 2d 1151.
55. Falsifying or altering documents
Attempt to obstruct grand jury investigation by causing book entries to be altered was corruptly impeding justice.
Bosselman v United States (1917, CA2 NY) 239 F 82.
Defendant's presentment of what he knew to be false affidavit to assistant United States attorney regarding pending
judicial matter violated due administration clause of 18 USCS § 1503. Smith v United States (1956, CA5 Fla) 234 F2d
385, 30 CCH LC P 69990.
Fabrication of false memoranda and testifying to grand jury that same were complete records of interviews between
recanter and others, when grand jury was investigating recantation of witness' testimony given on earlier trials was violation of 18 USCS § 1503 whether or not defendant believed omitted, changed, or fabricated portions of interviews material to grand jury investigation. United States v Siegel (1959, CA2 NY) 263 F2d 530, cert den (1959) 359 US 1012, 3
L Ed 2d 1035, 79 S Ct 1147, reh den (1959) 361 US 871, 4 L Ed 2d 111, 80 S Ct 117.
Act of causing false affidavit to be filed alleging that affiant had sexual intercourse with jurors who had been sequestered did not constitute violation of 18 USCS § 1503. United States v Essex (1969, CA6 Tenn) 407 F2d 214.
Defendant's knowing and willful alteration of documents which IRS had arranged to have subpoenaed by grand jury did not violate 18 USCS § 1503 where alteration of document did not bear reasonable relationship to subject of grand
jury investigation. United States v Ryan (1971, CA9 Cal) 455 F2d 728, 20 ALR Fed 719.
Fraudulent judgment given by lawyer to his client constitutes endeavor to impede due administration of justice even
though such obstruction occurred after resolution of lawsuit. United States v London (1983, CA11 Ga) 714 F2d 1558,
71 ALR Fed 914.
Preparation of false minutes of meeting in attempt to render innocuous documents already submitted to grand jury
in response to subpoena qualifies as attempt to obstruct justice. United States v McComb (1984, CA7 Ind) 744 F2d
555.
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Where defendants destroyed memoranda which had been subpoenaed for production before federal grand jury and
replaced them with substitute memoranda for purpose of representing substitutes to grand jury as originals, which misrepresentation was actually made eventually, this was offense of obstructing justice in violation of 18 USCS § 1503.
United States v Siegel (1957, DC NY) 152 F Supp 370.
Providing grand jury with disguised and misleading handwriting exemplars, and counseling grand jury witnesses to
give false testimony, is criminal conduct contemplated by 18 USCS § 1503. United States v Beatty (1984, ED NY) 587
F Supp 1325.
Obstruction of justice charge will not be dismissed from huge racketeering trial alleging numerous schemes to defraud investors by setting up and manipulating markets for over-counter securities, where securities broker and principal
in schemes submitted three purported "affidavits in contemplation of death" of decedent for whom broker was executor
of estate, which affidavits allegedly falsely attributed ownership of entities participating in schemes to decedent in order
to exculpate broker and others, because charge does not merely allege perjury but that broker used fraudulent documents in corrupt endeavor to obstruct and impede RICO prosecution, in violation of 18 USCS § 1503. United States v
Cannistraro (1992, DC NJ) 800 F Supp 30, writ granted, remanded (1993, CA3 NJ) 994 F2d 1002.
56. False testimony
Rendering of false testimony alone is not an obstruction of justice. United States v Essex (1969, CA6 Tenn) 407
F2d 214.
Witness's denial of having had sexual relationship with President in affidavit in support of her motion to quash
subpoena issued in discovery phase of state court proceedings was material to those proceedings within meaning of 18
USCS § 1623(a) and, therefore, constituted corrupt endeavor to influence district court within meaning of 18 USCS §
1503. In re Sealed Case (1998, App DC) 333 US App DC 245, 162 F3d 670, 50 Fed Rules Evid Serv 731.
Since 18 USCS § 1503 is contempt of court statute, false testimony alone does not amount to contempt of court and
therefore is not by itself 18 USCS § 1503 violation. United States v Campbell (1972, WD Pa) 350 F Supp 213.
Government sufficiently stated obstruction of justice charge where charge was based on defendant's alleged false
testimony, because government must also prove additional element that false testimony served to thwart court in performance of its duties. United States v Muniz (1988, ED Va) 690 F Supp 482.
57. Obtaining or disclosing secret grand jury documents
Defendants who unlawfully obtained unused and unreleased grand jury transcripts, inter alia, to establish fictitious
defenses in pending federal proceeding through false testimony violated 18 USCS § 1503. United States v Friedman
(1971, CA9 Cal) 445 F2d 1076, cert den (1971) 404 US 958, 30 L Ed 2d 275, 92 S Ct 326.
Defendant who unlawfully obtained, in return for cash payment, certain documents, including transcripts of grand
jury testimony and statements of prospective government witnesses in criminal case then pending against defendant and
draft copy of indictment (yet to be voted) involving another person, violated both 18 USCS § 371 and 18 USCS § 1503.
United States v Rosner (1973, CA2 NY) 485 F2d 1213, cert den (1974) 417 US 950, 41 L Ed 2d 672, 94 S Ct 3080.
Attempt to sell transcripts of secret grand jury testimony to persons under investigation for suspected violations of
federal banking laws, falls within omnibus clause of 18 USCS § 1503 which proscribes any conduct that has same effect
as specific acts enumerated in first part of § 1503. United States v Howard (1978, CA5 La) 569 F2d 1331, cert den
(1978) 439 US 834, 58 L Ed 2d 130, 99 S Ct 116.
Obstruction of justice statute (18 USCS § 1503) applies to scheme to transmit secret grand jury information exclusively to suspected grand jury targets and such application is neither overbroad under First Amendment nor void for
vagueness under Fifth Amendment. United States v Jeter (1985, CA6 Ky) 775 F2d 670, cert den (1986) 475 US 1142,
90 L Ed 2d 341, 106 S Ct 1796.
58. Reprisal
One indicted by grand jury for felony was guilty of violation of predecessor to 18 USCS § 1503 if he assaulted witness who appeared and testified against him before such grand jury, where assault was because of such testifying.
Kloss v United States (1935, CA8 Ark) 77 F2d 462.
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18 USCS § 1503
Attack after defendant's release from confinement upon witness who had given testimony resulting in defendant's
conviction was 18 USCS § 1503 offense. United States v Woodmansee (1965, CA2 Vt) 354 F2d 235.
59. Miscellaneous
Advising disregard of letter of United States attorney requesting plea to information was not offense. Rosner v
United States (1926, CA2 NY) 10 F2d 675.
Defendant was not guilty of obstructing and impeding due administration of justice by reason of having associated
with woman on probation conditioned on her not associating with defendant, who had knowledge of such condition.
Haili v United States (1958, CA9 Hawaii) 260 F2d 744 (criticized in United States v Novak (2000, CA8 Mo) 217 F3d
566).
Defendant cannot commit offense under 18 USCS § 1503 for claiming constitutional right against
self-incrimination. Cole v United States (1964, CA9 Cal) 329 F2d 437, cert den (1964) 377 US 954, 12 L Ed 2d 497,
84 S Ct 1630.
Attempt to obtain witness' signature on written statement which witness refuses to sign because witness believes
statement would be false is not punishable as obstruction of justice. United States v Brand (1985, CA11 Ala) 775 F2d
1460.
False records which defendant was subpoenaed to produce, and subsequently directed to produce within 72 hours,
were sufficient to support conviction for obstructing justice, even though he never presented them to grand jury, since
conduct is punishable where defendant acts with intent to obstruct justice and in manner likely to do so. United States v
Ladum (1998, CA9 Or) 141 F3d 1328, 98 CDOS 2851, 98 Daily Journal DAR 3937, 98-1 USTC P 50345, 81 AFTR 2d
1576, cert den (1998) 525 US 898, 119 S Ct 225, 142 L Ed 2d 185 and cert den (1998) 525 US 1021, 119 S Ct 549, 142
L Ed 2d 457.
Indictment adequately alleged elements of obstruction of justice charge under 18 USCS § 1503 against defendant
who allegedly had tried to access funds that had been frozen pursuant to court order in civil case seeking to enjoin alleged fraud arising out of defendant's "work-at-home-stuffing-envelopes" scheme, where indictment alleged existence
of judicial proceeding of which defendant had notice, and further alleged defendant's interference with due administration of justice in attempting to access assets frozen by court order. United States v Grasso (2001, ED Pa) 173 F Supp 2d
353.
IV.INCLUDED AND RELATED CRIMES 60. Attempt
Use of word "endeavor" in predecessor to 18 USCS § 1503 got rid of technicalities which might be urged as besetting word "attempt," and it described any effort or essay to accomplish evil purpose section was enacted to prevent.
United States v Russell (1921) 255 US 138, 65 L Ed 553, 41 S Ct 260.
18 USCS § 1503 punishes unsuccessful attempt to suborn perjury. Falk v United States (1966, CA9 Cal) 370 F2d
472, cert den (1967) 387 US 926, 18 L Ed 2d 982, 87 S Ct 2044 and (superseded by statute as stated in United States v
Simpkins (1986, NMCMR) 22 MJ 924).
61. Conspiracy
Conspiracy to obstruct due administration of justice through bribery of federal officials by agreement to pay sum of
$ 50,000 for dismissal of indictments was completed crime although money was never paid over. Craig v United
States (1936, CA9 Cal) 81 F2d 816, reh den (1936, CA9) 83 F2d 450 and cert dismd (1936) 298 US 637, 80 L Ed 1371,
56 S Ct 670 and cert den (1936) 298 US 690, 80 L Ed 1408, 56 S Ct 959 and reh den (1936) 299 US 620, 81 L Ed 457,
57 S Ct 6.
It was not crime for one jointly indicted with others and charged with conspiracy to consult with his codefendants
after indictment had been returned. Walker v United States (1938, CA8 Mo) 93 F2d 792.
Conspiracy in violation of predecessor to 18 USCS § 1503 was completed when first overt act to carry it out was
committed, regardless of success. United States v Minkoff (1943, CA2 NY) 137 F2d 402.
It is not only court officials who are capable of corruptly administering justice, therefore persons can be guilty of
conspiracy to procure corrupt administration of justice even though no court official is corrupted. United States v
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18 USCS § 1503
Johnson (1947, CA3 Pa) 165 F2d 42, cert den (1948) 332 US 852, 92 L Ed 421, 68 S Ct 355, reh den (1948) 333 US
834, 92 L Ed 1118, 68 S Ct 457.
It was sufficient if government established 2 codefendants conspired between themselves to do acts set forth in first
2 counts of indictment even if they were not successfully tied in with other codefendants for larger conspiracy set forth
in other counts. Ferina v United States (1962, CA8 Mo) 302 F2d 95, cert den (1962) 371 US 819, 9 L Ed 2d 59, 83 S
Ct 35.
Conspiring to influence and aid party to avoid testifying before federal grand jury pursuant to subpoena constitutes
18 USCS § 1503 violation. United States v Marionneaux (1975, CA5 La) 514 F2d 1244 (ovrld in part on other grounds
as stated in United States v Watson (1989, CA11 Fla) 866 F2d 381) and (ovrld in part as stated in United States v
Scrushy (2006, MD Ala) 237 FRD 464).
Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant conspired to conceal assault and obstruct investigation into resulting death, in violation of 18 USCS §§ 371 and 1503, where he gave investigators contradictory accounts
of events, failed to provide information to hospital personnel, and testified untruthfully before grand jury; "perjury" before federal grand jury constituted single overt act necessary to prove conspiracy to obstruct justice, despite inconsistency of defendant's acquittal of perjury, since there was sufficient evidence of perjury to support jury's finding of
conspiratorial act. United States v Messerlian (1987, CA3 NJ) 832 F2d 778, cert den (1988) 485 US 988, 99 L Ed 2d
501, 108 S Ct 1291.
V.DEFENSES 62. Double jeopardy
Conspiracy to transport liquor from distillery was entirely separate and distinct offense from one committed under
predecessor to 18 USCS § 1503 for urging coconspirator to remain out of jurisdiction of court and thereby inhibit trial;
consequently prosecution for one offense did not yield defense of double jeopardy for subsequent prosecution for other
offense. Pollock v United States (1929, CA4 Md) 35 F2d 174.
Since reciprocal action is not essence of crime under 18 USCS § 1503, conspiracy to violate 18 USCS § 1503 was
not barred by one defendant's previous acquittal of 18 USCS § 1503 substantive offense. Ferina v United States (1965,
CA8 Mo) 340 F2d 837, cert den (1965) 381 US 902, 14 L Ed 2d 284, 85 S Ct 1446.
When information charging obstruction of process in violation of 18 USCS § 1501 is dismissed on basis of satisfactory completion of pretrial diversion agreement and defendant is subsequently convicted of obstruction of justice in
violation of 18 USCS § 1503, defendant has been placed in jeopardy only once, at trial on § 1503 charge. United States
v Schaffner (1985, CA6 Ky) 771 F2d 149, 18 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1136.
Defendant's conviction under both 18 USCS §§ 1503 and 1512 was not multiplicious in violation of double jeopardy clause of Fifth Amendment since proof of violation of § 1503 requires proof of defendant's knowledge of pending
judicial proceeding, which is expressly not element of violation of § 1512. United States v Risken (1986, CA8 Iowa)
788 F2d 1361, cert den (1986) 479 US 923, 93 L Ed 2d 302, 107 S Ct 329.
Defendant who sold confidential law enforcement information was not subject to double jeopardy by being convicted under 18 USCS § 371, for conspiracy to defraud United States by compromising criminal investigations and 18
USCS §§ 371 and 1503, for conspiracy to obstruct justice by compromising activities of grand jury, since rule that each
offense requires proof of fact that other does not is satisfied. United States v Twomey (1986, CA1 Mass) 806 F2d 1136.
Count 2 of indictment, alleging that justice was obstructed by means of one or more false statements enumerated in
Count 1, was sufficient, even without itemizing particular statements, since it adequately protected defendant's right to
be tried on charges presented to Grand jury; double jeopardy would not be violated by his retrial on Count 2, since each
count stated separate offense, and defendant had moved to dismiss on grounds unrelated to his factual guilt or innocence. United States v Wood (1992, CA10 NM) 958 F2d 963, reh den, amd on other grounds (1992, CA10) 1992 US
App LEXIS 4656.
Indictment charging defendant with theft of government property, 18 USCS § 641, subsequent to his trial for offenses that arose from same facts as present indictment, trial in which jury acquitted him on obstruction of justice count
and district court reversed his conviction for criminal contempt, did not violate double jeopardy prohibition, since all
elements of present charge were not subsumed by either previous charge. United States v Forman (1999, CA6 Mich)
180 F3d 766, 1999 FED App 224P, reh, en banc, den (1999, CA6) 1999 US App LEXIS 19904.
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18 USCS § 1503
Double jeopardy did not bar 1996 prosecution for obstruction of justice following 1991 conviction for conspiracy to
commit wire fraud and conspiracy to commit murder-for-hire, since obstruction of justice required specific intent to
obstruct justice and conspiracy did not, while conspiracy required agreement and obstruction of justice did not; nor did
double jeopardy bar 1996 prosecution for conspiracy to obstruct justice, since conspiracies required agreements to
commit different crimes; defendant's further "participation" in conspiracy by falsely testifying in 1991 trial constituted
new offense for double jeopardy purposes, since it occurred after her arrest. United States v Sharpe (1999, CA5 Miss)
193 F3d 852, 52 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1650, reh den (1999, CA5 Miss) 1999 US App LEXIS 34976 and cert den (2000)
528 US 1180, 120 S Ct 1218, 145 L Ed 2d 1118 and cert den (2000) 528 US 1173, 120 S Ct 1202, 145 L Ed 2d 1105 and
cert den (2000) 530 US 1229, 120 S Ct 2658, 147 L Ed 2d 273 and cert den (2000) 530 US 1229, 120 S Ct 2658, 147 L
Ed 2d 273 and post-conviction relief den sub nom United States v Nix (2007, SD Miss) 2007 US Dist LEXIS 16297.
First officer's convictions for violating 18 USCS § 1512(b)(1) and 18 USCS § 1503 did not constitute multiple punishments for same offense in violation of Double Jeopardy Clause where each offense required one or more elements
not required for other offense since 18 USCS § 1512(b)(1) required proof that one intend to influence, delay, or prevent
testimony of any person and 18 USCS § 1503 did not require such element; conversely, 18 USCS § 1503, as read by
United States Supreme Court, required attempt to obstruct pending judicial proceeding; no such requirement of pending
proceeding existed in 18 USCS § 1512. United States v LeMoure (2007, CA1 Mass) 474 F3d 37.
After defendant was acquitted on charges of supplying services to Taliban, subsequent prosecution under 18 USCS
§§ 1001(a), 1503, and 1623 based on defendant's conduct in falsely denying that he had participated in jihadist camp
and that he knew about people he had communicated with about training for jihad was not barred by collateral estoppel
component of Double Jeopardy Clause of Fifth Amendment because issues of ultimate fact in two prosecutions were
distinct. United States v Benkahla (2008, CA4 Va) 530 F3d 300.
Indictment which alleged that obstruction of justice with which defendants were charged was carried out "by other
means" in addition to those specified, effectively broadened scope of acts to which jeopardy attached and correspondingly reduced opportunity for subsequent prosecution of defendants for alleged obstruction of justice during period alleged in indictment. United States v Haldeman (1976, App DC) 181 US App DC 254, 559 F2d 31, 1 Fed Rules Evid
Serv 1203, cert den (1977) 431 US 933, 53 L Ed 2d 250, 97 S Ct 2641, reh den (1977) 433 US 916, 53 L Ed 2d 1103, 97
S Ct 2992.
Since offense under 18 USCS § 499 was separate from offense in subsequent indictment under § 1503, previous
disposition of indictment under § 499 did not make double jeopardy defense in subsequent prosecution under § 1503.
United States v Hubbard (1979, DC Dist Col) 474 F Supp 90, affd (1981, App DC) 215 US App DC 206, 668 F2d 1238,
cert den (1982) 456 US 926, 72 L Ed 2d 440, 102 S Ct 1971.
Since interests protected by state were substantially different from interests of federal government, maximum penalties under each statute were radically different, and statutes differed as to type of conduct prohibited and proof required to establish offense, prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1503 and state statute prohibiting inducing another
to commit murder were not barred on grounds of double jeopardy, even though offenses arose out of same factual setting. People v Formicola (1979) 407 Mich 293, 284 NW2d 334.
63. Entrapment
Mere fact that informer told defendant, an attorney, truthfully that he knew some members on jury panel of prospective federal criminal trial in which defendant had interest, did not support defense of entrapment in attorney's 18
USCS § 1503 prosecution on charges of endeavoring to bribe member of jury panel. Osborn v United States (1966)
385 US 323, 17 L Ed 2d 394, 87 S Ct 429, reh den (1967) 386 US 938, 17 L Ed 2d 813, 87 S Ct 951.
64. Immunity
Defendant is entitled to evidentiary hearing to determine whether government's prosecution of defendant for obstruction of justice violates plea agreement by possibly using defendant's immunized testimony as basis for prosecution.
United States v Brimberry (1984, CA7 Ill) 744 F2d 580, 16 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1078.
Grant of immunity does not operate to bar use of immunized testimony against defendant on obstruction of justice
counts where alleged obstruction had to have taken place following court's granting defendant immunity under 18 USCS
§ 6002. United States v Caron (1982, ED Va) 551 F Supp 662, affd without op (1983, CA4 Va) 722 F2d 739, cert den
(1984) 465 US 1103, 80 L Ed 2d 132, 104 S Ct 1602.
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18 USCS § 1503
65. Impossibility of success
Defendant corruptly endeavored to impede due administration of justice, in violation of 18 USCS § 1503, by instructing intermediary to offer bribe to prospective juror in federal criminal case, despite fact that intermediary never in
fact approached juror and never intended to do so, doctrine of "impossibility" not being applicable since statute punishes any corrupt "endeavor" to obstruct justice in judicial proceedings. Osborn v United States (1966) 385 US 323, 17 L
Ed 2d 394, 87 S Ct 429, reh den (1967) 386 US 938, 17 L Ed 2d 813, 87 S Ct 951.
Doctrine of impossibility of success is not applicable to 18 USCS § 1503. United States v Rosner (1973, CA2 NY)
485 F2d 1213, cert den (1974) 417 US 950, 41 L Ed 2d 672, 94 S Ct 3080.
66. Statute of limitations
Prosecution for criminal conspiracy in violation of 18 USCS § 1503 instituted by indictment returned on October
25, 1954 is not barred by statute of limitations if conspiracy was still in existence on September 1, 1951. Grunewald v
United States (1957) 353 US 391, 77 S Ct 963, 1 L Ed 2d 931, 57-1 USTC P 9693, 51 AFTR 20, 62 ALR2d 1344.
Charges against judge for obstructing justice could extend RICO conspiracy for purposes of statute of limitations,
where conspiracy's main criminal objective, to fix cases whenever feasible, was neither accomplished nor abandoned so
long as judge remained on bench, one conspiring attorney practiced before him, and other served as bagman, since overt
act of concealment was made in furtherance of conspiracy's objectives rather than as cover up. United States v Maloney
(1995, CA7 Ill) 71 F3d 645, reh, en banc, den (1996, CA7 Ill) 1996 US App LEXIS 4533 and cert den (1996) 519 US
927, 136 L Ed 2d 214, 117 S Ct 295.
Attorney's act of filing appeal from dismissal of civil wrongful death action, listed as overt act of conspiracy to obstruct justice by backdating documents, was not relevant criminal act and did not renew five-year statute of limitations,
since it occurred after alleged obstruction. United States v Craft (1997, CA6 Ky) 105 F3d 1123, 1997 FED App 44P.
67. Miscellaneous
Bribing juror in civil suit was offense against United States and it was no defense that United States was not party
to suit. Sneed v United States (1924, CA5 Tex) 298 F 911, 37 ALR 772, cert den (1924) 265 US 590, 68 L Ed 1195, 44
S Ct 635.
Fact that others are violating law without prosecution is no defense to defendant in trial under 18 USCS § 1503.
Hodgdon v United States (1966, CA8 Minn) 365 F2d 679, cert den (1967) 385 US 1029, 17 L Ed 2d 676, 87 S Ct 759.
Fact that defendant used intermediary to approach juror in federal trial was no defense to 18 USCS § 1503 charge.
United States v Roe (1975, CA4 W Va) 529 F2d 629.
Plea agreement does not prevent prosecution of attempts to obstruct justice occurring before date of agreement,
where earlier actions are in furtherance of sole object of destroying records in attempt to obstruct justice and constitute
continuing course of conduct. United States v Brimberry (1984, CA7 Ill) 744 F2d 580, 16 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1078.
Defendant cannot attack 18 USCS § 1503 conviction because grand jury he was charged with obstructing had been
sitting beyond term prescribed by District of Columbia code. Shimon v United States (1965, App DC) 122 US App DC
152, 352 F2d 449.
VI.PROCEDURE, PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT
A.In General 68. Jurisdiction
Fact that defendant's complaints against government had not been fully processed and that his complaints take
precedence over complaints against him did not deprive Federal District Court of jurisdiction in prosecution under 18
USCS § 1503. Hodgdon v United States (1966, CA8 Minn) 365 F2d 679, cert den (1967) 385 US 1029, 17 L Ed 2d
676, 87 S Ct 759.
69. Venue
Since 18 USCS § 1503 does not prescribe venue for offense, it is necessary for courts to determine from other
sources place where statutory offense took place. United States v O'Donnell (1975, CA6 Tenn) 510 F2d 1190, cert den
(1975) 421 US 1001, 44 L Ed 2d 668, 95 S Ct 2400.
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18 USCS § 1503
In prosecution under 18 USCS § 1503, because defendant's first obstruction of justice indictment had been brought
in particular district and its events had centered there, venue properly lay there for subsequent obstructions of justice
although hindsight showed that no obstruction had occurred at time this subsequent indictment was brought in that district. United States v Partin (1977, CA5 Ga) 552 F2d 621, cert den (1977) 434 US 903, 54 L Ed 2d 189, 98 S Ct 298.
Venue under 18 USCS § 1503 is to be determined by focusing on which court is affected by attempt to influence,
obstruct, or impede due administration of justice rather than on location of acts committed. United States v Tedesco
(1980, CA1 Mass) 635 F2d 902, cert den (1981) 452 US 962, 69 L Ed 2d 974, 101 S Ct 3112.
Even though defendant acted elsewhere, where predicate judicial proceeding, which is prerequisite to violation of
18 USCS § 1503, was to be held in particular state, it is that particular state's court's due administration of justice which
is obstructed by appellant's actions and therefore venue properly lies in that particular state. United States v Barham
(1982, CA11 Ala) 666 F2d 521, 64 ALR Fed 672, cert den (1982) 456 US 947, 72 L Ed 2d 470, 102 S Ct 2015, reh den
(1982) 456 US 1012, 73 L Ed 2d 1309, 102 S Ct 2308.
Venue for prosecution charging violation of 18 USCS § 1503 lies in district where judicial proceeding that accused
sought to affect is pending. United States v Kibler (1982, CA4 Md) 667 F2d 452, 9 Fed Rules Evid Serv 897, cert den
(1982) 456 US 961, 72 L Ed 2d 485, 102 S Ct 2037.
In prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1503 venue is proper in district where defendants were charged with endeavoring to obstruct upcoming trial despite fact that alleged kidnapping occurred in another district. United States v
Johnson (1983, CA11 Ga) 713 F2d 654, cert den (1984) 465 US 1030, 79 L Ed 2d 695, 104 S Ct 1295.
Venue under 18 USCS § 1503 is proper in District in which proceeding sought to be obstructed is pending even
though would-be obstructive act takes place elsewhere. United States v Reed (1985, CA2 NY) 773 F2d 477.
Proper venue of 18 USCS § 1503 offense is place where defendant allegedly assaulted witness in federal prosecution, and not place where federal prosecution is taking place. United States v Swann (1971, App DC) 142 US App DC
363, 441 F2d 1053.
Charge brought under Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act for commission of violation of 18 USCS § 1503 is properly made in Eastern District of Tennessee where indictment charges defendant with incorrectly endeavoring to influence,
obstruct and impede due administration of justice in Eastern District of Tennessee by willfully causing false affidavit
subscribed by defendant to be filed in support of motion for new trial in criminal case in Tennessee. United States v
Essex (1967, ED Tenn) 275 F Supp 393, revd on other grounds (1969, CA6 Tenn) 407 F2d 214.
Where indictment charged that defendant corruptly endeavored to influence, intimidate and impede witness in discharge of her duty in case then pending in Western District of Virginia by allegedly attempting to prevent witness from
testifying by offering sum of money to leave area in which she then resided, which actions occurred in Middle District
of North Carolina, venue of prosecution for endeavoring to obstruct justice under 18 USCS § 1503 was in Western District of Virginia, because that was district where effect of defendant's actions would be felt, that is, district where proceeding was pending. United States v Elliott (1978, WD Va) 446 F Supp 209.
Venue is proper in Middle District rather than Eastern District of Pennsylvania where justice, alleged to have been
impeded, is pending since acts alleged in indictment charging violation of 18 USCS § 1503 occurred in Middle District
of Pennsylvania. United States v Bachert (1978, ED Pa) 449 F Supp 508.
Venue is proper in Eastern District of New York, where defendant allegedly sought to obstruct justice by verbally
influencing apparent grand jury witness in Southern District of New York, because investigation/prosecution defendant
sought to obstruct was proceeding in Eastern District and venue under 18 USCS § 1503 is proper in district in which
proceeding sought to be obstructed is pending even though would-be obstructive acts took place elsewhere. United
States v Hammad (1987, ED NY) 678 F Supp 397, revd on other grounds (1988, CA2 NY) 846 F2d 854, reh den (1988,
CA2 NY) 855 F2d 36 and corrected on other grounds (1988, CA2 NY) 858 F2d 834.
Venue for trial of obstruction of justice and related racketeering counts will not be changed from New Jersey to
New York, even though alleged obstructive conduct took place in Eastern District of New York, where conduct was
concealment of documents responsible to subpoenas of 2 different grand juries empaneled in New Jersey, because
proper venue for 18 USCS § 1503 obstruction is district in which obstructed proceedings took place. United States v
Eisenberg (1991, DC NJ) 773 F Supp 662.
70. Joinder of parties
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Even though defendant did not play any part in underlying scheme to defraud, which formed basis of first 18 counts
against other defendants, and conduct upon which obstruction of justice charge against her did not take place until 2
years after completion of that scheme, even assuming defendant was improperly joined, she failed to show any prejudice to herself and had count been tried separately, government would have been allowed to introduce most, if not all of
proof of underlying fraudulent scheme, in order to establish her motive, as defendant's wife, to play major role in obstructing government's investigation into scheme by removing material proof of husband's participation in it. United
States v Weiss (1974, CA2 NY) 491 F2d 460, cert den (1974) 419 US 833, 42 L Ed 2d 59, 95 S Ct 58.
B.Indictment or Information
1.In General 71. Generally
Predecessor to 18 USCS § 1503 was reproduction of statute concerning contempts of court, and proceeding by indictment was not exclusive if offense of obstructing justice under this statute was committed. Pettibone v United States
(1893) 148 US 197, 37 L Ed 419, 13 S Ct 542.
Financier and accountant were denied acquittal on obstruction of justice charge because they knew grand jury was
investigating their offshore-account tax-evasion scheme and intended to obstruct its investigation. United States v
Fassnacht (2002, ND Ill) 90 AFTR 2d 5467, affd (2003, CA7 Ill) 332 F3d 440, 91 AFTR 2d 2492, reh den, en banc
(2003, CA7 Ill) 2003 US App LEXIS 16568.
72. Bill of particulars
Even if it were assumed that complaint couched in general language of predecessor to 18 USCS § 1503 was insufficient, since there was no motion for bill of particulars, conspiracy count which fully and completely apprised defendant
of facts government would rely on, prevented prejudice to defendant because of lack of duty in indictment. Morris v
United States (1942, CA5 La) 128 F2d 912, cert den (1942) 317 US 661, 87 L Ed 531, 63 S Ct 60, reh den (1942) 317
US 708, 87 L Ed 564, 63 S Ct 156.
Indictment under predecessor to 18 USCS § 1503 did not require bill of particulars where crime allegedly committed was filing of false affidavits, and both defendant and counsel knew of contempt proceeding during which investigation was made of transaction under which indictment was brought. Nye v United States (1943, CA4 NC) 137 F2d 73,
cert den (1943) 320 US 755, 88 L Ed 449, 64 S Ct 62.
Indictments which charged offenses in very general language but did not give names or other identity of petit jurors
allegedly influenced, intimidated, or impeded entitled defendant to bill of particulars. Cefalu v United States (1956,
CA10 Colo) 234 F2d 522.
Indictment for violation of 18 USCS § 1503 which alleged that defendant sought to have witness falsely recant testimony was sufficient; to extent that defendant desired to know how government believed that he would have exploited
such testimony, deficiency may be cured by discovery or bill of particulars. United States v Johnson (1979, CA4 NC)
605 F2d 729, cert den (1980) 444 US 1020, 62 L Ed 2d 652, 100 S Ct 677.
Government failed to identify grand jury investigation's purpose, fact essential to defending against 18 USCS §
1503 charges against county sheriff who allegedly obstructed justice during his testimony before grand jury by lying
when asked whether he disclosed confidential informant's (CI) identity to accused person against whom that CI testified, so bill of particulars was required stating purpose of grand jury investigation, which testimony or portions of defendant's testimony are alleged to be false, and how defendant's testimony had effect of obstructing or impeding administration of justice. United States v Peterson (2008, MD Ga) 544 F Supp 2d 1363.
73. Joinder and severance of counts
Indictment charging general conspiracy, continuous in operation and single in character, having relation to no particular litigation but constituting agreement between judge and codefendant without limit as to time by which codefendant was to seek out litigants and parties who were interested in suits then or thereafter pending, and represent to
each of them that judge would accept sums of money in return for corrupt judicial action by him favorable to interests of
those who paid, constituted one conspiracy under predecessor to 18 USCS § 1503, and single indictment was all that
was required. United States v Manton (1938, CA2 NY) 107 F2d 834, cert den (1940) 309 US 664, 84 L Ed 1012, 60 S
Ct 590.
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18 USCS § 1503
Since 18 USCS § 1622 crime of subornation of perjury requires that endeavor be successful, it contains element
which is not contained in 18 USCS § 1503, and prosecutor did not have to elect between two before proceeding to trial.
Catrino v United States (1949, CA9 Mont) 176 F2d 884.
Joinder in same indictment of several counts of endeavoring to influence, intimidate, or impede jurors in discharge
of their duties was proper under Rule 8(a) on ground that offenses were of same or similar character. United States v
Hoffa (1965, CA6) 349 F2d 20, affd (1966) 385 US 293, 17 L Ed 2d 374, 87 S Ct 408, reh den (1967) 386 US 940, 386
US 951, 17 L Ed 2d 880, 87 S Ct 970, 87 S Ct 971.
Joinder of 18 USCS § 1001 charge with 18 USCS § 1503 charge, for having sought to influence investigation into
18 USCS § 1001 charge, was proper, where significant duplication of proof would be required between 2 separate trials.
United States v Rajewski (1975, CA7 Ill) 526 F2d 149, cert den (1976) 426 US 908, 48 L Ed 2d 833, 96 S Ct 2231.
Joinder of charges under 18 USCS §§ 1503 and 1621 was proper since charges were based on same transaction or,
at least, 2 different transactions connected together since they stem from trial of defendant for interstate transportation
of stolen vehicles. United States v Forrest (1980, CA5 Ga) 623 F2d 1107, cert den (1980) 449 US 924, 66 L Ed 2d
153, 101 S Ct 327.
Part of defendants' scheme to defraud U.S. by concealing defendant's assets allegedly involved sale of Corvette belonging to him: second defendant sent five interstate e-mails that government contended were in furtherance of such
scheme; where e-mails contained factual misrepresentations and details about plans to conceal source and identity of
proceeds from sale of Corvette, reasonable jury viewing them could have determined that both defendants were guilty
on five counts of wire fraud beyond reasonable doubt. United States v Frank (2004, CA8 Iowa) 354 F3d 910, 63 Fed
Rules Evid Serv 181, reh den, reh, en banc, den (2004, CA8) 2004 US App LEXIS 2709 and magistrate's recommendation (2005, ND Iowa) 2005 US Dist LEXIS 35369.
Indictment charging that defendant did endeavor to corruptly obstruct and impede due administration of justice by
presenting to federal grand jury false statements and causing to be presented falsely signed lease, charged offense within
18 USCS § 1503 although perjury may also have been charged. United States v Cohen (1962, DC Conn) 202 F Supp
587.
Motion to sever certain charges is denied in RICO proceeding against union and organized crime members where
certain members sought to sever false declaration and obstruction of justice charges from RICO counts and where government intended to use same evidence to prove false declaration, obstruction and RICO charges, because given commonality of proof, all charges were properly connected together. United States v Rastelli (1986, ED NY) 653 F Supp
1034.
Motion for severance is denied in RICO proceeding against members of union and organized crime, where member
also charged with perjury claimed evidence at RICO trial would be inadmissible for and therefore prejudicial to perjury
and obstruction of justice charges, because statements offered at trial would have been made by member in furtherance
of conspiracy and evidence of conspiracy would be evidence of perjury. United States v Rastelli (1986, ED NY) 653 F
Supp 1034.
74. Duplicity and multiplicity
Charging defendant with bribery of juror not only to vote for acquittal but also to vote not guilty, was not duplicitous. Bedell v United States (1935, CA8 Iowa) 78 F2d 358, cert den (1935) 296 US 628, 80 L Ed 447, 56 S Ct 151.
Although 18 USCS § 1503 permits indictment for each discreet act of obstruction, it also contemplates continuing
course of conduct, during pendency of judicial proceeding, designed to further single object of influencing, intimidating
or impeding witness; count of indictment is not prejudicially duplicitous where alleged acts of obstruction occurred
within relatively short periods of time, were committed by one defendant, involved single witness, and were in furtherance of defendant's solitary object of influencing witness not to reveal to grand jury certain circumstances. United
States v Berardi (1982, CA7 Ill) 675 F2d 894.
Indictment was not multiplicitous, where each of substantive obstruction of justice counts cited separate instances
of false testimony requiring different factual proof of falsity under RICO, encompassing 18 USCS §§ 1343, 1503, 1512,
1952, 1956, 21 USCS §§ 841(a) and 846, and violations of state law; indictment was not duplicitous by alleging two
separate and distinct answers to two different questions in trial testimony, each of which could support separate conviction for obstruction of justice. United States v Sharpe (1999, CA5 Miss) 193 F3d 852, 52 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1650, reh
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den (1999, CA5 Miss) 1999 US App LEXIS 34976 and cert den (2000) 528 US 1180, 120 S Ct 1218, 145 L Ed 2d 1118
and cert den (2000) 528 US 1173, 120 S Ct 1202, 145 L Ed 2d 1105 and cert den (2000) 530 US 1229, 120 S Ct 2658,
147 L Ed 2d 273 and cert den (2000) 530 US 1229, 120 S Ct 2658, 147 L Ed 2d 273 and post-conviction relief den sub
nom United States v Nix (2007, SD Miss) 2007 US Dist LEXIS 16297.
Two-count indictment in which count 1 charged defendants with intimidating witness in pending case in violation
of 18 USCS § 1503, and count 2 charged defendants with intimidating informant giving information in pending case in
violation of 18 USCS § 1510, was not duplicitous. United States v Zolli (1970, DC NY) 51 FRD 522.
Government's charging of willful endeavor to obstruct audit committee and its special counsel's communication of
information to federal investigators by multiple means is not impermissibly duplicitous. United States v Abrams (1982,
SD NY) 543 F Supp 1184.
Two obstruction of justice counts are not multiplicitous where defendant was charged with stealing tax documents
and subsequently destroying some of those documents, because each count requires proof of fact other count does not,
that is, theft and destruction. United States v Berkowitz (1988, ND Ill) 700 F Supp 1526.
Count of indictment that laid out several acts of obstruction was not duplicitous, because it charged single offense--obstruction of justice. United States v Peterson (2008, MD Ga) 544 F Supp 2d 1363.
75. Surplusage
In trial under 18 USCS § 1503, fact that indictment contained allegation concerning truth or falsity of influenced
witness' testimony was not prejudicial to defense and was simply unnecessary addition to government's burden of proof
and therefore not cause for reversal. United States v Good Shield (1976, CA8 SD) 544 F2d 950.
Although indictment charged that defendant violated 18 USCS § 1503 by creating false document in response to
subpoena, while jury charge permitted conviction premised only upon submission of false document without reference
to its creation, variance was not fatal, since § 1503 does not require document to be created in response to subpoena,
and allegations that go beyond essential elements required for conviction do not increase Government's burden. United
States v Jespersen (1995, CA2 NY) 65 F3d 993, cert den (1996) 517 US 1169, 134 L Ed 2d 669, 116 S Ct 1571.
Statements made in indictment as to outcome of previous trial should have been stricken as not being essential to
charge where defendants were charged with conspiring to violate 18 USCS § 1503 by assaulting witness at such previous trial. United States v Verra (1962, SD NY) 203 F Supp 87.
Legal effect of alleging offense under Article 134 of Uniform Code of Military Justice as violation of 18 USCS §
1503 is that phrase in specification alleging violation of 18 USCS § 1503 may be deleted, and substantive offense contrary to Article 134 of Uniform Code of Military Justice is sufficiently alleged, and reference to violation of 18 USCS §
1503 is to be considered redundant and unnecessary. United States v Long (1952) 6 CMR 60.
2.Necessity and Sufficiency of Particular Allegations 76. Conspiracy
Conviction for conspiracy to obstruct due administration of justice in violation of predecessor to 18 USCS § 1503
was improper where there were no averments in indictment that it was purpose of conspiracy to obstruct course of justice in federal court or that defendants were notified of pendency of any proceedings in federal court. Pettibone v
United States (1893) 148 US 197, 37 L Ed 419, 13 S Ct 542.
Indictment alleging conspiracy to influence and impede officers in order that codefendant would receive light sentence was sufficient although not specifying particular officers. United States v Polakoff (1940, CA2 NY) 112 F2d 888,
134 ALR 607, cert den (1940) 311 US 653, 85 L Ed 418, 61 S Ct 41.
Even if it were assumed that complaint couched in general language of predecessor to 18 USCS § 1503 was insufficient, since there was no motion for bill of particulars, conspiracy count which fully and completely apprised defendant
of facts government would rely on prevented prejudice to defendant stemming from absence in indictment of allegation
of lack of duty. Morris v United States (1942, CA5 La) 128 F2d 912, cert den (1942) 317 US 661, 87 L Ed 531, 63 S
Ct 60, reh den (1942) 317 US 708, 87 L Ed 564, 63 S Ct 156.
Indictment charging that defendants did corruptly endeavor to impede due administration of justice in that they did
agree and promise specified person against whom criminal case was pending that they would alter testimony of material
witnesses was sufficient. Anderson v United States (1954, CA6 Ky) 215 F2d 84, cert den (1954) 348 US 888, 99 L Ed
698, 75 S Ct 208, reh den (1955) 348 US 922, 99 L Ed 723, 75 S Ct 291.
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Indictment charging defendants with conspiring to violate 18 USCS § 1503 by influencing and aiding witness to
avoid testifying before federal grand jury pursuant to subpoena, stated offense. United States v Marionneaux (1975,
CA5 La) 514 F2d 1244 (ovrld in part as stated in United States v Watson (1989, CA11 Fla) 866 F2d 381) and (ovrld in
part on other grounds as stated in United States v Scrushy (2006, MD Ala) 237 FRD 464).
Count of indictment sufficiently alleged single agreement to reach overall objectives so that multiple conspiracies
could be tried as single enterprise conspiracy under RICO, where it alleged enrichment of members and associates of
enterprise as well as generation of funds for procuring defendant's release from prison as overall objectives of conspiracy, which was promoted by means of conspiracy to commit murder for hire, pre-May 1996 "scam," drug conspiracy,
obstruction of justice, and post-May 1996 "scam." United States v Sharpe (1999, CA5 Miss) 193 F3d 852, 52 Fed Rules
Evid Serv 1650, reh den (1999, CA5 Miss) 1999 US App LEXIS 34976 and cert den (2000) 528 US 1180, 120 S Ct
1218, 145 L Ed 2d 1118 and cert den (2000) 528 US 1173, 120 S Ct 1202, 145 L Ed 2d 1105 and cert den (2000) 530
US 1229, 120 S Ct 2658, 147 L Ed 2d 273 and cert den (2000) 530 US 1229, 120 S Ct 2658, 147 L Ed 2d 273 and
post-conviction relief den sub nom United States v Nix (2007, SD Miss) 2007 US Dist LEXIS 16297.
77. Corrupt act
Indictment alleging that defendant had willfully endeavored to influence, intimidate, or impede particular witness in
particular trial, and had endeavored to influence, obstruct, and impede due administration of justice in violation of 18
USCS § 1503 was sufficient, notwithstanding that it did not allege that defendant had acted "corruptly." Seawright v
United States (1955, CA6 Ohio) 224 F2d 482, cert den (1955) 350 US 838, 100 L Ed 748, 76 S Ct 76.
Indictment properly alleges obstruction of justice under 18 USCS § 1503, where indictment alleges judge attempted
to thwart grand jury bribery investigation by soliciting attorney to assist him in concealing bribery scheme. United
States v McDonnell (1988, ND Ill) 696 F Supp 356.
78. Details of conduct
Such details as conduct by which defendant corruptly endeavored to obstruct justice need not be alleged as long as
indictment furnishes sufficient information as to time, place and essential elements of crime to enable defendant to prepare for trial and avoid claim of double jeopardy. United States v Weiss (1974, CA2 NY) 491 F2d 460, cert den (1974)
419 US 833, 42 L Ed 2d 59, 95 S Ct 58.
Indictment for violation of 18 USCS § 1503 which stated that defendants corruptly endeavored to influence government witness, and did endeavor to injure witness in his person, and did corruptly endeavor to influence, obstruct and
impede due administration of justice did not state offense under § 1503 since facts charged, making out agreement to
kill witness, did not make out attempt to "influence" conduct of witness; in ordinary speech, attempt to "influence" individual means attempt to make him change his course of conduct and not attempt to destroy him as voluntary act.
United States v Johnston (1979, ED Pa) 472 F Supp 1102.
Indictment for violation of 18 USCS § 1503 which charged defendants with preparing and assisting and giving
misleading testimony to grand jury in order to impede investigation was sufficient. United States v Hubbard (1979,
DC Dist Col) 474 F Supp 64, 4 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1076.
Indictment charging only that defendant unlawfully, knowingly and willfully, did corrupt, obstruct, impede and attempt to obstruct and impede administration of justice, without alleging any facts to alert accused to conduct specifically in issue is insufficient to charge offense under 18 USCS § 1503. United States v Goldberg (1984, SD NY) 587 F
Supp 302, vacated on other grounds, remanded (1985, CA2 NY) 756 F2d 949, cert den (1985) 472 US 1009, 86 L Ed 2d
721, 105 S Ct 2706.
79. Federal action or proceeding influenced
Indictment was not bad for failure to allege particular case in which witnesses were to testify. Etie v United States
(1932, CA5 Tex) 55 F2d 114.
Indictment for violation of 18 USCS § 1503 which alleged that defendant interfered with grand jury investigation
was sufficient to provide element of obstruction of judicial proceeding. United States v Hubbard (1979, DC Dist Col)
474 F Supp 64, 4 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1076.
In prosecution for obstruction of justice and perjury, failure of government to allege or prove that individual was
witness or had been subpoenaed as witness before federal grand jury at time of alleged obstruction does not warrant
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18 USCS § 1503
grant of judgment of acquittal where government establishes that at time of alleged obstruction of justice, witness was
expected to testify to material facts in further legal proceedings, was co-operating with government and knew he would
be called as witness before grand jury to testify about his narcotic sources. United States v Vesich (1983, ED La) 558 F
Supp 1192, affd (1984, CA5 La) 724 F2d 451, 14 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1518, reh den (1984, CA5 La) 726 F2d 168 and
(superseded by statute as stated in United States v Gonzalez (1991, CA2 NY) 922 F2d 1044).
80. Intent, knowledge, or motive
Indictment had to allege knowledge that person threatened was or was about to be witness. Genna v United States
(1923, CA7 Ill) 293 F 387.
Indictment for willful and corrupt obstruction of justice was proper although it failed to charge that letters and affidavits used were false to knowledge of defendant. Nye v United States (1943, CA4 NC) 137 F2d 73, cert den (1943)
320 US 755, 88 L Ed 449, 64 S Ct 62.
Indictment for attempted bribery of grand jury witness which followed exact language of statute was not defective
because it failed to allege defendant knew person he attempted to bribe was to be witness before grand jury. Parsons v
United States (1951, CA5 Ga) 189 F2d 252.
Indictment alleging that defendant had willfully endeavored to influence, intimidate, or impede particular witness in
particular trial, and had endeavored to influence, obstruct, and impede due administration of justice in violation of 18
USCS § 1503 was sufficient, notwithstanding that it did not allege that defendant knew that other person was "witness,"
or that he had acted to affect witness "in the discharge of [her] duty." Seawright v United States (1955, CA6 Ohio) 224
F2d 482, cert den (1955) 350 US 838, 100 L Ed 748, 76 S Ct 76.
Indictment, sufficiently alleging offense in 18 USCS § 1503 language that accusation against defendant was that of
corruptly endeavoring to influence juror, was not rendered fatally defective because of failure to allege purpose on his
part to obstruct administration of justice. Holland v United States (1957, CA5 Fla) 245 F2d 341.
Indictment charging that defendants knowingly, wilfully, and corruptly endeavored to influence, obstruct, and impede due administration of justice in violation of 18 USCS § 1503 by endeavoring to induce named prospective witness,
by threat of force, not to testify in particular case which was set for trial, was sufficient, because it charged knowing
activity, set out facts that show knowledge or notice that victim was witness in pending proceeding, and gave defendants notice of charge in language of statute. United States v De Stefano (1973, CA7 Ill) 476 F2d 324.
Indictment under 18 USCS § 1503 which is modeled on language of statute need not contain technical terms of
knowledge and intent if it recites facts and uses language which, taken as whole, indicate knowledge and intent and that
indictment contains sufficient factual data to withstand motion to dismiss. United States v Haas (1978, CA5 Ala) 583
F2d 216, reh den (1978, CA5 Ala) 588 F2d 829 and cert den (1979) 440 US 981, 60 L Ed 2d 240, 99 S Ct 1788.
Indictment alleged fully and unambiguously that defendant had specific knowledge of pending grand jury proceedings, where it alleged that he "corruptly endeavored" to influence, obstruct, and impede due administration of justice by
shredding documents which pertained to litigation. United States v Monus (1997, CA6 Ohio) 128 F3d 376, 98-2 USTC
P 50488, 48 Fed Rules Evid Serv 224, 80 AFTR 2d 7329, 1997 FED App 311P, reh den (1998, CA6) 1998 US App
LEXIS 5558 and cert den (1998) 525 US 823, 119 S Ct 67, 142 L Ed 2d 53.
Indictment's allegation that defendant perjured herself at actual trial was sufficient to prove her specific intent to
impede administration of justice, since reasonable jury could find that her false testimony concerning her and others'
involvement in alleged schemes had natural and probable effect of interfering with due administration of justice. United
States v Sharpe (1999, CA5 Miss) 193 F3d 852, 52 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1650, reh den (1999, CA5 Miss) 1999 US App
LEXIS 34976 and cert den (2000) 528 US 1180, 120 S Ct 1218, 145 L Ed 2d 1118 and cert den (2000) 528 US 1173,
120 S Ct 1202, 145 L Ed 2d 1105 and cert den (2000) 530 US 1229, 120 S Ct 2658, 147 L Ed 2d 273 and cert den
(2000) 530 US 1229, 120 S Ct 2658, 147 L Ed 2d 273 and post-conviction relief den sub nom United States v Nix (2007,
SD Miss) 2007 US Dist LEXIS 16297.
Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's omnibus obstruction of justice conviction under 18 USCS § 1503
where there was sufficient evidence from which trier of fact could conclude that government established nexus element
of § 1503 because there was logical relationship between defendant's knowing conduct--sending "Endorsement Email"
while aware of grand jury subpoena's call for documents relating to his underwriter employer's initial public offering
(IPO) allocation process that were in possession of his direct reports (Tech Group bankers)--and effect it was likely to
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have--destruction of documents that otherwise would have been produced. United States v Quattrone (2006, CA2 NY)
441 F3d 153.
Acts alleged in indictment give basis for inferring plaintiff intended to obstruct justice where evidence indicates he:
(1) knew grand jury investigation was in progress, (2) could have known or foreseen that false affidavit and letter would
be submitted to and impede grand jury, and (3) requested witness to give him notes and report so witness could claim he
had no writings in response to subpoena. United States v Rogers (1986, DC Colo) 636 F Supp 237, affd, remanded
(1992, CA10 Colo) 960 F2d 1501, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 97735, cert den (1992) 506 US 1035, 113 S Ct 817, 121 L
Ed 2d 689.
Motion to dismiss indictment under 18 USCS § 1503 is denied where motion is based upon fact that indictment
does not allege that defendant was aware of allegedly obstructed pending judicial proceeding since "awareness" need
not be alleged in indictment which states that the defendant acted "corruptly;" word "corruptly" encompasses
knowledge of judicial proceeding and intent to impede it. United States v Schwimmer (1986, ED NY) 649 F Supp 544.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Sufficient evidence was introduced to convict defendant, police officer, of obstructing justice under
18 USCS § 1503, because it showed that he enlisted other officers to access restricted law enforcement database to retrieve personnel records of Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent who was investigating defendant's former fellow
officer in exchange for $ 1,000; jury was entitled to disbelieve defendant's testimony that he did not know that records
were those of DEA agent. United States v Salum (2007, CA11 Ala) 2007 US App LEXIS 28219.
81. Obstructive element
Since 18 USCS § 1503 is also contempt statute, obstructive element must be alleged before conviction can be had
under it. United States v Essex (1969, CA6 Tenn) 407 F2d 214.
Indictment for violation of 18 USCS § 1503 needs merely to allege that testimony had effect of impeding justice; it
need not describe testimony as either "evasive" or "false". United States v Griffin (1979, CA5 Fla) 589 F2d 200, cert
den (1979) 444 US 825, 62 L Ed 2d 32, 100 S Ct 48.
There is no requirement in language of 18 USCS § 1503 that government, having pleaded facts tending to show
commission of act that obstructed justice, must allege commission of additional act to state offense under § 1503.
United States v Caron (1982, ED Va) 551 F Supp 662, affd without op (1983, CA4 Va) 722 F2d 739, cert den (1984)
465 US 1103, 80 L Ed 2d 132, 104 S Ct 1602.
82. Miscellaneous
Indictment for willful and corrupt obstruction of justice was proper although failing to charge court had jurisdiction
of case in which attempt was made to obstruct justice. Nye v United States (1943, CA4 NC) 137 F2d 73, cert den
(1943) 320 US 755, 88 L Ed 449, 64 S Ct 62.
Indictment stated offense under 18 USCS § 1503 where it alleged that (1) appellant had been attorney for defendant
who had been convicted on narcotics violation; (2) federal authorities, as result of that conviction, were seeking to investigate further and to attempt to prosecute persons involved with that defendant in narcotic offenses; (3) appellant,
knowing this, conspired to conceal fact that certain of appellant's coconspirators were in fact principals with that defendant, by corruptly and by threats and force endeavoring to insure silence of that defendant in subsequent investigations; and (4) appellant thereby did endeavor to corruptly influence, obstruct, and impede due administration of justice.
Zamloch v United States (1952, CA9 Cal) 193 F2d 889, cert den (1952) 343 US 934, 96 L Ed 1342, 72 S Ct 770.
Twelve-count indictment which charged defendant with unlawfully and corruptly endeavoring to influence and
impede petit jurors, and thereby to obstruct administration of justice in violation of 18 USCS § 1503, was sufficient.
Beale v United States (1964, CA5 Miss) 327 F2d 227.
Offense charged in indictment under 18 USCS § 1503 must be similar to one of those specifically enumerated in
statute, applying doctrine of ejusdem generis. United States v Ryan (1971, CA9 Cal) 455 F2d 728, 20 ALR Fed 719.
Indictment under "due administration" clause of 18 USCS § 1503 for inducing another to commit perjury is sufficient. United States v Partin (1977, CA5 Ga) 552 F2d 621, cert den (1977) 434 US 903, 54 L Ed 2d 189, 98 S Ct 298.
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18 USCS § 1503
In prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1503, indictment plainly charges offense of obstruction of justice where
indictment specifically states that defendant did present to grand jury, $ 900,000 note, which note, defendant well knew
was not true evidence of any loan and which note was meant to mislead grand jury. United States v O'Keefe (1983,
CA5 La) 722 F2d 1175.
Indictment alleging that defendant obstructed justice by filing false affidavits was sufficient, despite lack of further
specificity as to particular manner in which affidavits had effect of obstructing justice, since indictment alleged all elements of offense. United States v Rankin (1989, CA3 Pa) 870 F2d 109, cert den (1989) 493 US 840, 107 L Ed 2d 86,
110 S Ct 126, subsequent app (1989, CA3 Pa) 893 F2d 1332, subsequent app (1991, CA3 Pa) 937 F2d 600.
Evidence was sufficient to affirm corporation's obstruction of justice conviction where evidence showed that
co-defendant was acting both in interest of himself and corporation. United States v Najjar (2002, CA4 Md) 300 F3d
466, cert den (2002) 537 US 1094, 123 S Ct 705, 154 L Ed 2d 641 and post-conviction relief den (2007, CA4 Md) 2007
US App LEXIS 25821.
Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's omnibus obstruction of justice conviction under 18 USCS § 1503
where there was sufficient evidence from which trier of fact could conclude that government established nexus element
of § 1503 because there was logical relationship between defendant's knowing conduct--sending "Endorsement Email"
while aware of grand jury subpoena's call for documents relating to his underwriter employer's initial public offering
(IPO) allocation process that were in possession of his direct reports (Tech Group bankers)--and effect it was likely to
have. United States v Quattrone (2006, CA2 NY) 441 F3d 153.
Indictment which alleged that defendant, knowing that grand jury was conducting investigation into matters as to
which correspondence within his control was material and relevant, and having reason to believe that he would be called
before grand jury to produce those documents, did knowingly, willfully, and corruptly destroy documents to prevent
their production before grand jury, was sufficient to charge offense under 18 USCS § 1503. United States v Solow
(1956, DC NY) 138 F Supp 812 (superseded by statute as stated in United States v Simpkins (1986, NMCMR) 22 MJ
924).
Indictment charging defendants with conspiracy to violate 18 USCS § 1503 by corruptly influencing, obstructing,
impeding, and endeavoring to influence, obstruct, and impede due administration of justice in course of grand jury investigation, by procuring destruction of stenographic notes and substituting others therefor, was sufficient without alleging in so many words that matters involved were "material" to investigation, since section contains no such language.
United States v Siegel (1957, DC NY) 152 F Supp 370.
Separate counts of indictment each charging violation of 18 USCS §§ 1503, 1505, and 1510, respectively, were not
defective and subject to dismissal on ground that such statutes are mutually exclusive and applicable to different governmental activities and separate chronological periods because alleged conduct which is not per se illegal in and of
itself constitutes corrupt endeavor within meaning of statutes if alleged efforts to influence justice are made for concealed motives; while one paragraph of each count charged violation in statutory terms and second incorporated by reference so-called "means" paragraph of count one, fact that initial count set forth ways and means did not mean that
court had to consider each of these ways and means in dealing with motion to dismiss charges both because parties had
not agreed on all facts, and this indictment, as instrument of accusation, containing elements of offenses charged, met
settled test of sufficiency; to equate individual allegation of "means" paragraph of indictment was entirety of Government's proof would transform Rule 12(b) motion into motion for acquittal pursuant to Rule 29, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. United States v Mitchell (1973, SD NY) 372 F Supp 1239, app dismd (1973, CA2 NY) 485 F2d 1290.
Indictment did not fail to allege facts sufficient to state offense and did not fail to apprise defendants of charge
against them where it tracked language of 18 USCS § 1503 and provided sufficient details, including dates and actions,
to apprise defendants of charges against them. United States v Mitchell (1974, DC Dist Col) 397 F Supp 166, affd, en
banc (1976, App DC) 181 US App DC 254, 559 F2d 31, 1 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1203, cert den (1977) 431 US 933, 53 L
Ed 2d 250, 97 S Ct 2641, reh den (1977) 433 US 916, 53 L Ed 2d 1103, 97 S Ct 2992.
Count of indictment which charges defendant with willfully endeavoring to intimidate federal witness by having
him killed and that defendant obtained information about such witness' secret whereabouts is sufficient to charge crime
under 18 USCS § 1503. United States v Bufalino (1981, SD NY) 518 F Supp 1190.
In prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1503, indictment is sufficient where it tracks language of elements of
statute and gives defendant notice of conduct specifically at issue in that it adequately alleges by necessary implication
Page 50
18 USCS § 1503
that defendant knew information was being sought for purposes of presenting it to federal grand jury and that defendant
endeavored to impeded this. United States v Abrams (1982, SD NY) 543 F Supp 1184.
Specific statements made to grand jury witnesses in counseling and instructing them to testify falsely are mere evidentiary detail and need not be pleaded in indictment. United States v Rogers (1986, DC Colo) 636 F Supp 237, affd,
remanded (1992, CA10 Colo) 960 F2d 1501, CCH Fed Secur L Rep P 97735, cert den (1992) 506 US 1035, 113 S Ct
817, 121 L Ed 2d 689.
Indictment properly alleges interference with grand jury under 18 USCS § 1503, where indictment alleges defendant directed witness under grand jury subpoena to give false and misleading testimony. United States v Bucey (1988,
ND Ill) 691 F Supp 1077, affd in part and revd in part, remanded on other grounds (1989, CA7 Ill) 876 F2d 1297, reh
den (1989, CA7) 1989 US App LEXIS 11009 and cert den (1989) 493 US 1004, 107 L Ed 2d 560, 110 S Ct 565 and (superseded by statute as stated in United States v Gollott (1991, CA5 Tex) 939 F2d 255).
Indictment against defendants, individual and corporation, sufficiently alleged elements of obstructing justice under
omnibus clause of 18 USCS § 1503 where that individual endeavored corruptly to influence or obstruct due administration of justice; whether government could prove that individual knew his actions were likely to affect grand jury depended on evidence at trial, and fact that indictment alleged that individual believed that grand jury would likely order
production of documents did not compel contrary conclusion. United States v Triumph Capital Group, Inc. (2003, DC
Conn) 260 F Supp 2d 470.
Indictment sufficiently alleged obstruction of justice charge when it stated that defendant knowingly and corruptly
interfered with due administration of justice and indictment did not need to allege that defendant knew of pending judicial proceedings. United States v Grossman (2003, ND Ill) 272 F Supp 2d 760.
C.Trial
1.In General 83. Witnesses
In prosecution for corruptly endeavoring to influence witnesses to testify falsely, cross-examination of recalcitrant
witness with respect to prior inconsistent statement made by him to federal revenue agent was permissible. Thomas v
United States (1939, CA4 Va) 104 F2d 986.
Where defendant was charged with alleged telephone conversation in which he threatened witness regarding prosecution of a friend for illegal possession of firearm, which defendant denied but defendant admitted that witness had
approached him after his indictment and arrest on charges of violating 18 USCS § 1503 and suggested that they might
make deal, inquiry should have been allowed on cross-examination to a reasonable degree into acts demonstrating basis
for bias and prejudice. United States v Baker (1974, CA6 Ky) 494 F2d 1262.
No right of defendant was violated in prosecution under 18 USCS § 1503 when FBI coached witness who had been
juror and juror's son with their full consent, therefore conviction was proper and did not reward government officials for
fruits of their own misconduct. United States v Quinn (1976, CA8 Neb) 543 F2d 640.
Counsel's right to cross-examine witnesses against him is not denied where trial court refuses to allow counsel to
repeat questions already asked or to explore areas already covered on previous cross-examination. United States v
Coven (1981, CA2 NY) 662 F2d 162, 9 Fed Rules Evid Serv 475, cert den (1982) 456 US 916, 72 L Ed 2d 176, 102 S Ct
1771 and (criticized in Ted Lapidus, S.A. v 77 World Design (1997, SD NY) 1997 US Dist LEXIS 9726).
In prosecution under 18 USCS § 1503 for assault upon prospective witness at trial of defendant, physical examination of prosecuting witness' person would not serve any purpose when requested more than 15 months after alleged assault. United States v Verra (1962, SD NY) 203 F Supp 87.
Court grants government's motion for permission to conduct more probing interviews of selected jurors, where interviews are necessary to help determine which jurors should be called as witnesses in trial of defendant charged under
18 USCS §§ 2 and 1503 with unduly influencing juror in his previous trial for cocaine distribution, because (1) permission is strictly circumscribed to protect secrecy of jury deliberations, (2) Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) limiting "testimony" of jurors upon inquiries into "validity" of verdicts is inapplicable to requested informal interviews, and (3)
court is convinced of relevance of jurors' recollections of fellow juror who allegedly received flowers, notes, and phone
calls from defendant. United States v Militello (1987, DC NJ) 673 F Supp 141.
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18 USCS § 1503
Under 18 USCS § 1503 it is proper for United States attorney to question witness about his social, family, and
business relationships with others who may be subject of inquiry and about his conversations with person who is subject
of inquiry, including advice given or arrangements made. In re Grand Jury for November, 1974 Term (1976, WD NY)
415 F Supp 242.
84. Remarks or inquiries of judge
In prosecution for conspiracy to violate 18 USCS § 1503, misstatement by judge as to which codefendant had proposed payment to party sought to be influenced was not cause for reversal where no exception to comment was made
and it could not be deemed that jury was influenced by comment. United States v Kahaner (1963, CA2 NY) 317 F2d
459, cert den (1963) 375 US 835, 11 L Ed 2d 65, 84 S Ct 62, reh den (1964) 375 US 982, 11 L Ed 2d 429, 84 S Ct 478
and cert den (1963) 375 US 836, 11 L Ed 2d 65, 84 S Ct 73 and cert den (1963) 375 US 836, 11 L Ed 2d 65, 84 S Ct 74,
reh den (1963) 375 US 926, 11 L Ed 2d 169, 84 S Ct 263.
Judge's comment on disbelief in defendant's testimony on lack of memory of events culminating in 18 USCS §
1503 prosecution was within compass of right of judge in trial in federal courts to comment on evidence. United States
v Woodmansee (1965, CA2 Vt) 354 F2d 235.
In prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1503, judge has broad discretion concerning extent of inquiry as to potential juror prejudice and is not required to conduct individual inquiry concerning jurors racial prejudices where race is
not central aspect of case. United States v Kibler (1982, CA4 Md) 667 F2d 452, 9 Fed Rules Evid Serv 897, cert den
(1982) 456 US 961, 72 L Ed 2d 485, 102 S Ct 2037.
Although trial judge's frequent interruptions of both direct and cross-examination of expert witness, who testified as
to defendant's sanity in prosecution for obstruction of justice, constitute error, such error is harmless where government
presents overwhelming testimony clearly supporting jury's verdicts of guilty. United States v Wilensky (1985, CA3 NJ)
757 F2d 594.
85. Remarks of prosecutor
Reference to defendant as "perjurer" by defense counsel is not improper at trial under 18 USCS § 1503 for attempting to influence juror where no exception was taken by defense counsel to use by prosecutor of "perjurer." United States
v De Alesandro (1966, CA2 NY) 361 F2d 694, cert den (1966) 385 US 842, 17 L Ed 2d 74, 87 S Ct 94.
Prosecutor's statement during colloquy between trial judge and both counsel, out of hearing of jury and with intended witness not present, that if witness was called and testified contrary to what she had told probation officer, officer would be called to impeach her testimony, such contrary testimony perhaps affecting her probation chances, did
not violate 18 USCS § 1503. Williams v United States (1969, CA10 Kan) 418 F2d 372.
86. Questions of fact or law
Credibility questions concerning 18 USCS § 1503 prosecution to which defense of entrapment was raised were for
jury to resolve. Osborn v United States (1966) 385 US 323, 17 L Ed 2d 394, 87 S Ct 429, reh den (1967) 386 US 938,
17 L Ed 2d 813, 87 S Ct 951.
In prosecution for intimidation of witness and for endeavoring to obstruct due administration of justice, where government's proof was squarely denied by defendants, that situation necessitated submission of case to jury under proper
instructions. United States v Meltzer (1938, CA7 Wis) 100 F2d 739.
In prosecution under 18 USCS § 1503, determination of whether defendant had requisite specific intent to commit
crime was for jury. Knight v United States (1962, CA5 Ga) 310 F2d 305.
Finding that defendant endeavored to influence witness "corruptly," as used in 18 USCS § 1503, is mixed question
of law and fact, if not of fact alone. United States v Fayer (1975, CA2 NY) 523 F2d 661.
Whether conversation between juror and defendant was innocent and reference to case upon which juror was sitting
was so incidental as to be innocuous was under circumstances for jury to determine in trial under 18 USCS § 1503.
United States v Roe (1975, CA4 W Va) 529 F2d 629.
Whether endeavor was "corrupt" was question for jury. United States v Fasolino (1978, CA2 NY) 586 F2d 939.
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18 USCS § 1503
Construction of 18 USCS § 1503 is question of law for court. Caldwell v United States (1954, App DC) 95 US App
DC 35, 218 F2d 370, cert den (1955) 349 US 930, 99 L Ed 1260, 75 S Ct 773, reh den (1955) 349 US 969, 99 L Ed
1290, 75 S Ct 880.
At trial for conspiracy to induce witness to claim privilege against self-incrimination, it was for judge to determine
whether his answer would reasonably have had such tendency. United States v Herron (1928, DC Cal) 28 F2d 122.
2.Instructions 87. Corruptly
Trial judge correctly instructed jury that defendants acted corruptly if in consideration of money paid to them, they
promised they would alter testimony of witnesses in pending federal case. Anderson v United States (1954, CA6 Ky)
215 F2d 84, cert den (1954) 348 US 888, 99 L Ed 698, 75 S Ct 208, reh den (1955) 348 US 922, 99 L Ed 723, 75 S Ct
291.
Instruction stating that any endeavor to influence or intimidate or impede witness falls within meaning of word
"corruptly," as used in 18 USCS § 1503, although possibly capable of being phrased better, did not render conviction
reversible especially where other instructions correctly defined term. United States v Partin (1977, CA5 Ga) 552 F2d
621, cert den (1977) 434 US 903, 54 L Ed 2d 189, 98 S Ct 298.
Trial court's instructions in prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1503 were not plainly erroneous, even though
instructions stated that word "corruptly" did not add additional element to crime. United States v Ochs (1979, CA2 NY)
595 F2d 1247, cert den (1979) 444 US 955, 62 L Ed 2d 328, 100 S Ct 435, reh den (1980) 444 US 1027, 62 L Ed 2d
663, 100 S Ct 695.
In prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1503, trial court properly instructed jury that "corruptly" means willfully,
knowingly and with specific intent to influence juror to abrogate legal duties and that intent ordinarily may be inferred
from surrounding circumstances; trial court also properly instructed jury that it had to find that defendant contacted specific jurors who had been selected to serve on panels from which petit jurors were to be selected in pending criminal
action and that by such conduct defendant tried to influence and impede such prospective jurors in discharge of their
duties and that such actions were accomplished corruptly. United States v Jackson (1979, CA8 Ark) 607 F2d 1219, cert
den (1980) 444 US 1080, 62 L Ed 2d 763, 100 S Ct 1032.
Failure to include reference to evil motive in defining word "corruptly" in instructions for prosecution for violation
of 18 USCS § 1503 was not reversible error since if jury believed evidence indicating that defendant attempted to deliver to juror handbook espousing his views on concept of jury nullification, then belief should be automatic that his motives were inherently evil; requested instruction that word "corruptly" meant endeavor done with wicked or evil purpose
was properly refused since evil purpose is not necessary element of offense; no reversible error existed because of instructions that what defendant does or fails to do may indicate intent or lack of intent to commit offense charged and it
is reasonable to infer that person ordinarily intends natural and probable consequences of acts knowingly done or
knowingly omitted; there was no error in omitting word "corruptly" in instructing on defendant's first Amendment rights
since term in proper context was used in instruction and court gave sufficient definition of it. United States v Ogle
(1979, CA10 Colo) 613 F2d 233, cert den (1980) 449 US 825, 66 L Ed 2d 28, 101 S Ct 87, reh den (1980) 449 US 1026,
66 L Ed 2d 487, 101 S Ct 594.
88. Knowledge or intent
Instruction requiring defendant to have had notice of pending case rather than knowledge was sufficient. Kloss v
United States (1935, CA8 Ark) 77 F2d 462.
In prosecution under predecessor to 18 USCS § 1503, instructions adequately covered element of intent when they
stated defendant must have acted corruptly. Martin v United States (1948, CA4 Va) 166 F2d 76.
Defendant's contention that trial court did not properly instruct jury on mens rea necessary to violate 18 USCS §
1503 has merit since under district court's definition, proof of any act to influence witness under any circumstances and
for any purpose would automatically subject accused to criminal penalties, regardless of his intent; however, when
viewed as whole, court's instructions could not fairly be said to have misled jury in proper application of law. United
States v Johnson (1978, CA5 Tex) 585 F2d 119.
Court correctly instructed jury as to matter of specific intent where it charged that specific intent to do act must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt, willfulness must be evidenced and that act is done willfully if done voluntarily and
intentionally with specific intent to do something law forbids. United States v Johnson (1981, CA4 NC) 657 F2d 604.
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18 USCS § 1503
Jury instruction was unconstitutional, since, when read as whole, it unambiguously set up mandatory rebuttable
presumption that, unless defendant proved his fear was "genuine" and "substantiated," jury must find that government
had met its burden on issue of intent. United States v Banks (1993, CA11 Ala) 988 F2d 1106, 7 FLW Fed C 241.
There was no harm in instructing jury that farmer knew or recklessly avoided knowing that mailings he sent to
bankruptcy judge were illegal attempts to intimidate or harass him, where evidence that farmer had legal research experience and had used law dictionary showed at most reckless avoidance of knowledge, since ignorance of law was no
defense. United States v Fulbright (1995, CA9 Mont) 69 F3d 1468, 95 CDOS 8622, 95 Daily Journal DAR 14879, reprinted as amd, reh, en banc, den, remanded (1995, CA9 Mont) 96 CDOS 25, 96 Daily Journal DAR 44, op withdrawn,
substituted op (1997, CA9 Mont) 105 F3d 443, 97 CDOS 480, 97 Daily Journal DAR 783, cert den (1997) 520 US
1236, 137 L Ed 2d 1041, 117 S Ct 1836.
Jury instruction defining proceeding as pending until disposition made of any direct appeal taken by party claiming
error that would result in new trial did not strip defendant of his defense that he considered his appeal to be so frivolous
as to have had no chance of resulting in remand; hence, he lacked intent to influence judge when he attempted to place $
10 million lien on judge's property. United States v Fleming (2000, CA9 Cal) 215 F3d 930, 2000 CDOS 4445, 2000
Daily Journal DAR 5975, 55 Fed Rules Evid Serv 136.
Instruction in prosecution for obstruction of justice was clear where judge told jury that words "specific intent,"
"knowingly," and "willfully," center on purpose that individual has when he does something, that is, his intent, his will,
that specific intent is important element of crime, and that to convict on obstruction of justice, jury must find, in addition to other elements, that defendant had specific intent to obstruct, impair, or impede due administration of justice and
that his endeavor was not accidental or inadvertent. United States v Haldeman (1976, App DC) 181 US App DC 254,
559 F2d 31, 1 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1203, cert den (1977) 431 US 933, 53 L Ed 2d 250, 97 S Ct 2641, reh den (1977)
433 US 916, 53 L Ed 2d 1103, 97 S Ct 2992.
89. Miscellaneous
In prosecution under predecessor to 18 USCS § 1503, that court failed to tell jury 2 witnesses were coconspirators
and that their testimony should be therefore viewed with care and caution was not erroneous where no request was made
by defense counsel. United States v Potash (1941, CA2 NY) 118 F2d 54, cert den (1941) 313 US 584, 85 L Ed 1540,
61 S Ct 1103.
In 18 USCS § 1503 prosecution for tampering with grand jury witness, limiting government to mysterious statement that defendant was somehow connected with investigation into some unidentified crime would unduly hamper
prosecution, therefore presenting subject of investigation would be allowed where cautionary instructions by judge were
given that conviction could not be had for crime which was under investigation by grand jury. United States v
Bradwell (1968, CA2 Conn) 388 F2d 619, cert den (1968) 393 US 867, 21 L Ed 2d 135, 89 S Ct 152.
Admission of testimony regarding dynamite explosion which related to matter not relevant to proving crime of violating 18 USCS § 1503 but was used to corroborate testimony of officer and father in regard to where defendant said
explosion would take place, corroboration was unnecessary in view of fact that two prosecution witnesses testified that
threat was made and defendant admitted occurrence of conversation in which alleged threat took place; therefore in absence of appropriate instructions considerable danger existed that jury might make improper use of evidence. United
States v Baker (1974, CA6 Ky) 494 F2d 1262.
Instructions in prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1503 did not invalidate conviction where, although government's chief prosecution witness testified that defendant had attempted to have him killed in order to prevent him from
testifying on retrial of case, instructions stated that defendant attempted to prevent witness from testifying in case
"pending in this court". United States v Chandler (1979, CA5 Ga) 604 F2d 972, reh den (1979, CA5 Ga) 608 F2d 524
and cert dismd (1980) 444 US 1104, 63 L Ed 2d 317, 100 S Ct 1074.
In prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1503, instructions are sufficient where judge quotes pertinent parts of
statute to jury, instructs that "corruptly" means any "endeavor" to obstruct justice, and defines "due administration of
justice", instructs that to convict defendant jury must find that grand jury was engaged in due administration of justice,
that defendant knew grand jury was conducting investigation, that defendant knew what documents were covered by
subpoena, and that, knowing that particular documents were covered by subpoena, defendant willfully concealed or
endeavored to conceal them from grand jury. United States v Rasheed (1981, CA9 Cal) 663 F2d 843, 9 Fed Rules Evid
Serv 360, 62 ALR Fed 284, cert den (1982) 454 US 1157, 71 L Ed 2d 315, 102 S Ct 1031.
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18 USCS § 1503
In prosecution of attorney who accepted amount from criminal defendant in return for promise to fix sentence, jury
instructions which gave several theories concerning "success" of endeavor, including "success" as to ultimate payment
or "success" as to need to have judge recuse himself, requires reversal. United States v Buffalano (1984, CA2 NY) 727
F2d 50.
Trial court must instruct jury that false testimony alone will not provide basis for conviction under 18 USCS §
1503, unless testimony at issue had natural and probable effect of impeding due administration of justice. United
States v Thomas (1990, CA11 Ga) 916 F2d 647.
Supplemental instruction which erroneously informed jury that it need not find pending official proceeding in order
to satisfy 18 USCS § 1503 was harmless, where factual finding that judge had obstructed justice by making corrupt
statements to attorney was closely related to ultimate and unrebutted fact of existence of pending grand jury investigation. United States v Maloney (1995, CA7 Ill) 71 F3d 645, reh, en banc, den (1996, CA7 Ill) 1996 US App LEXIS 4533
and cert den (1996) 519 US 927, 136 L Ed 2d 214, 117 S Ct 295.
District court did not plainly err in failing to instruct jury that it must unanimously find that defendant lied regarding particular answer, where government proved and district court actually instructed jury that issue was not whether
particular responses considered individually and out of context were made intentionally with knowledge of falsity, but
whether defendant's responses were made as part of endeavor to impede and block flow of truthful information, in single continuous scheme. United States v Sharpe (1999, CA5 Miss) 193 F3d 852, 52 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1650, reh den
(1999, CA5 Miss) 1999 US App LEXIS 34976 and cert den (2000) 528 US 1180, 120 S Ct 1218, 145 L Ed 2d 1118 and
cert den (2000) 528 US 1173, 120 S Ct 1202, 145 L Ed 2d 1105 and cert den (2000) 530 US 1229, 120 S Ct 2658, 147 L
Ed 2d 273 and cert den (2000) 530 US 1229, 120 S Ct 2658, 147 L Ed 2d 273 and post-conviction relief den sub nom
United States v Nix (2007, SD Miss) 2007 US Dist LEXIS 16297.
Evidence was sufficient to support giving of deliberate ignorance instruction for attorney who managed prison inmate's trust fund account, consisting of thousands of dollars accumulated through "lonely hearts" scam, where he gave
inmate's girlfriend, coconspirator, free reign of his office, and he met and spoke with co-conspirators who were planning
murders of judge and his wife. United States v Sharpe (1999, CA5 Miss) 193 F3d 852, 52 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1650, reh
den (1999, CA5 Miss) 1999 US App LEXIS 34976 and cert den (2000) 528 US 1180, 120 S Ct 1218, 145 L Ed 2d 1118
and cert den (2000) 528 US 1173, 120 S Ct 1202, 145 L Ed 2d 1105 and cert den (2000) 530 US 1229, 120 S Ct 2658,
147 L Ed 2d 273 and cert den (2000) 530 US 1229, 120 S Ct 2658, 147 L Ed 2d 273 and post-conviction relief den sub
nom United States v Nix (2007, SD Miss) 2007 US Dist LEXIS 16297.
Instruction, viewed in its entirety, clearly required commission of "overt act" as opposed to mere "failure to do
something," and thus properly required government to prove beyond reasonable doubt that defendant "corruptly endeavored" to obstruct justice. United States v Frank (2004, CA8 Iowa) 354 F3d 910, 63 Fed Rules Evid Serv 181, reh
den, reh, en banc, den (2004, CA8) 2004 US App LEXIS 2709 and magistrate's recommendation (2005, ND Iowa) 2005
US Dist LEXIS 35369.
Whether offense of obstructing justice by influencing and intimidating witnesses could be considered disorder under Clause (1) of Article 134 of Uniform Code of Military Justice, or violation of 18 USCS § 1503 or 18 USCS § 1505
and thus offense under Clause (3) of Article 134 of Uniform Code of Military Justice, instructions which implicitly required elements of 18 USCS § 1503 offense were adequate. United States v Rossi (1953) 13 CMR 896.
D.Evidence
1.Admissibility 90. Circumstantial evidence
Use of circumstantial evidence is often critical and necessary in 18 USCS § 1503 prosecution to connect defendants
and trial which was attempted to be tampered with, therefore such circumstantial evidence is admissible. United States
v Harris (1977, CA7 Ind) 558 F2d 366.
Evidence seized by police officers not listed on warrant is properly admissible where court reasonably could have
determined that evidence supported inference that defendants would have used such seized items to restrain or injure
victim. United States v Johnson (1983, CA11 Ga) 713 F2d 654, cert den (1984) 465 US 1030, 79 L Ed 2d 695, 104 S
Ct 1295.
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18 USCS § 1503
Indictment is not insufficient because it charges defendant with threatening witness without alleging that he knew
that person threatened was to be witness since law does not require such knowledge on part of defendant. United
States v Raineri (1980, WD Wis) 521 F Supp 16.
91. Expert testimony
In prosecution for conspiracy to endeavor to obstruct or impede due administration of justice by having abdominal
operation performed on defendant while latter was being tried under criminal indictment, testimony of defendant in
conspiracy case that he had read in paper that defendant in criminal case had served in federal penitentiary was admissible as showing that latter if convicted would have been second offender and that danger of his position as such was additional incentive that made consummation of conspiracy more likely. United States v Minkoff (1943, CA2 NY) 137
F2d 402.
Expert testimony is admissible in prosecution for conspiring to manipulate judge-assignment system in bankruptcy
court, where results of assignment system could appear to laymen to be random and innocent. United States v August
(1984, CA6 Mich) 745 F2d 400, 16 Fed Rules Evid Serv 731.
Admission of testimony regarding mental state of police officer in breach of surveillance was harmless in obstruction of justice case because similar testimony had been admitted previously without objection. United States v Schneiderhan (2005, CA1 Mass) 404 F3d 73, 66 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1220, cert den (2005) 546 US 873, 126 S Ct 381, 163 L
Ed 2d 167.
Where defendant was charged with making false material declarations to grand juries, in violation of 18 USCS §
1623, obstructing justice by virtue of false declarations, in violation of 18 USCS § 1503, and making false material
statements, in violation of 18 USCS § 1001(a), based on his conduct in falsely denying that he had participated in jihadist camp and that he knew about people he had communicated with about training for jihad, testimony of government's terrorism expert was admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 702 because expert's lengthy testimony about various aspects of radical Islam was necessary to help jury understand evidence and determine facts and probative value of evidence outweighed its prejudicial risk. United States v Benkahla (2008, CA4 Va) 530 F3d 300.
92. Pending indictments
In prosecution under 18 USCS § 1503, no error was committed in admitting into evidence indictments pending
against defendant at time of purported endeavor to obstruct justice, his conviction on one of those indictments, and testimony that he had sold accomplice certain firearms; evidence of pending indictments was proper as necessary ingredient in explaining crime in question or as establishing motive. United States v Mitchell (1975, CA6 Tenn) 514 F2d 758,
cert den (1975) 423 US 847, 46 L Ed 2d 68, 96 S Ct 86.
93. Photographs
Photographs of witness after assault by defendant were admissible in 18 USCS § 1503 trial since injuries were issue
in case. United States v Bailey (1976, CA5 Tex) 537 F2d 845, 1 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1186, cert den (1977) 429 US
1051, 50 L Ed 2d 767, 97 S Ct 764.
94. Prior convictions
Even if evidence of conviction of charge underlying alleged obstruction of justice charge under 18 USCS § 1503
was inadmissible at trial on charge of obstructing justice, such evidence was admissible with instructions limiting its use
for impeachment purposes where convicted person testified at trial for obstructing justice, and that such conviction was,
at time of use for impeachment, on appeal is immaterial. United States v Mitchell (1975, CA6 Tenn) 514 F2d 758, cert
den (1975) 423 US 847, 46 L Ed 2d 68, 96 S Ct 86.
Evidence that defendant had previously been convicted for abortion was admissible in trial under 18 USCS § 1503
notwithstanding that defendant had been subsequently pardoned for crime, where pardon and defendant's explanation
were also admitted. Laughlin v United States (1967, App DC) 128 US App DC 27, 385 F2d 287, cert den (1968) 390
US 1003, 20 L Ed 2d 103, 88 S Ct 1245.
95. Prior conduct
Evidence of prior conduct tending to show defendant's predisposition to commit offense charged was admissible in
18 USCS § 1503 trial where defense of entrapment was raised. Osborn v United States (1966) 385 US 323, 17 L Ed 2d
394, 87 S Ct 429, reh den (1967) 386 US 938, 17 L Ed 2d 813, 87 S Ct 951.
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18 USCS § 1503
In prosecution of attorney for bribery of juror, evidence of defendant's connection with previous trials, bailiffs, and
bondsmen, as to giving of money at prior trials, as to association with disbarred lawyer, and as to inquiries as to whether
he was justly disbarred, was collateral and inadmissible. United States v Sager (1931, CA2 NY) 49 F2d 725 (criticized
in United States v Wong (2000, SD NY) 2000 US Dist LEXIS 3545).
Since jury could well believe that past transactions tended to establish relationship which was far more likely to
produce attitude in defendant to act for financial reward upon intercession with judge rather than relationship between
doctor and patient that had developed into close relationship, admission of such past acts was relevant in trial under 18
USCS § 1503. United States v Kahaner (1963, CA2 NY) 317 F2d 459, cert den (1963) 375 US 835, 11 L Ed 2d 65, 84
S Ct 62, reh den (1964) 375 US 982, 11 L Ed 2d 429, 84 S Ct 478 and cert den (1963) 375 US 836, 11 L Ed 2d 65, 84 S
Ct 73 and cert den (1963) 375 US 836, 11 L Ed 2d 65, 84 S Ct 74, reh den (1963) 375 US 926, 11 L Ed 2d 169, 84 S Ct
263.
In prosecution for obstruction of justice pursuant to 18 USCS § 1503, which was based upon allegation that defendant had ordered potential informant to leave town, and his less than subtle threat that it might be good for informant's health not to say anything, testimony of defendant's assault on third party, in presence of informant, and with accompanying warning to informant, was probative of defendant's intent and motivation when, only short time later, he
told informant to leave town and threatened that it might be good for informant's health if informant didn't say anything.
United States v Carleo (1978, CA10 Colo) 576 F2d 846, cert den (1978) 439 US 850, 58 L Ed 2d 152, 99 S Ct 153.
Admission of evidence of defendant's engagement in loan sharking and prostitution was proper as affording necessary background to obstruction of justice count. United States v Ochs (1979, CA2 NY) 595 F2d 1247, cert den (1979)
444 US 955, 62 L Ed 2d 328, 100 S Ct 435, reh den (1980) 444 US 1027, 62 L Ed 2d 663, 100 S Ct 695.
96. Recordings
Use of recording device concealed on informer did not violate Fourth Amendment and recording was admissible at
defendant's 18 USCS § 1503 trial where veracity of recording was affirmed by defendant, recording provided strong
corroboration of evidence, and where federal court judges had authorized use of recorder for corroboration purposes.
Osborn v United States (1966) 385 US 323, 17 L Ed 2d 394, 87 S Ct 429, reh den (1967) 386 US 938, 17 L Ed 2d 813,
87 S Ct 951.
In prosecution for violation of 18 USCS §§ 241 and 1503, tape recording of extortion threat is admissible where
tape recorded threat served double purpose of negating defendant's testimony that he never told anyone to kill third party and establishing his motive for seeking third party's death. United States v Bufalino (1982, CA2 NY) 683 F2d 639,
10 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1052, cert den (1983) 459 US 1104, 74 L Ed 2d 952, 103 S Ct 727.
97. Statements and declarations
Although informer was present at conferences between defendant and his counsel during trial from which 18 USCS
§ 1503 prosecution arose for jury tampering, statements made to informer out of presence of counsel were admissible
against defendant at subsequent 18 USCS § 1503 trial. Hoffa v United States (1966) 385 US 293, 17 L Ed 2d 374, 87 S
Ct 408, reh den (1967) 386 US 940, 386 US 951, 17 L Ed 2d 880, 87 S Ct 970, 87 S Ct 971.
Statement made to witness that man had offered person making statement money to tamper with jury was admissible in trial of defendant who had made alleged offer as spontaneous utterance. United States v Bell (1965, CA6 Tenn)
351 F2d 868, cert den (1966) 383 US 947, 16 L Ed 2d 210, 86 S Ct 1200 and (superseded by statute as stated in United
States v Scisney (1989, CA6 Ky) 885 F2d 325, 28 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1127).
Where defendant was convicted of conspiracy to deprive citizen of civil right to be witness, causing her death, and
of injuring witness, admission of testimony of defendant's accomplice regarding declarations made by defendant's wife,
uncle and friend was prejudicial error. United States v Pacelli (1974, CA2 NY) 491 F2d 1108, cert den (1974) 419 US
826, 42 L Ed 2d 49, 95 S Ct 43.
Suppression of criminal defendant's grand jury testimony is not required, even though testimony--given without
prior Miranda warnings--will be used at trial to establish obstruction of grand jury under 18 USCS § 1503, where indictment and bill of particulars bind government to prove obstruction of grand jury by showing false or misleading
statements to grand jury, because case is governed by extensive body of precedent showing that unwarned testimonial
evidence of perjury will not be suppressed at subsequent perjury trial, even if there is constitutional right to warnings.
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United States v Gillespie (1991, ND Ind) 773 F Supp 1154, affd (1992, CA7 Ind) 974 F2d 796, amd on other grounds,
reh den (1992, CA7) 1992 US App LEXIS 23801.
In case involving obstruction of justice charges under 18 USCS § 1503, assertion of classification privilege by
agents of Israeli Security Agency during hearing on defendant's motion to suppress statements allegedly made to Israeli
authorities did not violate defendant's rights to confrontation and due process; given court's review of classified information under Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 USCS app. 3, § 4, defendant's rights were sufficiently protected; most of statements were found to have been voluntary, as defendant's claims of abuse were not credible. United
States v Marzook (2006, ND Ill) 435 F Supp 2d 708.
98. Miscellaneous
Where defendant contended that he was not trying to bribe witness but witness and another person were trying to
blackmail him, testimony by other person that defendant offered him $ 100 for not testifying was admissible for purpose
of showing intent of defendant. Parsons v United States (1951, CA5 Ga) 189 F2d 252.
Allegedly threatened witness was properly allowed to testify concerning meaning he attributed to words used in
threats to him in prosecution under 18 USCS § 1503. United States v Cioffi (1974, CA2 NY) 493 F2d 1111, cert den
(1974) 419 US 917, 42 L Ed 2d 155, 95 S Ct 195.
Testimony that defendant had sold certain firearms was relevant evidence of defendant's ability and intent to commit offenses charged, particularly since defendant claimed that much of his conversations with accomplice concerning
elimination of government witness was just conversation. United States v Mitchell (1975, CA6 Tenn) 514 F2d 758,
cert den (1975) 423 US 847, 46 L Ed 2d 68, 96 S Ct 86.
Testimony to effect that investigator had contacted coroner's office to learn if certain informant was dead was
properly admitted in prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1503 to establish that government had made reasonable
efforts to locate informant; testimony did not improperly link defendant to crime not charged, that is, having actually
injured informant. United States v Glickman (1979, CA9 Cal) 604 F2d 625, cert den (1980) 444 US 1080, 62 L Ed 2d
764, 100 S Ct 1032.
Trial court properly admitted testimony of government agent in prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1503 since
agent testified as to prior meeting with witness at which time witness was co-operative and apparently truthful, which
was relevant to proof of endeavor by defendant to impede witness' testimony before grand jury. United States v Baker
(1979, CA4 NC) 611 F2d 964.
In prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1503, testimony of assistant United States attorney concerning efforts to
refresh defendant's recollection prior to grand jury appearance was not inadmissible hearsay and did not deprive defendant of fair trial since defendant failed to object to admissibility of statements; further testimony by witness that he
expressed to defendant opinion that he believed defendant was not being candid with government was not improper.
United States v Kanovsky (1980, CA2 NY) 618 F2d 229, 5 Fed Rules Evid Serv 968.
In obstruction of justice case, motion for new trial was properly denied since letter written by district attorney was
not subject to disclosure under Brady or Jencks Act, 18 USCS § 3500; it was not exculpatory, no prejudice was shown,
and it did not relate to testimony of trial witnesses regarding harm inflicted by surveillance breach. United States v
Schneiderhan (2005, CA1 Mass) 404 F3d 73, 66 Fed Rules Evid Serv 1220, cert den (2005) 546 US 873, 126 S Ct 381,
163 L Ed 2d 167.
Where defendant was charged with endeavoring to obstruct justice, violation of 18 USCS §§ 1503(a), (2), and altering, destroying, or concealing documents, violation of 18 USCS §§ 1519, 2, for, among other acts, allegedly deleting
computer files with intent to impede federal investigation, although federal district court properly found that government computer specialist's testimony could be offered only pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 702 and, thus, that Government
violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G) by not providing written summary of it to defendant, decision to suppress testimony was vacated because district court did not consider reasons for Government's delay, degree of prejudice to defendant, or whether less severe sanction was appropriate. United States v Ganier (2006, CA6 Tenn) 468 F3d 920, 71
Fed Rules Evid Serv 962, 2006 FED App 423P.
Assuming without finding that search and seizure of evidence seized as result of search of defendant's computer
was illegal, it could have still been admitted in trial for making false declarations before grand jury, in violation of 18
USCS § 1623, and for obstruction of justice, in violation of 18 USCS § 1503, because defendant testified about it in
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front of grand jury, and he was aware of evidence obtained in search at time of alleged perjury. United States v
Benkahla (2006, ED Va) 437 F Supp 2d 541.
2.Sufficiency 99. Generally
"Two-witness rule" has no application to 18 USCS § 1503. Roberts v United States (1956, CA9 Cal) 239 F2d 467;
United States v Knohl (1967, CA2 NY) 379 F2d 427, cert den (1967) 389 US 973, 19 L Ed 2d 465, 88 S Ct 472 and (superseded by statute as stated in United States v Gerhart (1976, CA8 Iowa) 538 F2d 807, 1 Fed Rules Evid Serv 286);
United States v Cravero (1976, CA5 Fla) 530 F2d 666.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to uphold obstruction of justice charge. United States v Turcotte (1975, CA2
NY) 515 F2d 145, cert den (1975) 423 US 1032, 46 L Ed 2d 406, 96 S Ct 564.
100. Endeavor to influence, intimidate, or impede
To establish violation of 18 USCS § 1503, it is not necessary to show that other witness was in fact contacted where
defendants were charged with corruptly endeavoring to obstruct due administration of justice by agreeing to alter testimony of one of defendants and that of another witness in pending matter. Anderson v United States (1954, CA6 Ky)
215 F2d 84, cert den (1954) 348 US 888, 99 L Ed 698, 75 S Ct 208, reh den (1955) 348 US 922, 99 L Ed 723, 75 S Ct
291.
Evidence was sufficient to sustain charge under 18 USCS § 1503 for endeavoring to obstruct administration of justice where defendant approached juror who had been dismissed following mistrial and requested that she "hang the jury." Calvaresi v United States (1954, CA10 Colo) 216 F2d 891, revd on other grounds (1955) 348 US 961, 99 L Ed 749,
75 S Ct 522.
Defendant could not be convicted for obstructing grand jury investigation based on alteration of documents sought
by grand jury subpoena duces tecum where there was not an iota of evidence in the record showing any relevancy of
documents to grand jury investigation; fact that defendant, charged with altering documents sought by grand jury subpoena duces tecum, may have been guilty of contempt, or of some other crime with which he has not been charged,
does not support conviction under 18 USCS § 1503. United States v Ryan (1971, CA9 Cal) 455 F2d 728, 20 ALR Fed
719.
Evidence sustained obstructing justice conviction where defendant directed grand jury witness as to "preferred" line
of testimony. United States v De Luzio (1972, CA10 Colo) 454 F2d 711, cert den (1972) 407 US 922, 32 L Ed 2d 808,
92 S Ct 2467.
Evidence that defendant and another, who was also indicted in one of indictments pending against defendant, had
several times discussed killing witness, and that co-indictee, by then turned government informant, at his last meeting
with defendant handed over to defendant expense money to locate witness, showed sufficient "endeavor" within meaning of this section notwithstanding that federal agents arrested defendant as soon as he was handed expense money and
prior to doing anything to witness. United States v Mitchell (1975, CA6 Tenn) 514 F2d 758, cert den (1975) 423 US
847, 46 L Ed 2d 68, 96 S Ct 86.
Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for violation of 18 USCS § 1503 where he was shown to
have contacted former housemate to ascertain if her sister was on jury hearing case of friend and to tell sister that person
on trial was nice guy and probably innocent. United States v Lazzerini (1979, CA1 Mass) 611 F2d 940.
Approaching juror through intermediary is sufficient to constitute attempt to influence juror in violation of 18
USCS § 1503. United States v Forrest (1980, CA5 Ga) 623 F2d 1107, cert den (1980) 449 US 924, 66 L Ed 2d 153,
101 S Ct 327.
Evidence was sufficient that tax attorney obstructed grand jury testimony of witness who was purchaser of sham
trust package under fictitious name, when he suggested that purchaser lie about keeping trust income in Montana bank
account. United States v Tranakos (1990, CA10 Wyo) 911 F2d 1422 (criticized in United States v Cuong Huy Pham
(2005, ND Tex) 368 F Supp 2d 583).
Evidence was sufficient to prove that forged letter, ostensibly from defendant's employer and painting him in very
favorable light, which he submitted at his sentencing hearing for probation revocation had natural and probable effect of
influencing sentencing judge, where judge testified that letter submitted was of type he normally received and relied on
in imposing sentence. United States v Collis (1997, CA6 Mich) 128 F3d 313.
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Evidence was sufficient to convict investors of obstruction of justice, where fact that jury had convicted them of
conspiring to defraud bank meant that it had necessarily rejected their elaborate joint venture story concocted as legitimate reason for flow of funds from bank to them. United States v Cihak (1998, CA5 Tex) 137 F3d 252, reh den (1998,
CA5 Tex) 1998 US App LEXIS 9807 and cert den (1998) 525 US 847, 142 L Ed 2d 95, 119 S Ct 118 and cert den (1998)
525 US 888, 142 L Ed 2d 167, 119 S Ct 203 and cert den (1998) 525 US 888, 142 L Ed 2d 167, 119 S Ct 203 and (criticized in United States v Vaghela (1999, CA11 Fla) 169 F3d 729, 12 FLW Fed C 594).
Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction as evidence clearly supported charge that defendant's endeavor--namely, that of passing along that information to targets of investigation--had natural and probable effect of interfering with due administration of justice; further, fact that defendant was high-ranking member of organized crime family, and fact that he passed information, inter alia, to acting boss of family, supported view that defendant knew that his
actions were likely to affect judicial proceeding; evidence also indicated that defendant purloined information from
grand jury, or at least knew that it had been unlawfully obtained. United States v Giovanelli (2006, CA2 NY) 464 F3d
346, cert den (2007, US) 128 S Ct 206, 169 L Ed 2d 145 and magistrate's recommendation, habeas corpus proceeding
(2007, SD NY) 2007 US Dist LEXIS 86908.
No violation of 18 USCS § 1503 for obstruction of justice was shown in situation that defendant threatened good
friend who was police chief that certain party should be removed from prison or town would be burnt down, since at
time of threat local police chief had already turned over custody of person in question, had no remaining duties concerning him and could not possibly have released prisoner as demanded by defendant. United States v Knife (1974, DC
SD) 371 F Supp 1345.
Mere presence in room while witness is being exhorted to lie is not sufficient to sustain violation of § 1503 because
each named defendant must commit act of obstruction himself; thus where several defendants were present but only one
spoke when witness was coached to lie to grand jury, only defendant who actually did coaching can be convicted.
United States v Poppers (1986, ND Ill) 635 F Supp 1034.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Sufficient evidence supported defendant's convictions for obstruction of justice and conspiracy to obstruct justice, violations of 18 USCS § 1503, where reasonable jury could conclude that defendant had notice of subpoena, was aware that it had been issued by grand jury, and was further aware from nature of materials that she was
directed to gather that grand jury's investigation pertained to payment of employees at public career center, at which she
was administrative assistant who helped administer payroll; jury could also conclude that she would have known from
character of questions that Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) subsequently put to her in her interview that matters
relevant to grand jury's investigation were subject of FBI's inquire; additionally, evidence that defendant made false
statements to FBI agents supported jury's conclusion that she intended to influence or obstruct grand jury proceeding;
and evidence was sufficient for jury to infer therefrom that she was aware that her statements would go to grand jury,
and that she had spoken with her supervisors before she made them. United States v Dwyer (2007, CA1 Mass) 238 Fed
Appx 631, cert den (2008, US) 76 USLW 3441.
101.--Success of endeavor
"Two-witness rule" has no application to 18 USCS § 1503, since § 1503 punishes merely endeavor to obstruct justice, success of endeavor being immaterial to offense. United States v Knohl (1967, CA2 NY) 379 F2d 427, cert den
(1967) 389 US 973, 19 L Ed 2d 465, 88 S Ct 472 and (superseded by statute as stated in United States v Gerhart (1976,
CA8 Iowa) 538 F2d 807, 1 Fed Rules Evid Serv 286).
Evidence was insufficient that defendant's intimidating statements, made to jurors after they had been discharged
from jury duty, could have interfered with due administration of justice under "omnibus clause" of 18 USCS § 1503,
absent evidence that they were continuing their jury duty. United States v Bashaw (1992, CA6 Tenn) 982 F2d 168.
Evidence was sufficient to support attorney's convictions for violation of 18 USCS § 1503, since his acceptance of
money from client under pretense of attempting to bribe federal judge had natural and probable effect of interfering with
or influencing due administration of justice, even though his attempt failed. United States v Atkin (1997, CA6 Ohio) 107
F3d 1213, 79 AFTR 2d 1301, 1997 FED App 85P, post-conviction relief den, motion den (2000, ND Ohio) 80 F Supp
2d 779, post-conviction relief den (2002, CA6 Ohio) 38 Fed Appx 196.
102. Intent or knowledge
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18 USCS § 1503
Defendant's specific intent to commit offense of corruptly endeavoring to impede due administration of justice in
violation of 18 USCS § 1503 was shown in his intent to have alcohol "planted" where defendant, under charges of selling illegal alcohol, hired intermediary to influence, intimidate, and impede one who was to be witness against him by
"planting" illegal alcohol on premises of witness' drinking establishment and where, since witness was himself on probation, discovery of illegal alcohol at his place of business by either officers or himself would have had intimidating
effect. Knight v United States (1962, CA5 Ga) 310 F2d 305.
Indictment charging defendant with violation of 18 USCS § 371 because of his participation in conspiracy to violate
18 USCS § 1503 was supported by evidence where defendant admitted participation in conspiracy and evidence was
sufficient to establish that defendant acted with full knowledge of general purpose of conspiracy, to obstruct justice;
defendant was charged with wilfully and knowingly joining with other conspirators whose purpose comprised acts
which violated 18 USCS § 1503. United States v Brasseaux (1975, CA5 La) 509 F2d 157.
Specific intent for 18 USCS § 1503 purpose, may be established by circumstantial evidence. United States v White
(1977, CA10 Okla) 557 F2d 233.
Evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant had "corruptly" endeavored to impede testimony of witness
where evidence showed that defendant was owner and operator of house of prostitution, that defendant had repeatedly
showed desire that witness is not co-operate with law enforcement authorities and that defendant supplied witness with
powerful sedative which adversely affected her ability to testify. United States v Baker (1979, CA4 NC) 611 F2d 964.
Evidence was sufficient to show that defendants knew that intermediary between defendants in "kick-back" scheme
was witness in pending federal proceeding, where intermediary spoke to defendant shortly after indictment was brought
against accused and asked him to make arrangements for job outside United States so that he could not be subpoenaed
in pending proceeding. United States v Washington Water Power Co. (1986, CA9 Wash) 793 F2d 1079.
Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant had knowledge and specific intent that purpose of
attempted murder plot was to prevent victim from testifying, where murder was to occur several days before trial and
where co-defendant, now dead, had made statements that murder had been "blessed" and expressed fear that victim
would "spill some names" in trial, despite fact that case did not go to trial until much later. United States v Guzzino
(1987, CA7 Ill) 810 F2d 687, 22 Fed Rules Evid Serv 473, cert den (1987) 481 US 1030, 95 L Ed 2d 529, 107 S Ct
1957.
Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant had knowledge of pending judicial proceeding when
she falsified letter to court, where she wrote letter referring to case specifically, letter had effect of delaying appellate
proceedings, letter was written 11 months after trial, and defendant knew when trial was, although there was no direct
evidence. United States v Neal (1992, CA5 La) 951 F2d 630.
Evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant had corrupt intent to impede grand jury investigation required by
18 USCS § 1503, where he created back-dated contract for work performed on his house after he received subpoena,
where work was not done for pay, since defendant acted not only in awareness of grand jury investigation, but in explicit response to it, if not to subpoena itself. United States v Jespersen (1995, CA2 NY) 65 F3d 993, cert den (1996) 517 US
1169, 134 L Ed 2d 669, 116 S Ct 1571.
Evidence was insufficient from which jury could infer mother's intent to commit perjury and obstruction of justice
in son's case where, although government established that she understood purpose of suppression hearing, was aware of
importance of evidence her son sought to suppress and desired district court to grant her son's motion, it failed to specify what she hoped to achieve by testifying. United States v Littleton (1996, CA4 Va) 76 F3d 614.
Evidence was insufficient to support defendants' convictions for conspiracy to violate 18 USCS § 1503, where government failed to prove that only conspirator who engaged in conduct directed toward federal investigators had specific
intent to obstruct federal grand jury, where there was no showing that he knew that allegedly false statements he made
to federal investigators would be conveyed to federal grand jury in that he had himself not been called to testify and
there was no evidence that investigators gave him any indication they would repeat his statements to grand jury. United
States v Schwarz (2002, CA2 NY) 283 F3d 76.
Where indictment included each of elements of 18 USCS § 1503(a) obstruction of justice charge against defendants, and provided number of details to which defendants could have looked to determine conduct on which government
intended to rely, and rational jury could have found that defendants were aware of grand jury investigation into their tax
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returns, defendants convictions for obstruction of justice were affirmed. United States v Fassnacht (2003, CA7 Ill) 332
F3d 440, 91 AFTR 2d 2492, reh den, en banc (2003, CA7 Ill) 2003 US App LEXIS 16568.
In reviewing convictions under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and Violent Crimes in Aid of
Racketeering Act, appellate court, in rejecting Government's Pinkerton theory of liability, determined that rational juror
could not have concluded that two of defendants could have reasonably foreseen when they entered into their
false-statement conspiracy in 1994 that co-conspirator, as natural or necessary consequence of their agreement, would
make false statement to FBI agent in course of federal grand jury investigation that was convened six years later. United
States v Bruno (2004, CA2 NY) 383 F3d 65.
In reviewing convictions under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and Violent Crimes in Aid of
Racketeering Act, appellate court, in rejecting Government's Pinkerton theory of liability, determined that rational juror
could not have concluded that two of defendants could have reasonably foreseen, when they entered into their
false-statement conspiracy in 1994, that co-conspirator, as natural or necessary consequence of their agreement, would
make false statement to FBI agent in course of federal grand jury investigation that was convened six years later. United
States v Bruno (2004, CA2 NY) 383 F3d 65.
In reviewing convictions under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and Violent Crimes in Aid of
Racketeering Act, appellate court determined, inter alia, that evidence was insufficient to establish corrupt endeavor to
influence testimony of two grand jury witnesses because defendants agreed to "say nothing" in 1994 while grand jury
was impaneled in 2000; defendants could not have reasonably foreseen grand jury being impaneled six years after their
agreement, and, accordingly, convictions relating to obstruction of justice were also reversed. United States v Bruno
(2004, CA2 NY) 383 F3d 65.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for obstruction of justice and aiding and abetting obstruction of justice, in violation of 18 USCS §§ 1503 and 2, where it showed that (1) defendant knowingly participated in scheme to obtain money from client of unlicensed attorney by falsely claiming that he and attorney could
corruptly influence public officials to provide more lenient sentence for client, (2) defendant had knowledge of pending
judicial proceeding in client's money laundering case, and (3) it was natural and probable that defendant's fraud would
result in obstruction of justice. United States v Reynolds (2006, CA4 W Va) 178 Fed Appx 281.
103. Miscellaneous
Defendant could not be convicted on 18 USCS § 1503 charge of threatening witness where no evidence was presented by government as to whether defendant was being held at time of sending note on federal or state charges,
whether witness intended to testify on federal charges, or even whether federal charges had been filed. Cotton v United
States (1969, CA10 Kan) 409 F2d 1049, cert den (1970) 396 US 1016, 24 L Ed 2d 507, 90 S Ct 577.
Record presents sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that witness whom defendant
is alleged to have improperly influenced was to be witness before federal grand jury within scope of 18 USCS § 1503
since witness testified that she was subpoenaed before grand jury "in this building" and jury certainly knew witness was
referring to building where trial was held, federal courthouse in Houston, Texas. United States v Johnson (1978, CA5
Tex) 585 F2d 119.
Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for violation of 18 USCS § 1503 where government witness testified that defendant was present during almost all of meeting during which plans were discussed to bribe judge,
defendant told government witness that other party would pay for bribe, defendant assured government witness that
only persons present at meeting were aware of bribery scheme, and other testimony established that defendant exhibited
extreme concern at subsequent time that government witness might be "the heat". United States v Glickman (1979,
CA9 Cal) 604 F2d 625, cert den (1980) 444 US 1080, 62 L Ed 2d 764, 100 S Ct 1032.
Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for violation of 18 USCS § 1503 where testimony of
prospective juror established that defendant suggested to prospective jurors that his friend was being "harassed," even
though there was no proof that defendant threatened or bribed jurors. United States v Jackson (1979, CA8 Ark) 607
F2d 1219, cert den (1980) 444 US 1080, 62 L Ed 2d 763, 100 S Ct 1032.
Conviction for violation of 18 USCS § 1503 was supported by evidence that defendant arranged to have prospective
government witness murdered, gave conspirator money, and devised and helped implement person's potential escape
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18 USCS § 1503
from authorities. United States v McCarty (1979, CA8 SD) 611 F2d 220, cert den (1980) 445 US 930, 63 L Ed 2d 764,
100 S Ct 1319.
Evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction for violation of 18 USCS § 1503 where juror's testimony established
that she was stewardess for same airline for which defendant worked, she knew fellow stewardess who called her after it
was discovered that she was serving on jury in case against someone who had been involved in tax protest movement
and offered to provide her with pamphlet entitled "A Handbook for Jurors" which taught that tax crimes were not true
crimes and instructed on concept of jury nullification, fellow stewardess who had made offer testified that she was acquainted with defendant through working relationship, that she and husband had attended several weeks' course conducted by defendant concerning good citizenship and tax protest movement, that defendant was intensely interested in
tax protest movement, that pamphlet used in course was entitled "A Handbook for Jurors", that defendant was present at
trial of person involved in tax protest movement and recognized juror, and that he contacted witness by phone to determine if juror had copy of pamphlet. United States v Ogle (1979, CA10 Colo) 613 F2d 233, cert den (1980) 449 US
825, 66 L Ed 2d 28, 101 S Ct 87, reh den (1980) 449 US 1026, 66 L Ed 2d 487, 101 S Ct 594.
Evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction for violation of 18 USCS § 1503 where at trial detained illegal aliens
testified that they had been working for defendant and detailed facts leading up to defendant's arrest after border patrol
agents discovered aliens in defendant's pickup truck, 2 of aliens testified that defendant had later approached them in
attempt to persuade them to change statements which they had given to Immigration officials and which incriminated
defendant, aliens stated that they refused to comply with defendant's request, mothers of several of detained aliens also
testified that defendant had spoken to them about changing their sons' testimony, one of mothers stated that defendant
threatened to accuse aliens of stealing his truck if they did not change their stories and later testimony was corroborated
by neighbor of alien's mother who had listened to this conversation. United States v Varkonyi (1980, CA5 Tex) 611
F2d 84, cert den (1980) 446 US 945, 64 L Ed 2d 801, 100 S Ct 2173.
Evidence was sufficient to establish nexus between back-dated contract for work performed on defendant's house
and his alleged endeavor to impede grand jury, since if false representation that work was done for pay had been believed, grand jury would have been thrown completely off trail it was pursuing with respect to defendant. United States
v Jespersen (1995, CA2 NY) 65 F3d 993, cert den (1996) 517 US 1169, 134 L Ed 2d 669, 116 S Ct 1571.
Evidence was insufficient to prove obstruction of justice under 18 USCS § 1503, where government failed to either
link issuance of subpoenas with presently contemplated presentation of evidence to grand jury or to prove defendant's
knowledge of grand jury proceeding from fact that he knew individual was informant. United States v Davis (1999, CA3
NJ) 183 F3d 231, 52 Fed Rules Evid Serv 732, amd (1999, CA3 NJ) 197 F3d 662 and (criticized in United States v Arthur Andersen LLP (2002, SD Tex) 2002 US Dist LEXIS 26870).
Evidence was sufficient to prove that subpoenas were issued as part of actual grand jury investigation, where grand
jury existed concurrently with issuance of subpoena and would have been available to appear before in person, evidence
was given to grand jury in timely fashion, and there was then-present contemplation not merely of presenting subpoenaed evidence to grand jury but of prosecution. United States v Steele (2001, CA3 Pa) 241 F3d 302.
Jury verdict convicting defendant of obstruction of justice and removal of asset to avoid seizure was affirmed
where government presented evidence that defendant moved vehicle to another state after he had reason to know of
seizure order for car, that he later moved vehicle to yet another state, and that, when asked by agents about car, he became agitated and responded that he could not provide any help. United States v Frank (2004, CA8 Iowa) 354 F3d 910,
63 Fed Rules Evid Serv 181, reh den, reh, en banc, den (2004, CA8) 2004 US App LEXIS 2709 and magistrate's recommendation (2005, ND Iowa) 2005 US Dist LEXIS 35369.
Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of two counts of obstruction of justice under 18 USCS § 1503 and one
count of soliciting crime of violence under 18 USCS § 373 when there was corroborated evidence that defendant contacted individual that defendant thought was trusted member of defendant's white supremacy organization and had engaged in serious discussions with that individual about potential murder of federal court judge and that defendant possessed requisite intent to have crime carried out. United States v Hale (2006, CA7 Ill) 448 F3d 971, 70 Fed Rules Evid
Serv 267, reh den, reh, en banc, den (2006, CA7 Ill) 2006 US App LEXIS 18238 and cert den, motion den (2007, US)
127 S Ct 1020, 166 L Ed 2d 783.
In case in which defendant repeatedly made false statements while testifying before grand jury and while talking to
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA special agent about important issue of when defendant first knew about property owner's illegal fill activity in violation of Clean Water Act (CWA), evidence was sufficient to sustain his convic-
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tion for violating 18 USCS §§ 1503, 1623, and 1001; by falsely claiming to have not known about owner's illegal fill
activity until after he was contacted by employee from United States Army Corps of Engineers, defendant disrupted and
interfered with investigation into owner's violations of CWA; specifically defendant's false statements denied both EPA
agent and grand jury access to witness, i.e., defendant, who had detailed, firsthand knowledge of owner's pre-March
2002 activities, including owner's preparations, plans, and rationale for his filling project. United States v Johnson
(2007, CA11 Fla) 485 F3d 1264, 20 FLW Fed C 599.
In prosecution for endeavoring to influence juror in civil case in violation of 18 USCS § 1503, defendants' role in
corrupt endeavor and their intent was established by circumstantial evidence consisting of records of telephone conversation between defendants and attorneys for plaintiff in civil case and evidence that one of defendants had represented
himself as having some affiliation with those attorneys, such evidence establishing link among persons involved in case
and between defendant here and plaintiff in civil case on which juror was sitting. United States v Torquato (1970, WD
Pa) 316 F Supp 846.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Appellate court denied defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal because it found that nothing in
record supported notion that defendant was subjected to vindictive prosecution, and regarding sufficiency of evidence, it
was clear to us that jury was presented with enough probative evidence to find him guilty as charged under 18 USCS §
1503 where defendant effectively admitted to judge at sentencing hearing and to jury at trial that, looking straight at
probation officer, he made slashing motion court reporter described and uttered word "bitch." United States v Pugh
(2006, CA11 Fla) 176 Fed Appx 28, cert den (2006, US) 127 S Ct 164, 166 L Ed 2d 116.
Unpublished: Sufficient evidence supported defendant's 18 USCS § 1503(a) obstruction of justice conviction on
basis of false statements that she gave to Federal Bureau of Investigation, violation of 18 USCS § 1001, where she did
not contest that she stated that she believed employee's reported working hours were correct, when in fact she knew of
standing order to pay employee for 35 hours regardless of whether she worked zero hours; moreover, defendant also
stated that she did not know of any preferential treatment when she knew that employee had not been required to repay
loan; such false statements were material; if defendant had been truthful, investigation could have been significantly
shortened. United States v Dwyer (2007, CA1 Mass) 238 Fed Appx 631, cert den (2008, US) 76 USLW 3441.
3.Other Matters 104. Burden and standard of proof
Offense of attempting to improperly influence jurors did not require proof that defendants actually approached or
communicated with juror, or attempted so to do, or that any juror was conscious of observation, and it was immaterial
that Department of Justice maintained surveillance over jurors. Sinclair v United States (1929) 279 US 749, 73 L Ed
938, 49 S Ct 471, 63 ALR 1258.
Burden of proof was on government to prove that person whose testimony accused was alleged to have corruptly
endeavored to influence was and intended to be witness for and on behalf of United States, but it was not necessary to
prove that such person was subpoenaed. Walker v United States (1938, CA8 Mo) 93 F2d 792.
In 18 USCS § 1503 prosecution, all government was required to prove as to each defendant was that they had corruptly endeavored to influence, intimidate, or impede witness in pending cases or that single defendant had corruptly
endeavored to influence, obstruct or impede due administration of justice by filing allegedly false affidavit and petition.
Smith v United States (1956, CA5 Fla) 234 F2d 385, 30 CCH LC P 69990.
It was incumbent upon prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that defendant acted either corruptly or by
threats in endeavor to either influence, intimidate, or impede witness in order to convict defendant in prosecution
brought under 18 USCS § 1503. Overton v United States (1968, CA5 Tex) 403 F2d 444.
Test for determining liability for death of key witness is not whether defendant was in fact involved in witness's
death, nor even whether under preponderance of evidence of some lesser evidentiary standard court finds it probable
that defendant has participated in murder, but rather test must be simply whether at time trial judge is faced with question he reasonably concludes that there is distinct possibility that defendant participated in making witness unavailable,
at least where Government is totally without fault and case cannot proceed and ends of justice be served by evidence
already introduced or otherwise available to government. United States v Mastrangelo (1981, CA2 NY) 662 F2d 946,
cert den (1982) 456 US 973, 72 L Ed 2d 847, 102 S Ct 2236.
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18 USCS § 1503
In order to establish violation of 18 USCS § 1503 government is required to prove that each defendant specifically
intended to impede administration of justice although government is not required to prove beyond reasonable doubt
defendants' guilt of kidnapping under state law. United States v Johnson (1983, CA11 Ga) 713 F2d 654, cert den
(1984) 465 US 1030, 79 L Ed 2d 695, 104 S Ct 1295.
Government's burden on obstruction of justice charge is not satisfied merely upon proof that defendant rendered
false testimony; rather government must further demonstrate that rendering of such testimony thwarted or impeded
grand jury's investigation. United States v Caron (1982, ED Va) 551 F Supp 662, affd without op (1983, CA4 Va) 722
F2d 739, cert den (1984) 465 US 1103, 80 L Ed 2d 132, 104 S Ct 1602.
105. Presumptions and inferences
Where threatened officer had arrested party several times in past, there was strong indication that federal case in
question was not only conduct of officer relating to arrestee to which alleged threat could have applied; mere existence
of that federal proceeding was not sufficient to establish or support any inference that federal proceeding was focus of
alleged threat in violation of 18 USCS § 1503. United States v Baker (1974, CA6 Ky) 494 F2d 1262.
Jury could properly infer that defendants' object was to obstruct grand jury proceedings in violation of 18 USCS §
1503 where evidence showed that defendants arranged meeting, took active role in fabricating story about ownership of
2 horses, and knew that federal grand jury was investigating ownership of horses, inasmuch as evidence established
motives for defendants to concoct cover story, notwithstanding that defendants contended that story was fabricated for
purpose of presenting to state racing commission and not to federal grand jury. United States v Turcotte (1975, CA2
NY) 515 F2d 145, cert den (1975) 423 US 1032, 46 L Ed 2d 406, 96 S Ct 564.
In prosecution for violation of 18 USCS § 1503 by endeavoring to influence, intimidate and impede witness in discharge of duty in pending criminal case, evidence that while witness was testifying, and after referring to defendant
several times, defendant stood up, shook his fist and said "you better not" was sufficient for jury to have inferred defendant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt of endeavoring to impede testimony of witness. United States v Harris (1977,
CA7 Ind) 558 F2d 366.
106. Variance between indictment and proof
It was not fatal variance between facts and proof in prosecution under 18 USCS § 1503 that defendant was convicted of being conspirator to violation because it was not alleged that defendant had participated in actual criminal acts;
crime was committed in willfully and knowingly joining other conspirators whose purpose comprised criminal acts.
United States v Brasseaux (1975, CA5 La) 509 F2d 157.
There was no fatal variance between indictment and proof where defendant in 18 USCS § 1503 prosecution was
accused of wrongdoing during 2 consecutive months in 2 separate counts of indictment, evidence showed no violation
was committed in first month, and consequently count one was dismissed, and defendant was subsequently convicted
under second count; second count was not invalidated by proof of more wrongdoing than was originally alleged to have
occurred during month. United States v Bonacorsa (1976, CA2 NY) 528 F2d 1218, cert den (1976) 426 US 935, 49 L
Ed 2d 386, 96 S Ct 2647.
Allegation in indictment that defendants attempted to coerce witness to testify falsely was surplusage and not necessary element of proof under 18 USCS § 1503, thus, where evidence was that defendants caused injury to prospective
witness in attempt to influence her testimony in federal court, prosecution's alleged failure to prove that defendants were
attempting to force that witness to testify falsely did not require reversal of conviction. United States v Good Shield
(1976, CA8 SD) 544 F2d 950.
No fatal variance existed between indictment which alleged that defendant solicited money from defense counsel to
ensure that juror would vote to acquit attorney's client and evidence which demonstrated that defendant attempted to
obtain money from attorney by falsely telling him that he could ensure acquittal of client. United States v Neiswender
(1979, CA4 Md) 590 F2d 1269, cert den (1979) 441 US 963, 60 L Ed 2d 1068, 99 S Ct 2410.
E.Post-trial Matters 107. Verdict
Verdict of acquittal for improperly influencing witness in violation of predecessor to 18 USCS § 1503 did not necessitate finding of innocent for obstructing justice in violation of predecessor to 18 USCS § 1503, because there was no
inconsistency where offenses charged in 2 counts were defined as separate crimes punishable by separate subsections of
statute. United States v Meltzer (1938, CA7 Wis) 100 F2d 739.
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18 USCS § 1503
108. Sentencing and punishment
Court was not entitled to punish summarily for contempt under predecessor to 18 USCS § 1503. In re Savin
(1889) 131 US 267, 33 L Ed 150, 9 S Ct 699.
Obstruction of justice under 18 USCS § 1503 and perjury under 18 USCS § 1623 are separate offenses for which
consecutive sentences may be imposed upon conviction arising out of same act or transaction. United States v Langella (1985, CA2 NY) 776 F2d 1078, cert den (1986) 475 US 1019, 89 L Ed 2d 320, 106 S Ct 1207.
Lawyer's offense of making false statements to FBI with regard to matter of tax representation, in violation of 18
USCS § 1001, was not "more aptly covered" by Obstruction of Justice guideline, USSG § 2J1.2, where facts did not
establish by preponderance of evidence that he knew of grand jury proceedings or that statements he was making to
FBI, fairly construed as exculpatory denials, would reach grand jury. United States v Scungio (2001, CA1 RI) 255 F3d
11.
In sentencing defendant, district court properly declined to invoke obstruction-of-justice guideline, USSG §
2J1.2(c)(1), pursuant to cross-reference provision of USSG § 2B1.1(c)(3), as elements of obstruction-of-justice offense
had to be established by conduct set forth in count of conviction and proven by at least preponderance of evidence in
order for sentencing court to depart upwardly under USSG § 2B1.1(c)(3) and conduct in defendant's case did not establish violation of 18 USCS § 1503; indictment did not set forth sufficient nexus between defendant's false statements to
federal investigators and federal judicial proceedings so as to establish violation of 18 USCS § 1503, as indictment made
no mention of any grand jury or other judicial proceeding and government had not yet convened grand jury to investigate defendant's arrest for money laundering at time defendant made false statements. United States v Genao (2003,
CA2 NY) 343 F3d 578.
District court did not err by refusing to apply cross reference in USSG § 2J1.3(c), which would have given defendant much higher offense level, because perjury at issue occurred in bail hearing in proceeding to determine whether defendant's supervised release should be revoked; therefore, defendant's lies had little potential to interfere with prosecution of crimes lied about, but did have capacity to obstruct bail hearing and came close to warranting adjustment for
obstructing that proceeding in violation of 18 USCS § 1503. United States v Bova (2003, CA1 Mass) 350 F3d 224.
District court's enhancement of count for passport fraud, 18 USCS § 1542, by two levels for obstruction of justice
under USSG § 3C1.1, while at same time separately grouping obstruction count predicated on same underlying behavior, violated USSG § 3D1.2(c); § 3D1.2(c) mandated grouping of obstruction count, 18 USCS § 1503, and passport
fraud count once district court enhanced passport fraud count by two levels based on same obstructive behavior. United
States v Leung (2004, CA2 NY) 360 F3d 62.
District court could impose enhancement to defendant's sentence under 18 USSG § 3A1.4 after defendant had been
convicted of obstruction of justice under 18 USCS § 1503 and soliciting crime of violence under 18 USCS § 373 because defendant's conviction involved defendant's desire to have federal district court judge murdered; fact that defendant did not actually commit federal crime of terrorism was not relevant. United States v Hale (2006, CA7 Ill) 448 F3d
971, 70 Fed Rules Evid Serv 267, reh den, reh, en banc, den (2006, CA7 Ill) 2006 US App LEXIS 18238 and cert den,
motion den (2007, US) 127 S Ct 1020, 166 L Ed 2d 783.
In prosecutions under 18 USCS § 1623 and 18 USCS § 1503, district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing
sentences that fell well below range recommended by Sentencing Guidelines and by U.S.; district court thoroughly explained its reasons and it emphasized 18 USCS § 3553(a)(6) factor of avoiding disparate sentences between individuals
convicted of similar conduct, and U.S. conceded that timing was only significant difference between defendants' cases
and those of coconspirators who received even shorter sentences for nearly identical misconduct. United States v
Krutsinger (2006, CA8 ND) 449 F3d 827.
In case in which defendant testified falsely before grand jury about his knowledge of illegal fill activity in violation
of Clean Water Act--testimony that was facilitated by his failure to produce all of his subpoenaed record--and, as result
of which, government was required to conduct further investigation into owner's conduct, defendant's 24-month sentence for violating 18 USCS §§ 1503, 1623, and 1001 was affirmed because district court did not err in imposing
three-level enhancement under USSG § 2J1.3(b)(2); additionally, since district court: (1) correctly calculated USSG
range; (2) considered 18 USCS § 3553(a) factors; and (3) sentenced defendant within Guidelines range, sentence was
reasonable. United States v Johnson (2007, CA11 Fla) 485 F3d 1264, 20 FLW Fed C 599.
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18 USCS § 1503
Under USSG §§ 2J1.2(c)(1), 2X3.1, defendant's base offense level for his 18 USCS § 1503 obstruction of justice
conviction had to be cross-referenced to Guideline for arson-related charges that were being prosecuted in trial in which
defendant had sought to undermine witness's testimony (conduct underlying current obstruction of justice conviction),
thus his sentence was vacated and remanded for recalculation; on remand, under USSG § 1B1.5, cmt., application n. 3,
base offense level was to be calculated at six levels lower than most serious of those crimes. United States v Harrell
(2008, CA11 Ga) 524 F3d 1223, 21 FLW Fed C 584.
Where defendant was convicted of making false material declarations to grand juries, in violation of 18 USCS §
1623, obstructing justice by virtue of false declarations, in violation of 18 USCS § 1503, and making false material
statements, in violation of 18 USCS § 1001(a), defendant's sentence was properly enhanced pursuant to USSG § 3A1.4
for obstructing investigation into federal crime of terrorism, as defined by 18 USCS § 2332b(g)(5), because defendant
obstructed grand jury investigation into violations of 18 USCS §§ 2339A and 2339B and violations involved jihadist
camps training people to fight governments of India, Russia, and United States; that enhancement depended on facts
found by district court did not violate Sixth Amendment because district court treated U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual as advisory. United States v Benkahla (2008, CA4 Va) 530 F3d 300.
Offenses that are not specifically listed in Table of Maximum Punishments remain punishable as authorized by
United States Code or Code of District of Columbia, whichever prescribed punishment is less, and because soliciting
another to wrongfully refuse to testify at court-martial trial by paying him money is distinct substantive offense generally referred to as obstructing justice, which conduct is similar to that denounced in both 18 USCS § 1503 and Code of
District of Columbia, Title 22, § 22-701, where 18 USCS § 1503 imposes maximum authorized sentence of 5 years'
imprisonment while Code of District of Columbia is limited to maximum of 3 years, maximum confinement for military
offense would accordingly be 3 years. United States v Wysong (1958) 9 USCMA 249, 26 CMR 29.
Because offense of obstruction of justice is neither listed in nor closely related to any offense set forth in Table of
Maximum Punishments, punishment for this offense is governed by 18 USCS § 1503, but imposition of dishonorable
discharge is also permissible. United States v White (1962) 12 USCMA 599, 31 CMR 185.
Because Table of Maximum Punishments disclosed that there was no offense listed therein which might be identified as, or closely related to, obstructing justice, where accused was found guilty of assault upon certain person on account of her having previously attended and testified at summary court-martial, 18 USCS §§ 1501 et seq. must be examined to furnish guide as to appropriate sentence; crime of which accused was found guilty is precise offense proscribed by either 18 USCS § 1503 or 18 USCS § 1505, because if summary court-martial is not court within meaning of
18 USCS § 1503, it is department or agency within meaning of 18 USCS § 1505, and for purpose of punishment, it matters not which it may be as punishments provided by United States Code for both offenses are identical. United States
v Long (1952) 6 CMR 60.
Unpublished Opinions
Unpublished: Where defendant was convicted of violating 18 USCS § 1503, district court's USSG § 2J1.2 three
level enhancement for interference with administration of justice for fabricating documents did not constitute double
counting because substantial expenditure of government and court resources constituted negative consequences. United
States v Kilgarlin (2005, CA5 La) 157 Fed Appx 716.
Unpublished: Where defendant was convicted of wire fraud and aiding and abetting wire fraud, in violation of 18
USCS §§ 1343 and 2, and obstruction of justice and aiding and abetting obstruction of justice, in violation of 18 USCS
§§ 1503 and 2, district court's grant of upward departure pursuant to USSG § 5K2.7 for significant disruption of governmental function was erroneous as it did not find that there were unusual circumstances justifying departure on obstruction of justice conviction; furthermore, district court's attempt to apply departure to wire fraud conviction before
grouping offenses was improper since it failed to follow framework provided by USSG §§ 1B1.1 and 3D1.5, which required that offenses be grouped before departures were considered. United States v Reynolds (2006, CA4 W Va) 178
Fed Appx 281.
Unpublished: Defendant's challenge to 121-month prison term imposed on him for his 18 USCS §§ 1512(c)(2),
1503, obstruction of justice offenses was rejected; district court did not commit clear error in adopting eight level upward adjustment under USSG § 2J1.2(b)(1)(A) because evidence showed that defendant sought to have government
informant killed, not just discredited, and adoption of adjustment did not result in excessive sentence, when compared to
sentence that defendant otherwise faced. United States v Ellis (2007, CA7 Ill) 240 Fed Appx 146, cert den (2007, US)
128 S Ct 549, 169 L Ed 2d 374.
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18 USCS § 1503
Unpublished: Appellate court rejected defendant's argument that district court erred by imposing three-level enhancement to Guidelines offense level pursuant to USSG § 3A1.2(a) because of victim's status as government officer or
employee; although defendant's offense of conviction, 18 USCS § 1503, incorporated official status of his victim, question was not whether statute of conviction specifically incorporates elements of disputed enhancement, but whether applicable guideline specifically incorporated it. United States v Joiner (2005, CA8 Ark) 418 F3d 863, reh den, reh, en
banc, den (2005, CA8) 2005 US App LEXIS 21037.
Unpublished: Where defendant was convicted of conspiring to commit offenses against United States in violation
of 18 USCS § 371, conspiring to commit money laundering in violation of 18 USCS § 1956(h), obstructing justice by
bribing witness in violation of 18 USCS § 1503, and money laundering in violation of 18 USCS § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), his
sentence was substantively reasonable in that district court had considered crimes as serious, involving wholesale corruption of justice system under 18 USCS § 3553(a)(2)(a). United States v Magluta (2008, CA11 Fla) 2008 US App
LEXIS 12358.
109. New trial
On motion for new trial upon conviction of 18 USCS § 1503 for alleged unlawful surveillance by federal agents,
District Court must develop relevant facts and decide if government's surveillance was unlawful. Giordano v United
States (1969) 394 US 310, 22 L Ed 2d 297, 89 S Ct 1163, reh den (1969) 394 US 994, 22 L Ed 2d 771, 89 S Ct 1451.
Evidence did not preponderate heavily against defendants' conviction for conspiracy to corruptly endeavor to influence, obstruct and impede justice, so as to render jury's verdict miscarriage of justice, and thus, district court abused
its discretion in granting new trial; while first defendant was in jail after arrest for being unlawful controlled substance
user in possession of firearms, he and second defendant, his brother, were recorded speaking on telephone, and first
defendant told brother that two witnesses would be testifying against him, and brother said it was time to "get a murder
on" or "get a murder run," first defendant responded, "something," brother said he had enforcer, and defendants then
discussed where one witness lived and worked. United States v Bertling (2007, CA8 Iowa) 510 F3d 804.
110. Appeal and review
Government was barred from appeal under 18 USCS § 3731 when trial judge's finding was ambiguous as to whether defendant's motive was corrupt in attempting to influence prospective witness not to testify in grand jury investigation in order to protect defendant's clients. United States v Fayer (1975, CA2 NY) 523 F2d 661.
Whether criminal defendant who gives false name to magistrate can be prosecuted for violating 18 USCS § 1503 is
question of law subject to de novo review on appeal. United States v Plascencia-Orozco (1985, CA9 Cal) 768 F2d
1074.
Defendants, who were convicted of obstruction of justice, were not entitled to bond pending appeal; appeals court
would likely not find that: (1) evidence, including statements to IRS agent and conversations about false testimony, was
insufficient to convict; or (2) that indictment, which tracked statutory language and detailed allegations against defendants, was impermissibly vague. United States v Fassnacht (2002, ND Ill) 90 AFTR 2d 6507.