Draft: Do not cite without permission
For American Philosophical Association, April 2008
Philosophy Department, Tufts October 2008
Aristotle on Deformed Kinds
Charlotte Witt
University of New Hampshire
In thinking about Aristotle in relation to the idea of natural kinds it is useful to
begin with his definition of nature or what is natural, and then to consider his discussion
of biological kinds or . In recent philosophy, there is a tendency to contrast natural
kinds with linguistic or conventional kinds, but we do not find that contrast in Aristotle.
Instead, he distinguishes natural beings from artifacts, and that contrast, in turn, draws
upon his theory of causation or explanation. Natural beings, animals and plants for
example, have an internal origin of motion and change whereas the origin of motion and
change of artifacts is external. (Phys. ii, 1 192b 8-23) The origin of motion, or efficient
cause, is one of Aristotle’s four causes; it is grouped by Aristotle with the formal and
final causes and contrasted with the material cause. To call something natural in
Aristotle’s parlance, then, is to locate its causal or explanatory principles within the thing
itself.1
In the Parts of Animals, Aristotle emphasizes and explains the importance of the
final cause in relation to understanding animals, although the material cause also plays a
secondary role.
Animal parts, like other instruments, are “for the sake of” a goal or end,
and Aristotle identifies that end with an action or activity that is central to the life of the
animal. Aristotle illustrates this point with an artifact: “For sawing is not for the sake of
the saw, but the saw for sawing; for sawing is a certain use. So the body too is in a way
1
Ransome (2007, chapter 4) correctly emphasizes the importance of the internal location
of the telos in Aristotle’s natural teleology.
1
for the sake of the soul, and the parts are for the sake of the functions in relation to which
each of them has naturally developed.” (P.A. 645b 17-20) For example, eyes naturally
develop for the sake of seeing, and it is for the sake of that activity that Aristotle thinks
we should explain the development of eyes in animals. Unlike the artifact (the saw),
however, the parts of animals have an internal teleological principle because the activity
of seeing (the final cause) is just one of the life activities of the animal itself. In contrast,
the shaping of the saw’s parts for the sake of sawing is accomplished by an external
agent, who must be mentioned in an explanation of its creation and its purpose.
Combining Aristotle’s notion of a natural being with his understanding of the “for
the sake of which”, or final cause, a picture of animals (and their functional parts)
emerges. Animals have an internal teleological principle that explains their development
and their functional parts as for the sake of their characteristic life activities. Animals are
prime exemplars of natural beings for Aristotle, and so if we want to understand what
Aristotle thinks about natural kinds, it is useful to consider what he says about animal
kinds in his biological writings.2
This is a very large topic, which has engaged a lively scholarly debate over the
past twenty years. A central question is whether or not Aristotle is pursuing a taxonomic
project in his biology, and, if he is, what that project looks like. A key text in the debate
is the Historia Animalium a shaggy compilation of observations about the differences
among animals, focused on their functional parts and their lifestyles. Some argue that
since Aristotle’s use of the terms s (or kind) and s (or form) is context
2
Scharle (2008) argues that it is a mistake to make biological organisms central to our
understanding of Aristotle’s teleology, as it skews his basic disagreement with the
materialists, and his argument strategy against them.
2
dependent and since he uses them of animal groupings at different levels of generality, it
is doubtful that his project in the Historia Animalium is primarily taxonomic. (Pellegrin
1985, Lennox 2001a3) Others have defended a taxonomic reading of the Historia
Animalium while acknowledging that the text departs from Aristotle’s model of scientific
explanation in important respects. (Charles 2002)
I want to approach the topic of Aristotle and biological kinds from a different
direction, however, by considering the puzzling texts in which he refers to ‘deformed’
(s or sor ‘warped’ (s) animal kinds.4 It will be
useful to categorize these abnormal animal kinds into three types. The mole and the
lobster are deformed kinds according to Aristotle, and the deformity is connected to their
parts and functioning. Let us call them Type A. Another group of animal kinds, called
‘terrestrial aquatics’ either because they carry out some of their important life activities
on land and some in the water or because they have functional parts suited to both
terrains, are described as ‘warped’ kinds. Aristotle draws the distinction between land
and water animals in two ways: Either in relation to whether the animal takes in air or
water, or in relation to where they feed or live. (HA 589a12-15). Terrestrial aquatics
span these criteria—e.g. take in air, but feed and live in the water. Animals like the
“The taxonomic vocabulary is restricted to the two terms ‘kind’ (genos) and ‘form’
(eidos) and the terms refer to groups of animals at all levels of the taxonomic hierarchy.
There appears to be no concern for finding or consistently using certain features as
classificatory markers in order to provide either a classification which is exhaustive or a
hierarchy of taxa from widest to narrowest.” (Lennox, 2001, p. 40).
4
These texts have been interpreted in relation to several different philosophical issues.
Feminist interpreters of Aristotle (myself included) and their critics (Mayhew 2004, Tress
1996) have considered the texts concerning female animals in relation to the issue of his
sexism. (Witt 1998, Cook 1996, Matthews 1986, Henry 2007) Others have read them in
relation to the question of the intermingling of science and popular belief in Aristotle’s
biology (Lloyd 1986) and in relation to the issues of the eternality of the species in
Aristotle. (Granger 1987).
3
3
dolphin are puzzling because they take in both air and water and, hence, straddle a single
differentia. Terrestrial aquatics fall under the broad category of “dualizers”, roughly,
animals that straddle various criteria of classification. Terrestrial aquatics include the
dolphin, the whale, the seal, the otter, the hippopotamus and the frog. Terrestrial aquatics
are deformed animals of Type B. Finally, there are female animals, who are described as
“deformed” males (737a27-28) in the Generation of Animals using the very same word as
was used to characterize Type A animal kinds. Female animals are Type C. 5
These texts describing deformed kinds are puzzling for many reasons, but one
central problem is that it is hard to understand how an entire animal kind could be
deformed or abnormal, given Aristotle’s teleological view of nature and natural
processes.6 A natural process like animal generation occurs ‘always or for the most part’
and it is teleologically directed towards its end, which is the realization of form.7 In
Aristotle’s cryptic phrase “One human being generates another.” (Phys. 193bl2, 198a26,
5
The context-dependency of animal kinds () for Aristotle is evident in his
discussion of deformed animal kinds. First, Types A, B, and C collect animal kinds at
very different levels of generality; compare moles as a grouping with female animals.
Second, Aristotle sometimes juxtaposes two groupings of animals, like seals and
quadrapeds, (P.A. 657a22-24) or females and males, (G.A. 737a27) in his description of
one group as “deformed”. But these juxtapositions compare animal kinds at very
different levels of generality as well. It seems that what counts as a kind or comparison
class in these contexts depends upon the feature or characteristic being explained or
described. Hence, it is context-dependent. Further, there is no privileged level of
generality from which to judge whether or not a kind is deformed. But if there is no
privileged set of animal kinds to set a standard for normalcy, on what grounds are some
kinds described as deformed?
6
“Aristotle on a number of occasions refers to deformed kinds of animals, a usage that
needs defence since it is not clear what the standard for such of judgment would be in
that case”. (Lennox, 2001b, p. 229)
7
The phrase “always or for the most part” describes what naturally happens barring
outside interference, i.e. it is a teleological concept. Devin Henry has identified a (few)
text(s) --GA IV.4, 771b3ff.--in the biology where the phrase seems simply to mean “in
the majority of cases”. (personal communication)
4
202al 1, P.A. 640a25, Met. 1033b32, 1070a28) Hence, for Aristotle, an individual
animal might be deformed due to an accident during gestation, a congenital deformation
or some mutilation (like castration) later in life, but the determination that an individual is
deformed is relative to the functional parts and the life activities characteristic of
members of the kind to which the individual belongs, and which individuals of that kind
regularly and naturally achieve. For Aristotle, therefore, it seems to make no sense to call
a kind ‘deformed’.
In what follows I develop an interpretation that explains why Aristotle would
consider animal kinds of Types A, B, and C to be deformed, and then I explore what light
that explanation might shed on his conception of animal kinds. One issue, which I
discuss below, is whether or not Aristotle gives one explanation for all three types of
deformed animal kinds. I will argue that there is sufficient similarity or overlap in the
core explanation that Aristotle gives for describing each of these kinds of animals as
deformed to legitimate considering the three kinds together. Once we lump the three
types together, however, we are confronted with a theoretically significant number of
abnormal kinds, which suggests that we can use the discussion of deformed kinds to
reflect back on Aristotle’s notion of animal kinds. It is worth pointing out at this juncture
that deformed animal kinds of Types A, B, or C are discussed in all the central biological
texts--the Parts of Animals, the Generation of Animals, the History of Animals and De
Anima.
Scholars have offered different explanations of Aristotle’s description of animal
kinds as deformed. These explanations fall roughly into two kinds, those that provide an
explanation in terms external to Aristotle’s biological theory and those that provide an
5
explanation in terms drawn from Aristotle’s theory.8 Lloyd (1983) exemplifies the first
strategy when he suggests that the terminology of abnormality in Aristotle reflects the
intermingling of popular beliefs with his biological theory.9 Gotthelf (1985) exemplifies
the second strategy. Gotthelf’s interpretation focuses on the resources within Aristotle’s
biological theory to explain the phenomenon of deformed kinds. He proposes a
numerical interpretation of abnormality, by situating the abnormal kind within the
framework of a wider kind. For Gotthelf deformity is only “relative to a wider kind”. I
will call this the numerical/statistical interpretation of deformed kinds because it
preserves the numerical or statistical meaning of deformity by situating the deformed
kind within a wider kind.
I think that Gotthelf is right to interpret the texts about abnormal kinds using the
resources of Aristotle’s biological theory. And Gotthelf’s interpretation correctly
focuses on the functional parts of animals. He thinks that “the biological point is that we
have organs that cannot perform (as well) the functions they are most-suited for and have
developed for . . by the standard of performance of the version of that organ in the other
members of that wider kind” ( p. 40)
But I don’t think that the proposed
numerical/statistical explanation of the standard of normalcy is persuasive because it does
not apply to all three types of deformed kinds I have just mentioned. In particular, it
does not apply to terrestrial aquatics and to female animals (Types B and C), whose
8
Granger (1987) straddles the two options. He thinks that the language of abnormality is
metaphorical in relation to some kinds, but not with regard to the terrestrial-aquatics. He
does not discuss female animals.
9
“Dualizing thus provides a remarkable case of an interaction—within Aristotle’s
zoology—of traditional beliefs and his own independent theorizing.” (Lloyd 1983, 50)
6
deformity is not explained in relation to a wider kind. Female animals are (like)
“deformed” males, but male animals are not a wider kind. Instead, as I explain in more
detail below, female animals are deformed because they are unable to concoct nutrition
into semen, which is a crucial step in reproduction, and reproduction is a central life
activity of animals. Moreover, as we will see, it is not even clear that a
numerical/statistical interpretation of deformity fits Aristotle’s discussion of Type A
deformed kinds. In short, although Gotthelf’s proposal is attractive because it gives
straightforward numerical standard for what counts as a deformed kind, it does not reflect
what Aristotle actually says about them.
In place of the numerical/statistical interpretation I will develop a
functional/normative interpretation of abnormal kinds. Aristotle’s core notion of a
deformed kind turns on the idea that this type of animal does not have the functional parts
that an animal of that type ought to have and/or does not engage in the life activities that
an animal of that type ought to engage in. But if this is Aristotle’s core notion of a
deformed kind then we can see that Aristotle’s notion of a normal animal kind includes
what functional parts individuals of that type ought to have and/or what life activities
they ought to engage in. Hence, the core explanation of why certain types of animals are
deformed illuminates the normative dimension of Aristotle’s notion of animal kinds.
The explanations of the functional parts of animals as for the sake of their life
activities establishes a normative conception of kinds, because the “for the sake of” or
teleological relationship between part and activity is normative and not merely
descriptive. We can see this most easily in the case of abnormal kinds. If, as Aristotle
thinks, the claws of crustacea are for the sake of grasping, which is their natural function,
7
but we observe lobsters regularly using one of their claws for walking, we might draw
one of two conclusions. Either we re-classify the part as having a dual natural function
(walking or grasping) or we say as Aristotle does that lobsters do not use their claws for
their natural function (because claws are supposed to be used for grasping). Lobsters are
a deformed kind. Aristotle’s notion of the claw and its function is normative, and it can
withstand the counter-evidence presented by the lobster, by every lobster.
But, if that
is true of lobsters and their parts, it is also true of normal animal kinds and their parts.
Before considering the different types of deformed kinds in more detail, it is
useful to introduce Aristotle’s vocabulary of deformity. The verb smeans
“to be maimed “or “to be mutilated”; the adjective “s”means “maimed” or
“crippled”. These words connote an intervention or event, which results in a loss of
limb, part or function. Their standard use, which we find in Aristotle, is to describe
individuals who have suffered a loss of limb, part or function due to an unfortunate event
or, perhaps, a congenital deformity. (G.A. 737a25-27) Such events would be rare
occurrences that disrupt a normal process of development or that destroy the normal
function of a part.
When Aristotle applies the language of deformity to animal kinds of Type A, B,
and C, there are two important ways in which the usage is strained. First, Aristotle does
not seem to think that an external trauma, like castration or loss of limb, regularly occurs
in the development or life of the abnormal animal kinds that causes their deformity.
Hence, while Aristotle does think that something goes wrong in the development of some
8
deformed animal kinds, this does not seem to be due to an external intervention.10 And,
of course, when discussing abnormal kinds he does not contrast individual deformed
exemplars with normal exemplars of the kind. The two points are related since the
external event is an explanation of why the individual is deformed in a particular way,
and differs from others of the same kind--but this is precisely what does not occur with
deformed kinds.
In his commentary on the Generation of Animals Peck suggests a range of
meanings of  “Other attempts to bring out the meaning of this word
would include “imperfectly developed” “under-developed”, “malformed” “mutilated”
and “congenitally disabled”. (Gen An. p. 174)
According to Peck, “The underlying
notion is that s has not succeeded in achieving her proper s” (Gen. An. xlv) I
am sympathetic to the normative resonance in Peck’s description of the core notion of
deformity and its connection to teleology. But Peck does not address our puzzle, which
is what it means to say that nature can fail to achieve her proper telos in every instance
of an animal kind.
Sometimes Aristotle signals that he is using s and s in an
unusual way by prefixing the modifier  (meaning like or as if) : a female is like a
natural deformity; a seal is like a deformed quadraped. I think that the modifier attaches
to the method of mutilation, and not to the attribution of deformity. He does not mean us
to think that an external intervention occurs in the gestation of every female animal and
10
Aristotle compares the developmental process of some deformed kinds with the effects
of castration to make the point that a small change can have a systematic effect. (G.A. I.
2 . 716b2—12; also 766a 30. H.A. VIII.2 580b29-590a11) It is significant to my
interpretation that he makes this point about both terrestrial aquatics and females,
suggesting a theoretical connection between deformed kinds of Type B and Type C.
9
every seal that maims or mutilates it. Rather, as I explain below, he thinks that females
and seals have parts that are functionally deformed just like an individual female or an
individual seal might have if they lost a limb.11
Animal kinds of Type B, terrestrial aquatics, are described as “warped” or
“distorted” (s) in the extended text that describes their condition. (H. A.
VIII 2. 589b29-30) Despite the terminological variation there are strong similarities
between Aristotle’s explanation of terrestrial aquatics and abnormal animals of kinds A
and C, which justify grouping them all together. In addition, Aristotle occasionally uses
the language of deformity in describing terrestrial aquatics. As I just mentioned, seals are
terrestrial aquatics and they are also explicitly called deformed. (P.A.657a22-24)
Let us consider Aristotle’s fascinating discussion of the lobster as a representative
Type A deformed animal.12 In the Parts of Animals IV, 8 Aristotle discusses soft-shelled
animals, which he divides into four kinds: crayfish, lobsters, prawns and crabs; these
kinds in turn come in many different shapes and sizes. Two kinds, crayfish and crabs
have claws, which they use for “grasping and holding” and not for locomotion. After a
discussion of other parts and activities of these animals, and how they differ, Aristotle
comments: “The lobsters alone have one claw or the other, whichever one it chances to
be, larger, in both the females and the males. They have claws because they are in the
Gotthelf (1985) has a different explanation. “Where the organ performs another
function sufficiently well . . Aristotle will say, it seems, that they are only
deformed . . The female, who has a natural and necessary function, which she
performs perfectly well, has her ‘deformity’ doubly qualified.” (40) But, in this case we
would expect the lobster to be  deformed because its claw does perform another
function sufficiently well –i.e. walking.
12
Granger (1987) claims that the lobster and the seal are deformed kinds “merely in a
figurative sense” through their failure to live up to a standard of excellence of their genus.
(113). I don’t see why this counts as merely figurative or metaphorical deformation.
11
10
kind that has claws; while they have this part randomly distributed because they are
deformed and do not use it to do what claws are naturally for, but for the sake of
locomotion.” (P.A. 684 32-36) Aristotle explains the presence of claws in lobsters by
reference to their kind, but he calls them deformed because they do not use their claws
for their natural purpose, which is grasping. Here we find a connection between the
functional part of an animal and its natural purpose, which is the activity of grasping and
not walking. Lobster claws develop for the sake of grasping. If you were to ask, why are
lobsters deformed? The answer is: Because they don’t use their claws for their natural
purpose. But this is clearly a normative conception of the relationship between part and
function, and not a numerical or statistical conception. Recall that every lobster uses its
claw for walking. Gotthelf (1983) suggests that deformity in the lobster is relative to a
wider kind. But it is unclear what the wider kind is in the case of the lobster. It cannot be
soft-shelled animals because they do not all have claws, and it cannot be clawed, softshelled animals because that is an ad hoc grouping. (Lennox 2001b, 310)
The mole is slightly different Type A deformed kind. In the History of
Animals IV, 8 533a2-3 the mole is described as a deformed kind—
sbecause it does not have the faculty of sight. Aristotle notes that
the mole is the only live-birth, footed kind that lacks sight. There follows a discussion of
how moles have eye-like growths under the skin, and Aristotle speculates that there was a
deformation of nature during development. Does Aristotle envision a castration-type
event during the process of development of each and every mole? I don’t think so. At
H.A. I, 9 (491b27-36) we find a similar description of the undeveloped eyes of the mole,
11
but there Aristotle describes moles as s or incomplete. 13The idea seems to be that
the eyes of the mole are incompletely developed and that is why it lacks sight. The idea
of incomplete development will also be important in understanding Type C abnormal
kinds (female animals). In calling the mole a deformed kind Aristotle is commenting on
the inability of the mole to see, which is what live-birth, footed animals ought to be able
to do; in calling them incompletely developed Aristotle is suggesting an explanation for
their deformation, i.e. that the mole’s eye does not finish its process of development.
But, the use of the term s or incomplete also suggests that the mole never develops
to its molish end; Aristotle also calls children s because they have not reached the
full development characteristic of humans, not of some other kind.
Terrestrial aquatics (Type B deformed animal kinds) are those animals that can be
categorized as both terrestrial and aquatic. The terrestrial aquatics are a large group of
animals including the dolphin, the whale, the seal, the otter, hippopotamus and the frog.
These animals are like terrestrials because they breathe in air, but they are also aquatic
because they either live or feed in the water. At HA VIII, 2 Aristotle explains the
deformation of the terrestrial aquatic by comparison with a castrated male animal:
The nature of all these seems, as it were, to have been warped just
as some males become feminine, some females masculine. For animals
that receive a difference in small parts come to differ greatly as regards the
nature of the whole body. This is evident in the case of those that are
castrated; for when a small part is maimed the animal changes into a
female. So that it is evident that also in the animal's original conformation
if some small part be changed in magnitude, and if it should be a principle,
the animal comes to be in one case female, and in the other male; but if it
has been altogether destroyed, neither. So that the terrestrial and aquatic
animals exist in both ways, because a change comes to be in small parts.
13
We find the same idea at De Anima 425a9 where the
mole is cited in contrast to the animals that are “not imperfect or deformed”
(
12
(589b29-590a9)
Aristotle here speculates that there is small change in the body of terrestrial
aquatics during development that results in the animal partaking of two natures (=
terrestrial and aquatic) just as castrated male takes on a feminine form and
attributes and shares in two natures (= female and male). Aristotle’s comparison
between terrestrial aquatics and the male and the female anticipates a connection
between Type B and Type C deformed animal kinds concerning the process of
deformation. It is significant for my interpretation that he makes this point about
both terrestrial aquatics and females, suggesting a theoretical connection between
deformed kinds of Type B and Type C. (G.A. I. 2 . 716b2—12; also 766a 30.
H.A. VIII.2 580b29-590a11)
Aristotle’s focus in the text I just read is to speculate about the process
through which a deformity in terrestrial-aquatics occurs. But, a more basic
question concerns why Aristotle thinks that these animal kinds are deformed in
the first place. It cannot be simply a matter of their expansive lifestyles; the fact
that they live in two environments. In one interesting text Aristotle’s discusses
the seal’s hind legs, which are “finlike” for a land-animal, but “footlike” for a
water-animal. (P.A. 697b1-8) The seal’s organ of locomotion is not optimally
formed for the life activity of locomotion either in the water (too footlike) or on
land (too finlike). The seal example connects terrestrial aquatics to my proposed
core explanation of deformed kinds in Aristotle, since it turns on the connection
between functional part and life activity.
Aristotle’s discussion of Type C deformed kinds (female animals) is extensive
13
because the female is one of two principles of animal reproduction, which is the central
topic of Aristotle’s Generation of Animals.14
Aristotle defines the female in relation to
its incapacity to concoct nutrition and produce semen, and he defines the male in relation
to its capacity to concoct nutrition and produce semen. As Devin Henry (2007) explains,
this is a functional distinction:
According to GA IV.1 an animal is ultimately male or female insofar as
it is capable or incapable of concocting its nutriment fully and converting
it to semen. Whether or not an animal has this ability, and thus whether or
not it is male or female, depends on its source of natural heat. The stronger
the animal’s principle of natural heat, the greater is its ability to effect concoction and thus produce semen. (p. 5)
The female animal is deformed in the sense that she is unable to fully concoct
nutrition into semen as a male animal can. This is a functional disability, which is
directly related to one of the two central life activities of animals, which are
nutrition and reproduction. Aristotle’s teleological understanding of animal parts
as for the sake of their functional activities, e.g. semen exists for the sake of
reproduction, and his understanding of reproduction as a basic life function of
animals, gives a very precise meaning to the female animal’s deformity. It is a
functional incapacity in relation to a life activity, where the activity in question is
part of what it is to be an animal.
Aristotle’s explanation of the reproductive incapacity of females is
14
Lloyd (1983) provides an interesting compilation of the differences between males and
females that Aristotle catalogues in the Historia Animalium. (94-105) While some of
these observations are humorous, others accurate and yet others simply wrong, it is in
relation to his theory of reproduction that we find Aristotle’s rationale for describing
female animals as deformed. This is not surprising since the pattern in Aristotle’s
discussion of Type A and B deformity leads us to expect a focus on parts and
functioning. And we find this focus in Aristotle’s explanation of animal reproduction.
14
comparable to the inability of moles to see in one important respect.
Both are a
failure of full development, a failure of degree of completion of an important
functional part or capacity.15 Just as the eyes of moles exist under the skin but in
vestigial form, so too, female animals lack the ability to fully concoct blood into
generative semen. (GA 737a22-34; 728a17-35) In each case the organ or the
capacity fails to fully achieve its natural end, which is for the sake of a central
kind of animal activity. There is a core similarity between Type A and Type C
deformed animal kinds.16
But, the story is a bit more complex because females play a natural and necessary
role in reproduction; females provide the material cause. Indeed, Aristotle argues that it
is better that there are two sexes:
“That is why there is always a continuous generation (γένος) of humans, animals, and
plants. And since the principles of these are male and female, male and female will be
present for the sake of generation in each of the things that possess them. But the
primary moving cause is better and more divine in its nature than the matter, insofar
as the definition and the form belong to it, and it is better that the superior cause be
kept separate from the inferior one. It is on account of this that (in those species where
this is possible) the male is separated from the female. For the source of change, to
which the male principle belongs, is better and more divine in those things that come
into being, while the female corresponds to matter. However the male comes together
and combines with the female in order to perform the function of reproduction, for
this is something common to both. (GA II.1, 732a1-12)
The existence of females is not only necessary but also better than the
“While this view of Aristotle’s is a far cry from suggesting that females are
mere physical distortions of a more perfect male body type, it does go
some way towards establishing that Aristotle’s developmental biology views
females as somehow inferior to males. After all, Aristotle viewed the production of semen as a natural capacity of an animal and so, in a sense,
females are imperfect animals.” (Henry 2007, 7)
16
There is also a similarity between Type B and Type C deformed animal kinds because
Aristotle uses the example of castration to explain how the deformity might have
developed from an initial small change. (texts)
15
15
alternatives. This unusual status of females might help to explain Aristotle’s
statement that females are a natural deformity. (G. A. 775a15) But, it is important
to distinguish two questions. First, there is the question of why Aristotle calls
females deformed. And the answer is clear: their deformity is rooted in their
functional incapacity, their inability to fully concoct semen, where that incapacity
is determined in relation to the reproductive capacity of males, which is
understood to be part of the life function of animals, and to be teleologically
directed towards the activity of reproduction. A second, and different question, is
whether or not it is better (from some perspective) that both females and males
exist. I won’t explore Aristotle’s argument that it is better that both females and
males exist further here beyond remarking that it is an important text for assessing
the sexism in his theory of reproduction. (Henry 2007, Matthews 1986)
I hope that this necessarily brief survey of Aristotle on abnormal animal
kinds will allow me to draw a few conclusions. First, despite some
terminological variation, there is remarkable overlap in Aristotle’s core
explanation of the three types of deformed kinds. The notion of deformation is
functional, and it refers to a part or parts that (a) are missing or incomplete or (b)
do not perform their proper function or (c) do not perform it well. Since the part
or capacity exists for the sake of the corresponding activity, these animals are
functionally deformed. But, what function is relevant in making this
determination? The function is specified in relation to an animal kind and its
activities, but I have argued that there is little evidence to support the claim that
the kind in question is a “wider” kind or that Aristotle mentions a wider kind in
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order to explain what he means in calling the kind “deformed”. In the case of
moles, their inability to see is mentioned in contrast to other quadrapeds, although
the use of the term “incomplete” to describe the mole in relation to its inability to
see suggests that moles have not reached their full mole-iness.17 In the case of
lobsters it is hard to determine which kind is the comparison kind and it is unclear
that it is a wider kind.18
And, in the case of terrestrial-aquatics it is just unclear
what role a comparison kind plays, and hence whether the kind (or kinds) is
wider. Finally, in the case of female animals the situation is clear. The inability
to concoct nutrition into semen is a reproductive function of males, and males are
not a wider kind. I conclude that the numerical/statistical interpretation of
deformed animal kinds fails to capture Aristotle’s notion.
The example of female animals is instructive in unpacking Aristotle’s
meaning further. Aristotle seems both to contrast females with males (in
establishing their inability to fully concoct nutrition, their functional incapacity
and, hence, their deformity), and at the same time to take males as paradigmatic
exemplars of their kinds. They are paradigmatic exemplars because their parts
and capacities are for the sake of an important or characteristic life activity of
animals. Recall that reproduction and nutrition are basic life activities of animals
for Aristotle so that the parts and functions that contribute to them will be part of
what it is to be an animal (of a given kind). The “for the sake of “ or final cause is
an internal principle that explains why certain parts or capacities develop in
17
Also it is not clear why the kind mentioned is relevant to the deformity, the inability to
see.
18
Lennox, 2001b, 310.
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animals. Female animals are unable to do what it is that they should do in
reproduction, and what they should be able to do in reproduction (let’s call it “the
male standard”) is part of what it is to be an animal (of that kind). Females
animals as a kind are “like” individual deformed males, whose parts are also
incapable of reproducing--which is what they ought to be able to do. The
functional/normative interpretation of deformed kinds is more adequate to
Aristotle’s examples than the numerical/statistical interpretation.
Let me close with a few thoughts about how the functional/normative
interpretation of deformed kinds fits into and supports the broader claim that
Aristotle’s notion of animal kinds is itself normative. The normative interpretation
of Aristotle’s notion of animal kinds, and hence, his notion of natural kinds, is
rooted in two aspects of his philosophical biology. The first is his understanding
of nature as an internal causal principle, and the second is his insistence on the
primacy of the final cause in explaining the functional parts of animals. The
parts of animals have natural functions, which are what the part are for and not
simply what they could be used for. (Ransome 2007) The natural functions of
animal parts are explained in relation to the life activities that are both their ends,
and determinative of what it is to be an animal of that kind i.e., what an animal of
that kind ought to be able to do. In the case of normal animal kinds, individuals
realize their natural functions “always or for the most part”, which suggests,
misleadingly, that the notion of a natural function is captured by a numerical or
statistical interpretation.
In this paper I have suggested that Aristotle calls some animal kinds
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deformed because one or more of their functional parts are unable to perform (or
to perform well) the life activity (or activities), which is both the end for the sake
of which the part exists and what animals of the kind ought to be able to do. In
the case of abnormal animal kinds we can observe the notion of a natural function
diverge from what happens always or for the most part. Hence, Aristotle’s
discussion of deformed or abnormal animal kinds illuminates an important
dimension of his notion of animal kinds, which might otherwise remain invisible.
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