ACP-WG I-06/WP-09
International Civil Aviation Organization
3/17/2008
WORKING PAPER
Aeronautical Communication Panel
Working Group I – Internet Protocol Suite (IPS)
March 17-20, 2008
Montreal Canada
Updated
Security Requirements
for the
“Manual for the ATN using IPS Standards and Protocols”
Prepared by: Vic Patel and Tom McParland
Presented by: Vic Patel
SUMMARY
This paper provides updated security requirements for Doc 9896, “Manual for the ATN
using IPS Standards and Protocols.” This paper is an update of working paper 9 from the
5th meeting of Working Group I. Several changes to WP 9 were suggested during the 5th
meeting as described in the meeting minutes. In addition this papers incorporates chages
based on the adoption of Mobile IPv6 for air-ground mobility. The working group is
invited to consider these requirements as a baseline set of air-ground security
requirements.
CHANGES TO 2.6 INCORPORATED
2.6 SECURITY
This section contains provisions for ground-ground and air-ground security in the
ATN/IPS.
Note. - Support for security is to be based on a system threat and vulnerability analysis.
2.6.1 Ground-Ground Network Layer Security
Note . – Network layer security in the ATN/IPS internetwork is implemented using IPsec.
2.6.1.1 Ground-Ground IPsec
2.6.1.1.1 ATN/IPS nodes in the ground-ground environment shall implement the
Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol as specified in RFC-4301
2.6.1.1.2. ATN/IPS nodes in the ground-ground environment shall implement the IP
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol as specified in RFC-4303.
2.6.1.1.3 ATN/IPS nodes in the ground-ground environment may implement the IP
Authentication Header (AH) protocol as specified in RFC-4302.
2.6.1.1.4 ATN/IPS nodes in the ground-ground environment shall implement manual
configuration
2.6.1.1.5 ATN/IPS nodes in the ground-ground environment shall implement the Internet
Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol as specified in RFC-4306.
2.6.1.1.6 ATN/IPS nodes in the ground-ground environment shall implement the
Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Requirements for the Encapsulating Security
Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH) as specified in RFC-4305..
2.6.1.1.7 ATN/IPS nodes in the ground-ground environment shall implement The Null
Encryption Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec as specified in RFC-4305, but not the Null
Authentication Algorithm.
Note - ESP encryption is optional, but authentication is always performed.
2.6.1.1.8 ATN/IPS nodes in the ground-ground environment shall implement the
Cryptographic Algorithms for Use in the Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)
required algorithms for key exchange as specified in RFC-4307.
Note. – Algorithms of equivalent or greater strength than those identified in RFC-4307
are implemented as a local matter on a bi-lateral basis.
2.6.2 Air-Ground Security
2.6.2.1 Acess Network Security
2.6.2.1.1 ATN/IPS mobile nodes shall implement the security provisions of the accces
network.
Note. – For example, the WiMAX, 3GPP, and 3GPP2 access networks have
authentication and authorization provisions.
2.6.2.2 Air-Ground IPsec
2.6.2.2.1 ATN/IPS nodes in the air-ground environment shall implement the Security
Architecture for the Internet Protocol as specified in RFC 4301.
2.6.2.2.2 ATN/IPS nodes in the air-ground environment shall implement the IP
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol as specified in RFC 4303.
2.6.2.2.3 ATN/IPS nodes, which implement MIPv6, may implement the Authentication
Protocol for Mobile IPv6 as specified in RFC 4285.
2.6.2.2.4 ATN/IPS nodes in the air-ground environment shall implement the Internet
Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol as specified in RFC 4306.
2.6.2.2.5 ATN/IPS nodes in the air-ground environment, which implement MIPv6, shall
implement Mobile IPv6 Operation with IKEv2 and the Revised IPsec Architecture as
specified in RFC 4877.
2.6.2.3 Air-Ground Transport Layer Security
2.6.2.3.1 ATN/IPS mobile nodes and correspondent nodes may implement the Transport
Layer Security (TLS) protocol as specified in RFC 4346.
2.6.2.6 If TLS is used for air-ground security, mobile nodes and correspondent nodes
shall implement the Cipher Suite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as
specified in RFC 4492.
2.6.2.4 Air-Ground Application Layer Security
2.6.2.4.1 ATN/IPS mobile nodes and correspondent nodes may implement air-ground
security as specified in Doc 9705/9880.
2.6.2.4.2 If application layer security is used for air-ground security, IKEv2 shall be used
for key establishment as specified in section 2.6.2.
2.6.2.4.3 If application layer security is used for air-ground security, mobile nodes may
use a shared secret or HTTP_CERT_LOOKUP as the authentication mechanism for
IKEv2.
Note 1.-- In IKEv2 the authentication mechaism may be different in each direction.
Note 2. – With the shared secret method the ground system may retrieve the mobile
node’s shared secret from a AAA server.
Note 3. – With HTTP_CERT_LOOKUP the mobile node does not have to transmit an
actual certificate but rather transmits a hash value and a URL where the ground system
can retrieve the mobile node’s certificate and CRL.
2.6.2.4.4 If application layer security is used for air-ground security, ATN/IPS mobile
nodes and correspondent nodes shall implement the following transforms:
a) AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256-128 as the Integrity Algorithm for ESP
authentication as specified in RFC 4868.
b) PRF_HMAC_SHA_256 as the pseudo-random function in IKEv2 as specified in
RFC 4868.
c) 256-bit random ECP group for Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange values in IKEv2 as
specified in RFC 4753.
d) ECDSA with SHA-256 on the P-256 curve as the IKEv2 authentication method as
specified in RFC 4754.
CHANGES TO 2.6 REDLINED
2.6 SECURITY
This section contains provisions for ground-ground and air-ground security in the
ATN/IPS.
Note. - Support for security is to be based on a system threat and vulnerability analysis.
2.6.1 Ground-Ground Network Layer Security
Note . – Network layer security in the ATN/IPS internetwork is implemented using IPsec.
2.6.1.1 Ground-Ground IPsec
2.6.1.1.1 ATN/IPS nodes in the ground-ground environment shall implement the
Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol as specified in RFC-4301
2.6.1.1.2. ATN/IPS nodes in the ground-ground environment shall implement the IP
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol as specified in RFC-4303.
2.6.1.1.3 ATN/IPS nodes in the ground-ground environment may implement the IP
Authentication Header (AH) protocol as specified in RFC-4302.
2.6.1.1.4 ATN/IPS nodes in the ground-ground environment shall implement manual
configuration
2.6.1.1.5 ATN/IPS nodes in the ground-ground environment shall implement the Internet
Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol as specified in RFC-4306.
2.6.1.1.6 ATN/IPS nodes in the ground-ground environment shall implement the
Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Requirements for the Encapsulating Security
Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH) as specified in RFC-4305..
2.6.1.1.7 ATN/IPS nodes in the ground-ground environment shall implement The Null
Encryption Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec as specified in RFC-4305, but not the Null
Authentication Algorithm.
Note - ESP encryption is optional, but authentication is always performed.
2.6.1.1.8 ATN/IPS nodes in the ground-ground environment shall implement the
Cryptographic Algorithms for Use in the Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)
required algorithms for key exchange as specified in RFC-4307.
5
Note. – Algorithms of equivalent or greater strength than those identified in RFC-4307
are implemented as a local matter on a bi-lateral basis.
2.6.2 Air-Ground Security
2.6.2.1 Acess Network Security
2.6.2.1.1 ATN/IPS mobile nodes shall implement the security provisions of the accces
network.
Note. – For example, the WiMAX, 3GPP, and 3GPP2 access networks have
authentication and authorization provisions.
2.6.2.2 Air-Ground IPsec
2.6.2.2.1 ATN/IPS nodes in the air-ground environment shall implement the Security
Architecture for the Internet Protocol as specified in RFC 4301.
2.6.2.2.2 ATN/IPS nodes in the air-ground environment shall implement the IP
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol as specified in RFC 4303.
2.6.2.2.3 ATN/IPS nodes, which implement MIPv6, may implement the Authentication
Protocol for Mobile IPv6 as specified in RFC 4285.
2.6.2.2.4 ATN/IPS nodes in the air-ground environment shall implement the Internet
Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol as specified in RFC 4306.
2.6.2.2.5 ATN/IPS nodes in the air-ground environment, which implement MIPv6, shall
implement Mobile IPv6 Operation with IKEv2 and the Revised IPsec Architecture as
specified in RFC 4877.
2.6.2.3 Air-Ground Transport Layer Security
2.6.2.3.1 ATN/IPS mobile nodes and correspondent nodes may implement the Transport
Layer Security (TLS) protocol as specified in RFC 4346.
2.6.2.6 If TLS is used for air-ground security, mobile nodes and correspondent nodes
shall implement the Cipher Suite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as
specified in RFC 4492.
2.6.2.4 Air-Ground Application Layer Security
6
2.6.2.4.1 ATN/IPS mobile nodes and correspondent nodes may implement air-ground
security as specified in Doc 9705/9880.
2.6.2.4.2 If Doc application layer security is used for air-ground security, IKEv2 shall be
used for key establishment as specified in section 2.6.2.2.
2.6.2.4.3 If application layer security is used for air-ground security, mobile nodes may
use a shared secret or HTTP_CERT_LOOKUP as the authentication mechanism for
IKEv2.
Note 1.-- In IKEv2 the authentication mechaism may be different in each direction.
Note 2. – With the shared secret method the ground system may retrieve the mobile
node’s shared secret from a AAA server.
Note 3. – With HTTP_CERT_LOOKUP the mobile node does not have to transmit an
actual certificate but rather transmits a hash value and a URL where the ground system
can retrieve the mobile node’s certificate and CRL.
2.6.2.4.4 If application layer security is used for air-ground security, ATN/IPS mobile
nodes and correspondent nodes shall implement the following transforms:
e) AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256-128 as the Integrity Algorithm for ESP
authentication as specified in RFC 4868.
f) PRF_HMAC_SHA_256 as the pseudo-random function in IKEv2 as specified in
RFC 4868.
g) 256-bit random ECP group for Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange values in IKEv2 as
specified in RFC 4753.
h) ECDSA with SHA-256 on the P-256 curve as the IKEv2 authentication method as
specified in RFC 4754.
7
CHANGES TO APPENDIX A REDLINED
APPENDIX A – REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
IETF STANDARDS AND PROTOCOLS
The following documents are available publicly at http://www.ietf.org and form part of
this manual to the extent specified herein. In the event of conflict between the documents
referenced herein and the contents of this manual, the provisions of this manual shall take
precedence.
Request for Comments (RFCs)
netlmm-mn-ar-if
Network-based Localized Mobility Management Interface between
Mobile Node and Mobility Access Gateway, May 2007
netlmm-proxymip6
Proxy Mobile IPv6, February 2008
RFC-768
User Datagram Protocol, August 1980
RFC-793
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), September 1981
RFC-1006
ISO Transport Service on top of TCP, May 1987
RFC-1323
TCP Extensions for High Performance May 1992
RFC-1981
Path Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) Discovery for IP Version 6,
August 1996
RFC-2126
ISO Transport Service on top of TCP, March 1997
RFC-2460
Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification, December 1998
RFC-2474
Differential Services Field, December 1998
RFC-2488
Enhancing TCP over Satellite Channels, January 1999
RFC-2858
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP4) Multiprotocol Extensions June 2000
RFC-3775
Mobility Support in IPv6, June 2004
RFC-4271
A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4), January 2006
RFC-4285
Authentication Protocol for Mobile IPv6 , January 2006
RFC-4291
IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture, February 2006
RFC-4301
Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol, December, 2005
RFC-4302
Internet Protocol (IP) Authentication Header, December 2005
RFC-4303
IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), December 2005RFC-4305
Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Requirements for
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH) –
(NB proposed standard, obsoletes RFC-2402, RFC-2406), December 2005
RFC-4306
Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol, December 2005
RFC-4307
Cryptographic Algorithms for Use in the Internet Key Exchange Version 2
(IKEv2), December 2005
RFC-4346
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1, April 2006
RFC 4423
Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Architecture, May 2006
RFC-4443
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol
Version 6 (IPv6) Specification, March 2006
1
RFC-4492
RFC-4555
RFC-4753
RFC-4754
RFC-4830
RFC-4831
RFC-4868
RFC-4877
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
Security, May 2006
IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol (MOBIKE), June 2006
ECP Groups for IKE and IKEv2, January 2007
IKE and IKEv2 Authentication Using the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm, (ECDSA), January 2007
Problem Statement for Network-Based Localized Mobility Management
(NETLMM), April 2007
Goals for Network-Based Localized Mobility Management (NETLMM),
April 2007
Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with
IPsec
Mobile IPv6 Operation with IKEv2 and the Revised IPsec Architecture,
April 2007
2