The myth of choice in education ‘quasi-markets’:
The nature and implications of the emergence of
private schools in Punjab, Pakistan
Renwick Irvine
Dissertation
MPhil Development Studies
Institute of Development Studies
1st September 2004
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ABSTRACT
Pakistan is experiencing a dramatic transformation in the way basic education services
are being delivered due to an unprecedented growth in low-cost private schools. This
paper analyses this phenomenon from the perspective of choice in the quasi-market, in
which parents have to bear the costs of schooling. It first examines the factors driving the
growth of the private sector in Pakistan on the supply side. Secondly, the research
assesses how the quasi-market is manifesting itself within a specific environment.
Thirdly it explores how choice is perceived from the demand side through investigating
parental preferences. This paper shows that poor quality and differentiated access may
result from relying on imperfect markets to deliver services in a highly unequal, feudal
society. It reveals that choice is a myth for poor families in a non-universal education
context such as Pakistan. This poses considerable problems for how government can and
should respond.
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CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES, FIGURES AND MAPS .............................................................................................. 5
LIST OF ANNEXES ........................................................................................................................... 5
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................................................... 6
EXCHANGE RATE (AT TIME OF RESEARCH) ..................................................................................... 6
ACKNOWLEGDEMENTS
7
PREFACE
8
CHAPTER 1: CONTEXT AND TRENDS OF PRIVATE PROVISION IN PAKISTAN 10
1.1
THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION PROVISION IN PAKISTAN: THE SEEDS OF PRIVATE
EXPANSION? ................................................................................................................................. 10
1.2 AN ENABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR PRIVATE PROVISION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL...... 12
1.3 PROMOTING PRIVATE PROVISION AT THE PROVINCIAL LEVEL ...................................... 13
CHAPTER 2: CHOICE IN EDUCATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
15
2.1 THE RISE OF THE MARKET IN EDUCATION: THE BASIS FOR CHOICE? ............................ 15
2.1.1. EXPLAINING THE NATURE AND EXPANSION OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS ................................. 16
2.1.2 CHOICE AND RESPONSIVENESS IN EDUCATION QUASI-MARKETS ..................................... 17
2.2 MAKING CHOICES: RATIONAL AND PREDICTABLE OR CONTINGENT AND ARBITRARY?
AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK ................................................................................................... 19
2.2 COUNTER POSITIONS TO THE RISE OF THE MARKET ....................................................... 21
2.2.1 QUESTIONING THE MARKET IN EDUCATION ...................................................................... 21
2.2.2 ACHIEVING BETTER EDUCATION? VALUE PERSPECTIVES ON QUALITY ............................ 22
2.2.3 WHOSE RIGHTS MATTER IN CHOOSING SCHOOLS? ............................................................ 24
2.2.4 DEBUNKING MARKETS: EQUITY AND THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION PROVISION .............. 25
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY FOR RESEARCHING THE EDUCATION MARKET
27
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
RESEARCHING POLITICS AND POLICIES ............................................................................ 27
SELECTION OF SITES FOR FIELD RESEARCH ..................................................................... 28
CONSTRUCTING THE ‘QUASI-MARKET’ IN THE RESEARCH ............................................. 29
ASSUMPTIONS ..................................................................................................................... 29
EXPLORING SCHOOL RESPONSE IN THE PROVIDER DOMAIN ........................................... 29
EXAMINING CONSUMER PERSPECTIVES............................................................................ 30
STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH.......................................................... 31
CHAPTER 4: POLICY RESPONSES IN A HIGHLY POLITICISED CONTEXT
4.1
4.2
4.3
33
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN THE GOVERNMENT SYSTEM ........................................ 33
LOCAL ELITES AND DEVOLUTION: INCENTIVES FOR SUPPORTING EDUCATION?........... 34
ENCOURAGING PRIVATE SECTOR OR LOSING CONTROL? ............................................... 36
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CHAPTER 5: SCHOOL RESPONSE: SUPPLY-SIDE DRIVEN GROWTH OR
RESPONDING TO DEMAND?
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6
UNDERSTANDING RESPONSIVENESS .................................................................................. 39
CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE PROVISION ..................................................................... 39
THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW TYPE OF FOR-PROFIT SCHOOL ........................................... 40
PROFIT-MAKING ENTITIES: INCOME-ENHANCING AS A PRIME CONCERN?.................... 41
SUBSTANTIVE IMPROVEMENT: CHIMERA OR REALITY? ................................................. 45
DECEPTIVE APPEARANCES? .............................................................................................. 47
CHAPTER 6: PERSPECTIVES ON CHOICE: CONSUMER DEMAND?
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
6.5.1
6.5.2
6.6
6.6.1
6.6.2
6.6.3
6.6.4
6.7
6.8
6.9
50
RETHINKING CHOICE ......................................................................................................... 50
DEMAND FOR EDUCATION ACROSS THE SPECTRUM: VALUING EDUCATION .................. 50
SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION MEDIATING CHOICE AND OPPORTUNITY ............................. 53
PRIVATE SCHOOLS: PROVIDING AN OPPORTUNITY FOR GIRLS? ..................................... 54
CHOOSING BETWEEN OPTIONS: WHO MAKES THE DECISION? ........................................ 56
COST: “A SACRIFICE WE HAVE TO MAKE” ........................................................................ 56
THE CLOSER THE BETTER? THE BENEFITS OF THE PRIVATE SCHOOL NEXT DOOR ............ 58
EXPLORING PARENTAL PERCEPTIONS OF QUALITY ......................................................... 60
PEER-GROUP REFERENCE AND (NON)INFORMATION ......................................................... 60
TEACHERS: GOOD BAROMETERS OF QUALITY? ................................................................. 61
PARENTAL PRIORITIES: DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH OR TEACHING AND LEARNING? ............ 62
MINIMUM FACILITIES: ‘THE CHILDREN CAN BEAR IT’ ...................................................... 64
CHILDREN’S DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES: “A SCHOOL SHOULD LOOK LIKE A SCHOOL” 65
CHOICE: SUBJECT TO EVER-PRESENT TRADE-OFFS ......................................................... 66
THE MYTH OF CHOICE ....................................................................................................... 67
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE MYTH OF CHOICE
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
39
69
IMPLICATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT PROVISION AND POLICY ........................................... 70
IMPLICATIONS FOR POTENTIAL ENGAGEMENT WITH PRIVATE SCHOOLS ...................... 71
IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMAND-SIDE CHOICE ...................................................................... 71
WIDER SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MYTH OF CHOICE ............................................................. 72
BIBLIOGRAPHY
74
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List of tables, figures and maps
Table 1:
Gross enrolment ratio in Pakistan in primary schools:
change in the 1990s
11
Table 2:
Typology of potential school responses to the quasi-market
18
Figure 1: Theorising constructions of choice in the quasi-market
through spatial domains
Figure 2: Perspectives of quality spectrum
20
Map 1:
Sheikhupura: location within Pakistan
28
Table 3:
Sample characteristics by school type
31
Table 4:
Taxonomy of providers catering to the urban and rural poor
40
Table 5:
Summary statistics from mapping by school type
42
23
List of Annexes
Annex 1
List of persons interviewed
78-80
Annex 2
School mapping with principals questionnaire
Annex 3
Education officials semi-structured interview pro-forma
Annex 4
Parents’ focus group discussion guiding questions
Annex 5
PRA with children guidelines
Annex 6
Teachers’ focus group discussion guiding questions
88
Annex 7
Income, expenditure and profit of a typical middle private
school
89
81
82-83
84
85-87
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List of acronyms and abbreviations
ADB
BPS
CRC
DCO
DFID
DO
DEO
EDO
FBS
FGD
FS
FT
GBHS
GBPS
GGHS
GGPS
GoP
HT
JICA
MDGs
MoE
MSU
MT
MS
P-ERSP
PIHS
PPP
PRA
NFE
NGO
Rs.
Skp.
SMC
SSC
STR
UC
UNDP
UNESCO
UPE
Asian Development Bank
Basic Pay Scale
Convention of the Rights of the Child
District Coordination Officer
Department for International Development
District Officer
District Education Officer
Executive District Officer
Federal Bureau of Statistics
Focus Group Discussion
Female student
Female teacher
Government Boys High School
Government Boys Primary School
Government Girls High School
Government Girls Primary School
Government of Pakistan
Head Teacher
Japan International Cooperation Agency
Millennium Development Goals
Ministry of Education (Pakistan)
Multi Donor Support Unit
Male teacher
Male student
Punjab Education Sector Reform Plan
Pakistan Integrated Household Survey
Public-Private Partnership
Participatory Rural Appraisal
Non-Formal Education (Centre)
Non Governmental Organisation
Pakistani Rupess
Sheikhupura District, Punjab
School Management Committee
Secondary School Certificate
Student Teacher Ratio
Union Council
United Nations Development Programme
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
Universal Primary Education
Exchange rate (at time of research)
Approx. Rs. 100 = £ 1.00
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ACKNOWLEGDEMENTS
The people who contributed in the process of researching and commenting on this paper
are too numerous to mention. Thanks must go to all those who gave their time and
experience in interviews and discussion groups. Saeed-ul-Hassan and Naima Saeed
helped at every stage of the research in Pakistan, acting as collaborators, translators, and
friends. Mohammad Younas and Abid Hussain Gill from Sudhaar-ITA deserve a special
mention as they provided not only a floor to sleep on for six weeks but imparted their
knowledge of local issues. Amna Wirk and Saima Zarina helped facilitate the PRA
exercises, and provided many tips for working with children in Pakistan. Baela Jamil
(ITA) was a constant source of support and constructive criticism. Mark Poston (DFIDPakistan) made context-relevant observations. DFID-Pakistan provided financial support
for a study, out of which this emerged. Thanks must go to my supervisor Ramya
Subrahmanian and to Robert Chambers, Pauline Rose, Alex Shankland, Joanna Wheeler
and Emma Williams for comments and advice. Needless to say, all errors are my own
and the opinions expressed herein reflect that of the author.
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PREFACE
Pakistan is experiencing a dramatic transformation in the way basic education services
are being delivered. The size of the private sector in education has more than doubled in
the 1990s, encompassing, at a conservative estimate, 30% of education intuitions by the
end of the decade, the majority at primary level (MSU 2002). Concurrently, enrolment in
the government schools has been declining (MSU 2002). Yet poverty in Pakistan, over
the same period, has been growing (Hussein et al 2003: 45-47). The conundrum of why
and in what way private school provision has expanded is explored in this paper by
examining choice through the nexus of supply and demand dynamics in the local
environment.1 Primary school level in the province of Punjab, where the growth has been
most marked, is the focus of this paper, based on empirical research conducted over a six
week period (Andrabi et al 2002).
This unheralded expansion seems to take to an extreme the global pattern of
marketisation, the adoption of free market practices in the running of schools, and
privatisation, of both school ownership and administration, in education (Kwong 2000;
Kitaev 1999; Carnoy 1999; ADB 2003). The theoretical underpinnings of the rise of the
market are premised on improving efficiency, enhancing choice and delivering better
quality education. The policy context in Pakistan of promoting public private
partnerships in the state system and encouraging market entry to private schools appears
to lie firmly within this trend. However, the development of a quasi-market in education
provision, which is predicated on parents paying for school and making choices between
options, could have serious consequences (Kitaev 1999). This paper shows that poor
quality and differentiated access may result from relying on imperfect markets to deliver
services in a highly unequal, quasi-feudal society.
The central research question which this research addresses is unpacking the myth of
choice in a context where universal education provision is non-existent and poor people
lack the ability, either financial or otherwise, to exert choice. To do so, the paper
explores three interrelated questions of why private schools have expanded, what
1
Private schools are taken to be for-profit institutions which are owned and managed privately.
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characteristics they have and how they provide a service to parents. It first examines the
factors driving the growth of the private sector in Pakistan on the supply side, requiring
analysis of the prevailing policy environment and political economy of education.
Secondly, the research assesses how the quasi-market is manifesting itself within a
specific environment, and what characteristics it takes. Thirdly it seeks to understand
how choice is perceived from the demand side through investigating parental
preferences. By focusing on two overlapping domains, of producers (school ‘owners’)
and consumers (parents and children), synergies and dissonances in perspective are
highlighted. How they intersect to create particular patterns of market demand and supply
have consequences for the type of education offered, to whom it is accessible and why it
takes the form it does. The issues that have been uncovered in the empirical work,
although based on a limited sample size, reveal unexpected findings, making it
contribution to knowledge on the implications of extensive private school provision both
in Pakistan and for other developing countries.
The paper is divided into six chapters. Chapter one tracks the historical trends and maps
the current education policy framings in Pakistan. Chapter two analyses the rise of the
market and the existent critiques, offering a framework through which the growth and
implications of private provision can be understood. Chapter three summarises the
innovative methodological approach utilised to explore these dimensions. Chapter four
unpicks the conventional understandings of the market by showing how the policy
framings play out in the local environment. Chapter five explores how schools respond to
the market from the supply side. Chapter six unpacks the perspectives on choice from the
demand side, juxtaposing parental choice with the experience of children in the
classroom. Chapter seven concludes, drawing together the threads of the argument to
provide some tentative policy recommendations and highlight key areas for further
research.
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CHAPTER 1: Context and trends of private provision in Pakistan
The availability of school choices are determined by the nature of education markets.
Markets do not develop in a lacuna but are subject to historical developments and the
present educational supply-demand dynamics mediated by policy (Kitaev 1999: 61). This
chapter explores the context and trends of education provision in Pakistan.
1.1 The politics of education provision in Pakistan: the seeds of private expansion?
The historical idiosyncrasies of Pakistan and education policies adopted at various stages
have deeply affected the nature of private provision (Bengali 1999). At Independence in
1947, Pakistan was, in essence, an artificial country carved out of British India (Ziring
2003). State-driven mass education, as a mechanism to consolidate a country made up of
diverse ethnic groups and different languages was targeted as a priority in education
planning (Bengali 1999). However, insufficient political will to effectively address the
question of providing mass education resulted in inadequate public provision (Warwick
and Reimers 1995; Hoodbhoy 1998).
Private provision, by contrast was substantial in the period prior to the nationalisation of
schools (1972-73) by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (Jamil 2003; Jimenez and Tan 1987). Although
this policy was subsequently reversed under General Zia ul Haq, private schools took
time to respond to new opportunities (ibid.). The policy of promoting and mixing secular
and religious education under the Zia regime, together with the influx of Afghan
refugees, enabled madaris to flourish alongside private schools (Nayyer 1998).2 Jimenez
and Tan (1987) tracked this nascent growth in private provision, but did not foresee the
exponential rise in for-profit private education that has subsequently occurred.
Whilst the expenditure on education remained low in the 1990s (at about 2.7% GNP
throughout the 1990s, compared to an average of 3.8% GNP for other low income
2
Religious schools in Pakistan, in Arabic, madrassah (pl madaris), have also grown exponentially from
the 1980s, though it is thought for different reasons (Nayyer 1998). These are included in the study as they
provide an alternative for parents, but remain on the periphery of the discussion due to the limited sample
size.
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countries during the same period), Pakistan has one of the highest birth rates in the
world, with the average family having six children (Lloyd et al 2002). The result is that
the population of 5-14 year olds has grown from 20.3 million in 1980 to 36.8 million in
2000 (ibid.). Although official figures, notoriously problematic in Pakistan, suggest that
gross enrolment has increased during this period (table 1), given that over a quarter of
children never attend school, considerable shortfalls remain.
Table 1: Gross enrolment ratio in Pakistan in primary schools: change in the 1990s3
Year
Gross Enrolment Ratio
Both
Male
Female
1990
60.7
81.5
39
2000/2001
73
84
62
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (http://www.uis.unesco.org)
Poverty has been recognised as a key constraint to limiting school participation, with
35% of the population living below the poverty line and 15% on the margins (Lloyd et al
2002). Social demand for education was also considered low (Gazdar 1999). In spite of
this, it seems likely that supply, through government schools, has been outstripped by
demand, as private school growth demonstrates.
The mushrooming of alternative provision throughout the 1990s is unprecedented.
According to Pakistan Integrated Household Survey data, in 1983 there were only 3,300
private primary and secondary schools in the four main provinces, yet by 2000 this had
increased over ten-fold (Andrabi et al 2002). Moreover, from being a predominately
urban phenomenon in the 1980s according to Jimenez and Tan (1987), recent evidence
suggests that private education provision is penetrating rural areas, especially in the
Punjab (Andrabi et al 2002). Punjab been subject to the highest growth out of all
provinces, with over 32% of primary school students enrolled in private schools
(Alderman et al 2001; MSU 2002). A recent survey indicates that there are
approximately 2,700 government and 3,400 private institutions providing education in
Sheikhupura District, the focus-area of this study (Punjab EMIS, forthcoming). The
3
Net enrolment figures are unavailable, but are likely to reveal an even bleaker picture as to the state of
education in Pakistan.
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majority of these schools are low-cost, small private schools which appear to be catering
to all socio-economic echelons (Andrabi et al 2002).
However, it is unlikely that this kind of exponential growth can be attributed solely to
excess demand. Politically, little has changed in Pakistan as Heward (1999) asserts that
“despite fifty years of independence, Pakistan’s democracy is fragile, its power centres
controlled by tiny feudal, military and industrial elites”. A rigid hierarchical
administrative structure in the education bureaucracy predominates. As a result there
seems to have been a collective sigh of fatigue at trying to make state education work, the
problems of which have been extensively documented; corruption, bureaucratic
bottlenecks, patronage appointments of teachers, strong yet conservative teacher unions,
teacher absenteeism, ghost schools, poor quality of facilities and missing facilities to
name but a few (Warwick and Reimers 1995). Investment during the 1990s was pushed
through the Social Action Programmes (SAP-I and SAP-II); widely recognised as having
failed to meet their original objectives, school provision remains inadequate (Gazdar
1999; interview Education Consultant 29/04/05). This is borne out in a low internal
efficiency (high repetition and drop-out rates), pointing to the poor standards of
government schools (UNESCO 2000). Therefore the limitations of the public system
appear to have also prompted the growth of private schools.
1.2 An enabling environment for private provision at the National level
Education in Pakistan is firmly on the policy agenda at national level. Progressive policy
work undertaken in recent years, manifesting itself in the Education For All National
Policy agenda (Ministry of Education 2003), coupled with the PRSP and 2001 Local
Government Ordinances for devolution, has thrown up multiple options to reform a
moribund state education system (MFP 2001). However, the influence of the World Bank
in the education sector is shifting the discourse to promoting private alternatives: most of
the recent studies on private provision have been funded by or attached to the Bank
(Alderman et al 1999 and 2002; Andrabi et al 2002; Burnett 2002; Kardar 2001; MSU
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2002).4 Public-private partnership (PPP) is the new yet ill-defined mantra heard
reverberating within the policy environment as a result (GoP 2004). Outlined in the
national policy is “a strategic role” for the private sector: what this might be in practice,
however, remains to be seen (Jamil 2003; GoP 2004).5
1.3 Promoting private provision at the Provincial level
The Government of Punjab has, over the last two years, made significant efforts to
increase provision of government schooling and augment community participation in the
running of schools (interview provincial official 07/06/04).6 The setting up of school
councils or school management committees (SMCs) is an attempt to involve
communities in supporting the local government schools (Khan 2003). The problem of a
lack of state responsiveness to local demands still remains, however. Resultantly, the
government is looking to divest, delegate and devolve government involvement in at
least the direct provision of services, while providing an encouragement to the private
sector.7
The Punjab Education Sector Reform Plan (P-ERSP), the current policy framework, has
earmarked funds allocated per district for government school improvement. This has
developed alongside devolution to district level to facilitate more efficient service
delivery (Jamil 2003).8 The P-ESRP has taken steps to encourage private provision by
providing a package of incentives which includes the provision of land free of cost or at
concessional rates in rural areas; utilities such as electricity and gas assessed at noncommercial rates; a liberal grant of charter; exemption of custom duties on import of
4
Significant multilateral and bilateral donor investment and a pro-market Government appear to be pushing
reform down this path.
5
One example is the new provincial and national Education Foundations, designed to enhance private
sector involvement, but have struggled to make a significant impact (interview government officials
16/06/04 and 07/06/04).
6
Education policy is largely determined at Provincial level, rather than Federal.
7
Programmes such as “Adopt-a-school”, in which NGOs manage government schools, and the Community
Participation Programme (CPP), which requires the community to run upgraded high schools in the
afternoon on government school premises, can be seen as delegation by franchise (Najam 2003). See Savas
(2000) for a discussion of these forms of privatisation.
8
Devolution is attempting to shift responsibility for delivering services from provincial to lower levels.
District, and sub-district, tehsil and union councils level have been reformed to create new opportunities for
political representation and power sharing (Nadvi and Robinson 2004). However, devolution is also about
creating a constituency for the incumbent President Musharraf, following the coup d’etat in 1999 (interview
education consultant 15/05/04).
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educational equipment; and exemption of 50% income tax to private sector institutions
for faculty, management and support staff (GoP 2003).
The devolution programme, encouragement to the private sector and community
participation are conflated in policy thinking, forming a logic for less direct government
involvement (GoP 2004). How these three policy framings, discernible at the macro and
meso levels, play out at the local level are explored in chapter 4. In order to explain the
rationale for adopting pro-private policies, they need to be situated within broader
international trends.
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CHAPTER 2: Choice in education: a framework for analysis
It is no coincidence that Pakistan is facing a transformation in terms of how educational
services are delivered: it is a reflection of global shifts towards privatisation and
marketisation as “it is now increasingly difficult to understand education in any context
without reference to the global forces that influence policy and practice” (Crossly 2000
cited in Apple, 2001: 409). This chapter tracks the rise of the market and unpacks how
choice and competition should operate. A framework for analysing choice in Pakistan is
subsequently developed and the limitations of choice in a non-universal education
context examined.
2.1 The rise of the market in education: the basis for choice?
Education provision, previously delivered by private actors, became subject to statedriven control over the 20th century as it became recognised as playing a pivotal role in
national and economic development, especially in newly independent states in the postcolonial era (Brown et al 1997; Green 1997). Yet in recent decades, the idea of statedelivered universal education provision has been challenged from two directions (Brown
et al 1997). Firstly, as low public spending and tight fiscal policies became the norm in
economic policy in the 1990s, “the cornerstone of New Right education policy has been
the introduction of market competition into all the education sectors” (Brown et al,
1997: 21). Secondly, the state was seen as failing to deliver appropriate services
efficiently due to pernicious state monopoly (Offe 1984). As a solution, markets are
heralded as being “natural and neutral, and governed by effort and merit” (Apple 2001:
413): parental choice is a central tenet of the education market.
The rise of market-based education policies originated in Western countries which had
already secured universal coverage (Carnoy 1999) but is being exported to developing
countries, such as Pakistan, where universalism is a still a distant goal (Gazdar 1999). As
a result, education is “increasingly considered a quasi-market (Levacic 1995) requiring
families and communities to pay for education – directly or indirectly – as a social
service” (Kitaev 1999: 41). By purchasing education as a commodity, parents (not
children, importantly) are considered to have a ‘choice’, based on school selection in the
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quality and quantity (i.e. number of years) of the service. Moreover, as the market has
shifted the construction of citizens from being welfare beneficiaries to contributing
consumers (Gaventa and Valderrama 1999), individual responsibilities of parents tend to
be emphasised rather than common entitlements or state guarantees in accessing
education. Atomised choice between schools, determined by price, is the outcome.
This appears paradoxical given the prevailing international focus on achieving the
Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of Universal Primary Education (UPE) by 2015.
The international debates over UPE revolve around financing (UNESCO 2002): at the
national levels the focus is on increased private sector involvement, the creation of
internal and external markets in education and promoting community participation to
plug resource gaps (World Bank 2003b; Mundy 2001; Klees 2002). Bringing services
closer to the poor through decentralisation (Lauglo 1995) and enhancing ownership over
schools through community participation (Bray 2000) are increasingly being conflated
with private provision (Whitty et al 1998; World Bank 2003a).
Private provision, governed by market principles, is designed to bring multiple benefits:
efficiency improvements through competition, a removal of market distortions created by
the state monopoly, increase cost effectiveness of schooling, and ultimately improve
student performance who (or whose parents) value their education more because they are
paying for it (Jimenez and Lockheed 1995). This assumption, based on principal-agent
theory, is that benefit is obtained from a “separation of purchaser from provider and an
element of choice between the providers” by circumventing the state (Levacic 1995, cited
in Whitty et al 1998; World Bank 2003a). What choice actually exists, and how it has
developed, is vital for understanding whether the expected benefits materialise.
2.1.1. Explaining the nature and expansion of private schools
At this juncture, a clearer definition of what constitutes ‘private’ schools needs to be
made. Schools can be private in terms of ownership, management and in a major share of
funding and expenditure (Kitaev 1999: 43-44), yet as Bray (1997) points out,
‘privatisation’ can span a very wide spectrum of schools, including for-profit and not-for-
- 17 -
profit types. Religious, NGO and community schools are likely have different
characteristics to profit-motivated private schools (Kitaev 1999). This paper focuses on
low cost for-profit schools, the major growth area in Pakistan.
Explanations for the expansion of private provision may be due to both demand and
supply side factors, as illustrated in the case of Pakistan (Kitaev, 1999: 59). On the
demand side, two distinct but overlapping rationales can be discerned; firstly, un-met
demand from gaps in access and coverage; and secondly, diversified demand of parents
for particular schooling conditions, values and quality. On the supply side, three causes
are plausible: firstly, a redundant qualified teaching force creating a potential specific
supply; secondly, efforts by profit-making school managers focused on specific target
groups of population; and thirdly, as a result of inadequate public supply or a deliberate
government policy to reduce pressure upon the existing schools. Several of these reasons
may overlap. The reasons behind the expansion, moreover, determine to a large degree
what characteristics private provision takes.
Thus, it is important to understand why these markets have developed in context in order
to arrive at some conclusions about what, if anything needs to or can be done about them.
Government response to this phenomenon varies between restriction and promotion
(Kitaev 1999). Most governments strike a balance between tighter control to maintain
standards (through curriculum and evaluation) and lighter regulation to enable the private
sector to flourish (Tooley 1999). In Pakistan, private schools are being positively
encouraged by providing incentives and removing barriers to market entry (Jamil 2003)
while excessive regulation and bureaucratic controls, which stifle private provision, are
being removed (Kardar 2001). This is because private provision in Pakistan is seen to be
providing a ‘choice’ for even poor families (Andrabi et al 2001).
2.1.2
Choice and responsiveness in education quasi-markets
The idea of choice, the focal point of this paper, is inextricably linked to the functioning
of the market. Gintis (1996) outlines several preconditions of the existence of an
effective system of school choice and with it the effectiveness of promoting markets.
- 18 -
Choice is effective only if there are several alternative suppliers available to a significant
proportion of families. Moreover, consumers need to be able to accurately assess the
quality of the goods and services they purchase. Thirdly, consumers must be the best
judge of their needs and these needs are reflected in their options. Finally, a competitive
system is socially efficient if the good is a ‘private good’. Through this, choice is shown
to result from the nexus of both demand-side issues and the ability to respond to this
demand on the supply side.
Response to demand operates in two main ways in a competitive environment: firstly the
creation of new institutions or redefinition of existing ones to cater for unmet needs and
preferences, thereby providing alternatives, discussed above (Kitaev 1999). Secondly,
internal change within schools to attract and retain pupils occurs. This can be categorised
by the typology outlined below (Woods 1994).
Table 2: Typology of potential school responses to the quasi-market
School responses
Competitive responses
Objective
To increase or maintain number of children at the
school
Substantive change
Attract students through quality improvements
Environment scanning
Understand consumer demand and recognising
market niche of school
Promotional activity
Activities to raise profile of school to attract students
Income enhancing and
efficiency-incrementing
To maximise the income from revenue streams and
rationalise expenditure
Political responses
Lobbying at local level for changes to rules etc.
Collaborative responses
Working together
(Source: Adapted from Woods 1994: 125)
The behaviour of private school owners is influenced by the market, as funding is
demand-driven. They try to understand what parents want, presenting and promoting
their schools accordingly. Moreover, owners attempt to enhance their income and
improve the efficiency of the school by managing their staff better, thereby retaining and
developing a competitive edge as they have autonomy over decisions (Chubb and Moe
1990). They may also use political connections as a mechanism to access funds, lobby for
- 19 -
change of, or even circumvent regulation. The collaborative aspect means joining forces
(with other providers) to complement each other, perhaps even providing services
together. Whether private schools in Pakistan respond in this manner is explored in
Chapter 5.
It is upon satisfying these assumptions of choice and competition that the advantages of
the market system are hung, which are critiqued below. A framework for analysis is
constructed to show how the choice in the quasi-market can be understood.
2.2 Making choices: rational and predictable or contingent and arbitrary? An
analytical framework
Parental ability to exercise choice is critical to the functioning of the market. Quasimarkets in education are based on rational choice assumptions, yet as this paper will
show, questions of choice are not driven by the neat individual rational calculus of
classical economics, as it entails “messy, multidimensional, intuitive and seemingly
irrational or non-rational elements of choice” (Gerwitz et al, 1995: 6). Choice of what, in
terms of the availability and quality of alternatives, and for whom, are of prime
importance. Whilst certain assumptions can be made as to what significant factors, either
directive or contingent, might be important for parents, they will be both contextuallyspecific and heterogeneous.
In quasi-markets, children will tend to “attend the school which is nearest and the most
affordable” (Kitaev 199: 101). Choice is dependent on the resources of the family and the
availability of schooling options. However, quality and perceptions of quality of
schooling, and what education is believed to deliver, is an important variable in
choosing. Expected benefits are not only direct material outcomes but also predicated on
social expectations and aspirations. In Pakistan, caste, class, gender, and birth order of
child may all be contingent factors to school choice. Informational factors, relationships
and dominant discourses about education play a key role.
As Gerwitz et al suggest it is “(o)nly by relating choice, response and distributional
outcomes together in particular local market settings will it begin to be possible to
- 20 -
understand, evaluate and theorise the education market as a social, educational and
political phenomenon” (1995: 3). In order to do this a spatial approach is helpful, as
represented in figure 1. This portrays not discrete domains but interlocking and
interdependent spheres that shape choice. The overlapping area represents the confluence
of all the factors in decision-making outlined above, and potentially unexpected others,
dictating choice, or rather, as will be shown, the myth of choice.
Figure 1: Theorising constructions of choice in the quasi-market through spatial
domains
Macro environment
Micro environment of locality
Consumer domain
Factors in
Producer domain
(Parents)
decision-making
(Schools)
The consumer domain represents parents as the active (and quasi-independent) chooser
within the household, in which intra-household power dynamics shape decision-making
(Kabeer 1994).9 Providers are schools, or rather education options to which parents in a
locality could conceive of sending their children.10 Likely responses have been
expounded above in table 2. This diagram indicates that both schools and parents must
be situated within the mirco and macro environments. The micro domain is the locality,
catchment area or community, which has the traces of history, geography, local politics,
9
The very concept of the nuclear household is recognised as an artificial construct. However, for
simplicity, it will be used here.
10
As a caveat, further options such as child labour and not sending the children to school are important
considerations. It is estimated that 9-10 million children of school-going age are out-of-school in Pakistan
(interview Ameena Khan, ILO 15/06/04). This is beyond the scope of the current paper, and subject to
different debates.
- 21 -
socio-economic situation, as well as the socio-cultural aspects within an area or
community. Far from being a neat division, it is contested, with communities being
neither homogenous nor easily defined. Here, particular policy framings get played out:
in Pakistan, the emphasis on encouraging community participation in government
schools, devolution and the promotion of private options all heavily influence the local
availability and quality of schools. There exists a significant overlap between the
community and the market, as all viable options for schooling (the market) are located
within a particular community, especially in rural areas. This implies that not only are
they mutually-dependent but also that they are likely to reflect the politics and
inequalities within the community.
The macro environment encapsulates the broader policy framework regarding education,
from the rise of the market and the pressure to achieve international targets, to the
availability of concessions, incentives and the regulatory environment which have been
explained in chapter 1. Through this framework, it will be possible to explore how
parental ability to exert choice is determined within a non-universal context such as
Pakistan.
2.2 Counter positions to the rise of the market
Despite the strong claims for promoting the market in education, two different types of
argument exist. One is an economist’s argument that is not critical of markets per se, but
questions whether markets exist for education, given its public/social good elements. The
second raises more fundamental questions about how markets operate from a
sociological perspective. It raises questions as to whether private schools necessarily
provide better quality, if parents are the best judges of their children’s needs and how
education markets can operate in highly politicised environments.
2.2.1
Questioning the market in education
Education can be seen ‘quasi-public good’, rather than a private good, which has spillover benefits as well as private returns (Colclough 1996). Accordingly, the state should
invest due to the externalities or social benefits of education (Jimenez and Lockheed
1995). Investing in human resources is recognised as a crucial aspect to poverty
- 22 -
alleviation (ibid.). This is especially true at primary level when the social returns are
highest (and private returns less significant). The market, by contrast, cannot guarantee
the provision of all goods, as a right on a fair basis to all citizens (Colclough 1996). At
the macro level, privatisation may result in “a highly differentiated school-structure
which closely reflects the relative prosperity of different communities and geographical
areas” (Colclough 1993: 175).
At the household level, many studies show that “income and level of education of parents
turn out to be significant determinate of education spending propensity” (Kitaev 1999:
104). Purchasing power allows parents to select the ‘better’ schools for their children: but
some parents lack the resources to choose (Fowler 1992 cited in Kitaev 1999: 106). The
ghettoisation following this exodus of more affluent children from the “poorer” schools
is a serious problem that needs to be tackled not at the local level but nationally (Kwong
2000: 92). Some have argued that the demand for education is inelastic (less than unity)
with respect to marginal increases in price (Jimenez 1987 cited in Colclough 1996).
However this fails to take into account the differing elasticities among user groups, as for
poor families the demand is highly elastic, thus a marginal increase in costs creates a
tendency to withdraw from the purchase of that good. As a result, education is likely to
be undersupplied by the market and access to schools will be uneven (Gintis 1996).
2.2.2
Achieving better education? Value perspectives on quality
Exponents of private schools argue that it improves the quality of education provided,
and increases the choice that parents have (Chubb and Moe 1990). Potential conflict
between commercial considerations and wider educational and social concerns exists in
promoting private schools, however.11 Merely aggregating individual preference may not
lead to a better education system, which plays a role in cohering the social and
transforming society (Green 1997; Kumar forthcoming). This appears to corroborate
Whitty et al’s (1998: 97) analysis that “(g)overnment policy, at the state or national level,
is about overseeing performance and consolidating cultural preferences. A proliferation
of alternative schools will not only be more difficult to monitor but foster modes of
- 23 -
teaching and learning that produce ‘inappropriate’ outcomes”. Where the expansion of
private schools is unplanned, leading to “privatisation by default” (Bray 1996 cited in
Kitaev 1999), and the government lacks requisite control for securing quality,
competition and choice may have deleterious results.
Understanding values of quality is the core of education and imbues parental decisionmaking (Gerwitz et al 1995). Values are shaped by an interpretative process which
continually absorbs and responds to the surrounding environment, both immediate
(family, locale) and more distant (media, policy environment), making the understanding
of how choice is made, and how quality in education is defined a reflexive process.12
Therefore value perspectives of education dictate the aspects of quality emphasised.
Quality is notoriously hard to pin down (Kumar forthcoming). Thus, rather than
determine quality measurements this paper adopts a value perspective approach to quality
along a subjective spectrum (Woods et al 1998). The instrumental-academic perspective
places an emphasis on the acquisition of particular skills resulting in quantifiable
outcomes, in which education is seen as a means to a particular end. Conversely, the
intrinsic-personal, or social ‘value’ perspective, encompasses the amalgam of factors
which affect the development of a child, such as behavioural, atmospheric, etc. Figure 2
outlines these perspectives as a spectrum, along which it should be possible to situate
discourses in policies and opinions of school owners, parents, children and teachers
alike.13
Figure 2: Perspectives of quality spectrum
Instrumental-academic
Output-orientated
Qualification focused
Intrinsic-personal value
Process-orientated
Whole child focused
The motivation driving private schools is contentious as “even proprietors of entrepreneurial schools are
reluctant to admit that they are motivated primarily by profit” (Kwong 1997 cited in Kitaev 1999).
12
As Giddens (1984) points out, the recursive character of modern life, in which the medium and outcome
of social life are irrevocably intertwined, makes identifying causality and direction of causality
problematic.
13
Discourse in here understood as “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are
produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given
to physical and social realities (Hajer 1995 cited in Keely and Scoones 1999: 24).
11
- 24 -
These distinctions are of prime importance in understanding which aspects of quality are
being ‘improved’ as a result of competition. Private schools have been documented to
respond to the demands of parents for academic results, who are paying for education,
skewing it towards the instrumental-academic end of the spectrum (Gerwitz et al 1995).
However, parental ‘satisfaction’ is a relative notion, crucially linked to expectations and
aspirations that are mediated through symbols and meanings (Rampal 2004; Schwalbe et
al 2000). Thus how quality is construed needs to be unpacked. This implies that ‘what
values’ as much as ‘whose values’ are fundamental questions in determining quality.
2.2.3
Whose rights matter in choosing schools?
The right balance of rights is satisfied by no education system. The rights of parents to
choose, based on individual freedom, counterpoised to the rights of citizens to education
with the duty of public authority in providing free and comprehensive education is the
crux of this tension.14 Nuancing this, the rights of the child imply that their ‘best interest’
be protected, but who will protect them better, the state or their parents? 15 Market theory
assumes that individuals are the best judges of what is in their own interest; parents,
however, are not clearly and indisputably the best judges of their child’s interests (Alder
1993). Adopting a rights perspective to the private schools issue, the fine balance
between preserving the rights of parents and children to choose with the entitlement of
every child to a ‘good’ school needs to be achieved. Whether markets or the state balance
this better is the issue discussed below.
According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Article 26(iii) states that “Parents have a prior
right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children”. Equally, however, Article 26(i) states that
“Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages” (Available from
http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html)
14
15
Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) of 1989, to which Pakistan is a signatory,
indicates that the child’s best interests should be protected at all times (available at
http://www.unicef.org/crc/crc.htm).
- 25 -
2.2.4
Debunking markets: Equity and the politics of education provision
Markets are, as Ball (1990: 8) observes, “neither natural nor neutral phenomenon, they
are socially and politically constructed”. The actual constructions reflect the power and
interests of different actors in determining its distribution (Ball 1990). The market is built
upon assumptions that are blind to deep-running inequalities which insidiously constrain
choice and options. To reveal this requires that “both the formal properties of the market
and informal arrangements within that market” be understood (Lauder et al 1994, cited in
Gerwitz et al 1995: 5). Social geography, local history, politics, existing social
inequalities, cultural and social norms, class and religion may all act to distort choice (by
providers) and mediate choices (by consumers) along unexpected avenues. Deeper
structural inequalities in society more broadly are also important.
National education policy, enmeshed in complex political economy relationships, could
be weighted against government provision as a result. Governments are likely to pursue
policies which reward the interest groups upon which they depend for power and serve
their own interests (Colclough 1996:606). Supporting private schools may do this.
Moreover, the emphasis in Pakistan on community participation in government schools
and the instigation of a programme of devolution, explored in chapter 4, can also be seen
as a reflection of political interests of the elites rather than a concern for improving
access and quality to government schools. The history of social provision indicates that
“social equity and high levels of universal social provision have only been secured and
retained when those services are available to and used by the middle class. It is the sharp
elbow of the middle class…that has ensured good quality social provision” (Deacon,
2000: 38). When this ‘sharp elbow’ is removed, the likelihood of achieving better statedelivered education diminishes and the incentive for mobilising collective action to
improve the quality of education for all rescinds.
Inequalities can be reproduced through school choice in different ways. Credentialisim
and the acquisition of ‘cultural capital’ in the form of academic certificates and social
connections, can be seen as central to reproducing middle-class privilege (Brown et al
1997: 15). The different abilities of parents to transmit their cultural capital to their
children by making good choices, based on their own knowledge, connections and
- 26 -
background is heightened by private school options (Whitty et al 1998). When this
‘choice’ can be bought, the effects are potentially even more divisive. The ideology of
competitive individualism, compounded by the emergence of private schools, places a
pressure on parents who can afford schooling to maintain the social boundaries
(Schwalbe et al 2000: 430). Those who are unable to do so fall further behind.
The interactive processes that reproduce inequality, Schwalbe et al (2000) argue, are not
a static result of class, caste, race or gender differences. Rather, as “inequality cannot be
understood apart from the processes that produce and sustain it” (Schwalbe et al 2000:
420), the actions of parents, school owners, officials and the configuration of mirco-level
political networks are consequential. Private schooling not only provides an entry to
higher social status and opportunities, but actually serves to reinforce and demarcate
these divisions. The process of defensive othering may occur, whereby “subordinate
groups seek safety or advantage by othering those in their own group” by adopting the
symbols and belief system of the more powerful (Schwalbe et al 2000: 425). By sending
children to private schools, parents seek to distinguish themselves from others in the
community, thereby inadvertently aiding the reproduction of a larger system of
inequality. Both mediated entry to, and defining quality of schools can have the effect of
othering and boundary maintenance (ibid. 422).
The wide-ranging debates on choice and private provision have tended to be dominated
by research undertaken in a Northern context. The relevance of these arguments for a
developing country such as Pakistan needs to be carefully examined. The empirical
messiness of a case study is used to illuminate how choice - and the elements which feed
into that choice - is understood, internalised, reflected and refracted through different
domains. The next chapter explains how the empirical research was designed to capture
this.
- 27 -
CHAPTER 3: Methodology for researching the education market
This chapter outlines the methodological approach employed, including the reasons for
using one a study and the data collection methods used. It also includes a brief discussion
of the strengths and limitations of the study.
The key questions surrounding the myth of choice are overlapping, as shown in figure 1.
It first examines the factors driving the growth of the private sector in Pakistan on the
supply side, requiring analysis of the prevailing policy environment and political
economy of education. Secondly, the research assesses how the quasi-market is
manifesting itself within a specific environment, and what characteristics it takes. Thirdly
it seeks to understand how choice is perceived from the demand side through
investigating consumer perceptions. A semi-inductive approach was taken, in which
already-identified areas of interest were complemented by lassitude for new and
unexpected results to emerge. During the data analysis stage, these three sections were
cross-interrogated to suggest how choice is being constructed and point to the
implications this may have for equity and quality.
3.1 Researching politics and policies
Literature review from secondary sources and policy documents provided the background
information to the growth of private education and the political economy surrounding it.
This was complemented by open-ended interviews with knowledgeable people working
in the education field in Pakistan as well as those from the NGO sector (annex 1).
In order to explore the policy assumptions in context detailed semi-structured interviews
were undertaken with education, administrative and elected officials at Federal,
Provincial, District and Union Council levels (annex 1). These aimed to see how
attitudes towards private schools, and the practical implications of this in terms of
regulation and support, were being manifested (questions in annex 2). Moreover, given
recent public sector reform through devolution, generating an understanding of roles and
responsibilities was pertinent in these interviews.
- 28 -
3.2 Selection of sites for field research
Gauging how producers respond to this environment and, subsequently, how choices are
made, a qualitative approach was adopted which focused on two localities, one urban and
one rural within Sheikhupura District, Punjab (see Map 1). Sheikhupura, in Central
Punjab, was selected as an area with rapid growth in private provision (Punjab EMIS
forthcoming), but representative of Punjab in terms of education and literacy, as it is
ranked 16th out of the 34 districts of Punjab in literacy rates (Government of Punjab at
www.punjab.gov.pk/education/.htm).
Map 1: Sheikhupura: location within Pakistan
Accessed from www.encarta.msn.co.uk
Moreover, having both rural and urbanised areas a suitable comparison could be made
between them. One week was spent in an informal scoping survey to gain an overall
picture of education provision within the district, in which many providers were visited
- 29 -
across two different tehsils (sub-division of district). It also provided an opportunity to
test the methodology across different areas and with different sets of providers in order to
hone the questions within the local context. The process for selecting the locations was
deductive and relied to a certain degree on local knowledge.16 Locations were selected
which had a ‘typical’ mix of provision, including a functioning government school which
enabled a comparison to be made between them.17 1998 Census data confirmed the
socio-economic profile of the communities. Gharibabad is an urban slum community on
the outskirts of Sheikhupura town. Makki 460 is a village located approximately one
hour drive from Sheikhupura, and 20 minutes away from the main road.
3.3 Constructing the ‘quasi-market’ in the research
This research mapped, in totality, two distinct yet bounded localities, and investigated the
driving forces dictating decision-making within them. Following the mapping, a smaller
purposive sample of schools was then selected. This sample represented a range of
providers, divided equally between rural and urban, in which more in-depth analysis was
undertaken (table 3).
3.4 Assumptions
Two key assumptions were implicit in the research: firstly, proximity being a key factor
in school choice, parents were unlikely to send their children outside the community for
primary education, thus the schools studied would constitute the entire market provision.
Secondly, the selection of locations with at least one functioning government school,
which is used as a comparator, and a range of other schools, may not be entirely
representative. However these localities were chosen to investigate why parents select
private schools even when government schools function, thereby making the findings
even more pertinent.
3.5 Exploring school response in the provider domain
16
Sudhaar-ITA Alliance, an NGO working in Skp., proved an invaluable source of information as they has
mapped all Government, NGO and NFE schools, and were able to draw up a shortlist of possible Union
Councils to work in which I was then able to visit.
17
Functioning is taken to mean that the school is open and some teachers are present.
- 30 -
Owners and head teachers (HTs) represent the ‘providers’. Thus each school in the
locality – effectively within reasonable (usually 2-4 km) distance from the government
school - was mapped. This mapping exercise utilised in-depth questionnaires with the
HTs or owners (annex 3) to extrapolate key characteristics of the school and teachers,
rationale for existence, management structure, relationship with the state and modes of
financing. Moreover, issues that owners/HTs faced were explored through probing
questions in an unstructured manner as particular points of relevance arose: most were
very free with their opinions. This facilitated the providers’ perspective on how they
respond to meet the demand. Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with teachers (annex 6)
were utilised to not only cross-check owners’ response but also provide an insight into
what is going on in the school, especially in terms of teacher motivation, support or
obstacles from the community, teacher perceptions of the school and the quality of
education that it provides.
3.6 Examining consumer perspectives
Grade five (or children of equivalent ages in 10-12 year bracket, in the case of NFE
schools) was selected as the comparative frame between schools given that it is an
important year for several reasons.18 As an accreditation and exit year at the end of the
primary cycle, the ‘choice’ of school is likely to be more marked than in early years, as
pressure on performance would be greater. It would also enable the researchers to explore
the educational history of the child, as they may have moved schools. Moreover, the
maturity of grade five pupils meant that they would interact more comfortably with the
researchers than younger students. To compare with the responses from owners and
teachers, and delve into why parents ‘choose’ to send their children to particular schools,
FGDs were organised. Parents of grade 5 students were called to the school by their child
with the permission of the head teacher/ owner. Generally consisting of between 4-8
participants, the prompting questions asked why they had sent their children to a
particular school, what their perceptions are of alternative options and what factors are
important in choosing a school (annex 4).
18
In Pakistan, primary education lasts for five years (grades 1-5), preceded by two years preparatory
classes (kachi, or nursery). Secondary education is divided into three cycles: three years' middle school (68), two years' secondary (high school grades 9-10) and two years' higher secondary (intermediate 11-12).
On completion of the high school, pupils matriculate, taking the Secondary School Certificate (SSC).
- 31 -
In the same schools, PRA-style exercises with children of grade 5, or equivalent age in
NFE Centres, were carried out (annex 5) (Cox and Robinson-Pant 2003). This exercise,
which involved drawing the family and drawing the school, had multiple purposes:
firstly, to build up an understanding of the socio-economic and familial background of
the children for inferential quantitative comparisons; secondly, to map the education
trajectory of the child and to encourage the child to talk about his or her school and past
schools (Theis 1996). Where time permitted, discussions on aspirations were held, which
frequently brought out many of the problems children faced in going to school.
Participative observation, recorded in field notes, was an important tool utilised
throughout, especially in regarding interactions between actors within the schools and in
lesson observation.
The range of methods reflect Booth et al’s (1998) appeal for ‘robust eclecticism’ in
research, by triangulating findings with information gathered from a variety of different
methods and sources. It also enables the setting up of different subject-perspectives in the
different domains. Table 3 provides a breakdown of the sample characteristics of the
research by school type.
Table 3: Sample characteristics by school type
Govt. Private
Mapped schools
4
9
Parents FGD
2
4
Teachers FGD
2
4
PRA with children
2
4
Number of pupils in PRA 17 (2) 34 (12)
(Number in brackets number of boys)
NGO
1
0
0
1
4 (4)
NFE
2
2
2
1
6 (1)
Madrassah Total
3
19
1
9
1
9
1
9
4 (2)
65 (21)
3.7 Strengths and limitations of the research
The strength of this research is that it looks in-depth at two localities, which gives a
unique insight into how quasi-markets function in Pakistan from numerous subject
perspectives. Its qualitative focus is the comparative advantage, as it provides space for
different actors to voice their positions regarding private schools. Unlike other
investigations into this field rely upon quantitative research utilising household surveys
or census data (Andrabi et al 2002; MSU 2002), extensive school information gathering
- 32 -
(Kardar 2001) or pupil testing across schools to assess quality and, thus, efficiency
(Kingdon 1996; ADB 2002), this study takes an innovative approach to analysing private
schooling. Triangulation with secondary sources and quantitative data points to where the
current research resonates with and differs from broader trends. Thus it aims to fill a
significant knowledge-gap on private schools in Pakistan.
Several limitations are worth noting. Firstly, research collaborators (one male and one
female) undertook much of the research directly, as language and cultural barriers made
this necessary. For this, training with PRA, FGD and interview technique was required,
which only developed through practice. Secondly, access to schools was not always
straightforward, and a significant degree of suspicion had to be overcome to gain access
and trust. Anonymity and assurances that government officials would not be privy to the
details were prerequisites to entry. Much time had to be spent in each school to merely
gain access (and innumerable cups of tea drunk). In the urban locality access was denied
to one private school and one madrassah. Thirdly, managing expectations of the school
owners who hoped for a benefit in return for collaborating was problematic. This was
done by carefully explaining the purposes and outcomes as a piece of academic work.
Fourthly, the shortness of school timings meant that time in research was limited,
especially when travelling significant distances to the rural location. Fifthly, due to
government schools closing prematurely for the summer vacation due excessive heat, indepth work required much coordination with local leaders to call people to FGDs.
Where necessary, all responses are made anonymous to protect privacy and school names
have been coded alphabetically (Table 5 below).19 Where permissible, interviews are
referenced by name of individual as follows: (interview name, date). Otherwise, post and
level is substituted for name.
19
Abbreviations for government schools are GGPS (Government Girls Primary School), GGHS
(Government Girls High School), GBPS (Government Boys Primary School) and GBHS (Government
Boys High School). Other abbreviations used for respondees are covered in the list of abbreviations and
acronyms.
- 33 -
Chapter 4: Policy responses in a highly politicised context
This section picks apart conventional understandings of education markets in the
Pakistani context in which devolution, private sector promotion and community
participation are the driving policy influences.20 Comparing responses from officials with
that of school owners uncovers how the policy framings are translated into reality. This
leads to a questioning of how choice can operate effectively in a highly politicised
context.
4.1 Community participation in the government system
Policy emphasis on community participation is receiving a muted response and active
involvement appears patchy. The setting up of school management committees (SMCs)
has been mandated for government schools (Khan 2003). Yet, in the view of one district
official, “the SMC members are illiterate, and create problems for teachers. Illiterate
people don’t know the problems of schools, they just want to dominate a school as a
choudhry21” (interview 13/05/04). Participation is having an unequal impact as parents
value government schools differently for boys and girls. A significant degree of effective
material participation occurred in the Government Boys High School in Makki 460:
“the community participation in sprucing up the school and making it
workable is touching - the government does not help at all, despite
petitioning.” (Head Teacher (HT))
The school relies on the council, composed of a few enthusiastic people for school
improvement. The GBHS is in a strong position of being functioning with teachers
present and teaching (table 5). This saves parents the cost of sending boys to private
school, especially as it goes up to grade 10. By contrast, the GGPS in the same
community is seriously under-resourced and ill-supported by the community. According
to the auxiliary teacher, the “parents are very uncooperative”. Yet many girls are being
20
The broader debates surrounding community participation (see Bray 2000) and decentralisation (see
Lauglo 1995) are relevant to this discussion. Space here does not permit an examination of these; rather
they have been highlighted as they directly impinge on the nature of choice available. Without illuminating
these here the discussion in subsequent chapters would be incomplete and ungrounded.
21
Choudhury means local boss, and derives from the caste system.
- 34 -
sent to private schools close by. Why this occurs, rather than improving the government
school, is partially due to the configuration of local politics.
The discourse of community participation has so deeply permeated the thinking of
education, that if schools are failing, the blame is shifted to the community itself.
Officials emphasise the role that should be played by the community; curiously, they
frame education as a private good to be organised and even managed ‘cooperatively’ but
according to ones’ (the mythical community, the isolated parent?) own interest.
According to a senior district official, “it is not the lack of money to ensure that schools
run well, but rather that the local community give time to properly supervise the local
school” (interview 22/05/04).
This fails to take into account that the people left to use the government schools lack the
wealth and influence within the social system to make change happen. As “the
government never buys the land in a village for a school” (interview district official
13/05/04) the question of who is willing or able to donate land in a society where the
poor are landless labourers and the rich hold extensive lands remains unanswered
(Hussein et al 2003). The better-off in the community have no interest in the proper
functioning of ‘free’ government schools as their children go the private schools, a
poignant point of which local people are well aware:
“There are some influential people in the area … but they don’t do any
thing for the betterment of people. No one is ready to allot some land for
school: everyone here is just ready to fill his own belly” (Father, NFE C).
Resultantly, those left within the system, and reliant upon it, are those with the least
resources. The system appears tilted against government schools so that they are bound to
fail. Interestingly, no SMCs existed, or were demanded, in the private schools visited.
Education thus becomes a commodity to be bought (and sold), removing the incentive for
collective action.
4.2 Local elites and devolution: incentives for supporting education?
This has been further complicated by the initiation of a process of devolution, in which
local tiers of government have some control over education (see Lauglo 1995 on the
- 35 -
implications of decentralisation for education).22 Although beyond the scope of this
paper, problems of accountability of the government schools the education department
remain vis-à-vis the functioning (interview, district official, 13/05/04). Moreover, the
elected officials at UC level who should be the most motivated and active are in fact,
partly because of the presence of alternative education options, the least active with
regards to supporting the government schools:
“The [locally elected official] lives just close to government primary school
but he is a hypocrite. His claims are high but he is good for nothing…. He
doesn’t take interest in the welfare of people.”
(Father, NFE C)
One locally elected official from Gharibabad remarked, unblinkingly, that “(m)y own
children are getting education from the eminent private school in the city. I am not only
paying 5000 per month to the school but also 2000 Rs. to the tutor who comes to help my
kids in studies” (interview 04/06/04). The locally elected officials (the new offices under
devolution) were frequently related to owners of private schools (in the case above, a
brother in law), and are more likely to lobby to support them than give resources to the
direct competitor.
Interestingly, as one district official (interview 13/05/04) pointed out sardonically,
“politicians, policy-makers and bureaucrats have the remedy. A son of a Secretary or a
Minister should be taught in Government Schools, not in private schools, to set an
example and to boost the morale of Government schools”. A viscous circle is developing
whereby poorly functioning government schools leads to desertion of those who can
afford private schools, which in turn diminishes the “sharp elbow” (Deacon 2000) of
pressure of those with the capacity to improve them. If devolution has given increased
power to local elites as these findings suggest, whose interest in improving government
schools appears minimal, it may have the opposite affect to the stated aim of increasing
responsiveness and improving services. From bad, current policies may in fact make
government schools worse.
22
A fuller examination of the impacts of devolution is too early to make, given the short time since it was
made effective. Indeed, it may offer opportunities to improve service delivery (Nadvi and Robinson 2004).
- 36 -
4.3 Encouraging private sector or losing control?
The “socio-regulatory contexts” (Minogue, 1991: 8) illustrate the degree to which
markets are embedded and conditioned by macro and meso forces. The strategic support
for private schools outlined in the P-ESRP and summarised in chapter 1 appears to have
had no noticeable impact on the running of private schools and none of the owners were
aware of the potential support. It is clear that the measures are aimed at well-established
and wealthy private establishments as the exemption of custom duties for the import of
equipment bears out. Support appears on paper, but has no impact in practice.
Moreover, although clear regulatory procedures exist, a significant confusion about who
is responsible for registering and regulating private schools remains at the district level
(Kardar 2001). When interviewed, the education officials suggested that the Executive
District Officer was the indicated in-charge. Yet he claimed to have no record (or no
knowledge of any record) of private schools. The actual process appeared from these
interviews to bypass the education department in its entirety.
The regulation that school owners were aware of was the need to register, which
contradicts the above. Light but ineffective, or even negative, controls exist:
“The government wants to know how much area the school has, the number
of rooms and what all is on the premises. The land should be at least 10
marlas. You also need to have a health certificate. Then government people
from Sheikhupura come and check the school, whether it comes up to the
health standards or not and whether it is fit for registration. Then after the
health inspection is passed the certificate goes to the DO office and then the
school is recognized. Bribery is common as it is hard to convince the
officials to come to a remote area. The entire process takes 6 months to a
year. 1,500 Rs have to be given to the bank for renewal of registration after
3 years.” (Owner, Private School H)
This shows that there is little or non concern for the quality of the education provided.
The ease with which schools can be registered is frightening, as an informal process
decided by bribery and connections exists:
“My friend had some links in the Education Department. I gave him Rs.
8,000 and he got my school registered” (Owner, Private School B)
The political influence of school owners comes through, even in regulation avoidance:
“As I am a Lady Councillor (in the UC) of the area as well, it wasn’t a major problem for
- 37 -
me to get my institute registered” (Owner, Private School C). This emphasises the power
of political lobbying at local level for changes to rules and lax application and the
negative impact of patronage on healthy competition. Visits are also part of the mandate,
but feed in to the mechanism of buttering up the officials to avoid interference:
“Some officials visit the school and we have to arrange lunch for
them…and usually their subordinates take a bribe.” (Owner, Private
School E, Gharibabad)
Although the state is unable to effectively monitor public schools (interview district
official 13/05/04) they seem capable of visiting new private schools in urban areas. These
visits appear to be driven by rent seeking which would be unavailable to them in public
schools. Now that their mandate has been expanded to governing a growing private
sector, interest in monitoring and improving government schools may diminish.
In the face of private school growth allied with patronage connections, the state is too
weak to respond. Government officials are cognisant of the negative effects of private
schools on the public system but are incapable of taking action:
“Sons and daughters of government teachers are in private schools - and
some are even running their own schools. They sign the attendance sheet
and then go into a private school, especially in classes 9 and 10. There may
be a tuition centre - and they tell the whole class that they must attend”
(interview district official 13/05/04).
The impossibility of appropriately enforcing the regulatory framework and the
acknowledgement of the importance of the private sector by the Government means that
privatisation by both default and design is occurring (Bray 1996). The harsh reality of
Pakistan’s quasi-feudal political economy coupled with recent policy impulses is having
two interrelated impacts. Firstly, education is becoming atomised and personalised as it
becomes a private good. Secondly, the distinction between the government schools and
the private schools is being sharpened. In the words of a district official, “the people who
have money are not concerned (about government schools) - poor families don’t have
such opportunities (of opting out)” (interview 13/05/04). This intimates that the quasimarket is far from apolitical and that stratification within society is being entrenched.
There seems to be a tacit recognition within policy circles that attempts to reform the
government sector are doomed to failure and private schools offer the solution. To assess
what kind of solution private schools are offering, the next two chapters analyse the ways
- 38 -
in which school owners respond to the quasi-market and how parents and children
perceive the school choices.
- 39 -
CHAPTER 5: School response: supply-side driven growth or
responding to demand?
This section looks how schools respond to the market. This reveals what kind of choice
of schools is available through a taxonomy of school type, and why the options emerged
from the owners’ perspective. This balances supply side availability and market gaps
with nuanced aspects of school response to demands for quality education.
5.1 Understanding responsiveness
Two levels of responsiveness have been recognised in the theory. Firstly, there is a
response to opportunities resulting in the creation of new or redefinition of existing
institutions. The efforts by profit-making school managers, as well as NGOs and
madaris, focused on specific target groups of population thereby responds to
differentiated demand. Secondly, owners initiate change within existing schools to
respond and appeal to parental preferences (Woods et al: 1998). Woods’ (1994: 125)
categorisation of the way schools may respond in a ‘quasi-market’ (see table 2) is tested
by empirical findings.
5.2 Characteristics of private provision
Schools in the two localities can be situated along the spectrum of being financed and
managed by the state (planned) to ‘pure’ private schools. However, four broad categories
of school-type, evidenced in terms of rationale of existence, can be recognised which are
catering to poorer families in the areas surveyed and more widely in Sheikhupura District
(table 4).23
23
Numerous other types exits: highlighted here are the significant types which cater to poor communities
and are found in both the scoping survey and as part of observation in different localities in the district (see
P-EMIS, forthcoming).
- 40 -
Table 4: Taxonomy of providers catering to the urban and rural poor
Rationale
Type
Government
schools
Public good
Adopted schools
Not-for profit24
Cost per month
Nominal, but with hidden
costs
< Rs. 25
Non Formal
Education
(NFE) Centres
NGO managed,
‘local ownership’
Nominal, with funding
from NGOs
NGO formal
primary schools
Head teacher,
NGO managed
Rs. 100- 175 plus
scholarships for poor
Private
Private owners
and management
Rs 50-150
Tuition Centre
Private owners, in
private school or
lone individual
Madrassah
Owned and
managed by
private religious
group/ Mosque
For-profit
Religious values
Stewardship/
management
Ministry of
Education (MoE)
Owned by MoE,
managed by
NGOs
Rs. 30+ depending and
time and frequency, used
as a supplement to all
types of schools
Free education shelter and
food, with funding from
political parties,
community and foreign
sources.
5.3 The emergence of a new type of for-profit school
From the school mapping, it is clear that the majority of schools have been recently
established, with 11 out of 15 private schools started in the last 5 years (table 5). Given
this, it was pertinent to gauge the perspective of the owner as to why they set up the
school in the first place. Private schools tend to be founded by, and are capitalising on, a
redundant qualified teaching force creating a potential specific supply (Kitaev 1999). The
plethora of unemployed qualified graduates means that there is no shortage of people
who turn to teaching for a few years, whether as teachers or owners:
24
NGO schools and NFE centres are a relatively new phenomenon, representing the donor-driven agenda
of encouraging NGOs to enter into service provision. As a non-contentious, ‘apolitical’ way of working in
development, numerous NGOs, supported by multilateral and bilateral agencies are being co-opted into
service provision, especially in the education sector (interview Fareeha Zafar 06/05/04). However, it is
beyond the scope of the current study which focuses on for-profit private schools.
- 41 -
“I was completely free after my graduation and B.Ed. (unemployed) and I
wanted to involve myself in some income generating activity, so I thought I
would use my house as a school and charge a minimal fee of 10 Rupees per
child”. (Owner, Private School A).
Interestingly, about half of the owners are female. From informal discussions, and later
visits to the schools, it was discovered that educated wives were encouraged to set up
schools as an income-generating activity to supplement the earnings of their husbands or
other family member. This was seen as a ‘safe’ occupation, as the wives did not have to
leave the house; the teachers employed were frequently related to the owners, thereby
keeping it in the family. Moreover, the status of becoming a head teacher within poor
communities may be significant. Running a school, ostensibly to serve the poor,
generates good will that could be transformed into political capital, which explains why
school owners are the more active members of the community.
5.4 Profit-making entities: Income-enhancing as a prime concern?
Business opportunities exist as market space encourages the proliferation of schools.
Although both catchment areas were small and had government schools close by, many
new schools had sprung up. This suggests that government provision was insufficient for
the number of children living in the community. This market space was recognised by
school owners, who highlighted distance between schools and physical boundaries as
reasons for establishing schools, being aware of parental concerns for security:
“Parents were anxious about their children as they had to go to [private
school D] which is on the other side of the road…traffic and a lot of hustle
and bustle made them think to have a school in their own mohalla so the
establishment of our school lessened their anxiety”25
(Owner, Private School F).
The HT of Private School H in Makki 460 suggested that “other private schools in the
area were not doing the job correctly” was the rationale behind setting the school up.
Established in 2001, Private School H already has 150 students.
25
Mohalla can be translated as a part of town or, as in this case, a small cluster of streets.
- 42 -
[INSERT TABLE 4 SUMMARY STATS]
see end
- 43 -
It started off as a single room, but following some family investment the school grew to
having three small classrooms within the same compound.
The driving rationale behind private schools is profit. Yet the profit motive of the schools
was frequently hidden behind rhetoric of providing education. One owner describes, with
missionary zeal, the establishment of her school as part of “a vision to bring the people
from the darkness of ignorance to the light of educational awareness” (Owner, Private
School E). However, when one of the teachers who worked at the school was
interviewed, she laughed at this, and suggested that the only vision was that of profit and
the head teacher didn’t care about what happened in the school as long as parents paid
their fees (FT NFE A).26
The fee level was relatively consistent across all private schools in both localities, with
fees payable on a sliding scale dependent on grade (Annex 7). However, there are other
costs involved, to which parents are very sensitive:
“In private schools we have to pay heavy fee and buy expensive book. They
charge additional funds like the cleanliness fund, picnic, study, recreational
tour funds” (Father NFE A)
Private schools do offer incentives in terms of fee concessions and reduction on fees for
families with more than one child enrolled, although this is to attract new customers and
retain valuable ones, rather than an altruistic concern for the poor. However, no
schooling is entirely free: government schools are still charging a ‘nominal’ amount per
pupil, but hidden costs are also involved.27 A case of extortion came out clearly in one
government school, where parents had to pay more than the basic amount and pay for the
‘free’ textbooks. NGOs and NFE Centres both charge fees, but are more accessible to
poor parents as they supply books and offer scholarships.
Private schools appear to be providing services at substantially lower cost per unit than
government schools (interview Shahid Kardar 09/06/04). This is achieved as the direct
costs of school are kept low, as the private schools tend to be situated within people’s
26
One teacher taught in the morning at a private school and in the afternoon at a NFE Centre. The other
taught at a different private school, which facilitated interesting insights into different perspectives on
schools.
27
Primary education is supposed to be free and compulsory in Pakistan for the first five years, yet this is
still not the case, especially when hidden costs are taken into account.
- 44 -
own homes, thereby minimising risks on investment. Expenditure is limited to utility
bills, registration fees (where registered) and teacher salaries, as shown in annex 7 for
breakdown of revenue and expenditures. Very little money is re-invested into schools,
which means that the facilities are not upgraded. One hypothesis is that schools, being
family businesses, mirror the traditional method of working along familial lines rather
than as ‘businesses’ in the sense of maximising profit (pers. comm. Miguel Loureiro).
This would explain the apparent glass ceiling on the size to which schools can, and in
fact want to, expand. Private schools have, on average, only 125 students, spanning all
grades, compared to 236 for government schools (table 5). The implications this has for
cost-effectiveness and actual quality provided are significant, as the generally accepted
‘good’ size for a functioning primary school would be larger as economies of scale exist
in primary schools.28 The result is poor facilities, with children packed into very small
classrooms, with limited sanitation facilities: over 75% of private schools had sanitary
facilities, but only a little over 50% had separate facilities for boys and girls. The
limitation on both ready capital and aspiration to build a more substantial school
encourages more schools to enter into the market rather than consolidate into larger
entities. The market in education, with schools run along familial lines, can be
considered antithetical to co-operative efforts (Woods 1994).
Andrabi et al (2003: 16) argue that the most “effective way to decrease fees in private
schools is through the competitive pressure that arises from the number of such schools
providing education services”. However, the outcome may further squeeze the quality
provided; owners are increasingly reticent to invest in facilities and teacher salaries,
already abysmally low, may be pushed down further. Nor do schools compete on quality
provided, as shown below. Adler (1994) argues that there is little evidence in the
education sector “of the market functioning as a self-correcting mechanism”, as schools
form into ‘natural’ layers or go out of business. The implication for sustainability of these
private schools is a significant aspect that requires further (and longitudinal)
examination. Ethical concerns about businesses being involved in service delivery yet
paying dividends from profits to owners with the money that might be spent on
classrooms creates a dilemma for possible government interventions.
28
There is very little work on this. However, small, multigrade classrooms may be the only option in
remote rural areas, there seems little logical explanation for them in more densely populated rural or urban
- 45 -
5.5 Substantive improvement: Chimera or reality?
The expected superior quality of private schools derives from impact competition has on
the accountability and responsiveness to demand (Chubb and Moe 1990). Quality is seen
as vital in determining student participation. In developed countries, it has been argued
that, with competition, there has resulted a sharpening of focus on the academic,
manifested in academic output such as examination results which can be measured and
understood by parents in comparison with other schools (Woods et al, 1998). Empirical
work in South Asia indicates that both NGOs and private entrepreneur operators are
more successful in attracting students due to their ability to ensure the proper functioning
of the school (Kingdom 1999; Alderman et al 1999).
Private schools appear to provide a better, more personalised service. From the sample,
overt signs of private school quality such as student-teacher ratio at 22:1 (on average)
and student classroom ratio of 25:1 are much lower than those of government schools
(figures calculated from table 5). In all the private schools visited, teachers were present.
By contrast, the motivation of government teachers is low. In a survey reported in Gazdar
(1999), almost 50% of government schools visited were closed and 30% of the teachers
absent in the schools that were open. Equally, private school teachers appear to be more
accountable to the owners:
“In private schools, teachers are compelled to cover the syllabus and they
are instructed to engage the students in studies all the time. Teachers have
to work under the strict supervision of the head teacher who is there to
humiliate them for nothing.” (FT NFE A/ private school)
However, as this quote indicates, teachers’ working conditions are poor and the
individual teachers lack autonomy within the classroom. There is a predisposition to
authoritarian styles of management in private schools. As a result, an atmosphere of fear
is created within some schools. In a private school during the PRA with students, one
student was recounting that “Mr X (owner) behaves in a rude way with our teachers…we
don’t like it. Sometimes he hits us on the head with the book”, at which point Mr X reentered the room. The student became scared, quickly correcting herself “we don’t have
any problems here. All our teachers are so good, they take much care of us” (Female
ones.
- 46 -
student (FS), Private School A).29 Teaching (and learning) in this kind of environment
would be problematic for even the best teachers (or the most diligent students).
However, teachers in private schools are less well qualified and paid less than
government school teachers (Kardar 2001). The majority of teachers are female,
potentially providing an encouragement for girls to enrol. They are also young and
inexperienced, selected for their enthusiasm. Teachers frequently remarked that they
liked teaching for the respect it gave them in the community: “I love to be called
Sirjee... we are respected by students and parents” (MT NFE C). The job frequently
seen as a fill-in before they get married: “After a few years, teachers leave the school
owing to marriage” (Owner, Private School A). Teacher turnover is relatively high as a
result, as teachers regard the profession as “a chance for us to earn a bit of money for
ourselves and step out of the house” (FT, Private School G). This, coupled with the
reticence of owners to invest, means that teacher training is neither given nor
contemplated by the owners. The fear is that teacher training will lead to demands for
increased wages or poaching from other schools.
An amorphous ‘academic quality’ was the dominant discourse from owners, looking at
‘academic achievement’, although only a few had evidence of results. Indeed, this
emphasis came about as a result of head teacher involvement, as a female student
comments:
“sometimes the head teacher gives us a surprise test, and if we show bad
performance she hits us with books and our note copies…last time she gave
me a slap and I can still feel it” (Private School C).
However, what this means for actual quality is problematic, as parents seemed unaware
of quantifiable measurements of school quality, as shown in chapter 6. Any advances
children made were a direct result of the hard work and dedication of the school:
“In the very beginning we had to work hard on kids because they were
getting education for the very first time in their life; bad accent and lack of
guidance from homes lack of concentration were the major issues”
(MT NFE C)
29
Setting up the PRA exercises in a way that would provide a neutral and safe environment for the students
was a continual problem, due to the lack of free space in schools. Multi-grade teaching and noncompartmentalised classrooms resulted in a disruption to the school and a false environment in which the
PRA could be undertaken.
- 47 -
A trend towards traditionalism can be observed in pedagogy as a result of the need to
respond to parents’ wishes. From participant observation, rote learning was the norm,
with children frequently hauled up in-front of the researchers to (painfully) recite a poem
or refrain in Urdu, and for schools where English is promoted, in unintelligible yet
memorised English. This was, the researchers were told by the owners, an example of the
excellent education the children were getting. These children were the more presentable
and were the ones best able to adapt to the necessity of memorising vast quantities of
material.30
The private school phenomenon in rural Punjab, according to recent quantitative work,
“is interesting as it has the largest fraction of teachers with only Matriculation” (of 45%),
which, coupled the fact it has seen the most rapid expansion, the lowest per-pupil
expenditure and the highest student teacher ratio means that “potential quality concerns
tend to be more pronounced in rural Punjab” (Andrabi et al 2002: 19-20). 31 This, they
observe, is exacerbated by a “lack of standardization of private schools in terms of values
underlying education, the pedagogic philosophy and actual teacher ‘practice’ (Andrabi et
al 2003: 21). This corroborates the findings of this research, but the conclusion they draw
puts a more positive spin on the contribution of private schools.
5.6 Deceptive appearances?
Private schools in Pakistan present an image to the prospective consumers in a manner
which differs quite substantially from that of government schools. Although private
schools and government schools are similar in that they use the same textbooks and are
Urdu medium, differentiation derives from perceptions of quality difference. Imagemaking and projecting are done via visible external mechanisms such as signs outside the
front of schools, flags, brightly coloured front walls. They adopt a ‘uniform’, designed by
the owner, consisting of a coloured shirt and trousers for boys, a sash and coloured shirt
for girls, a badge (with the name of the school) or a tie. This homogenised image of low
cost private schools, perhaps in mimicry of an ‘idealised’ private school of the middle
30
Pedagogic styles in Pakistan tend to be reliant on rote learning in all academic institutions as a recent
survey of education in Pakistan points out (SPDC 2003)
31
Matriculation is a grade 10 graduate who has completed high school, but without any professional
training.
- 48 -
classes, seeks meeting a certain, unwritten yet instantly perceptible notion of what a
school should consist of. Each private school looks like and sounds like the next, with
highfalutin names (for example New Jinnah English Medium Public Model High
School), pertaining to something which they are not. This appeals to parents who value
‘middle class’ traits. This resonates with the perceptions of what a quality education is on
behalf of the parents wherein discipline, manners and cleanliness are the important
‘lessons’ children receive, discussed in chapter 6. However, visible signs are a hollow
shell of a good school, given the absence of observable teaching.
The profile of owners within the community is important for bolstering enrolment. The
local Imam, patron of the Madrassah C in Makki 460, is, according to the head teacher
(also his son), “deeply respected and considered a trustworthy person, so they (the
parents) are sending their children to this school”. The school, established only in 2004,
already has a quorum of nearly 150 students, bears this out. Private schools rely on
personal contacts and ties for attracting students, and most owners seemed active on this
front:
“Me and my sister started our studies in G Public School. Study in that
school was good but Sir F. (head teacher of H Public School) is my father’s
fast friend…he forced my parents to send us in H School …so we are here
for the last 2 years.” (FS, Private School H)
Keeping up a reputation is harder than getting one - much gossip was unofficially
discussed regarding scandals either within schools or about the teachers or owners, which
seemed to dictate the relative ‘popularity’ of the school. The sustainability of private
schools may well be a problem as they are so dependent on the fragility of individual
initiative and reputation.
Private schools market themselves and raise their profile through promotional events
such as prize giving days:
“We usually meet the parents in order to convince them to send their
children to the school. Here the community is worse than backward
villages. On the eve of annual prize distribution, parents are called to attend
the ceremony, and at that moment most of the parents are attracted and
decide to send their children to our school.” (Owner, Private School A)
A positive spin-off of this effort is that private schools are actually mobilising demand by
raising the profile of education within the community. Yet, paradoxically, the sales pitch
- 49 -
is aimed at parents whose children are already in school, either government or other
private schools, as they will be the ones who can afford the fees. According to the HT of
GGPS A “(d)uring the last two years 50 students have left the school to get admission in
private schools. But in a very short period of time, 50 more students were enrolled here”.
The impact that private schools have on either alleviating the pressure on government
schools, given the continued high STRs and SCRs in government schools, or increasing
access to education is questionable. Here, the role of NGO schools and NFE centres is
important, as they target specifically the poor in their mobilisation campaigns and school
provision (interview Abid Gill 10/05/04).
Private schools appear to prefer to adopt measures which promote themselves rather than
face up to any internal change which could be beneficial in terms of quality. The reason
behind this is the nature of the demand coming from parents. In a situation where
alternatives are not good, where government school is perceived in such a dim light, and
where there is a high but un-met demand for schools, it is likely that the providers dictate
choice and help shape the discourse around quality.
- 50 -
CHAPTER 6: Perspectives on choice: consumer demand?
6.1 Rethinking choice
Markets in education are predicated on a demand; in the both the urban and rural areas
studied, demand for education appeared high. This chapter will analyse why parents
make certain decisions about schooling options, which shows that real choice is often
absent. Education has certain values attached to it by parents, which reflect their sociocultural milieu and aspirations for their children. Hence as “(the) choice of
school…cannot be made separate from the interpersonal relationships, patterns of
parenting and material environments which constitute and constrain the lives and
opportunities of families” (Gerwitz el al 1995: 50), so the analysis examines all factors
that emerged as influencing choice. However, insights into the ‘black box’ of classroom
activities from the perspectives of those most closely engaged with the process, children
themselves, provides a unique perspective to set alongside reasons for parental decisionmaking and school response. Illuminatingly, three aspects can be juxtaposed: the rhetoric
of improved quality by the owners discussed in chapter 5, the perceptions of quality by
the parents, and the reality experienced by the pupils. The research reveals distinct
perspectives.
6.2 Demand for education across the spectrum: valuing education
Contrary to the perception of the education ‘problem’ in Pakistan being a lack of demand
(Warwick and Reimers 1995), this research suggests that not only is the demand high, it
is also high for girls. Until recently, it was a commonly assumed that high opportunity
costs of educating girls due to their value of taking care of siblings, especially in rural
Pakistan, coupled with the custom of exclusion, purdah, created barriers for the
education of girls (Gazdar 1999; Heward 1999). The findings presented here resonate
with recent work argues that it is supply-side constraints that are hampering expansion
(Lloyd et al 2002). If the demand is high, for both boys and girls, this must be
underpinned by a value attached to education, and the role it can play in the lives of the
people.
- 51 -
The parents in the FGDs in all schools held positive views of education. The value they
attached to education can be divided into five aspects, although parents themselves
understood these benefits conjointly. Firstly, education is viewed as a form of escape
from the poverty stricken life of the slum community or a way out of the village to the
opportunities presented in the city. Much of this is a retrospective response to what the
parents have missed out on as a result of being uneducated as only 60% of fathers and
31% of mothers of the children in the PRA exercises had received some education.
“We are all well aware of the significance of education…I know if I had
been provided all the educational opportunities by my parents, things would
have been totally different”
(Mother, GGPS B)
Secondly, there is utility value attached to education (or functional literacy) as parents
know that “an uneducated person doesn’t know how much bill (utility bills) he has to
pay” (Father, NFE Centre A).
Thirdly, education is perceived to bring benefits in direct monetary terms as parents
believed that through schooling children have a brighter future, better employment
opportunities and, as a result, a better standard of living. Most parents agreed that
education enhances life chances:
“Their life will be made and they will know how to start a business and
earn money for themselves. Their thinking will become sharper and
better…they will become intelligent people. What could be better than
that?” (Father, Private School B)
This is despite the reality of high unemployment rates for school graduates, and relatively
small rates of return to additional schooling at primary level in Pakistan (Kastis et al
1999). The desire for their children (boys) to be army officers, doctors or high ranking
government officials was pervasive, as these professions are held in high esteem within
society. The result of these employment opportunities is that, according to a generally
echoed view, “families would rather spend more on boys than girls as boys tend to be a
source of income” (Father, Private School F). However, direct material benefits from
investing in girls’ education appear to be changing as “educated girl tends to get better
marriage proposals: people want educated wives and daughters-in-law” (Father, Private
School H). Marriage transactions and employment opportunities for married girls may
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partially explain why families are now prepared to pay fees in private schools for girls
(see Kabeer 1997 on similar trends in Bangladesh). This deserves further investigation,
as it is linked to changing social norms.
Fourthly, education has intrinsic value in the positive impact it has on children which
result from cultural shifts in the acceptance of education. Thus by comparing the opinion
that “children become rude, hot tempered, and hollow if they are out of schools”
(Mother, NFE Centre A) with the expected benefits of schooling, it would make children
well-mannered, temperate and ‘whole’ people. As one father (Private School B)
reflected, “(e)ducation makes a child son of man otherwise there is no difference between
animal and a human”, echoing the teachings of the Quran. The influence of the media has
greatly expanded their perceptions of how children should act and behave, creating a new
standard, as one mother commented: “We watch television and we see all these boys and
girls from all over the Pakistan speaking with such poise and grace. We want to see our
children like that too” (Mother, Private School H). This signifies a shift in cultural
attitudes towards education, which is beginning to be valued as an end in itself, showing
that it education is becoming a social norm for all.32 Cultural attitudes have moved
towards welcoming education even for girls as an Imam of a Madrassah C stated quite
bluntly:
“Our elders had old minds…they were not ready to accept new
requirements and were reluctant to send their daughters in schools. They
thought they have to ultimately take charge of their homes so they should
remain inside the home….now we are all agreed at one point that our all
kids must be educated.” (Imam, Madrassah C)
In addition to this, finally, parents tended to associate education with status and power, as
“(a)n educated person is respected” (Mother, NFE Centre A). This reflects the inferior
status ascribed to the uneducated within Pakistan. Put together, these rationales for
education create a strong feeling within the localities studied that education is essential
for both the material benefits and transformative role it plays. Social differentiation and
gender, explored below, however, remain barriers to entry.
According to Kabeer (1997: 299), “Social change dos not occur as a single discrete moment of rupture
with the past but as a gradual expansion of possibilities as more and more people are prepared to take risks
and challenge the old way of doing things”. Sending girls to school is one of these challenges.
32
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6.3 Social differentiation mediating choice and opportunity
The affect of social class distinctions, such as the education of parents, caste and
household income, appears important to determining both the quality of schooling opted
for and whether children are sent to school in the first place (Sawada and Lokshin 2001;
Gerwitz et al 1995). Indeed, for low income families, it has been suggested that
“Pakistani households might adopt perverse informal self-insurance mechanisms by
using child labour income as parental income insurance, sacrificing the accumulation of
human capital” (Sawada and Lokshin 2001: 19). Rather than seeing these household
decisions as “perverse”, it would be more useful to analyse if and how social
differentiation is influencing demand, determining supply and, more insidiously, subtly
shaping choice. As Bourdieu, describing class effects in Western education systems,
rather pessimistically argues, “the symbolic struggles between the classes have no chance
of being seen or organised as such, and are bound to take the form of competitive
struggles helping to reproduce gaps which are the essence of the race” (1986: 251).
Education is represented by parents as an opportunity for a different life, yet is bought
like a commodity (Gazdar 1999: 53).
In Punjab, the traditional caste status of biraderi has been associated with an
occupational position (which developed from the close mix with the Hindu caste system
pre-Independence). Thus, landless, agricultural labourers are strictly distinguished from
landowners.33 According to Sawada and Lokshin (2001: 14), “(t)his system of caste has
prevailed in the form of social norms, and members of each class are expected to act
according to their social and economic status”. This would make the caste system a direct
constraint on education opportunities for low caste children. Schools are simultaneously
a mirror and reflection of society; not separate mechanisms but deeply embedded in
society, thereby riven by inequalities and exclusion (Subrahmanian 2003). Thus while
socio-cultural background would appear a strong influence on schooling (Sawada and
Lokshin 2001), others suggest that “the concept of social class…does not apply well to
Pakistan” (Warwick and Reimers 1995). It can be argued that, in their 1995 study using
prior data, Warwick and Reimers did not look at the effect the emergence of new private
33
Very little sociological or anthropological work has been done on the biraderi system, especially in
recent years. Useful starting, and ending, points are Ahmad, S. (1977) investigation into “Class and power
in a Punjabi Village”, and the even older Elgar, Z., (1960) “A Punjabi Village in Pakistan”.
- 54 -
schools was having, as they argue that all government students come from the same
class.
With regard to caste, very little came to light directly in the research. One explanation for
this is that, although present in Central Punjab, biraderi has a much greater hold in
Southern Punjab. Gazdar (2000) points towards how the presence of functioning of
government schools tends to eradicate caste-based differentials. A much more detailed
anthropological study is required to undertake this level of analysis. However, parents,
almost all either first generation literates or illiterates, have a basic unfamiliarity with
both school and the process of schooling. It is an alien environment, which can seem
intimidating and abstract, especially as teachers and owners are educated and therefore in
a position of power. This affects their choice of school, the demands they place on the
school in terms of facilities and the quality of the education expected. This research
shows that not only are social class differences an important feature of shaping
preferences, but they serve to create a hegemonic discourse around quality and symbols
of quality. This presents a serious challenge to equity of opportunity under the current
pattern of provision, and indicates that current policy prescriptions are leading down
dangerous paths. Social class, although having less influence on parental willingness to
educate children, mediates the actual uptake of opportunities.34
6.4 Private schools: providing an opportunity for girls?
Girls have been systematically discriminated against in education in Pakistan, with one
girls’ primary school built for every two boys’; resultantly, only 36.8% of women were
literate in 2000–01 compared with a male literacy level of 61% (Lloyd et al 2002: 3;
Heward 1999). However, private schools appear to offer an alternative. Indeed, more
girls, as a percentage of the total students in each school type, enrol in private schools
than in public at a national level (MSU 2002). This finding, corroborated by this
research, is in spite of the fact that private schools are mixed. Moreover, although on
34
The locations may have been important in reflecting a high demand for education, as other villages
visited seemed much more cynical about education and less reticent to support either government schools
- 55 -
average over 80% of the teachers are female, they have a mixed teaching staff (table 5).
Parents stated that they have ‘no qualms’ about male teachers, and, at least until grade
eight, no problems with mixed classes: “Boys and girls could study together till middle
(grade 8) but not after that ….because too many scandals may be created as after middle
the youngsters become too ‘aware’ and making them study together is asking for trouble”
(Father, Private School B). This has significant policy implications for the Government,
which has built at hugely additional costs, separate primary and middle schools
(Warwick and Reimers 1995). It also suggests that the requirement to employ female
teachers for girls is no longer the constraint it was, as long as there is a mixed teaching
staff in the school.
Furthermore, girls are better students than boys, a feeling which came across in every
school regardless of type. Boys were not as “enthusiastic” (Mother, Private School B),
whilst “(g)irls are more prudent…more intelligent and hardworking” (Father, NFE
Centre C). One reason given for the lack of interest is that “they (boys) have lands and
they will have to ultimately take care of their lands so there is no need for education”
(Father GGPS C). Moreover, the disciplining of girls in that they remained in the home
and were less likely to be playing in the streets produces better results:
“Here girls are more seriously involved in education. Under the strict supervision
of mothers girls find a better environment to focus on studies without any
distraction.” (Father, Madrassah C)
The dedication of the girls, especially when parents are paying for education, results in
them being given more opportunity to study and parents are more willing to pay.
However, the barriers remain as long as there are insufficient numbers and inaccessible
high schools for girls: one mother aptly commented that, given the boys lack of
enthusiasm “it is sad that they got the opportunities for higher education, not the girls”
(Mother, Private School C). Menarche often marked the time when girls were no longer
allowed to go to school. However, cultural norms, for example the practice of purdah in
Muslim families, should not be seen as rigid and unchanging structures. Private schools
appear to be offering girls more leeway to continue studying than was previously
facilitated by public schools alone, especially after primary grades.
or private schools. However, broad trends recognised elsewhere suggest the representative nature of this
work (Gazdar 1999; Heward 1999; Lloyd et al 2002) as does triangulation via key informant interviews.
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6.5 Choosing between options: who makes the decision?
The actual process of parental decision-making about schools is complex, and merits
further research. Bargaining and negotiation can occur between husband and wife, parent
and child (Kabeer 1994). The decision-making about education appeared to be made
jointly within the household, with fathers deciding the price-range and mothers looking
after the actual selection and monitoring of the school: “My mother scolds us when we
don’t want to go to school. She forcefully sends us here” (Male Student (MS), Private
School G). This division of responsibility, however, was far from neat, with conflict
arising over the education:
“My daughter has completed her 5th grade and is so passionate to continue
her studies but we don’t have enough money to let her continue her studies.
I fully understand the significance of education but my husband doesn’t do
any thing (unemployed) and when I enrolled my son here in class prep
without his father’s permission he punished me…he often beats me…my
son is 7 years old and has been admitted here in class prep. His father wants
to send him in some hotel but I categorically told him I will do anything,
but I will send him to school and finally I succeeded.” (Mother, NFE A)
This dilemma reflects the constant tension which poor parents face regarding costs of
education and the benefits that their children could reap. Choice, in this situation, is of a
very limited nature.
There are multiple perspectives on what is important in making choices. Three key
elements stand out, however: the material costs of the school, the location and the
perceived quality.
6.5.1
Cost: “A sacrifice we have to make”
No schooling is ‘free’ in Pakistan as direct, hidden and opportunity costs of the child not
working need to be factored in. Countervailed to this is the high value given to education
resulting in a significant demand, creating a tension in the struggles which poor people
go through in trying to educate their children:
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“Education is essential if you want to be successful in life and we’d rather
spend money on our children’s schooling than ourselves; that’s a sacrifice
that we have to make if we want to see our children flourish.”
(Father, Private School H)
It seems, rather than there being a surfeit of choice in the Pakistani education market as a
result of the growth of private provision, choice is immediately curtailed by a lack of
money (Gazdar 1999). This results in a ranking of schools according to costs, just to see
whether it is within the price range of the family. The process of deciding according to
cost is simple: many parents stated that “this school was not as expensive as other private
schools” (Mother, Private School H). For parents who are unable to afford private
schools, the other cheaper options are more viable “as we don’t have to pay anything
…tuition and especially books are free” (Father, NFE A). Parents seem to be very price
sensitive, both about fees and other costs. When the Government introduced free school
books into primary schools, anecdotal evidence suggested that children enrolled into
government schools from private ones, especially in the lower grades (pers.comm. HT
GGPS A). Equally, in private schools, incentives and cost-management are prevalent:
“The best thing about this school is (that) it lends books to parents, helping them cut
costs (and) families are given leeway to pay fees late or in instalments” (Parent, Private
School H). Social differentiation occurs between school-going children and those either
out-of-school or in child labour, as well as between schools. According to one parent
“only the really destitute don’t send their children to school” (Father Private School G),
which shows how contingent opportunities are on material well-being.
Even the madrassah option is subject to costs: in rural and urban areas alike, madaris
were considered but discarded by many parents on the basis of cost: “We like
madrassahs and have nothing against them, but what can we do? They are just additional
costs.” (Father, Private School G). As a result, only very “religious minded people send
their kids to madrassahs” (Mother, GGPS C). This runs counter to the generally held
assumption that madaris have a social safety net function, their low or absent cost seen as
an attractive feature (Nayyer 1998); however, no conclusions can be drawn due to the
small sample size of madaris in this study.
Surprisingly some parents felt that paying for education did not result in value for money
and saw private schools as businesses: “(p)rivate school are here just to make a lot of
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money” (Father, NFE A). Yet, private school parents viewed other options as determined
by cost: “NFE is an option for people even poorer than us. Such families have an
inclination to educate their kids but at the same time they want their children to help their
parents in their work to increase the monthly income” (Mother, Private School H).
The very fact that they were paying for education private school, some parents felt,
would automatically lead to a better result, and as a result were complacent about the
quality delivered. This may be one explanation for the apparent growth in ‘tuition’
centres. The more that is spent on education and the more a child is in school, the better
are the expected learning outcomes. Even poor parents who send their children to NFE
Centres also send their children to the tuition centres run by ‘qualified girls’ of the area.
This is because parents feel they cannot help the children in their studies: “the parents
who are educated to some extent, check the daily work of their kids and guide them
accordingly… but uneducated parents who can afford….don’t find any other choice
except sending them to tuition centres” (Mother, NFE Centre C). It is also a strategy for
covering all bases, as tuition centres are a kind of diversification mechanism to spread
the risk amongst schools: “I send my two daughters who are studying in government
primary school to X private school who offers tuition after the school time is over. I pay
Rs. 50 each (child) as tuition fee” (Mother GGPS C). Other literature alludes to the
possibility that parents are being duped into paying additional fees for extra classes in the
afternoon in the same school by unscrupulous owners who suggest that children need
special attention, especially in the higher grades (Bray 2003). This is probably true, but
begs the question as to why children actually pay to attend school in the first place where
less qualified teachers in multi-grade classrooms struggle to ‘impart’ the required
knowledge.35
6.5.2
The closer the better? The benefits of the private school next door
If cost is the principal factor determining whether children go to school, location and
proximity would be likely to be a key element in parents deciding which school to go to
35
The curriculum in Pakistan at Primary and Middle level is about learning and regurgitating facts. Time is
required to do this effectively; hence tuition centres are prevalent in higher grades where more time is
required.
- 59 -
(Gerwitz et al, 1995). Certainly, parents did tend to send their children to schools which
were close by. Indeed, it ranks alongside cost and quality for some parents in choosing
and changing schools, as this student commented:
“I got admission here in prep [but] there were some domestic problems so
my father transferred me to Government school. I studied there for just
three months [but] Government school is far from here so my parents
decided to send me here as we live in the next street”
(FS, Private School B)
Proximity was associated with safety, both in terms of the dangers of crossing main roads
but also the idea that the social space of the street was dangerous and unknown.
Furthermore, proximity for parents was conflated with knowledge of the school. Typical
for many parents is the following comment from a mother in Gharibabad:
“The good thing about this school is that it is nearby and we don’t have to
worry about our children wandering away. Sending our children to a school
that is far away is a risk because…who knows what the school may do to
them?” (Private School B)
Transport connections and distance severely restrict access, especially in the rural areas.
At primary level, with government schools located within walking distance, access was
not a problem. However, after grade five, children frequently had to travel significant
distances for middle and high government school, or pay substantial fees for private
schools or private tuition.
“No one can imagine how traumatic it becomes when we send our young
girls to high school which is 18 to 20 kilometres away from our area. We
don’t have any proper transportation facility in our area. It is so miserable
for young girls to go by local vans which are already fully packed. Our male
family members are against girl’s higher education.”
(Mother, GGPS C)
This alludes to different cultural attitudes which come into play with older girls, which
are frequently passed off as transport considerations, limiting access to post-primary
opportunities (Gazdar 1999):
“After middle girls are considered ‘young women’ and are expected to stay
home and not step outside unless necessary. The boys have it better: they
can travel to schools by vans or bicycles outside the village if they want to
pursue higher studies” (Father, Private School H)
The comparative advantage of private schools and tuition centres catering to this age
group, especially for girls, is considerable as they are located close to the home.
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However, unless the family has money, the child will be denied access to education. This
suggests double discrimination, where opportunities are based on both social class and on
gender.
6.6 Exploring parental perceptions of quality
Parental perception of quality is shaped by an amalgam of different elements. How
parents, who may not have that much experience of schools, actually rate the ‘quality’ is
a complex phenomenon. Four aspects emerge as important in determining how parents
choose schools based on their perception of quality: firstly, personal relationships, peer
group reference and reputation; secondly, the role of the teacher; thirdly, the internal
environment within a school matters of what is taught and how it is taught; and fourthly,
the external environment of the facilities of a school.
6.6.1
Peer-group reference and (non)information
Parents suggested that certain schools gave better results. The basis for this appears to be
speaking with neighbours and family, and a process of trial and error in school selection.
Unlike a ‘pure’ market, information about schools is difficult to attain, and for illiterate
parents, difficult to understand; no parent looked at the results of schools (admittedly
only recently made available at 8th grade). This means that people rely on reputation and
trust. Government schools were subject to a poor reputation, which appears to be
something deeply ingrained within Pakistani society (Warwick and Reimers 1995).
Private school parents felt that government school was below them:
“My kids have never been in government schools but I am well aware of
the bad reputation of government schools as teachers hardly come to teach
and when they come they barely teach and the students spent most of their
time playing and wasting time.”
(Mother, Private School C)
However, private schools are not always held in high regard by parents. Securing trust
also points to why private schools strive to get themselves registered:
“We cannot trust private schools. Usually without any serious intentions
people decide to set up a school with the help of their own young
unemployed educated family members. When these youngsters get some
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better employment opportunities they leave the school and ultimately, after
one or two years, they have to close the schools.” (Father, GGPS C)
Although this may smack of resentment because of a lack of material resources to afford
private schools, there is often a deep scepticism about private schools. This lack of trust
in private schools reflects a feeling that collusion between education officials and private
owners, discussed in chapter 4, results in sub-standard education in which poor parents
are being exploited (Sawada and Lokshin, 2001):
“Most of the private schools are not registered. They just claim [to be] but
in reality, with the underhand co-operation of education officials they are
running schools…all these things cause trepidation....and parents don’t opt
for private schools.” (Father, Madrassah C)
Moreover, there is still a feeling that “a boy who completes his education from
government school can get government job (more) easily than the student of an
unacknowledged private school” (Father GGPS C). As a result, parents will frequently
move their children between schools, basing decisions on how their children are doing
and how other people’s children appear to be doing in other schools. Personal
connections matter, however, in choosing schools, and private schools are often run and
staffed by people from the community, whereas government schools have appointed
teachers from outside. Chapter 5 shows how owners attract parents by paying personal
visits and their profile in the community. This differs little from other research into
parental choice, in which the head teachers’ style, personality, outlook and
approachability is important for parents (Gerwitz et al 1995: Woods et al 1998).
6.6.2
Teachers: good barometers of quality?
Teachers are seen as barometers of quality, and are most closely associated with the
‘results’ the child attains. The parents tended to focus on the role of the teacher, as they
have daily dealings with the children. Both the attitude and the physical attendance of
teachers mattered in judging a school. Unsurprisingly, government teachers came under
much criticism as “(t)he major problem with govt. schools was that the teachers didn’t
bother to be regular in their attendance… those schools are complete mess and they are
run with no sense of responsibility” (Father, Private School F). Nor were they able “to
pay individual attention” (Mother, GGPS C) to the children, due to the class size and lack
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of teachers. Their ‘quality’, in terms of academic qualifications, was not an issue with
most parents: they were seen to be good if they could maintain discipline, emerging as
one of the key factors of ‘quality’ of a school. How this is achieved and maintained,
however, is a matter of deeper concern.
6.6.3
Parental priorities: Discipline and punish or teaching and learning?
Parental interest about what was being taught was notable by its absence. Issues of
curriculum, levels of maths, science and languages or pedagogic methodology did not
emerge in the FGDs. This may partly be due to the difficulties parents have engaging
with an alien environment such as a school, and the power dynamics of parents speaking
with head teachers or teachers. This made it problematic for them to measure student
progression and school quality. Actual learning does not enter into the purview of
parents, but the very fact that children go to school - especially when they are paying for
it and can hear children chanting, in chorus, numbers or the alphabet, must mean they are
learning something.
Conversely, this research points to a set of values as prime qualitative concerns for
parents. The ability of the school to provide discipline (and the appropriate punishment),
create orderliness and ensure cleanliness dominated responses. This reflects the
aspirations of parents for their children to lead a different kind of life from them.
Although a natural concern, it is also modelled on a ‘middle class’ attitude and
impressions gained from increased access to the media.36 According to Bourdieu, “(e)ven
when it is in no way inspired by the conscious concern to stand aloof from working class
laxity, every bourgeois profession of vigour, every eulogy of the clean, sober and neat,
contains a tacit reference to uncleanliness, in words or things, to intemperance or
imprudence” (1986: 246-7). Whilst this is written of a different society, the underpinning
value-ordering process remains relevant. This sense of othering or bordering which
reproduce inequalities through education is important for understanding not only the high
36
Whilst it has been noted that there is a very small middle class in Pakistan, I would argue that the image,
seen everywhere on posters, TV and radio advertisements and programmes, is very powerful. The media
has been highlighted as one of the key drivers of change in Pakistan (Nadvi and Robinson 2004).
- 63 -
demand for private schools, but also important for understanding why quality concerns
take the form they do (Schwalbe et al 2000).
Demand for discipline is double-edged sword for schools. Parents seek environments
which ensure that their children are provided firm discipline, to make them educated and
‘polite’, through appropriate punishment. This is of express concern for boys, as girls, it
was repeatedly said, were much more amenable:
“Here boys are so rude. They don’t obey their parents. They are so insolent,
they must be punished. We ourselves ask the teacher to punish our children
…children study well only if they fear their teacher”
(Father, NFE Centre C)
Thus whilst fearing the teacher is seen as integral to the learning process, punishment
should not extend too far. Parents seem relatively responsive to their children’s concerns
about punishment, who become “totally fed up with the maltreatment of his teachers”
(Mother, NFE Makki 460) and will remove their children from school if they are
excessively beaten. This creates a fine line for schools to follow, who must have teacher
and head teachers who are “strict disciplinarians” but not excessive:
“One of the teachers in our previous school (private) slapped me so
forcefully on my face that blood came out from my mouth…..now here in
this school I am happy as our teachers do not punish us.” (MS, Private
School H)
The inculcation of manners and politeness in children was the aim for parents. Private
schools were seen as having the advantage. As one mother stated, “by sending my
children to a private school, I am ensuring that they learn manners and the proper way of
speaking” (Private School C). This reflects the status symbol that education represents,
and the trappings of ‘civility’ for which they strive.
The advantage of having a uniform was apparent, yet is construed differently than
previously recorded (Andrabi et al 2002; Alderman et al 2001). Children who are sent to
private schools become clean; teachers ensure that the children’s appearance is spruced
up in school, thereby giving the parents the impression that the children are improving. A
package of ‘values’ is provided by schools, where cleanliness and manners were closely
associated; “the uniform is regularly checked here and the children were taught proper
manners and cleanliness” (Mother, Private School C). By contrast, government schools
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were seen by private school parents in both localities as unreliable, dirty, a place to play
and not to study, and unsafe; “(c)hildren just waste time and get filthy” in Government
Schools (Mother, Private School B).
6.6.4
Minimum facilities: ‘the children can bear it’
The extent and standard of physical facilities have been seen to be determinates in
sending children, especially girls, to school in Pakistan, as elsewhere in South Asia
(Heward 1999). It is a commonly accepted assumption that parents are looking for
security and respectability before they send their children in school (Lloyd et al 2002).
Some responses corroborated this opinion; “We feel ashamed of sending our girls in a
school where there is no security, no boundary wall” (Mother, GGPS C). From the
mapping survey, the difference between government and private schools is not that
significant: indeed, observed facilities - in terms of playground, water, sanitary facilities tended to be marginally better in government schools.37
However, the relative importance that parents gave to the facilities within private schools
was surprisingly low. An oft-repeated remark was that children can make do with the
minimum - and that minimum refers to security issues rather than anything else: as one
mother from a private school (H) remarked, “(t)he Government Schools had bathrooms,
but most private schools do not have good bathrooms. But it doesn’t matter: the children
can bear it”. The same was said for water supply, which they could get from home, and
limited classroom space. The benefits that private schools have, from this research
seemingly the most crucial, is the constrained space and security of being inside a homelike environment. This has attractions for parents who expect their children to be neat,
clean and tidy, which is easier to ensure by not letting children out. The parents’ subject
perspective juxtaposed with that of the children reveals diverging priorities.
37
As a caveat, it is important to note that government school facilities have been found to be seriously
deficient in other work (Gazdar 1999). Much depends on the locality.
- 65 -
6.7 Children’s differing perspectives: “A school should look like a school”
By contrast to their parents, children were much more aware of the quality of education.
Quality is seen by some children in a more holistic way - indeed, their understanding of
‘good’ education appears to be far more sensitive and nuanced that that of either their
parents or, indeed, the teachers. One student commented on his previous school that
“their method of teaching was not good. Our English teacher used to skip important
words” (Private School C). The physical environment matters to the students much more
than for either their parents or the providers. This is due to the fact that the students have
to suffer daily the frequently dreadful conditions of the schools. Reflecting on his
previous private school, one student recoiled: “there were only 2 rooms…it was so
difficult to concentrate on studies as there was a lot of noise.” (MS, NGO B). The NGO
School, offering easily the best facilities and standard of teaching observed, was
recognised by the children as a good school:
“I was studying in a private school. Now here in NGO B…I like the
capacious building and cleanliness of my school. Teachers are so kind: they
teach us in an interesting way.” (MS, NGO B)
A selection of the many observations from all types of schools furnishes a snapshot of
general perception of other schools offering undifferentiated quality: “the site of our
school is not proper. There are rubbish heaps outside the school” (MS, Madrassah C);
“Our toilet is not good. Most of the time it is blocked” (FS, Private School G); “I wish
the class had more classes; it just gets too crowded” (FS, GGPS C); “there are unlimited
flies in the school” (MS, Madrassah C); “We have a hand pump here but it gives
contaminated water” (FS, Private School H).
Children yearn after the opportunity to play, desiring trees, a play ground, plants, and
swings. Inside the classroom they want tables, chairs and charts. Overall, children wanted
an atmosphere that matched their mental image of a good school. Their PRA drawings all
showed their idealised picture. The following quote captures this succinctly: “I don’t like
this school as it resembles home… A School should be like a school not like a home.”
(MS, NFE A). Yet neither parents nor owners give much credence to this. This suggests
that children lack agency to influence their parents, whilst owners place a low value on
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improving facilities as long as parents still send their children. Children’s perceptions of
schooling, and their degree of agency in decision-making, merits further research.
6.8 Choice: subject to ever-present trade-offs
Choice of school is not a one-off decision for most parents, but an on-going balancing of
different options permitted by their own situation. In tracking the education history of the
children, it became apparent that many had changed school. From the PRA data, 31% of
all children changes school at least once in their primary school career, rising to over
40% of children in private schools. Determined by both cost, proximity and quality
considerations, one mother typifies the problems with paying for school:
“My kid of grade 2 was in a private school, I was paying Rs. 30 as fee. But
my husband fell prey to paralysis and we had no other choice except to take
our child out of school. But when this school was opened here we thought it
was the only choice for him.”
(Mother, NFE Centre A)
This reflects the dynamic nature of poverty within Pakistan, with households becoming
transitorily poor (in which expenditure levels fall below the poverty line for a period),
making household decisions about expenditure on schooling more acute for a short
period (Baulch and McCulloch 1999). The outcome is that parents will remove children
from school, and at a later date put them back in to either the same or a different school
at a different price level. Whilst advocates of ‘choice’ in schooling would, perhaps, view
this as exercising voice through exit, in reality the choice is a false one. It is not likely to
push the prices down (as the market mechanism would indicate) as there are enough
consumers to pay for the commodity at that price, given that household shocks and
transitional poverty are idiosyncratic (household specific) rather than covariant risks.
Children are likely to suffer from a disruption in their education as a result, as the
following quotes bear out:
“My father is a chronic victim of T.B. He gets fits sometimes. We all
become so sad (because) our financial condition didn’t allow my elder
brothers and sister to continue their studies. He (father) wants me to
discontinue my studies but my mother encourages me to study properly.”
(FS, Private School C)
The prioritisation of education spending within the household basket, despite the high
value, will take second place to more pressing concerns, such as debt:
- 67 -
“My parents cannot afford my fee so I will discontinue my studies…and
when my father will pay all the debts then I shall re-continue my studies.”
(FS, Private School B)
Having dropped out, children often find it harder to re-enter the education cycle (Moore
2001). This makes for a fragmented education for the child and places a strain on the
schools, given that are never sure of their sustainability. Moreover, a ‘herding’ between
schools exists. One example is when a private school sacked their teachers and the new
ones were not “as good”, according to several parents who had taken their children out of
that school and put into others close by. Parents may have an instinctive belief whether
their children are progressing well or not, due to the fact that they would involve their
children in ‘school-hopping’ from one school to the next. However, as shown above,
their criteria for choosing may not protect the ‘best interest’ of the child concerned.
6.9 The myth of choice
The chronically poor, however, cannot afford any education: even that of the supposedly
free government schools is beyond their means. Children have to “share the burden” of
survival with their parents. This problem affects urban and rural poor alike: “We have a
lot of domestic problems…there are more than 6 or 7 members in the family and the
bread winner is only one. And one man cannot fulfil the requirements of the whole
family so we are compelled to send our children to do some work to share the burden of
their fathers.” (Mother, NFE C). This may lead to selecting, on birth order, perceived
intelligence or diligence, which of the children is given the opportunity of schooling,
issues which merit further research.
However, child labour is more than an economic survival strategy but a means for a
relevant training in skills necessary for life. Indeed, some parents recognise it as an
education in itself, rather than child labour:
“Our children are not involved in child labour. We send our kids to the
fields and kilns where their fathers work to hand over lunch to them and
they start working over there not only to help their fathers but also to learn
the art of brick making or harvesting after their own accord.”
(Mother, NFE A)
- 68 -
This may reflect the lack of relevance of what is taught in school to the daily lives of
children (SPDC 2003). This questions the very fundamentals of what is taught and what
is learned in school.
The consumer domain is not homogenous, and many parents appeared to have
contradictory reasons for choosing certain schools. This matches Lloyd et al’s (2002: 14)
findings, which indicates that both “public and private (options of schooling) each have
distinct features valued by parents”. However, access to schools, decided by a trade off
between cost and dubious quality considerations, is neither transformative nor
emancipatory (Gazdar 1999). Instead it appears to be entrenching inequality in curious
ways. The result is the development of a pyramidal structure of school types by
preference, determined by cost, with private schools elevated to a badge of status. The
positive aspect is that private options augment female access to schools.
Demand for education appears to be high, but how this willingness to educate their
children translates into active demanding by the parents for a good quality in any school
deserves further education. Initial findings suggest that parents feel a lack of agency in
their ability to change facilities within all schools which develops into a fatalism about
the standard of education: “Children of junior level sit on the ground under the
trees...most of them without mats…we know our kids will have to study in the open area
in scorching sunlight but we cant do anything” (Mother, GGPS A). Even when paying for
education, parents did not exert voice nor pressure the school to deliver. Children, in all
schools, lack agency. Thus choice in the quasi-market is not producing better quality as
understandings of basic standards are absent and informational asymmetries pervade.
- 69 -
CHAPTER 7: Conclusion and implications of the myth of choice
The emergence of low cost private schooling poses multiple challenges to the provision
of quality universal basic education in Pakistan. This paper has attempted to disentangle
the factors that have driven their growth and explore some the implications of a vibrant
private sector. This paper took as its original premise that choice was increasing for poor
people, even in rural areas (Andrabi et al 2002).38 Indeed, the range of education
alternatives in Pakistan has expanded over the last decade through rising supply via
private provision. Proponents of private provision argue that such an expansion is likely
to, via competition, augment choice, improve the quality and increase the efficiency of
the education delivered (Chubb and Moe 1990; Jimenez and Lockheed 1995).
However, research undertaken in one urban and one rural setting in Punjab show that
choice is a myth in quasi-markets in Pakistan as there are insufficient alternative
suppliers available to a significant proportion of families (Gintis 1996). The poor,
excluded from accessing private provision primarily by a lack of money but also through
other socio-cultural constraints, are finding that government provision is worsening. This
is a consequence of the withdrawal of the powerful from the use of these services. School
owners, by contrast, are able to make significant profit without having to provide quality
education, given that the government schools are so poor. Parents, even those who can
afford private schools, are left with little choice between poor quality schools. Parents
struggle to accurately assess the quality of the services they purchase due to information
asymmetries mediated through patronage connections, and the quality they do demand is
of an inferior type.
The findings of this research and their related implications fall into three broad and
interconnected categories: government level policy and state provision; potential
engagement with private schools on the supply-side; and demand side issues.
38
The current literature trumpets the growth of private provision as providing a choice for poor parents,
which was the starting point of the research. The subsequent questioning of the actual choice available to
poor parents became apparent during the empirical and data analysis stage.
- 70 -
Connections to the wider debates on the promotion of choice through private provision
are subsequently drawn.
7.1 Implications for government provision and policy
Current government policy is merely reacting to unregulated, spontaneous provision
caused by deficient schools and systematic under-provision by the state. Lax application
of regulation by a disinterested state bureaucracy enables private schools to flourish. For
national policy, state provision seems likely to be ineffective so long as the current policy
trajectory continues without taking into account embedded inequalities. The education
market is politicised in Pakistan, as elsewhere, but politics bites more deeply, reflecting
the feudal and patronage-ridden environment. As a consequence, there is a negative
impact on efforts to improve government schools, as those with power, influence and
money within communities, including elected officials, bureaucrats and teachers, have
bought out of the system by sending their children to private schools. The removal of the
‘sharp elbow’ to improve the state sector reflects deeper inequalities within Pakistan
(Deacon 2000).
No silver bullets exist to transform a moribund government sector: tentative policy
recommendations need to be located within the bureaucratic, political and economic
constraints. In areas where demand remains low, private provision will not develop,
causing market failure. Equally, in the absence of competitive markets, private schools
are allowed the luxury of sinking to the lowest common denominator, which at present is
the government school (if one is functioning). Measures to reform government schools
are beyond the scope of this paper, but would appear to be of utmost importance if
overall access and quality improvements are to be achieved. In a context where universal
provision is still a chimera, the government would appear hypocritical to enforce rigid
quality standards and restrict private provision. However, regulation through districtlevel private education cells and capacity building on monitoring of all schools would be
useful first steps.
- 71 -
7.2 Implications for potential engagement with private schools
In terms of Wood’s (1994) model of school response (table 2), schools attempt to
understand and respond to parental preference. However, the use of political connections
and lobbying through patronage networks is being played out in a way that undermines
the basis of the competitive environment. Moreover, schools do not attempt to maximise
the profit as they are run along the lines of small family businesses, and are therefore
reticent to expand beyond a certain size or invest in facility upgrading. This minimises
risk for the family but, as a corollary, private schools remain ill-conducive learning
environments. The policy implications of this are significant. External efforts to improve
private schools, such as providing teacher training, are likely to come up against owner
intransigence, fearing that teachers will seek better employment or demand higher wages.
How the government can engage effectively with diverse and numerous forms of
provision deserves further research, but given the current prognosis, the opportunities for
doing so appear limited.
7.3 Implications for demand-side choice
Parental ‘choice’ is shown to be a complex and contingent process which is frequently
constrained by cost. Even where different education options exist (and in the two
communities studied, they are numerous) choice between them is not a realistic option
for many. Four findings stand out as surprising on the demand-side. Firstly, parental
perception of quality differed from the expected. Parental discourse on quality did not
emphasise the instrumental-academic and outcomes as making a good school, as an
expected response to a competitive environment (figure 2), nor veer towards the
intrinsic-personal dimension of education being process-orientated (Woods et al 1998).
Instead, the instillation of values of good manners, cleanliness and orderliness through
firm discipline were dominant tendencies. This reveals that the values that parents in
Pakistan hold differ from those understood in the literature on choice. In a comparison
with empirical work in India, Rampal (2004) found that “poor parents may have good
reason to be satisfied with a school where the teacher comes regularly…irrespective of
what goes on in the name of teaching and, more crucially, the quality of learning”. One
policy recommendation that emerges is the need to fill informational gaps about what
- 72 -
standards – a basic minimum or quality threshold – should be expected of any school.
Bottom-up efforts and an exertion of parental voice to demand real quality would thereby
be encouraged.
The quality concerns of children are markedly distinct to that of their parents or the
school owners. Children value space for playing and lay an emphasis on the school
environment as well as the quality of the teaching. Whether the parents are the best
judges in choosing the schools, however, needs to be situated within the context of nonuniversal and sub-standard provision. One interesting aspect that deserves further
attention is the potential to make the children’s voices be heard in the running of schools
and even in policy, as has happened elsewhere in South Asia (Williams 2004).
Thirdly, parents are sending their girls to private school. Several reasons for this
emerged: access of boys to better government schools; the proximity and security of
private schools; the better study habits of girl students. It points to changing social
norms, but also to the opportunities presented by private schools to expand female
enrolment. One area of policy focus would be to assess the opportunity of subsidising girl
students in registered and quality-assured private schools, especially at secondary school
level. It also indicates that government policy of creating single-sex institutions should
be revised.
Fourthly, there is a temporal and dynamic aspect of choice that was not captured by the
spatial framework of figure 1, as schooling decisions are subject to ever-present tradeoffs, resulting in children dropping out and shifting schools frequently. This suggests the
need to establish mechanisms for tracking children in their education career to ensure
that efforts to keep them in school are properly targeted. Further research would provide
a better understanding as to the nature of this dynamic, and how it links with poverty
cycles for poor families.
7.4 Wider significance of the myth of choice
The private sector in education in Pakistan looks set to remain an important element in
delivering basic services, even in poor communities. However, where various perverse
- 73 -
incentives combine to exclude quality-based competition and a diminution of support for
government schools, the empirical evidence provided in this paper reveals an actual
narrowing or even denying of choice. Thus a pragmatic approach that recognises the
importance of successfully reforming the public sector while harnessing what private
schools offer but mitigating their negative impact emerges as the most appropriate
response. Yet given the current environment, there is a distinct danger that policy will
further be pushed along the path towards privatising education provision.
This critical analysis of choice in education quasi-markets has wider resonances, as
private provision is increasingly been lauded as a mechanism for delivering good
services cheaply (World Bank 2003a). The education market in Pakistan, despite its
historical idiosyncrasies, is typical of a developing country context in which quasimarkets develop within a context of non-universal provision. Comparative research to
highlight similarities and differences would help foster a more informed debate on the
implications of private provision and the myth of choice. Efforts to make the myth of
choice into a reality are both ideologically questionable and, until universal provision has
been achieved, practicably impossible. Concentration on delivering free education to all
in Pakistan, as elsewhere, should remain the highest priority.
- 74 -
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ANNEX 1: List of persons interviewed
Officials/ Government Sector interviewees
Date of
interview
16/06/04
Person interviewed
Post and place of interview
Mr Qazi Afaaq
Managing Director, Punjab Education
Foundation, Islamabad
Mr Afzal Ahmad
District Officer, Planning, Skp. District, Skp.
15/05/04
Mr. Ch. Sardar Ali
District Education Officer (DEO) Male
Elementary Education, Skp. District
13/05/04
Mr. Mukhtar Ali Gill
District Education Officer (DEO) Secondary,
Sheikhupura District, Skp.
13/05/04
Prof. Javed Iqbal
Executive District Officer (EDO) Education,
Sheikhupura District, Skp.
13/05/04
Mr Afzul Haq
Managing Director, National Education
Foundation, Lahore
07/06/04
Mr Mohammad Khokhar Provincial EMIS Co-ordinator, Punjab, Lahore
04/05/04
(multiple)
04/06/04
Mrs. S. Naheed
Munawar
Lady Councillor, Union Council 62 Urban 4,
Skp., Gharibabad
Mr Muhammad Jamil
Najam
Director, Public Instruction (Elementary
Education) Punjab/ Director, Community
Participation Project (CPP), Lahore
07/06/04
Mr Tariq Najeeb Najami
District Co-ordinating Officer (DCO),
Sheikhupura
22/05/04
Mr Yawar Saeed
Naib Nazim, Union Council 83, Makki 460
01/06/04
Dr. Muhammed Saleem
Director EFA Wing, MoE, Islamabad
Mrs. Iffat Anwar Shah
District Education Officer (DEO) Female
Elementary Education, Skp. District, Skp.
13/05/04
Mr. Malik Muhammad
Sharif
Executive District Officer (EDO) Literacy and
IT, Skp. District, Skp.
14/05/04
Mr Sana Ullah Virk
UC Nazim, Union Council 62 Urban 4, Skp,
Gharibabad
04/06/04
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NGO sector interviewees
Person interviewed
Post
Date of
interview
07/06/04
Lt. Col. M. Anwar
Awan
Regional Manager, The Citizens
Foundation, Lahore
Ms. Nadia Ejaz
Co-ordinator PULSE-NGO Project, Lahore 04/0/5/04
University of Management Sciences, Lahore
Mr Abid Gill
District Manager, Sudhaar-ITA Alliance,
Skp.
10/05/04
(multiple)
Mrs Nasira Habib
Khoj’ - Society for People’s Education
(NGO), Lahore
07/05/04
Mr Randy Hatfield
Programme Manager Education, Aga Khan
Foundation (Pakistan), Islamabad
16/06/04
Mrs Zibha Hussein
Director, Child Resources International
15/06/04
Ms. Baela Jamil
Director, ITA (Centre for Education and
Consciousness) NGO, Lahore
28/4/04
(multiple)
Mrs Zarina Jillani
Research Co-ordinator, Society for the
Protection of the Rights of the Child,
Islamabad
15/06/04
Hamib Khawaja
Co-ordinating Director, Co-operative for
Advancement, Rehabilitation and Education
(CARE), Lahore
07/05/04
Mrs Beena Manza
Co-ordinator, School Improvement Network 15/05/04
Programme, Lahore
Mr Fiaz Shah
Programme Officer Education, Save the
Children (UK), Islamabad
15/05/04
Dr. Fareeha Zafar
Director, Society for the Advancement of
Education (SAHE), Lahore
06/05/04
Mr Fawad Usman
Executive Director, Sudhaar NGO, Lahore
01/05/04
Mrs Tracey WagnerRizvi
National Co-ordinator, Society for the
Protection of the Rights of the Child
(SPARC), Islamabad
15/06/04
- 82 -
People working in/ researching the sector
Person interviewed
Post
Mrs Monazza Aslam
DPhil candidate, Wolfson College, Oxford
(researching private schools on field work),
Lahore
Dr Faisal Bari
Professor, Lahore University of Management
Sciences, Lahore
04/05/04
Mrs Maliha Hussein
Independent Education Consultant, Islamabad
29/04/04
Mr Rafiq Jaffer
Consultant, Institute of Social Studies, Lahore
15/05/04
Mr Shahid Kardar
Independent education consultant, Systems
Private Limited, Lahore
09/06/04
Ms. Ameena Khan
Project Officer, ILO, Islamabad
Takumi Koide
JICA Expert, Punjab Literacy Programme,
Lahore
08/05/04
Lahore University of Management Sciences,
Lahore
11/06/04
District Empowerment Through Community
Participation (DETCP), UNDP, Islamabad
14/06/04
Miguel Lourerio
Mr Paul Oquist
Date of
interview
04/05/04
15/06/04
Dr. Masako Ota
JICA Expert, EFA Wing, MoE, Islamabad
Dr. Mark Poston
Education Advisor, DFID-Pakistan, Islamabad/
29/04/04
Skp.
(Multiple)
Mr Maurice Robson
Chief, Education and Child Protection,
UNICEF, Islamabad
Mrs Sofia Shakeil
Independent education consultant, Islamabad
Dr Gulzar Shah
Associate Professor, Lahore University of
Management Sciences, Lahore
29/04/04
16/06/04
29/04/04
11/06/04
- 83 -
ANNEX 2: Government Officials (district level and below) semi-structured key
informant interviews pro-forma
Date of visit/time:___________
Interviewer:__________________________
Name of interviewee:____________________________
Post: ________________________________________________________________
Held from/ until: _______________________
1. Responsibilities (i.e. what is your mandate, what do you do on a daily basis etc)
2. Relationship with other levels of administration (issues of accountability, autonomy,
problems arising)
3. Attitude towards Government Schools (failing/ working, reform initiatives undertaken)
4. Attitude towards Private Schools (Are private schools a ‘good thing’? levels of regulation,
data collected)
5. Attitude towards NGOs (Is there close collaboration/ rivalry, NGO adopting schools, good
service providers, sustainability)
6. Incentives to non-state and non-government sector - how do these work? (taxation, land,
books)
7. Attitude towards Madaris (What role do madaris/ madrassah education play in Pakistan?
What is the impact at the UC/Tehsil/District level)
8. Perspective on Community Participation (Is it good that the Community participates in
education? How should they do so? Are there any drawbacks to this?)
9. Impact of devolution (How has devolution affected your role? What has changed/ stayed the
same?)
- 84 -
ANNEX 3: School mapping with principals questionnaire
Principals/ managers/ owners semi-structured pro-forma for mapping exercise
Date of visit/time:___________
Interviewer:__________________________
Name of interviewee:____________________________
1.School details:
1.1.Name
1.2.Address
1.3.Teshil:
1.4.Date of establishment:
Markaz:
2.Rationale for existence (cultural, economic, social - FP/NFP)
3.Location
3.1.R/U
3.2.Socio-economic locale
3.3.Proximity to closet available alternative
4.School characteristics:
4.1.Cooed/ Single sex
4.2.Grades served
4.3.Number of students/ gender division
4.4.Register available?
4.5.Language medium
4.6.Textbooks used
4.7.Accreditation/ certification
5.School facilities
5.1.Number of classrooms
5.2.Sanitary facilities (y/n, mixed)
6.Management structure
6.1.By whom (NGO, religious, entrepreneur)
Village/area:
- 85 -
6.2.Links with community
7.Stewardship
7.1.I/C
7.2.Autonomy in decision-making
7.3.Regulation/ relations with gvt.
7.3.1.Registered? Details
7.4.Visits/ supervision
7.5.Incentives received/ barriers confronted
8.Teachers
8.1.Number/ grade and total
8.2.Gender
8.3.Level of experience/ qualifications
8.4.Turnover rate
8.5.Pay (monthly Rs)
9.Financing and financing
9.1.Fees/ month
9.2.Costs covered/ not covered (uniforms, food, books)
9.3.School expenditure/ revenue
 per child
 total
9.4.Surplus generated/ reinvested
9.5.External financing (donors/ gvt/ philanthropists)
9.6. Government aid received
Other comments:
- 86 -
ANNEX 4: Parents FGD: key questions and prompts
Introduction of who we are and what we are doing
1)
Why are your children in [ ] centre/ school?
 what was your child doing before school?
 what is education/ why is it important?
 Is there a difference between the education of boys and girls? Are they in
different schools?
 What problems have you encountered in getting your child educated?
2)
What do you think about the other education options nearby?
 Govt School
 Private School
 Madrasah
 NFE
 What about not being in school at all - is that a viable option?
3)
What factors are important for choosing a school
Possible prompts:
 Proximity
 female teachers
 teachers qualifications
 attendance of teachers
 head teacher/ organiser motivation
 School buildings
 Number of classrooms
 latrines
 water
 electricity
 fans
 boundary wall
 cost
 textbook provision
 uniform
 popularity within community
 separation of boys and girls
 language medium
- 87 -
ANNEX 5: PRA Exercise with Children: “This is my family”39
What is PRA?
Participatory Rural Appraisal (sometimes called Participatory Reflection and Action),
commonly known as PRA, is a research tool which attempts to let people speak through
exercises and activities. In the case of adults, these can be done through village mapping,
seasonal charts, matrix and preference ranking. For children, activity-based and play
exercises, such as drawing and singing are commonly used. This allows the children to
express their thoughts, feelings and experiences in a more relaxed manner, and can
produce some rich data as children have a unique and personal position both within the
family and within the school. They are the ones who really know what life is like for
them. One of the key elements is handing over control to the children and allowing free
expression. However, as they are children there must be some framework for guidance
provided. This is done by the facilitators in a sensitive and relaxed manner: a sense of fun
is imperative!
Purpose
The purpose of this exercise is to find out what the children think about their schools,
discovering in the process key elements which stand out for them. This is not
predetermined but should emerge throughout the process. An auxiliary purpose of this
exercise is to understand the decisions that parents, and children as active agents within
the household, make in selecting certain schools. Important factors could be:
 the socio-economic profile of the child’s family (occupation father/ other relatives)
 the education attainment of parents
 the gender of the children/ and of brothers and sisters
 the birth order of the child (i.e. first born opportunities may differ from last born)
 the nature of the school (environment, teachers attitude etc)
Through describing their family, the facilitators should probe as to what is important, and
pursue avenues of discussion as they arise.
This exercise should also provide a form of retrospective mapping of educational life of
children - both the child taking part and his/her siblings. This will capture which schools
(if any) the children have gone to previously and establish why changes have occurred
(such as household shocks, changes in familial circumstances, changes in schools and
increased opportunity). This will be done via informal probing and recorded by the
facilitators.
Methodology
PRA is a flexible means of investigation. There are no set rules, and the facilitator should
adapt to the situations which arise. In every situation they should select what they
consider to be the most appropriate approach, and be prepared to change to arising
circumstances. However, when working with children, it is vital to provide a framework
of activities from which they can work off. This can be through games, discussing,
drawing and feedback. The main PRA activity selected is communication through
39
This sheet was distributed to the facilitators. A clear briefing and trial run was done to practice and
change the questions. The number of activities was increased to keep the children occupied. Photographic
examples of the environments in which the PRA was conducted are appended.
- 88 -
drawing with probing questions used, supplemented by ice-breakers and one-on-one
discussions, which are recorded on paper. The following steps should be used as a
guideline and reminder:
Step 1: Outline of exercise. Explain purpose of research and why we want to speak with
the children. The facilitator with wall chart of his/her family will explain the drawing of
the family, and the questioning that occurs simultaneously.
Step 2: Icebreaker games with children (clapping, miming game, role play of acting as
your teacher/ parents)
Step 3: Distribution of charts and crayons. Encourage the children to draw family on the
sheet, beginning with the parents and the siblings in age order.
Step 4: Simultaneously, probing questions should be asked. These are outlined below,
with a suggested sequencing.
Step 5: In-depth conversations with children using the pictures as a framework for
discussion.
Step 6: Drawing of school and further discussions about likes and dislikes.
Step 6 (optional, depending on time): Aspirations in a FGD with the children. What do
they want to do next year, what are they likely to do? What they want to be in 10 years
time (this could be done via another picture session, time permitting).
Step 7: Wind up and post charts on walls.
Outline questions:
These questions should serve to jog the memory, and not be used as a concrete format.
They ensure that all the areas are covered. However, if one aspect seems interesting, it is
worth pursuing this. They should be used throughout the process of drawing, as people
emerge. The names of the children should be recorded on the blank piece of paper - both
on the chart sheet and facilitators’ note pad.
Prompts:
1) Parents background (questions to ask at time of drawing):
 What does your father/ mother do?
 Did he/she go to school?
 Is your home near here?
 Do they like you going to school?
 Who encourages/ discourages you going to school? (mother/ father)
2) Siblings (questions to ask at time of drawing)
 Does your elder/ younger brother/sister go to school?
 Where, and have they always been in that school?
 Do your parents like your sisters going to school?
 What do they work as now (if elder)?
 If in different schools, why?
 If dropped out/ working, why and what are they doing?
3) Child in exercise (at time of drawing themselves)
 Were you always in this school? (track educational history of child if been in different
schools - probe to why they moved)
 What do you like/dislike about this school? (encourage them to expand on answers e.g. nice teachers, good environment, good friends, close to home etc)
- 89 -
Step 6: (optional, given time) FGD on aspirations
 What do you want to do after this year?
 What do you want to be in 10 years? [This can be done via subsequent drawings on
A4 sheets of paper a picture of what they would like to be. This will reveal gender
stereotypes and also provide data on internal limitations of child’s perspective]
Practical and ethical issues
Working with children is very sensitive. If you feel it inappropriate to ask questions, or
probe more deeply, DONT. We must have the child’s best interests in mind at all times.
It is important to avoid exposing children or putting them in awkward positions. This
exercise should be fun and like a conversation - give something of youself and provide
encouragement and support to the children in undertaking the exercise (such as
complements). The work should, if possible, be carried out in a shady area without the
(close) presence of teachers or other students, as this will both distract them and make
them reticent to talk.
Informal discussion
with children with
facilitator Amna in
NFE Centre,
Gharibabad
Amna, Saima Saeed (L-R)
suggesting ways to draw
the families in GGPS
Gharibabad
- 90 -
ANNEX 6: Teachers FGD prompting questions pro-forma40
This focus group discussion is aimed at exploring several key threads in the research
from the perspective of the teachers. The purpose is to get to the root of the issues of why
parents are choosing certain schools. Teachers have unique insights as they are at the
chalk face on a daily basis, having direct contact with the children and frequent contact
with parents and community members. It will also allow us to triangulate (i.e. check)
what the head teachers say in the mapping, and confirm opinions, doubts etc of the
parents. However, as a starting point the teachers’ perspectives on motivations are
explored, as this will allow a space for comfort and will enable all participants to speak.
The questions are semi-structured which should allow for debate and disagreements. It is
important to let the conversation flow; question prompts are offered below.
1. Why did you choose to become a teacher?
- how long have you been teaching
- past experience/ different schools
- education attainment and from where
2. Do you enjoy it?
- if so, why – what is it you enjoy?
- If not, why not?
3. What support do you get?
- from parents/ community
- from institution
- from government
- from own family
4. What kind of children go to your school?
5. Why do you think they go to that school
Prompts:
- Reputation
- Cost
- Teachers
- Atmosphere
- Facilities
- etc.
6. Do the children enjoy school?
- What could be improved for them?
- Do many drop out?
- Do many repeat the year?
7. Any other comments (try to make sure that what the teachers say is the same as the
principal’s etc. If there are differences, probe).
40
This blurb was given as an explanatory note to the facilitators, and has been included here for reference.
- 91 -
ANNEX 7: Monthly income, expenditure and profit of a typical middle private
school
Income - direct
Grade
Nursery
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Total
Number
Cost
per
(Rupees)
class
25
50
30
60
20
70
12
100
12
120
9
150
7
200
6
250
5
300
126
Total
1,250
1,800
1,400
1,200
1,440
1,350
1,400
1,500
1,500
12,840
Expenditure per month
Teacher salaries
Qualification
BA
FA PTC
Matric
Matric
Matric
Total
Utility bills
Upkeep
Registration
Expenditure total
Profit margin:
Monthly
salary
(Rs.)
1200
800
600
600
600
3800
1500
500
150
5950
Rs. 6,890
Using data from table 5 and the questionnaire surveys, a ‘typical’ private school has been
designed to indicate how monthly income and expenditure work out. From this, the
monthly profit margin can be deduced.
- 92 -
- 94 -
Table 5: Summary statistics from mapping by school type
School Type
Level served
Registered
Student
population
StudentTeacher
ratio
Student
Classroom
ratio
Percentag
e of male
teachers
Primary
Yes
400
67
133
0%
Primary
Primary
High42
Yes
Yes
Yes
175
170
200
88
85
18
88
85
40
0%
0%
100%
3180 4150
1000 7000
BPS41
BPS
Yes
Primary
Yes
72
36
36
0%
1350
2001
2003
Yes
Yes
Primary
Primary
Yes
Yes
175
65
16
33
22
33
0
100%
3200-2800
1450
Urban
Urban
Urban
Urban
Urban
Urban
Rural
Rural
1992
1993
1996
2000
2000
2003
2001
2001
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Middle
High
Middle
High
Middle
Middle
Middle
Middle
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
225
109
125
125
110
110
150
113
19
16
16
31
28
28
25
19
38
18
31
42
37
55
30
38
17%
29%
13%
50%
25%
0%
33%
0%
Rural
2004
Yes
Primary
No
60
20
30
0%
500 - 1000
1000-1200
600- 1000
750-1000
500-1000
500 - 600
700 - 2000
500-1000
1000 1500
Location
Established
Mixed
GGPS A
Urban
1988
GGPS B
GGPS C
GBHS
Urban
Rural
Rural
1989
1985
1922
Yes
(partially)
Yes
(partially)
No
No
NFE Centre
Urban
2003
NGO School
NFE Centre
Rural
Rural
Private A
Private B
Private C
Private D
Private E
Private F
Private G
Private H
Private I
41
Basic Pay Scale for teachers, dependent on qualifications and years of service, generally from Rs.3000-6000.
42
Madrassah
A in 1995
Urban
No scholarships
Middleforand
religious
No 4Mixed private
100 and madrassah
11
14site
Upgraded
to Middle 1998 3 With 100%
about
60% of students
in same
11%
Madrassah B
Madrassah C44
0%
25%
Rural
Rural
2002
2004
Yes
Yes
Religious and 1-3
Primary and religious
No
No
50
147
50
18
50
37
Teacher
pay
(Rs./mth)
1500 3000
yet to
receive
500 - 1000
Fees (Rs./
month)
5
5
5
5
5
100 –
17543
5
30 - 100
50 - 300
50 - 150
25 - 300
100-150
30 - 200
50 - 200
50 - 150
40 - 70
0
50 - 100
50
- 95 -
Basic Pay Scale for teachers, dependent on qualifications and years of service, generally from Rs.3000-6000.
3
Upgraded in 1995 to Middle
With 100% scholarships for about 60% of students 4Mixed private and madrassah in same site