Elemental Teleology
Running head: ELEMENTAL TELEOLOGY
Elemental Teleology and an Interpretation of the Rainfall Example in Physics 2.8
Caleb Kinlaw
MSc Philosophy
The University of Edinburgh
2008
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Abstract
This paper proposes an interpretation of the rainfall example in which Aristotle does not
himself think that crop growth is the final cause of rain. The grounds for this interpretation
will be an ‘elemental teleology’ which affirms that the only final cause of the movements of
the elements is the goal of reaching their proper places of rest. Textual evidence for the
presence of this doctrine in Aristotle’s thought is examined in the first two thirds of the paper.
My interpretation is then offered along with an argument for why it is both possible and
preferable to the alternative reading which claims that Aristotle believed that rain falls for the
sake of the crops.
Elemental Teleology
Table of Contents
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………….4
Chapter I – Teleology and the Four Elements…………………………………………6
Aitia in Aristotle……………………………………………………………………….6
Final Cause…………………………………………………………………………….7
Function……………………………………………………………………….8
Goal / Event…………………………………………………………………...8
Value…………………………………………………………………………..9
The Scope of Aristotle’s Teleology……………………………………………………10
Change and the Four Elements………………………………………………………...11
Natural Change………………………………………………………………..11
The Constitution of the Elements……………………………………………..14
Elemental Motion……………………………………………………………..18
Teleology and Necessity…………………………………….…………………………20
Simple Necessity………………………………………………...………….…20
Hypothetical Necessity………………………………………………………..22
Does Elemental Locomotion Have a Final Cause? ……………………………………25
Chapter II – An Interpretation of the Rainfall Example in Physics 2.8………………..27
The Difficulty in Physics 2.8…………………………………………………………..27
The Rainfall Example………………………………………………………………….31
Is the teleology of rainfall being questioned? ………………………………...32
The ‘Opposite Effects Argument’……………………………………………..34
Rainfall and Hypothetical Necessity…………………………………………..35
The Seasonality of Rain……………………………………………………….37
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………..38
Works Cited……………………………………………………………………………40
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Concerning Aristotle’s Teleology and the Elements
In Physics 2.8 Aristotle puts forward a ‘difficulty’ concerning causality in nature.
Aristotle there examines a ‘materialist’ explanation of natural processes. This viewpoint
claimed that rain does not fall for the sake of crop growth. Commentators are divided on the
issue of whether or not Aristotle agreed with this claim. I will argue that he did not think that
rain occurs for the sake of man’s crops. Aristotle did, however, believe that rain takes place
for the sake of something. It will be the position of this paper that Aristotle considered the
only final cause of rainfall to be water’s natural tendency to move towards its proper place.
The idea that water moves upwards with its natural motion for the sake of reaching its
proper place is consistent with an ‘elemental teleology’. Though Aristotle nowhere explicitly
says that elemental motion has a final cause1, the extensive textual support for ‘elemental
teleology’ within the Aristotelian corpus validates this position. However, the context of the
rainfall example lends itself to multiple interpretations.
In the text Aristotle presents a
viewpoint which claims that processes in nature are not caused by the purpose they serve just
as rain does not fall in order to make crops grow. Because Aristotle rejects the central
materialist thesis, the denial of final causality in nature, it is often said that the entire text
expresses a viewpoint antithetical to Aristotle’s own. The purpose of this paper is to argue
that though Aristotle did believe that rain falls for the sake of something, he did not disagree
with the materialists’ rejection of crop growth as the final cause of rain.
Though referring to the opposing viewpoint as ‘materialist’ is anachronistic it is still
an appropriate label. Susan Suave Meyer describes the viewpoint:
The opponents whom Aristotle has in mind are the Presocratic natural philosophers
(phusiologoi) – especially Democritus, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras. He here homogenizes
their views and attributes to them generally the thesis that natural phenomena result of
necessity from the activities of the material elements.2
These thinkers neglected the final cause and gave their focused attention to the material and
efficient causes. Though such terminology was not available to these thinkers their thought
can nonetheless be understood in terms of Aristotle’s classification of causes. It is because
they gave primary causal power to the material cause that the title ‘materialist’ is acceptable.
My interpretation will be founded on an elemental teleology, the principle that the
1
2
Robert Wardy, ‘Aristotelian Rainfall or the Lore of Averages’, p. 20.
‘Aristotle, Teleology, and Reduction’, p. 792.
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four elements (earth, air, fire, and water) move for the sake of reaching their proper places.
Because elemental teleology is the framework through which I will examine the text of
Physics 2.8 I will dedicate the greater part of this paper (sections 1 – 6) to exploring the key
ideas which constitute this position: the final cause, the elements and their movements. With
an understanding of these concepts it will then be possible to interpret the rainfall example in
a manner consistent with, and restricted to, the tenets of elemental teleology.
This paper is divided into 2 chapters with a total of 8 sections. Chapter I establishes
that elemental teleology is Aristotelian in order to justify my interpretation of the rainfall
example. The first two sections examine the idea of cause in Aristotle, with a specific focus
given to the final cause. Section (3) will consider where the final cause is present in the
Aristotelian cosmos. It will be shown that the presence of the final cause is particularly
difficult to confirm with regard to the movements of the four elements. In section (4) I will
step back to take a look change in general as well as the specific way that the elements
change. The discussion concerning elemental changes will introduce the idea of necessity,
which will be the subject of section (5). An understanding of necessity will be important for
an accurate interpretation of the Physics text because the materialists claimed that processes
in nature are necessitated by the matter involved3. I will then return to the question of
whether or not the elemental movements have a final cause in section (6). The conclusion
reached in that section will affirm that the elements do move with a final cause, and that final
cause is reaching the place to which they naturally belong. This ‘elemental teleology’ will be
the grounds for my interpretation of Physics 2.8.
Chapter II will consist of an examination of the materialist view expressed in Physics
2.8, my interpretation, and reasons in support of my position. It will begin in section (7) by
introducing the relevant text. The rainfall example will be interpreted in such a way as to
deny that Aristotle thought that crop growth was the final cause of rain. Three reasons will
then be given why such a claim is not only possible but also consistent with Aristotle’s view
of the final cause in elemental movements. Section (8) will contain the brunt of my argument
which consists of the three main reasons in support of the proposed interpretation as well as a
response to an important objection:
(A) The status of rainfall in its causal relation to crop growth is not being questioned either in
the difficulty or in Aristotle’s responding arguments.
(B) The ‘Opposite Effects Argument’ put forward in the difficulty is a valid argument.
(C) Though rain may be necessary for crops to grow, that does not imply that crop growth is
the final cause of rain.
The term ‘matter’ would not have been used by Aristotle’s predecessors. Their explanations referred
to a cause which Aristotle called the ‘material cause’. For that reason I am using the term ‘matter’ to
refer to the specific cause which they made use of.
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(D) Three reasons against accepting David Sedley’s argument4 that the seasonality of rain is
evidence that crop growth is the final cause.
The paper will conclude with a restatement of my thesis along with a summary of the main
points in support of my interpretation.
Chapter I – Teleology and the Four Terrestrial Elements
1. Aitia in Aristotle
An overview of causation in Aristotle will pave the way for an examination of the
final cause. Aitia is the Greek word translated as ‘cause’ in Physics 2.3, where Aristotle puts
forward the four types of cause: material, efficient, formal, and final (195a 15) 5. Causes were
for Aristotle a means by which to explain something. An aitia was an answer to the question
‘Why?’, or ‘On account of what?’. An explanation of a thing or event will refer to the cause
of that thing or event6. To offer such an explanation one must have full knowledge of the
cause (An. Post. 1.1 71b7 8-12). Knowledge (scientific) is stated in deductive form, and to
demonstrate such knowledge is to form a syllogism “the grasp of which is eo ipso such
knowledge,” (An. Post. 1.2 71b 18-19). In such a syllogism the cause can be shown as the
middle term which necessitates the conclusion. We know why the Athenians fought the
Persians when we understand the aitia of the war (An. Post. 2.11). Aristotle puts forward the
following example:
1. Persians attack anyone who raids Sardis.
2. The Athenians raid Sardis.
3. Therefore the Persians attack the Athenians. (An. Post. 94a 35 - b 7)
When the first premise is followed by the second the conclusion follows. The term shared by
both the first and second premise, ‘raiding Sardis’ is what ‘causes’ the conclusion to follow.
The middle term, ‘raiding Sardis’, can thus be considered the efficient cause of the Persian
War.
Aristotle takes the ‘Why?’ question to be a request for a full understanding of the
primary causes of a thing. If we judge the sufficiency of an answer according to the
understanding it imparts, we will better understand Aristotle’s conception of ‘cause’. If I am
David Sedley, ‘Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?’, pp. 184-187.
R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye’s translation in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon.
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When I refer to ‘things’ and ‘events’ in nature, I will not always specify one or the other due to the
fact that it will not always matter. Aristotle applies the final cause to ‘things’ such as animals and their
parts, as well as ‘events’ such as nest building or reproduction. My arguments will by and large cover
both ‘things’ and ‘events’. The concepts often overlap. When discussing the final cause of a ‘thing’ it
may make reference to its function, which is an event, or its coming to be, which is also an event. The
heart (a thing) exists for the sake of the organism. An understanding of that would require one to
recognize the process of how the heart’s activity facilitates the organism’s survival (a process). For
this reason I will at times use these terms interchangeably.
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asked why I moved my pawn in a game of chess and I reply in terms of the material cause
alone (my hand made contact with the wooden piece and changed its location etc.), my reply
would rightly be considered unsatisfactory. Aristotle’s four causes distinguish between the
different meanings of the ‘Why?’ question and the corresponding different types of answers.
The explanation would need to refer also to the strategy which motivated my move (e.g., to
gain control of the center of the board). The failure to recognize all types of causation leads
to explanations which do not fully explain ‘why’ a thing is as it is. According to Plato in the
Phaedo such an impoverished explanation was given by Anaxagoras concerning the
arrangement of things. Upon realizing that Anaxagoras’ explanation failed to explain fully
why things are as they are, Socrates said that he had failed to provide the causes of such
things:
My glorious hope, my friend, was quickly snatched away from me. As I went on with my
reading I saw that the man made no use of intelligence, and did not assign any real causes for
the ordering of things, but mentioned as causes air and ether and water and many other
absurdities. And it seemed to me it was very much as if one should say that Socrates does with
intelligence whatever he does, and then, in trying to give the causes of the particular thing I
do, should say first that I am now sitting here because my body is composed of bones and
sinews, and the bones are hard and have joints which divide them and the sinews can be
contracted and relaxed and, with the flesh and the skin which contains them all, are laid about
the bones. (Phaedo 98b – 99b)
As will be seen below, Aristotle expresses similar dissatisfaction with causal explanations
given by his materialist predecessors (Phys. 2.8). The point here is that for Aristotle a cause,
or aitia, is a full explanatory account of why something is as it is, and not just how. A full
explanation will provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to come to be
in all four senses of the term cause. Such a satisfactory account will require that reference be
made to the final cause.
2. Final Cause
The final cause is introduced in Physics 2.2 as ‘that for the sake of which’ a thing is
done (194b 33). Like in the example above, the final cause can serve as the middle term of a
syllogism which necessitates the conclusion. The following syllogism provides an answer to
the question, “Why does the house exist?”:
1. A structure is built which serves to preserve one’s goods.
2. The preservation of one’s goods is the function of a house.
3. The structure that is built is a house. (An. Post. 2.11 94b 9-10)
The middle term here is ‘the preservation of man’s goods’, which is the final cause of the
existence of the house. The final cause thus offers an answer to the ‘why’ question of the
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house’s existence.
Identifying the final cause of a house is relatively easy in comparison with finding it
in nature. In order to pursue that inquiry one must know exactly what to look for. There are
multiple aspects of the final cause which can be gathered from Aristotle’s application of the
concept. I would like to highlight three aspects of final causation which will assist in
understanding and identifying it in nature. The final cause can be considered in terms of:
function, goal and value.
A. Function
An essential function is a thing’s primary purpose. The function of a thing is
sometimes said to be the ‘end’ of its existence:
The function of each thing is its end. It is obvious, then, that the function is better than the
state. For the end, as end, is the best. For it was assumed that the best and the final is the end
for the sake of which all other things exist. That the function is better than the sate and the
condition, then, is plain. (E.E. 2.1 1219a 8-11)
When something is fulfilling its function it is acting (or causing) in virtue of being itself. The
eye is fully an eye when it is actively seeing, because that is its primary function7. Among the
many functions performed by an organism, that which is highest is its end. By ‘highest’ I
mean the function which is the actualization of the organism’s form. Frog legs may function
as an appetizer or as means for jumping. Since the latter function fulfils a key aspect of what
it is to be a frog, it is that which is the leg’s primary function. For animals in general the
primary function is utilizing the power of perception and locomotion, and for man the
exercise of thought is primary as well as perception (NE 1170a 16-17). Given that a thing’s
primary function is also its end, it may be said to exist for the sake of performing that
function. The sculptor only has being as a sculptor as long as he is able to make sculptures.
The fact that the primary function is the ‘end’ of a thing’s existence means that it exists for
the sake of performing that function and not the other way around. The eye exists for the sake
of seeing, but animals do not see in order to have the capacity of seeing (Meta. 9.8 1050a 1011; D.A. 2.1 412b 10-24).
B. Goal / End
Any purpose driven action requires an end if it is to avoid becoming subject to an
infinite regress of explaining for what sake the action takes place (Meta. 2.2 994b 8-16). One
might explain one’s moral choices by appealing to the goal of being happy. If there were no
such goal then an explanation of a given moral choice would be subject to an infinite regress,
never arriving at a sufficient explanation of ‘why’ the action was chosen. The same is true of
7
De Anima 2.1 412b 10-24
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any rational activity. For example, the ‘end’ of the boat builder’s activity is the completed
boat. Without such an end there would be no reason to begin the process. Monte Johnson
says the same goes for intentional activity in general, “Action cannot get off the ground if
there is no determinate and ultimate end for the sake of which it is undertaken”8.
The cause ‘for the sake of which’ is not necessarily an ‘end’ in the sense of the final
stage of a process. It is the ‘aim’ of the process which is fulfilled in the final stage, but it
remains present whether or not the final stage is ever realized. If the boat is not successfully
completed, the boat still remains the ‘end’ of boat-building activities insofar as it was that for
the sake of which the process started. It is helpful to think of the final cause as “that for the
sake of which” rather than implying finality or completion. This point is made clear in
Metaphysics 5.17 when Aristotle says that sometimes the final cause is both the starting thing
and the end of the process. In discussing the meanings of ‘limit’ he says it is, “the end of
each thing (and of this nature is that towards which the movement and the action are, not that
from which they are - though sometimes it is both, that from which and that to which the
movement is, i.e. the final cause)” (1022a 6-9). When a doctor heals a patient the final cause
of ‘health’9 is in the doctor’s mind before he cures the patient, and it is instantiated in the
patient after he is cured10. Thus the final cause of health, though it is the ‘end’ of the process
of healing, is present at the beginning of the change as well as at the end.
C. Value.
The final cause must be a good for that which it is a cause. Aristotle says: “‘That for
the sake of which’ means what is best and the end of the things that lead up to it. (Whether we
say the ‘good itself’ or the ‘apparent good’ makes no difference.)” (Phys. 2.3 195a 24-25).
The final cause was seen above to be a goal at which a process aims. The goal however must
be good for the thing undergoing the process. For, death is a goal in the sense that it is the last
stage in a process, but it is not a final cause because it is not a good. David Furley says,
“Again, since every animal dies in the end, why should we not say that its life processes are
for the sake of death? Aristotle’s answer was that the goal must be recognizably a good.”11
Having distinguished between the goal or end of a process and the value of
completing a process we are able to understand why Aristotle considers the final cause to
have a dual meaning. Something may exist or occur for the sake of something in two ways
8
Aristotle on Teleology, p. 83.
‘Health’ is here being considered as the idea of health, or the ‘formula’ of health (Meta. 7.7 1032b5).
10
Aristotle says in Meta. Zeta, “But from art proceed the things of which the form is in the soul of the
artist,” (1032a 34). Thus in art the form is passed on just as in natural generation. But in art the form
exists beforehand in the soul of the craftsman, in natural generation it exists in the parent. David
Bostock says, “That ‘by which’ the generation is effected is the same form as is acquired in the
generation, but ‘in another’ – in the one case in a material thing (the parent), but in the other in the
mind,” (Metaphysics Book Z and H, p. 125).
11
‘What Kind is Aristotle’s Final Cause?’ p. 66.
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(Phys. 2.2 194a 35-6). It may occur for the sake of reaching the goal or for the sake of
attaining a good. Aristotle says, “The phrase ‘for the sake of which’ is ambiguous; it may
mean either (a) the end to achieve which, or (b) the being in whose interest, the act is done,”
(De Anima 2.4 415b 3-4). So the final cause of constructing the house is both (a) the goal of a
completed house and (b) the man whose goods will be preserved. This illustrates the
important distinction between “(a) some being for whose good an action is done, and (b)
something at which the action aims” (Meta. 12.6 1072b 2-3).
3. The Scope of Aristotle’s Teleology
The presence of the final cause is expansive in Aristotle’s cosmos. “Nature never
makes anything without a purpose” (P.A. 658a 10). This idea is a leitmotif running throughout
many of Aristotle’s physical works12. Does this mean that all things and events in nature have
a final cause? The boundaries of what is and what is not included within the teleological
realm are not easy to identify. It is for this reason that even today interpretations differ
concerning Aristotle’s view of rainfall. A tool which Aristotle uses in order to identify the
final cause within nature is his ‘nature-craft analogy’.
Many processes in nature are said to be teleological due to the resemblance they bear
to processes carried out by people. With regard to final causality Aristotle sees a close
similarity between nature and craft. He uses this similarity to support his claims that processes
in nature are goal oriented (Phys. 199a 10-20, 33- 199b6, 199b 25-30). He claims that:
Further, where a series has a completion, all the preceding steps are for the sake of
that. As in intelligent action, so in nature; and as in nature, so it is in each action, if
nothing interferes. Now intelligent action is for the sake of an end; therefore the
nature of things also is so. Thus if a house, e.g., had been a thing made by nature, it
would have been made in the same way as it is now by art; and if things made by
nature were made also by art, they would come to be in the same way as by nature.
(Phys. 199a 9-15).
In craft it is easy to observe that each stage of a process takes place for the sake of
accomplishing a goal. The carpenter measures and cuts for the sake of making something
with the wood. Likewise, processes in nature which occur regularly and usually lead to the
same stage of completion when not impeded have that last stage as the final cause of the
process. For example, Aristotle mentions the works of creatures such as ants and spiders
(Phys. 199a 23). When we see a spider build a web we have grounds for asserting the final
cause to be capturing prey. The craft analogy supports this claim because man also creates
12
The idea that nature does nothing in vain can be found in the following texts: De Caelo 271a 33,
291b 13-14; De Anima 432b 21, 434a 41; P.A. 661b 24, 691b 4-5, 694a 15, 695b 19-20; G.A. 739b 19,
741b 4, 744a 37-8.
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traps to catch food, and such processes are caused by the final stage of the process13.
It is not debated that animals and their parts are included among those things that are
teleological. Plants are included as well (Phys. 199a 23-30). Plants send down their roots
naturally ‘for the sake of nourishment’ (199a29). The natural movements (the precise
meaning of this term will be explained below) of animate beings and their parts (most of
them) do have a goal, function and value. The goal of the plant spreading its roots is to reach
water, the function is to provide nourishment, and the value is the plant’s growth and
sustenance.
It is neither unreasonable nor contentious to claim that some things in nature should
be excluded from the category of the teleological. Aristotle recognized that there are limits to
what is included among natural things which exist for the sake of something. Some things do
not exist for the sake of anything. The color of your eye, for example, does not exist for the
sake of anything. It serves no purpose. But the eye itself exists for the sake of seeing, which is
part of being human. “Thus the existence and the formation of an eye is ‘for the sake of
something,’ but its being blue is not,” (G.A. 5.1 778a 30). An eye is not blue for the sake of
anything, the color is an accidental property of the eye (G.A. 778b). It is accidental that the
eye is blue, but it is not accidental that the eye can see. Likewise, when considering the eye as
the cause of sight, the eye itself will be the direct cause of sight, while the color will be an
incidental cause of sight14.
We know, then, that plants, animals and their parts exist and function for the sake of
something. We also know that there are limits to the teleological realm and some things do
not have a final cause. What remains to be considered is the status of the inanimate things in
nature. Do these have a goal, function, and value? Like animate beings, inanimate things in
nature do move and are changed. To understand whether or not the inanimate beings are
included within the teleological realm requires a detailed analysis of such change. For it is in
change that causation can be analyzed.
4. Change and the Four Elements
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The analogy need not bring intentionality into the works of nature. Aristotle considers craft to be
without deliberation. “Art does not deliberate,” (Phys. 199b 27). Therefore it is not necessary to
consider a spider’s web to be a product of deliberation. Sarah Broadie claims that the objection that
this analogy entails that there is a psychological aspect in natural processes is a ‘non-problem’ for
Aristotle’s teleology. She says of the analogy that, “craft is non-psychological in precisely those
respects in which craft is most suited to provide the model for nature,” (‘Nature and Craft in
Aristotelian Teleology’, p. 398).
14
An incidental cause is one which belongs to the direct cause of an effect ‘incidentally’ (Phys. 195a
35). For example, the direct cause of a sculpture is the sculptor, whether he be Polyclitus or
Michelangelo. The direct cause of the Pieta was the sculptor while the incidental cause was
Michelangelo. This is because ‘sculptor’ and ‘Michelangelo’ are incidentally related. The person who
carved the Pieta could not have been anything but a sculptor, but the sculptor who carved it could have
been someone other than Michelangelo.
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A. Natural Change
Any change which involves one thing becoming something else can be divided into
two contrary states (Phys.1.7), a negative and a positive, each of which share a single
underlying matter (G.C. 315b30-33). The movement from one pole to the other may involve a
change in a thing’s form and matter, or in a quality of the thing. The former type of change is
coming-to-be or passing-away15, the latter type is ‘alteration’ (G.C. 317a 23-29). Because it is
impossible for something to come-to-be from nothing16, such a change moves from a negative
pole of ‘potentiality’ to the positive pole of ‘actuality’17. That way it is not being asserted that
something came from nothing, but that something actual came from something that was only
potentially so. Another way of putting it would be to say that a being comes from not-being
which has potential for being, but nothing comes from not-being qua not-being. Aristotle
says, “For coming-to-be necessarily implies the pre-existence of something which potentially
‘is’, but actually ‘is not’; and this something is spoken of both as ‘being’ and as ‘not-being’
(G.C. 317b 16-18). It is not-being in the sense of a privation, which is ‘not-being’ in a
qualified sense (Phys. 191b 16). When one thing comes-to-be another thing, that which it
comes from serves as the negative pole of ‘not-being’ or ‘potentially being’, while that which
comes-to-be serves as the positive pole of ‘being’, or the actual thing. When a man becomes
healthy the change is from disease to health. Disease is the privation of health and might
exists in that which is potentially healthy. The positive corollary is actual health.
With regard to the elements, when one changes into another the two poles will be
similarly present. “Hence whatever the contrasted ‘poles’ of the changes may be – whether
Fire and Earth, or some other couple – one of them will be a ‘being’ and the other ‘a notbeing’”(G.C. 318b 12-13). Whenever something comes to be there will always be a reciprocal
passing away of what served as the negative pole of the change (G.C. 319a 20). For whatever
was potential before the change will no longer be potential and will thus not exist as
potentially that thing. This movement between contrary poles can pertain to a thing’s
quantity, quality, location, or substance18.
The two poles of change must be contraries of a reciprocal nature. They must be
related to each other as two extremes on a continuum. For example, white and black are both
15
There are five different ways that something can come-to-be given by Aristotle in Physics 1.7.
“Generally things which come to be, come to be in different ways: (1) by change of shape, as a statue;
(2) by addition, as in things which grow; (3) by taking away, as the Hermes from the stone; (4) by
putting together, as a house; (5) by alteration, as things which ‘turn in respect of their material
substance,” (190a 5-9).
16
The famous Parmenidean thesis which “more than any other, preoccupied and alarmed the earliest
philosophers,” (G.C. 317b 30).
17
The definition of motion is given in Physics 3.1 as “The fulfilment of what exists potentially, in so
far as it exists potentially, is motion,” (201a 10).
18
A change involving a thing’s substance means that whatever comes to be can in no way be considered
a property of that which served as the negative contrary (G.C. 320a 1-2). For example, when earth
changes into fire, fire is not simply a new and different property of earth.
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colors, and can therefore serve as contraries between changes in color. ‘White’ and ‘line’,
however, can not serve as two opposite poles because they are not proper contraries (G.C.
323b 25). In a change there must be something shared between that which is before and that
which is after the change. I can’t change anything about an object which I have nothing in
common with. Try as I might, I won’t be able to change the location of a something I can’t
touch. I only have the possibility of changing the location of a marble if I share with the
marble the capacity of making physical contact. If we have that in common, then I can make
contact with it. Health and disease are identical in so far as they are each a condition of man’s
body.
If we consider ‘change’ in respect of that which is going to change and that into
which it changes (the before and after product), there must also be involved in change an
action and a passion. When I push the marble I am the active agent and it is the passive agent.
This active-passive dichotomy is characteristic of all change. The active agent in any change
must share with the passive agent something in common of which the active is at one extreme
and the passive at the other. Fire can only act on ice because both the active and passive
agents are identical with regard to being bodies which have temperatures. Fire can not melt an
idea because they do not share the quality of having a temperature or being combustible.
Aristotle says,
Hence agent and patient must be in one sense identical, but in another sense other than (i.e.
‘unlike’) one another. And since (a) patient and agent are generically identical (i.e. ‘like’) but
specifically ‘unlike’, while (b) it is ‘contraries’ that exhibit this character: it is clear that
‘contraries and their ‘intermediates’ are such as to suffer action and to act reciprocally – for
indeed it is these that constitute the entire sphere of passing-away and coming-to-be. (G.C
324a 4-9).
When two things possessing corresponding contraries make contact with each other, the
active thing will assimilate the passive thing to itself (G.C. 324a 11). Because ice is
potentially warm, and fire is actually hot, fire will make ice like itself and heat the ice. Not
only is this likely to happen, it must happen in the absence of interference (G.C. 324a 13,
324b 9). The active contrary which effects such change in other things which are potentially
like itself is called by Aristotle an ‘active power’, which is also a ‘cause’ in the sense that it
starts the process of change (G.C. 324b114). For fire, this power is ‘the hot’ (G.C. 324b 19).
We may furthermore consider ‘the hot’ to be the very form of fire, for Aristotle also says that
the form is the power immersed in matter (G.C. 322a29).
Something which comes-to-be comes from a) the underlying matter and b) the
privation of that which serves as the positive pole of the change. Consider boiling water as an
illustration. Water might be considered the underlying matter. Before it boiled the water was
cold, and in that sense it lacked warmth. The coolness then would serve as the privation. The
Elemental Teleology
14
corresponding contrary is heat, and when the water heats up the privation (coolness)
disappears. The tricky thing is that the substratum can be viewed as both the privation and the
matter, or as that which does not survive the change and that which does.
This may be easier to understand with an illustration provided by Aristotle (Phys.
190b 10-15). When I learn to play the guitar a change takes place. I was un-musical and now
I am musical. I am the subject of the change. ‘Musicality’ is the quality which can be
represented by two contraries, one which represents a privation (un-musical) and one which
represents an actuality (being musical). The product of the change is musical-me, a composite
of form (musical) and subject (me). The subject (me, or man) is like the substratum in that it
can be viewed as the matter (the thing undergoing change) or as the privation of the form
acquired(the potential of whatever is going to be actual)19. The matter can be viewed as a) that
which lasts through the change, or as b) that which contains the privation of the form. In the
first sense it is potentially that which it becomes actually, and thus it exists before and after
the change. In the second sense it passes away, for the privation no longer exists once the
form is actualized (Phys. 192a 25-30). Matter, whether viewed as the privation of or the
potential for a form, is always in-formed (G.C. 329a 26). Aristotle says that matter is “the
‘mean’ between the two contraries, and matter is imperceptible and inseparable from them,”
(G.C. 332a 36-37) If we consider these different aspects of change we can place them in an
order of primacy. The substratum is primary in the strictest sense of the word, for it is not
actually a body (G.C. 329a 34). The positive and negative contraries with which matter is
bound are primary, but they presuppose the substratum. The physical elements must
presuppose both the contrary and the substratum and are thus ‘primary’ in a weaker sense
(G.C. 329a35). The elements, then, are not ‘prime matter’20 or the actual contraries such as
‘the hot’ and ‘the cold’. To understand what they are let us now turn to their constitution and
the in which they change.
B. The Constitution of the Elements
All the complex bodies on Earth are composed of these four elements (G.C. 334b
34)21. The fact that the elements are the building blocks of all other physical bodies is their
If we consider ‘man’ as the subject it is both the ‘matter’ of the changing thing and the privation of
the attribute which is being acquired (non-musical). The subject can then be considered in two sense,
though numerically it is one (Phys. 190b23-26).
20
The idea of ‘prime matter’ is controversial and commentators are divided on whether or not such a
concept can be found in Aristotle’s thought. For an analysis of the different interpretations see the
appendix in C.J.F. William’s edition of De Generatione et Corruption or in W. Charlton’s Physics I
and II, both in the Clarendon Aristotle Series.
21
However, in Meteorologica 4.4 381b 24, and 382a 4 Aristotle says that physical bodies are
composed of earth and water rather than all four elements. This may be due to a different viewpoint
being taken in that work, as claimed by H.D.P. Lee in his introduction, “For in this book all four
elements are still involved in the composition of bodies; but two are regarded as active, and therefore
19
Elemental Teleology
15
defining characteristic. In De Caelo Aristotle says, “An element, we take it, is a body into
which other bodies may be analysed, present in them potentially or in actuality (which of
these, is still disputable), and not divisible into bodies different in form,” (G.C. 302a 16-17).
Animate bodies can be analysed into three stages of composition. At the basic level
the elements are present. These constitute the ‘uniform parts’ such as blood and bone, which
in turn constitute the second level, the non-uniform parts, such as the face and the hand (P.A.
646a 13-24). The form of the living being is identifiable with the highest degree of
composition, and it is the soul (P.A. 641a 19). When the soul departs the elements remain, but
because these are not the form of the being the organism no longer exists (P.A. 641a 20-21).
Plants and animals are ‘complex structures’ which come-to-be and pass-away in a manner
which makes it clear that more elemental bodies, such as earth, are the basic building blocks
of these structures (G.C. 328b 33-35). A corpse will not retain its complexity and will
manifest the basic elements upon its decay22, for ‘dust we are and unto dust we shall return’23.
On the flip side of that coin, things also grow and are generated from these elements. Plants
and animals are generated when the underlying matter of change has a variety of contraries all
mixed together (hot-cold, wet-dry, etc.) in just the right proportion (logos) so as to effect the
coming-to-be of the thing (Meteor. 4.1 378b 26-29).
These perceptible bodies are characterised also by the tangible contraries which they
manifest (G.C. 329b 10). The elements contain actual and potential contraries such as hot and
cold, yet they are not themselves identical with any one of these contraries. Fire is hot, yet it
is not ‘the hot’, or as Aristotle would put it, the contraries do not “constitute the substance of
any thing” (Phys. 189a 30). ‘The hot’ is the active power of fire and it acts on that which is
potentially hot. It does not act on ‘the cold’, for ‘the cold’ is its own contrary (Phys. 198b33).
Aristotle makes this point with regard to Empedocles’ primary contraries Love and Strife,
“For Love does not gather Strife together and make things out of it, nor does Strife make
anything out of Love, but both act on a third thing different from both,” (Phys. 189a 25-26).
Since we observe change taking place between contraries and these contraries are not acting
on each other, there is a ‘substratum’ which is postulated as a ‘third principle’ (Phys. 189a
29)24.
The primary pairs of contrarieties are hot-cold and dry-wet (G.C. 329b25). The hotcold pair are active contraries, while the wet and the dry are passive (Meteor. 4.1 378b 12).
as efficient cause, two as passive, and therefore as material cause,” (Meteorologica, p. xix).
22
“Things, therefore, that are decaying become first moist and then in the end dry: for it was from these
properties that they originated, the moist being determined by the dry through the operation of the
active properties,” (Meteor. 4.1 379a 8-10).
23
Gen. 3:19.
24
He makes the same point in G.C. 2.1 saying, “We must reckon as an ‘originative source’ and as
‘primary’ the matter which underlies, though it is inseparable from the contrary qualities: for ‘the hot’
is not matter for ‘the cold’ nor ‘the cold’ for ‘the hot’, but the substratum is matter for them both,”
(329a 31-33).
Elemental Teleology
16
Hot brings like things together and cold joins together like and unlike things (G.C. 329b 2830). Wet is characterised as that which is easily shaped yet has no shape of its own, and dry is
that which has a shape of its own but is not ‘readily adaptable in shape’ (G.C. 329b 33).
These are the four contraries from which all others are derived (see diagram)25. These four
contraries mix and match resulting in four combinations; four rather than six because any two
opposites will not be coupled, i.e. there is nothing that is both cold and hot (G.C. 330a30).
These four combinations of contraries attach themselves to matter and result in the four
elements (G.C. 330b 2): earth, air, water, and fire (Meteor. 339a 16)26. Fire is the combination
of the hot and the dry, earth is cold and dry, air is hot and wet, and water is cold and wet.
(G.C. 330b 3-5) (see diagram)27. Water is contrary to Fire, and Earth is contrary to Air (G.C.
331a 2-3). Though each element is a pair of contraries, they are each characterized primarily
by one of the contraries: Earth is primarily dry, Fire is primarily hot, Air is wet and Water is
cold (G.C. 331a3-5).
Aristotle believed that the elements could be perceived to come-to-be (G.C. 331a8).
The spark which creates a fire involves a change of what was dry and (perhaps) cold into
something that is dry and extremely hot. A thunderstorm on a hot humid day manifests a
change from hot humid air into cool wet water. These are grounds for asserting that the
elements come-to-be from one another28. Aristotle states this doctrine clearly in Meteorolgica
25
The basic tangible contrarieties are: hot-cold, dry-wet, heavy-light, hard-soft, viscous-brittle, roughsmooth, coarse-fine, (G.C. 329b 19-20). The last three pairs are derived from the dry-wet pair.
COLD –
Brings together with
itself other cold
things as well as noncold things
HOT Brings together with
itself other hot
things
WET –
Easily bounded but
naturally without
bounds
DRY –
Not easily shaped,
but naturally has
shape
Fine
Course
Viscous
Brittle
Hard
Soft
26
In a rather enigmatic remark Aristotle says in De Caelo 4.5 that there are as many kinds of matter as
there are simple bodies, “The kinds of matter, then, must be as numerous as these bodies, i.e. four, but
though they are four there must be a common matter of all – particularly if they pass into one another –
which in each is in being different,” (312a 31-35).
27
“And these four couples have attached themselves to the apparently ‘simple’ bodies,” (330b1-2).
Hot
Hot
Wet
Air
28
Cold
Wet
Hot
Dry
Fire
Cold
Dry
Wet
Water
Cold
Dry
Earth
An alternative argument for this fact is found in De Caelo where Aristotle says that it would be
Elemental Teleology
17
1.3, saying, “We maintain that fire, air, water, and earth are transformable one into another,
and that each is potentially latent in the others,” (G.C. 339b 1-3). These changes are directed
according to the contraries which characterize the elements. An element will tend to change
into that element which shares that contrary which is its primary contrary. For example, earth
tends to change into fire because earth is primarily dry and the only other element which
shares that contrary is fire. Likewise, fire tends to turn into air because air shares with it fire’s
primary contrary ‘hot’. This results in a cycle of change which is facilitated by complimentary
factors’ (G.C. 331a24-35) (see diagram)29. The changes are not bound by these rules however,
they simply occur most easily and quickly in this way (G.C. 331a25). “It is evident, therefore,
that the coming-to-be of the ‘simple’ bodies will be cyclical; and that this cyclical method of
transformation is the easiest, because the consecutive ‘elements’ contain interchangeable
‘complimentary factors’,” (G.C. 331b1-3).
The water cycle manifests this cycle. Such a cycle would have been considered by
Aristotle a change of water into air, and then back into water (G.C. 338b 6-8). The elements
do not recur in the same particulars, but in the same kinds. For example, when there is a
thunder shower rain falls, evaporates, and then forms a cloud. When that thunder cloud
produces rain it will not result in the exact same raindrops as the shower the night before.
The recurring rain will be identical in form but different in number. This is similar to the
cycle of generations among man. The grandchild is the specifically the same as the
grandfather (they are both human), but numerically distinct (they are different people)30.
impossible for an element to be generated from either a) an incorporeal body, or b) a corporeal body
other than an element (3.6 305a 14-33).
Air
WET
HOT
Water
COLD
DRY
Fire
29
Earth
The cycle of transmutation:
C.J.F. Williams points out important differences between the water-cycle and generational cycle.
The stages of cloud-rain-cloud are not analogous to the generations of man, man-man-man, with each
being a different person with a different name. In the water cycle there also has to be a cloud in order
30
Elemental Teleology
18
C. Elemental Motion
The elements are what Aristotle calls ‘natural substances’ (De Caelo 298a 29-30,
Meta. 1017b 10)31. “All these are called substance because they are not predicated of a subject
but everything else is predicated of them,” (Meta. 1017b 12-13). For example, we may say
that fire is hot, bright, red, etc. But we would not say of anything other than fire that “x is
fire”. It is not predicated of other things, but other things are predicated of it. To be a
substance also means that the thing has within itself a principle of motion (De Caelo 268b 2729, 301b 17). Such a principle is characteristic of anything which is natural. For example, a
tree is a natural substance and has an internal principle of change. A bed is an artefact and not
a natural substance, and therefore does not have an internal principle of motion in virtue of
itself. If you planted both a wooden bed and a small acorn tree in the ground only one of them
would reveal an internal principle of motion (Phys. 193a 11-17)32. This is because a bed is the
product of art rather than nature. In Physics 2 Aristotle says, “All the things mentioned
present a feature in which they differ from things which are not constituted by nature. Each of
them has within itself a principle of motion and of stationariness,” (192b12-15)33.
The elements, as bodies with magnitude, are capable of locomotion (De Caelo 268b
15). Because the elements are simple (not made of parts) their motion will be simple as well
(De Caelo 269b 30). Simple locomotion can be of two types, circular or rectilinear (or a
combination of the two) (De Caelo 268b 14-15). Rectilinear motion is either towards or away
from the centre, i.e. upward or downward (De Caelo 268b 21). The four elements move in a
rectilinear fashion34: earth and water move downward, fire and air upward (De Caelo 269a 18,
Meteor. 339a 11-16). In the absence of any obstacles the elements will move in these
directions (De Caelo 311a 20).
Though the elements have within themselves a principle of motion, this does not
mean that they move themselves. With regard to locomotion animals are self-movers (Phys.
253a 14). Because their motion is derived from within themselves their movements are
for there to be rain and vice versa. Among man however this necessity is not reciprocal; if there is to
be a 2nd generation there must be a 1st generation, but not the other way around (Aristotle’s De
Generatione et Corruptione, p. 209).
31
The elements are sensible-perishable substances, one of three types of substance given in
Metaphysics 7, the other two being: sensible-eternal substances and immutable substances (1069a 30
ff.).
32
Aristotle quotes this example from Antiphon who used it as an argument to say that a thing’s matter
is its nature. I am here using the example with the intention of illustrating what a principle of motion is
and recognize that I am using it in a completely different way than it was used in the context of Physics
2.1.
33
Nature is defined as “a source or cause of being moved and of being at rest in that to which it
belongs primarily,” (Phys. 192b 22-23). When referring to a thing’s ‘nature’ Aristotle distinguishes
between two senses of the word: it may refer to the matter of a thing or the form (P.A. 641a 26).
34
The ‘fifth element’ (though actually prior to the others), aither, moves in perfect circular motion,
(De Caelo 1.2).
Elemental Teleology
19
natural (Phys. 254b 17)35. The power to move one’s self is distinctive only of living things.
Such movement can be recognized as self-derived because it is accompanied by the power to
stop the motion as well as start it (Phys. 255a 5-7). It is impossible for the elements to move
themselves because they are ‘naturally connected substances’ (Phys. 255a 13)36. Self-motion
requires composition, a division between an active and passive part. In such motion there is a
mover and a moved. Elements are not so divided and therefore depend on an external force to
set them in motion (Phys.255a 17). That, however, does not mean that when they do move
their motion is not natural. Motion which is not derived from within the moving object can be
either natural or unnatural. Any movement towards a thing’s proper place is natural,
movement in the opposite direction is unnatural (Phys. 254b 22). The elements move towards
their proper place, and thus their movements are natural.
The elements have natural places which might be thought of as concentric layers
which start in the middle of the earth and spread out towards the heavens. Earth’s proper
place is at the centre of the world and thus it moves naturally in that direction. Fire’s proper
place is at the extremity of the world and it moves upward away from the centre (De Caelo
296b 9-16, Phys. 230b 10-20).
These two bodies are ‘absolutely’ heavy and light
respectively. Water is ‘relatively’ heavy compared to air, which is ‘relatively’ light. These
two bodies combine the properties of heavy and lightness. Air is relatively heavy compared to
fire and relatively light compared to water and earth. For this reason water and air rise and fall
in rectilinear movements towards their proper places, which are located in the between the
centre and extremity, where the other two ‘absolutely’ heavy and light elements move (De
Caelo 311a 15-30).
Natural movements are therefore towards these places. Every time fire rises and earth
falls these movements are natural because they are moving in the direction of their places of
rest. Unnatural movements are in the opposite direction. Both natural and unnatural
movement can be seen when a rock is thrown into the air. It first rises unnaturally and then
moves back towards is proper place. It stops when it hits the ground not because it has
reached the centre, but because it is impeded from moving further. Even when the rock is
resting on the ground, because its location remains away from the centre, such rest is
unnatural in the same way that its flight upward is unnatural (De Caelo 300a 26). “Just as
there is unnatural motion, so, too, a thing may be in an unnatural state of rest,” (Phys. 231a 8).
It might be wondered why the four elements do not reach their resting points and
Johnson defines ‘natural change’ as the change which happens “in the case of things that have a sate
of completion and, concomitantly, the capacity to change into that,” (2005, p.134). Such a state of
completion with regard to elemental movements will be discussed below.
36
How their movements are to be explained if not from within themselves is a subject debated by
commentators. According to Monte Johnson, this issue more than any other, “has been a source of
confusion and misinformation about Aristotelian teleology,” (2005, p.135).
35
Elemental Teleology
20
stratify the world into four layers. The elemental movements are caused by the heavenly
bodies, especially the sun. Concerning the sublunary region Aristotle says, “This region must
be continuous with the motions of the heavens, which therefore regulate its whole capacity for
movement: for the celestial element as source of all motion must be regarded as first cause,”
(339a20-25). If the sun had no effect on the atmosphere and terrestrial world the elements
would each settle into their places like a jar of oil and water would settle after being shaken.
The celestial motions keep them ‘stirred up’ in the changes and processes which we see in
nature37. The sun’s continual approach and retreat govern the processes of generation and
destruction (G.C. 336b 9), as well as causing the transmutation of the elements to continue
(337a 13). The cycle of transmutation, governed by the sun’s movements, is what keeps the
elements from separating unto themselves.
It is because their movements are natural that each element always moves in the same
direction without fail (Phys. 252a 17). If you witnessed a stone floating on water it would be
unnatural because water’s proper place is above earth rather than closer to the centre. Does
the fact that the elements always display natural motion mean that it is impossible that a stone
could float on the water? This line of thought brings us to the idea of necessity in elemental
motions.
5. Teleology and Necessity
It was mentioned above that fire must melt ice upon contact in the absence of
interference. Aristotle makes a similar remark with regard to elemental motions:
These arguments make it plain that every body has its natural movement, which is not
constrained or contrary to its nature. We go on to show that there are certain bodies whose
necessary impetus is that of weight and lightness. Of necessity, we assert, they must move,
and a moved thing which has no natural impetus cannot move either towards or away from the
centre. (De Caelo 301a 21-26)
In the Metaphysics we learn that something can be ‘necessary’ in a few different ways.
Something is necessary when it is (A) that without which a being cannot live, or a good can
not be attained (health), (B) that which impedes or hinders an impulse or purpose, as when
something is forced to act in a certain way due to necessity, and (C) that which can not be
otherwise (Meta. 5.5). The last of these senses of ‘necessary’ is the most fundamental (Meta.
1015a 35). When something ‘necessary’ is causal (when it produces an effect), it may be
referred to as ‘necessity’ (Meta. 1015b 5). So when it is necessary for the sick person to
undergo surgery in order to live, his choice is caused by necessity in all three senses listed
above (Meta. 1015a 24).
37
H.D.P. Lee, Meteorologica, pp. 8-9, n. (c).
Elemental Teleology
21
A. Simple Necessity
That which is necessary, or that which necessarily causes an effect, may be classified as
one of two general types of necessity: un-hypothetical and hypothetical (Phys. 199b 34, P.A.
642a 35). The first type of necessity is also called ‘simple’ necessity. This type of necessity is
present in any production involving the four elements. As was noted, the elements are natural
substances and have natures which consist of an internal principle of movement towards their
proper place. The nature of the element refers to its matter and form. The element is the
composite of matter and form in its very definition. If it did not have the nature it has it would
not be what it is. This implies that the element is, and moves, as it does in a way that is
necessary in sense (C) above. Since earth is what it is, it moves downward in the absence of
interference. This same necessity applies in mathematics. “Since a straight line is what it is, it
is necessary that the angles of a triangle should equal two right angles,” (Phys. 200a 14). The
sum of the angles of a triangle necessarily follow upon the nature of a line.
Simple necessity can also be seen in syllogisms.
1. A is B
2. B is C
3. Therefore, A is C.
The conclusion is a necessary consequent of the two premises which have a single common
middle term (An. Post. 94a 25). If A is B and B is C it can not be false that A is C. In a
similar way,
1. An element is a natural substance.
2. A natural substance moves in the direction of its proper place.
3. An element moves in the direction of its proper place.
If an element did not naturally move in the direction of its place of rest then either (1) or (2)
would be false. As it is, we have seen that (1) and (2) are actually true, so (3) follows
necessarily. The movement of the element then follows upon the premise that it has a nature
and that such a nature involves an internal principle of motion in a certain direction (premises
(1) and (2) respectively).
When a rock is thrown into the air it moves in two directions, each of which is
necessary in an un-hypothetical sense (An. Post. 94b 37-95a 4). The movement upward would
be necessary in sense (B). It moves upward due to an external force pushing it in opposition
to its natural movement, hindering such movement. When it begins to fall back to the ground
it does so because that is its nature and it can not do otherwise. Aristotle says in Posterior
Analytics, “Necessity too is of two kinds, it may work in accordance with a thing’s natural
tendency, or by constraint and in opposition to it; as, for instance, by necessity a stone is
borne both upwards and downwards, but not by the same necessity,” (94a 37).
The sum of the angles of a triangle are necessarily 180 degrees because of the nature of a
Elemental Teleology
22
line (Phys. 200a 14). Insofar as the lines are the parts which constitute the triangle, they may
be viewed as the matter of a triangle. The nature of the matter necessitates an essential
characteristic of a material thing. This necessity can be seen in art and nature as well as math.
Consider a wall made of bricks and mortar (Phys. 200a 1-5). The bricks are by nature hard,
have straight edges, heavy, solid, and do not crumble under heavy weight or changing
weather. The mortar is wet, malleable, and upon drying it acts like glue which can also
withstand weight and weather. This is the matter of a wall. Now consider the wall. It too is
hard, straight, heavy, and can support heavy weight and exposure to the weather. These
features of the wall follow upon the nature of the matter in the same way that the angles of a
triangle follow upon the nature of a line. Given that the matter has a certain nature, the wall
necessarily will be of a certain nature. Placed in a syllogism this could be expressed as
follows:
1. A wall is made of bricks.
2. Bricks are hard and heavy.
3. Therefore the wall is hard and heavy.
And it is not only the finished product that is determined by the nature of its matter, but the
process of its production as well. If we consider the wall again, how would the process of its
construction begin? An idiot might begin by throwing the bricks in the air hoping to build it
from the top down. The wall, however, can not be constructed in this way because the process
must, of necessity, have certain steps taken in a certain order. It is because bricks have
straight edges that they must be stacked upon one another with their flat sides making contact.
It is because bricks do not naturally adhere to one another that mortar must be placed between
them38. It is because mortar naturally holds two flat surfaces together that the bricks are not
stacked on their corners. All of these stages, stacking on the ground, spreading mortar,
stacking the next row, are in a way determined by the material being used. This determining
force is simple necessity. The wall can not be built from the top down, it can not be built any
other way than from the bottom up. This is due to the nature of the material. This idea is well
expressed when Aristotle says “Necessity is in the matter,” (Phys. 200a 14).
B. Hypothetical Necessity
The second type of necessity, ‘hypothetical necessity’, is present among processes
which have a final cause. Given that animals and artefacts are both finally caused it is not
surprising that Aristotle says that hypothetical necessity, “has to do with everything that is
formed by the processes of Nature, as well as with the products of Art, such as houses and so
forth,” (P.A. 639b 23-25). A wall exists to support a roof. This is the purpose and final cause
38
David Bostock refers to these requirements as ‘laws of matter’ (2006, p. 66).
Elemental Teleology
23
of the wall’s construction. For Aristotle, the presence of the final cause implies a different sort
of necessity, one based on a hypothesis. It is necessary to build a base before building the top
of the wall due to the material being used. This was referred to above as simple necessity.
But the presence of the building material is not necessary due to the nature of the matter. It is
not necessary for bricks to be at the building site unless such bricks are needed for an
intended wall. The materials are necessary, not due to their natures, but on the hypothesis that
a wall is going to be built (P.A.. 639b 27)39. If there is to be a wall, then bricks and mortar are
necessary. This is itself based on the hypothesis of their being a roof, which is the final cause.
Aristotle explains this concept with an example:
For instance, why is a saw such as it is? To effect so-and-so and for the sake of so-and-so.
This end, however, cannot be realized unless the saw is made of iron. It is, therefore,
necessary for it to be of iron, if we are to have a saw and perform the operation of sawing.
What is necessary then, is necessary on a hypothesis; it is not a result necessarily determined
by antecedents. (Phys. 200a 11-14)40.
The difference between hypothetical and un-hypothetical necessity turns on whether or not
the process has a final cause. When there is an end, purpose, or value which is serving as a
final cause, then the entire process happens for the sake of that end. That means that the
bricks and mortar and tools were gathered together only because of the final cause. Without
such a goal there would be no way to determine what material is needed, and thus no process
and no simple necessity governing that process.
This was where, according to Aristotle, some of his predecessors went wrong41.
Failing to recognize the importance of the final cause, they witnessed the simple necessity
present in nature and art and claimed that it was fully responsible for both the process of
production as well as the finished product. For example, such thinkers would say that the wall
is what it is only because of the process of its production which was governed by simple
necessity. Aristotle says that if these thinkers were seriously committed to this claim then they
must account for the wall’s existence by making reference only to the material used. He
highlights the absurdity of this view, saying:
The current view places what is of necessity in the process of production, just as if one were to
suppose that the wall of a house necessarily comes to be because what is heavy is naturally
carried downwards and what is light to the top, wherefore the stones and foundations take the
lowest place, with earth above because it is lighter, the wood at the top of all as being lightest.
This point is made in Physics 2.9 as well, “If the end is to exist or does exist, that also which
precedes it will exist or does exist; otherwise just as there, if the conclusion is not true, the premises
will not be true, so here the end or ‘that for the sake of which’ will not exist….If then there is to be a
house, such-and-such things must be made or be there already or exist, or generally the matter relative
to the end, bricks and stones if it is a house,” (Phys. 200a 20-26).
40
The same illustration is used in P.A. 642a 10-12.
41
The accuracy of Aristotle’s presentation of the thought of his predecessors is a subject outside the
scope of this paper.
39
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24
(Phys. 200a1 5)
If you were to ask one of these predecessors why a house has a foundation they would reply
that the foundation is made of concrete, and that is the heaviest of all the house-building
materials. Therefore it is located beneath everything else. Aristotle’s criticism is emphasizing
the fact that when there is a purpose of a thing it must be referred to in an explanation of its
coming to be.
An important point to take note of here is that the form plays the role of giving a
process its direction. This applies to the coming-to-be of a wall or the birth of an animate
substance. The direction moves towards the form of the mature specimen. The puppy grows
into a dog and not a cat because it has been given that specific form. The defining
characteristics of the dog are caused by the form and not just the material or efficient causes.
It is the form, not the process, which causes the organism to take its particular shape. This
belief is in contrast to Empedocles’, who held that the process of growth determined an
organism’s features. For example, Empedocles believed that the backbone is twisted and
broken on account of the small space in the womb (P.A. 1.1 640a 20-23). He also thought that
organisms shed their teeth because the first set of teeth accidentally grow too early and could
not last (G.A. 5.8 788b 11-12). Aristotle believed that the process is determined by what the
thing is (G.A. 778b 1-10). Dante poetically expressed this truth, saying, “All things become
what they are in their being”42. Aristotle claimed that teeth are shed for a purpose. Teeth are
blunted and need to be replaced in order to function properly (G.A. 5.8 789a 9-11). The
backbone is broken not due to an accidental aspect of the process of an organism’s growth in
the womb, but because a flexible backbone is a feature of what the organism is as determined
by its form. In its role as that towards which the change is aimed, the form serves as the final
cause. For this reason the formal and final cause are said to be the same. Aristotle says of the
two, “Really these first two should be taken as being almost one and the same” (G.A. 1
715a4-9).
There is some truth in the thought of these predecessors. Insofar as simple necessity
does determine some aspects of the process (P.A. 639b 26)43, an explanation of the cause of
the process should account for this fact. The bricks are flat on their sides and so they are
stacked on their sides. The mortar is malleable so it is put in the crevices where it can dry and
harden of necessity. These steps, caused by the nature of the material, caused the process of
the wall’s production to take a certain shape. But because the wall serves a purpose the
necessity which is found in the nature of the matter does not afford a full explanation. The
42
Paradiso xx.78.
“If a house, or any other End, is to be realized....one thing must first be formed, and set in motion,
and then another thing,” (639b 27).
43
Elemental Teleology
25
construction of a wall therefore manifests both simple and hypothetical necessity44. It must be
made of brick if it is to serve its purpose (hypothetical), and the construction must take place
in a certain manner because the bricks are of a certain nature (simple)45. The important
distinction must be made that though the bricks do necessitate that the process be a certain
way (it must begin with a base being built before the top), this does not mean that the wall is
constructed due to the nature of bricks:
Whereas, though the wall does not come to be without these, it is not due to these, except as
its material cause: it comes to be for the sake of sheltering and guarding things. Similarly in
all other things which involve production for an end; the product cannot come to be without
things which have a necessary nature, but it is not due to these (except as its material); it
comes to be for an end. (Phys. 200a 5-10)
When something has a final cause its production will involve simple necessity due to the
nature of the materials being used, but such necessity is ‘subsumed’ by hypothetical necessity,
i.e. the bricks are only present because the end is a wall46.
6, Does Elemental Locomotion Have a Final Cause?
It has been shown that simple necessity is involved in the movements of the elements.
It remains to be shown how hypothetical necessity might be present as well. This turns on the
question of whether or not such movements have a final cause. Something is hypothetically
necessary if there is a goal to be achieved (P.A. 642a 35). If a process is governed by
hypothetical necessity it is due to there being a goal which directs the process. This goal must
be just that, a goal and not a haphazard result of a process. John Cooper explains this with an
illustration:
But (for good reasons) Aristotle does not speak of hypothetical necessity except where the
outcome is also a goal: it may be true enough that my window would not have broken when it
did if there had not been a heavy wind blowing, but the wind did not blow by (hypothetical)
necessity. That is because the window’s breaking was no natural (or other) goal: where
something is being pursued as a goal there is some reason to think it will come about, and this
44
This point can also be applied to animals and their parts. Just as the wall is built if the roof is to be
supported, so an organ is formed if the animal is to survive. John Cooper defines hypothetical necessity
as applied to living things: Summarily stated, an organ or feature of a living thing is and is formed by
hypothetical necessity if, given the essence of the thing (specified in terms of capacities and functions)
and given the natures of the materials available to constitute it, the organ or feature in question is a
necessary means to the creature’s constitution (‘Hypothetical Necessity’, 154).
45
Aristotle recognizes both simple and hypothetical necessity as present in many natural things and
events: respiration (P.A. 642a32- b4), hair growth (P.A. 658b 2-7), deer shedding their antlers (P.A.
663b 12-14).
46
David Sedley remarks on the relation between simple and hypothetical necessity, “Natural purpose
involves conditional necessity in a way which closely mirrors intelligent purpose. He therefore has
much the same reasons as Plato did to treat conditional necessity not simply as coexisting in some kind
of equal partnership with simple necessity, but as subsuming it,” (‘Creationism and Its Critics in
Antiquity’, p. 183).
Elemental Teleology
26
gives point to saying about the conditions necessary for the outcome in these cases, but not the
others, that they come about by necessity. 47
We have discussed how the movements of the elements are natural. The question now
becomes whether or not such movements are goal directed. The answer seems to be clearly
stated in De Caelo 1.8, “If then the bodies have a natural movement, the movement of the
particular instances of each form must necessarily have for goal a place numerically one, i.e.
a particular centre or a particular extremity,” (276b 30-34). This fact may have been implied
by the above discussion which referred to each element having a proper place of rest. Earth
moves towards the centre of the world because that is its goal (De Caelo 296b 14). That goal
is to actualize its potentiality for being what it is, for its form involves being in its proper
place. In De Caelo 4.2 Aristotle says that, “…the movement of each body to its own place is
motion towards its own form,” (310a 34). It was also pointed out that since these elemental
motions are natural they occur regularly. Earth will always move down in the absence of
interference (Phys. 252a 17). Considering then that the elements always move towards their
goals, such movement may accurately be explained in terms of a final cause. “Again,
whenever there is plainly some final end, to which a motion tends should nothing stand in the
way, we always say that such final end is the aim or purpose of the motion,” (P.A. 641b 2426). Aristotle also refers to the elements as having a function:
From what has been said it is clear that the difference of the elements does not depend upon
their shape. Now their most important differences are those of property, function, and power;
for every natural body has, we maintain, its own functions, properties, and powers. (De Caelo
307b 18-21)
It was explained previously that when a thing which has a function which is natural, the
function serves as its final cause. Thus when earth falls it is fulfilling its function, for an
element’s function is its movement (De Caelo 298a 34).
The third concept fundamental to anything with a final cause was ‘value’. It may be
wondered how the movement of an element is in any sense good. In Physics 8.1 Aristotle
proves that there has always been and will always be movement. Motion causes things to
come-to-be and pass-away, which is a process which occurs continuously (G.C. 336a 24-26).
The dual effect of generation and destruction is consequent of the sun’s ‘motion along the
inclined circle’ (G.C. 336a 34). Its approach brings life, its departure brings death. This
eternal cycle takes place because Nature seeks to produce life rather than destroy things:
Nature always strives after ‘the better’. Now ‘being’ (we have explained elsewhere the exact
variety of meanings we recognize in this term) is better than ‘not-being’: but not all things can
possess ‘being’, since they are too far removed from the ‘originative source’. God therefore
adopted the remaining alternative, and fulfilled the perfection of the universe by making
47
1985, p. 164, n. 2.
Elemental Teleology
27
coming-to-be uninterrupted: for the greatest possible coherence would thus be secured to
existence, because that ‘coming-to-be should itself come-to-be perpetually’ is the closest
approximation to eternal being. (G.C. 336b 25-33).
The movements of the elements individually are towards their places of rest. However, they
also participate in a sort of circular motion when they mutate into one another. In this way
they ‘imitate circular motion’48:
That, too, is why all the other things….imitate circular motion. For when Water is transformed
into Air, Air into Fire, and the Fire back into Water, we say the coming-to-be ‘has completed
the circle’, because it reverts again to the beginning. Hence it is by imitating circular motion
that rectilinear motion too is continuous. (G.C. 337 1-7)
The value involved in this motion is simply that the elements continue to exist due to their
involvement in an eternal cycle. Just as species continue their existence in kind by taking part
in a cycle of birth and death, so the elements remain existent due to their cyclical movement49.
Johnson remarks on this ‘value’, saying, “In this case, it amounts to an extremely attenuated
benefit: a kind of immortality sufficient for the axiological maxim, that it is better to exist
than not”50. In the Phaedo Socrates expresses a similar recognition that the study of the
process of generation and destruction is also a study of value and what is best for a thing51.
The investigation thus far has examined what it means for something to have a final
cause as well as where such a cause exists in the Aristotelian cosmos. With regard to animate
substances such causation is clearly present. In order to determine if the final cause is also
present among elemental movements an analysis has been provided concerning change in
general and changes of the elements specifically. This analysis showed that the movements of
the elements can indeed be considered to have a final cause. The textual evidence for an
‘elemental teleology’ has been shown sufficiently strong to claim that Aristotle did view their
movements as finally caused. This position is summarized by Monte Johnson:
The four terrestrial elements (earth, water, air, and fire) are teleologically explicable because
their motion can be completed when they arrive at their natural place in the cosmos, and
because through cyclical transmutation they resemble the circular motions of the heavenly
bodies. 52
This view of elemental movements will now be applied in an interpretation of a particular text
in Aristotle’s Physics.
For an analysis of Aristotle’s non-metaphysical use of the word ‘imitation’ see Johnson 2005, p. 147148.
49
The parallel argument with regard to animate beings and their participation in the cycle of
reproduction is made in G.A. 731b 20-732a 1, and De Anima 415a 23-142b 21.
50
2005, p. 147.
51
“So if anyone wishes to find the cause of the generation or destruction or existence of a particular
thing, he must find out what sort of existence, or passive state of any kind, or activity is best for it,”
(97c).
52
2005, p.8.
48
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28
Chapter II – An Interpretation of The Rainfall Example in Physics 2.8
7. The Difficulty in Physics 2.8
In Physics 2.8 Aristotle wrestles with a materialist account of nature. According to
the materialists, all things and events in nature exist due to the nature of the matter (Phys.
198b 16-30) (this will be further explained below). The opening of Physics 2.8 puts forward
the materialist viewpoint:
Why not say, it is asked, that Nature acts as Zeus drops the rain, not to make the corn grow,
but of necessity (for the rising vapour must needs be condensed into water by the cold, and must then
descend and incidentally, when this happens, the corn grows), just as, when a man loses his corn on the
threshing-floor, it did not rain on purpose to destroy the crop, but the result was merely incidental to
the raining? So why should it not be the same with natural organs like teeth? Why should it not be a
coincidence that the front teeth come up with an edge, suited to dividing the food, and the back ones
flat and good for grinding it, without there being any design in the matter? And so with all other organs
that seem to embody a purpose. In cases where a coincidence brought about such a combination as
might have been arranged on purpose, the creatures, it is urged, having been suitably formed by the
operation of chance, survived; otherwise they perished, and still perish, as Empedocles says of his
‘man-faced oxen.’ (198b1 17-33)
The remainder of this paper will consist of an analysis of the materialist challenge
and Aristotle’s response to that viewpoint. Special attention will be given to the example of
rainfall. The rainfall example is important because it is a rare occasion in which Aristotle
discusses in a teleological context an event which involves only the terrestrial elements53.
There are different possible interpretations concerning this text and I will argue that
Aristotle’s responses to the general materialist viewpoint do not apply to their account of
rainfall. I have argued that Aristotle viewed the terrestrial elements as moving for the sake of
reaching their place of rest. This being the case, it would be inconsistent if Aristotle fully
accepted an explanation of rainfall (water’s movement downward) as caused by its matter
alone. So what reason is there for interpreting Aristotle as accepting the materialists’ account
of rainfall? I propose that Aristotle viewed rainfall as having the final cause of reaching its
place of rest and not crop growth. There are three reasons why such an interpretation is
possible.
First, Aristotle does not reject the materialist account in toto. Not only does he
recognize the explanatory significance of simple necessity but considers it the scientist’s duty
to include such necessity in a full causal account. A good example of this is in P.A. 1.1 where
he examines the causes of respiration:
53
John Cooper claims this is the only occasion (‘Aristotle on Natural Teleology’, p. 125.)
Elemental Teleology
29
Here is an example of the method of exposition. We point out that although Respiration takes
place for such and such a purpose, any one stage of the process follows upon the others by
necessity…..It is necessary that the hot substance should go out and come in again as it offers
resistance, and that the air should flow in – that is obviously necessary…..This example shows
how the method works and also illustrates the sort of things whose causes we have to
discover. (642a 29- b 4)
When Aristotle disagrees with the materialists he is disagreeing with their insistence that
simple necessity alone can account for processes which have a final cause. Aristotle says that
both causes must be included in an explanation (Phys. 200a 31-b10). Insofar as the
movements of the elements involve simple necessity (they move due to the nature of their
matter, which can not be other than it is and is thus necessary), the materialist account is
accurate54. Aristotle disagrees with their claim that there is no final cause in nature55.
If the initial difficulty is broken into parts there are three claims that can be
distinguished, “A difficulty presents itself: (A) why should not nature work, not for the sake
of something, nor because it is better so, (B) but just as the sky rains, not in order to make the
corn grow, (C) but of necessity?” (198b 17-20). The general thesis of the materialists is
expressed in (A), the idea being that there is no final cause in nature. The second part, (B), is
claiming that corn is not the final cause of crop growth. And part (C) is claiming that rain falls
of necessity. It has been shown already that for Aristotle the elements do move of simple
necessity (An. Post. 95a 2). He has reason then to accept (C). However, we know that he
rejects (A) and therefore would not accept (C) without qualifying it so that hypothetical
necessity is present along with simple necessity. But his rejection of (A) does not imply his
rejection of (B). This is because (B) is not claiming that the rain does not fall for the sake of
anything, but not for the sake of the crops. It is possible that Aristotle accepts (B), that rain
does not fall for the sake of the crops.
The second reason why it is possible to interpret Aristotle as agreeing with the
materialists is the fact that crop growth is unnecessary in explaining the cause of rainfall. If
we interpret the rainfall example as involving only an ‘elemental teleology’ then there is no
need for Aristotle to propose any further final cause than the element’s proper place of rest.
An explanation of the cause of rainfall is adequate so long as it contains reference to a final
cause. Viewing the event in terms of ‘elemental teleology’ is sufficient to provide such an
explanation. The basic elemental teleology will allow Aristotle to accept that rainfall is
54
David Sedley, who argues that rain does indeed fall for the sake of crops, admits that Aristotle would
not disagree with this aspect of the materialist viewpoint. “I think it has to be admitted that the actual
mechanics of the elemental change described are Aristotelian: ‘…what goes up must get cold, and what
has got cold becomes water and comes down.’,” (1991, p.182).
55
The materialists did recognize the existence of a final cause in theory. However, in practice they
neglected it to such an extent so as to make it irrelevant. Aristotle said that if they even mention the
cause, “it is only to touch on it, and then goodbye to it,” (Phys. 198b 16).
Elemental Teleology
30
teleological while also accepting that it includes simple necessity and does not happen for the
sake of crop growth.
The final cause of reaching its proper place fulfils the criteria for serving as a final
cause and makes an additional final cause superfluous. It was noted above that a final cause
can be viewed as both a beneficiary and a goal (Meta. 1072b 1-3). With regard to the
elements it has been argued that the final cause is reaching their place of rest. The aim of the
movement, therefore, is an element’s proper place. The beneficiary is the element itself, for
the involvement in the cycle of transmutation is an imitation of perfect circular motion (G.C.
337a 5). This ‘immortality’ of sorts allows the elements to exist, and the value in that is
simply that being is better than not-being (G.C. 336b 29-30). Therefore the elements, not
crops or any other natural thing, are the beneficiaries of their own movement. Crops do
benefit from rainfall, but that does not mean that rain falls for the sake of crops.
A third reason for interpreting Aristotle as agreeing with the materialists’ account is
the fact that the final cause of elemental movement is extremely obscure. For that reason any
claim of a specific final cause beyond reaching its natural resting place would require a
thorough and extensive justification. This is no where present in Aristotle’s responding
arguments. In Meteorologica 4.12 Aristotle says that the final cause is more recognizable in
some things than others. The distinction between final and material cause is most clear among
animals and their parts, less clear with regard to flesh and bone, and even less so among the
elements (389b 30- 390a 35). “For the final cause is least obvious where matter
predominates” (390a 6). He speaks of a scale with two extremes, those things which have a
final cause which is obvious at one end, and those things which have an obscure final cause at
the other. The low end of that scale is ‘simply matter’ (390a 7), the high end would likely be
animals. He says that a thing’s final cause is identifiable with clarity relative to where on that
spectrum a thing lies. The material elements could be assumed to be just one remove from
‘simple matter’. The obscurity of purpose within elemental motion is likely the reason that
Aristotle largely focused on animate beings in his discussions of teleology. Allan Gotthelf
recognized this fact, saying, “In almost every passage in which Aristotle introduces,
discusses, or argues for the existence of final causality, his attention is focused on the
generation and development of a living organism,”56.There is reason then to consider the final
cause of elemental motion, though definitely present, as less obvious than any other natural
substance.
In light of this fact it seems unwarranted to claim that the elements have a clearly
identifiable final cause other than the most ‘elementary’ final cause which has been
established. Considering that a) Aristotle accepts elemental teleology, and b) he claims that
56
‘Aristotle’s Conception of Final Causality’, p. 207.
Elemental Teleology
31
the final cause of elemental movements is more difficult to identify than any complex
substance, what reason is there for asserting that Aristotle also believed crop growth to be a
final cause of rain? Surely such a precise teleological account involving the substance in
which the final cause is most obscure would merit an extensive explanation and justification.
Those who say that Aristotle did believe crop growth to be the final cause are under the onus
of explaining the absence of such justification. For these reasons I think it is acceptable to
interpret Aristotle as accepting the materialist claim that crop growth is not the final cause of
the rain.
8. The Rainfall Example
Having explained why such an interpretation is possible, it remains to be shown why
such an interpretation is preferable to an alternative. Commentators are divided concerning
how to interpret Aristotle’s position concerning rainfall. David Sedley57, and David Furley58
argue that he believed that crop growth was the final cause, while Lindsay Judson59 and W.
Charleton60 argue against this. The relevant section of the difficulty is the following text:
Why not say, it is asked, that Nature acts as Zeus drops the rain, not to make the corn grow,
but of necessity (for the rising vapour must needs be condensed into water by the cold, and
must then descend and incidentally, when this happens, the corn grows), just as, when a man
loses his corn on the threshing-floor, it did not rain on purpose to destroy the crop, but the
result was merely incidental to the raining? (198b 17-23)
Aristotle responds:
Yet it is impossible that this be the true view, for teeth and all other natural things either
invariably or normally come about in a given way; but of not one of the results of chance or
spontaneity is this true. We do not ascribe to chance or mere coincidence the frequency of
rain in winter, but frequent rain in summer we do; nor heat in the dog-days, but only if we
have it in winter. If then, it is agreed that things are either the result of coincidence or for an
end, and these cannot be the result of coincidence or spontaneity, it follows that they must be
for an end. (198b 33-199a 5)
A brief note should be made with regard to evidence used by some commentators in
support of a teleological reading of rain with respect to crop growth. Both Furley61 and
Sedley62 make use the idiom ‘Zeus drops the rain,’ to support their claim that the rainfall
example is part of the materialist account and for that reason should be considered antithetical
to Aristotle’s own beliefs. Furley points out that the phrase, “Zeus drops the rain” would have
57
1991, pp. 181-187.
‘The Rainfall Example in Physics II.8’, pp. 115 ff.
59
‘Aristotelian Teleology,’ pp. 344 ff.
60
Aristotle’s Physics Books I and II, p. 121.
61
1989, p. 116.
62
1991, p.185.
58
Elemental Teleology
32
been a common phrase used by the phusiologoi63 by which they mocked the ignorant accounts
of natural events which resort to superstition and teleology64. My interpretation does not rely
on separating the rainfall example from the general materialist position. Therefore Furley’s
reading of the ‘Zeus makes rain’ phrase is compatible with my own. For what matters is not
whether Aristotle is voicing his own view concerning rainfall, but whether or not his thought
is consistent with the materialist account of rainfall. I happen to agree with Furley that the
rainfall example should be read as part of a whole viewpoint which starts at 198b 17 and ends
at 3365. I simply hold that this is part of their general viewpoint with which Aristotle would
not disagree.
What follows are three reasons why Aristotle’s views concerning rainfall should be
interpreted as being limited to elemental teleology rather than the belief that crop growth is
the final cause. Briefly these are as follows:
(A) Upon scrutiny it can be shown that whether or not rain has a final cause is not the
subject of debate in the text. There is no need then for Aristotle to commit himself to
a specific final cause aside from the one affirmed in elemental teleology.
(B) The argument concerning the opposite effects of rain at 198b 21-23 is a strong
and valid argument which elicits no response from Aristotle.
(C) The necessary conditions for a thing’s survival do not have causal force on that
account. Therefore the fact that rain is necessary if the crops are to grow does not
imply that crops are the final cause.
In conclusion I will respond to an argument put forward by David Sedley66 concerning the
emphasis Aristotle places on the seasonality of rainfall.
A. Is the teleology of rainfall being questioned?
Within the difficulty the arrangement of teeth is being questioned as to its teleological
status, i.e. whether or not their purpose is causal. If the rain is serving as a parallel example as
the arrangement of teeth, then one could argue that its causality is a matter of debate in the
same way as teeth. However, the reference to rainfall in the difficulty may be different from
that of teeth. If we consider the position and purpose of the rainfall example within both the
difficulty and Aristotle’s response it can be argued that it is not being questioned by either
party as to whether or not crop growth is the final cause. What is clearly drawn into question
“Aristotle calls them collectively phusikoi, or phusiologoi, ‘physiologers,’ i.e., writers on ‘Nature,’
‘natural’ scientists,” (A.L. Peck in the Introduction to G.A., p. xvi, n. b).
64
1989, p. 115.
65
This is in contrast to the view of Lindsay Judson, who claims that the materialist viewpoint begins
after 198b 19, and does not include rainfall (2005, p. 346). Because the rainfall example is preceded by
“A difficulty presents itself,” and because it is phrased as a question I consider it to be part of the
materialists view point.
66
1991, p. 184.
63
Elemental Teleology
33
in the difficulty are two things:
1. The workings of nature - “Why should not nature work…” (17)
2. The parts in nature - “Why then should it not be the same with the parts in nature, e.g. that
our teeth should come up of necessity” (23-24)
The rainfall is not directly questioned as to whether or not it is teleological. I suggest that it is
being used as an example of something which is clearly not oriented towards the growth of
crops, and in relation to the crops rain fall is a non-teleological process par excellence. As
such the materialists may be putting it forward as an assumed common ground between a
teleological view and their own. It is upon this example that the materialists hope to extend
the agreed upon explanation to other aspects of nature, namely, the parts of animals. They are
saying, for example, that in the same way rain is related to crop growth (one is not the final
cause of the other), so parts of animals are related to the whole organism. If rainfall is used by
the materialists as an assumed common ground then the teleological status of the event has
not been questioned. Therefore we do not need to interpret Aristotle’s reference to rainfall in
his response as addressing its teleological status. To understand whether or not Aristotle does
address the final causation of rain it is necessary to look again at the role which rain plays in
the difficulty.
It is clear that the materialists are claiming that rain does not fall for the sake of the
crops. The example serves as an event in nature which is a paradigm of a naturally
necessitated process. In that respect it is serving as a sort of measuring stick, against which
other things in nature might be compared. To the extent that something in nature resembles
the relationship between rain and crop growth, to that extent purpose is absent in the thing or
event. Support for this interpretation is in the fact that Aristotle’s response uses rainfall in the
same way as the materialists. He uses it as a measuring stick for identifying chance events.
The more consistent something is (like rain), the less likely that it is a chance event. If
Aristotle were attempting to make the point that rain itself is teleological then why would he
choose an event which can be divided according to seasons? The result being that winter rain
appears to happen for the sake of something while summer rain is mere chance. I hold that he
is simply using the same event in nature which the materialists used in order, like them, to put
forward a premise upon which each party could agree. For the materialists that premise was
that some processes in nature do not have a purpose. For Aristotle the premise concerns
chance events: We identify chance events according to whether or not they occur invariably
or for the most part. Rain serves to illustrate his point precisely because it can be divided
according to season and exemplify one event which is regular (winter rain) and one which is
sporadic (summer rain). Aristotle is using an agreed upon non-teleological event simply in
order to get his opponents to agree to his ‘chance-premise’. He is inviting his opponents to
recognize a distinction that we all make every time we complain about unpredictable weather,
Elemental Teleology
34
be it a hot spell in early October, or steady rainfall in July (which is rare in Greece).
David Furley considers the fact that Aristotle immediately follows the ‘all other
natural things’ clause with a mention of rainfall as evidence that rain is an example of a
natural thing67. Though I agree that rainfall is natural, I do not think Aristotle intended it to be
included within the category in this context. My interpretation is more in line with Allan
Gotthelf, who thought that the example was “quoted only to illustrate a generic point about
chance: we do not call regular winter rainfall a matter of chance”68. The mention of rainfall is
not being put forward as an example of a natural thing, but an example of an event which
manifests the difference between chance and non-chance events due to frequency.
B. The ‘Opposite Effects Argument’
For the sake of argument let us assume that rainfall is in fact being debated. Any
assessment of the difficulty must accept that the debate revolves around whether or not rain
has a purpose. The debate does not involve figuring out what that purpose is. The one
possible final cause is stated in the difficulty and no alternative is offered in Aristotle’s
response. Crop growth is the assumed final cause by each party, that being rejected by the
materialists and affirmed by Aristotle (according to this reading). The challenge for this
reading is how to account for the argument in the difficulty regarding spoiled grain. The
concept of existing ‘for the sake of something’ seems to imply that it exists for the sake of
something’s existence, not its destruction. Body parts exist for the sake of the animal’s
thriving, not its destruction. The ‘Opposite Effects Argument’ might be formed in the
following manner:
1. X is the final cause of Y when Y exists for the sake of X.
2. To exist for the sake of X implies that it does not exist for the sake of not-X69.
3. Y results in X and not-X (ceteris paribus).
4. Therefore Y does not exist for the sake of X.
5. Therefore X is not the final cause of Y.
A thing or event in nature which is followed by contrary results cannot be said to exist for the
sake of only one of those results. This argument is not countered by Aristotle in his responses
in 2.8 and 2.9. I take this as further evidence that Aristotle himself did not view crop-growth
as the final cause of rainfall.
One might object to this argument on the grounds that grain left on the threshing floor
is the result of a mistake. Aristotle argues that mistakes presuppose an end oriented process.
For mistakes are recognized insofar as the end was not reached. (Phys. 2.8 199a 20-33). Be
67
1989, p. 118.
Furley 1989, p.118 n. 4.
69
Not-X means ‘the absence of X’
68
Elemental Teleology
35
that as it may, the mistake of leaving grain on the threshing floor was an agricultural mistake,
not a natural mistake. It was not a failure on nature’s part when the grain was spoiled.
Therefore the mistake only serves as evidence that crop growth is the final cause of
agriculture, not rainfall. With regard to rain fall the process of the water cycle is completed
whether or not man heeds the warning of thunder clouds.
Even when the farmer manages to save all of his grain and reap a full harvest, the
natural event of rain yet results in opposite results. The weeds which grow alongside the crops
may be destructive to the crops, yet the growth of both plants is a result of the same rainfall.
Furthermore, the contrary effects of rain may benefit different organisms in any case. Though
detrimental to agriculture, perhaps other animals benefit from flooded grain. If that is the
case, then why should one species of organism be singled out as the final cause? This exact
scenario is painted by Nikos Kazantzakis in which the ants benefit from the flooded threshing
floor:
Working in groups of twos or threes, they were carrying away the wheat in their roomy
mandibles, one grain at a time. They had stolen it from the plain, right out of the mouths of
men, and were transporting it now to their anthill, all the while praising God the Great Ant,
who, ever solicitous for his Chosen People the ants, sent floods to the plain at precisely the
right moment, just when the wheat was stacked upon the threshing floors 70.
Is food production for the ants then the final cause of rainfall? Considering that rain benefits
myriad substances it is unclear why just one species should be singled out as the primary
beneficiary.
David Furley claims that the simple fact that the ‘opposite effects argument’ is
present implies that the idea is not agreed upon by each party. For why would a mutually held
premise require a supporting argument?71 I disagree with this for two reasons. First, the
argument is concerning rainfall alone, not the parts of animals. Yet the rainfall example is part
of the single materialist viewpoint. If, as I claim, Aristotle agrees with part of their view
(concerning rain) and disagrees with another part, then that part with which he agrees should
be put forward in a way which makes its truth convincing. If it were simply presented as an
assertion rather than an argument, and if Aristotle were to then agree with it, his agreement
would look like an unwarranted concession. Secondly, he does not respond to the argument.
All of his responding arguments are targeted at the materialist challenge to teleology among
animate natural substances. Though such an argumentum ex silentio is not convincing in
itself, the conspicuous absence of a response to the Opposite Effects Argument might be
considered evidence that he does not disagree with the materialist account of rainfall.
70
71
The Last Temptation, p. 132.
1989, p. 117.
Elemental Teleology
36
C. Rainfall and Hypothetical Necessity
It may be objected that natural necessity is not the only necessity involved in rain.
For plants can not grow without water. Therefore if plants are to grow then rain must fall.
Does this not suggest that rain is hypothetically necessary for crop growth? The problem with
this objection is that the necessary conditions for an organism’s survival are not attributed
with causal power on account of that fact. It is necessary for a human to have water, therefore
rain could be said to be finally caused by man’s thirst. But this is not the case, for a condition
necessary for a thing’s survival may be necessary in an un-hypothetical way72, such as the
presence of water for living things. Furthermore, the presence of water does not have to take
the form of rain. The crops may be irrigated and relatively unaffected by rain. If water is
considered to fall for the sake of the crops on account of being a necessary condition for its
growth, then we could also include all other aspects of the environment. The temperature
could be affirmed to be warm on account of the crops, the altitude, the air purity, the richness
of the soil, all these things would then exist for the sake of the plants.
Lindsay Judson provides an illustration which relates to the idea that rain is
hypothetically necessary for crop growth and therefore crops are the final cause of rain. He
says, “Suppose that avalanches regularly cut off access to a certain Alpine valley, and that one
of two constantly warring tribes regularly takes advantage of this to regroup in the safety of
the valley,”73. In such a situation would we then say that the avalanche is hypothetically
necessary for the safety of the tribe, and has that safety as its final cause? Rather we would
explain the cause of the avalanche with regard to the nature of the matter (i.e. snow). The
final cause would be isolated to the snow’s movement towards its proper place. Without
limiting Aristotle’s teleology to the specific nature involved one is on a slippery slope
towards a cosmic teleology which sees all things working together for the good of an ultimate
beneficiary. Such a position is held by prominent commentators (i.e. David Sedley), but it is
not the position of this paper. For the crop’s coming-to-be and growth as a natural substance
can be fully explained in terms of its own matter and form. The necessary and sufficient
account of its coming-to-be will make reference to its intrinsic cause rather than extrinsic.
Lindsay Judson comments on this point:
Neither the rain which falls nor the meteorological processes which cause it are primarily
responsible for the presence of the seeds or young plants (though of course the fact that rain
regularly falls in this particular place may be partly responsible), and the good outcome is not
a good for – does not constitute or bestow on – the rain, clouds, etc.74
John Cooper remarks on this point, “If for example it is part of human nature to have the capacity to
see then having eyes of some sort is necessary to a human being as part of his nature (see G.A. v
778b16-17), and is not a mere hypothetical necessity,” (1985, p. 152).
73
2005, p. 346.
74
2005, p. 348.
72
Elemental Teleology
37
Rain is extrinsic to crops and therefore need not be included in an adequate explanation of
why crops grow. Monte Johnson makes a similar point when discussing the prospect of one
animal existing for the sake of another animal, as food for example. Rather than saying that
the pig exists for man’s nourishment, any benefit gained by man should be viewed as
incidental to the causation of the pig. With regard to this idea he says, “But these ends are not
explanatory of the parts or motions (i.e. behaviours) of the animals in question. They are
much like the incidental benefits of rainfall in that this kind of benefit has no role to play in
the scientific explanation of the natural substance”75. Rainfall would not be included in a
scientific explanation of corn because it is an incidental benefit to that natural substance.
D. The Seasonality of Rain
David Sedley thinks that Aristotle highlights the difference between winter and
summer rainfall in his response in order to show that winter rain fall is purposive while
summer rainfall is not76. This is inconsistent with my interpretation. As was explained above,
I believe he is highlighting the seasonality of rain in order to put forward the ‘chancepremise’ upon which his opponents would likely agree, i.e. the fact that we call irregular
events chance and regular ones natural. If we view rainfall in the way I have proposed, as
simply an element’s return to its natural place, then the seasonality of the event does not come
to bear on whether or not it is finally caused. Its proper place remains the same as does
water’s motion towards it. The strength of Sedley’s argument is in the fact that Aristotle goes
on to use the seasonality distinction in order to also distinguish between coincidental events
as opposed to teleological events. A defence against this objection would have to show that
rain, though it exemplifies the difference between chance and purposive events, is not itself
considered by Aristotle to be sometimes purposive (in the winter months) and sometimes nonpurposive (in the summer months). Three reasons against Sedley’s view are offered below.
If Judson’s avalanche example is convincing, then it might support my reading
against the seasonality objection. Perhaps the avalanches were more common occurrences in
winter rather than summer. And perhaps the warring tribes made use of the avalanche every
single time it happened. If the final cause of the avalanche was never considered to be the
protection of the villagers, then the seasonality and frequency of the event does not change
that fact. Now let this idea be extended to rainfall. If crop growth was never considered to be
the final cause of crops to begin with, the seasonality distinction would not change that fact.
Robert Wardy voices a similar idea in response to Sedley’s seasonality argument:
To infer that summer showers are accidental and so not for a purpose, Sedley must be
relying on Aristotle’s explanation “for it does not seem to rain frequently in winter from luck
75
76
2005, p.9.
1991, p. 184.
Elemental Teleology
38
or coincidence, but rather if it rains in August” (198b 36-199a 2). His fallacy results from
illicit promotion of “always or for the most part” from a sufficient condition to a necessary
condition for natural purpose.77
Secondly, if Aristotle is using the seasonality distinction to say that winter rain falls
for the sake of the crops while summer rain has no final cause, then the example of summer
heat should be interpreted in the same way. For Aristotle uses both rain and heat as examples
of seasonal events. Heat is mentioned immediately after rain but no alternate final cause is
provided. It would seem, then, that crop growth is the assumed final cause of each. This,
however, is nowhere argued for or even hinted at in the discussion. Crops may indeed benefit
from summer heat, but claiming that crops are the final cause of the temperature in summer is
a rather bold claim.
Thirdly, according to Sedley the seasonality of rain benefits not only crop growth, but
ultimately man. Sedley says, “In Attica, winter rain was the only important rain for
farmers….If Aristotle is writing at Athens, he is describing the apparently anthropocentric
functioning of the weather as it affects local agriculture, with its two staples, corn and
olives,”78. I think the ‘elemental teleology’ put forward in this paper is preferable to such an
anthropocentric reading due to its conservative claims. Aristotle’s belief in the obscurity of
final causes behind elemental motion seems to favour such a conservative approach rather
than proposing not just a clear final cause extrinsic to the elements, but a final cause (man)
which is nowhere mentioned in the difficulty. For these reasons perhaps Sedley’s seasonality
argument does not invalidate my interpretation.
Conclusion
This paper has concerned itself primarily with Aristotle’s final cause in its relation to the
movements of the four terrestrial elements. Elemental teleology proposes that the elements
move for the sake of reaching their place of rest. By establishing that such a viewpoint is
present in Aristotle I was able to approach the text of Physics 2.8 using elemental teleology as
the lens through which to interpret Aristotle’s own position. It was argued that Aristotle
rejected the idea that rain falls for the sake of crop growth. This position was claimed to be
possible for three reasons: (1) Aristotle did not disagree with the materialist position
completely, (2) elemental teleology provides Aristotle with a means of explaining rain fall as
purposive without extending the final cause beyond reaching its place of rest, and (3) the
obscurity of the purpose behind elemental motion favours a conservative interpretation
concerning the final cause of rain. Three reasons were then given why my interpretation is not
only possible but preferable: (1) the teleological status of rainfall is not a matter of debate in
77
1993, p.21.
78
1991, p. 186.
Elemental Teleology
39
either the difficulty or Aristotle’s response, (2) the ‘Opposite Effects Argument’ is a valid
reason for both parties to reject crop growth as a final cause, and (3) the necessary conditions
of crop growth do not imply that such conditions are finally caused by crop growth. Finally, a
response to David Sedley’s seasonality argument was put forward with three reasons against
adopting his reading. With this interpretation I have been able to avoid the conclusion that
rain falls for the sake of crops without giving up a global teleology. By approaching the text
from the vantage point of an elemental teleology it was shown that Aristotle could accept the
materialist account of rain without also accepting their denial of a final cause in nature.
Elemental Teleology
40
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