Michael Dean Jaworski
Curriculum vitae
1506 W Fig Ave Apt A
Department of History and Philosophy
Pharr, TX 78577
The University of Texas-Pan American
mdjaworski@utpa.edu
1201 West University Drive
Cellular Phone (614) 940-1830
Edinburg, TX 78539
Education
Bowling Green State University, 1994-1998. BA in Philosophy, 1998.
The Ohio State University, 1999-2010. PhD in Philosophy, 2010.
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Religion
Areas of Competence
Applied Ethics
Logic and Critical Thinking
Teaching Experience
Teaching Assistant/Grader, 1999-2002. The Ohio State University.
Lecturer/Teaching Associate, 2002-2007. The Ohio State University.
Lecturer, Spring 2007. Ohio University-Lancaster, Pickerington Center.
Lecturer, 2007-2011. The University of Texas-Pan American.
Courses Taught
As a Primary Instructor:
Introduction to Philosophy
Introduction to Logic
Critical Thinking
Introduction to Religion
Contemporary Social/Moral Problems in the U. S.
Introduction to Ethics
Professional Ethics
Engineering Ethics
As a Teaching Assistant/Grader:
Introduction to Philosophy
Introduction to Logic
Introduction to Religion
Asian Philosophies
Political and Social Philosophy
History of Ancient Philosophy
Philosophical Problems in the Arts
Dissertation
Thought Without Language: an Interpretationist Approach to the Thinking Mind
Abstract
I defend an account of thought on which non-linguistic beings can be thinkers.
This result is significant in that many philosophers have claimed that the ability to think
depends on the ability to use language. These opponents of my view note that our
everyday understanding of our own cognitive activities qua thought bestows upon those
activities the propositional structure of sentences and the inferential norms of public
linguistic practice. They hold that our attributions of thought to non-linguistic beings
project non-existent structure onto the cognitive activities of those beings, and assess the
beings’ activities according to standards to which the beings bear no responsibility. So,
despite the complex neural and behavioral activities of many non-linguistic beings, my
opponents hold that those beings are not properly described as thinkers.
To respond to my opponents successfully, one must not merely cite scientific and
folk practices of thought attribution that permit thought to be attributed to some nonlinguistic beings. My opponents’ insights might be taken to demonstrate a need to revise
those practices, or to treat the attributions of thought to non-linguistic beings made within
those practices as instrumentally valuable but technically false. Instead, my strategy is to
acknowledge the language-like structure and norms of thought, and show that a nonlinguistic being’s cognitive activities might nonetheless have that structure and be subject
to those norms. I identify seven features pertaining to the structure and normativity of
thought---intensionality, extensionality, control, reflection, objectivity, conceptual
composition, and the institution of standards---that those who share my opponents’
intuitions might deem necessary for any cognitive activity to count as thought. I argue
that the motivations for the reflection requirement rest on confusions about the nature of
entertaining a proposition, and I reject some interpretations of the institution requirement.
But I accept the other five requirements, and a properly-interpreted institution
requirement, and show how a non-linguistic being can meet them. On the account I
defend, a non-linguistic being counts as a thinker given that it obtains information from at
least two sensory modalities, behaves in ways that are not immediate, invariant responses
to stimuli, has been through a learning process in which its cognitive system underwent
modification to better conform to standards of truth and rationality and track flourishingrelevant categories, and displays a pattern of cognitive and behavioral activity in which a
rational pattern can be found.
I am guided in this process by reflection on the practical purposes that are served
by our folk practice of thought attribution, chief among them the coordination of rational
social living. I argue that these purposes place strictures upon the nature of thought that
could potentially conflict with the structure cognitive science might find in cognition, but
that the folk notion requires no legitimization from science. Furthermore, which cluster
of attributions correctly describes a subject is always partially determined by attributers’
varying conceptions of ideal rationality and interpretations of how to render odd behavior
rationally explicable. These commitments yield my approach to the theory of thought,
“Non-Scientific Interpretationism”.
Graduate Coursework
In Logic, Language and Science:
650 Advanced Symbolic Logic (Stewart Shapiro)
673 Advanced Philosophy of Language (Steven Boer)
855 Seminar in Philosophy of Science; The Devil in the Details (Bob Batterman)
873 Seminar in Language; Vagueness (Diana Raffman and Stewart Shapiro)
873 Seminar in Language; general (William Taschek)
873 Seminar in Language; The Taming of the True (Neil Tennant)
873 Seminar in Language; Concepts (Neil Tennant)
In Metaphysics and Epistemology:
700 Proseminar; Perception and Color (Diana Raffman)
863 Seminar in Metaphysics; Mental Content (Louise Antony)
863 Seminar in Metaphysics; general (Robert Kraut)
863 Seminar in Metaphysics; Sellars (Robert Kraut)
863 Seminar in Metaphysics; Narrow Content (Joe Levine)
863 Seminar in Metaphysics; Truth (Stewart Shapiro)
In Value Theory:
830 Seminar in Value Theory; Metaethics (Sigrun Svavarsdottir)
In History of Philosophy:
801 Seminar in History; The Hellenistic Period (Sylvia Berryman)
801 Seminar in History; Kant (Lisa Shabel)
References
Neil Tennant
Department of Philosophy
The Ohio State University
350 University Hall
230 N Oval Mall
Columbus, OH 43210
(614) 292-7914
William W. Taschek
Department of Philosophy
The Ohio State University
350 University Hall
230 N Oval Mall
Columbus, OH 43210
(614) 688-5542
Cory Wimberly
Dept. of History and Philosophy
University of Texas-Pan American
311 Social and Behavioral Sciences
1201 W University Dr
Edinburg, TX 78539
(956) 827-4502
Greg Gilson
Dept. of History and Philosophy
University of Texas-Pan American
304 Social and Behavioral Sciences
1201 W University Dr
Edinburg, TX 78539
(956) 457-3745