Societal Beliefs
International Journal of Conflict Management, 1998, 9, 22-50
Running head: SOCIETAL BELIEFS OF INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS
Societal Beliefs in Times of Intractable Conflict:
The Israeli Case
Daniel Bar-Tal
School of Education
Tel Aviv University
Daniel Bar-Tal
School of Educaiton
Tel-Aviv University
Tel Aviv, Israel 9978
Tel. (O): 972-3-6408473
Tel. (H): 972-3-6474927
e-mail: daniel@ccsg.tau.ac.il
Fax: 972-3-6409477
The author would like to thank Yoram Bar-Gal, Ruth Firer, Jacob Berkovitch, Louis
Kriesberg, Michal Shamir, Michael Ross and anonymous reviewers for their helpful
comments on the earlier drafts of this paper. Portions of this paper were presented at
the Annual Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Washington,
DC, July 1995. The writing of this paper was supported by a grant from the NCJW
Research Institute for Innovation in Education, School of Education, The Hebrew
University of Jerusalem. Requests for reprints should be sent to Daniel Bar-Tal,
School of Education, Tel-Aviv University, Tel-Aviv, 69978 Israel.
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Societal Beliefs
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Societal Beliefs in Times of Intractable Conflict:
The Israeli Case
Abstract
Intractable conflicts are characterized as protracted, irreconcilable, with vested
interests in their continuation, violent, of zero-sum nature, total, and central. They are
demanding, stressful, exhausting, and costly both in human and material terms.
Societies involved in this type of conflict develop appropriate psychological conditions
which enable them to cope successfully with the conflictual situation. The present
paper proposes the following societal beliefs which are conducive to the development
of these psychological conditions: beliefs about the justness of one's own goals, beliefs
about security, beliefs of delegitimizing the opponent, beliefs of positive self image,
beliefs about patriotism, beliefs about unity and beliefs about peace. These beliefs
constitute a kind of ideology which supports the continuation of the conflict. The paper
analyzes as an example one such intractable conflict, namely the one between Israel
and Arabs, concentrating on the Israeli society. Specifically, it demonstrates the
reflection of the discussed societal beliefs in the Israeli school textbooks. Finally,
implications of the presented framework for peaceful conflict resolution are discussed.
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Societal Beliefs in Times of Intractable Conflict:
The Israeli Case
Conflicts between societies or nations, which erupt when their goals, intentions,
and/or actions are perceived as mutually incompatible (Bar-Tal, Kruglanski, & Klar,
1989; Mitchell, 1981; Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994), occur even between close allies.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the study of conflicts has become one of the central
areas of research in the social sciences (e.g., Brecher, 1993; Deutsch, 1985; Fisher,
1990; Kriesberg, 1982; Lebow, 1981; Leng, 1993; Rubin, et al., 1994; Snyder &
Diesing, 1977).
Conflict cannot be viewed as a unitary phenomenon. There are different types
of conflict which are classified in different ways, for example according to their
severity and longevity. Over time, different concepts have been proposed to describe
the negative pole in such a classification. The work of Edward Azar, who advanced the
concept of protracted conflict, is especially notable in this attempt (e.g., Azar, 1985,
1990; Azar, Jureidini, & McLaurin, 1978). While this concept was also used by a
number of other researchers (e.g., Brecher & Wilkenfeld, 1988; Crighton & MacIver,
1990), with the same intention to describe severe conflicts, other social scientists
introduced additional concepts such as enduring rivalries (e.g., Goertz & Diehl, 1993;
Huth & Russett, 1993; Mor & Maoz, 1994), malignant conflicts (Deutsch, 1985), or
deep-rooted conflicts (e.g., Burton, 1987; Mitchell, 1981). These concepts not only
differ in semantics, but also in the classificatory criteria which they constitute.
However these definitions have been quite vague and their use has often been
inconsistent.
Recently Kriesberg (1993, 1995) suggested elaborated criteria for classifying
conflicts on the intractable-tractable dimension. On the one side of this dimension are
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found tractable conflicts in which the parties in dispute attempt to resolve them through
negotiation: they avoid violence, recognize mutual interests and accept each other's
identity and rights. The other pole is constituted by intractable conflicts, which are
prolonged, involve great animosity and vicious cycles of violence: this type of conflict
seems to be irreconcilable and self-perpetuating. (see also Kriesberg, Northrup, &
Thorson, 1989). The conflicts between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland,
in Turkey between Turks and Kurds, in India's Kashmir and in the Middle East, are
cases in point.
Intractable conflicts are exhausting, demanding, stressful, painful and costly -in human as well as material terms. They require, therefore, that society members
adapt to the conflictual situations both in their individual and social life. Successful
societal adaptation to and coping with intractable conflict demands certain appropriate
military, economic, political, societal, and psychological conditions. Without them a
society might have great difficulty to withstand the opponent and may eventually
become the losing side in the conflict.
The present paper proposes the major psychological infra-structure that enables
society to cope with the intractable conflict -- namely the existence of societal beliefs.
That is, intractable conflict poses special demands on society members, and coping
according to one psychological definition, refers to the various ways in which people
try to meet these demands (Zeidner & Endler, 1995). The present conception suggests
that the formation of particular societal beliefs constitutes a way of coping under the
situation of intractable conflict. These beliefs on the one hand strengthen the society to
help it cope with the conflict as such, but, on the other hand, they also constitute a
certain psychological investment in the conflict and thus perpetuate its continuation.
The present paper will describe the general characteristics of intractable conflict. Then
it will propose the societal beliefs that create the psychological conditions that in turn
facilitate successful adaptation to the intractable conflict. These two parts provide a
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conceptual framework for the analysis of intractable conflicts around the world. The
next part will analyze one instance of intractable conflict, namely between Israel and
the Arabs, concentrating on the Israeli society. It will specifically demonstrate the
reflection of the earlier mentioned societal beliefs in Israeli school textbooks, as
documented in several studies which content-analyzed them. Finally, conclusions will
be drawn.
The Intractable Conflict
Because intractable conflicts have serious implications for the world
community, understanding their dynamics is a special challenge for social scientists.
Kriesberg (1995) suggested that four features characterize the extreme cases of
intractable conflicts:
a.
They are protracted. Intractable conflicts persist for a long time, at least a
generation; attempts to resolve such conflicts have failed and the parties have
accumulated animosity, hatred and prejudice.
b.
They are perceived as irreconcilable. Parties involved in intractable conflicts
view their goals as radically opposite and irreconcilable. Each side sticks to its own
goals, perceiving them as essential for own survival; neither side sees a possibility of
making concessions, or anticipates a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Both sides
expect that the conflict will last indefinitely.
c.
Parties have an interest in the conflict's continuation. The parties engaged
in the intractable conflict make vast military, economic and psychological investments
which later impede its resolution. These investments include military training,
development of military industries, and formation of an ideology to buttress the
conflict. Having vested interests in the conflict, individuals and groups have great
difficulties changing the perceptions, beliefs, and behaviors which perpetuate the
conflict.
Societal Beliefs
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Intractable conflicts are violent. Wars are fought, limited military
engagements take place, and terrorist attacks occur with fluctuating frequency and
intensity. Over the years not only soldiers are wounded and killed, but often civilians
are also hurt and civil property is destroyed. Intractable conflicts also frequently create
refugee problems and atrocities may be perpetrated by either or both sides.
In addition to Kriesberg's above features, it is possible to formulate three
characteristics which may further elaborate the nature of extreme intractable conflict.
They are perceived as being of zero sum nature. Parties engaged in the
intractable conflict perceive any loss suffered by the other side as their own gain, and
conversely, any gains of the other side as their own loss. Each side tries to inflict as
many losses as possible on the opponent and to prevent any gains (Ordeshook, 1986).
They are total. Intractable conflicts are perceived by the parties involved as
concerning needs or values that are absolutely essential for the party's existence and/or
survival. Therefore, intractable conflicts address a plurality of issues such as territory,
resources, identity, economy, culture, religion, etc.
They are central. Members of a society involved in an intractable conflict are
preoccupied constantly and continuously with it. This preoccupation reflects its
centrality in the cognitive repertoire of society members (Bar-Tal, Raviv, & Freund,
1994). This centrality is further reflected in the saliency of the conflict on the public
agenda.
These seven characteristics describe only the most extreme cases of the
intractable conflict. It can be assumed that less extreme cases have less characteristics,
since conflicts differ in their intensity, severity, and extensity. The present conception
focuses on the extreme cases of the intractable conflict.
Societal Beliefs Functional for Coping with the Intractable Conflicts
Coping with the intractable conflict is a vital objective for the involved societies
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and requires the development of appropriate military, political, economic, societal, and
psychological conditions. Of special interest to the present study are the psychological
conditions, which are necessary but not sufficient for meeting the demands of
intractable conflict: Devotion to society and country, high motivation to contribute,
persistence, coping with physical and psychological stress, readiness for personal
sacrifice, unity, solidarity, pursuit of society's objectives, determination, courage, and
endurance are proposed to be only examples of the necessary psychological conditions.
The basic assumption of the present conceptual framework is that in order to fulfill
these conditions, a society needs to impart particular skills and societal beliefs to its
members.
Skills are behavioral abilities, which can be learned, at least partially. There are
a number of skills which are required in times of intractable conflict, and which the
society tries to inculcate to its members according to the particular nature of the
conflict, particular characteristics of its own culture and other factors. The list of the
type of skills includes, for instance, courage, social responsibility, endurance,
resourcefulness, or maintenance of objectives. It is beyond the scope of the present
paper to elaborate on these skills, since it focuses rather on the societal beliefs, which
are proposed to be functional for coping with extreme intractable conflict.
Societal beliefs are cognitions shared by society members on topics and issues
that are of special concern for the particular society, and which contribute to the sense
of uniqueness of the society's members (Bar-Tal, press-a). The contents of societal
beliefs refer to characteristics, structure, and processes of a society and cover the
different domains of societal life. In general, they may concern societal goals, selfimages, conflicts, aspirations, conditions, norms, values, societal structures, images of
outgroups, institutions, obstacles, problems, etc. They are organized around thematic
clusters, each of which is grounded in a number of beliefs. Themes can for instance
pertain to a security problem, specific intergroup relations, or equality in the society.
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What characterizes societal beliefs is that they have implications for the society. They
appear often on the public agenda, are discussed among society members, serve as
relevant references in leaders' decisions and influence chosen courses of action.
Societal beliefs are acquired and societal institutions actively impart them to society
members. They are incorporated into the ethos and are reflected in the group's
language, stereotypes, images, myths and collective memories. They constitute part of
society members' shared repertoire and contribute to the solidification of social identity.
The following eight themes of societal beliefs are proposed to be particularly
functional for coping with intractable conflict: 1) the justness of one's own goals, 2)
security, 3) adversary's delegitimization, 4) positive self image, 5) own victimization,
6) patriotism, 7) unity, and 8) own wish for peace. These beliefs refer to the causes of
the conflict including the societal goals which lead to the conflict, self-societal image,
image of the adversary and the necessary conditions for coping with the conflict. The
centrality of each theme may differ from society to society depending on such factors as
the society's culture, nature of the intractable conflict, or the geopolitical conditions.
Some of these societal beliefs are an inseparable part of societal ethos, irrespectively of
the conflict state in which the society is involved. Societies always try to maintain
positive self-image, develop security, patriotism and unity, and believe that their goals
are justful. But, what makes these beliefs special in times of intractable conflict is their
complementary wholeness, unidimensionality extremism, black and white view, blind
adherence to them, strong belief in their validity and their intensive and extensive use
in the society. The following part will devote some attention to each theme of the
proposed societal beliefs.
Societal beliefs about the justness of one's own goals
Intergroup conflicts break out because two societies set themselves mutually
contradictory goals (Bar-Tal, Kruglanski, & Klar, 1989; Boulding, 1962; Holsti, 1972).
In order to cope successfully with this situation society members have to be convinced
Societal Beliefs
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of their own right. This logically implies that the adversary's goals are unjust: society
members tend to take only their own perspective, while disregarding that of the other
(Eldridge, 1979).
The beliefs about the justness of one's own goals not only outline the goals and
establish their justice, they also provide the rationale for the eruption of the conflict.
First of all, beliefs in the justness of one's own goals rest on the assumption of the
supreme and vital importance of those goals: failure to achieve them threatens the
existence of the society. Next, justness beliefs provide a set of reasons to support
assured importance of these goals. Reasons can be of different kinds and are drawn
from, for instance, historical, national theological, cultural sources. They are frequently
embodied in an ideology which plays a vital role in the society's life.
Societal beliefs about security
Intractable conflicts involve violent clashes, including military actions and
terrorist attacks, and all this requires military, economic, human, political and societal
resources. The issue of security becomes the main preoccupation of such a society's
members and a central and determinative societal value which plays a major role in any
decisions made by the society.
A society's security values are expressed in its beliefs concerning national
survival and personal safety (Bar-Tal & Jacobson, in press). On the personal level,
security beliefs concern conditions which can prevent loss of life, injury and property
damage. More generally, these beliefs refer mostly to conditions which can secure
national survival, guarantee achievement of principal national goals, preserve the basic
values, deter and contain the enemy, and preferably achieve victory in the conflict.
They may pertain to the geopolitical, economic, diplomatic, educational, or societal
domains, for instance referring to the geo-political boundaries that ensure security,
military industries for maintenance of security, or security-related legislature. Any
society engaged in intractable conflict specifies its own conditions for security,
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depending on various factors, such as the nature of the intractable conflict, the
characteristics of the enemy, the society's culture, legal considerations, etc.
Of special importance are security beliefs which refer to military issues and
conditions, and this includes the personnel responsible for maintaining security.
Security personnel fulfill a crucial and determinative role in times of intractable
conflict. It is their responsibility to defend the society and country, to deter the enemy,
and to win the conflict. Military personnel are the first to pay the price of the conflict
in casualties. Therefore, beliefs about security honor the military forces and raise their
prestige and status. They encourage military service, volunteering and commitment,
they glorify heroism and make a point of commemorating those who have fallen as a
result of the conflict (Shalit, 1988).
Societal beliefs that delegitimize the opponent
Societies in intractable conflict form beliefs which delegitimize the opponent
(Bar-Tal, 1990; Rieber, 1991; Stagner, 1967; White, 1970). Delegitimization is the
categorization of groups into extremely negative social categories with the purpose of
excluding them from recognized human groups which act within the framework of
accepted values and norms (Bar-Tal, 1989). In essence, delegitimization denies the
humanity of the other group. Dehumanization, outcasting, negative trait
characterization, use of political labels and group comparison are among the most
commonly used practices of delegitimization.
One of the important tasks for a society in intractable conflict is to explain to its
members the reasons for the opponent's objection to the fulfillment of its own declared
goal, the reasons for the opponent's antagonistic positions, the causes for the latter's
actions, and to justify one's own goals and actions. Such explanations always delegate
almost total responsibility for the eruption of the conflict to the opponent, since each
society views itself in a positive light and its own goals as legitimate and just. This
passing of responsibility is always accompanied by the delegitimization of the
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adversary (Bar-Tal, 1990).
More specifically, the above methods of delegitimization and their resulting
beliefs provide the rationale, explanation and justification for the eruption and
continuation of the intractable conflict. Delegitimization explains why the opponent
has "far reaching", "irrational", "malevolent" goals which negate the honorable and
worthy goals of one's own society, and why the adversary is intransigent and
unreconciling (Bar-Tal, 1990). In addition, delegitimizing beliefs help explain the
violence, viciousness and atrocities of the opponent (Holsti, 1967). Finally, according
to Bar-Tal (1990), delegitimizing beliefs serve also as justifications for one's own
violence and destructiveness vis-à-vis the adversary. Delegitimizing beliefs not only
indicate that the delegitimized society does not deserve human treatment, but they also
suggest the need to prevent potential danger by initiating violent acts and to punish for
past violence.
Societal beliefs that create a positive self image
Societies engaged in intractable conflicts have to develop and maintain societal
beliefs that create and support their positive self image (Sande, Goethals, Ferrari, &
Worth, 1989). The contents of such beliefs can pertain to a variety of positive traits,
values, and skills which are used to characterize the society; to positive actions
performed in the past, and to positive contributions to mankind and civilization. These
beliefs reflect the general and well-documented tendency toward ethnocentrism
(LeVine & Campbell, 1972), but in times of intractable conflict they gain special
importance. The intense effort required, the need for social and military mobilization,
the violence, and especially own side's perpetration of aggressive and immoral acts,
sometimes even atrocities -- all this requires the forceful maintenance of a positive self
image. This is done by means of intense self-justification, self-glorification and selfpraise.
Attributes that are often used for this purpose are humaneness, morality,
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fairness, and trustworthiness, on the one hand, and courage, heroism, and endurance, on
the other. Special efforts are made to contrast the own group against the adversary on
these characteristics (Frank, 1967; Stagner, 1967). The objective is to form a selfimage that is superior to the enemy and to create maximum contrast between "they" and
"we".
Societal beliefs about victimization
A society in intractable conflict believes that it is being victimized by the
opponent, a belief formed through a long period of violence, as a result of own
sufferings and losses. Supporting such a belief are other beliefs about the justness of
own goals, the wickedness of the opponent's goals, the delegitimizing characteristics of
the opponent and own positive self-image (Frank, 1967). In other words, the focus on
the injustice, harm, evil, and atrocities of the adversary, in combination with the
society's self-perception as just, moral and human leads a society to assume that it is a
victim. Beliefs about self-victimization imply that the conflict was imposed by the
adversary who not only fights for unjust goals, but also uses immoral means to achieve
these goals.
During intractable conflict it is functional to perceive one's own society as being
the victimized party. This perception first of all delegates the responsibility for both
the outbreak of the conflict and the subsequent violence to the opponent. In addition,
it provides the moral power to seek justice and oppose the adversary. In this respect,
such beliefs give a rationale for continuing the struggle.
Societal beliefs about patriotism
Patriotism, defined as the "attachment of group members to their group and the
country in which they reside" (Bar-Tal, 1993, p. 48), is of crucial importance in times
of intractable conflict. This attachment, which is associated with positive evaluation
and emotion, is expressed in beliefs connoting contents of love, loyalty, commitment,
pride or care. Unless patriotic beliefs are internalized by its members, a society will
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have difficulty in coping with intractable conflict (Stagner, 1967). On the most
elementary level, patriotism increases the cohesiveness of the society (Doob, 1964). In
the name of patriotism, society members can be asked to forego their personal
conveniences, wishes or even needs (Somerville, 1981). In times of intractable
conflict, patriotism even demands the ultimate sacrifice -- the loss of life. In general,
thus, patriotic beliefs serve as explanation and justification for sacrifices (Bar-Tal &
Staub, 1997).
Societal beliefs about unity
It is essential that a society involved in intractable conflict be united. Beliefs
about unity focus on the importance of setting aside any internal conflicts,
controversies and disagreements and unite the group's forces in face of the external
threat. Beliefs about unity engender a feeling that all society members support the
goals of the conflict and follow the leaders. They function to increase solidarity and
cohesiveness which are important for mobilization. In times of intractable conflict
unity allows mobilization of energy for coping with the conflict. Lack of unity, on the
other hand, creates polarization and internal tensions, which interfere in the struggle
with the enemy.
Societal beliefs about peace
Beliefs about the ultimate desirability of peace are also functional for societies
engaged in intractable conflict: they present the society members, both to themselves
and to the world, as peace loving and peace seeking. This peace however is usually
conceived of in utopian terms as a vague dream or wish. Their function is to provide
hope and optimism, which are crucial when a conflict is prolonged and violent, with
much suffering and exacting great cost. In such times, there is need for a light at the
end of the tunnel and beliefs about peace fulfill this role.
Implications
It is suggested that the described societal beliefs complement each other, are
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interdependent and can be seen to constitute a kind of ideology which both strengthens
a society that has to cope with conflict and at the same time supports the continuation
of that conflict. Belief in the justness of the own side's goals, positive self-perception,
perceiving one's own group as the victim, and beliefs about peace all contribute to
positive self image and a sense of one's own justice and morality. They also stand in
contrast to beliefs about delegitimization of the enemy, which come to differentiate
between the society members and the opponent. They all lead to beliefs about security,
patriotism and unity -- all of which are necessary in order to withstand the
delegitimized enemy.
The societal beliefs which were discussed in the above section are proposed to
serve as a basis for developing the psychological conditions that allow coping with the
intractable conflict. They enable to understand the conflict and serve as a rationale for
actions taken by the society. In other words, they serve the two important functions of
informing and motivating the society members engaged in intractable conflict.
Understanding is a primary human need: individuals strive to live in a comprehensible,
organized and predictable world, especially in times of stress. Societal beliefs, which
are products of reality construction, can be viewed as a kind of glasses through which
society members perceive, and feel that they understand, the situation (see Ross, 1995).
The general motivational function of the societal beliefs treated in their article is
that they inspire, motivate, and encourage society members to take courses of action
which enable coping with intractable conflict. These beliefs do not only directly call
for action, but also, as indicated, provide the underlying rationale for action. All of the
reviewed societal beliefs have behavioral implications. They underlie behaviors
reflecting determination, heroism, persistence, sacrifice and many specific acts related
to conflict. In addition they have affective implications: they arouse strong feelings
and thus become relatively resistant to change.
Because the noted societa beliefs fulfil the described functions, societies in
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intractable conflict make special efforts to impart them to their members, both
intentionally and unintentionally, directly and indirectly through various societal
channels of communication (Bar-Tal & Saxe, 1990; Renshon, 1977). Political, social,
educational, and cultural institutions are extensively mobilized to socialize members of
the society to acquire the societal beliefs which enable them to cope best with the
intractable conflict, by focusing on them, emphasizing them, basing norms on them,
and turning them into main values. They serve as anchors which define the social
consensus. Individuals who reject these beliefs are viewed as breaking the unity and
are sometimes considered as "non-patriots" (Bar-Tal, 1997). Eventually, the societal
beliefs functional for coping with the conflict are incorporated into the ethos of the
society. On their basis the society constructs its language, symbols, myths, and even
collective memory.
The above outlined conceptual framework will be used in the next part of this
paper to analyze one particular intractable conflict - the Israeli-Arab conflict. This part
will illustrate the intractable nature of the Israeli-Arab conflict and the prevalence of
the above-mentioned societal beliefs in Israeli society. For this purpose, some studies
will be reviewed which content analyzed Israeli school textbooks. The review will
focus on the presentation of conflict-related societal beliefs in school textbooks.
Following this analysis, there will remain an opened question, whether this conceptual
framework can be used in the analyses of other extreme intractable conflicts.
Israeli Society in Intractable Conflict
Israeli-Arab conflict as intractable conflict
The Israeli-Arab conflict was one of the most salient instances of intractable
conflict until at least 1974 -- the year that the Egyptian-Israeli and Syrian-Israeli
disengagement agreements were signed. These agreements were a prologue to the long
peace process which began three years later with the visit of the Egyptian President
Anwar Sadat in Jerusalem and still continues today.
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The Israeli-Arab conflict developed about the contested territory known over
the last centuries as Palestine, which two national movements claimed as their
homeland. For more than 70 years, Palestinian nationalism and Zionism, the Jewish
national movement, clashed recurrently over the right for self-determination, statehood
and justice. The conflict however is not only territorial and political, but also concerns
deep contradictions in religious and cultural interests. The Israeli-Arab conflict which
started as a communal conflict between Jews and Palestinians living in British-ruled
Palestine became a full blown interstate war between Israel and Arab states in 1948-49.
Since 1967, with the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the Six Day
War, the conflict has been fought at both the interstate and communal levels (Sandler,
1988). According to Sandler (1988), this spatial expansion reinforced the intractability
of the conflict. Each new phase involved intense violence and was followed by the
introduction of new parties to the conflict and the development of new patterns of
hostilities.
For a long time the conflict seemed irreconcilable and total. The dispute
concerned elementary issues, existential needs of each side, and it was impossible to
find a feasible solution for both parties. Israel's minimum requirements exceeded the
Arabs' maximum concession and vice versa. Thus the sides involved perceived the
conflict as being of zero sum nature and they mobilized all possible resources, efforts
and supports within the group and the international community in order to gain the
upper hand in it.
The conflict has been on Israel's public agenda almost daily because related
events have been taking place continuously. Many of these events have had a direct
impact on the life of individuals living in the conflict region. The involved parties
learned to live with this harsh and violent reality (Kimmerling, 1984). It was almost
impossible to imagine an alternative to the conflict, which thus became a way of life for
both Israelis and Arabs. With time powerful, ideological, economic and military
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forces appeared, which perpetuated the continuation of the conflict.
But in spite of the fact that some of the features that have made this a typically
intractable conflict are still intact, the Israeli-Arab conflict is slowly but steadily
becoming a tractable conflict. The peace treaty with Egypt in 1979, the Madrid
convention of 1991, the Oslo agreements in 1993 and 1995 and the peace treaty with
Jordan in 1994 are hallmarks of the peace process which is continuously changing the
relations between Jews and Arabs in the Middle East. Nevertheless, there are segments
in the Israeli, as well as in Arab, societies who still view the conflict as intractable and
act accordingly.
Societal beliefs in Israel
During its intractable conflict with the Arabs in the late 40s, the 50s, 60 and
early 70s, the great majority of the Israeli society supported and maintained societal
beliefs which enabled coping with the conflict. These beliefs were based on the
perceived conflict-dominated reality which was harsh, violent, and threatening. The
intractable conflict with all its characteristics was real for Israeli Jews, who made every
effort to adapt to it. Societal beliefs were functional to this adaptation process.
Not all of these functional societal beliefs were new and had to be formed.
Some of them, for instance beliefs about self-victimization or beliefs about positive
self-image had been part of a long Jewish tradition. Other societal beliefs, e.g., ones
involving patriotism or security, had to be formed and imparted to the newly emerging
Jewish society in Israel. A short analysis of the societal beliefs which were nourished
by the Israelis during the years of the intractable conflict suggests the following.
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The return of the Jews to Israel, after 2000 years of exile, to establish their own
state in Palestine was inspired by the nationalist ideology of Zionism. This ideology
provided Jews with goals and their justifications (Avineri, 1981; Vital, 1982) and it
also served as a basis for the formation of societal beliefs which referred to self image,
image of other nations, patriotism, and unity. On the basis of this ideology beliefs
evolved which characterized the new-born state. But at the same time the Zionist
ideology led to direct confrontation with Arabs who considered the same land as their
homeland and had similar national aspirations.
The particular circumstances under
which the Israeli-Arab conflict developed required special efforts to form, maintain and
strengthen all the societal beliefs needed for coping with the conflict (Cohen, 1989).
Special attention of this kind was required as regards Jews' beliefs about the justness of
their own goals: historical, theological, national, existential, political, societal, and
cultural arguments were used for this purpose (Avineri, 1981; Halpern, 1961). Among
them can be found references to the fact the Jewish nation was formed in the land of
ancient Israel; that during the long period of the Jews' ancient history Israel was their
homeland: that during their exile Jews maintained close spiritual as well as physical
relations with the land of Israel, continuously aspiring to return to it; and that the
repeated experience of anti-Semitism in exile was a constant reminder of the need to
secure the existence of the Jewish people in their old homeland.
In the course of this intractable conflict, security has become one of the most
central problems to the Israeli Jews (Bar-Tal, Jacobson, & Klieman, in press; Horowitz,
1993). Since Arab states attempted to destroy Israel, Israeli Jews believed, and many
still do, that the security of Israel and its Jewish citizens is seriously under threat
(Arian, 1995; Stein & Brecher, 1976; Stone, 1982). Therefore, security has become a
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19
cultural master symbol in the Israeli-Jewish ethos (Horowitz, 1984). It has been used
routinely to mobilize human and material resources that people in other societies would
perhaps consider above and beyond their abilities and obligations (Lissak, 1984, 1993).
This concern turned the Israeli society into "a nation at arms" or a "nation in uniform"
which lived in a situation that has been labeled a "dormant war" (Yaniv, 1993).
A very basic shared belief in Israel is that the country has the right and duty to
defend itself by means of its own armed forces, without having to rely on foreign
military help (Horowitz, 1993). Other beliefs specify conditions that would
strengthen the national security (Bar-Tal, 1991). These beliefs had strongly affected
every sphere of public life (Kimmerling, 1993; Perlmutter, 1969). In this climate, the
security forces enjoyed a high status (Lissak, 1984). Service in the Israel Defense
Forces was viewed as an entrance ticket to Israeli society and high prestige was
attributed to high ranking officers and combat fighters (Peri, 1983). All the channels of
communication and agents of socialization paid tribute to the security forces (Lissak,
1984). They nourished a heritage of wars and battles and glorified heroism. Military
heroes were celebrated and the society commemorated those who fell in military
service. This approach was extended to the treatment of Jewish history. Historical
fighters and their acts of heroism, such as the Maccabees, Bar Kochba's rebels, the
refusal to surrender at Massada or the Warsaw Ghetto resistance, were presented as
models for identification and admiration (Liebman & Don-Yehiya, 1983).
During the long years of conflict between the Israelis and the Arabs, mutual
delegitimization has been one of its most bitter outcomes (Bar-Tal, 1988). Beliefs
causing delegitimization strongly influenced the attitudes and behaviors of each group
and contributed to the continuation of the conflict. Although the expressions of these
Societal Beliefs
20
beliefs have varied over time in intensity, content and form, both groups have formed
different types of delegitimizing beliefs and used all possible channels to transmit
them.
From early on, the encounter between Jews, who came mostly from Europe, and
the Arabs who were living in Palestine, brought about negative stereotyping (Lustick,
1982). Arabs were thought of as primitive, uncivilized, savage or backward (e.g., Adir,
1985; Benyamini, 1981). With time, as the conflict deepened and became violent,
Arabs were perceived as killers, a blood thirsty mob, rioters, treacherous,
untrustworthy, cruel and wicked. After the foundation of the State of Israel, these
delegitimizing beliefs about Arabs prevailed and were transmitted through
institutionalized channels such as school and books (Domb, 1982; Segev, 1984). In
addition, Arabs were blamed for the continuation of the conflict, for the eruption of all
the wars and military acts and were presented as intransigent and refusing a peaceful
resolution of the conflict (Ben-Gurion, 1969; Harkabi, 1977; Landau, 1971).
Unsurprisingly, the delegitimizing beliefs about Arabs stood in absolute
contrast with the beliefs Israeli society held with regard to Jews. Jews viewed
themselves as a "new people", reborn in Israel (Hofman, 1970). They liked to
stereotype themselves as persistent, brave, hardworking, determined, smart and
intelligent. The Jewish heritage was also portrayed in this flattering light. Jewish
culture, religion and tradition were viewed as the roots of western civilization and of a
superior morality (Hazani, 1993). Jewish people in Israel therefore tried to think of
themselves as the Chosen People who set an example unto the nations.
The positive self-image of Jews in Israel was associated with societal beliefs
they had about themselves as victims. These beliefs evolved through a long history of
Societal Beliefs
21
negative experiences that left their mark on the Jewish psyche and were absorbed into
the Israeli ethos (Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992; Liebman, 1978). From early on in their
history, Jews perceived themselves as victims in a hostile world (Stein, 1978; Hereven,
1983). This view was strengthened by regular outbreaks of anti-Semitism which led to
constant and continuous persecutions, libels, special taxation, restrictions, forced
conversions, expulsions and pogroms. Anti-Semitism climaxed in the 20th century
with the Holocaust, the systematic genocide and the "final solution" to the Jewish
problem in Europe. One of the results of this has been called the siege mentality.
The events of the Israeli-Arab conflict can be regarded to confirm the siege
mentality. The concerted attempts of the Arab states to annihilate the State of Israel
during the first 30 years of its existence, the Arab embargo on Israeli trade, and the
terrorist attacks on Israeli and non-Israeli Jews were all perceived by the Israelis as
evidence of their victimization. In this frame of reference, the four major wars of 1948,
1956, 1967, and 1973, as well as numerous military clashes, have been perceived as
self-defensive actions. Arab attitudes and behaviors were viewed as another direct
expression of the world's hostility, and Arab anti-Zionism, during the intractable
conflict, was viewed as a continuation of old anti-Semitism (e.g., Harkabi, 1972).
At its apex, the intractable conflict between Israel and the Arabs required much
devotion, commitment and sacrifice from the members of the Israeli society (Galnoor,
1982). It is thus not surprising that special efforts were made to impart the type of
beliefs that would buttress patriotism and a sense of unity. Different channels and
methods , such as schooling, participation in youth movements or mandatory army
service (Eisenstadt, 1973) were used to develop love and loyalty to the country, the
state and the Jewish people. In addition, economic hardship, the burden of the military
Societal Beliefs
22
service, and human losses in hostile activities were all sacrifices which the citizens of
Israel were asked to make as patriotic citizens. Volunteering was highly encouraged
whether for the security forces, living in a kibbutz, or in the border regions.
Israeli society also made special efforts to foster unity and to build a sense of
belonging and solidarity (Barzilai, 1992; Kimmerling, 1985). Common heritage and
religion were emphasized and an attempt was made to minimize ethnic differences
among Jews coming from different parts of the world. Unity was also enforced: lines
of mainstream agreement, called the "consensus" were set, and sanctions were applied
to those who expressed opinions or exhibited behaviors beyond this consensus
(Smooha, 1978). The consensus pertained especially to societal beliefs concerning the
Israeli-Arab conflict, and particularly to those enhancing the sense of justness of Israel's
goals and conditions and ways to ensure security (Lahav, 1993; Negbi, 1985).
Finally, the Israeli society also cherished beliefs about peace. Peace was
presented as an aspiration, wish, or hope. It was described as a dream, in utopian and
idyllic images. Jews were stereotyped as peace-loving people who were forced by
circumstances to engage in violence. Israelis presented themselves to themselves as
being ready to negotiate and achieve peace: it was only the Arabs who rejected any
peaceful resolution and even refused to have direct contact with Israelis.
Reflections of the societal beliefs in school textbooks
To support and illustrate the above description of the societal beliefs that were
prevalent in Israel during the years of intractable conflict, findings of studies that
analyzed Israeli school textbooks used between the 1950s and 1970s will now be
presented. School textbooks, in general, are excellent illustrations of institutionalized
societal beliefs, especially in democratic societies (e.g., DeCharms & Moeller, 1962).
Societal Beliefs
23
They are a formal expression of a society's ideology and ethos, imparting the values,
goals, and myths which the society would like to inculcate in new generations (Apple,
1979; Bourdieu, 1973; Luke, 1988). School books are approved for use by a society's
institutions through a formal decision-making process. They are used by the entire
young generation in the society, since school attendance is mandatory. Moreover, the
knowledge imparted through them is usually presented and perceived as objective,
truthful and factual and therefore are influential. In the words of Luke (1988), school
textbooks "act as the interface between the officially state-adopted and sanctioned
knowledge of the culture, and the learner. Like all texts, school textbooks remain
potentially agents of mass enlightenment and/or social control" (p. 69).
School books in Israel are based on the curricula developed by the Ministry of
Education and Culture which outline the didactic, academic and societal objectives
(Eden, 1971), and approves the books by means of which these are to be attained. The
transmission of societal beliefs to the young generation is particularly done through
school books concerning the subject matters such as history, literature and Hebrew,
geography, social sciences and Bible studies. The following part will review four
major studies which analyzed the school textbooks in history, geography and Hebrew,
which were used during the first two decades of the existence of Israel, at the height of
its intractable conflict with the Arabs. The studies show how the school books
propagated extensively, intensively and unequivocally the eight societal beliefs of ethos
of intractable conflict to the young generation.
The most extensive and comprehensive study of history school textbooks in
Israel was done by Firer (1985). She content analyzed 142 history textbooks, used in
the Jewish schools in Israel, during four periods between 1900-1984, to examine their
Societal Beliefs
24
role as agents for Zionist socialization. Of special importance for the present paper are
findings which pertain to books published between 1948-1967, because in those years,
there was a unanimous view in Israeli society that the Israeli-Arab conflict is
intractable.
Firer (1985) shows that history school books were used to present justifications
for the Jewish people's claims on the land and for the Zionists' position in the
intractable conflict. At the same time the books tried to discredit any parallel Arab
claims, for the same reasons. The basic justification referred to the historical origin of
the Jews in Israel (Eretz Israel, i.e., "the land of Israel") where their nation originated
and lived for many centuries until they were forcibly exiled. Their return to Eretz Israel
was presented as the rightful regaining of their homeland. In addition, Firer found three
other, complementary justifications. The first pertained to the rights, deriving from
universal human values, of the Jewish people to lead a normal life in a country of their
own. This type of life was denied to the Diaspora Jews. The second justification
referred to the continuous spiritual contact with Eretz Israel that the Jews kept
throughout their exile. This was brought to bear in order to indicate that Jews never
surrendered their rights to Eretz Israel, which they only got back with the establishment
of the Jewish state. The third justification referred to the continued Jewish presence in
Eretz Israel, the waves of Jewish immigration to the Holy Land, throughout history.
The same school books denied the Arab rights to the land of Israel. This was done,
according to Firer (1985), through the delegitimization of Arabs, the denial of a
national Arab movement and the refusal to recognize a Palestinian entity.
The Arabs were presented very negatively. The most frequent stereotypes
portrayed them as primitive, hostile to Jews, violent and easily agitated. It was often
Societal Beliefs
25
stated that their intention was to destroy the Jewish settlements in Israel.
The same beliefs were found by Bezalel (1989) who content analyzed Hebrew
language textbooks (readers) used in elementary schools (grades 1-8) from the late
fifties to the mid-eighties. The study found that the readers in the fifties and sixties, at
the height of the intractable conflict, were characterized by their intensive attempts to
inculcate Zionist values. According to Bezalel, "In this period it is clear that a large
part of the material was included in the readers because it conveys explicit and implicit
Zionist values" (p. 312). During this period special attempts were made to strengthen
the public's belief in the justness of the Zionist cause. Bezalel found two main
justifications in the readers. One pertained to the "general human right to a homeland",
especially in view of the persecutions in the exile. This line presented "the Zionistpioneering solution, which dominated Zionism in Europe as the only and right solution
to the existential dangers of Jews in the exile" (p. 314). The other justification was
based on the historical ties between the Jews and Israel. This justification was
tripartite: "Historical ties because of our ancestors' right, who lived as sovereign people
in Eretz Israel. Continuous spiritual ties of yearning during all the generations.
Historical ties of continuous Jewish settlement in the country throughout the ages" (p.
315).
Bar-Gal (1993a) performed the most extensive study, with a content analysis of
about 200 geography textbooks published between 1894 and 1989. His study showed
that during the fifties and sixties the objective of geography instruction was first and
foremost "to serve societal and national needs. Other objectives accepted in planning
modern studies for the needs of the individual and the requirements of the subject
matter were not considered by the planners of the subject matter" (Bar-Gal, 1993a, p.
Societal Beliefs
26
80). Content analysis of the geography school books used during this period therefore
unsurprisingly revealed that their aims and themes were "to develop loyalty to the State
and readiness to defend it", "to instill love for the homeland and the will to guard and
cultivate it" or "to impart the recognition that the country is the basis of our national
culture".
With regard to the country's borders, geography books in the fifties dealt with
them in historical terms as extending from the desert to the Mediterranean, including
all of the Biblical Land of Israel, which also covers parts of present-day Jordan. Of
course the issue of borders was extremely significant in the Israeli-Arab conflict. The
borders imply the continuity of the State of Israel on the basis of the ancient Jewish
promised land and the ancient kingdom. They also added important dimension to the
definition of the conflict, indicating the goal of the Jewish state to extend its borders
(see also Bar-Gal, 1993b).
During the fifties the description of the country was dominated by nationalist
values. The geography books presented "the glory of the ancient past, the destruction
and negligence when the people went to exile, and renewal and revival of the
landscape with the help of the Zionist movement" (Bar-Gal, 1993a, p. 150). This
justified the return of the Jews to their homeland by implying that they cared about the
land and successfully made the swamps and the desert bloom. At the same time this
type of justification delegitimized Arab claims to the same land. The message was that
the Arabs had neglected the country, failed to cultivate the land due to their primitivism
and backwardness. This latter message is backed up by the more direct negative
stereotyping of Arabs of the books. In such stereotypes Arabs featured as:
Societal Beliefs
27
unenlightened, inferior, fatalistic, unproductive, apathetic, in need of a
powerful paternalism. In addition it was said that their customs were
different, as well as their homes, occupations, and their ways of life in
general. They were presented as divided, tribal, exotic, people of the
backward East, poor, sick, dirty, noisy, colored. Arabs are not progressive,
they are fast to increase, ungrateful, not part of us, non-Jews. Moreover
they burn, murder, destroy, are easily inflamed, and vengeful.
(Bar-Gal, 1993a, p. 189)
The books also presented some positive traits such as Arab hospitality,
combativeness, and hard working. But such positive description of Arabs mainly
depended on collaboration with the Zionist enterprise. The books ignored the tragic
fate of the hundreds of thousands of Arabs experienced during the Independence War
who became refugees after their villages were destroyed.
It should be noted though that after the Independence War, Arabs who
continued living in Israel came to suffer from less delegitimization with time.
References to their ignorance and primitivity slowly decreased and they stopped being
described as an enemy of Zionism. They were distinguished from Arabs who lived
beyond the borders, and who continued to be stereotyped negatively. School books
began to describe the integration of Arabs in the Jewish-Israeli society and emphasized
their good treatment by the state authorities and Israel's contribution to this population's
development(see also Bar-Gal, 1994).
Zohar (1972), who examined how Arabs were stereotyped in Hebrew textbooks
in the 1950s and 60s, found a similar picture in history and geography textbooks. First
of all, Arab people were most frequently referred to as a collective, and rarely included
the description of particular individuals. The label "Arabs" was also used for Arabs
who were Israeli citizens. On a general level, Arab societies were presented as
primitive and backward. Arab people mostly featured as farmers or soldiers. Their
difference and remoteness was ascribed to their "old fashioned way of work and their
primitive tools, as well as their traditionally passive approach to work" (p. 70). They
were said to use ancient tools and cattle for farming, without trying to cope with the
Societal Beliefs
28
nature or attempting to change their conditions or those of the land.
Most frequently, Arabs were presented as enemies.
The Arabs are described as enemies of different kinds, differing in type of
organization and fighting objectives. Some are organized in regular
armies, some fight as gangs of robbers and some attack in a sporadic way.
Although the stories differentiate between a sporadic attack and a battle,
many times the term 'robbery' is used also to describe a war or a battle
(Zohar, 1972, p. 72).
In general Hebrew textbooks tended to describe Arab activities as hostile,
deviant, cruel, immoral, unfair, intending to hurt Jews and to annihilate Israel.
Delegitimizing labels like "robbers", "wicked ones", "blood thirsty mob", "killers",
"gangs" or "rioters" were used in this context.
These descriptions of Arabs, according to Zohar, fulfilled the additional
function of promoting solidarity:
...the Arab presented in the readers is not just a stranger: he plays the
particular role of the enemy. As such his role is to throw into relief our
common characteristics from the point of view of internal group solidarity
- in the domain of nationality. Interestingly and significantly some of the
readers only mention Arab nationalism indirectly and generally while
leaving it out of the context of wars between us and the Arabs. (p. 72 - the
italics are in the origin).
According to Zohar the negative descriptions of Arabs highlighted the
difference between them and the Israeli Jews, who were presented in a very positive
light. Even though all violent events were presented as having been forced on the
Jews, who were in quantitative inferiority, they nevertheless won most of these hostile
encounters due to their determination and bravery. Jews were also described as more
advanced and educated, and bringing much progress to the country. They were
presented as industrious workers who actively cope with difficulties, and in addition
they were presented as moral, human and fair.
Firer (1985) found that history school textbooks between the years 1948 - 1967
Societal Beliefs
29
took a line which emphasized the active contribution of the Jews in the events of
general history. The books also stressed the active struggle of Jews with the harsh
reality of exile. There were many descriptions of military events in which Jews had
participated and the language was militant. Of special salience were acts of Jewish
heroism which were described in detail and presented as symbols. Firer pointed out
that:
the activist-militant trends and the extension of the general history during
the first years of the State of Israel, expressed the period, period of active
struggle of the young state for its existence against enemies in the borders,
its struggles in the domains of economy, society and culture.
(1985, p. 45)
Nevertheless all the history books also presented a picture of the Jewish people
as victims. There was overwhelming emphasis on Jewish suffering through the
centuries as a result of anti-Semitism. Jewish history was presented as an unbroken
sequence of pogroms, special taxations, libels, and forced conversion, with the
Holocaust forming the climax of two thousands years of persecution and hardship. In
the words of Firer, "The dominant approach in the books is that the hatred against Jews
is eternal with only its external manifestation changing according to periods" (p. 57)
and "According to these books hatred and anti-Semitism play a major, and even central,
role in Jewish and general history" (p. 58). The textbooks transmitted intensively
negative attitudes towards the non-Jewish world, which abounded in negative
stereotypes and even referred offensively to the "goyim".
The history textbooks emphasized a contrastingly positive image of the Jewish
people: they celebrate the uniqueness of the Jewish people who survived persecution
through their determination, a survival presented as a spiritual victory. In addition, the
books stressed the moral and cultural superiority of the Jewish people over other
nations and the exceptionality of the Zionist nationalist movement. Some books
referred to the Jewish people as "the chosen people", the "special people" and, even, the
Societal Beliefs
30
"pure race".
Firer's (1985) analysis also shows that during the intractable conflict the history
school textbooks, to impart patriotism, made special efforts to glorify the pioneering
myth. This was done by stressing the pioneers' sacrifices for the sake of the State of
Israel, and their commitment to Zionism. These pioneers were presented as
having heroic traits and they rebelled against their historic oppression, and
left to conquer the old Eretz Israel. In their new homeland, the pioneers struggled
with immense difficulties: the virgin land, deadly swamps, the Arabs, the hostile
authorities. By sheer will power and their readiness for self-sacrifice, they
overcame these difficulties, holding a gun in one hand and a plough in the other,
while under their feet stretched green fields and fertile orchards, and before their
eyes the Jewish nation was being renewed in its country as during the eras of the
First and Second Temple.
(Firer, 1985, p. 156)
The same theme featured largely in geography and Hebrew textbooks. The
geography books attempted to impart patriotic beliefs by nourishing love of the country
and the Jewish people (see Bar-Gal, 1993). The country was described as beautiful and
good and the pioneers who settled it as devoted Zionists whose attachment and
devotion to the country ran deep. The books glorified the sacrifices the pioneers made
to revive the nation and to build the country. They were portrayed as dedicated,
industrious and brave manual laborers who dried the swamps, cultivated the land, built
Jewish settlements and defended themselves bravely and successfully against Arab
violence. They were presented as models of loyalty, devotion and commitment to the
country and the Zionist cause.
Similarly, the Hebrew textbooks imparted patriotism
by describing the sacrifices of the pioneers, who thus were hoped to serve as models for
the new generations. They came to Israel to live according to the precepts of Zionist
ideology an initiative widely described in the books as the "realization" of Zionism's
ideals. As Bezalel noted:
Pioneering "realization" which features widely in the readers describes the
immigration of the pioneers and their way of life. The readers imply great
Societal Beliefs
31
sympathy and even admiration for the pioneers, who farmed and guarded
the land, contented themselves with little, lived modestly, suffered
shortage and malaria, but rejoiced in spite of all this, aware of the
importance of their pioneering acts.
(Bezalel,
1989, p. 318)
A major theme in this context was that the Jews who presently lived in Israel,
like their forefathers who lived in ancient Israel (and unlike the stereotype of their more
recent forefathers in exile), were farmers who cultivated the land. In addition, the
Hebrew books paid special attention to Biblical heroes and to the Maccabees. This not
only illustrated the continuity of Jewish life in Israel, but also glorified the heroism and
bravery of the Jews. The same type of glorification of heroism appeared in the
description of Jewish resistance during the Holocaust; Hebrew books especially
emphasized stories describing heroic acts of children. In addition, the justness of the
goals of Zionism was presented through a rejection of any continued Jewish existence
in the Diaspora. The only solution to the problems Jews encountered living among the
goyim , was -- the books stressed -- to build a new life in their own state. Here, too, in
the Hebrew textbooks, Jews were presented as victims of the world, which had
persecuted them through their long exile.
In sum, it is evident that the Israeli educational system made special attempts to
inculcate the societal beliefs it assumed functional for coping with the Israeli-Arab
conflict. During the climax of the conflict this amounted to a form of indoctrination.
The specific nature of the conflict, the establishment of the new state and the attempts
to form a new Israeli nation required socialization to take this direction. The eight
societal beliefs functional for coping with the intractable conflict were not transmitted
only via educational channels of school textbooks, as described. All the societal,
political, and cultural mechanisms and institutions were recruited to impart these
beliefs. No systematic studies have been done to examine the contents of all of these
eight societal beliefs. But, numerous studies and analyses have been done to address
Societal Beliefs
32
one or two of these as they occurred in Hebrew literature, mass media, theatrical plays,
films and political speeches (see for example, Bar-Tal, 1988; Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992;
Ben-Ezer, 1968, 1977; Ben-Shaul, 1997; Caspi & Limor, 1992; Cohen, 1985;
Feldman, 1989; Gertz, 1986, 1995, in press; Liebman & Don-Yehiya, 1983; Ofrat,
1980; Urian, 1996; Yudkin, 1995; Zerubavel, 1995).
Societal beliefs about the justness of one's own goals, and about the importance
of security; beliefs that delegitimized Arabs, while allowing positive self-presentation,
beliefs about self-victimization, beliefs to strengthen patriotism and unity and beliefs
perpetuating peace as a goal -- all played an important role in the struggle with the
Arabs. They supported the development of the psychological conditions which enabled
the coping with the situations dictated by the intractable conflict with Arabs. But they
also were absorbed into the national ethos and became characteristic for the Israeli
Jews. These beliefs could be considered as an ideology of the conflict. Though this
ideology enabled the Israelis to cope with the stress, costs, hardship and loses
associated with the conflict, it also supported the continuation of the conflict.
Conclusions
Intractable conflicts, which are central, protracted, violent, total, irreconcilable,
and of a zero-sum nature, profoundly affect the participating societies as a whole and
the personal lives of their members. Societies in such a situation must develop the
psychological conditions which enable them to cope with the conflict. The present
paper proposes societal beliefs which are conducive to the development of these
psychological conditions.
The societal beliefs which facilitate coping with the conflict perform crucial
functions on the cognitive, affective and behavioral levels. They define the goals which
instigate the conflict, indicate the means for coping with it, describe the enemy and
provide self-presentation of the ingroup. The necessary condition for motivating the
Societal Beliefs
33
society members to engage in intractable conflict is that they believe in the justness of
their own society's goals which have led to the conflict. Beliefs about justness of own
goals present the goals together with the reasons that justify them. Beliefs about
security, patriotism and unity specify the means which are necessary for coping with
the conflict. Beliefs which delegitimize the enemy add an explanation to the causes of
the conflict and provide justification for the society's own behavior. Finally, beliefs
concerning self (beliefs conducive to a positive self-image and beliefs about
victimization)generate a superior self-image in the difficult times of the intractable
conflict.
The described societal beliefs construct the social reality for the society
members engaged in intractable conflict. They define the situation and national
identity and in essence constitute a type of ideology. In the light of these societal
beliefs, the past is constructed, present information is interpreted and a future is
planned. These beliefs exert a determinative influence on the course of the conflict.
On the one hand, by serving as an epistemic and motivating basis, as indicated, they
allow the development of the psychological conditions that support persistence in the
conflict. On their foundations, a society in intractable conflict develops endurance,
readiness for sacrifice, solidarity, determination, persistence, courage, to name some of
the conditions. But, on the other hand, these same beliefs perpetuate animosity and
hostility by rationalizing the conflict and delegitimizing the enemy.
In this way, such beliefs help create the vicious cycles of violence which
characterize intractable conflicts: On the one hand, the development and adherence to
conflictual ideology intensifies conflictual activities, while on the other hand, one's
own actions and those of the enemy increase the commitment to the conflictual
ideology. That is, the societal beliefs about intractable conflict lead to behaviors which
intensify that conflict and delegitimze the opponent. They cause violence since they
provide justification for the continuation of the conflict. But, at the same time, the
Societal Beliefs
34
violent behavior of both, the own society and the enemy, strengthens the adherence to
the societal beliefs, since they further confirm for the verity of the beliefs. In this
respect the societal beliefs constitute the psychological investment that prevents
peaceful resolution of the conflict. As long as society members, including leaders,
view the conflict through the glasses of the described societal beliefs, it is difficult for
them to consider an alternative to the conflict.
The question arises then how the vicious cycles that are typical of the
intractable conflict can be broken. Such change is not easy. Years of indoctrination
cause the internalization of the societal beliefs: they are held with great confidence and
considered as central. Clearly any progress towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict
requires a change of the beliefs of at least one or all parties in the conflict (see Bar-Tal,
Kruglanski, & Klar, 1989). The changes of beliefs take place usually on the basis of
changes perceived in the conflict situation. It should be noted however that even
change of geopolitical, military, or economic conditions have an effect on resolution,
continuation, if they are perceived by individuals and interpreted as facilitating peaceful
resolution. The above implies that although intractable conflicts are over real issues
and involve concrete goals, even the beginning of the attempts to resolve a conflict
peacefully requires change of beliefs, which maintain the intractable conflict.
It is beyond the scope of the present paper to elaborate ways that facilitate
change of the societal beliefs which perpetuate intractable conflicts. But some
examples of past contributions to this issue can be noted: presentation of a
superordinate goal to the parties involved in intractable conflict (Sherif, 1967);
involvement of a third party which, for instance, can introduce new information or
reinterpret conflictual beliefs of the parties in conflict (e.g., Bercovitch & Rubin, 1992;
Fisher, 1978; Young, 1978; Zartman & Touval, 1985), organization of problem solving
workshops which provide parties in intractable conflict with the framework and proper
conditions for controlled interaction that can lead to joint thinking about their conflict
Societal Beliefs
35
in order to develop new ideas about its resolution (e.g., Burton, 1969; Kelman &
Cohen, 1976; Rouhana, 1995); continuous and constant pressure by a minority with a
different view about the intractable conflict on the leaders and public opinion in order
to change their beliefs (e.g., Maass & Clark, 1984; Moscovici, 1976; Nemeth, 1979); or
change of conflict schema either via its unfreezing or its decentralization (Bar-Tal,
Kruglanski, & Klar, 1989; Jonsson, 1982).
Some of these ways refer to changes of
societal beliefs made by leaders, others refer to their changes by society members.
Society members have to question those societal beliefs they hold which support the
continuation of the conflict, and especially the beliefs in the justness of own goals, and
those that result in the delegitimization of the enemy. Also, it is necessary to change
beliefs about peace from utopian and vague notions to concrete and feasible plans
which outline steps of negotiation with the adversary. Other societal beliefs about
positive self-image, security, patriotism and unity are also important in times of peace.
But then they should be complex, multifaceted, moderate, and opened to criticism.
Such a change opens new perspectives, allows the possibility of considering an
alternative to the conflict, and enables the transition from an intractable to a tractable
mode (see Kriesberg, Northrup, & Thorson, 1989), and formation of societal beliefs of
peace ethos which refer to such themes as cooperation or commonality with past
opponent. In order to achieve this, the leaders have to go through the described
changes of societal beliefs. They are the ones that can lead to conflict resolution.
However, members of their society have to be part of these changes in order to stabilize
the peace process. Such change takes a long time, over years. It requires support of
the various societal institutions and channels of communication. Societal beliefs of
intractable conflict change gradually as the peace process progresses and peaceful
relations are formed.
An example of the changes required to resolve this kind of conflict can be found
in the Israeli case described earlier. Since the late seventies, the Israeli-Arab conflict
Societal Beliefs
36
has become less intractable and has moved onto the rocky road leading towards peace.
The 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement, the 1991 Madrid conference, the 1993
Oslo agreement between the Israelis and Palestinians, and the 1994 peace treaty with
Jordan are all hallmarks of the peace process which changed the relations between Jews
and Arabs on the Middle East.
In view of these developments, the question can be asked of how dominant
these societal beliefs still are in Israeli society when the peace process is under way? In
order to answer this question, Bar-Tal (in press-b) content analyzed all the textbooks in
Hebrew, history, geography and civic studies approved for use in the education system
in March 1994 by the Israeli Ministry of Education. In general, the analysis showed
that the contents of the textbooks used in the 90s differed dramatically from those used
in the 50s - 70s. The emphasis on the societal beliefs functional for coping with
intractable conflict decreased considerably. Only a small part of the school textbooks
focuses on societal beliefs concerning security, positive self image and the
victimization of Jews. The delegitimization of Arabs has almost disappeared, but their
negative stereotyping still continues. Some textbooks attempt even to transmit new
societal beliefs which promote the peace process and coexistence with the Arabs.
Indeed, it is possible to suggest that the Israeli society is in transition -- while
part of it views the Israeli-Arab conflict as being solvable and moving towards tractable
characteristics, another part still perceives it as being intractable. Accordingly, while
the former part has modified the societal beliefs of intractable conflict, the latter part
still maintains them. This is probably one way to see the polarization between "doves"
and "hawks" which characterizes the Israeli society (Arian, 1995).
Finally, we should like to repeat that the conceptual framework, presented in
this paper of societal beliefs associated for coping with intractable conflict is intended
to be universal. The case analyzed in this paper pertains to the Israeli society only -one side of the Israeli-Arab conflict, but our assumption is that the same conceptual
Societal Beliefs
37
framework could be used in the analysis of Arab societies, as well as in any other
societies engaged in intractable conflict. Such further analyses are needed in order to
validate the proposed conception.
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Daniel Bar-Tal
School of Educaiton
Tel-Aviv University
Tel Aviv, Israel 9978
Tel. (O): 972-3-6408473
Tel. (H): 972-3-6474927
e-mail: daniel@ccsg.tau.ac.il
Fax: 972-3-6409477
Societal Beliefs
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Daniel Bar-Tal is professor of psychology at the School of Education, Tel-Aviv
University. His research interest is in political and social psychology studying societal
beliefs regarding conflict, delegitimization, security, patriotism and siege mentality. He
authored Group beliefs (Springer-Verlag, 1990) and Societal beliefs of ethos (Sage, in
press) and coedited Social psychology of intergroup relations (Springer-Verlag, 1988),
Stereotyping and prejudice (Springer-Verlag, 1989), Patriotism in the lives of
individuals and nations (Nelson Hall, 1997) and Concerned with security (JAI, in
press).