Fragmentation in Global Governance Architectures: The Cases
of the Chemicals and Biodiversity Cluster
Paper prepared for the Third Global International Studies Conference in Porto, Portugal,
17-20 August 20111
Nils Simon
Environmental Policy Research Centre, Freie Universität Berlin, nils.simon@fu-berlin.de
Abstract
In this paper, the Fragmentation of Global Governance Architectures (FGGA) framework as
presented by Biermann et al. (2009) is used to assess clustering processes within
international environmental governance (IEG). First, fragmentation is discussed as a feature
of complex governance architectures, and the FGGA framework is outlined, critically
assessed and refined. Second, the international environmental governance (IEG) system is
introduced as a prime example for varying degrees of fragmentation of complex regime
settings. Finally, two case studies drawn from IEG, namely the chemicals and waste cluster
and the biodiversity cluster are assessed with the selected approach.
Introduction
Over the past years, scholars of international relations have increasingly focused their
attention towards complex webs of institutional arrangements entailing manifold linkages
between them. One of these strands has employed the notion of governance architectures
as a “meta-level of governance” that is “broader than the concept of international regimes”,
yet “narrower than the notion of order.” (Biermann et al. 2009a: 15-16) Related approaches
are those of meta-regimes, regime complexes, institutional clusters, governance networks,
or organizational fields. They all have in common that institutional fragmentation is a
ubiquitous phenomenon within them, meaning a plurality of institutions with different
scope, membership, and resources.
Departing from a long-held view that fragmentation is an obstacle to be overcome and
replaced by the more positively framed coordination, researchers concentrating on interplay
between international institutions have put forward a more nuanced appreciation of the
causes and effects of fragmentation (cf. Gehring/Oberthür 2008; von Moltke 2005;
Oberthür/Gehring 2004). Scholars from the Earth System Governance (ESG) Project posited
that fragmentation can either resemble a largely synergistic, cooperative, or conflictive type,
depending on the degree of institutional integration, norm conflicts, and actor constellations
(Biermann et al. 2009a). However, the framework entailing this typology provides no
exhaustive background on how to classify governance architectures and needs additional
analytic substance. Furthermore, it has so far been applied only to the case of climate
change, and rather tentatively so, hence it may be tested and refined through the
application to additional cases.
International environmental governance (IEG) offers a wide array of potential case studies,
since the field contains a plethora of institutions that are usually counted in the hundreds,
with some sources even counting more than 1,000 environmental agreements in place
1
A publication based on this draft is pending as SWP Discussion Paper and expected for August 2011.
1
today. Of particular interest are policy fields in which states have actively acknowledged the
existence of interplay issues between adjacent institutions by setting up procedures to cope
with them, turning the webs of overlapping institutions into regime clusters. This paper sets
out to investigate clustering processes in two domains of environmental governance, the
chemicals and waste cluster and the biodiversity cluster.
Fragmentation and complexity in global governance
In their influential article on the governance of plant genetic resources, Raustiala/Victor
(2004) defined a regime complex as “an array of partially overlapping and non-hierarchical
institutions” tasked with or exerting influence over a particular issue area. Defining
characteristics of a regime complex are its “horizontal, overlapping structure and the
presence of divergent rules and norms”. Such multilayered institutional environments with
manifold overlaps between their constitutive parts have been identified in diverse areas
such as climate change, refugees, or environmental governance (Keohane/Victor 2011; Betts
2010; Alter/Meunier 2009). The depiction of the climate change regime complex in Figure 1
shows the abundance of actors and institutions that may influence the type of
fragmentation in a governance architecture.
Figure 1: The regime complex for managing climate change. Source: Keohane/Victor 2011: 10.
Our understanding of the processes and dynamics within regime complexes remains limited.
Alter and Meunier (2009) presented a preliminary research program for studying regime
complexity. Stating that “international governance occurs via a multitude of nested, partially
overlapping, and parallel trans-border agreements,” they noted sometimes surprising sideeffects of dense institutional webs, leading to difficult to predict dynamics including
problematic interference as well as useful synergies. Within regime complexes, some wellknown as well as rare behaviour of negotiating state actors can be observed, including
forum-shopping, regime-shifting, or the creation of strategic inconsistency among regimes.
To describe yet another strategy, the authors introduce the term chessboard politics, which
works in the way that “once a density threshold is reached, the existence of multiple
institutions with authority over an issue allows moves made in a single international
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institution to reposition pawns, knights, and queens within other institutions.”
(Alter/Meunier 2009: 16)
This variety of different strategies by states to deal with complexity does not come with
many hints for the analysis to follow. The rationality behind specific designs for international
institutions by states has been debated controversially in the past (Koremenos et al. 2001;
Wendt 2001), and indeed it remains an open question as to what extent regime complexity
is an unwanted by-product of international regulatory achievements, or instead the result of
calculated moves by states. Drezner (2009) noted that increasing complexity ultimately
favours more powerful or resourceful states, since they are better capable of dealing with
the specific challenges of complexity like numerous negotiating fora, which require a lot of
resources to keep up with, and blurred responsibilities, which allow for diplomatic strategies
like forum-shopping and others, as described above. With a view to trade liberalization,
powerful states indeed tend to favour bilateral agreements once multilateral fora do not
develop into a direction they prefer, and due to their bargaining power they can often
negotiate favourable terms in these bilateral treaties. However, it is unknown whether such
processes also take place within environmental governance with its inherently different
incentive structure, and whether states consciously engage in complexity enhancement to
maximize utility. While answering this question is left to other researchers, its existence may
serve as an illustration to the general point made above that we do not know an awful lot
about the dynamics going on within complex institutional settings.
The Fragmentation of Governance Architectures Framework
Over the past few years, researchers have increasingly focused their attention on causes and
effects of certain shapes of governance architectures. In line with the Earth System
Governance Project (ESG), governance architectures are defined here as “the interlocking
web of widely shared principles, institutions and practices that shape decisions at all levels in
a given area of earth system governance.” (Biermann et al. 2009b: 31) Architectures are
therefore conceptualised as “broader than the concept of international regimes”, yet
“narrower than the notion or order” (Biermann et al. 2009a: 16). The concept of
architectures corresponds with the notion of a regime complex as described above, as well
with other approaches dealing with the same phenomenon of a confusing empirical reality
entailing multiple overlaps, linkages, or interplay between numerous institutional
arrangements on normative, functional, and political levels (Alter/Meunier 2009;
Carlsson/Sandström 2008; Dingwerth/Pattberg 2009; Keohane/Victor 2011; Raustiala/Victor
2004; von Moltke 2005).
While in theory there are ideal forms of total universality and total dispersion of complex
institutional arrangements, in reality all governance architectures lay somewhere in between
these poles. Linkages between the constituent parts of a governance architecture are
commonplace, and institutional fragmentation is therefore in fact ubiquitous. That said,
fragmentation is not per se good or bad. According to a typology developed by Biermann et
al. (2009a) in the Fragmentation of Global Governance Architectures (FGGA) framework, it
can take a synergistic, cooperative, or conflictive form. Governance architectures can be
identified as falling into one of these types according to varying degrees alongside three
criteria called institutional integration, norm conflicts, and actor constellations (see Table 1).
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A closer look at the concept of governance architectures and the types of fragmentation
reveals some ambiguities within the framework. These refer to the choice of institutions
under scrutiny, the norms that are assessed, and the actors involved.
Table 1: Typology of Fragmentation of Governance Architectures. Source: Biermann et al. 2009: 19.
Synergistic
Cooperative
Conflictive
Institutional integration
One core institution,
with other institutions
being closely integrated
Core institutions with
other institutions that
are loosely integrated
Different, largely
unrelated institutions
Norm conflicts
Core norms of
institutions are
integrated
Core norms are not
conflicting
Core norm conflicts
Actor constellations
All relevant actors
support the same
institutions
Some actors remain
outside main
institutions, but
maintain cooperation
Major actors support
different institutions
The first ambiguity relates to the identification of relevant institutions and the definition of
integration. Assessed institutions may be confined to the global or multilateral level, yet they
may also be found at the regional, national, or even local level. What may look like
synergistic fragmentation on the level of multilateral institutions may look different if the
interplay between the global and the local level comes to the forefront of attention.
Likewise, an analysis may be concentrating on elemental regimes as relatively stable sets of
institutions, or it may include more informal or temporary institutions that are loosely
connected to a regime. It may be restricted to institutions operating directly in a given issue
area, or it may be widened to include all institutions that may or may not exert some
influence over it.
Biermann et al. (2009a) made it not explicitly clear to what institutions the framework
should be confined to, if any. In their own application of the framework, elemental regimes
within a single issue-area like the ozone regime, partnership networks, and cross-cutting
interlinked regime complexes like the climate and trade regimes are all being mentioned. An
analysis aiming at investigating the causes for a specific type of architectural fragmentation
needs to be aware of this abundance of potentially relevant institutions.
Furthermore, the meaning of “integration” remains imprecise, and in at least one point the
corresponding variable needs an adjustment. It is assumed by Biermann et al. (see Table 1)
that a synergistic fragmentation entails, on the institutional level, “[o]ne core institution,
with other institutions being closely integrated”. Borrowing insights from studies of network
governance (cf. Sørensen/Torfing 2007), this should be adjusted to e.g. “closely integrated
institutions”, since there is no evident necessity for one core institution. Why?
International relations scholarship has seen an increasing value in incorporating tools of
network analysis over the past years (Hafner-Burton et al. 2009), and governance
architectures resemble many features of networks. Regarding organizational structures,
Provan and Kenis (2007) developed a classification of effective network governance forms
that can be used to inform the analysis of institutional fragmentation. Depending on the
density of trust as well as the degree of goal consensus between participants, their number,
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and the need for network-level competencies, one of three forms of network governance is
being considered effective by the authors (see Table 2).
Table 2: Key predictors of effectiveness of network governance forms. Source: Provan/Kenis 2007: 237.
Governance Forms
Trust
Number of
Participants
Goal Consensus
Need for
Network-level
Competencies
Shared governance
High density
Few
High
Low
Lead organization
Low density, highly
centralized
Moderate number
Moderately low
Moderate
Network
administrative
organization (NAO)
Moderate density,
NAO monitored by
members
Moderate to many
Moderately high
High
It is apparent that there is no functional need for one core institution, but that a “shared
governance” type may work equally synergistic. Consequentially, Mee (2005: 256) suggested
that effective environmental governance “require[s] the creation of a ‘neural network’ of
MEAs”. Likewise, Kanie (2007: 73) argued that “the best institutional design for managing
complex problems such as the global environment is a loose, decentralized and dense
network of institutions and actors.” While these statements were intended as a reaction to
failed attempts of centralising the environmental governance system (see below), they may
be used here to serve the point that not only does the IEG system not necessarily require a
unitary and centralising core institution, neither do individual governance architectures. In
fact, all three types of effective network governance forms should be considered to
resemble synergistic fragmentation.
A second set of ambiguities is connected with the norms under scrutiny. Regime analysis has
traditionally focused on the four elements norms, principles, rules, and decision-making
procedures (Krasner 1983: 2). These four elements pose some challenges to any regime
analyst who ought to clearly distinguish between them (Hasenclever et al. 1996: pp. 179).
Keohane tried to alleviate this problem when he narrowed them down to only one element,
rules (Keohane 1989: 4). Yet as McGinnis (2011) has shown, the study of rules poses some
particular challenges in itself, as there is a variety of different rules that may influence
regime development from different angles, and actors are constantly engaged in
reformulating these rules. Likewise, the selection of norms as one of three central elements
in the FGGA framework is not without problems. Norms should consequentially be read as
an aggregate variable comprising all four elements contained in the original “consensus
definition” of international regimes put forward by Krasner in 1983.
Finally, the actors involved can vary considerably. The analysis may include only treaty
parties as helmsmen of a regime, or all nations that may or may not influence the
development of a governance architecture like important non-members. It may be confined
to nation states as the principals of international treaty institutions, or include non-state
actors like businesses or civil society organizations.
In that regard, international organizations (IO) as integral parts of global governance
architectures may or may not be given much room in an analysis. It is known from research
in IOs that they may exert considerably more autonomy and hence influence than traditional
IR approaches would assume (Barnett/Finnemore 2004). Detailed comparisons between
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environmental secretariats have brought to light substantial disparities in these
bureacracies’ ability and willingness to exert autonomous influence (Biermann/Siebenhüner
2009). It therefore has to be assumed that IOs may also differ on their interplay
management practices, making the bureaucracies associated with environmental regime
clusters an important factor to be assessed.
Fragmentation within international environmental governance: An
overview
There is hardly another issue in global governance that exhibits such a degree of
fragmentation as international environmental governance. 44 different UN entities have
mandates that make them at least partially responsible for environmental issues. More than
500 distinct environmental agreements have been set up since the early 20th century, plus
an additional 400 amendments and about 200 protocols, bringing the total number of
multilateral environmental agreements (MEA) to more than 1,000 (see Figure 2). These
treaties come with their own membership, procedures, bureaucratic structures and
obligations. About 70% of these MEAs have been estimated to be regional in scope, and the
remaining 30% are transregional or global (Inomata 2008: 10).
Figure 2: Absolute increase of multilateral environmental agreements since 1911.
The effects of this fragmented governance landscape have been debated controversially in
the past. The UN Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) reached the conclusion in a comprehensive
review that “The current framework of international environmental governance is weakened
by institutional fragmentation and specialization and the lack of a holistic approach to
environmental issues and sustainable development.” (Inomata 2008: iii) Others, however,
point to the merits of a system comprising numerous specialized agreements operating in a
confined space, a structure that some see as delivering greater robustness. Since such a
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governance setup enables progress in one forum while other fora may be blocked, it might
be less conducive to power play strategies as for example the WTO and its current Doha
Round have shown to be. Had ozone politics, to name one example, been an early victim of
“climate change bandwagoning” (Jinnah 2011a) and become part of climate negotiations, it
is hard to imagine how the phase-out of ozone-depleting substances could have been
achieved as decisively and quickly as it did. As Young put it: “With all due respect to the
importance of synergy, there is also something to be said for promoting diversity – and even
redundancy – in the realm of global environmental governance. Diversity may allow separate
regimes to survive intact, even when individual components of the tapestry of
environmental governance experience stress and ultimately collapse.” (Young 2008: 18-19)
That said, there is no doubt the growth of MEAs has meant some stress especially for
developing countries, who find it difficult to follow – and of course even more so to
influence – the manifold negotiation processes. At an extent of about 115 negotiation days
per year only for the ten larger MEAs, leading to an annual average of 185 resolutions, “the
system may have begun to stabilize after having reached the maximum number of days it
can sustain.” (Muñoz et al. 2009: 7). This can also be seen by the steep decline in new
environmental agreements over the 2000s, as depicted in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Relative increase of multilateral environmental agreements since 1911.
Given the immense complexity of the IEG system, its internal organization comes
increasingly to the forefront of political and scientific attention. One political reaction to this
fragmentation has been the instigation of several intergovernmental coordinating bodies.
The main body for the IEG system, the Environment Management Group (EMG), was
7
founded in 1999 and is chaired by the Executive Director of the UN Environment Programme
(UNEP). It comprises 44 members and has been set up with “the purpose of enhancing interagency coordination in the field of environment and human settlements”, as formulated by
the relevant resolution of the UN General Assembly (A/RES/53/242). However, the
membership is overlapping considerably with that of the UN Chief Executives Board for
Coordination (CEB), the principal coordinating body for the whole UN system, and the UN
Development Group (UNDG), by now a sub-group of the CEB and responsible for
coordinating efforts in development cooperation. Both CEB and UNDG also frequently deal
with environment-related topics, and the effectiveness of the EMG has remained rather
limited (Inomata 2008: 19). Given this confusing multiplicity, it is not surprising that calls for
more centralisation of the IEG system are occasionally heard.
Calls for a World Environment Organization and clustering processes as a
pragmatic alternative
The most prominent example of the idea to centralize the IEG system can be seen in
attempts to create a World or United Nations Environment Organization (Biermann/Bauer
2005; Rechkemmer 2005). Designed to streamline the “world environmental regime” (Meyer
et al. 1997), such an entity is supposed to act as a gravitational centre of the myriads of
MEAs, much like the World Trade Organization or the International Labour Organization act
as core institutions in their respective fields of governance.2 Calls for such a grand reform
scheme are as old as the United Nations themselves, and they can be found more or less in
any field the world organization is involved in (Gostin et al. 2011; Rain 2006; von Winter
2006).
Yet below such grand schemes we can find more subtle and more realistic solutions to deal
with regime complexity. In IEG, von Moltke (2005), seconded by Oberthür (2002), called for
the clustering of MEAs. Clustering means to bring together topically or spatially related
treaty institutions. This can happen with varying intensity, with singing of Memoranda of
Understanding (MoU) and institutionalised coordination activities as a starting point,
followed by a co-scheduling of conferences of the parties (COP) and shared secretariat
administrative services or co-location of secretariats, and ultimately the merging of MEAs.
Clustering entails several key features that made it (at least theoretically) well applicable to
IEG. It leaves the single MEAs and their individual structure basically intact, hence it is
conservative enough to reduce initial resistance from governments and secretariats alike
stemming from fear against more substantial changes such as relocation. Clustering keeps
the treaties’ decision-making procedures in place, hence it is not neglecting established
institutional mechanisms and procedures that have been developed and refined over years.
It also doesn’t destroy the social capital built among treaty members, including mutual trust
relationships. Clustering is flexible in the way that it allows treaty parties to chose among a
menu of collaborative tools the ones they deem fit, thereby enabling a potentially creeping
interlacing process; and it is non-exclusive in that allows for various MEAs to be engaged in
more than one cluster, be it topical or spatial, if that becomes necessary.
2
For a critical discussion of a proposed centralization of environmental governance see e.g. Young 2008, and
for an overview of recent reform processes in IEG see Simon 2011.
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Case studies on MEA clusters as fragmented environmental
governance architectures
The refined FGGA framework developed in this paper will be applied to two case studies.
Following a “diverse case” approach (Gerring 2007: pp. 97), cases will be selected to vary
over the dependent variable, i.e. the spectrum of fragmentation within global governance
architectures. Following a preliminary scanning of potential cases, it was found that the
chemicals and waste cluster resembles a largely synergistic/cooperative type of
fragmentation, whereas the biodiversity governance architecture appeared to represent a
cooperative/conflictive type. It should be noted, though, that in reality no governance
architecture fits precisely into one of these categories, but will usually resemble elements of
all three types (Biermann et al. 2009: 19-21). In addition, the cases as presented here should
be seen as preliminary applications of the outlined research framework, and require
additional empirical grounding.
There is no agreement within either the scientific or the diplomatic community as to what
exactly a cluster is. In the past reference has been made to clusters as sets of elemental
regimes operating in a defined issue area, e.g. chemicals, climate, ocean, or biodiversity
governance. The problems mentioned above about the unclear delineation between regime
complexes, meta-regimes, organizational fields or governance networks become even more
exacerbated through using the notion of clusters here. One could try to bring some
systematization in these categories by distinguishing these designations according to the
type of interplay between institutions (largely accidental or by purpose) as well as by the
degree of issue-overlap (single-issue or cross-cutting). Following this line of thought, one
could get the following overview:
Table 3: Proposed typology for various types of fragmented governance architectures. Source: Own work.
Cross-sectoral
Overlap
(inadvertent interplay)
Linkages
(deliberate interplay)
Intra-sectoral
regime complex
regime nexus
regime cluster
I conceive of regime complexes as meta-institutions entailing manifold and largely
unintended overlaps between institutions within a given issue-area. Regime clusters, on the
other hand, are likewise confined to a specific issue-area, yet characterised by a design
intended to facilitate the management of institutional linkages. Finally, a regime nexus is
defined here as a super-interlaced structure spanning various sectors.
By choosing to study regime clusters, I therefore confine my analysis to complex regime
settings in which there is some intentional governance on interplay issues, and in which
relevant institutions are largely concerned with different aspects of a specific issue.
Furthermore, I choose to concentrate on multilateral treaty institutions as the central
elements of regime clusters.
Case I: Chemicals and waste cluster
Overview
Historically, early attempts to limit the amount of hazardous substances being released into
the environment date back to the late 19th and early 20th century (Selin 2010: pp. 54). In the
9
second half of the 20th century, the OECD was one of the first international organizations to
put chemical safety on its agenda. In fact, it consistently pushed for further controls and
limitations to chemicals that posed risks to human health and environmental safety. Through
its Chemicals Group (founded in 1971 under the name Sector Group on the Unintended
Occurrence of Chemicals) and a “decision by the OECD Environment Council in 1975 to
restrict the use of PCBs to a few identified areas (Selin 2010: 55), the OECD laid the
foundations for what was later to become the chemicals regime cluster. This cluster is
formed by the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions, dealing with international
trade in chemicals, toxic waste, and other hazardous substances.
The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
their Disposal was negotiated in the 1980s and entered into force on 2 March 1989. It is
designed to control or limit the transport of dangerous waste products across national
borders, especially from industrialised into developing countries. It is today ratified by 172
parties, with the US being the most important non-ratifying country.
The Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade deals specifically with trade or other
transborder movement of toxic substances, including well-known chemicals such as asbestos
and DDT. Negotiated in the 1990s, it was signed in September 1998 and entered into force
six years later. The Rotterdam Convention has been signed and ratified by 128 nations so far.
Following a call from UNEP in 1995 to take action on persistent organic pollutants (POP), the
Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety (IFCS) and the Inter-Organization Programme
for the Sound Management of Chemicals (IOMC) identified a list of twelve of the most
dangerous POPs. To control for this “dirty dozen” became the primary objective of the
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, which was finally agreed upon in
May 2001 and entered into force three years later.
Clustering process
Given that the three multilateral treaty institutions deal specifically with certain sets of
chemicals, it is only logical to assume there was much potential for clustering them.
Raustiala and Victor (2004: 306) assumed that widespread international regulation of
chemicals would represent a natural candidate for analysis of regime complexes. Likewise,
Najam et al. (2006: 34) positively stipulated that the chemicals and waste cluster’s “expected
end result is a coherent legal framework to support environmentally sound management of
hazardous chemicals and wastes through their whole lifecycle, including production, use,
trade and disposal.”
Following a multi-stakeholder dialogue, the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals
Management (SAICM)3 was set up in February 2006. It is hosted by UNEP and supposed to
contribute to the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) goal
that by 2020, adverse impacts on human health and the environment by hazardous
chemicals should be minimised through their safe use and transport.
Within the SAICM framework, the Ad-Hoc Joint Working Group on Cooperation and
Coordination among the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions (AHJWG) 4 was
mandated for finding cooperation and synergy potentials between the three conventions.
3
4
http://www.saicm.org
http://ahjwg.chem.unep.ch/
10
The COP of each convention first had to agree establishing the 45-member AHJWG, and
would afterwards have to adopt any recommendation emanating from it. This mandate was
given by decision VIII/8 of the Basel Convention COP, decision RC-3/8 of the Rotterdam
Convention, and decision SC-2/15 of the Stockholm Convention.
The AHJWG met three times, and on its third session, held in March 2008 in Rome, it decided
upon common recommendations and delivered these to the respective COPs
(SAICM/ICCM.2/INF/2). Regarding organizational issues, three recommendations were made
including increased coordination at the national level, better programmatic cooperation “in
the field”, and more coordinated use of regional offices and centres. In addition, technical
issues like better and easier reporting, information issues like joint outreach and public
awareness, administrative issues, and decision-making procedures were covered. These
recommendations were adopted by each COP individually. The ninth COP of the Basel
Convention did so adopted them in June 2008 through decision IX/10, COP4 of the
Rotterdam Convention did so in October 2008 with decision RC-4/11, and the Stockholm
Convention COP4 followed in May 2009 through decision SC-4/34.
Synergies were then exploited further by a so-called Simultaneous Extraordinary Meeting of
the Conferences of the Parties to the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions5, or
ExCOP. It took place in Bali, Indonesia, in February 2010, just before the 11 th Special Session
of the UNEP Governing Council and the Global Ministerial Environment Forum. Prepared by
an Advisory Committee, consisting of members from the conventions, and with the help of a
Synergies Oversight Team (SOT), mandated to strategically look for possible synergies and in
the way prepare the extraordinary meetings, the ExCOP was generally deemed a success and
provided some more impetus to the clustering process. One result was the creation of a
Joint Head, an additional UN professional position supposed to bring the three conventions
closer together. The Joint Head is not established permanently, but will be subject to review.
Assessment of fragmentation
The three main treaties in the chemicals and waste cluster share a number of features that
make them look relatively compatible. They all “share the common objective of protecting
human health and the environment from hazardous chemicals and wastes, and help
facilitate the delivery of assistance to countries to manage chemicals and wastes at different
stages of their life-cycle.” (UNDESA et al. 2011). They are providing means to control
transborder movements of hazardous substances, or to ban the use of a growing number of
chemicals.
Selin identifies three basic principles that are common within the chemicals and waste
cluster, including the principle of prior informed consent (PIC), the polluter pays principle,
and the precautionary principle.
The principle of prior informed consent stipulates that a certain substance may be lifted
across a national border only after the target state has been made aware of and agreed to
this movement. The PIC principle goes back to similar OECD regulations from the 1970s, and
prior to establishing the Basel Convention it was put down in the so-called Cairo Guidelines
from 1987, a voluntary framework agreed upon by the UNEP Governing Council (Selin 2010:
69-70). It is well-established in the Basel Convention which made the prior voluntary
agreements mandatory and operative when hazardous waste products as classified by the
Convention are being traded. During the negotiation phase, distinct coalitions formed of
5
http://excops.unep.ch/
11
members calling for a complete ban in international hazardous waste trades on the one side,
mostly consisting of developing countries especially from Africa, and pro-trade-members on
the other side, which were mainly industrialized countries plus a few developing countries
that saw economic opportunities in waste trades (Selin 2010: pp. 70). Ultimately, the protrade fraction achieved acceptance of its position, yet it had to agree to a binding PIC
provision that would give developing countries a veto against such trades. The principle is
also at the heart of another convention which bears it in its full name, the Rotterdam
Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and
Pesticides in International Trade. Just like the Basel Convention, the Rotterdam Convention
replaced earlier voluntary agreements yet aims specifically at supporting developing
countries in deciding whether they should ban a certain substance for import or not, thereby
focusing on capacity development through access to information.
The polluter pays principle is consistently being used in all three conventions, at least to the
extent that the vast majority of funding comes from developed countries.
The precautionary principle looms strong in all three conventions through the reliance on
science for legitimizing their respective provisions, and for extending their regulatory scope
towards additional substances. Problems concerning release of and exposure to hazardous
substances relate to harmful effects on both ecosystems and human health. Scientific
findings play a crucial role in identifying what accounts as dangerous exposure levels and
what should be regarded as relatively safe. While for some chemicals their sources,
transmission channels, and ecological and biological effects are well understood,
uncertainties regarding other substances remain large. One current research frontier are
“long-term, low-dose exposures to “cocktails” of multiple, persistent, bioaccumulative, and
toxic chemicals” (Selin 2010: 54). Technological innovations influence regime development
in two ways. First, the chemicals industry constantly introduces new substances that may or
may not pose risks to humans and ecosystems. On the other hand, scientific methods to
measure, identify, and assess levels of chemicals and associated risks constantly improve.
It can generally be assumed that higher scientific uncertainty goes along with less likely
introduction of effective regulation. Consequentially, international chemicals governance
has usually been reactive rather than proactive, and substantial amounts of chemicals may
be released before an effective control is in place. There are signs of change to this reactive
approach, at least in regional European chemicals governance with the adoption of the
REACH regulatory framework that requires safety assessments for all chemicals of which a
relatively low amount is being produced each year. Yet whether this proactive regulation will
be transferred to the global level is uncertain.
On the bureaucratic level, the secretariat functions of the three agreements are nowadays
all covered by the UN Environment Programme and located in Geneva, due to successful
bargaining and national leadership by Switzerland, which opened up opportunities for
administrative efficiency gains through further enhanced cooperation.
Conclusion
Following my preliminary empirical analysis, an effective control of transborder trade in
hazardous substances is serving goals commonly shared among the diverse memberships of
the chemicals and waste governance architecture, which resembles a largely
synergistic/cooperative type of fragmentation. Scientific results of hazardous health effects
play a prominent role in the development of all three, and once a substance is proven to be
12
harmful the way is paved for relatively effective control. An elaborated system of scientific
bodies supports decision-making in the respective COPs. Governments have actively
fostered the development of a well-functioning network of the three slender agreements
whose purposes are clear cut, i.e. the control or prohibition of international trade in specific
hazardous substances. Functional linkages between the agreements have been
acknowledged and sometimes actively fostered in order to provide backups, should one
agreement not fulfil the expectations. With the Strategic Approach to International
Chemicals Management (SAICM) and a common Extraordinary Conference of the Parties
(ExCOP) member states have set up institutions aiming at further intensification of
institutional interplay. The chemicals cluster should therefore be considered a successful
attempt at improving coordination within a complex governance architecture, resembling a
synergistic/cooperative type of fragmentation. However, the clustering process in
international chemicals governance is so far confined to the administrative level and should
be seen as successful, at least so far. However, it is implementation where the success of
allegedly improved cooperation between the three chemicals agreements will have to be
proven.
Case II: Biodiversity governance
This case study still has to be brought in line with the outlined research approach and should
be regarded as very (!) preliminary.
The biodiversity cluster consists of five to six (depending on who you ask) environmental
treaties, which offer some potential for institutional integration (Urho 2009). These are the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the Convention on Migratory Species of Wild
Animals (CMS), the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora (CITES), the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture (ITPGRFA), the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance
especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar), and the Convention concerning the Protection of
World Cultural and Natural Heritage (WHC). The CBD as the largest and informally “leading”
convention was agreed upon in 1992 and entered into force one year later. It consists of 192
parties and encompasses biodiversity as a whole, including essentially all species, be it plant
or animal, and covering all ecosystems. It is therefore widely considered the treaty with the
most far-reaching mandate, and it tends to dominate relations with the other five treaties
(Andresen/Rosendal 2009: 138).
In order to identify potential synergies among the biodiversity-related conventions, the
Liaison Group of Biodiversity-related Conventions (BLG)6 has been set up in 2004. It has met
eight times so far, including one collective retreat in 2010. The first meeting was held in June
2004 in Paris, and with the exception of 2007 at least one meeting took place in every year
since then. The group is mandated by CBD COP decision VII/26. The mandate from CITES,
CMS, and Ramsar is derived from their strategic plans, and that of WHC emanates from its
Operational Guidelines.7
Institutional interplay among the six BLG-institutions is widespread. The CBD website offers
a cooperation matrix for biodiversity-centred treaties, showing how common formalised
coordination is among them (see Table 4).
6
7
http://www.cbd.int/cooperation/related-conventions/blg.shtml
http://www.cbd.int/cooperation/related-conventions/mandates.shtml
13
While this amount of collaboration looks impressive, Andresen/Rosendal (2009: 138) remain
sceptical: “Formally, it appears that there is considerable coordination, but memoranda of
understanding and joint web sites do not necessarily say much about the extent to which
there is real coordination.” First, the smaller secretariats, like Ramsar, consider external help
more necessary than the relatively well-funded CBD. Second, in their analysis of UNEP’s role
in the coordination of the BLG, the authors note that the relationship between the UN
Environment Program and the respective MEAs is sometimes difficult. This might be the case
since UNEP is not a party in the cluster, and its coordinating mandate may be formally
correct, but in reality external actors also play a role (ibid.: pp. 145).
Table 4: Formal agreements between five biodiversity-related conventions. Source: CBD,
http://www.cbd.int/cooperation/related-conventions/mandates.shtml#jwp
CBD
CBD
CMS
CITES
Ramsar
WHC
MJ
MJ
MJ
M*
M J*
MJ
M
CMS
MJ
CITES
MJ
M J*
Ramsar
MJ
MJ
WHC
M*
M
M
M
M = memoranda of cooperation/understanding, J = joint work programme/plan, * = in development
Figure 4: Preliminary and simplified depiction of the biodiversity regime complex, including five conventions,
their formalized relationships, and host agencies. Source: Own creation.
Clustering is in parallel taking place in the supporting scientific domain. With the
Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem-Services (IPBES)8, UNEP has
spurred the development of a science-policy interface similar to the IPCC with regards to
climate change. IPBES will deliver peer-reviewed comprehensive scientific assessments
8
http://ipbes.net/
14
about the state of global biodiversity and ecosystem services to the treaties. Envisioned as a
follow-up to the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment at the same time, its reach may well go
beyond the few experts dealing with biodiversity issues and offer a more prominent forum
for the issue.
Apart from interplay among predominantly biodiversity-centred institutions, a lot of
scientific attention has been paid to interactions between biodiversity-related and –
unrelated regimes. Among others, studies are concerned with interplay between the
biodiversity and the climate change regime (Kim 2004), while probably the majority of
attention has been put into interplay studies dealing with free trade agreements. Rosendal
(2001) for example analysed the impacts of institutional overlap between the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) agreement as part of the WTO, following the classical case for environment-traderelationships (Oberthür/Gehring 2008: 189). While the CBD is concerned with the protection
of global biodiversity as well as fair distribution of economic benefits deriving from it, TRIPS
is designed to abolish any barriers against free trade of intellectual property, including
patentable genetic information from remote plants and animals. This contradiction offers
much room for conflicts between both regimes that have not been resolved until today.
Conclusion
In the biodiversity governance architecture, the scope of the five agreements involved is
very wide, their tasks are much more intricate, and their respective responsibilities are
sometimes blurred. Scientific results regarding the loss of biodiversity are characterised by
large uncertainty, even though there is little doubt about its overall decline, and only
recently has the reframing along economic benefits of intact ecosystems gained pace. Three
different organizations are acting as hosts to these MEAs, adding a source for potential turf
wars delimitating effective organizational consolidation. There are bureaucratic tensions
between UNEP and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) on the one hand as well as
between the CBD and other biodiversity-related agreements on the other hand. This reflects
disagreement on the international level about the preferred general development of the
biodiversity architecture. No clear decision on the interplay (or network) model has been
taken by national delegates, and this appears to be a major problem to the biodiversity
cluster. In spite of instigating the Biodiversity Liaison Group (BLG) as a central forum for
interplay management in 2004, much potential for synergies remains unrealised (cf. Urho
2009).
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