A2: Meta-Ethics
G582: A2 Religious Ethics
Ethical Topics and Theories: Meta-ethics
Candidates should
understanding of:
be
able
to
demonstrate
knowledge
and
 the use of ethical language – the ways in which different scholars
understand how words like ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘right’, ‘wrong’ are used
when ethical statements are made;
 how meta-ethics differs from normative ethics;
 the different approaches: cognitive and noncognitive; ethical
naturalism; intuitionism; emotivism and prescriptivism and how
these apply to ethical statements.
Candidates should be able to discuss these areas critically and their
strengths and weaknesses.
1
A2: Meta-Ethics
2
A2: Meta-Ethics
Candidates should be able to demonstrate knowledge and understanding of how
meta-ethics differs from normative ethics;
• Normative ethics = the philosophical study of what makes an act right/wrong,
or what makes a person good/bad. e.g., Utilitarianism.
• Meta-ethics = The philosophical study of ethical language and judgement.
o ‘what does ‘right’ mean in the sentence, “that is the right thing to
do?”’
o ‘what do you mean when you judge an act to be right?’
• At the beginning of the 20th Century, English philosophers started to be
interested in the analysis of ethical language and judgement (Wittgenstein’s
‘linguistic turn’).
Candidates should be able to demonstrate knowledge and understanding of the
different approaches: cognitive and noncognitive; ethical naturalism; intuitionism;
emotivism and prescriptivism and how these apply to ethical statements.
Do you think ethical sentences
can be true and false?
YES
NO
You are a cognitivist
You are a non-cognitivist
Do you think we can know that an
ethical statement is true through
experience?
YES
You are a moral
naturalist. Choose
from:
 Utilitarianism
 Natural Moral
Law
 Virtue Ethics
Do you think ethical sentences are
simply expressions of
approval/disapproval?
NO
YES
You are a moral nonnaturalist (an
intuitionist). Choose
from:
 Consequentialist
intuitionism
(Moore)
 Deontological
intuitionism (Ross)
3
You are an
emotivist
(Ayer)
NO
You are a
prescriptivist
(Hare)
A2: Meta-Ethics
Cognitivism
• Ethical statements are meaningful and truth apt – either true or false – and
can be known.
• Ethical statements are FACTS
• There are two kinds of moral cognitivism:
o Naturalism: ‘moral goodness’ is a natural property that can be
discovered through experience.
o Non-naturalism: ‘moral goodness’ is not a natural property.
Non-cognitivism
• Ethical sentences are not truth-apt, and are instead meaningless when taken
as assertions of fact.
• So ethical sentences express something other than facts:
o Emotion (Ayer’s Emotivism).
o Prescriptions (Hare’s Prescriptivism).
Versions of Cognitivism
Cognitivism (i): Ethical naturalism
•
•
•
•
Utilitarianism is a kind of naturalism (pleasure is a natural property).
Ditto for Aristotelian virtue theory (eudaimonia is a natural state of being).
Ditto for Aquinas’ Natural Moral Law (what is natural is good).
We can get an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’. E.g., if eating chocolate causes you
pleasure, then you ought to eat chocolate. (We start with a description of a
natural fact and you can get to a moral/value fact.)
• Moral properties are just part of the natural order, discoverable by
observation/science.
• Moral properties can be defined in terms of natural properties (F.H. Bradley)
Strengths of Ethical Naturalism
• There is nothing mysterious of ‘metaphysical about moral properties – they
are just part of the natural world.
• Ethical statements can be observed to be true or false (so meaningful
according to the Logical Positivist’s criteria).
• We can know moral truths in familiar ways (through experience).
• Gives us an objective moral reality.
4
A2: Meta-Ethics
Criticisms of Ethical Naturalism
(1) Hume’s Law
• We need to distinguish between matters of fact (descriptions) and matters of
value (evaluations).
• It is logically invalid to derive an evaluative conclusion (ought) from premises
that are purely descriptive (is)
• His point is NOT that we can never use natural facts to support our conclusion,
but only that we cannot derive our conclusion solely from them: We cannot
rely on the facts alone.
• This is called Hume’s Law
(P) Killing animals causes pain
(C) Therefore, you ought to be vegetarian
• **This argument is invalid
• But what about the following argument?
(P1) Killing animals causes pain
(P2) Causing pain is morally wrong
(C) Therefore, you ought to be vegetarian
• This is valid, but already includes an evaluation as a premise, so the argument
doesn’t move from mere description to evaluation.
o However John Searle argues that in some cases you can derive an ought
from an is:
 (P) You promised to pay me back my £5
 (C) Therefore you ought to pay me back
o Searle argues that the institution of promise keeping is a natural fact about
us (society), and there are ‘normative implications’ for this.
 But perhaps there is a hidden evaluative premise – ‘you ought to
keep promises’ (or the premise just is evaluative anyway).
(2) The Naturalistic Fallacy (G.E. Moore)
• ‘Morally good’ cannot be defined. It is a simple term.
• I can teach you what is good by giving examples. (Same point for colours – e.g.,
‘yellow’.)
• Moral values are not reducible to natural properties.
(3) Moore’s Open Question Argument
• Let us suppose that I am wondering if it is good to do act A.
5
A2: Meta-Ethics
• The Utilitarian replies ‘Yes, because doing A causes more pleasure than pain.’
• It is then an open question to ask: ‘But is it good to cause more pleasure than
pain?’
• This question is just as intelligible as the first.
• So ‘A is good’ does not mean the same thing as ‘A causes more pleasure than
pain’.
Cognitivism (ii): Ethical non-naturalism
• Moral properties are not the same kind of properties as colours, shapes,
weights etc. Moral properties are sui generis (a separate kind of property)
• Moral properties cannot be experienced through the senses in the way that
colour properties can.
• BUT – moral properties are REAL properties.
• People who are ‘good moral judges’ can discern the wrongness in some
actions. (It takes practice.)
• We discern morality in a ‘kind-of-perceptual’ way (we have a special ‘moral
truth sensor = moral intuition).
• Ross: ‘The moral order ... is just as much part of the fundamental nature of the
universe ... as is the spatial or numerical structure expressed in the axioms of
geometry or arithmetic.’
Versions of non-naturalism
(1) Moore’s Intuitionism (Principia Ethica (1903))
•
•
•
•
He believes ethical terms pick out simple, primitive non-natural properties.
Ethical terms are indefinable.
Ethical facts cannot be reduced to natural facts.
We use moral reasoning (moral intuition) to work out what goods to pursue
(hence the theory is a kind of consequentialism).
(2) Prichard’s Intuitionism
• Common sense obligations are self-evident.
• Our moral intuition tells us what our obligations are. (If you understand what
promises are, then you just know you ought to keep them.)
(3) Ross’ Deontological Intuitionism
• There are seven prima facie duties that we should consider when making a
moral judgement:
i. fidelity
iv. non-maleficence
ii. reparation
v. justice
iii. gratitude
vi. beneficence
6
A2: Meta-Ethics
vii. self-improvement
• We use intuition to show us what is morally relevant in the particular situation
• We use reason/judgement to work out which prima facie duty makes
demands on us in the particular situation.
• E.g., in Sartre’s dilemma, intuition might reveal that JUSTICE outweighs
FIDELITY (and so the young man ought to fight the Nazis).
Strengths of Non-naturalism (intuitionism)
• The theories avoid the Naturalistic Fallacy, and other criticisms of Naturalism.
• The fact that scientists haven’t discovered natural moral properties is not
surprising, and not a problem
Criticisms of Non-naturalism (intuitionism)
• How can we justify our own moral judgements?
• How do we gain moral knowledge? Intuition sounds a bit mysterious.
• Are moral properties real if Science doesn’t find them?
o But not everyone believes in the ‘closure of Science’.
Ethical non-cognitivism
Background
Derived from Logical Positivism
 Logical Positivism = if a synthetic sentence cannot be empirically verified, then
it is meaningless.
• synthetic/analytic distinction.
• empirical verification = observation/scientific test – based on experience.
The influence of British Empiricism
 Empiricism = All knowledge comes from experience.
 John Locke: all human knowledge is a posteriori. The mind is a tabula rasa that
experience colours.
 David Hume: ideas come from sense experience.
Wittgenstein’s influence
 Wittgenstein influenced the Logical Positivists.
 Picture-theory of meaning: a word gets a meaning by referring to something in
the world.
 The word ‘chair’ is meaningful only because it represents
a part of reality.
2
A2: Meta-Ethics
 Words that fail to refer fail to have a meaning.
So there are problems with Ethical Naturalism and Non-naturalism.
Versions of Non-cognitivism
Non-cognitivism (i): Emotivism
 Emotivism is a theory of meta-ethics developed in the Twentieth Century by:
1) A.J. Ayer in his Language, Truth and Logic (1936)
2) C.L. Stevenson in his Ethics and Language (1944)
 Emotivism is ...




o Anti-realist (there are no mind-independent moral properties)
o Non-cognitivist (‘killing is wrong’ is not truth-apt)
o Subjectivist (there are no external standards)
Argument:
o If moral sentences describe the moral properties an act has, then such
sentences are meaningless because they cannot be verified.
o If a sentence is meaningless, then it has no use.
o But, moral sentences do have uses.
o Therefore they are not used to make cognitive claims.
Hence moral sentences are non-cognitive. (They do not express truths or
falsehoods.)
When we say: “Cruelty towards children is wrong” we are really expressing a
negative attitude (BOO!) towards killing children, and when we say “Being kind
to old people is good” we are expressing positive feelings (HOORAH!) towards
such acts of kindness.
Hence, morality is subjective: moral sentences are expressions of our emotions
= EMOTIVISM.
Strengths of Emotivism
1. Avoids what Mackie calls an ‘Error Theory’. In other words, Emotivism explains
how ethical sentences can have a meaning without relying on ‘queer’
properties.
2. Emotivism offers a coherent analysis of moral sentences that we could hold if
objective theories fail.
15
A2: Meta-Ethics
3. Ayer & Stevenson highlighted the importance of language in the study of
Ethics.
Criticisms of Emotivism
 Logical Positivism is false, therefore since Emotivism rests on LP, it too must be
false.
o
Both Ayer and C.L. Stevenson thought that Emotivism would survive
even if Logical Positivism was disproved. Look, there just are no
moral properties (non-natural or natural).
 Subjectivism cannot explain the existence of moral disagreement
o
Ayer thought that moral disagreements were either:
i. genuine non-moral disagreements about the non-moral facts, or
ii. simply not genuine moral disagreements.
 On this view, disagreement just boils down to a ‘shouting match’. Vardy &
Grosch: Emotivism leaves moral debate as ‘just so much hot air and nothing
else’.
 Subjectivism cannot explain the existence of moral disagreement
o
C.L. Stevenson’s version of Emotivism can accept genuine moral
disagreements. Stevenson thought that our emotion-response is
dependent upon background beliefs and principles (religious, moral,
political etc). And so a moral disagreement boils down to a
disagreement over fundamental moral principles
 When I say ‘killing is wrong’, I am not merely expressing my attitude - I am also
saying that you ought not kill.
o
Ayer thinks that moral sentences might be used to provoke a certain
response, but this is not a main idea in his theory. Stevenson
however argues that moral sentences contain both (i) an expression
of emotion, and (ii) an intention to influence the feelings of others.
 My emotional-responses are not as reliable as using REASON when dealing
with ethical situations. (Rachels argues reason should have a central role in
moral deliberation).
o
Ayer thinks that just as ‘I like coffee’ needs no reason to support it,
so moral sentences are just subjective. Stevenson thinks that moral
sentences are the result of subjective views, and can be backed up
with such reasons.
16
A2: Meta-Ethics
Non-cognitivism (ii): Prescriptivism
 R.M. Hare’s attempt to improve the Emotivism of Ayer and Stevenson.
 Unlike Emotivism, Prescriptivism does NOT say that moral sentences are
expressions of approval/disapproval, but that they are recommendations or
commands of a course of action that others ought to follow.
 “Murder is wrong” means “Do not murder!”
 Prescriptivism: name commonly given to those with views which hold that
moral judgements are in some special sense ‘action guiding’.
 Hare thinks that moral prescriptions are universalizable – everyone should
agree – but only in similar circumstances. (Similar in spirit to Kant’s theory).
We kind of ask “What if everyone did that?”
 Hare believes that calling an action wrong commits the speaker to judging
wrong any relevantly similar action done at any time and any place by any
person.
 So there is a rational side to moral judgements – it is rational to only prescribe
universalisable judgements (We ask – “What if everyone did that?”).
 It is rational to only act on those judgements that are universalisable.
Strengths of Prescriptivism
• It seems beneficial for morality to have a common set of moral laws (this
might be achieved by others agreeing with us – this is an advantage of the
universal nature of prescriptions).
• Avoids the conclusion that the moral discourse is fundamentally non-rational
(improvement over Ayer’s Emotivism).
• Because Hare thinks morality has to be rational – it explains why in most
situations the act of murder is not prescribed – it is irrational and inconsistent.
• Prescriptivism can only be true if all other attempts at an objective theory fail
– and they do fail (it could be argued).
• Prescriptivism explains moral disagreements: there can be genuine
disagreement over which prescriptions are universal.
17
A2: Meta-Ethics
Criticisms of Prescriptivism
• How do I know which judgements are universalisable – does this rely on my
subjective ideals? This might just lead to a kind of relativism.
• Are all moral sentences prescriptions? If I am having a moral discussion with a
friend who I know will never murder anyone, I might still say to him, “Murder
is wrong” even though I am not recommending that he does not commit
murder (I know that he has the same view).
• This is a difficult question to answer. Hare thinks that prescriptions are
universal – this means that they apply to anyone in the same situation (If I say
that you ought not to kill in this situation, this does NOT mean that I would
recommend not-killing in all situations). BUT, these prescriptions are not
independent of us humans – they are dependent upon rationality. So in this
way they are subjective. We could call Hare’s theory a subjective universalism.
The universal recommendations are those it would be rational to accept as
universals.
18