1. Robin Small. Time and Becoming in Nietzsche’s Thought. London/NewYork: Continuum, 2010. Pp. xii + 202. ISBN: 978-1-4411-8965-3.
2. Summary
In this study, Robin Small aims to develop a new interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of
temporality, i.e. “his approach to questions about the nature of becoming, and about past, present
and future,” which Plato calls the forms (eide) of time, and which he distinguishes from the parts of
time (12). After a clear general introduction, the author evaluates Nietzsche’s doctrine of absolute
becoming in the first chapter, starting with his discussion of ancient Greek thought in his early
Basel lectures, where he pays particular attention to the Heraclitean notion of becoming. In
addition, Small demonstrates that Nietzsche developed his own argument(s) for “the reality of
becoming” in explicit dialogue with contemporaries, such as Afrikan Spir, Eduard von Hartmann,
Philipp Mainländer, and Eugen Dühring.i
In the second chapter, Small elucidates Nietzsche’s conception of time as an interpretation
of (the fact of) becoming. In doing so, he makes a distinction – inspired by notably Werner
Stegmaier – between time as interpretation and a more primordial, though unfathomable time of
the Dionysian process of absolute becoming, in which this interpretation takes place; the time of
representation.ii The representation of time is arrived at, by way of imposing rhythm as a form
upon the continuous, though heterogeneous process of becoming. The third chapter examines
how this account relates to Nietzsche’s early sketch of a so-called “time-atom theory” (KSA 7:
26[12]). Small makes clear that this attempt should be seen in light of Nietzsche’s broader project
to develop an alternative to the dominant scientific outlook, going back to the ancient atomistic
and Eleatic thinkers, who give priority to space over time. He concludes, however, that Nietzsche’s
attempt to inverse this model in his theory of temporal “time-points” cannot account for the
radical continuity of becoming and eventually leads to “a hyper-Eleatic apotheosis of the moment
as a radically isolated monad.” For the later Nietzsche, in contrast, the moment will become “an
unreal abstraction from becoming” (76-7).
In his later work, especially in the Zarathustra, Nietzsche starts to use new, metaphorical
expressions to symbolize time, motion and becoming, according to Small. In the fourth and fifth
chapter, he argues that the images of the mountain path and of the lanes and the gateway in the
Zarathustra (‘On the Vision and Riddle’) – the former referring to parts of time, whereas the latter
refers to the forms of time – presuppose a context of power and conflict. Accordingly, the
mountain path, stretched out between the high peek and the abyss down below, in the tension
between the way upward and the way down, symbolizes the struggle of forces within the (human)
organism, as a result of which it acquires a personal measure of time (a notion inspired by Karl
Ernst von Baer). In symbolizing time like this, Nietzsche replaces the concept of causality,
underlying the traditional conception of time, with the notion of conflict and force, according to
Small. In addition, Small interprets the Augenblick in the image of the gateway not only as a mere
perspectival image, but also dynamically, as the result of the productive conflict between past and
future. In line with this, and on the basis of a literal indication in one of Gustav Teichmüller’s
books,iii Small sets out an interesting interpretation of Zarathustra’s rejection of the dwarf’s
response, in which he blames him for not recognizing the perspectival and contradictory character
of the moment, as a result of which the distinction between past and future simply collapses.
The tendency to identify the eternal return directly with an objective circular model of time is a
failure in many interpretations, according to Small, which as a result have problems explaining the
significance of the thought for human existence.iv In contrast, Small stresses that the thought of
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eternal recurrence is primarily formulated in tensed language of past and future, relative to the
perspective of the present moment (McTaggert’s A-series). However, he opposes an understanding
of the thought of eternal recurrence as an apotheosis of the moment, because, according to him,
the moment obstructs the reconciliation with time that the eternal recurrence is supposed to bring
about – it is constituted by the conflict between the past and the future. Instead, according to
Small, the reconciliation is attained in a timeless hour (Stunde), a living present, which incorporates
both past and future and which is the model of temporality that constitutes the ‘way of greatness’
(156-61). In contrast to the lanes and the mountain path, the way of greatness represents a way of
life that is associated, not with walking or climbing, but with dancing and flying. The contradiction
between past and future, represented in the image of the gateway and brought into conflict by the
image of the mountain path, is now overcome, resulting into the achievement of absolute freedom
and power. The temporal mode of this way, the hour, corresponds to the life-time that is affirmed
in the affirmation of the thought of eternal recurrence; a life-time in which past and future are
reconciled.
3. Characterization and Evaluation
Small approaches the theme of time and becoming in Nietzsche from a very broad angle at the
beginning of the book, but zooms in from the fourth chapter onwards into a very specific and
much discussed passage in Nietzsche’s Zarathustra ( ‘On the Vision and Riddle’). In doing so, Small
has skipped at least one important text on the theme of time for the greatest part, namely the
second untimely meditation, “On the Use and Disadvantage of History for Life” (although he does
use small phrases of this text that suit his interest). Moreover, Small has not redeemed his
(implicit) promise to take into account various aspects of the experience of time as well and not to
focus solely on the thought of eternal recurrence in the end; something which he accuses other
interpreters of as well. Nevertheless, from his broad point of entrance, he is able to give a valuable
contribution to the interpretation of the central passages on ER; not only by the reference to
Teichmüller, but also by interpreting it in light of Nietzsche’s philosophy of power, struggle and
becoming.v
If some passages are hard to read, this is most of the time more due to the difficulty of the
theme of time and to Nietzsche’s ambiguous treatment of it, than to the author’s writing and
argumentation style, which in general is quite clear and succinct. Nevertheless, although Paul
Loeb’s comment, on the back flap, that Small demonstrates a “patient willingness to let the
argument take him were it may,” is certainly applicable, this described characteristic leads in the
end to a rather ambiguous chapter on Nietzsche’s – admittedly also quite ambiguous –
understanding of the reconciliation with time in the ‘way of greatness’ and its corresponding mode
of temporality, the hour. Again, it must be noted that Small himself admits this when he states,
towards the end, that he “can only form an idea of what the outcome might be” with regard to a
solution to the question how the will is to achieve “reconciliation with time and something higher
than any reconciliation” (166).
Although Small does not present final answers, especially his attention to the sources of
Nietzsche’s thinking, his thorough dialogue with important secondary literature, and his attention
to historical as well as contemporary philosophical discussions, makes the scholarly contribution of
this book with regard to the theme of time in Nietzsche very valuable.
4. Further Characteristics
In a rather small ‘Note on the Use of Primary Sources and Translations’ at the beginning of the
book, Small testifies that he has generally relied upon the older translations of Hollingdale and
Kaufman, as well on the one of Greg Whitlock with regard to the Basel Lectures, but has made
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some modifications of his own (which are not always indicated). Small’s German, however, seems
to be excellent; in many cases he solely relies on his own translations of Nietzsche’s notes or the
works of other German authors.
Small’s use of secondary sources is extensive, including English, French, as well as a
considerable amount of important German secondary literature. His discussion of the theme of
time and becoming in Nietzsche involves a thorough evaluation of other important literature on
these issues, notably Joan Stambaugh’s Untersuchungen zum Problem der Zeit bei Nietzsche (1957;
transl. 1987), with regard to which this book might be considered as a worthy successor. Given the
fact that the greatest part of the book deals with interpreting the notion of the eternal recurrence,
some important works on this theme are found to be missing, such as Karl Löwith’s (1956), Gilles
Deleuze’s (1962), Günter Abel’s (1984, 1998), and Lawrence Hatab’s (2005). It is also a pity that
Small has not been able to take into consideration some articles in the recent volume Nietzsche on
Time and History, edited by Manuel Dries (De Gruyter, 2009), since there are some overlappings,
which certainly could have given rise to interesting points of discussion. Small does enter into
discussion with Loeb’s recent book, including its controversial central argument on the
psychological continuity between recurring lives, with regard to which he offers a more plausible
alternative (163-4).
Wolter Hartog
22-12-2010
i
Nietzsche’s line of argument consists, according to Small, first of all in a self-proclaimed “argument ad hominem”
against Parmenides’ denial of becoming and multiplicity, based on the reality of motion and multiplicity within
(subjective) thinking (20-22). Secondly, Nietzsche gives an argument for one of the implications of the assumption that
the world is one of becoming, namely that it cannot have a final state of rest. This can be demonstrated on the basis of
the argument that if such a state of rest is to occur at all, it should already have occurred. And since the “fact of mind
as a becoming” shows the actuality of change, it indicates that it cannot have a final state, and thereby demonstrates
the finitude of possibilities within becoming.
ii
Werner Stegmaier, “Zeit der Vorstellung. Nietzsches Vorstellung der Zeit,” Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 41,
no. 2 (Juni 1987): 202-228. We find a similar distinction also in, amongst others, John Richardson, ‘‘Nietzsche on Time
and Becoming,’’ in A Companion to Nietzsche, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 208–29; R.
Kevin Hill, ‘‘From Kantian Temporality to Nietzschean Naturalism,’’ in Nietzsche on Time and History, ed. Manuel Dries
(Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 2008), 75-86 ; Manuel Dries, “Towards Adualism: Becoming and Nihilism in Nietzsche's
Philosophy,” in ibid., 113-147.
iii
Nietzsche appears not to have read the book in which the literal phrase that “from a mere perspectival picture” on
the circular and timeless totality, “the crooked must appear straight and the straight appear crooked” appears, namely
in Darwinismus und Philosophie (1877), but it is remarkable that Teichmüller explicitly refers to the passage in his later
work, Die wirkliche und die scheinbare Welt (1882), which Nietzsche almost certainly studied.
iv
Against the notion of a circular time, Small brings in that it is not so problematic to represents the eternal recurrence
of all events in the picture of a circle, but he argues that in that case, the circle symbolizes the events that make up the
course of becoming, and not the motion of time itself. “Talk of motion begins only when we think of them as coming to
be and passing away, and as being in the past, present or future” (120). Moreover, a circular representation of time is
not compatible with the notion of infinite time, Small argues, since the distance between particular positions upon this
circle is limited. So, either we speak of a circular time, in which time is thus finite, or we must speak of a linear time in
which a finite number of events occur again and again. Hence, the notion of eternal recurrence still has to presuppose
a linear conception of time, according to Small.
v
With regard to Small’s arguments, I only have one concrete remark. Small makes a rather challenging, and at first
sight contra-intuitive argument with regard to the inconsistency of the notion of an infinite, circular time (cf. endnote
iv), on the basis of which he takes Zarathustra to be refuting the dwarf’s claim that “time is itself a circle.” Small argues
that in a circular conception of time, time can only be finite, since either the points on the circle are always represent a
finite distance with regard to one another, or the distance is taken to exceed the length of one circle, but then we are
actually assuming a linear time, according to Small, which can be infinite indeed. I think that, in Nietzsche’s view, such
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an infinite conception of linear time would be inconsistent as well, since it assumes that we can make distinctions
between earlier and later occurrences of the same event, and this seems to presuppose, on its turn, the notion of a
beginning and an end, or at least a criterion on the basis of which distinction can be made. This criterion is not
available, however, if the recurring events are always exactly the same, but this brings us back to a circular model of
time in which such a distinction is not possible. Maybe, the only possibly criterion would be the present moment, on
the basis of which one can make distinctions between previous and later, past and future occurrences. Yet again, if one
would count back, from this perspective, to more than one previous occurrences, then one would already assume a
linear model of time, on the basis of which one beliefs to make distinctions between various occurrences, which seems
to be impossible if the recurring events are exactly similar, indistinguishable. There seems to be an aporia here, which
might be partly resolved by distinguished the linear and circular models of time as two frames of reference, which are
both applicable, though each has its incongruities.
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