Strategies for Answering Discussion and Essay Questions
Answers to the Review Questions included at the end of each chapter in the third edition of
Ethics and Technology can be found fairly easily. You simply need to locate and review the
relevant section in each chapter, from which the question is drawn. Each Review Question is
fairly simple and straightforward, and each is designed in such a way that a clear and precise
answer to it can be found in the text. However, there are no “correct,” or at least no uniquely
correct, answers to the Discussion Questions or to the Essay/Presentation Questions, which
are also included at the end of each chapter. Hence, I make no attempt to provide “solutions,”
in the conventional sense of that term, to the controversial issues raised in those questions.
Instead, I provide some strategies for instructors and students to consider as they set out to
resolve the issues and dilemmas raised in selected Discussion and Essay Questions from each
chapter. For example, I suggest some ways in which certain conceptual tools and
methodological frameworks—including the various ethical theories and critical-thinking skills
introduced in the early chapters of the textbook—can be applied in answering many of the
Discussion and Essay Questions included.
Please note that the full text of the Discussion and the Essay Questions themselves, included
at the end of each chapter in the book, are not repeated here. So you will likely want to have
the textbook in hand, and opened to the relevant pages, as you read through the various
strategies provided below.
I: Strategies for selected Discussion and Essay Questions in Chapter 1 (See pages 30-31
in the textbook)
A. Strategies for Selected Discussion Questions in Chapter 1
4. Gotterbarn’s arguments are well constructed, and Gotterbarn makes a plausible case for
why computer ethics should be conceived of as field of professional ethics. In defense of
Gotterbarn’s position, we must concede that an understanding of professional-responsibility
issues is critical to an adequate understanding and analysis of computer ethics issues. In the
period of computing preceding the World Wide Web, Gotterbarn’s argument for why the field
of computer ethics should be conceived of as an area of professional ethics (whose primary
concern was for computer professionals) was plausible. At that time, many (if not most) of the
ethical issues involving computers directly affected the computing profession. Since then,
however, two important factors have influenced the field. First, a new (and broader) wave of
computer-related ethical issues emerged when the Internet became accessible to ordinary
people. Second, most people who currently use computers, either for work or for recreational
purposes, are not computer professionals. So, it would seem that we need a much broader
conception of the field than the one proposed by Gotterbarn. However, we also saw that
Gotterbarn’s view may ultimately turn out to be correct as more and more traditional
computer-ethics issues, such as those involving privacy, property, speech, and so forth,
become folded into “ordinary ethics.”
6. If we apply the first two-steps of the methodology described in Sec. 1.6 (entitled “A
Comprehensive Strategy for Approaching Cyberethics Issues”), we must first identify what
the ethical issues are in this case. Here, issues involving the personal privacy of Internet users
would seem to be apparent; so we have identified at least one ethical issue. Next, we need to
see whether there are any “policy vacuums” associated with this particular issue. There would
indeed seem to be a policy vacuum in the sense that neither ISPs nor ordinary users have a
clear understanding of a law or a policy for determining whether personal information about a
user’s online activities can be given to a non-law-enforcement organization merely because
some organization suspects one or more subscribers to an ISP of having violated copyright
laws. Consider that the RIAA is not a law enforcement agency. So, a policy vacuum
regarding cybertechnology once again emerges, and this vacuum or void needs to be filled
with a clear and explicit policy.
B. Strategies for Selected Essay Questions in Chapter 1
1. As we saw in this chapter of the textbook, a relatively recent practice that has generated
considerably controversy involved the way that the Recording Industry Association of
America (RIAA) pursued individuals it suspected of exchanging copyrighted music files on
the Internet. For example, we saw that the RIAA monitored the amount of “traffic” of
unauthorized music files that was routed through the computer systems of users’ systems. In
order for the RIAA to get the information it needed about the users who operated these
computer systems, the Recording Industry requested that ISPs provide to them the names of
individuals that corresponded to certain IP addresses.
Were the ISPs obligated, either legally or morally, to provide the RIAA with the actual names
of individuals, which are normally protected under the anonymity of IP addresses? On the one
hand, ISPs are required to comply with law enforcement authorities in cases where criminal
activities are suspected of taking place in their online forums. On the other hand, having P2P
software installed on one’s computer system is not in itself illegal. And even if having
unauthorized copyrighted music on one’s computer system is illegal, one could still question
whether the means used by the RIAA to track down suspected violators falls within the
parameters of what is morally (and even legally) acceptable behavior.
If we apply the first two-steps of the methodology described in Sec. 1.6 (entitled “A
Comprehensive Strategy for Approaching Cyberethics Issues”), we must first identify what
the ethical issues are in this case. Here, issues involving the personal privacy of Internet users
would seem to be apparent; so we have identified at least one ethical issue. Next, we need to
see whether there are any “policy vacuums” associated with this particular issue. There would
indeed seem to be a policy vacuum in the sense that neither ISPs nor ordinary users have a
clear understanding of a law or a policy for determining whether personal information about a
user’s online activities can be given to a non-law-enforcement organization merely because
some organization suspects one or more subscribers to an ISP of having violated copyright
laws. Consider that the RIAA is not a law enforcement agency. So, a policy vacuum
regarding cybertechnology once again emerges, and this vacuum or void needs to be filled
with a clear and explicit policy.
2. Theoretically, one could envision cyberethics issues being examined from an indefinite
number of perspectives. For example, we could conceivably analyze these issues from the
vantage point of political science, economics, history, and so forth. However, the three
perspectives that we have laid out in Chapter 1 are fairly exhaustive in their scope. Consider
that the professional-ethics perspective addresses many of the concerns faced by software and
hardware engineers, computer science professionals, and information-technology and libraryscience professionals in their roles as professionals. The descriptive-ethics approach, which is
empirically-based, addresses concerns that are of interest to sociologists, anthropologists, and
psychologists (and thus indirectly addresses the interests of related groups such as political
scientists, economists, historians, and so forth). And the philosophical-ethics approach
examines cyberethics issues from a perspective that is both normative (as opposed to
descriptive) and conceptual/analytical (as opposed to empirical).
We saw that the Amy Boyer case was interesting because it could be analyzed from all three
perspectives. While not all cyberethics issues are analyzable from each of the three
perspectives, many are capable of being analyzed from two vantage points. For example, the
Napster case can be examined from the perspectives of descriptive ethics (i.e., its sociological
impact) and philosophical ethics (i.e., normative questions having to do with fairness and
moral obligation).
4. Some computer scientists have suggested that because: (a) Cybertechnology is relatively
new; (b) Cybertechnology raises ethical issues; it follows that (c) Cybertechnology has raised
new ethical issues. They point out, for example, that recent technologies such as data
encryption raise certain kinds of social and ethical concerns that did not exist prior to the
introduction of that technology.
Some computer scientists and philosophers have also argued that because computer
technology has had a global impact with respect to ethical issues, a new global (or universal)
theory of ethics is needed. In other words, Western ethical theories such as utilitarianism are
no longer adequate to deal with ethical issues that are global in scope.
Other philosophers have taken a slightly different tack to show why a new ethical framework
is needed. Philosophers Hans Jonas (2006) and Luciano Floridi (1999) have argued,
independently of one another, that modern technology has introduced new “objects of moral
consideration.” For example, recent work in the fields of artificial intelligence has contributed
to the creation of software robots (“softbots”); and developments at the intersection of
cybertechnology and biotechnology has made possible the creation of certain kinds of objects,
entities, or “creatures” that appear to be human-like. As a result, some philosophers argue that
we need to expand our sphere of moral consideration to include such objects and entities; and
in the process, we will also likely need a new ethical framework.
In our analysis of question of whether any computer ethics issues are unique (in Chapter 1),
however, we saw that our existing ethical framework is fairly robust. We also that if we make
certain adjustments to the standard, three-step method used in applied ethics, then we can
avoid having to construct a new ethical framework For example, if we include the
recommendations suggested by James Moor and Philip Brey, we can proceed with our
existing set of ethical theories. Following Brey, we would first need to identify and disclose
any embedded values in technology (i.e., either transparent or non-transparent moral values);
and following Moor, we need to identify and resolve any policy vacuums and conceptual
muddles that arise, before we can apply the traditional ethical theories.
II: Strategies for Essay Questions in Chapter 2 (See page 72-73 in the textbook)
1. Another example of a discussion stopper would be a remark to the effect, “Morality and
ethics are really about religion, so questions about morality only apply for those who have
religious beliefs.” Here, the suggestion is that morality is tied exclusively to religious beliefs
and that moral issues cannot be debated independently of those beliefs. When we examined
the connection between religion and morality, however, we saw that religion was as one of
many perspectives from which moral issues could be examined. And we saw that the religious
approach to these issues was very different from the approach taken by (philosophical) ethics,
which we defined as “the philosophical study of morality.” For example, we saw that
philosophical ethics analyzes a moral system from the point of view of ethical theories and
logical argumentation.
Unfortunately, it is very easy to fall victim to one or more of the four discussion stoppers that
we identified in Chapter 2, because, at first glance, each stopper seems to have some merit.
Upon closer inspection, however, we saw why each also is conceptually flawed.
2. If you approach this problem from a utilitarian perspective, you will want to do what is best
for the majority of employees and for the company itself. So, if laying off 5% of the
workforce would help to bring about more desirable ends for the greatest number of
employees affected by the decision, then a utilitarian would favor Proposal # 2. A
deontologist, on the other hand, will want to choose whichever option is fair to all of the
employees (not just the majority). As such, the deontologist would likely favor Proposal # 1,
since everyone would receive a 5 percent cut in pay. In Kant’s deontological scheme,
Proposal #1 would be the right course of action because the principle behind that proposal is
“universalizable” in the sense that it can be applied to everyone in the corporation, without
exception. And, a Kantian would argue that such a principle would treat each employee as an
end-in-him/herself, as opposed to a means to some end.
3. In this scenario, you encounter a genuine ethical dilemma. It is a dilemma because you
must choose between one of two undesirable options: lying or breaking a promise. A
utilitarian would most likely choose lying in order to save the life of her friend. However, we
saw that utilitarianism, as a moral principle, also allows some individuals to be treated as
means to the ends of others. So utilitarianism is not a fully satisfactory ethical theory, and
many philosophers reject solutions to ethical dilemmas that are based solely on utilitarian
principles.
David Ross’s scheme of Act Deontology offers an alternative strategy for approaching this
kind of dilemma by asking us to look at the “situation” or “circumstances,” as opposed to
consequences, in deciding which course of action to take. Ross points out that we would have
to be omniscient to know whether a particular action would necessarily lead to a desirable
outcome (consequence). So, in Ross’s scheme, the pursuit of desirable outcomes or
consequences – i.e., the utilitarian model – cannot be our guiding principle in ethical
deliberation. On the other hand, Ross’s scheme also requires that we use a form of ethical
intuitionism (similar to mathematical intuitionism) in each situation to “weigh” between the
various “prima facie duties” in order to arrive at the correct decision for that particular
situation. And, as we noted in Chapter 2, this aspect of Ross’s theory has been controversial.
4. We saw that each of the four traditional ethical theories had its own particular strengths and
weaknesses, and that none of these theories, individually, could withstand certain kinds of
criticisms. However, we also saw the clever way in which Moor’s theory of “just
consequentialism” is able to combine the best aspects of both the utilitarianism and
deontological ethical theories, while managing to avoid some of weaknesses of each theory.
Moor’s theory also presents us with a concrete, two-step strategy for deliberating on how to
proceed in the case of each ethical issue. You may want to review that strategy, described on
page 66 in the textbook.
III: Strategies for selected Discussion and Questions in Chapter 3 (See page 98-99 in the
textbook)
A. Strategies for Selected Discussion Questions in Chapter3
3. Construct the best arguments you can to advance the positions that have been held on both
sides of the Napster dispute. Next compare the strength of your argument for why the sharing
of on-line proprietary music files should be allowed to the strength of your argument for why
it should not. Is either argument sound? If not, is either argument deductive (but with one or
more false premises)? Is either inductive? Is either, or are both, arguments fallacious? You
may also want to consult Appendix G (available on this Web site) to go over the guidelines
for determining how to verify the truth and falsity of statements that make up arguments.
4. In constructing this argument, you may want to look ahead to some of the sample
arguments included in Chapter 5, on privacy in cyberspace. Once you construct the best
argument you can for why personal privacy should be strongly protected in all e-commerce
activities, test your arguments against the standards for validity and invalidity that we
examined in Chapter 3. Also determine whether your argument contains any informal logical
fallacies by reviewing the list of common fallacies that we examined in Sec. 3.9.
B. Strategies for Selected Essay Questions in Chapter3
1. One could construct the following kind of argument for why students should be required to
take a course in cyberethics.
Premise 1. Undergraduate student should be required to take courses on topics that
examine ethical and social issues that will impact them in their professional and
personal lives.
Premise 2. Cyberethics courses examine ethical and social issues that impact students
in both their professional and personal lives.
Conclusion. Undergraduate students should take a course in cyberethics
This argument is valid or deductive because if the premises are both true, the conclusion must
also be true. However, we don’t yet know whether the premises are, in fact, true. Premise 1 is
somewhat controversial in that the truth of that statement can be challenged. So the argument
is not sound. If we modified Premise 1 slightly to read, “Generally, students should be
required…”, the argument would be invalid (instead of deductive), because it would then be
possible for one or more premises to be true and the conclusion false. However, because the
conclusion would likely be true when the premises are true, this argument would also be
inductive. And since it premises would be true in the actual world, this particular inductive
argument would be stronger overall than it was in its deductive form.
2. A good starting point in this case would be to locate a copy of either Time or Newsweek
magazine. Each periodical has columns on technology issues, and each has run cover stories
on Napster, Internet pornography, Internet pedophilia, etc. Once you have located a periodical
that contains an article that addresses a particular ethical or social involving cybertechnology,
isolate one or more arguments made by the author(s). Next, test each argument via the sevenstep strategy we used in Chapter 3 (pages 90-91 to determine whether each argument is
deductive, inductive, or fallacious.
IV: Strategies for selected Discussion and Essay Questions in Chapter 4 (See pages 128129 in the textbook)
A. Strategies for Selected Discussion Questions in Chapter 4
1. You can begin by reviewing Table 4-1 on p. 110. Once you have assessed the individual
strengths and weaknesses of professional codes, determine whether the overall benefits of
having professional codes outweighs the disadvantages of not having them. Apply your
conclusion to a current case, such as the one involving computer professionals who are
working on aspects of the National Missile Defense System. Or consider a hypothetical
scenario where computer professionals are working on the development of a kind of
“spyware” to be used by government officials for the purpose of monitoring the on-line
activities of its citizens.
B. Strategies for Selected Essay Questions in Chapter 4
1. In examining the five computer-related professional codes (included in Appendixes A-E on
the book’s Web site), you will see that the IEEE-CS/ACM Code of Software Engineering and
Professional Practice (SECEPP) is the most comprehensive. Review the full text of SECEPP,
which you will find in Appendix E. This professional code is fairly comprehensive.
Determine whether it is also internally coherent and consistent.
Should a professional code of ethics be expected to be exhaustive in the sense that it can
provide its members with a precise or unambiguous answer for every possible ethical issue
that may present itself within the context of one’s professional duties and obligations? What
are some of the reasonable expectations of a professional code?
2. Here, you face a genuine ethical dilemma. You have an obligation as a spouse and parentto-be to provide financially for your family. On the contrary, you have personal convictions
and principles that have to be balanced against considerations of career advancement. You
would no doubt want to express the concerns you are having with your spouse, who could
help you in your deliberation in this particular dilemma. One additional variable, which is
external to the case per se but which is also very relevant to your deliberation, has to do with
the state of the economy at the time you encounter this particular dilemma. For example, if
alternative employment with a similar salary is available to you, then your options are very
different than they would be in a bad economy. This factor can clearly affect your autonomy
with respect determining whether to leave or remain in your current position.
3. You may already have seen the similarity between the hypothetical scenario posed in
Discussion Question 4 and the BART case that we examined. Review that case and then
decide whether you would follow the same course that the three employees at BART took.
Which factors, if any, might influence you to make a decision that would be different from the
one made by the engineers at BART? Were they justified in blowing the whistle? Would you
be justified in this case?
4. In the case involving BART, and in the hypothetical scenario (similar to the BART case)
that we considered in the preceding question, you had to decide whether, on moral grounds,
you are justified in blowing the whistle. In this case there were no legal constraints preventing
you from for doing so. (Of course, you could have been fired for blowing the whistle, as the
BART engineers were; but it would not have been illegal to blow the whistle in those cases.)
Currently, however, there are certain anti-whistle-blowing provisions in the Homeland
Security Act that make it illegal to blow the whistle. Thus, depending on the nature of your
work and on the status of your employer, you may now find yourself in a situation where you
have to consider whether it would be illegal to blow the whistle even when it may seem
morally permissible – perhaps even morally required of you – to do so. Would you still be
willing to break the law (and possibly face a jail sentence in doing so), if you thought that
blowing the whistle in a certain case might save lives?
V: Strategies for selected Discussion and Essay Questions in Chapter 5 (see pages 169170 in the textbook)
A. Strategies for Selected Discussion Questions in Chapter 5
2. As a test case, connect to the search engine Google.com and then type in your name in
Google’s entry box. How many “hits” were returned under your name? Assuming that one or
more hits were returned, was any of the information that you were able to retrieve about
yourself information that you personally had authorized to be on the Web. Were you surprised
that any of the information about you identified on Google was so easily accessible to the
general public? Should that kind of personal information be treated as “public information”?
What recourse should you have, if you wish to get that information about you removed from
the Internet.
3. Striking the “appropriate” balance in this case has not been easy. Generally, in the US,
privacy laws have tended to favor the interests of businesses and organizations in the
commercial sector rather than individuals. In Europe, on the other hand, privacy policies and
data-protection schemes have been friendlier to individuals. Judith DeCew has argued that we
should presume in favor of individual privacy and then let people negotiate their personal
information in ways that they choose.
Further complicating the process of trying to balance the interests of personal privacy and
information access has been recent concerns about national security. This has been especially
apparent in period following the 9/11 attack.
B. Strategies for Selected Essay Questions in Chapter 5
1. In the early days of computing, the main concern about privacy invasion tended to be
centered around issues associated with fears involving governments snooping on their private
citizens. This was especially the case in the 1960s, when the U.S. government considered the
feasibility of constructing a huge, national database that would contain information about
every citizen. Fears about this proposal were then allayed when it was determined that such a
database would not be constructed at that time. In the 1970s through the 1990s, fears
regarding privacy violations of individuals shifted away from concerns about the federal
government to worries about businesses and organizations in the commercial sector that
collect and exchange personal information about individuals. Following September 11, 2001,
however, privacy concerns have once again shifted – this time, moving away from concerns
about privacy invasions in the commercial sector to privacy concerns about the new roles that
the federal government plays in gathering personal information. The USA Patriot Act, for
example, has concerned many civil libertarians who fear that personal privacy has been
significantly eroded and that it may never again be fully restored.
3. In the days immediately following 9/11, there were some signs that people would be
willing to trade-off bits of their privacy in return for greater security. Indeed, many Americans
still seem willing to do this. However, there have also been attempts by privacy advocates to
“reclaim” some of the individual privacy rights that appear to have been undermined by
controversial legislation such as the Total Information Awareness Act. For example, under
certain provisions of this act, it would be permissible for airlines to conduct a background
check on one’s credit history before determining whether that individual is considered a
security risk. (In other words, an association is made between one’s credit record and that
person’s likelihood of being a terrorist; opponents of this legislation have argued that it
unfairly biases poorer individuals.)
In some sense, privacy interests have already been reassessed and recalibrated in the postSeptember 11 world. Yet, many American still claim to value their privacy. One way to
proceed with respect to privacy expectations in the current period is for individuals to concede
that they must be willing to give away more pieces of their privacy to the federal government
for purposes of national security, but that they should be able to expect to retain their privacy
in cases of commercial transactions. One way of doing this is to think of privacy not so much
in all-or-nothing terms but rather how individual privacy can be protected in various sectors –
i.e. sectors involving medical privacy, financial privacy, employee privacy, and so forth.
Personal privacy in most of these sectors could still be protected from commercial interests,
even if the federal government has greater access to our personal information.
VI: Strategies for selected Discussion and Essay Questions in Chapter 6 (See pages 197198 in the textbook)
A. Strategies for Selected Discussion Questions in Chapter 6
2. Any attempt to strike an appropriate balance between security and convenience will always
be controversial. For one thing, people often have very different beliefs about where the
default should lie – i.e., should we presume in favor of security or of convenience, as a
starting point? If we opt in favor of more secure computer systems, then the likely result will
be a loss of some convenience for users. If we presume in favor of convenience, on the other
hand, then certain aspects of security can be compromised. As computer systems become
increasingly vulnerable to attacks from “malicious” programs, more and more ordinary users
may be willing to tolerate less convenience and ease of use in order to achieve greater
security.
B. Strategies for Selected Essay Questions in Chapter 6
1. This question presents us with a case for examining moral relativism, described in Chapter
2. You may want to review that discussion on pages 50-52 in the textbook. Those subscribing
to the Hacker Code of Ethics may believe that “innocent” or non-malicious hacking is
acceptable. But the broader community has not been as sensitive to the distinctions that
computer enthusiasts draw when it comes to hacking. So, it would seem that from the point of
view of descriptive ethics, we have two different moral systems. But it doesn’t follow that
members in each group are free to act as they please. The hacker community is clearly a subgroup in the population. As such, it can work to change laws, as well as attitudes, toward nonmalicious hacking. However, to embrace its own standards for hacking as an acceptable
alternative to the general laws and policies for hacking would also be to embrace a form of
moral relativism.
2. Unfortunately, Spafford’s position might seem inconsistent because he claims that one is
doing “the right thing” by breaking into the hospital computer system to save a life, even
though breaking into computer systems is “unethical” because break-ins always cause harm.
However, we also noted that Spafford’s position can be justified on a version of Act
Deontology, as described in Chapter 2. There we saw that it is the agent’s actions, not the
consequences that result from actions, which need to be assessed in moral dilemmas. So,
Spafford could consistently argue that, all things being equal, it is wrong to break into a
computer system, and he can also make exceptions on nonconsequentialist grounds for when
such a break-in is justified. You may want to review David Ross’ version of Act Deontology
(pages 55-57 in the textbook).
3. Once again, we have a question about whether the ends (desired) justify the means (used to
achieve the ends). In this particular case, the injured candidate would seem to have a
presumptive right to know whether the person who had defamed him or her on the Internet
was indeed a rival political opponent. However, if we allow the breach of anonymity in this
case, why shouldn’t we allow it in other cases involving on-line defamation? But why stop
with defamation? We see that we may encounter a slippery-slope line of reasoning (see
Chapter 3). An important question here, at the general level, is: When should an ISP be
required to reveal the identity of one of its subscribers to some external source? Consider, for
example, the incident in which the RIAA solicited from ISPs the names of individual
subscribers that it suspected to be illegally sharing copyrighted music via P2P systems.
Should ISPs comply with these requests in such cases, even when no direct warrants have
been issued by law-enforcement organizations?
VII: Strategies for selected Discussion and Essay Questions in Chapter 7 (see pages 225226 in the textbook)
A. Strategies for Selected Discussion Questions in Chapter 7
1. In one important way, the Internet entrapment case illustrates the classic tension between
utilitarians and non-consequentilists that can be found in a wide range of contemporary
debates involving the means-ends distinction, which we considered above. (See, for example,
the strategy for resolving Question 3 in Chapter 5.) Utilitarians would argue that the end
(catching the pedophile) justifies the means used (entrapment on the Internet). Clearly, there
is something desirable in being able to catch pedophiles. But is the use of any means
whatsoever acceptable? Consider that we could have inspectors constantly monitoring
conversations between Internet users to catch pedophiles. Is that the kind of society in which
we want to live?
Recall the example of computerized matching of electronic records that we discussed in
Chapter 5. There we saw that the prospect of catching welfare cheats and deadbeat parents
was desirable, but that the means used were highly questionable and very controversial. Nonconsequentialists, such as deontologists, argue that we cannot base an adequate moral system
solely on the goal of achieving desirable consequences, as utilitarians do.
3. Both the critics and proponents of Clipper believed that the central issue in that 1990s’
controversy would arise again in a different guise. At issue is whether the government can be
trusted to hold one of the keys (in a public-key encryption system) in escrow. In the postSeptember 11 era, however, there seems to be much more sympathy for the view that the
government should be able to have a technology such as Clipper. On the contrary, it is not
clear how external market forces will respond to American electronics products that have
embedded in them an encryption device similar to Clipper.
4. Drafting specific laws to handle certain kinds of crimes can be useful in helping to
understand the nuances of certain crimes and in helping to prosecute a crime as a crime of a
particular type. For example, we have general crimes involving homicide, and specific crimes
involving vehicular homicide. In this case, it is believed that a separate crime for homicides
resulting from the use of motor vehicles is useful both in understanding and prosecuting such
crimes. Analogously, having cybercrime statutes can help us both to understand and prosecute
certain crimes involving cybertechnology is useful. However, attempting to understand and
prosecute every crime involving the use of cybertechnology under that category could also be
problematic and confusing. Hence, separating crimes that depend solely on cybertechnology
from those that happen merely to involve the use of that technology to some degree would
seem to be useful.
B. Strategies for Selected Essay Questions in Chapter 7
1. The use of biometric technologies in large public places such as airports and sports
stadiums would seem to be justified. Although this technique also is a form of computerized
matching, it differs in significant respects from the kinds of matching operations used to track
down deadbeat parents and welfare cheats. In those cases, databases containing the names of
individuals presumed to be innocent were cross-referenced in the hope of obtaining one or
more “hits,” which identified individuals whose names reside in two incompatible databases
(e.g., the database of federal employees and the database of welfare recipients). In the case of
biometric matching, however, one of the databases used contains a list of names and photos of
known or suspected criminals and terrorists.
VIII: Strategies for selected Discussion and Essay Questions in Chapter 8 (See pages
261-262 in the textbook)
A. Strategies for Selected Discussion Questions in Chapter 8
2. The “common good” approach used by McFarland (and others) to analyze ethical issues
has its roots in natural law theory. Natural law, which traces it origins to the writings of
Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas, operates on the assumption that every object has a natural
purpose or end. Using McFarland’s insight, we see that the purpose or natural goal of
information (as an ‘object” of some kind) is something to be shared and communicated. The
view that information should be fee is not necessarily incompatible with natural law theory;
however, that theory need not require that information be totally free. Nonetheless, natural
law provides us with a certain presumptive principle about how we should proceed in the
debate over intellectual property – viz., that information should be shared and communicated.
So using this presumptive principle, we could argue against framing overly oppressive and
restrictive intellectual property laws that “commodify” information and that militate against
the sharing and communicating of information.
3. The “intellectual commons” is analogous to the physical commons in that it provides
people with a common area in which they can congregate and freely use the resources
available. (In the case of the intellectual commons, the resources are ideas and information
that can be freely shared.) As stronger intellectual property laws are passed, the intellectual
commons tends to shrink. Many, including Lawrence Lessig, believe that the intellectual
commons is shrinking. Consider once again the case of Eric Eldred’s Web site, which we
examined in Sec. 8.4.3. We saw that with the passage of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act in 1998, some books that were about to enter the public domain will instead
remain copyrighted.
James Boyle’s suggestion that we think of the intellectual commons along the lines of the
environmental movement of the 1970s could help us to reframe the current debate. For
example, thinking of it in this way can help us to see that the short-sightedness of arguments
used in favor individual rights for ownership of land could easily have destroyed the
environment. When applied to the intellectual commons, the environmental analogy can also
be used to muster support among the various “stakeholders” to help preserve the intellectual
commons from further degradation.
B. Strategies for Selected Essays Questions in Chapter 8
1. If we proceed from a principle like “information wants to be shared” (but not necessarily
free), then we can frame intellectual property laws and policies that help to keep information
accessible to individuals while, at the same time rewarding the producers of proprietary
information, including computer software. Such a presumptive principle could also help to
reverse the trend of commercializing information, which has greatly reduced its ability to be
shared.
3. There would certainly appear to be an inconsistency in that both groups flip-flop their
positions when it comes to privacy vs. property claims. Each side seems to want to have it
both ways. We can find similar inconsistencies between liberals and conservatives with
respect to life issues. For example, conservatives who are pro-life in the abortion debate are
often pro-death penalty in the debate over capital punishment (despite the fact that
conservatives claim to believe in the “sanctity of life,” which implies that all human life is
sacred). Conversely, liberals tend to be pro-choice in the abortion debate, but are anti-death
penalty in the capital punishment debate (presumably because they believe that taking any
human life is morally wrong). So perhaps it is not surprising that with respect to the personal
privacy and intellectual property debates, liberal and conservatives are also inconsistent in
their respective views.
IX: Strategies for selected Discussion and Essay Questions in Chapter 9 (see pages 296297 in the textbook)
A. Strategies for Selected Discussion Questions in Chapter 9
2. “Deep linking” is the ability to connect directly to a sub-page of a Web site without first
having to access the site’s main page or home page. We saw that in the case of Ticketmaster
v. Microsoft, deep inking can be controversial. One problem with deciding controversial cases
involving deep linking on the Web has to do with determining what the legal status of a Web
site is. If a Web site is considered private property, then users wishing to enter that site can be
told which path they must take (just as the owner of home can inform visitors about which
door they must use to enter the house). If a Web site is considered a public space, on the
contrary, then the site’s owner should not be able to restrict users’ movements in that space by
determining which access point (if more than one is available) they must use to enter when
linking to that site.
3. We saw that Spinello believes that spam is morally objectionable for two reasons; one
utilitarian and the other deontological. For one thing, he points out that spam has harmful
consequences, because of its financial impacts, such as cost shifting and the consumption of
valuable network resources. Spinello notes that spam consumes and strains valuable
computing resources. We saw that he also pointed out that even if Internet resources were
infinite and there were no negative utilitarian consequences, spam would still be morally
objectionable because it does not respect the autonomy of individual users as persons or as
“ends-in-themselves.” He appeals to (Kant’s version of) a deontological argument to show
why spam cannot be universalizable. In Chapter 2, we saw that in Kant’s system, a practice is
universalizable only if it can coherently apply to all persons without exception. So, Spinello
makes a plausible case for why spam can be considred morally objectionable on deontological
as well as utilitarian grounds.
Miller andMoor (2008) take a different path in their analysis of moral objections to spam. For
one thing, they argue that an adequate ethical analysis of spam also needs to take into
consideration criteria such as accountability and deception. Recall their distinction between
Unsolicited Commercial Bulk Email (UCBE) that is non-fraudulent (NF-UCBE) and that
which is fraudulent (F-UCBE). Miller and Moor believe F-UCBE should always be
condemned, they argue that some cases of NF-UCBE can be justifiable from a moral point of
view, in certain cases. They imagine a scenario in which a whistleblower might send a
message to a large commercial mailing list to alert recipients of an injustice or a danger.
Miller and Moor suggest that in this scenario, the whistleblower may have justifiable reasons
for sending the email broadly and for wishing to be anonymous. They point out Miller that in
this whistle-blowing scenario, the “intent” of the sender needs to be taken into consideration.
So, in their scheme, there can be some cases where sending spam in the form of NF-UCBE
would be morally justifiable.
B. Strategies for Selected Essay Questions in Chapter 9
1. On the one hand, companies like Sony BMG have an interest, as well as a right, in
protecting their online content. On the other hand, these companies also have an obligation to
obey the law in their effort to track down individuals who make unauthorized use of their
copyrighted content. While DRM systems are legal, it is not clear that using spyware of the
sort employed by Sony BMG to track users is also legal. It would seem reasonable for users to
expect to be told that, when they purchase a CD, their activities can be monitored via the
company’s DRM systems. In that case, the practice would be open (or transparent) and could
be more easily challenged in the courts, and a ruling one way or another on the legality of this
practice could be established. So, a model of transparency on the part of the companies who
use DRM systems would seem to be the best compromise at this point in time.
2. The Communications Decency Act (CDA) was struck down as unconstitutional because the
US Supreme Court ruled that this act was over-reaching in terms of its scope. However, the
portion of CDA known as the Child Pornography Protection Act (CPPA) was originally
upheld, despite the Court’s ruling against CDA overall. The CPPA was also eventually struck
down as unconstitutional (in 2002). The Child Online Pornography Act (COPA), passed in
1998, was also declared unconstitutional. One problem with each of these child-pornography
acts is that they failed to distinguish between real children being represented on a computer
screen in some type of pornographic depiction, and “virtual children” (i.e., computergenerated images of children) being similarly represented. To determine whether these acts
should have been declared unconstitutional, review the full texts of the court decisions, which
are available on the Web.
We also saw that the Supreme Court upheld the Children’s Internet Pornography Act (CIPA).
Yet the majority of the Court’s members also argued that it was unconstitutional to filter
information accessed by adults in public libraries, where CIPA applies. So some have
questioned whether the Court has been consistent in its decisions regarding online
pornography, as it affects children.
X: Strategies for selected Discussion Questions and Essay Questions in Chapter 10 (see
page 326 in the textbook)
A. Strategies for Selected Discussion Questions in Chapter 10
1. If cybertechnology is a vital human resource as Jeremy Moss suggests it is, then having
access to that technology would seem to be very important. And if access to that technology is
as vital and as important as Moss claims, then it would seem to follow that developed nations
in the West have some moral obligation to provide developing nations with better access to
cybertechnology.
2. We have seen some of the paradoxical characteristics of race and the Internet. On the one
hand, the Internet is “color blind” in that Internet users are not conscious of race in terms of
the kinds of physical characteristics that are apparent to people when they interact in
geographical space. On the other hand, the Internet can and has been used as a tool to promote
and spread racist speech. European nations, especially France and Germany, have been more
interested in censoring race-related hate speech (such as neo-Nazi propaganda) and have been
less concerned with censoring pornography. The US, on the other hand, has been less
concerned about censoring speech involving hate and racial prejudice than with controlling
pornography as a form of speech.
3. Within the US, there is some debate over whether universal service for cybertechnology is
a necessary condition for receiving a public education. In Chapter 10, we saw that in the US,
access to free public education from grades 1 through 12 is considered a “positive right.”
Hence, that the US government is legally obligated to provide access to public education for
all school-age children. And some argue that if having access to cybertechnology in homes is
a necessary condition for one’s acquiring that education, the US government must ensure that
all school-age children attending public schools have such access in their homes.
4. With respect to the goal of providing cybertechnology to the disabled, we saw that the
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) established the Web Accessibility Initiative (WAI).
This initiative has mandated that accessibility features for disabled persons be built into the
design of all Web interfaces for computer systems.
We also saw that some have argued that improving access for the disabled is good, because all
people (disabled and non-disabled as well) will benefit. There may indeed be some truth to
this argument. However, the danger in proceeding with that kind of utilitarian-based argument
is that it assumes that greater benefits for the majority of users will continue to be realized.
What if it turned out that, at some future date, non-disabled persons would not necessarily
benefit from improvements made to access for the disabled? And further suppose that these
improvements were also very costly. In this case, it would seem that if we followed the
utilitarian analogy we would be justified in not continuing to improve technological access for
disabled persons. But would this be the right thing to do from a moral point of view? You can
probably see the danger of proceeding from a utilitarian perspective on this issue.
B. Strategies for Selected Essay Questions in Chapter 10
1. In trying to make sense of the question, “Who should be held responsible for the actions of
ES systems?” it would be helpful to return to our discussion of the problem of “many hands”
in Chapter 4. There we saw that in the case of the Therac-25 malfunctions, several parties
could be held accountability. For example, we saw that moral responsibility is not an
“exclusionary” concept. That is, because X is responsible for Z, it doesn’t follow that Y also
cannot be held responsible for Z. So it would seem that in the case of an ES involving an
“expert doctor,’ the following parties could each bear some level of moral responsibility: the
hospital that uses the system; the hospital employee who may have entered incorrect
information into the system; the manufacturer who sold the system to the hospital; and the
software and hardware engineers who built the system for the manufacturer.
XI: Strategies for selected Discussion Questions and Essay Questions in Chapter 11 (see
pages 357-358 in the textbook)
A. Strategies for Selected Discussion Questions in Chapter 11
1. We saw that Gordon Graham believes that online communities promote individual freedom
because members can more easily disregard personal attributes, such as gender and ethnicity,
which are more obvious in traditional communities. However, we also noted online
communities have also had some negative effects. In addition to threatening traditional
community life, they have: facilitated social polarization (because of the very narrow focus of
some groups); minimized the kind of face-to-face communications (that have defined
traditional friendships); and facilitated anonymity and deception (thereby enabling some
forms of socially and morally objectionable behavior that would not be tolerated in traditional
communities).
Mitch Parsell considers some aspects of online communities whose focus tends to be on
topics and issues that are divisive and narrow. He worries that “extremely narrowly focused”
online communities can be dangerous because they “can polarize attitudes and prejudices,”
which can lead to increased division and “social cleavage.” So, rather than reinforcing and
extending positive values of community life, Parsell suggests that some narrowly focused
online communities threaten social cohesiveness.
2. Many critics worry that political blogs are dangerous for democracy because they
disseminate information that typically has not been vetted by journalistic standards. So, there
are questions of accuracy and reliability with political blogs, and critics worry because it is
generally believed that truth is essential for a democracy to thrive. However, Alvin Goldman
is not as pessimistic about these factors as many critics are. For one thing, he notes that even
if some bogs are biased and inaccurate, it doesn’t follow that the entire blogosphere is biased
(appealing to kind of Fallacy of Composition critique. But we also saw that Goldman suggests
that the “zealous advocacy” of some political bloggers, as well as the “adversarial process”
facilitated by blogs in general, may even turn out to be a good thing? How can that be?
Goldman believes the system of checks and balances, which are “collectively stronger than
the kinds of filtering mechanisms used in the conventional media” may be a good mechanism
for “truth-determination.” In this sense, Goldman implies that the blogosphere may ultimately
contribute to the preservation of democracy and democratic ideals.
B. Strategies for Selected Essay Questions in Chapter 11
1. For one thing, Rheingold’s portrayal of virtual interaction in the future does not address the
kind of harm that could result from individuals engaging in “cybersex.” Because sexual
activity of this type is considered virtual, i.e., in the sense that it takes place in cyberspace or
virtual space, it does not follow that this activity is unreal (see the Virtuality Fallacy discussed
in Chapter 3). Marital infidelity that takes place in cyberspace can still cause harm to the
injured party. Brey has shown why we cannot simply dismiss the kinds of harm that can result
from behavior carried out in virtual environments as unreal harms.
2. Critics of VR technologies seem to be correct in that, all things being equal, VR
experiences are less fulfilling than (“real”) experiences in the physical world. In this sense,
then, we can agree with the critics of VR that virtual reality is an “impoverished reality.”
However, some people may be capable of experiencing something only through the use of VR
technology. For these people, including those with disabilities of a certain sort, the VR
experience of some activity would seem to be preferable to not being able to experience it at
all. An interesting question, however, is whether some individuals may eventually come to
prefer virtual interactions to the kinds of interactions that take place in the physical world. For
example, some may prefer to conduct all of their social activities in cyberspace. It is one
thing, if someone can interact only in a virtual forum because of geographic constraints or
because of a disability. However, if persons prefer virtual interactions because it can eliminate
the need of one’s ever having to interact at all in face-to-face social situations, then something
of what we have come to believe is a vital part of natural human discourse could be
threatened.
XII: Strategies for selected Discussion Questions and Essay Questions in Chapter 12 (see
p. 389-390 in the textbook)
A. Strategies for Selected Discussion Questions in Chapter 12
2. Would you want intelligent machines making all you house-hold decisions for you? On the
one hand, the thought might be appealing—after all, who wants to have to be bothered with
routine tasks that seem merely mundane? On the other hand, there are certain risks to consider
in delegating these tasks and chores solely to machines. Recall the scenario (in the textbook)
involving E. M. Forster’s description of what can happen to humans when they become too
dependent on a machine. Also consider what could happen to us if we delegate too many
“cognitive” tasks to machines.
3. As a research subject, you could ask for a guarantee that your genetic data would not be
used in subsequent processing without your explicit authorization. You could also insist that
your data not be sold to third parties. Perhaps you could also find out what would happen if
the organization to whom you volunteered you genetic data were to cease operations as that
organization—i.e., either declare bankruptcy or be taken over by another organization (in the
public or the private sector). You could also ask what role the government would take in your
behalf in protecting and safeguarding the personal genetic data about you that resides in the
organization’s computer database.
4. John Weckert offers an interesting discussion of the question of how we should proceed
with research and development in nanotechnology—i.e., that the “presumptive principle”
should be “in favor of” conducting this research. At present, there are no universally agreed
upon guidelines in place for conducting research at the nano-level. An ethical framework for
nanotechnology research that has been advanced by Ray Kurzweil is based on the ELSI
(ethical, legal, social implications) model, used in the Human Genome Project. The ELSI
model has been defended as a proactive, rather than a reactive, set of guidelines. But Moor
and Weckert reject the ELSI model for nanotechnology, which they describe as an “ethicsfirst” model. Moor and Weckert are also critical of the “ethics-last” model, as well, which
they note has been the standard in many fields of applied ethics. Because the future advances
in nanotechnology are difficult to predict, they argue that we can’t wait to get all of the facts
before conducting nanotechnology research. They correctly note that ethics is “dynamic” and
that the process has to be continually evaluated in terms of ethics and policies. In effect, the
(nanotechnology) genie is already out of the bottle! What we need now is a set of clear ethical
and policy guidelines to direct us in future research in this area.
B. Strategies for Selected Essay Questions in Chapter 12
2. One concern that could arise has to do with the converging aspects of computers and
humans into cyborgs. Will humans, as they acquire more and more computer parts (e.g.,
bionic chips and implants), become more computer-like? And will computers, as they acquire
emotional states and more intelligence, become more human-like? Will there come a time in
the near future when it will be difficult to distinguish some humans from some machines? It
would seem that the emergence of cyborgs illustrates one way in which the pace of
accelerated convergence of cyber and non-cybertechnologies can generate some additional
ethical and social concerns.