Michel Foucault and the sociology of structure and agency
Introduction
Since its beginnings as a discipline in the late 19th century sociology has been concerned with
the question if society determines the individual or vice versa. Theorists of the former position
often see society as a system which provides basic means for social interaction and follows
certain ends which determine the individual’s opportunities and set its goals or direct it by
hidden forces (for example see the works of Karl Marx, Max Weber and Talcott Parsons).
Theorists of the latter position argue that it is the individual, i.e. the subject that acts towards
certain ends and constructs meaning in process with other individuals and it is the sum of
these interactions which finally make up society (take the works of George Mead and Erving
Goffman for example).
Michel Foucault takes a different approach. He is interested in the question of how the human
sciences themselves invent the subject and construct the individual. For Foucault it is the very
discourse between the individual’s opportunities and the society’s constraints which shape the
subjects self-awareness and construct its will (Foucault, 1970). He is interested in the
configuration of the “epistème”, that modern condition of sciences that makes the emergence
of the human sciences possible. He looks onto how discourse about the subject informs
disciplinary institutions and how they construct the subject (Foucault, 1991) and finally asks
how power understood as “action upon action” (Foucault, 1982, p.791) renders or even
creates the individual body in a productive way.
In this essay the different aspects of Foucault’s work will be shown and in the conclusion
finally it’ll be asked how it applies to contemporary university.
The epistemological configuration
At the end of the 18th century two important phenomena emerged. On the one hand the
epistemological discourse began to shift away from classicism to modernity. On the other
hand industrialisation emerged, a process that changes almost everything, beginning from the
requirements on the human material over basic social norms and values and not ending at the
new sense of time.
Corresponding Foucault sees two versions of the emergence of the humanities. Firstly on a
discursive level as event in the order of knowledge and secondly on the non-discursive level
as a consequence of the development of the disciplinary society (Smart, 1982, p.124).
1
In the classical age ‘man’ as an object of knowledge of the human sciences did not exist as the
social sciences themselves did not exist. In the classical age, a period that Foucault ascribes to
the 17th and 18th century, subject and object were strictly divided. Complex phenomena like
language, nature and wealth were thought of as arrangements of their single representations.
Language was the sum of all words and their arrangement in the grammar. Natural history
was the sum of all living beings and their interplay in nature and wealth the sum of all needs
and their satisfaction via economic means. As a consequence of the subject-object division
man who recognises an object was never to be found as that object itself (Smart, 1982,
pp.125).
As the turn of the 19th century, that epistemological configuration began to shift. Foucault
spoke of the emergence of the modern episteme. Representations lost their explanatory power.
The key to language was no longer to be found in words. Instead it developed its own organic
existence. Words became the means, in which language established a relation with man. Man
became an object of knowledge himself. He is on the one hand the foundation of all
positivities, the one who knows, but on the other the entity of empirical analysis himself, the
one whom is known about. The whole field of knowledge exploded into various dimensions,
into formalization of thought and logic, philosophical reflection and social theory and finally
empiricist research and mathematical, statistical thought. Knowledge was no longer a unity
but fragmented. That does account for the various differences in the approaches in the human
sciences (Smart, 1982, p126).
With the construction of the subject in the human sciences accompanied the ideology of
humanism. At its heart one found the subject. That is the subject of a hierarchical political
order (the sovereign in a democracy), the subject to laws, ‘truth’, ‘nature’ and ‘god’. The
desire for power was eradicated from the subject in the name of ‘values’. Humanism told the
individuals that although they don’t have power they are still the rulers thus makes existent
power invisible and hides it behind morale (Pickett, 1996, p452).
The emergence of the disciplinary society
With the emergence of complex knowledge about men come various divisions. The mad was
distinguished from the sane, the healthy from the unhealthy body and the delinquent from the
righteous, upright person (Foucault, 1982, p.778). Human sciences constructed the ‘normal’
subject.
2
Disciplinary society made man the subject of disciplinary institutions like the hospital, the
school and the prison. A new, a ‘normalised’ subject was to be constructed in these
institutions, a subject useful for the needs of the emerging industrial system.
The rise of the industrial system can be seen as a consequence of the shift from the middle
ages to the new time. Foucault spoke of the shift of the overall social objective from salvation
of the next life to assuring it in this one by means of assuring health, wealth and security
(Foucault 1982, p.784). That required a giant rise in economic production, made possible by
the inventions and discoveries of the classical age.
The industrial society required a productive subject with minimal political resistive force
which was provided by the modern form of power as it organises the aimless flux of impulses,
sensations and desires in an individual into a skilled worker (Pickett, 1996, p.458)
The subject was put under a strict regiment of time. The timetable, a means developed in
monastic communities, spread over the whole of institutions of society. Its three great
methods –established rhythms, imposed occupations, regulated cycles of repetitions – were
soon to be found in all disciplinary institutions (Foucault, 1991, pp149).
In schools there were exact times of the lessons, of their start and their end and the rituals and
occupations in them. Delinquents in prison were put under a strict regiment of labour, meals
and prayers. The visits by the doctors, medical treatment and a plan for the normalisation to a
healthy subject in the hospital were organized through an exact timetable.
The most important mean to impose a strict regime became surveillance. All subjects were
watched closely, buildings were built in a way to impose perfect supervision over the
subjected individuals. In a system of files knowledge about the individual subject was
constituted. Marks in schools, which measure the learning process of the students, was
captured in school certificates, a hospital file for every patient, in which all means of
medication and a precise record of the process of his disease, were laid down, finally a
criminal record for delinquents, in which the knowledge of his criminal career and his
behaviour in the justice system were recorded – they all constituted a system of indicators
which made up large numbers of individual properties.
The data was collected by hierarchical surveillance, by teachers in the schools, doctors in
hospitals and guards in prisons. It was the awareness of the importance of small things to
control people that gave rise to a set of techniques of control (Smart, 1982, p.129).
The final step in the construction of the subject was implementing the surveillance into the
subject itself. In the panopticon that was tried to be achieved by means of a building. The
panopticon is a prison that is built in a ring shape. Placed on the periphery are the cells of the
3
delinquents. Each cell has two windows, one to the inside where there is a central tower and
one to the outside which allows the light to pass through the cell into the inside of the
building. The central tower has a window to each of the cells and is the place where the
guards watch the delinquents. The backlighting has the effect of making the interior of each
cell perfectly visible to the central tower. The guards themselves can hide from the gaze of the
delinquents by constructing the windows of the central tower in a way that the guards can
watch the latter but not vice versa. The delinquents now never know when they are watched
which principally means, that they are possibly under constant supervision (Foucault, 1991,
pp200). The pure knowledge of the delinquent that he could be watched becomes the perfect
means to discipline him with the imagined gaze by others (one could call that imposed self
reflection).
Power and technologies of the self
One does not understand Foucault if one does not understand his concept of power. Power by
Foucault is not something that somebody has. It is not the society and its institutions that have
power over the individual and thus can make it a subject of that power. Power is something
that somebody does.
It is useful to draw upon Foucault’s distinction between capacity, power and relations of
communication (Foucault, 1982, pp786). Capacity enables us to modify, use, consume or
destroy objects whereas power brings into play a relationship between persons. Relations of
communication are defined by an exchange of information. The three concepts do not
contradict each other; they can overlap or even support each other and are exercised together
in the disciplines. The exercise of power is an action to modify another action.
Power has certain concrete points (Foucault, 1982, p. 792). Every power relationship is based
on certain differences which can be of economical, political, social nature or in terms of
gender differences. It has types of objectives (privileges, profits, authority) and means which
bring it into being (threat of arms, effect of words, economical disparities). Often it is
institutionalized (formal as well as informal institutions, i.e. the legal structure but also
customs or fashions or complex systems with multiple apparatuses like the state) and it is
measurable in a degree of rationalization (how it is configured and adjusted to the situation).
At the macro level, meaning the whole of society, Foucault speaks about techniques of
governmentality (Miller, 1987, pp206). Thereby he means techniques to watch and control the
whole of society. But power also exists on a micro level. In his history of sexuality Foucault
(1978) examines how the individual makes itself subject to sexuality. He rejects the thesis of
4
sexual repression in the centuries from 1700 onwards, assuming that the various morals and
discourses about sexuality are not superimposed by an overall structure but technologies of
the self whereby individuals control and modify their own bodies and behaviours to maximise
pleasure. Power renders the body active and productive and discourse makes the body an
object of knowledge which makes its transformation possible. Sexuality can be understood
through the pleasures, knowledge and power which is produced and disciplined in language
and society (Martin, 1982, p9).
Miller (1987, pp207) explains that both levels are interdependent. The state supervises society
thereby using various techniques of surveillance which reach a deep level down to the
individual. The individual supervises itself, turning itself into a subject of whom the truth is
knowable thus building the basis of modern power. The state thereby is not the source of all
power despite power itself has increasingly governmentalized.
Power is not a contradiction to freedom. Instead Foucault (1982, p789) explains that power is
not a relationship of physical constraint. Power maintains ‘the other’ to the end as a person
who acts on his own thus power is depend on the freedom of the subject.
Resistance and struggle
As already explained power presupposes freedom. Foucault says a power relationship is
limited by the possibility of resistance. In fact he is analysing the whole concept of power
from the possibility of resistance (Foucault, 1982, p780). A strategy of confrontation can lead
into open struggle. It reaches its stable point when one of the opponents succeeds and stable
mechanisms replace the confrontation, i.e. when a new relation of power is established.
Limits of morale can be transgressed. Transgression is the affirmation of negation of limits; it
seeks to undermine or weaken given sets of limits and thus making them less violent (Pickett,
1996, p451).
The individual can desubjectify itself. It should not struggle against power to achieve justice
but to struggle for power and overthrow limiting hierarchies and morale norms. Power can be
made visible thus provoking resistance against it.
But Foucault is deliberately diffuse in his concept of resistance. He does not explain where it
comes from, only explains that it is possible. That is due of the role of discourse in power
relations. Making resistance explicit would make power able to suppress it. According to
Foucault suppressed groups or individuals have to struggle on their own site and for their own
goals. A unifying ideology or vision of a future society would only be an extension of the
existing ideology of humanism therefore struggle would be in danger to end in participation in
5
the existing system. He suggests that we do not think any longer of who we are but start to
refuse what we are and how we have been made like that (Foucault, 1982, p.785).
Conclusion: The subject of a study program
Michel Foucault informs the reader about the condition of the modern subject, of the ways in
which it is produced, of the discourses that inform that production and of the knowledge that
constitutes the technologies of the self. The subject is a subject to various power relations that
inscribe themselves direct onto the body and are internalised by the subject.
Economic competition is a famous means of power relations nowadays. It is of decisive
importance when it comes to talk about the university. Students are subjects to the production
of skilled labourers. Through scientific discourse the university tries to anticipate what
abilities the labour market wants to have from an educated student and through scientific
discourse it tries to find out, how students want to be educated. The production of knowledge
and knowing subjects becomes ‘slippery like an eel’ minimising possible complaints und thus
resistance. Power renders the bodies productive; economic competition on the labour market
renders students competitive for the best strategy of economic self empowerment thus
establishing these power relations in a slightly softer form already between students.
Students work on their body (for example in the sports village) and subject their selves to
sexual identities to maximise pleasure (in the nightlife) and exercise power over each other
(‘mirror mirror on the wall, who is the best looking girl, the most successful guy of them
all?’).
We could resist if we struggle against the diverse surveillance methods at university (whether
cctv in the library or examinations covering our ability to internalise knowledge required for
certain degrees) take over the lessons and learn what and how we want it. We just need to
exercise solidarity with each other, making existing power relations and hierarchies visible.
We need to refuse what we are and stop informing discourses about our needs and producing
truth about our identities. We need to refuse taking on submissive gender roles and should
deliberate from a start about pleasures and the production of power.
That sounds impossible at the moment? The power mechanisms (tuition fees, economic
pressures, perfect offers, identities which are conceived as natural) are working too perfectly?
Most of the 12 thousand students have never heard of Michel Foucault or the deconstruction
of the self.
6
Maybe the amplifying of the humanist discourses through a multi media power has increased
the level of power exercised over contemporary students. But this power too could be
revealed some day, igniting resistance against it one day.
However as a first step, the author of this essay won’t fill in any survey forms anymore. ;)
Bibliography
Foucault, Michel (1970): The Order of Things, New York: Routledge
Foucault, Michel (1991): Discipline and Punish, London: Penguin Books
Foucault, Michel (1978): The History of Sexuality, New York: Random House
Foucault, Michel (1982): The Subject and Power, In: Critical theory, Vol.8 (4), pp.777-795
Martin, Biddy (1982): Feminism, Criticism and Foucault, In: New German Critique, No.27,
pp.3-30
Miller, Peter (1987): Domination and Power, London: Routledge, Chapter 7: From
disciplinary power to governmentality, pp.194-213
Pignatelli, Frank (1993): What can Id do? Foucault on Freedom and the question of Teacher
Agency, In: Educational theory, Vol. 43(4), pp.411-432
Pickett, Brent L. (1995): Foucault and the Politics of Resistnce, In: Polity, Vol. 28(4), pp.445466
Smart, Barry (1982): Foucault, Sociology and the problem of human agency, in: Theory and
Society, Vol. 11(2), pp. 121-141
7